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U.S. CONGRESS. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
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September 28, 1972.
/o3 7
TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR
TEST BAN TREATY
JX . . . . .
) A^*,
.*.*. & Q- HEARING
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. Res. 230
TO ENCOURAGE A MORATORIUM ON UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR
WEAPONS TESTING AND TO PROMOTE NEGOTIATIONS FOR
A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY
AND
S. Res. 273
CALLING ON THE PRESIDENT TO PROPOSE AN EXTENSION OF
THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY TO INCLUDE UNDERGROUND
TESTING
MAY 15, 1972
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
- U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79–879 WASHINGTON : 1972
pepositep º' Wºmes
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
GALE W. MCGEE, Wyoming JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois
WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR., Virginia
CARL MARcy, Chief of Staff
ARTHUR M. KUHL, Chief Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine, Chairman
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois
MORELIA HANSEN, Staff ASSistant
GEORGE W. ASHWORTH, Staff Assistant
(II)
C O N T E N T S
Statements by: Page
Chayes, Prof. Abram, Harvard Law School----------------------- 56
Farley, Philip J., Acting Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency------------------------------------------------ 27
Fisher, Adrian S., dean, Georgetown University Law School_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 64
Hart, Hon. Philip A., U.S. Senator from Michigan____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 19
Kennedy, Hon. Edward M., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts_ _ _ _ _ _ 3
Mathias, Hon. Charles McC., U.S. Senator from Maryland_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 21
Pomerance, Mrs. Jo, cochairman, Task Force for a Nuclear Test Ban-- 78
Sykes, Prof. Lynn R., Lamont-Doherty Geological Observatory,
Palisades, N.Y---------------------------------------------- 53
York, Herbert F., dean, graduate studies, University of California
at San Diego------------------------------------------------ 51
Insertions for the record:
Text cf S. Res. 230, 92d Cong., second sess_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1.
Text of S. Res. 273, 92d Cong., second sess_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2
Letter to Senator Stuart Symington from Senator Philip A. Hart,
April 25, 1972----------------------------------------------- 15
Prepared statement of Senator Philip A. Hart--------------------- 19
Prepared statement of Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.----------- 22
Prepared statement of Philip J. Farley, Acting Director, U.S. Arms •
Control and Disarmament Agency----------------------------- 28
Coordinated executive branch comments on S. Res. 230-------- - - - - - 32
“U.S. and Soviet Low-Range Underground Nuclear Explosion,” sup-
plied by ACDA.--------------------------------------------- 41
“Total Test Ban,” article by James J. Wadsworth and Jo Pomerance,
the Washington Star, May 14, 1972---------------------------- 43
Comments on the Washington Star article, supplied by ACDA___ _ _ _ 44
Schedule of ratification of nonproliferation treaty, supplied by
ACDA----------------------------------------------------- 45
“Underground Testing Figure Below Which There Would Be No
Danger of Violation,” Supplied by ACDA.----------------------- 50
Table 1–Seismic Detection and Discrimination Thresholds__________ 54
Prepared statement of Prof. Abram Chayes, Harvard Law School--- 60
Prepared statement of Adrian S. Fisher, Dean, Georgetown Universit
Law School------------------------------------------------- 67
Scientists’ statements on the “Seismological Aspects of a Comprehen-
sive Test Ban,” dated May 12, 1972, and April 7, 1972_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 76
Prepared statement of Mrs. Jo Pomerance, cochairman, Task Force
for a Nuclear Test Ban--------------------------------------- 79.
Appendix: -
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Resolutions—Statement of Senator
Hubert H. Humphrey---------------------------------------- 3.
Statement of Senator George Mc Govern_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 84
“An Inquiry into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements,” article
lºan Chayes, Harvard Law Review, vol. 85, No. 5, March 7
1972------------------------------------------------------- 8
Coordinated executive branch comments on S. Res. 273_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ i 52
(III)
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TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN
TREATY
Monday, MAY 15, 1972
- UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION
oR THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
- Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room
4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator Edmund S. Muskie
(chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.
Present: Senators Muskie, Fulbright, Symington, and Cooper.
Senator MUSKIE. I would like, if I may, to read a brief opening
statement to set the setting for these hearings which resume today.
OPENING STATEMENT
We are resuming hearings which were originally held in July of
last year on prospects for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.
We will hear testimony today on two resolutions recently introduced
in the Senate, one by Senator Kennedy calling for a moratorium on
all tests while urgent negotiations on a treaty proceed, and the other
by Senators Hart and Mathias urging the President to make renewed
efforts in light of improved technology to extend the Limited Test
Ban Treaty of 1963 to include underground tests as well. Parallel
resolutions have been introduced in the House. These resolutions
provide an opportunity for Congress to express bipartisan support for
a comprehensive test ban.
(Texts of S. Res. 230 and S. Res. 273 follow:)
[S. Res. 230, 92d Cong., Second sess.]
RESOLUTION To encourage a moratorium on underground nuclear weapons testing and to
promote negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty -
Whereas the United States is committed in the Partial Test Ban Treaty and
the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty to negotiate a comprehensive
test ban treaty; -
Whereas the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty will reinforce the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, and will fulfill our pledge in the
Partial Test Ban Treaty; -
Whereas continued underground nuclear weapons testing means continued
threats to the environment;
Whereas continued testing may produce further developments in nuclear
weaponry that would threaten the security of all nations;
Whereas there has been much progress in the detection and identification of
underground nuclear tests by seismological and nonseismological means; and
Whereas the success of the Partial Test Ban Treaty negotiations followed the
announcement by the late President Kennedy that he would halt atmospheric
tests for so long as the Soviet Union did likewise: Now, therefore, be it
(1)
2
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President of the United
States (1) should open prompt negotiations between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics for a treaty to end all underground nuclear weapons tests, and (2)
should announce an immediate moratorium on all United States testing to remain
in effect so long as the Soviet Union also abstains from testing.
[S. Res. 273, 92d Cong., second sess.]
RESOLUTION Calling on the President to propose an extension of the nuclear test ban
treaty to include underground testing
Whereas prior to 1963 there were earnest efforts by the United States to achieve
a total nuclear test ban treaty in the hope of curtailing the burdensome and dan–
gerous arms race between our Nation and the Soviet Union; and
Whereas inability to achieve agreement on methods of verifying a ban on
underground tests frustrated hopes for a comprehensive treaty, and resulted in
acceptance in 1963 of a limited test ban; and
Whereas the massive underground testing which has since continued on both
sides has constantly fueled the burdensome nuclear arms race without promoting
national or international security; and r
Whereas steady and continuing scientific progress in seismology now makes it
possible, using national means alone, to monitor underground events down to
levels so small that any remaining undetected or unidentifiable events would have
no controlling military significance; and
Whereas the early achievement of total nuclear test cessation would have many
beneficial consequences: imposing finite limits on the nuclear arms race; releasing
resources for peaceful uses; protecting our environment from growing testing
dangers; creating a more favorable international arms control climate; helping to
win acceptance by more nations of the crucial nuclear non-proliferation treaty;
making more stable agreements it is hoped will result from the current SALT
negotiations: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That in the interest of promoting negotiations for general cessation of
the nuclear arms race and advancing international security, the Senate calls upon
the President to propose to the Soviet Union and the other nuclear powers an
extension of the limited test ban treaty to include testing underground and to strive
for its prompt acceptance.
- ABM BAN
Senator MUSKIE. We renew these hearings at an opportune moment.
President Nixon has expressed optimism in achieving an agreed limit
on ABMs (antiballistic missiles) when a first phase SALT agreement
is nailed down, hopefully in the very near future. A properly designed
ABM treaty would remove most of the military incentives for further
nuclear weapons testing. Tests related to strategic weapons have
comprised 89 percent of all those conducted during the past 8 years.
After an ABM ban, there will not only be no requirement for new
ABM warheads but also no need for more advanced offensive strategic
weapons to penetrate an ABM.
PRESSURE TO RUSH weAPONS PROGRAMs AFTER SALT I
For several years I have urged, and most of my Senate colleagues
have supported, restraint on any new strategic weapons programs
| Such as MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles).
Unfortunately, SALT I will probably not specifically ban MIRV
development and deployment or indeed any other qualitative improve-
ments in strategic weapons. If the experience of the Limited Test
Ban Treaty is any guide, after SALT I there will be strong pressures
to push all weapons programs which are not directly forbidden by
agreement. Initiative on the comprehensive test ban is needed now
to prevent SALT from becoming only another force to promote the
ai’IllS I’8, C6, 1][] Ilê VW 8.1°é à.S.
3
U.S. POLICY CONCERNING COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN
Despite some attempts at backsliding within the Pentagon and the
AEC (Atomic Energy Commission). It has been for many years and
still is the U.S. policy to favor a comprehensive test ban provided it
can be adequately verified. This position was reaffirmed by Ad-
ministration witnesses at our hearings last year and I hope it will be
reaffirmed again today.
In the subcommittee's hearings last year, scientific experts docu-
mented the progress made in recent years in the techniques of de-
tection and identification of underground nuclear tests. As a result of
the evidence gathered in those hearings. I urged the administration
to reexamine its position on the question of Onsite inspection and to
take new and bold initiatives to breathe life into its own stated com-
mitment to work for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.
WHAT COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN WOTLD DO
I hope that testimony today will underline the importance of this
issue. A comprehensive test ban would slow or even terminate the
arms race in the area of nuclear warhead development. It would
strengthen the Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 by imposing the same
testing constraints on the nuclear powers that are already imposed
on the nonnuclear powers by that treaty, and thus encourage ac-
ceptance of that treaty by several important potential nuclear powers.
A comprehensive test ban treaty would also avoid environmental
hazards, such as radioactive leakage and venting from underground
tests, and it would save us the millions of dollars that are now spent
annually on a nuclear testing program of questionable value to our
Nation’ security. For all these reasons, our Nation must not delay in
taking the necessary steps to move us toward this goal.
At this point I would like to express Senator Case's regrets that he
cannot be here this morning. He has asked me to convey his deep
regrets to those who will be testifying before this committee this
morning.
If I may ask my colleagues for any comments they would like to
make before we begin with the testimony, Senator Fulbright?
Senator FULBRIGHT. No, no. I am very pleased you have these
hearings, but I will wait until the witnesses have their say.
Senator MUSKIE. Senator Symington?
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no questions.
Senator MUSKIE. It is a pleasure, then, to welcome this morning the
author of one of the resolutions, the subject of this hearing, Senator
Kennedy from Massachusetts.
STATEMENT OF HON, EDWARD M. KENNEDY, U.S. SENATOR
FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify
before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and
Organization today on S. Res. 230, which I introduced on January 24.
This resolution calls for a moratorium on underground nuclear weapons
testing and prompt negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty–
CTB. I am pleased to be able to state that this resolution now has
some 15 cosponsors.
4
This hearing also will cover the resolution introduced by Senators
Hart and Mathias. On the House side similar resolutions have been
introduced. - ,”
These actions in recent months represent a growing recognition by
many of us that we must take steps now to make good our 9-year-old
commitment to negotiate an end to all nuclear weapons testing. In
this regard, let me commend you, Mr. Chairman, for providing re-
newed public attention on this matter last year with an excellent set
of hearings on this subject; and let me also commend the ranking
minority member, Senator Case, for his long and diligent work on the
subject of a CTB and the area of arms control generally.
NATION AT CRITICAL JUNCTURE IN ARMS RACE
Mr. Chairman, I believe that many of us feel that the Nation today
is at a critical juncture in the arms race.
In the past 9 years since the partial test ban treaty, we have spent
over $2.5 billion on nuclear weapons testing. In the past 3 years alone
we have spent over $25 billion on strategic weapons systems; and we
have watched, too, as the weapons of war take precedence over the
tools of peace in our national priorities.
If we are determined that technology improves the quality of our
lives, then we must turn our resources from the technology of war to
the technology of peace.
We remain today as the most powerful nation on the world, capable
of matching the biblical description of the wrath of the Lord, for we,
too, can “lay the land desolate.”
But if we have greater power than other nations, then we also must
show a greater sense of responsibility, a greater willingness to see that
our weapons are never used. For us, the balance must always fall on
the side of arms control rather than on the side of arms development.
But too often in the last decade other matters seemed more im-
portant. One of the Supreme tragedies of Vietnam is that it over-
shadowed the issue of arms control in the national attention.
So it was that the partial test ban treaty, the first major act toward
arms limitations, came and passed; and a decade later we find un-
paralled increases in the strategic stockpiles of the United States and
the U.S.S.R. -
We find the average number of nuclear tests actually has been
higher in the years since the test ban than during the previous 18 years.
We have conducted an estimated 240 undergrounds tests and the
Soviet Union has carried out an estimated 86.
We must not allow the same course of events to follow a limited
SALT agreement. That is why I would urge the President to act now
to pursue the next goal in the disarmament process, the goal of a
comprehensive test ban treaty. -
PERENNIAL PRECEPT OF NATION'S FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1963
Since 1963 when the partial test ban treaty was ratified, a perennial
precept of this Nation’s foreign policy has been to endeavor “to
achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons
for all times.”
5
That position was ratified again in the Nonproliferation Treaty in
1968 by a different President and a different Congress; and not once
but time after time national leaders have reaffirmed our treaty obli-
gations to negotiate an end to all tests.
But both Democratic and Republican administrations have failed
to pursue that goal vigorously. Despite the advances of technology
on every front, we have remained with the same negotiating position
that we held 9 years ago. As a result, the nations of the world have
been denied the benefits which are vital to the future of peace and
to the future of man.
ADDING BRARIE TO PURSUIT OF ADVANCED IN UCLEAR WEAPONS
First, a comprehensive test ban would add another brake to the
senseless pursuit after still more advanced nuclear weapons, a pursuit
undertaken in the illusory hope that new weapons will bring new
security.
If we consider the matter strictly in terms of the strategic balance of
power, I doubt whether any would claim that developments in nuclear
technology over the past decade have made us any more secure.
Despite ABM’s and MIRV's, I think one can argue that the strategic
balance was far more favorable to us in 1963 than it is today.
More testing can only undermine our nuclear deterrent, which even
the Defense Department acknowledges is totally adequate against
any threat. More testing can only uncover new nuclear developments
which might upset the basic parity between the superpowers, and it
surely makes little difference whether we or they discover the tech-
nological innovation first. Once known, inevitably the information
will spread to the other side. And so even our own success might well
threaten our security by offering the Soviet Union a new model to copy.
A test ban treaty would put an end to that possibility, for no nation
would set out to deploy a major strategic weapon system without the
confidence achieved through testing.
Thus, a comprehensive test ban treaty would place an additional
layer of restraint over the worldwide cache of nuclear weaponry.
STRENGTHENING NONPROLIFERATION TREATY
Second, a comprehensive test ban treaty would significantly
strengthen the Nonproliferation Treaty.
Since 1968, more nations have declined than have ratified the treaty,
and for many the refusal to ratify relates directly to the spectacle of
the superpowers demanding adherence while blissfully testing under-
ground at an unfettered pace. - -
It is not solely the smaller nations who are rankled by the pressure
from the U.S.S.R. and the United States for nuclear abstinence. For
France and China, the ease with which the major nuclear powers
pursue their military purposes through underground testing is an
additional reason to reject arms controls measures.
It is well to recall the words of President Kennedy: “I am haunted,”
he said in March 1963, “by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are
successful, there may be 10 nuclear powers instead of four; and by 1975,
15 or 20. I see the responsibility in the 1970's of the President of the
United States having to face a world in which 15 or 20 nations may
have these weapons. I regard that as the greatest possible danger.”
6
There are now five, not four, nuclear nations, but there are at least
half dozen more who could well have that capacity at any moment.
The specter that President Kennedy foresaw could well be realized if
we are unsuccessful in achieving a final halt to testing.
We have endured the anxieties of life in a nuclear world for 25
years, anxieties which are seemingly forgotten until weeks such as the
One we have just experienced bring them vividly to the center of our
attention. But there is the hope that the other nations of the nuclear
club will show restraint, even when we do not, so that the overriding
interests of all mankind take precedence.
But what if it were not a handful of nations? Instead, what if
Germany and Japan, Israel and Egypt, or India and Pakistan acquired
that capacity?
If we are to reinforce the nonproliferation treaty, then we must
demonstrate by our own actions that we, too, are ready to forgo
further nuclear weapons development.
ELIMINATING MENACE TO ENVIRONMENT
Third, an end to underground nuclear testing would eliminate a
continuing menace to the fragile environment of our planet. In the
comments from the State Department on Senate Resolution 230, the
statement is made that “The environmental issue . . . cannot by itself
be an overriding reason for our adopting a moratorium.”
Overriding—perhaps not—but a significant reason nevertheless. The
environmental risk from nuclear testing is real, and it will remain with
us So long as we test. -
Even ACDA Deputy Director Philip Farley, testifying last year,
ěš. environmental benefits one of our “important advantages” of a
For despite all of the precautions and all of the safeguards devised
by the Atomic Energy Commission, one of every four underground
tests has vented. A year ago, the worst venting occurred in the Project
Banberry test, with radioactive particles spreading over several States.
There are other environmental risks as well. Although the Cannikin
test did not produce the earthquake and tidal wave that some
prophesied, it should be of little comfort to underground testing
enthusiasts. A 1968 scientific panel concluded that the potential for
such occurrences exists as a result of underground testing. We were
fortunate that the potential was not realized following the Cannikin
blast. But do we want to blithely accept those risks in the future?
STOPPING COMPETITION FOR QUALITATIVE PROLIFERATION
Finally, and perhaps more important, the conclusion of a compre-
hensive test ban treaty would establish a new political climate
encouraging additional steps toward nuclear disarmament.
A CTB would signal to the world that the superpowers are serious
about halting the arms race, and it would be a natural corollary to an
agreement on strategic arms limitations. The most likely accord now
appears to be limits on the numbers of offensive and defense missiles,
without touching on the characteristics of the missiles themselves. So
it is that Swedish Minister of State, Mrs. Alva Myrdal, told the
Geneva Conference 8 weeks ago: -
7
Only a ban on further testing can stop the competition for qualitative prolifera-
tion; that is, the quest for product improvement which is the most dangerously
destabilizing element in the arms race.
I would add, Mr. Chairman, if we would look over the course of
history since the Partial Test Ban Treaty, I don’t think any of us could
have predicted the escalation and the rapid development of new
weapons systems through the explosion of the nuclear warheads under-
neath the ground. One of the very genuine concerns that I think all of
us must have, even if we are able to reach an agreement at SALT for
the limitation of offensive and defensive weapons, is that there may be
a strong push by the Pentagon to undertake costly and unnecessary
programs to refine the quality of those weapons. I think that is why it
is so completely appropriate that these hearings be held prior to the
time that the President travels. I know this will certainly be a theme
which is underscored in the course of these hearings, and I think history
bears out full well the importance of this concern.
Senator MUSKIE. As a matter of fact, there was some argument
made at the time of the Limited Test Ban Treaty that the treaty
would restrain us from testing what would serve our national Security
interests. In other words, it would be too inhibiting a force .
Senator KENNEDY. That’s right. -
Senator MUSKIE (continuing). As I recall that argument at the
time. It has just been the reverse since that time.
Senator KENNEDY. To the contrary, quite to the contrary. Under a
CTB, major improvements in Soviet nuclear warheads would be pre-
vented, thereby lessening the risk that they could add an accurate
MIRV. A CTB thus would complement any SALT accord by pro-
viding assurance that the current parity of the superpowers would not
be upset by new developments in warhead engineering.
These are the substantial and compelling reasons why we must en-
deavor to fulfill our treaty obligations and reject the call of those who
oppose a CTB.
DEBATE OVER DESIRABILITY OF CTB
Yet there are some within the administration who would deny the
value of these benefits. They argue, as did the Chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission, that: “The real question is * * * whether it is
desirable to cease nuclear testing.”
Perhaps the existence of the debate over the desirability of a CTB
explains why this administration has failed to announce a single new
initiative to achieve a treaty since it took office.
For over 3 years we have turned deaf ears to the pleas of other
nations at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at
Geneva. We have disregarded the resolution adopted at the United
Nations, and we have maintained the same negotiating position first
elaborated 9 years ago—a position made stagnant and unconvincing
by the passage of time.
The benefits of a comprehensive test ban treaty far outweigh any
Supposed advantage that continued testing might offer to the security
of this country; and today it is feasible to conclude such a treaty
without demanding the level of onsite inspections which has been our
bargaining position for the past 9 years. -
8
U.S. DEMAND FoR onsiTE INSPECTIONS IN 1968
In 1963 the United States demanded seven onsite inspections as a
final offer to the Soviet Union; in return, the U.S.S.R. offered three.
Yet our capability then for detecting and identifying nuclear ex-
plosions was minimal. So perhaps there was some justification for
fearing cheating. Too, we had little confidence in the Soviet Union's
willingness to abide by a treaty and so the opportunity for a com-
prehensive test ban treaty was lost.
FACTORS AT PLAY IN 1963 HAVE CHANGED
But the factors at play in 1963 have changed; the technology is
different and the stage for negotiation with the Soviet Union is
different.
Today, seismological experts have testified convincingly that present
methods of detection are adequate to locate and identify all but the
smallest underground events.
A report on hearings held last year before this subcommittee con-
cluded that: “Enormous advances have been made in seismology so
that it is now possible, through seismic means alone, to identify
underground explosions to a degree unknown 5 years ago and even
presently deployed systems are vastly superior to those deployed a
few years ago.”
And last October a study for the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute—SIPRI-concluded: “Taking into account tech-
nical realities, we can say that underground testing above 10 to 20
kilotons can be made extremely risky for the tester by the use of
seismic monitoring alone.”
The summary of the Woods Hole seminar of the Advanced Research
Project Agency of DOD reported a consensus that the correct state-
of-the-art included the ability to identify most underground explosions
down to the level of 2 kilotons in hard rock.
Dr. Franklin A. Long, former Assistant Director for Science and
Technology of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, described
the new seismological ability last year as being extremely close to the
Situation when we can distinguish between earthquake and nuclear
explosion whenever we can detect an underground disturbance.
In that situation, Onsite inspection becomes virtually meaningless
as a halt against cheating. If the disturbance is too small to detect,
then there would be no reason to ask for an inspection; and if we were
able to detect it then We also could identify it as a nuclear test without
Onsite inspection.
And our capacity for verifying adherence to the treaty has improved
in"other areas as well. During the past decade, the use of satellites for
intelligence gathering has become a fine art, providing constant closeup
portraits of the earth below.
Thus, last year the Defense Department announced its conclusions
concerning Soviet missile buildups because satellite photos had dis-
closed a change of a few feet in the diameter of Soviet missile silos.
Satellites, heat sensors, traditional means of intelligence gathering–
all of these factors are obviously additional aids in assuring that no
nation is cheating.
9
Once we understand that since 1963 our seismological capability to
detect underground nuclear explosions has improved tenfold, our
satellite photography has improved nearly as much, and the benefits
to be gained from cheating have become so questionable, then it is
inconceivable that our negotiating position remains the same today
as it was 9 years ago.
EXPERIENCE OF PAST DISCADE OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
Also, we have had the experience of the past decade of arms controls
agreements and the past evidence of the Soviet Union’s willingness
to respect those agreements; and in none of those treaties or conven-
tions, stretching from the partial test ban treaty to the Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty, the Sea Bed Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and the
Convention on Biological Weapons, in none of those treaties did we
require Onsite inspection of either of the superpowers.
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR BREAK WITH MILDEWED NEGOTIATING
POSITION
For all of these reasons, I believe sufficient evidence now is available
to warrant a bold break with a mildewed negotiating position which
is no longer justifiable, no longer reasonable, and no longer in our
national interest. We can think of the biological weaponry, Mr.
Chairman, lacking a complete kind of inspection on that. We don’t
really have very much idea of what’s being done by the Soviet Union
or any of the other nations that have that capacity to do it; yet we are
willing to accept that; and what a difference there is on our attitude
On something which, I think, in terms of technology, advanced tech-
nology for detection, has increased so dramatically.
OPENING NEGOTIATIONS FOR, CTB AND ANNOUNCING MORATORIUM
URGED
Therefore, the resolution I have introduced establishes it to be the
sense of the Senate that the President of the United States (1) should
Open prompt negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty and
(2) should announce an immediate moratorium on all U.S. testing
to remain in effect so long as the Soviet Union also abstains from.
testing on a comprehensive test ban treaty. -
Let the President achieve a second Moscow treaty that will extend
the partial test ban treaty into a comprehensive test ban treaty, and
let him demonstrate to the Soviet Union our willingness to accomplish
that goal by announcing a moratorium of testing so long as the
Soviet Union abstains.
I urge the President to use the opportunity of this summit conference
in Moscow not only to achieve a limited SALT agreement but also
to begin as well a new process leading to a comprehensive test ban
treaty. - . -
I might simply recall the historical precedent in which a similar
Senate moratorium resolution helped produce a test ban treaty.
It was 9 years ago this month when a group of 34 Senators intro-
. a resolution urging a moratorium on all testing in the atmos—
pnere.
10
Then, on June 10, President Kennedy spoke at American University,
announcing a moratorium on U.S. testing in the atmosphere so
long as the Soviet Union abstained and pledging prompt and im–
mediate negotiations to seek a treaty. Two months later, in August,
the formal signing of the treaty took place.
I would argue that the risks are slight for the President to an-
nounce a moratorium and to pursue immediate negotiations for a
CTB. The risks are slight, but the rewards are substantial and the
moratorium would lend an added urgency and an added determina-
tion to the negotiations. The favorable expectations as the negotiators
sat down at the table would themselves provide a positive climate at
the bargaining table session.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union must recognize the
deep and abiding mutual interest that links us, for we are both
privileged and condemned to seek our futures on this planet. It is
here that we will prosper or perish. It is here that our children will
grow. It is here that we will live out our short lives.
So we have far greater interest in achieving controls over the
weapons that could destroy us both than we do in pursuing an un-
predictable and illusory security based on more weapons and more
warheads. .
I believe that the resolution I have introduced turns us away from
that course of action and I believe it may well have the effect of
acting as a catalyst to bring this administration to move determinedly
toward a comprehensive test ban treaty. If it accomplishes that much
it will have served its purpose. -
Senator MUSKIE. Thank you, Senator Kennedy, for an excellent
statement.
UNDERSCORING PRESIDENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SovieT UNION BY
SU GGESTED INITIATIVE
I might suggest that the President went to some pains in connection
with his recent initiative in Vietnam to say that that initiative was not
aimed at the Soviet Union. Here might be a very specific way in which
he can underscore that point of view.
If you take the initiative suggested here this morning, then the
Soviet Union might really be persuaded he does not have a hostile
attitude with respect to them. -
I think the statement is especially valuable in illuminating the whole
case and the basic argument for the comprehensive test ban treaty
and for your own proposition which is a moratorium on U.S. testing
to remain in effect so long as the Soviet Union also refrains from
testing. - - - , ,
DEALING WITH QUESTION OF PEACEFUL ExPLOSIONS
How do you think we should deal with the question of peaceful
explosions, Senator? - -
Senator KENNEDY. They have to be covered now under any CTB.
I think they would probably have to be covered perhaps up to a
period of some 10 years and then the matter could be reevaluated in
light of changing events. I think there are serious concerns about how
Operation Plowshare has worked and how useful peaceful explosions
can ever be.
11
Recent studies have shown that you have to have over 250 explo-
sions in order to increase natural gas production by 5 percent. It has
been discounted as a possibility of being used for building a second
canal in Panama. -
Senator MUSKIE. I think there is less interest in peaceful explo-
sions now than there was 9 years ago, partly because of the environ-
mental hazards.
Senator KENNEDY. Only last week, as the Chairman of the National
Science Foundation, in listening to testimony with regard to pro-
grams that are being considered for meeting the energy crisis, I noted
that there was no mention of Plowshare as an effective tool to meet
the problem. Clearly, one of the reasons is its obvious impact on
environmental considerations.
ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS’ ARGUMENTS CONCERNING PRESENT
- UNDESIRABILITY OF TREATY
Senator MUSKIE. You touched upon the arguments that are being
advanced by some officials in the administration that the treaty is not
desirable at this time. Do you have any real feel for why they feel it is
not desirable?
Senator KENNEDY. Well, as you are very well aware, the three
arguments which they use are: first, their concern about the develop-
ment of the ABM by the Soviet Union and their desire for increasing
our own ABM system. But I think, in reviewing the evidence, we
have the capacity to overwhelm any ABM in the Soviet Union. We
have a superior ABM at the present time; so I think it makes very
little sense to use that argument to justify continued nuclear testing.
Second they argue that testing must go on to insure the development
of tactical weaponry. As I understand, we now have some 25 different
tactical nuclear weapons varying in size from 6 inches to 6 feet. I
don’t know how much is too much, but I think certainly we have
reached the kind of variety in this area which provides for our security
under all of the different types of warfare that one can possibly
imagine. I don’t think that is a convincing argument when weighed
against the benefits of ending all testing.
The third argument is testing must go on because of the danger of
the nuclear stockpile developing defects. I understand that of the
approximately 400 explosions only five had been used to test weapons
believed to have defects. And they found that the two or three that
had defects could have been detected without testing. Also, I think
the obvious corollary is if our weapons may deteriorate so may those
of the Soviet Union. At best they deteriorate together. Also, if the
Soviets have less faith in the reliability of the stockpile, then it is far
less likely that they ever would try a first strike. So I fail to find any
very convincing argument that has been put forward by the Defense
Department.
Also I think when we look over the record of the last 9 years, we
have been very unimaginative, uncreative, in responding to a variety
of different, thoughtful proposals made by different countries at
Geneva.
I think any fair evaluation would just say that we are caught,
stuck in the mud of our own indifference. .
Senator MUSKIE. Thank you very much, Senator, for what I regard
as important opening testimony in these hearings. -
12
Senator Fulbright? - -
Senator FULBRIGHT. I join the chairman. I think it is an excellent
statement. I can't see any reason why we shouldn't proceed to have a
comprehensive treaty.
COMPARATIVE TESTING SINCE PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY
I was quite struck by your comparison. You say we have had 240
tests and the U.S.S.R. only 86 in 3 years?
Senator KENNEDY, No, since we signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty.
U.S. SPENDING FOR STRATEGIC whAPONs systEMs
Senator FULBRIGHT. You say we spend $25 billion in 3 years?
Senator KENNEDY. That is the last 3 years for strategic weapons
systems; we have averaged $300 million a year for testing.
DEPLOYMENT OF ABM
Senator FULBRIGHT. One observation: You say that the comprehen-
sive test ban treaty would put an end to that possibility, for no nation
would set out to deploy a major strategic weapon system without the
confidence achieved through testing. -
It is my impression we did it through the ABM. I don’t think there
is much evidence in our hearings that we have had any adequate proof
that the ABM is effective and I haven’t seen any signs we have any
superior ABM. It is all very much up in the air as to whether it is any
good or not.
Senator KENNEDY. I don’t want to be making the case for the ABM.
As I understand, there hasn’t been a test of a complete unit. There has
been a test of the different parts, underground and overground, indivi-
dually but not together, and I found your arguments convincing as to
the questionable nature of the whole package. - -
Senator FULBRIGHT. I think the testimony this committee had about
the effectiveness of it from all competent scientists except those in the
employ of the Pentagon would indicate it was far from being per-
fected and yet we proceeded to deploy it.
Senator KENNEDY. I am convinced.
Senator FULBRIGHT. It is purely an observation.
Senator KENNEDY. Yes.
WHAT IF OTHER COUNTRIES ACQUIRED NUCLEAR CAPACITY”
Senator FULBRIGHT. I don’t know what to think about this. I don’t
question you about it when you say, “Instead, what if Germany and
Japan, Israel and Egypt or India and Pakistan acquired that capacity?”
I have often thought about these two big countries—well, there are five
you say—but the two that have the major stockpiles of nuclear weap-
ons seem to be so irresponsible in the way they approach the problem.
Isometimes thought maybe it might be of advantage for a great many
of them to have it and then they might develop some comprehensive
agreement through the United Nations, or otherwise. I don’t really
know what I think about this. What do you think? Are you sure that it
would be a bad thing for the others to have it?
13
Senator KENNEDY. Well, it is my conviction that it would be, Mr.
Chairman—Senator Fulbright. I can think back, for example to the
invasion by China along the borders of India several years ago, about
what the possible response would have been had India possessed
nuclear weapons. What might have happened if Pakistan had had
nuclear weapons this past summer at the time of the Bangladesh
incident? - - --- -
I certainly feel a good deal more comfortable without them having
it.
Senator FULBRIGHT. I, too, and I am not saying they should have
it. It is just a question relative to the way the big countries act. It
seems to me they are less inclined because they think they are power-
ful to enter into agreements than are the smaller nations. They think
they have security on their own. I don't agree that they do, but they
believe they do and they are so reluctant to make these agreements.
QUESTION OF CHEATING
This leads me to the last question, about this question of cheating,
which has been the obstacle in the past, this insistence upon on-site
inspection. It strikes me that there is something fundamentally wrong
about that. The incentive to cheat as between, say, the major countries
doesn’t seem to me to be a very strong one. Especially in view of the
great probability that it would be discovered, the risks of cheating so
outweigh the advantages that that really isn’t a serious consideration
anymore. ; -
I agree with you. You say on-site inspection is not needed now.
Part of this is the basic assumption of the purposes of the major
countries, what they really have in mind as to their overall policy,
which is a great mystery. In the case of our own country, I am not at
all sure what we have in mind in some of the things we are doing now.
I am unable to find any reasonable justification for it. But that has
to do with this proliferation.
AGREEMENT WITH WITNESS
I agree with your thesis entirely. I was trying to suggest some other
consideration or some other ways we could look at this matter which
would reinforce the basic thrust of your resolution, which is to proceed
to a comprehensive test ban treaty. I think all of this would go toward
that end. I can’t conceive of any rational reason or any reason why we
should not proceed to a comprehensive test ban treaty. t
I think you have made a very good case.
Senator MUSKIE. Senator Symington?
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
VOLUNTAIRY MORATORIUM CONCEPT COMMENDED
Senator KENNEDY. You have made a good case. What I like about
your resolution as against Senate Resolution 273 is the voluntary
moratorium concept, which, in effect, does more than just express
the position of the Senate. -
79–879—72—2
14
NECESSITY OF GETTING FACTS Oly"T
I say that because this matter cannot pass in the Senate unless we
get the facts out. -
I was one of the Seven members of the Preparedness Subcommittee
who considered the limited test ban treaty some 10 years ago. We
lost in committee 4 to 3, but because, we developed a lot of thinking
in the committee that could be presented to the Senate later on, we
won a decisive victory on the floor. It was the same type and character
of problem we have today, especially because of the relative lack of
information on the subject. -
I have some correspondence here I will put in the record. Some of
the people here in the audience, people like Dean Fisher, knows at
least as much about this problem as anybody. They will be prepared
to testify against these points. -
JAEC’s LETTER CONCERNING S. 273
I am a member of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee and am
impressed with the difficulty of changing anything in this field under
present conditions. When this resolution of Senator Hart and Senator
Mathias came up, I wrote to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee,
I received back this letter from them which I read into the record.
This is in response to your letter to me on April 7, 1972, asking about the
Joint Committee's position on S. Res. 273 which proposes a ban on underground
nuclear tests. The Joint Committee has not taken a position on this resolution or
on the matter of supporting or opposing a comprehensive test ban treaty.
As you may recall, on October 27 and 28, 1971, Mr. Price's Subcommittee on
Research, Development, and Radiation held hearings on the status of our current
technology to identify seismic events as natural or man made. An analysis on
the hearing entitled “Status of Current Technology to Identify Seismic Events as
Natural or Man-Made” was prepared by the Committee staff. The hearings
entitled “Status of Current Techology to Identify Seismic Events” have also
been published. There were several conclusions arrived at as a result of these
hearings.
It was acknowledged that the VELA program conducted by the Advanced
Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense has made significant
advances in underground test detection. The U.S. ability to locate the site or
epicenter of seismic events in areas of interest has also improved considerably.
Further improved capability of detection and site location would cost hundreds
of millions of dollars for a network of stations located primarily on foreign soil.
It should be understood that detection and site location provides, in most cases,
sufficient information to determine if the event was man made or natural.
The Department of Defense had built three large seismic arrays which are now
in operation. These are in Montana, Alaska, and Norway. Additionally, DOD is
sponsoring the operation of 11 “long-period experiment” stations at sites through-
out the world. It will take about three years to obtain and analyze sufficient data
from these two types of systems—long-period and large array. At that time our
national leaders could be told to what extent the United States, under a compre-
hensive test ban, could identify a “determined evader.” Until such time it is
apparent from testimony at the hearings that the Department of Defense considers
it important that on-site inspections remain a requirement for any comprehensive
test ban treaty. The Soviet Union has not, for many years, acquiesced to the
requirement for on-site inspections.
SENATOR HART's REPLY CONCERNING JAEC LETTER
I sent that letter to Senator Hart. He replied—i won’t read his
letter, a good letter, constructive—as of April 25. I would ask
unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, that this letter be placed in the
record at this point.
15
Senator MUSKIE. Without objection.
Senator SYMINGTON. It is dated April 25.
(The information referred to follows:)
UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D.C., April 25, 1972.
HON. STUART SYMINGTON,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
D EAR STU: Thank you for sharing with me Captain Bauser's comments on the
comprehensive nuclear test ban. - -
To begin with, I am reluctant to go along with Captain Bauser's statement that
it will take three years before “our national leaders”—including, presumably,
members of the Congress—could be told to what extent the United States, under a
comprehensive test ban, could identify a “determined evader.” Our national leaders
can and should be told today what would be the security risks and what would be
the gains from a complete ban. As I understand it, there will always be a yield
threshold below which some seismic events cannot be identified, and there will
always be scientific developments which will permit some lowering of this threshold.
National leaders can be informed today on the evasion risks based on best estimates
of the technology as of today and forecasts for the future. Three years from now,
these estimates may be lowered on the basis of technology and data available
then.
In the Joint Committee's October 27 and 28 hearings referred to by Captain
Bauser (p. 45, 46), Dr. Lukasik (Department of Defense) testified that we now
understand how to identify explosions by teleseismic techniques down to a magni-
tude mb 4.5 (7 to 14 KT in hard rock) and that in principle seismic discrimination
around mb 4.0 (1 to 2 KT) appears feasible. Non-government scientific experts
testified that discrimination down to mb 4.0 would be possible with high reliability
upon deployment of adequate numbers of available modern instruments (p. 134).
While the magnitude of seismic signals is reduced when we have explosions in some
materials, such as dry alluvium, these rarely if ever occur at sufficient depths to
avoid formation of an easily detectable collapse crater. Dr. Lukasik testified (p. 53
that in such media, the conservative yield limit to avoid seismic detection or iden-
tification was 1 to 2 KT. These and similar data give us a basis for an evaluation of
the security risks from Soviet cheating below the identification threshold.
The October testimony is also interesting on the subject of on-site inspections.
Under a treaty, on-site inspections would only be triggered by a seismic event
which had been detected but not identified. Thus, for a detection threshold of
mp 4.0 and an identification threshold of mb 4.5, on-site inspections would only
be useful for events between these magnitudes, i.e., yields between 1 to 2 KT and
7 to 14 KT. On-site inspection is not needed above 7 to 14 KT and not usable
below 1 to 2 KT. Furthermore, on-site inspections will be of no value in negating
the evasion techniques described by government witnesses in the hearings (p. 53),
i.e., decoupling, detonations after an earthquake or multiple shot simulation of an
earthquake, since if these are successful they will not produce a detectable but
unidentifiable seismic signal. Finally, Dr. Lukasik testified (p. 65) that only two
on-site inspection techniques, visual inspection and radiochemical analysis, are
useful and that sufficiently deep burial will preclude surface effects and seepage of
radioactive gas to the surface.
Thus, by Department of Defense testimony, on-site inspections are of only
doubtful value for a small range of low yield tests. No case has been made that
this marginal added verification capability should control our decision as to
whether a comprehensive test ban is or is not in our Security interest.
To all of this I would add that the ultimate decision here—as in the ABM
controversy—is more a political one than a technical One. The real questions are:
is a ban in our net national interest? Would it provide greater security than the
present situation, where nuclear testing by the two major powers is limited only
by their ability to contain the explosion? If we had a treaty, how would violations
so small that you couldn’t detect them affect the strategic balance?
These and other questions will be explored at the hearing on Comprehensive
Nuclear Test ban resolutions before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
May 15. You are way ahead of me in knowledge and understanding of all of this
business. I hope you can be there.
Sincerely,
- PHILIP A. HART.
16
JAEC COMMENTS ON SENATOR HART's LETTER
Senator SYMINGTON. On May 11 I received another letter, and
will read it because all witnesses should understand the nature of the
opposition we have in other committees and will have on the floor of
the Senate:
This is in response to your request of May 1, 1972, for comments on Senator
Hart's letter of April 25, 1972, to you. I would like to cover several salient points
in Senator Hart's letter.
Senator Hart quotes nongovernment scientific experts as testifying at the Joint
Committee's Seismic hearings on October 27 and 28, 1971 (“Status of Current
Technology to Identify Seismic Events as Natural or Man made”) that the
discrimination of seismic events, with body wave magnitudes of 4.0 or greater,
would be possible with high reliability upon the deployment of adequate numbers
of available modern instruments. This statement was made by Dr. Brune who
estimated that the deployment of this system of modern instruments would take
approximately three to five years and cost over $130 million, would be primarily
on non-U.S. soil, and would cost $20 million annually to operate.
As mentioned in my letter of April 14, 1972, the Department of Defense has
established 11 long-period experiment stations throughout the world, using the
instruments to which Dr. Brune referred in his testimony. The reliability and
threshold limitations of these instruments have not yet been proved out by
actual field trials and data recording. It is for this reason that I stated, based on
testimony at our Seismic hearings, that it would take about three years to accum-
ulate enough data to know exactly what the U.S. could do in terms of seismic-
only discrimination between natural and man-made events.
Dr. Brune, in his statement before the Joint Committee, said that several
factors made it unnecessary to wait for deployment of an upgraded monitoring
system before beginning negotiations on a test ban.
Senator Pastore questioned this judgment. The colloquy follows (page 134):
“Senator PASTORE. You say several factors make it unnecessary to wait for
deployment of an upgraded monitoring system before beginning negotiations on
a test ban treaty.
“Now, that is not a scientific conclusion. That is a political conclusion, isn’t it?
“Dr. BRUNE. Well, the sense of using negotiations here is throughout this
Statement I have not made a complete distinction whether it is going to be an
international or purely national system. In fact, this statement implies an inter-
national deployment of instruments and in such an international deployment the
idea is that some negotiations on what countries would be involved in deploying
these instruments could be made ahead of time. -
“Senator PASTORE. I am glad to have your explanation. The way I read it, the
implication of your statement is the fact that we have so advanced that it is
not necessary to wait any longer, just get on with the negotiations.
“You don’t mean that, do you, or do you? If you mean that, I am afraid you
are getting into a political question.” - -
The reply Senator Pastore elicited from Dr. Brune was, and remains, the under-
standing of the Joint Committee staff that no system has yet been proved out
which, by seismic means alone, could be used to verify a comprehensive test ban.
Dr. Brune’s use of the word “negotiations” refers to obtaining an agreement to
install seismometers. -
The recording of data from the new Alaskan seismic array and from the Nor-
wegian array is just starting. New methods of transmitting these data and data.
from the large array in Montana are undergoing study, with some indication that
satellites might be used for real time reporting. Here again, it will be almost
three years before sufficient data are available to permit the correlation of events
at the three sites from seismic signals generated by events in the range of body
magnitude 4.0.
Senator Hart stated that the hearings brought out that a conservative estimate
would limit test yields to 1 or 2 kilotons in dry alluvium to avoid seismic detec-
tion or identification. This is correct concerning detection. However, for the tester
who is not concerned with detection but is concerned with identification, this yield
number could be much closer to 10-kiloton tests in alluvium without having “an
easily detectable collapse crater.” It should be noted that the development of
warheads can be accomplished with tests under 10 kilotons.
Senator Hart states that on-site inspections are useless for tests below 1 to 2
kilotons and unnecessary for tests over 7 to 14 kilotons. What Senator Hart did
17
not address was the false alarm problem, wherein some seismic events up to mag-º.
nitude 5.0 (50 to 100 kilotons in alluvium) cannot today be identified by any
known seismic analytical methods. Seismic experts state that at least several
events, which can be classified as false alarms, originate in the Eurasian land mass
annually. Without the right of on-site inspection there could be no reasonable
way to attempt to resolve the question of the identity of the seismic event. For
this reason, until such time as seismic systems are essentially spoof- and fool-
proof and can provide the means necessary for identification of all detectable
seismic events, there will remain a need for the right to conduct on-site inspection,
whether or not an inspection is ever made.
PREPAIRATION FOR FLOOR DISCUSSION
Senator SYMINGTON. There is no secret about the importance of the
position of the Joint Atomic Committee. There is no secret about
how the staff feels. This matter will come to the floor and will be
discussed in detail. I would hope everyone will be ready to answer
the points brought up in this letter. Because of the tremendous
amount of money we put into the universities, many of these pro-
tagonists for weapon systems you clearly brought out have later
proved useless although very expensive, in effect the proponents say
to the people who receive these gigantic grants, through the Defense
Department, “Come and protect your meal ticket.” They come and
get into a lot of technical talk. Some are to some extent chloroformed
by all the presented technical data. . . .
I would hope, when we reach discussion of this matter, that the
facts presented by Senator Hart in his letter, and the facts of opposi-
tion which are presented in good faith, by the head of the staff of the
joint committee, will be discussed in these hearings, Mr. Chairman,
so that when we go to the floor we know the facts.
The most prominent scientist opponent of the limited test ban
treaty 10 years ago volunteered later the fact that in underground
testing a great deal more could be ascertained about nuclear explo-
sions than he had felt could be.
My feeling was he was trying to say, if he had known as much as
he does when it came up he would not have opposed it. The question
of Onsite inspection may run through the same cycle.
Would you comment?
Senator KENNEDY. You are going to hear experts who have spent
a lifetime on this particular subject and could provide the material
which is essential for us to have on the floor.
PROGRESS IN SEISMOLOGY AND SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHY FIELDS
I would just say this, though, Senator Symington; there has been
enormous progress in the whole field of seismology. Dr. Brune has
testified before this committee, as well as the Atomic Energy Com-
mittee, that you can identify explosions down to 10 kilotons in hard
rock now.
He and the summaries of DOD research indicates that the potential
exists to identify tests down to 2 kilotons in hard rock and to between
12 and 20 kilotons in alluvium. But it cannot be questioned that we
have seen tremendous progress in this field as well as in the field of
satellite photography for detection.
So there has been tremendous progress in both of those areas. Yet,
there has been absolutely no recognition of that progress in our nego-
18
tiating stance. I believe the moratorium on underground testing that
I have proposed can be undertaken with the assurance of complete
security for this Nation; and I think we ought to be about it.
SEEKING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO ESTABLISH worldwide
4. NERVE SENSOR SYSTEM
I would say, finally, that we should begin to seek international coop-
eration to establish a worldwide system of nerve sensors for the detec-
tion of explosions underground. As I understand the experts, it costs
approximately $90 to $100 million to establish and about $15 million
a year to maintain and it can be done really quite easily.
SECURITY NOT THREATENED BY CONSIDERING RESOLUTIONS POSTIVELY
It is not a great technical problem as was suggested in the first letter
that you read. But I think you ought to hear from them.
I think the overwhelming evidence by science and any fairminded
reading of the evidence would conclude that our security would not be
threatened and, as a matter of fact, would be strengthened by con-
sidering these resolutions positively.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.
EMEPHASIS ON CONTROL OF MIRV
I have one more comment, Mr. Chairman, one that worries me,
the emphasis on control of MIRV.
I would like to see it more clearly. To me, from the beginning, ABM
was wrong. Inasmuch as the SS-9 was really nothing more than a
modern, improved Titan, it seems to me they have been stretching
things too far. It has been proved out now that they were.
In Foreign Affairs Quarterly, the last issue, Dr. Scoville, a true ex-
pert in this field, emphasized
Senator KENNEDY. He is here; he is going to be here, I think.
Senator SYMINGTON. I hope he is. He emphasized that MIRV was a
second strike concept and it would be difficult to consider it a first-
strike concept. Therefore, I hope we don’t try to get everything. If
we had adopted that policy, concentrating on everything, we would
not have the Limited Test Ban Treaty.
I am very much impressed with your statement, especially with the
fact you are going beyond the normal characteristics of a resolution,
in that you are requesting a voluntary moratorium. I do thank you
for your testimony.
Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. -
Senator MUSKIE. Thank you very much, Senator Kennedy and
Senator Symington, for what I think is a useful contribution to the
record at this point. - ‘.
The next witnesses are the authors of the other resolution. Senator
Hart and Senator Mathias, why don’t you both come forward. It
is a pleasure to welcome you both this early Monday morning.
19
STATEMENT OF HON, PHILIP A. HART, U.S. SENATOR
FROM MICHIGAN
Senator HART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee. Thanks for giving us this opportunity.
Lest the experts feel there will be very little remaining for them to
say on the technical questions after Senator Mathias and I finish, I just
want to reassure them. I think we ought to say we are just a couple of
politicians. I am a Greek and history man myself, but I think we can
raise what is equally relevant—the political judgment—recognizing
there are few certainties in life, even in predicting our own personal
conduct, much less national ambitions as they affect governments.
But, acknowledging the risks and the uncertainties which Senator
Symington and I hope will be, if not resolved, made as clear as can be
made, history tells us that unless you stop this business, disaster
periodically will occur. We are sure of that. -
We are not so sure about who can cheat whom for how long and
what hazards and adverse consequences will follow from the cheating,
but we do know that whether it is handguns in the bureau drawer,
multiplied by every family on the block, and target practice in the
backyard, or digging holes to test bombs by nations, that you increase
the threat to survival in the neighborhood and in the world by every
one of those tests; and it is in that sense, Mr. Chairman, that acknowl-
edging I am not an expert in the field, but a politician, that I make no
further apology. I think it is the political judgment that is just as
important here as the technical, and if you do not object I would
ask leave to have printed in the record the statement that I have
prepared. - w -
It omits to say that both Senator Mathias and I did talk to very
able representatives of the Department of Defense at Some length
before introducing this resolution, and to their great credit they, too,
were tentative. -
Senator MUSKIE. Senator Hart, thank you very much.
Your statement will be included in the record, and with all due
respect to your prepared statement, I would say that the oral state-
ment you have just made is perhaps as significant a contribution to
this testimony this morning as we could have. You have put the
question in its fundamental terms, I think, and I appreciate that.
(Prepared statement of Senator Hart follows:)
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR PHILIP A. HART
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: Let me begin by admitting
that I am not an expert on weapons technology or seismology. The technical
questions involved were explored last year by eminently qualified witnesses before
the subcommittee chaired by Senator Muskie and will be further illuminated in
these hearings. But I feel no embarrassment about my lack of technical expertness,
because the issue now before this committee is not basically a technical one.
The underlying and central issue presented is whether the bankrupting and
frightening arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States is in our
national interest; and, if not, whether it can be halted. There are those in the
Soviet Union and in our own country who appear to be reconciled to endless
weapons escalation; there are even those who welcome the elusive search for some
form of national nuclear “superiority.” I cannot share such views, nor can growing
numbers of our colleagues who have year after year felt compelled to pour down
the bottomless nuclear pit precious funds which could do so much for our tangible
human and national needs. It is to stop the bankrupting and futile nuclear race
that we urge favorable action on this issue, namely, the ending of nuclear testing.
20
Of course, we are aware of the hopes raised in recent months that by treaties
with the Soviets limiting further deployment of strategic weapons a large portion
of the nuclear arms race could be terminated. I share the hope that the SALT
negotiations will be complemented by an international agreement to put brakes
On the deployment of ever more costly and fantastic systems of nuclear terror;
namely, by agreeing with the Soviets to end all nuclear testing.
Such an agreement was frustrated in 1963 by the impasse over on-site inspection.
New capabilities in seismology now enable detection and identification beyond
national borders. In the light of these advances in technology, an end to the
underground nuclear testing which fuels the race should be sought with zeal and
without delay. -
Today we and the Soviets have achieved a firm nuclear deterrent against each
other. Each side has an assured nuclear devastation capacity which provides some
assurance against resort by the other to nuclear weapons. Without brakes on the
race, the future can bring only escalation to higher and higher levels of overkill
and nuclear refinement.
Recognizing these facts, all of us who see new hope for arms control are dis-
tressed and concerned over the events of this week.
If the mining of North Vietnamese harbors destroys our chances for early agree-
ment with the Russians on arms limitations, then we will have more reason than
ever to regret that decision for decades ahead.
Fifty years from now, Vietnam will be a footnote in history no matter what
happens there now. But the state of the arms race, I have no doubt, will continue
to be of desperate, overriding importance.
We will not be judged wise if history records that we sacrificed long term bene-
fits while Snatching at short term advantages of dubious merit.
This nation should concentrate on those items that we know will continue to
matter in the long sweep of history, carefully protecting them from damage from
momentary crises.
Certainly, the issue we discuss today holds that long term promise. By the
early conclusion of a comprehenisive test ban treaty, it is our hope that the
nuclear weapons bill we have had to pay in the last ten years will not have to be
paid again and again in a weapons race that stretches on indefinitely.
Senator Mathias and I introduced this resolution in March of this year, and we
were strongly motivated—at least until last Monday—by the conviction that this
would be the year when all the pieces would likely fall into place. Joining us in
CO-sponsoring the resolution are Senators Burdick, Church, Cranston, Fulbright,
Harris, Hatfield, Humphrey, Inouye, Javits, Magnuson, McGovern, Mondale,
Stevenson, and Tunney.
We believed this for three principal reasons.
First, recent seismological advances now make possible a comprehensive treaty
without the on-site inspection which formerly precluded Soviet acquiescence.
Second, we are on a brief plateau in the strategic weapons race, where there is
no immediate program of new development and deployment which would make
nuclear testing necessary on either side. Third, the nuclear non-proliferation
treaty is in trouble in key non-nuclear countries at least partly because of continued
Soviet and American nuclear testing and development. Let me touch briefly on
each of these three points. -
On the seismology issue, I have little to add to what the committee already
knows from the experts, except perhaps a political judgment on the relative
Consequences of two competing risks. On the one hand, if we go on without a test
ban or other major breakthrough we run the risk—if not the certainty—of a
continued nuclear weapons race. That means we can never have true nuclear
Security and must bear the relentless burdens of escalation to maintain parity.
On the other hand, there will always be some small risk of cheating under a
comprehensive ban. No matter what improvements are made in seismology, there
will always be some low yield threshold below which a test could escape detection
and where even on-site inspection is of no value. A minor risk will always exist
that the Soviets might be able to make modest nuclear experiments. But this
must be balanced against other risks. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the
risks of the unabated nuclear race are infinitely more serious than the uncertain-
ties surrounding Soviet mini-detonations of minor military significance.
On the second point, Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize the necessity for a
test ban promptly—now—because such treaty may become impossible to achieve
if we delay. Right now we are on a kind of temporary plateau, where both we and
the Soviets feel relatively secure about our nuclear deterrent. Neither nation, as
far as we can tell, is planning in the immediate future any major new strategic
weapons development or deployment which would require nuclear testing. That
21
makes this an ideal moment for achievement of a firm and final test ban treaty.
If the matter is put aside for another day, we may find that once more new
insecurities will develop which will compel new escalation fueled by the inevitable
underground experiments. Mr. Chairman, there are moments of potential progress
in history which if not seized are lost. The present relative stability in the nuclear
race is such a moment, and if not seized likely will be lost.
The third consideration which makes this the necessary and appropriate time
is the vital matter of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Our present dilemma
arises because some of the key non-nuclear nations we had hoped would become
signatories of the treaty have withheld their acquiescence. In those nations there
is vocal opposition by some to the renunciation of the nuclear path, and the
continued Soviet and American nuclear testing is used by these opponents to
great advantage. They allege that these nuclear powers pledged in the treaty to
end their own testing and arms escalation, but have not done so. Both the United
States and Russia would be dismayed if one of these nations should finally decide
to reject the treaty and commence nuclear arms development. While it will not
guarantee against further proliferation, early achievement of a comprehensive test
ban is a necessity if that calamity is to be prevented. -
Finally, a test ban would strongly complement strategic weapons limitations
measures we anticipate from the SALT talks and should not be postponed until
after those measures have been adopted. We learned to our regret in 1963, when
the atmospheric test ban was approved with understood ‘safeguards’ requiring
vigorous underground test programs, that if you push the arms race down only in
a particular area, it soon surfaces in another area and with equal momentum. That
is what will likely happen if we do not buttress a quantitative offensive weapons
agreement with a measure like the test ban, which would generally inhibit the
continuance of the qualitative arms race. Indeed, in the absence of a timely effort
in that direction, a SALT agreement intended to curb the arms race may be
approved only after understandings with domestic opponents which will permit
such continued advances in nuclear weapons that no real inhibition on the nuclear
race will result. Accordingly, we deem the comprehensive test ban strongly sup-
portive of the Administration’s SALT efforts.
Senate passage of this resolution, Mr. Chairman, would signal to the world that
the Senate continues to recognize sound arms control programs as issues of supreme
importance. .
If we do recognize arms control as a matter that will remain vital to our well-
being for decades into the future, then surely we have the responsibility to see that
this Opportunity is not lost because of momentary tensions.
The world will certainly think our priorities in serious disorder if we allow our
house to burn because we are busy repairing shattered windows. -
Senate Resolution 273 will establish our awareness of what is most important
for the long term. .
And because this committee has a well-deserved reputation for responding to
the needs of history as well as the pressures of the day, I am confident of your
decision.
Thank you.
Senator MUSKIE. Senator Mathias, would you like to make a
statement?
STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, J.R., U.S. SENATOR
FROM MARYLAND
Senator MATHIAs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to make
a similar request as that of Senator Hart, that my statement be
included in the record.
Senator MUSKIE. Without objection.
Senator MATHIAs. As an English major, I approach the subject
with even more diffidence than one who was a Greek and history
major, but I think that Senator Hart, in his customary eloquence, has
stated exactly the political question that the Congress must determine.
Senator Symington has pointed out the proposition we make to this
committee is a less extensive one than that which Senator Kennedy
has just explained. We feel that this is a practical approach at this
22
time. We think it is necessary because the security questions which
underlie this endless escalation in the arms race, as the Senate Armed
Services Committee, speaking through Senator Stennis, said so well
last year: This thing can go on and on and on until security itself
evaporates by the sheer exhaustion of the effort to be more secure.
Of course, it has been claimed that there will be some risk areas that
will not be covered with absolute certainty, certain small explosions
in sandy soils that can perhaps be detected but not identified—these .
are the things that Senator Symington suggests, and I heartily agree,
we should debate, we should expose, we should make our minds up
about and decide whether there are risks, and if there are, whether they
are acceptable risks. I think the committee is very much to be thanked
for making it possible to have this kind of a discussion, this kind of a
debate.
I think one of the dangers here that we have to contemplate is the
fact that continued testing might be ultimately successful to the point
that almost any small nation could find a cheap and easy way for
arriving at a nuclear armament of its own. I am reminded that we
have given up biological warfare as an instrument of national policy.
I am not unmindful of the fact that one of the reasons we did that
was because any nation which had the technological capacity to brew
beer could become a powerful nation in terms of biological weapons.
We could project the same kind of success into the nuclear field if we
go on long enough and if the scientific and technological community
is ultimately able to perfect its techniques.
It is the debate we need now; it is the debate which we think our
resolution will help to provide and for which we are very grateful to
this committee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
(Prepared statement of Senator Mathias follows:)
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHARLEs McC. MATHIAs, J.R.
Mr. Chairman, the members of this distinguished Committee are to be com-
mended for turning their attention this morning to a subject of vital national
concern—expanding the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 so that all nuclear
tests are forbidden. The Test Ban Treaty now prohibits all tests above ground.
Senator Hart and I, along with Senators Burdick, Church, Cranston, Tunney,
Fulbright, Harris, Hatfield, Humphrey, Inouye, Javits, Magnuson, Mc Govern,
Mondale, and Stevenson have sponsored the Resolution before you which calls
upon the President to propose an extension of this treaty so that it covers all
underground tests as well.
As we all know, we have traveled a long and treacherous road since the dawn
of the nuclear age. While we can now be certain that we can destroy civilization
within seconds, we can be much less certain whether we have developed the
ability to avoid such an unthinkable holocaust. One major step toward controlling
the nuclear destructive power in the world was taken in 1963 with the Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty, when the United States and Russia agreed to turn from the path
of unlimited development of nuclear weapons and take instead a path which
limited nuclear testing. Now we have reached another grave fork in the road,
and we must decide whether to continue to permit unlimited underground testing
or to seek in the near future an agreement with the Russians banning all such
tests. -
Traveling the first path could fuel the enormously expensive arms race and
encourage the proliferation of nuclear powers around the globe. Such a course
would not lead to greater security for our citizens. Travelling the second path—
involving a cessation of nuclear tests—would help limit the arms race and would
help make our civilization more secure.
Before I expand on my reasons for these conclusions, let me stress to this Commit-
tee that this country has been formally committed to seeking a complete nuclear
test ban for the past nine years. This commitment was made a part of the 1963
23
test ban treaty. It was reaffirmed on July 1, 1968, in the Nonproliferation Treaty.
It has been reaffirmed again in statements of this Administration. Yet despite
this formal commitment, we still have no treaty. Instead we have seen nine years
pass during which neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union has negotiated deter-
minedly to expand the 1963 Treaty. Indeed, the negotiating positions of the two
sides have remained essentially what they were in 1963 a gap between the Soviet's
offer of three onsite inspections and the United States' request for seven onsite
inspections deadlocked the talks. -
During the 9 years which have passed since that deadlock, there have been
ample technical reasons for the updating of our negotiating position. Seismological
capabilities have increased substantially. Underground testing above 10 or 20
kilotons can be made extremely risky for the tester by the use of seismic moni-
toring alone. Our reconnaissance capabilities have also improved enormously, thus
enabling us to identify otherwise suspicious events. Many experts believe that
these methods, together with other intelligence methods, can provide a firm basis
for the negotiation of a suitable treaty using national inspection alone. But, in
any case, no experts will deny that these technical advances deserve an updating of
our negotiation position. And, as noted, our treaty commitments demand such
revision. Passage of the resolution I have sponsored could provide the President
with the support he needs for a bold effort to reach a new agreement. -
The test ban treaty is not just unfinished business. It is an important part of
our national security requirements. Continuing along our present course may
indeed produce dramatic new improvements in nuclear technology. But such
improvements resulting from continued testing are likely to undermine our
security, as other nations learn of these discoveries. The possibility of a truly
cheap bomb is a most significant possibility of this kind. The richest nation in the
world—armed already with thousands of weapons—does not need it. But poorer.
countries, unable to invent such a weapon themselves, might well acquire the
know-how from us. -
In 1968 we concluded the Nonproliferation Treaty, which sought to discourage
non-nuclear nations from developing nuclear capabilities. The development of a
cheap nuclear bomb would seriously undermine that Treaty. We should not let
inaction in 1972 erode the historic progress we made in 1968.
A test ban will complement any SALT agreement. As is known, the SALT talks.
are concentrating on numerical limits—limits on numbers of launchers. Each side
is evidently going to be free to make “qualitative” improvements in each launcher.
But these improvements, including MIRVed warheads, can be of dramatic signifi-
cance. The total test ban would inhibit the development of ever small—and more
numerous—warheads by prohibiting tests of them. This is a concrete way in which
the test ban can slow the arms race and help close a loophole in anticipated SALT
agreements.
There are other compelling arguments. The test ban will encourage the effort
to prevent proliferation. It will prevent the expense and pollution associated with
underground nuclear tests. And it will serve as another step toward wider agree-
ments—just as did the partial test ban treaty.
If the executive branch reopens the question of the test ban, I believe that it
will conclude that the case for reaching comprehensive agreement is compelling.
I believe it will decide that on site inspection is of only marginal significance today
and that verfication has ceased to be the important obstacle to agreement. But our
resolution does not require that this latter conclusion be reached. We call only for
reopening the question. We emphasize today the commitments that exist—and
the technical background that has changed. These alone justify a new look, after
9 years, at this entire question. -
In summary, then, Mr. Chairman, the meaning of our proposal is this: The
administration and Congress have an obligation, after 9 years of unchanged
negotiating position, to reconsider the total test ban and make new proposals.
COMMENDATION OF WITNESSES
Senator MUSKIE. May I thank you both. May I add the comment
that the fact you have joined in cosponsorship adds a characteristic
to this debate which is very healthy. It gives it a bipartisan tone which
I think is essential in the objective examination of these questions.
And, may I say, finally, that you found a way in a very few moments
to pose the political question which confronts us and for that I am
grateful, too. - - *
24
Senator Fulbright? - w
Senator FULBRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate very much what they have said. May I clear up one
point?
WITNESSES’ VIEWS ON MORATORIUM
Do you object to a moratorium or do you believe that the mora-
torium would be an obstacle to achievement of any agreement?
Senator HART. We have not caucused on that, Mr. Chairman.
Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you object as an individual?
Senator HART. No, I would not. -
Senator FULBRIGHT. In other words, you have no objection but
think it might be an obstacle to getting anything done. Is that right?
Senator HART. A memorandum I have tells me it would be an
obstacle and yet it shouldn’t be an obstacle. Only one man is involved
in that decision.
Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes. I wanted the record to be clear, if I
understand the question.
Senator MATHIAs. May I volunteer I think it would probably be a
practical obstacle. -
Senator FULBRIGHT. I know, but you would not object if for any
reason it was acceptable? -
Senator MATHIAs. If it could be achieved, yes.
POLITICAL JUIDGMENT AND U.S. PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBE, EMI
Senator FULBRIGHT. I agree with you that the political judgment
really is the essence of the matter. I have often thought that having
been the only country that has actually used nuclear weapons to kill
tens of thousands of people, we are probably more unduly suspicious
of others. We are more conscious of what it will do than any other
country and that this has given us a psychological problem that no
other country has. Is that what you are trying to say, and that
politically you think that as a matter of judgment of the common-
sense of people that so long as they are at least halfway rational the
interests of their people are for the stopping, the cessation of this on-
going, spiraling arms race? Is this what you are saying?
Senator MATHIAs. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The risk of an unabated
nuclear race is infinitely more serious than somebody cheating.
Senator FULBRIGHT. That is a political judgment, and the dissad-
Vantages to cheating and the probability of being discovered would
be so great in the minds of everyone that no responsible country,
certainly, would undertake to cheat in a matter of this seriousness,
especially with the existence of such lethal weapons already in place.
If you want to call it political judgment, I think you are quite right.
That is what it comes down to. -
Do you believe that other countries are just waiting for the oppor-
tunity to drop a bomb? And this is what I meant: I think we are
unduly, unnecessarily sensitive to this simply because we are the only
Ones who have ever done it.
That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator MUSKIE. Senator Cooper? -
Senator CoopFR. Mr. Chairman, I was not able to be present to
hear Senator Kennedy, but I read his testimony.
25
COMMENDATION OF WITNESSES
I would say, first, I think it is a very fine and constructive effort by
Senator Mathias, Senator Hart and Senator Kennedy to come here to
speak of this issue, particularly at this time. I think it shows that we
can look forward with hope for continued efforts to restrict nuclear
Weapons.
WITNESS’ RESOLUTION
As I understand it, your resolution would simply call for negotia-
tions. I assume that whatever we did would depend upon whether the
Soviet Union entered into a treaty; is that correct?
Senator HART. That is correct.
Senator MATHIAs. That is correct.
SENATOR KENNEDY'S RESOLUTION
Senator CoopFR. Senator Kennedy's would call for a moratorium
while negotiations were being sought?
Senator MATHIAs. That is correct.
PAST AGREEMENT TO SUSPEND TESTING IN ATMOSPHERE
Senator CoopFR. As I recall, both the Soviet Union and the United
States before the Limited Test Ban Treaty entered into an agreement
to suspend testing in the atmosphere. The Soviet Union then began
testing, and there were efforts and arguments in this country to begin
to test again. As I recall, President Eisenhower did not agree and we
did not test in the atmosphere again.
POSSIBILITY OF VIOLATION IN EVENT AGREEMENT MADE
Do you think there is some deep irrational fear that even if we
entered into such a test ban agreement, that it might be breached
again?
*śator HART. Senator Cooper, is your question in the event a
agreement was made a party to it would violate it? -
Senator Coop ER. In the past a test ban was violated.
Senator HART. I think that was an agreement entered into in an
informal sense; am I not correct on that? I have no reason to claim
that an informal agreement would fail by reason of the breach by
either party. But the discussion that will be raised, I am sure, in
connection with either the proposal of Senator Kennedy or this
jointly bipartisan proposal will be: In the event there is a formal ratifi-
cation, if parties cheat, is it possible to insure that we will know
when they cheat? -
Senator Symington has, I think, perhaps before you came in
developed this argument. We need a record which will enable us to
make some judgment about that; and Senator Mathias and I have
suggested that we anticipate—I think we can say this—we anticipate
as a conclusion from even this solid a record the possibility that there
can be cheating, notwithstanding a formal treaty commitment. But
the advantage to the cheater is so minimal compared to the disadvan-
tage, both in world condemnation and the limited additional informa-
26
tion he gains with respect to the utilization of his nuclear capacity,
that it is a risk that we better can run than the constant acceleration
of a nuclear pursuit for the ultimate weapon. • -
Senator MUSKIE. If you refer to the earlier experience, Senator
Cooper, it was not an example of cheating. The Soviet Union simply
announced it was going to depart from the agreement. r
Senator Coop ER. That is correct. But, even so, it was somewhat of a
shock at the time.
Senator MUSKIE. Yes, it was.
POSSIBILITY OF AGREEMENT IF MOSCOW MEETING TAKES PLACE
Senator CoopFR. I would think these resolutions would have more
possibility of success if the Soviet Union and the United States could
actually meet and if the United States and the U.S.S.R. can agree upon
a limitation for ABM's and come to some agreement on offensive
weapons. I hope the meeting takes place in Moscow. It would be a
most hopeful thing. The SALT talks are far more important than
Vietnam for the future of the United States and the world. Some of my
colleagues on the committee don't agree, but I believe the United
States and the Soviet Union were ready to reach an agreement. I
think they were and are ready. If this meeting takes place in Moscow,
I believe an agreement will be reached.
Senator MATHIAs. I share the Senator's hope.
Senator FULBRIGHT. Everybody hopes it.
ºnto: CoopFR. I know that, but I just say I think it will take
place.
Senator MUSKIE. Senator Symington.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
COMMENDATION OF WITNESSES
First, Senator Hart and Senator Mathias, I would congratulate you
for pointing up this subject, the most important subject in the world
today. -
TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL AIR.G.U MENTS
Technical resistance to the Limited Test Ban Treaty turned out
to be incorrect resistance on the part of those scientists who opposed
the treaty at that time.
One of the great scientists in this field, Dr. York, is here. He had
the courage to rise above any influence in the university field to say
what he believed was right.
It is political, no question. Based on answers to the letter you wrote,
plus my talks with experts, I think that technically you can prove
this to be an advisable thing to do. That way we can make it a practical
decision.
It is like the ABM. Last year we spent hundreds of millions of
dollars because we were influenced by the so-called SALT bargaining
chip argument. That was a technical argument, but also political.
Now, it is generally agreed that argument was a fallacious argument.
I would hate to see us get into technical arguments that later turned
out to be wrong, especially if our basic purpose is to achieve some
legislation to stop this arms race. That is the thrust of my questions.
27
HAIND FING IN ONSIGNERS
If this is passed, what do we do about the nonsigners? Israel is one;
India another, the People's Republic of China. What is your thinking
about how all that can be handled even if we reach agreement with
the Soviet Union?
Senator HART. Mr. Chairman
Senator SYMINGTON. That is a combination political-technical
question. -
Senator HART. Well, it is my understanding from reading those
knowledgeable in the field, including your own committee, that in
the event we and the Soviets expand our prohibition to include all
testing that this will, as Senator Kennedy, I think, testified earlier,
encourage those nations with the probable capacity to go nuclear
themselves to sign the treaty which they have not yet been party to.
Senator SYMINGTON. It is a serious matter. We all have to think
about it. There was a time when Mr. Chruchill called it a balance
of terror; Dr. Oppenheimer said two scorpions in the bottle. There
will be more scorpions in the bottle. We should do something pretty
SOOſl.
Senator MATHIAs. This is what I said. This thing can proliferate
very quickly if there are some technological breakthroughs, but they
are likely to not go on the wagon if we are still testing and that is the
first step we have to take. -
Senator SYMINGTON. That is well put. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator MUSKIE. Thank you very much, Senators, for your testi-
IYD OIl V.
ð. next witness this morning is the Acting Director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Philip J. Farley. It is a
pleasure to welcome Mr. Farley again.
Mr. Farley, go right ahead with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF PHILIP J. FARLEY, ACTING DIRECTOR, U.S.
ARIWIS CONTROL AND DISARMAMIENT AGENCY
Mr. FARLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wish, first, to thank you for the invitation to appear before you
today to present current executive branch views on the subject of
Senate Resolution 230 and Senate Resolution 273, and, I might add,
on the question of further limitation of nuclear tests which underlies
those resolutions.
While I understand then that the immediate focus of the hearings
is on these proposed Senate resolutions, the underlying questions are
those on which I testified before this subcommittee last July. These
questions are: Does the United States want a comprehensive test ban
and what progress is being made toward achieving one?
ADMINISTRATION POSITION ON COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN
On the first question, I can reconfirm today that the administra-
tion’s position on this subject remains that stated by President Nixon
in his message to the Geneva Disarmament Conference on March 18,
1969, namely: “The United States supports the conclusion of a compre-
hensive test ban, adequately verified.”
28
In the hearings last July, I reviewed the potential advantages which
we have long recognized that a comprehensive test ban treaty could
have. It might be helpful, Mr. Chairman, to include the full text of
that earlier statement in the record of these hearings, since it outlines
more fully than I will try to do today, the relationship between the
objectives of the comprehensive test ban and the arrangements for
insuring effective verification. -
Senator MUSKIE. Without objection.
(The information referred to follows:)
PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHILIP J. FARLEY, ACTING DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS
CoNTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, JULY 22, 1971, BEFORE U.S. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Mr. Chairman, I would like first of all to express my satisfaction at your decision
to hold hearings on this important subject. When I appeared before this subcom-
mittee in April of this year, Senator Case expressed the hope that we were giving
serious study to the possibility of attaining a more comprehensive test ban treaty.
As I said then, we have been and are continually doing so. Let me try to give you
some idea of why, and of the issues we confront. .
An adequately verified comprehensive test ban treaty has been an objective
of the United States for a number of years. This objective was supported by each
of the three preceding administrations and reflected in the test of the limited test
ban treaty, which provided that it was “without prejudice to the conclusion of a
treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including
all such explosions under ground, the conclusion of which, as the parties have
stated in the preamble to this treaty, they seek to achieve.” The parties to the
limited test ban treaty now number over 100, including not only the United
States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, but virtually all the nonnuclear
weapon States.
In his initial message to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, on March 18,
1969, President Nixon reaffirmed this policy of the United States as follows:
“The United States supports the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban
adequately verified. In view of the fact that differences regarding verification
have not permitted achievement of this key arms control measure, efforts must
be made towards greater understanding of the verification issue.”
I would like to elaborate this morning both on the potential advantages which
we have long recognized that a comprehensive test ban treaty could have, and on
why those advantages depend upon its being adequately verified.
To the extent that such a treaty was an effective one, which in fact prevented
underground nuclear testing by others, it would have the following important
advantages. I think, Mr. Chairman, these agree very strikingly with the advantages
you cited at the outset but I would like to restate them. -
First, it would contribute to our efforts to apply the brakes to U.S.-Soviet
nuclear arms competition. It would do so by choking off further improvements
by either side of the nuclear components of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons,
since testing is important both in developing such improvements and in checking
on their effects.
Second, it would contribute to efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons
to additional countries. It would do so in two ways—by creating an even more
significant practical obstacle than the limited test ban treaty to the independent
development of nuclear weapons by parties which have not yet acquired them:
and by reinforcing the Nonproliferation Treaty.
It would accomplish the latter by lessening the strongly expressed sense of
disparity between the total abstinence that is being asked of nonnuclear-weapon
states and the freedom the nuclear-weapon states now have to continue their own
nuclear weapons programs with no restrictions other than those imposed by the
Limited Test Ban Treaty. In this connection, it is worth noting that the Non-
proliferation Treaty makes a preambular reference to the objective of a compre-
hensive test ban treaty and then requires the parties to pursue negotiations in
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at
an early date, and that treaty further provides for a conference in 1975 to review
the operation of the treaty with a view to assuring that its purposes and provisions
are being realized. Moreover, conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty
would help contribute to a decision by some states not yet parties to the NPT to
join it.
29
*~
Third, it would be responsive to a widespread desire in the world community,
and contribute to a favorable climate for further progress in arms control. One
illustration of this point is the resolution adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly last December, by a vote of 112 to 0, with only one abstention, request-
ing the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as a
matter of urgency, its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear
tests. -
Fourth, the comprehensive test ban would help allay concerns about possible
effects of underground nuclear tests on the environment.
But I would like to remind you that the potential advantages which I have just
cited would be realized only to the extent that the treaty was broadly acceptable
and effective in preventing nuclear testing by the parties. If it did not have this
effect, and other parties could conduct significant nuclear weapons testing without
its becoming known, one or more of the advantages cited above could be nullified,
and the treaty could become disadvantageous to the parties that continued to be
bound by it.
This is why our insistence on adequate verification—verification that would
enable us either to determine with confidence that other parties were living up
to their obligations, or, if they were not, to establish that they were violating
them—has always been an inseparable part of our policy of Supporting efforts
to achieve a comprehensive test ban treaty.
The United States has been making serious efforts to contribute to the solution
of the verification problem. In the past decade, we have spent some $274 million
on research and development with respect to the detection and identification of
underground nuclear tests. Most of this work has been in the field of seismology.
The basic problems have been to improve our capability to detect seismic signals
and to see if we could develop methods by which we could identify whether the
recorded signals came from an earthquake or an explosion. Both problems were
especially difficult at the lower magnitudes, where the number of earthquakes
recorded is high. -
Moreover, we needed an ability to accomplish this detection and identificatio
at considerable distances from the events in question.
We have improved our detection capability by better instrumentation, added
knowledge relating to the optimum siting of instruments, and construction of
arrays of both long and short period seismometers.
With respect to the identification problem, research during the past several
years has developed and improved a set of parameters that are useful in differen-
tiating the seismic signals of earthquakes and explosions if these signals are re-
corded at such amplitudes that they are not obscured by seismic noise. This set
of parameters includes such signal characteristics as direction of first motion,
complexity of the P-wave signal, the depth of focus as interpreted from times of
arrival of short period body waves, and relative generation of short period and
long period waves. The widely discussed discrimination criterion using the ratio
of magnitude values based upon surface and body waves is of the latter type.
But the application of these various methods depends upon having the opera-
tional capability to receive the signals on which they are based. There are sig-
nificant limitations on present operational capabilities to do so, which depend on
the location, nature, quality, and extent of seismic arrays, and the resulting
signal to noise ratio; and at least in the lower magnitudes there are inherent
limitations, since neither background noise, nor the possibility that a signal will be
drowned out by signals from concurrent seismic events of larger magnitudes,
can ever be wholly eliminated. Mioreover, present techniques cannot distinguish
between nuclear and nonnuclear explosions, although this is significant only at
low magnitudes where nonnuclear explosions are also possible.
We have long considered that unmanned seismic stations, or “biack boxes,”
in the territory of a nuclear weapon party could increase our detection and
identification capabilities. We have done some useful work in designing “black
boxes” for this purpose. -
Even the fullest conceivable application of these methods, however, would
1eave events that cannot be clearly identified as explosions rather than earth-
quakes. To help resolve such ambiguities, the first requirement is to locate the
event. Thus another aspect of our verification capability is the accuracy with
which we can locate seismic events of various magnitudes.
In considering what capabilities for detection, identification, and location may
exist or become, it is necessary to appreciate the assumptions underlying partic–
ular estimates. For example, when an expert speaks of a specific identification
threshold, it is important to know: -
79–879—72—3
30
1. Whether he is speaking of an operational capability we now have, or of one
which it is estimated could be achieved on the basis of our current state of
knowledge; - -
2. Whether the figure is one at which he estimates we would have a 90 percent
confidence that we could identify an event of that size, or a higher or lower
percentage of confidence; -
3. Whether the figure refers to our capability to identify events at a given
magnitude (called our incremental capability) or our capability to identify
events at that magnitude or higher (called our cumulative capability). This may
make a difference of a few tenths of a magnitude in the claimed threshold, since
our superior capability to identify a higher magnitude is reflected in the cumu-
lative capability figure; and
4. Whether the corresponding capability to locate the event is to within an
area of tens, or hundreds, or thousands of Square kilometers. -
Even when we have determined the limits of our capability in terms of seismic
magnitude, there are difficulties in knowing how large a nuclear explosion would
yield a seismic signal of that magnitude. This will vary by as much as an order of
magnitude depending on Such factors as whether it is conducted in hard rock or
dry alluvium. We are also continuing to study the extent to which determined
attempts to evade detection or identification can degrade our capabilities, and
what we could do about them. -
While I am encouraged by the progress made thus far, it is my understanding
that there will continue to be a number of ambiguous events of possible signifi-
cance. Onsite inspection could play an important role in helping deter a potential
violator and could provide the parties with added confidence that the treaty was
being complied with.
Finally, I should note that the problem of verification is not necessarily con-
fined to distinguishing earthquakes from explosions. If a comprehensive test ban
treaty makes provision for peaceful nuclear explosions, we will have to devise and
negotiate adequate means of assuring that such peaceful nuclear explosions are
not used as a cover for prohibited weapons testing. This was clearly recognized
in the pre-1963 discussions of a comprehensive test ban. We have continued to
look at this problem, too, and hope it can be satisfactorily resolved.
My remarks today, Mr. Chairman, have been intended to review the potential
advantages of a comprehensive test ban treaty, why adequate verification is es-
sential to make sure that such potential advantages are real ones, and what efforts
are being made to solve the verification problem.
In closing, I would like to thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear
before you and your committee today.
CoNTRIBUTIONS OF COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY
Mr. FARLEY. In brief, I pointed out that such a treaty would
contribute to our efforts to apply the brakes to U.S.-Soviet competition
in nuclear arms, that it would contribute to efforts to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries, that it would be
responsive to a widespread desire of the world community, contribute
to a favorable climate for further progress in arms control, and that
it would help allay concerns about possible effects of underground
nuclear tests on the environment, even though the actual record on
this score has been good. -
REASON FOR INSISTENCE ON ADEQUATE VERIFICATION
But I pointed out that these potential advantages would be realized
only to the extent that the treaty was broadly acceptable and was
effective in preventing nuclear weapons testing by the parties. If it
did not have this effect and other parties could conduct significant
nuclear weapons testing without its becoming known, one or more of
these advantages could be nullified and the treaty could become
disadvantageous to the parties that continued to be bound by it.
This is why an inseparable part of our policy on achieving a compre-
31
hensive test ban has always been an insistence on adequate verification;
that is, verification that would provide acceptable confidence in our
ability to identify violations and take into account the possible need
to furnish convincing evidence to the public and the international
community that such violations had occurred.
PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVING ADEQUATELY VERIFIED TEST BAN
TREATY
My testimony went on to deal with the second question identified
above; that is, the progress being made toward achieving an adequately
verified test ban treaty. We have sought actively in the period since
the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty to improve verification
capabilities. Over $274 million has been spent so far to this end, and
these efforts are continuing. In my earlier testimony, I discussed the
encouraging developments in our ability to detect, identify, and locate
seismic events; to discriminate between explosions and earthquakes;
and to cope with possible evasion techniques. I also reviewed a number
of the unsolved problems we still face in the field of verification on
which more work needs to be done. Further, 2 days of hearings on
these technical aspects of the problem, including the problem of
evasion, were held by the Subcommittee on Research, Development,
and Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy last October.
While I cannot cover all of this ground again today, it is our judg-
ment that: (1) There is a range of explosive yields within which even
our improved seismic and other capabilities would not enable us to
verify with confidence that underground nuclear weapons tests had
not been carried out, and (2) militarily significant tests can be carried
out within that range. -
In the light of this judgment, it remains our position that onsite
inspections are needed and can play an important role in helping deter
a potential violation and could provide the parties with added
confidence that the treaty was being complied with. Here it must be
recognized that the current position of the Soviet Union does not
contemplate any onsite inspections. If agreement could be reached on
the number of inspections permitted, we would also have to settle the
vital matter of the modalities of such inspections. This would require
careful negotiation.
Finally, in my previous testimony I pointed out one other facet of
the verification problem. If the parties to a comprehensive test ban
treaty made provision for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, it
would be necessary to devise and negotiate adequate means of assuring
that such explosions could not be used as a cover for prohibited
weapons testing. This aspect of the problem was recognized in the
staff report published by your subcommittee on November 1, 1971.
Since last summer's hearings, the administration has continued its
efforts to find solutions to the problems I have described. We are
pursuing our seismic research and other verification programs and
keeping their implications under continuing scrutiny.
We are participating in international discussions, both at Geneva.
and in the United Nations, on approaches to achieving a comprehen-
sive test ban. Intensified interest has been shown in this subject in
these forums where, within the past year, specific suggestions for
partial measures have been made by the Canadians and the Japanese.
32
The Soviets have sharply criticized these suggestions; they have also
reiterated their position that national means alone must be relied
upon to verify any such treaty. - -
We have also carefully looked at comments and suggestions made
by the Members of our own Congress and the public.
While there have been no breakthroughs since last July, I assure you
we have continued to give this matter the most serious attention.
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMENTS ON SENATE RESOLUTION 230
Turning now to the specific resolutions before this subcommittee, I
would first like to address Senate Resolution 230. In response to a
request from Senator Fulbright for coordinated executive branch
comments on that resolution Assistant Secretary of State Abshire
incorporated such comments in a letter dated April 4, 1972. Among
these comments was the following: -
Since a moratorium on all nuclear testing would amount to an informal under-
taking to stop such testing, relying only on national means of verification and not
providing for adequate assurance of compliance, we have not considered it a
prudent step to take at this time. -
Mr. Chairman, I request that a copy of that letter, to which I need
not add, be inserted in the record at this point. -
Senator MUSKIE. Without objection, so ordered.
(The information referred to follows:)
- DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., April 4, 1972.
Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT, -
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate. -
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of
January 28, 1972 requesting coordinated Executive Branch comments on S. Res.
230, concerning underground nuclear weapons testing and negotiations for a
comprehensive test ban treaty.
This Administration, like its three predecessors, has favored the conclusion of a
comprehensive test ban adequately verified. In view of the fact that differences
regarding verification have not permitted achievement of this arms control
measure, the United States has been making serious efforts to contribute to the
solution of the verification problem. However, despite improvements in the
means to detect and identify underground nuclear explosions, more work needs
to be done. Moreover, there will remain a level below which national seismographic
means cannot distinguish between natural and explosive Seismic events. It is still
our view that some on-site inspections are also necessary to supplement our
national means in order to help resolve uncertainties and ambiguities which occur.
The issues associated with a comprehensive test ban were discussed on July 22
and 23, 1971 by Administration officials testifying before the Subcommittee on
Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee. More presentations of a technical nature were made to the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on October 27 and 28, 1971.
Since a moratorium on all nuclear testing would amount to an informal under-
taking to stop such testing, relying only on national means of verification, and
not providing for adequate assurance of compliance, we have not considered it a
prudent step to take at this time. Moreover, we have had an unsatisfactory experi-
ence with a test moratorium in the past. In 1961, after both the United States
and the Soviet Union had abstained from testing for three years, the Soviet
TJnion, with only one day’s notice, initiated an extensive and well-planned
atmospheric test program.
The US continues to participate actively in the discussions and deliberations
of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, in which the
|US and the USSR are cochairmen and our respective allies and the nomaligned
are also represented. We have submitted the results of our technical research on
the verification issue to the CCD.
33
With regard to the environmental issue mentioned in the resolution, we believe
that the record of our underground nuclear test program, insofar as health, Safety,
and protection of the ecology are concerned, has been very good, and thus cannot
by itself be an overriding reason for our adopting a moratorium. -
The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the
Administration’s program there is no objection to the Submission of this report.
Sincerely, -
. DAVID M. ABSHIRE,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.
OPERATIVE PROVISIONS OF SENATE RESOLUTION 273
Mr. FARLEY. The operative provisions of Senate Resolution 273
differ from those of Senate Resolution 230 in that they do not call for
“announcement of an immediate moratorium on all U.S. testing to
remain in effect so long as the Soviet Union also abstains from testing.”
They simply “call upon the President to propose to the Soviet Union
and the other nuclear powers an extension of the Limited Test Ban Treaty
to include testing underground and to strive for its prompt acceptance.”
The language of this operative paragraph, taken alone, would not
appear to me to require anything new. We have repeatedly proposed
negotiation of an adequately verified comprehensive test ban that
would go beyond the Limited Test Ban Treaty by banning under-
ground tests and indicated our readiness to strive for the prompt
acceptance of such a treaty.
But doubt upon this literal reading of the operative paragraph is
cast by the preamble to the resolution. The fourth preambular para-
graph asserts that seismic progress “now makes it possible, using
national means alone, to monitor underground events down to levels
so small that any remaining undetected or unidentifiable events
would have no controlling military significance.”
If the operative paragraph is intended to be interpreted, in the light
of this preamble, to call upon the President to propose a comprehen-
sive test ban treaty verified by national means alone, it is inconsistent
with the administration’s present position as discussed above.
Mr. Chairman, I have tried to review for you today the adminis-
tration's position supporting a comprehensive test ban, adequately
verified, and discussed what we are doing toward its achievement.
Against this background, I have commented on the two resolutions
currently before this subcommittee. It is my hope that these remarks
will be helpful. y
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity. That con-
cludes my prepared statement.
Senator MUSKIE. Yes. All right.
A few questions simply for clarification:
TJ.S. NIEGOTIATING POSITION
You say, “We have repeatedly proposed negotiation of an ade-
quately verified comprehensive test ban that would go beyond the
Limited Test Ban Treaty by banning underground tests and indicated
our readiness to strive for the prompt acceptance of such a treaty.”
What form has that activity taken?
Mr. FARLEY. This is a matter which has been on the agenda, Mr.
Chairman, of the Geneva Conference of the Committee of Disarma-
34
ment and its predecessor, the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Com-
mittee in the period since 1963; and this has been our posture there
consistently.
Senator MUSKIE. It is a posture, but does it represent or has it
represented at any time a new, active initiative to develop such an
agreement? -
Mr. FARLEY. As I have explained, Mr. Chairman, the basic diffi-
culty which has affected the negotiating posture since 1963 has been
the Soviet position that no onsite inspection is necessary or per-
missible and our insistence that the national means which are, of
course, Very important, be supplemented by such inspection. We have
thus had a difference of opinion which has meant that initiatives have
been limited essentially to attempt to understand and deal construc-
tively with the verification problem which has been the gap in principle.
lººr MUSKIE. Have we changed our negotiating position since
ti Mr. FARLEY. Our position has been essentially the same since that
]] Iſle.
Senator MUSKIE. So that there is no place for an initiative? Would
you care to describe it as simply a routine effort from time to time to
explore the possibility that the other side has changed its negotiating
position? -
Mr. FARLEY. It has also, Mr. Chairman, been a massive effort to
see if it is possible to improve national means of verification, to make
them better able to cope with the verification problem.
As I indicated, we have conducted a very extensive program which
is the basis for the improvements in verification capability which have
ibeen frequently referred to in this and other hearings, so we have
worked very diligently on that aspect of the problem.
Senator MUSKIE. As I understand it, then, although you take some
Satisfaction out of the investment in technological development that
we have made and you concede there is substantial progress, nothing
that has happened has changed our negotiating position in 9 years?
Mr. FARLEY. I tried to indicate that we take satisfaction in the
substantial progress also, Senator. We hope there will be further prog-
ress in the verification capability. We still have a difference of opinion
between us and the Soviet Union, however, as to the basis for actually
proceeding with negotiation of an agreement now. -
Senator MUSKIE. So with all of this progress we still insist, as we
did 9 years ago, on seven onsite inspections; we still insist, as we did
9 years ago, that national means are not sufficient?
Mr. FARLEY. That is correct.
Senator MUSKIE. That isn’t real progress then, is it?
Mr. FARLEY. It is not a situation where I can now indicate to you
a time when we can reach agreement on a test ban treaty. I cannot
believe, however, that the work that has been done does not represent
progress toward getting us nearer to that goal.
SUFFICIENT NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION
Senator MUSKIE. Have you defined the state-of-the-art which you
would require we must achieve before we can be satisfied with national
means of verification?
Mr. FARLEY. I do not believe that one can describe it in quantita-
tive terms. I have found that the definition of the problem, as it was
35
put forward by earlier spokesmen today, was an accurate one. One is
talking about the balance of the risks and uncertainties of verification
with the incentives which there may be to continue testing on the part
of parties or nonparties to the treaty and the importance of testing
which may be conducted—all of those are things which change over
time and it would, therefore, be a judgment on balance as to whether
we concluded we did have sufficient confidence that we would know
* a treaty was being complied with through national means
al OI) e.
Senator MUSKIE. Well, is it your view that all tests of military
significance must be identifiable before you would agree to national
means of verification?
Mr. FARLEY. I don’t think that one can establish a standard as
absolute as that, all tests must be detectable. I believe it is reasonable
to say that to make a difference in the current strategic balance and
in the current military status of the powers would require more than
single tests.
I believe a fairer standard is that we should be confident no other
country could conduct a series of tests of sufficient weight to have
that kind of military significance.
Senator MUSKIE. The phrase “determined evader” has been used
this morning. Would you say that we ought to be able to identify a
determined evader? -
Mr. FARLEY. I think that is a relevant criterion, for the double
reason that most of the problems which are identified with our present
detection and identification capabilities come from the possibilities of
evasion that arise in testing in media which produce a signal of smaller
magnitude or from masking explosions either through decoupling or
the use of earthquakes. Those all represent determined efforts to evade.
Second, I think it would have to involve someone who had a pro-
gram of sufficient importance and scope to indeed be determined to
make some important change.
MUST RISK OF SOVIET UNION BECOMING DETERMINIED
EVADER BE JUDGED?
Senator MUSKIE. Is it your view that there is a high enough risk
that the Soviet Union might decide to become a determined evader,
that this must be taken into account in your judgment?
Mr. FARLEY. What we have had to deal with is basically the
question if that problem arose, if that charge were made, would
we be able to have confidence in our judgment that it was not warranted
and would we be able to demonstrate that this would be the case.
I would not want to imply anything about the motivations of the
Soviet Union here.
Senator MUSKIE. No; but a moment ago you were not willing to
exclude the possibility that the risks of a comprehensive test ban treaty
were acceptable even though we were not 100 percent sure that we
could identify all militarily significant tests. If you are not ready to
rule out the possibility of that conclusion as a matter of national
policy, then aren’t we at that point now? I mean at whatever point
we may be prepared to consider such a national judgment, we are
going to have to accompany that judgment, with a judgment as to
whether or not we think the Soviet Union is likely to become or is
interested in becoming a determined evader. Isn’t that true?
36
Mr. FARLEY. Well, I think we are talking, Mr. Chairman, about a
treaty which we would hope would be a matter of some duration. One
cannot always be confident either of what will happen on the part of
other parties in a relatively short future or what charges might arise;
and it appears to us that it would be a much more stable treaty—we
would have much more confidence that it would make a political
contribution if there were a basis for dealing with any doubts with
confidence that there was indeed compliance on the part of all parties.
MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT TESTS UNABLE TO BE VERIFIED
Senator MUSKIE. I wonder if I may get back to the question of
militarily significant tests which you raise in your testimony. Your
precise language is that the “militarily significant tests can be carried
out” within the range of yields which could not be verified with con-
fidence. I wonder if you could tell us what tests could be carried out
below the present threshold which would present a significant risk to
our security? -
Mr. FARLEY. Well, I think that is a question which other witnesses
can deal with more authoritatively than I. Indeed, I believe you have
statements on the record from your earlier hearings. Basically, how-
ever, the possibilities which have been identified relate to tests of
relatively small yield in themselves which may nevertheless be impor-
tant to continued development of major strategic weapon systems. It
does not necessarily require a large test in physical magnitude to have
significance in development of a weapons type of importance.
Senator MUSKIE. Would this risk be eliminated if you could verify
seismologically at the magnitude of 4?
Mr. FARLEY. Well, the difficulties which arise are a little more
complicated, I think, than simply to say from a seismic signal that
we know it is from a weapon explosion of corresponding magnitude
at 4. There is the question of whether we will be able to detect and
identify events producing yields measured by this size, if they are
fully coupled. There is the problem of whether they will indeed be
detected because they can be masked by other activities. So I don’t
think one can set a simple numerical figure as the one which is the
breakpoint here.
Senator MUSKIE. How would onsite inspections help us deal with
that problem?
Mr. FARLEY. In the case where no signal is received, it is clear there
is nothing which triggers an onsite inspection. However, onsite inspec-
tions introduce another area in which uncertainty can actually play
on the side of deterrent. It seems to us that even a determined evader
in calculating risks is going to have to assess the risks that if some-
thing goes wrong an ambiguity is created. If that happens and there
is no onsite inspection, we may simply have an ambiguity. If there is
onsite inspection there is the possibility that violation will be identi-
fied and demonstrated; and we believe that possibility adds impor-
tantly to the deterrence to an initiation of such evasion.
LIKELIHOOD OF SOVIET AGREEMENT TO ONSITE INSPECTIONS
Senator Muskie. Is there any likelihood in your judgment that
the Soviet Union would ever agree to onsite inspections on the basis
of your experience of the last 9 years in raising this issue with them?
37
Mr. FARLEY. The Soviet position has certainly been consistent in
the last 9 years. I do not think one can exclude the possibility that they
will accept onsite inspection. As you recall, they were at one time ready
to concede a number of inspections—two or three.
Senator MUSKIE. When did they change that position?
Mr. FARLEY. Almost immediately after the signature of the Limited
Test Ban Treaty.
Senator MUSKIE. So for 9 years the evidence is negative, in response
to my question? .
Mr. FARLEY. That is correct.
Senator MUSKIE. Does that mean, therefore, that only at such point
as we ourselves are satisfied as to the sufficiency of natural means of
inspection is there any prospect of a comprehensive test ban treaty?
Mr. FARLEY. Well, as I say, there is the history before the 9-year
period of Soviet openness on the point of Onsite inspection, which seems
to me to make it an equally possible outcome that they will reexamine
their position and return to the possibility of some onsite inspection.
But I think one must recognize the two ways in which we might move
to a comprehensive test ban.
PossIBILITY OF SoviPT INITIATIVE BEFORE CHANGE IN U.S. POSITION
Senator MUSKIE. Is there anything in the history of our relations
with them to indicate that they would take an initiative before we
change our own position to move toward a comprehensive test ban
treaty?
Mr. FARLEY. Well, on the question of whether they will return to on-
site inspection, I can cite only what I have not mentioned, that they
did at one point admit that possibility.
On the question of whether they will move and take initiatives, I
think it must be said for the Soviet Union that they do on occasion
reexamine their positions in the light of the positions we have taken
and move in our direction. This was the manner in which progress was
made, for example, on the Seabed Treaty and the Biological Weapons
Convention where initially they opposed such measures taken as par-
tial steps, but eventually came around to espouse them and work
actively for them.
WHY NO INSISTENCE ON ONSITE INSPECTION CONCERNING BIOLOGICAL
- WEAPONS” -
Senator MUSKIE. Why haven’t we insisted on onsite inspection with
respect to biological weapons? -
Mr. FARLEY. We do not insist on onsite inspection out of any
theological conviction; our principle is that when we enter into an
agreement we assess the risks, we assess the confidence we will have
regarding compliance, and if the balance is satisfactory in the case of
national means only we proceed on the basis of national means. That
has been the case, of course, for most of the agreements which we have
entered.
Senator MUSKIE. Do we have sufficient national means with respect
to biological weapons?
Mr. FARLEY. Considering the risk, yes; there I want to say that the
unlikelihood that biological weapons would be used by another coun-
38
try—in light of the same considerations that led us to renounce their
use even without a treaty—is in that case a major element in the
calculation. -
Senator MUSKIE. Senator Fulbright?
CHANGE IN U.S. POSITION
Senator FULBRIGHT. You said from time to time the Soviet Union
has changed its position. Can you give us any indication that the
United States has changed its principles?
Mr. FARLEY. Change what, Senator?
Senator FULBRIGHT. You said to the Senator from Maine that the
Russians have from time to time changed their position; did you not?
Mr. FARLEY. I did.
Senator FULBRIGHT. Can you give us an example of where the
United States has also changed its position on a more important
principle?
Mr. FARLEY. To take only the area of test ban limitations, we
originally worked exclusively for a comprehensive test ban treaty and
then came to agree that it was feasible to start with a limited test ban
treaty in the atmosphere and other environments. I would say that the
biological warfare convention itself is a change in position. At one time
we considered any limitation on biological and conventional warfare
to be an integral part of a systematic program of complete disarmament.
#. to require onsite inspection. We broke out the biological warfare
eld.
HOLDUP OF GENEVA PROTOCOL
Senator FULBRIGHT. The Geneva protocol is still held up because we
don’t agree on the use of tear gas and herbicides, isn’t it?
Mr. FARLEY. That is correct. There is the position taken in your
letter to the President that in these circumstances we should not
proceed with ratification.
OMISSION OF COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN FROM STATE OF WORLD
MESSAGE
Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Farley, the Presidential statement of
support for the comprehensive test ban treaty which you quoted in
your statement, I believe, was made in 1969; was it not? -
Mr. FARLEY. That is correct.
Senator FULBRIGHT. And although you say the administration's
position is unchanged, it is interesting to note in the 11 pages devoted
to arms control in the President's State of the World Message the
comprehensive test ban is not mentioned at all, not even in the brief
subsection entitled “New Areas for Progress.”
Should this omission be taken as an indicator of the administra-
tion's lack of interest in pursuing the test ban?
Mr. FARLEY. I do not believe so. I think it reflects rather, an
assessment, in what is an annual report, of the areas in which it is
realistic to expect progress in negotiations or progress in major changes
in attitudes during the period foreseen.
39
LIKELIHOOD OF SOVIET UNION BECOMING DETERMINED EVADER
Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you believe the Soviet Union is likely to
become a determined evader if we sign such a test ban? Is that the
belief of the administration?
Mr. FARLEY. Our view is, rather, Senator, that if such doubts or
charges arise we want to be in position to say we have confidence that
this is not happening.
Senator FULBRIGHT. You have said from time to time, I think, in
the course of the previous examination that this isn’t subject to
absolute criteria. Didn’t you say something to that effect?
Mr. FARLEY. I think that is correct. I believe that to have 100-
percent certainty
Senator FULBRIGHT. You are dealing in judgment and probabilities.
Is that right?
Mr. FARLEY. Judgment and probabilities.
Senator FULBRIGHT. Why do you think it probable, which you do
think, I guess, that the Soviet Union would take the risk of cheating?
What is it in their history and overall picture that leads you to believe
they are likely to do so?
Mr. FARLEY. Well, we have not based our attitude on an assess-
ment that the Soviet Union is likely to cheat. We have assessed our
position on the test that if that question arises we want to be able to
say with confidence that we do not believe they are.
Senator FULBRIGHT. Absolute confidence or relative confidence?
The way you use the word “confidence”, there you convey to me the
idea that you have to be absolutely certain that there is no possibility
of it, and this is moving back and forth on this. It is an ambivalent
attitude, it strikes me.
Mr. FARLEY. I tried to accept your test, Senator. It is a matter of
probability and of judgment, but it does have to be a judgment in
which this administration or a succeeding one could have confidence.
Senator FULBRIGHT. I wonder if the Russians have any reason to
have confidence that we wouldn’t continue to test. If they follow the
hearings on ABM and matters of this kind, there are people in our
administration who are just as determined to test. In the recent
experience with Cannikin when there was a great uproar in Alaska
and here in the Congress and among the populace, you continued
anyway; didn’t you? -
Mr. FARLEY. I don’t know, Senator, that I would consider Cannikin
a very clandestine test. - --
Senator FULBRIGHT. No; but there were a great many people who
didn’t want it done. I am talking now about the determination to go
forward with the testing regardless of what anybody else thinks about
it. It is the determination that we are talking about. I don’t know if
there is anything further to be said, frankly. If a country was detected
in one violation, of course, everyone else, of course, would be released
from any obligations, certainly, with regard to that matter, wouldn’t
they? We wouldn’t continue to be bound if you detected a violation by
any member of the treaty, would we?
Mr. FARLEY. That is correct.
Senator FULBRIGHT. It is difficult for me to see what the great riskis,
unless you are saying that they could continue over a long period of

40
time of testing undetected. That really is an assumption; isn’t it. It
wouldn't be just a single test. That wouldn’t do anybody any good;
would it? It would have to be a series of tests to be significant; wouldn’t
it? . -
Mr. FARLEY. I think that is correct, personally.
Senator FULBRIGHT. In other words, you must feel, I suppose, that
it is quite possible that they could continue over a considerable period
to test and be undetected. We would not be likely to detect?
Mr. FARLEY. I believe that is a fair -
Senator FULBRIGHT. That is an assumption?
Mr. FARLEY. That is a fair criterion to apply.
Senator FULBRIGHT. I have no further questions.
Senator MUSKIE. I wonder if I might ask a question here?
IMPORTANCE OF TESTS BELOW 4.0 NINE YEARS AGO
Nine years ago, at the time we signed a treaty, to what extent were
militarily significant tests below the 4 level important to either
country?
Mr. FARLEY. Well, of course, as I said earlier, the 4 level is the level
of a seismic signal received.
EFFECT of IMPROVING DETECTION CAPACITY ON TESTING ABILITY
Senator MUSKIE. Let me state the point I am trying to get at: It
seems to me as we develop this science and this technology of weapons
and testing, that we increase our ability to make militarily significant
tests at lower and lower levels of magnitude. If we pursue the line that
you are arguing for to improve our capacity to detect militarily
significant events of lower and lower magnitude, we are also developing
our ability to make tests at lower and lower levels of magnitude. Is
that an accurate kind of evaluation to make?
Mr. FARLEY. Well, I think it is true that given the size of the stock-
pile and the magnitude of the developmental effort which the United
States and the Soviet Union have accumulated over the past now 25
years or so, relatively small tests can have significance against
the background of all this information, In that part of what you said
I think I have to agree that there is a factor here.
I have not attempted to argue that this meant that any size at all,
even a fraction of a kiloton test, will have to be detectable and will
be of military significance. The matter is not one that I want to pursue
to an absolute in that way either, any more than I think an absolute
on the verification side is a reasonable test to apply.
Senator MUSKIE. If we are able to get you to pursue absolutes, we
might be in a better position to make political judgments which, I
suppose, is a frustration. . . -
TESTS BELOW 4.0 IN LAST 9 YEARS
Let me ask you, of the 240 tests we have conducted in the last 9
years, if that is an accurate figure that Senator Kennedy stated
Senator FULBRIGHT. Is that an accurate figure? -
41
Mr. FARLEY. I don’t know whether it is exactly right, but it is
quite close to the number that has been announced.
Senator FULBRIGHT. Versus 86 for the Russians?
Mr. FARLEY. Again, it is in that general ratio. -
Senator MUSKIE. I wonder if you could characterize those in terms
of the number of tests that might have fallen below this 4.0 threshold
which seems to be the benchmark in the discussion?
Mr. FARLEY. I could not do that. I can, if you wish, try to get you
an answer for the record.
Senator MUSKIE, I would be happy to have that. How do we know
the number of tests that the Soviets have conducted in the last 9 years?
Mr. FARLEY. Well, we don’t know. We know the number we have
detected and there are, of course, ambiguous events, so that figure is
an approximate one.
Senator MUSKIE. Of what magnitude were those? Could you give
us those figures, too, the 86 or whatever figure is accurate?
Mr. FARLEY. I will take the question; I am not sure what informa-
tion I can provide. This is basically, of course, from intelligence sources,
but I will be glad to take the question. -
(The information referred to follows:)
U.S. AND SOVIET LOW-RANGE UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR ExPLOSION
(Supplied by ACDA)
The data we have with respect to U.S. and Soviet underground nuclear
explosions are not truly comparable. We know the explosive yield of all of our own
nuclear explosions, but have teleseismic readings on only a limited number
selected specifically for study. On the other hand, we have teleseismic readings on
a number of Soviet events from which we must deduce their probable explosive
yield, but are not certain that these include all Soviet underground nuclear
explosions.
Between August, 1963 and December 31, 1971 the number of U.S. nuclear
explosions announced by the AEC was 241. Of these, 150 were in the low range
(0–20 kt). While a portion of this latter group would be likely to produce a
teleseismic reading of less than 4.0 magnitude, the tests above this range would
most likely produce a larger teleseismic signal. (This would not necessarily be
true if evasion techniques had been used to avoid identification by teleseismic
means).
Neither all U.S. underground nuclear explosions, nor all detected Soviet
underground nuclear explosions have been announced. Between August, 1963 and
December 31, 1971 the AEC announced 61 Soviet explosions, of which 9 were
announced to be in the low range.
(Additional material provided is classified and in the committee
files.)
Senator MUSKIE. All right. Senator Symington? I apologize.
Senator SYMINGTON. Not at all.
POINT AT WHICH YOU CEASE TO BUY SEISMIC CAPABILITY
Mr. Farley, last October, in testimony before the joint committee,
Chairman Price, acting chairman at the time, said: “If evasion tech-
niques are so effective below 5 or 6 kilotons, what purpose is there
in attempting to lower our identification threshold below this level
as is being advocated in Some quarters at great cost and effort?”
42
Dr. Lukasik, who, I understand, is a Department of Defense
scientist, replied, “It is certainly clear that in a sense the more capa-
bility you have the better. The question is really a tradeoff between
how much insurance you want to buy and how much you want to
spend for it.” -
Then he says: “One should certainly attempt to make the job of
the invader as difficult as possible, so this suggests that you want to
drive to lower and lower magnitudes. On the other hand, there is a
point at which you convince yourself that either he can’t do it or you
don’t care or he will choose not to and that represents the point at
which you cease to buy seismic capability.”
How could the Senate or this committee go about trying to deter-
mine that point? Let me put it this way: Do you believe there is such
a point? -
. º FARLEY. I believe there is such a point. As I indicated earlier,
I think it will be a matter of judgment from which it is going to be
very difficult to precisely state how much is the exact magnitude of
seismic signal which represents the threshold, how much represents
the assessment of how important it is that Soviet or other nations are
testing, and so forth. -
Senator SYMINGTON. I want to be sure we understand each other.
Here is a Department of Defense scientist who says there is a point
at which you will convince yourself that either he can’t do it, or
doesn’t care, or will choose not to; and that represents a point at
which you cease to buy seismic capability.
You are the agency primarily interested in this subject. Have you
arrived at a point—presumably you have—where you could take a
solid position on one of those three?
Mr. FARLEY. Well, at this point, the position that I am here to
represent is that we have not yet reached the point at which we
would be satisfied to say either that we can with our national means
know sufficiently well whether an event has been conducted or that
any event which is conducted does not matter.
Senator SYMINGTON. What is that point, in your opinion?
Senator FULBRIGHT. He doesn’t know. -
Mr. FARLEY. Well, the point will be the one when responsible
authorities make the judgment that they are satisfied with the
capability. .
Senator SYMINGTON. Don’t you consider yourself and your agency
a responsible authority in this field? -
Mr. FARLEY. We have some of the responsibility.
Senator SYMINGTON. Then what is your opinion about the limit—
the point Dr. Lukasik makes in his testimony—at which you would
be willing to say you don’t care whether they do it or not?
Mr. FARLEY. Well, since the detection and identification capability
is a matter which is being actively improved, and on which improve-
ment is continuing, I don’t know at what point in that improvement
process we will reach that conclusion. We have not done it yet.
Senator SYMINGTON. You have not reached it yet?
Mr. FARLEY. Yes, that is correct.
Senator SYMINGTON. You don’t know at what point—well, I won’t
pursue it.
43
ARTICLE ENTITLED, “TOTAL TEST BAN”
In yesterday's Washington Star there was an article, “Total Test
Ban.” Did you read it?
Mr. FARLEY. I did not, Senator.
Senator SYMINGTON. It was written by former Ambassador to the
United Nations, James J. Wadsworth, who was the chief U.S. nego-
tiator at the Geneva Disarmament Conference from the late 1950’s
and early 1960's and Mrs. Jo Pomerance, a consultant to the chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Arms Control and
International Organization and a former special adviser to the United
Nations. You have not read the article?
Mr. FARLEY. I have not. I know Ambassador Wadsworth, of
COUII’Sé.
Senator SYMINGTON. Would you read it and at this point supply
for the record your opinion of the analysis it presents in his recom-
mendations?
Mr. FARLEY. I will do that.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
(The information referred to follows:)
[From the Washington Star, May 14, 1972]
TOTAL TEST BAN
(By James J. Wadsworth and Jo Pomerance)
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will hold hearings this week on two
Senate resolutions that urge the administration to promptly begin negotiations
with the Soviet Union on a treaty to ban all nuclear weapons tests—including
underground ones. It is a question that should be treated with urgency, because a
treaty could signal the end of the nuclear arms race between the United States and
Soviets, halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other nations and stop contam-
ination of the human environment caused by nuclear weapons testing.
Several nations, including Japan, India and Israel, are posed to develop their
own nuclear weapons. This was made evident by their failure to ratify the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. There are mounting pressures, both internal and exter-
nal, for these nations to go nuclear.
These and other nations may have already stockpiled plutonium, a basic sub-
stance in nuclear bombs, as a byproduct from nuclear reactors used for electric
power. These reactors were Supplied by One of the present nuclear powers, presum-
ably restricted for peaceful purposes. -
Today, many non-nuclear nations have the technology to build their own reac-
tors. They have also acquired from the nuclear powers the ideology of maintain-
ing a large defense establishment.
The overriding threat of nuclear proliferation is that the chances of a nuclear
holocaust increase proportionately with the spread of nuclear weapons. If this
danger has long been recognized by responsible government leaders throughout the
world, why, then, should these countries consider joining the nuclear club? -
First, some fear a nuclear attack or threat of attack by missiles, which can reach
them from all corners of the globe. They believe their own nuclear capability might
be a deterrent. - -
Also, as armaments—rather than negotiation—are emphasized as the best guar-
antee of Security among the big powers, the military have gained more influence in
policy decisions in the non-nuclear nations as well.
Let us examine two specific cases:
India's tradition of Ghandian nonviolence first began to fade in the early 1950s,
when the United States signed a military assistance pact with Pakistan. U.S.
foreign policy at that time was served by Pakistan's joining the SEATO alliance
and acquiring an arsenal of American military weapons. -
44
India, perceiving Pakistan as a threat, began to arm with equipment from the
TInited States, Britain and the Soviet Union. The political and religious disputes,
sharpened by the massing of armaments on both sides, resulted in last year's
India–Pakistan War with all the atrocities that accompanied it. Thoroughly
aroused by U.S. support of Pakistan and the possibility of changing alliances in the
Far East, Madam Ghandi and the Indian government may acquiesce to mounting
pressures from within the country to acquire a nuclear capability. In fact, India.
has recently announced that it will conduct nuclear tests for “peaceful purposes.”
The Middle East is regarded as the most dangerous area for a nuclear confronta-
tion between the United States and the Soviet Union. It also may be the most
likely area for nuclear proliferation.
The lack of progress in the current UN-sponsored peace negotiations has caused
the Israelis to continue to rely upon military strength. Israel may have already
decided to develop a nuclear defense capability. Some experts believe Israel could
Inow build nuclear warheads from fissionable materials from their Dimona reactor
and join them to short- and medium-range missiles it already possesses.
The spread of nuclear weapons not only brings closer the prospects of ultimate
disaster, but will add to the number of nations conducting nuclear tests.
Nuclear testing pollutes the planet with plutonium debris—one of the most
dangerous substances known. Radioactive fallout was a major reason for the 1963
Limited Test Ban Treaty outlawing atmospheric explosions. .
We now know underground tests are also dangerous. Of the announced 200 U.S.
underground tests between 1963 and 1970, 68 vented radioactive material detected
in or near the testing site. As recently as 1970, after 19 years of testing experience,
the underground shot, Baneberry, vented radioactivity contaminating 300
workers and forcing evacuation of a major portion of the Nevada Test Site.
Plutonium debris has a radioactive life of 24,000 years. It is estimated that 250
square miles of the Nevada Test Site are permanently contaminated. Here, as in
the Denver area, which had been polluted by a plutonium fire—an unavoidable
risk of bomb manufacturing—the Atomic Energy Commission has refused to
allow the medical Surveys necessary to determine if the cancer rate has risen as a
result of contamination. -
The AEC has consistently concealed or minimized scientific information on the
environmental and health hazards of nuclear testing.
As the Third World stands on the brink of going nuclear, there is one important
step the major powers can take to halt this alarming prospect: negotiate a com-
prehensive treaty banning all nuclear tests.
Since 1965, the near-nuclear countries have implied they would agree to a
non-proliferation agreement and renounce nuclear weapons if the United States
and the Soviet Union demonstrated their determination to scale down the arms
race by signing a treaty banning all tests.
A comprehensive test ban would be more persuasive to these nations than a
SALT agreement limiting strategic weapons. A test ban would stop the develop-
ment of new nuclear weapons, where a SALT agreement would merely place a
quantative limit on the number of weapons.
The comprehensive test ban should be treated with urgency at the Senate
hearings. Among the questions to be explored are: Will the U.S. now decide to
start negotiations with the Soviet Union? Will the test ban be high on the Presi-
dent’s agenda when he travels to Moscow? Let's hope the hearings shed light on
the answers as well as the questions. º,
Mr. Wadsworth was the chief U.S. negotiator at the Geneva disarmament con-
ferences in the late 1950s and early’ 60s. Mrs. Pomerance is a former special adviser
*o the United Nations. .
COMMENTS ON WASHINGTON STAR ARTICLE
(Supplied by ACDA)
The main arguments in this article are that a comprehensive test ban treaty
would contribute to our non-proliferation efforts and that it could eliminate the
risk that radioactive debris might escape from underground nuclear explosions.
In my prepared remarks I noted both of these points among the potential advan-
tages of an adequately verified comprehensive test ban treaty.
45
In supporting this line of argument, however, the article makes a number of
assertions of fact, opinion and political judgment to which I could not subscribe.
I shall address only a few of these.
While I believe that an adequately verified comprehensive test ban treaty
would contribute to our efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, I
think the article somewhat overstates the degree to which such a treaty might be
the decisive factor in gaining adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
I also think the article creates a highly exaggerated impression of the degree to
which radioactive contamination from underground nuclear explosions has been
a problem since the Limited Test Ban Treaty. For example, the facts are that only
a relatively small fraction of U.S. events have vented any activity off the test site
and the activity that has been detected has fallen well below Federal Health and
Safety levels of permissible concentrations. Moreover, on the basis of careful
monitoring, no plutonium has been detected in the amount of activity from those
few underground tests that have vented. With respect to the accidental fire at
Rocky Flats, Colorado several years ago, it should be noted that a comprehensive
test ban treaty would have no bearing on Such an incident, which did not involve
a nuclear weapons test or any other nuclear explosion.
CURRENT STATUS OF 1968 NON PROLIFERATION TREATY
Senator MUSKIE. I wonder if we might have for the record the
current status of the Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968. What major
countries have not signed? What major countries have not ratified
the treaty yet?
Mr. FARLEY. I wonder if it would be permissible for me to submit
that for the record. It is a fairly complicated list.
Senator MUSKIE. Yes. I think we ought to have an updated list.
(The information referred to follows:)
SCHEDULE OF RATIFICATION OF NONPROLIFERATION TREATY
(Supplied by ACDA)
As shown in Column. A below, there are now 70 states parties (P) to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and 31 states which have signed (S) but not yet ratified it.
As shown in Columns B, C, and D, a number of states which are not yet parties
to that treaty are parties to the Limited Test Ban Treaty (which also has an
effect in inhibiting proliferation of nuclear weapons), the Treaty for the Pro-
hibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, or agreements providing for
international safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities. (In column D,
“all” indicates that all such activities are subject to IAEA safeguards; “US’’
shows that at least all nuclear materials acquired by virtue of US civil uses
agreements are subject to IAEA safeguards; “Euratom” means that all peaceful
nuclear activities in the territory of the listed states are subject to Euratom safe-
guards; and “(NSM)” means that no safeguardable material is believed to exist
in the listed State at this time. .
In addition, the Federal Republic of Germany has undertaken, in Protocol No.
III to the Brussels Treaty (establishing the Western European Union) “not to
manufacture in its territory any atomic weapons, chemical weapons, or biological
weapons.”
79–879—72—4
46
C. Treaty
prohibiting
A. Nuclear - e. nuclear D. Agreement
Nonpro- B. Limited Weapons providing for
liferation test ban in Latin international
Country Treaty treaty America Safeguards
Afghanistan--------- - P * -------------- (NSM),
Algeria---------------------------- - - § -------------- (NSM).
Argentina------------------------------------------------------ S S United States.
Australia----------------------------------------- S * -------------- D0.
Austria------------------------------------------ P * -------------- Ali.
Barbados---------------------------------------- § -------------- P (NSM)
Belgium----------------------------------------- S * -------------- Euratom
Bolivia------------------------------------------- P P P (NSM).
Botswana---------------------------------------- P * -------------- NSM).
Brazil---------------------------------------------------------- P S 1 United States
Bulgaria------------------------------------------ P * -------------- Ali.
Burma--------------------------------------------------------- * -------------- (NSM).
Burundi------------------------------------------ P § -------------- (NSM)
Cameroon.---------------------------------------- P § -------------- (NSM)
Canada------------------------------------------ P * -------------- |}.
Central Africa Republic---------------------------- P * -------------- (NSM).
Ceylon------------------------------------------- S * -------------- (NSM).
Chad--------------------------------------------- P * -------------- NSM).
Chile---------------------------------------------------------- P S SM).
China (Republic of)-------------------------------- P F -------------- United States
Colombia----------------------------------------- S S S D0.
Costa Rica---------------------------------------- P P P . (NSM).
Cyprus------------------------------------------- P F -------------- (NSM)
Czechoslovakia------------------------------------ P F -------------- All.
Dahomey----------------------------------------- S * -------------- (NSM)
Denmark----------------------------------------- P F -------------- All.
Dominican Republic------------------------------- P P P (NSM)
Ecuador------------------------------------------ P P P (NSM)
gypt-------------------------------------------- S * -------------- (2).
El Salvador--------------------------------------- S P P (NSM)
Ethiopia------------------------------------------ P S -------------- (NSM)
Finland------------------------------------------ P * -------------- All.
Gabon---------------------------------------------------------- F -------------- (3).
Gambia,the-------------------------------------- S * -------------- (NSM)
German Democratic Republic 4---------------------- P * -------------- ll.
Germany (Federal Republic of)---------------------- S * -------------- Euratom
Ghana------------------------------------------- P F -------------- (NSM)
Greece------------------------------------------- P P -------------- Ali.
Guatemala---------------------------------------- P P P (NSM)
aiti--------------------------------------------- P S P (NSM)
Holy See----------------------------------------- * ---------------------------- (NSM)
Honduras----------------------------------------- S P P (NSM)
Hungary------------------------------------------ P F -------------- ll.
Iceland------------------------------------------- P F -------------- (NSM).
India---------------------------------------------------------- F -------------- United States.
Indonesia---------------------------------------- S F -------------- D0.
Iran--------------------------------------------- P P -------------- D0.
Iraq--------------------------------------------- P P -------------- All.
Ireland------------------------------------------- P F -------------- Do.
Israel---------------------------------------------------------- F -------------- United States.
Italy----- S * -------------- Euratom.
Ivory Coast S * -------------- ---
Jamaica - - - -a ºr ss ºm ºr - - - - - - as me s = * * - - - - - - * * P S P (NSM).
Japan S * -------------- United States.
Jordan - ---- P * -------------- NSM).
eflyā--------------- P * -------------- NSM).
Korea (Republic of)---- S * -------------- United States.
Kuwait-------------------- S * -------------- NSM).
Laos P F -------------- (NSM)
Lebanon.-- P F -------------- (NSM)
Lesotho---- P * - - - (NSM)
Liberia P * -------------- (NSM)
Libya S * -------------- (NSM)
Luxembourg S * -------------- Euratom
Malagasy Republic-- P * -------------- (NSM)
Malawi-------------------------------------------------------- * -------------- (NSM).
Malaysia----- P * -------------- All.
Maldive Islands P - (NSM)
Mali P § -------------- (NSM)
Malta P * -------------- (NSM)
Mauritania * -------------- (NSM)
Mauritius- P * -------------- (NSM)
Mexico P P P All.
Mongoli - - - P * -------------- (NSM)
Morocco.---- P * -------------- (NSM)
Nepal P * -------------- (NSM)
Netherlands S P P 5 Euratom
New Zealand-- P * -------------- AII.
Nicaragua S P (NSM)
Niger---------------------------------------------------------- * -------------- (NSM)
See footnotes at end of table.
47
C. Treaty
prohibiting
A. Nuclear & ºr nuclear D. Agreement
- w Nonpro- B. Limited Weapons providing for
liferation test ban in Latin international
Country Treaty treaty America Safeguards
Nigeria----- P * -------------- (NSM).
Norway--------- - - - - __ P * -------------- All.
Pakistan-------------------------------- - - - S -------------- (6).
Panama - - - S P P (NSM)
Paraguay --------------- * S P (NSM)
Peru--------------------------------------------- P P P (NSM).
Philippines--------------------------------------- S * -------------- United States.
Poland------------------------------------------- P * -------------- All.
Portugal------ 2- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - § -------------- United States.
Romania----------------------------------------- P * -------------- All.
Rwanda-------------------------------------------------------- * -------------- (NSM)
San Marino--------------------------------------- P * -------------- (NSM)
Senegal------------------------------------------ P * -------------- (NSM)
Sierra Leone---------------------------------------------------- F -------------- NSM
Singapore---------------------------------------- S F -------------- (NSM)
Somalia------------------------------------------ P § -------------- (NSM).
South Africa * * * * --- P -------------- United States.
Spain------- - - P -------------- D0.
Sudan----- S * -------------- (NSM),
Swaziland----- P * -------------- (NSM).
Sweden.--------- P F -------------- United States.
Switzerland--------- S F -------------- DO.
Syrian Arab Republic------------------------------ P * -------------- (NSM).
Tanzania------------------------------------------------------- F -------------- (NSM).
Thailand-------- * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *-s º sº, sº * * -------------- United States.
989-------------------------------------------- P * -------------- NSM).
9788------------------------------------------- P F -------------- (NSM).
Trinidad & Tobago.-------------------------------- S P S 1 (NSM).
Tunisia------------ * * * * * * * * * * * - sº sº ºm º º ºs- * * * * * P F -------------- (NSM).
Turkey * * * * * * * * * * = * - tº a sº º sº. S F -------------- United States
Uganda-------------------------------------------------------- F -------------- (NSM).
United Kingdom------------ P P P 57 (8).
United States------------------------------------- P P P 7 (8).
Upper Volta-------------------------------------- P S -------------- (NSM)
Uruguay----------------------------------------- P P P All.
U.S.S.R. -- **, * P F -------------- (8).
Venezuela---- * * - - - - S P P United States
Vietnam (Republic of) - P § -------------- D0.
Western Samoa---------------- F -------------- NSM).
Yemen (Aden).------------- S ---------------------------- (NSM)
Yemen (San'a) - - - - S S -------------- (NSM)
Yugoslavia---- * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * P * -------------- All.
Zaire--------- * * P F -------------- D0.
Zambia------- * -------------- (NSM).
1 Also ratified subject to preconditions not yet met.
2 Has I research reactor.
3 Has no nuclear facilities, but exports source material.
4 Regime not recognized by United States.
5 Additional protocol I.
6 Has 1 power reactor and 1 research reactor, both subject to IAEA safeguards,
7 Additional protocol II.
8 Nuclear weapon states.
Senator SYMINGTON. Would the chairman yield?
VENTING AND CONTAMINATION BETWEEN 1963 AND 1970
I would read a short part of this article:
Radioactive fallout was a major reason for the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treat
Outlawing atmospheric explosions.
We now know underground tests are also dangerous. Of the announced 200
TJ.S. underground tests between 1963 and 1970, 68 vented radioactive material
detected in or near the testing site. As recently as 1970, after 19 years of testing
experience, the underground shot, Baneberry, vented radioactivity contaminating
300 workers and forcing evacuation of a major portion of the Nevada Test Site.
Plutonium debris has a radioactive life of 24,000 years. It is estimated that 250
square miles of the Nevada Test Site are permanently contaminated. Here, as in
the Denver area, which has been polluted by a plutonium fire—an unavoidable
risk of bomb manufacturing—the Atomic Energy Commission has refused to
allow the medical Surveys necessary to determine if the cancer rate has risen as a
result of contamination.
48
The AEC has consistently concealed or minimized scientific information. On
the environmental and health hazards of nuclear testing.
Do you agree with these statements?
Mr. FARLEY. Well, there are a number of statements there. Some
of them may be factually true. I do not know of my own firsthand
knowledge. I would not agree with the characterization of the attitude
of the Atomic Energy Commission on this.
Senator SYMINGTON. The other statements as far as you are con-
cerned, may be true or may not be true; right?
Mr. FARLEY. That is right.
Senator SYMINGTON. Is that because you don't know what the facts
are, or because you are against the basic position? *.
Mr. FARLEY, No; it is because I am not sure of the precise numbers.
I do not find those numbers inherently implausible because that is
very localized venting that was referred to.
Senator SYMINGTON. When you run through that article, Mr. Farley,
and supply comments for the record, will you answer those questions?
Mr. FARLEY. I will do that. (See p. 44.)
Senator SYMINGTON, Thank you.
PARTIES AND SIGNATORIES TO LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY
Mr. FARLEY. I wanted to comment, Mr. Chairman, that you might
want the material you requested on the Nonproliferation Treaty to
include also information on who has become a party or signatory to
the Limited Test Ban Treaty, because I had the impression that a
statement was made earlier today which is perhaps not quite accurate.
I think the only major nonparties to the Limited Test Ban Treaty,
other than, of course, China and France, are only two in number and
I think that is a relevant consideration.
Senator MUSKIE. Yes; we would like to have all of that information.
(See p. 45.)
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN’s EFFECT ON NONPROLIFERATION TREATY
May I ask you this question: Do you think a comprehensive test
ban would improve the chances for a successful nonproliferation
treativ?
º FARLEY. I think it would improve the chances. There has been
a good deal of feeling on the part of nonnuclear weapons that the
Nonproliferation Treaty did not have a fair balance of obligations and
limitations on the part of the nuclear or nonnuclear powers and I
believe one thing that could be done to redress that balance would be
a comprehensive test ban which would weigh on the present nuclear
powers.
why HAVEN'T WE LOWERED REQUIRED NUMBER OF ONSITE
INSPECTIONs?
Senator MUSKIE. One final question, if I may: -
We have not changed our negotiating stance since 1963. Why
haven’t we at least changed the number of onsite inspections that
we would insist upon? I get the sense from what you have said, and
you could clarify my impression on this score, that it isn’t the possi-
bility of actual onsite inspection that you were concerned about as the
49
right to make them. If that is the case, why haven’t we changed our
negotiating stance by at least lowering the number of onsite inspec-
tions which we would require?
Mr. FARLEY. Since we have been faced with the flat rejection of the
principle of onsite inspection, we have not been in negotiations on
this point. ---
As you say, I do personally believe that it is the element of deter-
rence in Onsite inspection which is one of the most important contri-
butions it can make. That does depend on there being onsite inspec-
tions available and, to lower the number may mean that we lose
some of the effectiveness of the actual possibility that events could
physically be inspected. But that is a matter which would be open to
negotiation if we got again into specific consideration of onsite
inspections.
Senator MUSKIE. If what we are concerned about is the determined
evader, wouldn’t the right to one onsite inspection serve the purpose
of interrupting a determined and persistent evasion as such?
Mr. FARLEY. The situation we find, though, Senator, is that there
will certainly be ambiguous events, and if there is an atmosphere of
Suspension in which it becomes important to conduct an onsite
inspection to dispel such doubts and suspicions, at that point if your
quota is one, you no longer have deterrence.
Senator MUSKIE. But in any case we haven’t taken the initiative to
lower the number?
Mr. FARLEY. We have not.
Senator MUSKIE. And the Soviet have?
Mr. FARLEY. They have lowered it to zero.
Senator SYMINGTON. May I ask a question?
MORATORIUM ON ATMOSPHERIC TESTING
If you had a moratorium on testing, which was discussed at length
in the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the chances would be strong, would
they not, that we could detect a meaningful test in the atmosphere?
Mr. FARLEY. In the atmosphere, I think, almost certainly.
Senator SYMINGTON. So that from the standpoint of military secu-
rity, physical security, to voluntarily say you are not going to have
another test unless the opposition tested would not involve any mili-
tary security, would it?
Mr. FARLEY. But I thought your prior question, Senator, related to
testing in the atmosphere? -
Senator SYMINGTON. It did.
Mr. FARLEY. Yes. In that case there would be no risk. We have no
reason to believe that there has been any violation of the atmospheric
test ban—Limited Test Ban Treaty. .
TJNDIERGROUND TESTING FIGURE BELOW WIHICH NO DANGER OF
VIOLATION
Senator SYMINGTON. Right. Will you put into the record the figure
of underground testing below which you feel there would be no
danger of violation?
Mr. FARLEY. I would give you the best answer that I can to that
question. .
50
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. This is not my business; it is your
business and at some point you should come up with a statement
that means something from a practical standpoint; otherwise we will
be continuing the wasting of many billions of dollars in this field.
There has been a lot of discussion about atomic power. One thing
that impresses me is how ignorant the American people are. Whether
this is fostered by those who may want to perpetuate the arms race, I
honestly don’t know.
For example, if you said “atomic” to the average child in the United
States, he would think of Hiroshima, not of all the good that can
come from control of air and water pollution, waste control, energy
and so forth; and the primary reason for this lies in the Secrecy in which
this whole atomic picture has been held over a long period of years;
in the hands of those who might be called the favored few. A year ago,
when I went to Europe with Senator Pastore, I learned more about
the true strength, military/nuclear strength, of the United States in
Europe in those 6 days than I did in 18 previous years on the Armed
Services Committee. It is about time that the experts in this field, of
which your agency is certainly No. 1, tells us a figure below which
you don’t think there is any danger. What is wrong with the logic
of that statement?
Mr. FARLEY. Senator, I was not trying to be evasive as to whether
I thought there was such a figure. I was trying to suggest I think
there may be advantage in recognizing that this is a matter of judg-
ment and not a matter of setting an arbitrary goal for, say, technical
detection, which we may or may not be able to meet.
Senator SYMINGTON. Everything is that way, basically. I ask what
is your judgment and that of your agency.
What do you think is the limit? You say it is a matter of judgment.
Everything is a matter of judgment. In my opinion, and I say this
with great respect, if you don’t give us some estimate, based on my
limited knowledge of the art, you are deliberately ducking the question
before the committee that has to put up the money.
Mr. FARLEY. I would take that question in that spirit.
Senator SYMINGTON. Will you answer it?
Mr. FARLEY. I will answer it.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.
(The information referred to follows:)
UNDERGROUND TESTING FIGURE BELow WHICH THERE WOULD BE No DANGER
OF VIOLATION
(Supplied by ACDA)
In response to Senator Symington's question, I do not believe we can identify
in advance such a figure below which there would be no danger of violation. For
example, magnitude 4.0 is equivalent to an explosive yield of about 1.5 KT in
hard rock, about 4.5 KT in material of intermediate coupling, and even higher
yields if more loosely coupling materials are available. Moreover, if the explosions
were not fully tamped (i.e., the seismic magnitudes were muffled by use of various
cavity decoupling techniques), then substantially greater yields could be tested
that would be recorded at seismic magnitude 4.0 or below. Other evasion tech-
niques which could mask or confound seismic detection or discrimination capabili-
ties have also been described as technically feasible. Even at the lowest of these
yields, we believe tests could be performed that would be of military significance.
To place the value of testing at low yields in perspective, I should point out that a
51.
large percentage of U.S. underground testing is below 20 KT, and important.
development is involved at yields of a few KT, including significant weapons effects
tests.
Thus, we do not believe that a detection system could ever have such a capability
that there would be no risk of an undetected violation—nor do we believe that
it is necessary to place such a requirement on our means of verification.
- With regard to on-site inspection, it should be noted that, independent of the
relative excellence of our seismic capabilities, the right to conduct on-site inspec-
tions could have deterrent value as well as value as a means of reinforcing confi-
dence and assurance in the operation of a test ban.
Against this background, it should be clear why it is not feasible for me to
identify a precise seismic capability which would enable the U.S. to decide to
agree to a comprehensive test ban treaty that permitted verification only by
national means. All I can say is that the decision has not been made that we have
reached that point. .
Senator MUSKIE. Thank you very much, Mr. Farley.
HEARING PEOCED URE
We have a panel of distinguished scientists. I wonder if they would
all come forward—Professor Chayes of Harvard Law School; Dean
Fisher of Georgetown University; Professor Sykes of Lamont-Doherty
Geological Observatory, Palisades, N.Y.; Dr. Herbert York, dean of
graduate studies, University of California, San Diego. -
The scenario is that each of you is in the order that you have agreed
upon to present your statements. I wonder, as to the possibility of
maximizing the chance for questions, and I will leave this to your
judgment, if you might summarize your prepared testimony or would
prefer to get your prepared statements in totally before us?
Dr. York, we want you to handle it because we want you to educate
us because obviously there are questions.
STATEMENT OFDR. HERBERT F. YORK, DEAN, GRADUATE STUDIES,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT SAN DIEGO
Dr. YoRK. My prepared statement is very short and it will take
considerably less than 5 minutes.
Senator MUSKIE. Why don’t you go ahead.
Dr. YoRK. I would like to preface it by a quote from the present
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, James Schlesinger. He
said in an interview given to the U.S. News and World Report:
We have very much improved our capability to monitor events in the Soviet
Union, but the question of the desirability of a test ban goes far beyond the
question of monitoring what the Soviets are doing. The real question is, given the
changed nature of the opposing forces in this era of negotiations, whether it is
desirable to cease testing.
I agree with his position. I have for some time felt that the real
question is whether it is desirable.
QUESTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED
In any serious discussion of a comprehensive test ban, three of the
questions which must be considered are (1) what are the probable
benefits of continuing testing; (2) what are the probable benefits of
an agreement to prohibit testing; and (3) how do these probable
benefits compare with each other.
52
HOW ARGUMIENTS MADE A DECADE A GO CAME OUT
Fortunately, for our present purposes, we went through this same
discussion rather thoroughly just a decade ago. What was then the
future has now become the past, and it is therefore both possible and
useful to see how the arguments made then actually came out.
At that time, those favoring continuing testing made three prin-
cipal claims:
One of these concerned ABM. It was claimed that the Soviets had
learned something in their 1961–62 series of nuclear tests that had
enabled them to solve the ABM problem, while the United States
lacked this essential information for its own program. Now, a decade
later, it is clear that the claim was incorrect. The ABM debates held
before this committee during the last several years showed that the
most important ABM questions do not involve nuclear testing. It is
equally clear that the Soviets did not solve their ABM problems as a
result of their last atmospheric test series.
A second claim made 10 years ago by those supporting the need for
further testing concerned breakthroughs and surprises. New and im-
portant breakthroughs and surprises were said to be just around the
corner, and it was repeatedly suggested that we were on the threshold
of a “third revolution” in nuclear weapons comparable in its impor-
tance to the invention of the A-bomb itself, and to the step from the
A-bomb to the H-bomb. Those then supporting a test ban said that
nuclear weapons technology was mature, and that future break-
throughs and revolutions were not very likely. The passage of a
decade has confirmed this latter view. Nuclear technology has proved
to be mature. In addition, our weapons capability is so saturated
that even a technologically novel weapon is likely to have only a
minimal political effect when and if one does emerge.
Third, it was claimed 10 years ago that, breakthroughs aside,
there would be further improvements in such design factors as yield-
to-weight ratio and in our understanding of weapons’ effects. This
third claim has turned out to be true in a strictly technological sense.
However, the progress that has been made has not been very impor-
tant in political or military terms. All of our current weapons systems,
including MIRV and ABM, could have been outfitted with nuclear
components developed before the limited test ban went into effect. In
some cases the details would be different but the overall situation
would be virtually the same. The same thing holds true for weapons’
effects. We have learned a little more about the effects in the last 10
years but we have long since passed the point where further refine-
ment of details is likely to have any important political or military
significance. - -
On the other hand, at least two of the hopes expressed by those who
supported a test ban 10 years ago have been fulfilled.
One of these was that the achievement of a nuclear test ban would
create a climate which would lead to further progress in arms control
and disarmament. Since the original nuclear test moratorium went
into effect in 1958, a series of additional valuable arms limitation
agreements and treaties have indeed been achieved. The current
SALT talks are the latest in the series. -
A second hope was that a test ban treaty would inhibit the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons. So far, this hope has been fulfilled also.
53
The Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Nonproliferation Treaty, which
was the most important of the many additional agreements that flowed
from the partial test ban, have inhibited further spread of nuclear
weapons. However, half the nations of the world, including some very
important ones, have so far declined to sign the Nonproliferation
Treaty. This gloomy fact, plus other international political factors,
make further reinforcement of the inhibition against proliferation
urgently needed. The long overdue conversion of the Limited Treaty
to a comprehensive one would be a powerful step in that direction.
COMPEREHENSIVE TEST BAN LONG OVERDUE AND URGENTLY NEEDED
In short, insofar as the balance between the benefits of testing and
the benefits of a test ban are concerned we could have had and we
should have had a comprehensive test ban 10 years ago. In the inter-
vening years the balance between two sets of benefits has moved even
further in the direction favoring a comprehensive test ban. Therefore,
a comprehensive nuclear test ban is both long overdue and urgently
needed and I strongly support the measures designed to achieve it
which are now before this committee.
Senator MUSKIE. Thank you, Dr. York. I think the agreement is
we go through all your statements first and then get into questions.
Let's see, No. 2 on the list is Professor Sykes.
COMMENDATION OF WITNESSES
Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave because of a
constituent problem. I would pay my respects to Dr. York and
Professor Chayes and Dean Fisher and will read everything they say
carefully. I don’t know the other gentleman, but would congratulate
you all on the proved wisdom of your position in this matter over the
years, as against what was told us at the time we discussed such matters
as the Limited Test Ban Treaty. -
Thank you.
Senator MUSKIE. Thank you, Senator Symington, very much.
STATEMENT OF PROF. LYNN R. SYKES, LAMONT-DOHERTY
GEOLOGICAL OBSERVATORY, PALISADES, N.Y
Mr. SYKES. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, in the
interest of shortening time, I will submit, with your permission, my
testimony and shorten it to about half the presentation that I will
read here. - r
Seismic waves propagating through the solid earth are the principal
means of detecting, locating, and identifying underground nuclear
explosions at great distances from their source. During the last 10
years a large research effort has focused on the detection of under-
ground explosions and the discrimination of underground explosions
from earthquakes. .
As a result, a great advancement has been made in detection and
identification of underground explosions. This research has lead to an
improved understanding of the differences in the seismic waves
Originating from earthquakes and underground explosions. It is these
54
fundamental differences in the two types of sources that permit
explosions of a certain size or larger to be discriminated or distinguished
from earthquakes. ..",
During the last 10 years the earth Sciences, which include seismology,
have experienced a renaissance in the understanding of large-scale
earth processes such as why earthquakes occur where they do and what
types of earth movements occur in various areas of the world. .
Today I will summarize the present thresholds for the detection and
identification of underground explosions. I will also estimate thresholds
that appear to be achievable with existing seismic instruments within
the near future, that is, within about 1 year.
Although seismic methods are highly reliable for events larger than
the thresholds I report, it must be remembered that any seismic
system will have a threshold, or lower unit, below which smaller events
probably will not be detected and identified. Also, high reliability does
not mean 100 percent or absolute certainty. I will refer to the false
alarm problem later in more detail. Also, I will discuss the evasion
problem, that is, the possibility that underground explosions may be
detonated so as to possibly escape detection and identification by
existing methods. !
DETECTION AND DISCRIMINATION THEESHOLDS
Table 1 summarizes the present thresholds and those expected in the
near future for the detection and the discrimination of earthquakes and
underground explosions of a certain magnitude or larger in the Western
United States and in Eurasia, and I believe you have this table before
you.
The present capabilities are as follows: Western United States, for
detection and location, magnitude 3.9; discrimination, 4.0; for Eurasia
at the present, detection and location, 4.3; discrimination 4.5; expected
in near future for Eurasia, detection and location, 4.0 to 4.3; discrimina-
tion of explosions from earthquakes, 4.1 to 4.4.
(Table 1 follows:)
Ar TABLE 1.-Seismic detection and discrimination thresholds
€8,
g e ‘ tº * g g g Magnitude
Present capibilities: threshold
Western United States: (mb)
Detection and location------------------------------- 3. 9
Discrimination of explosions from earthquakes---------- 4. 0
Eurasia:
Detection and location------------------------------- 4, 3
Discrimination of explosions from earthquakes---------- 4. 5
Expected in near future (about 1 year): -
Eurasia:
Detection and location------------------------------- 4. 0–4. 3
Discrimination of explosions from earthquakes---------- 4. 1–4. 4
Mr. SYKEs. The thresholds are given in terms of the Richter mag-
nitude, which is a measure of the size of the seismic waves. It is
important, to distinguish detection of events from discrimination or
identification. The detection, location, and estimation of the size of
events is normally performed with short-period seismic waves, par-
ticularly those recorded by arrays of seismic instruments. The most
useful methods of discriminating underground explosions from earth-
quakes are (1) the depth of the event, (2) its location and (3) the
55
so-called Ms—mp method in which long- and short-period seismic
waves are compared. Underground explosions generate much Smaller
long-period waves than earthquakes. Other less reliable methods, such
as complexity of the seismic signal and discriminants based on short-
period seismic waves, are also available as diagnostic aids. .
The capabilities in table 1 assume availability of data from existing
seismic stations and arrays in and outside the United States but not
from stations in the U.S.S.R. or China. These estimates are similar to
those given in testimony by a number of individuals last year before
this subcommittee and before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
These numbers are also similar to those reported at recent scientific
meetings and in technical journals. The determination of the location
and depth of an event is less accurate near the detection threshold,
but it improves considerably as the magnitude increases by 0.3 units.
It is not possible to distinguish chemical and nuclear explosions at the
smallest yields.
CONVERSION OF MAGNITUDE TO YIELD OF EXPLOSION
The magnitudes in table 1 may be converted to yield as follows:
In hard rock magnitude 4.0 is 1.5 kilotons—KT; 4.5 is 6 KT; in dry
alluvium the yields are about 12 KT for magnitude 4.0 and 45 KT
for magnitude 4.5. All of these figures assume that no attempts at
evasion are made. Estimates given before the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy last fall indicate that explosions in dry alluvium larger
than 1 to 10 KT would likely produce collapse craters that could be
detected by nonseismic means. .
FALSE ALARM PROBLEM
The identification of underground nuclear explosions requires not
only knowledge that an event has occurred but also the capability to
identify, that is, discriminate, the detected event as either an explosion
or an earthquake. The frequency of earthquakes increases rapidly as
magnitude decreases. For example, in the U.S.S.R. and China about 200
earthquakes occur per year of magnitude of 4.5 and larger. About
three times as many events are larger than magnitude 4.0. Events
located offshore in the active Kurile-Kamchatka area of the far
eastern U.S.S.R. are not included in these totals. -
False alarms, that is, earthquakes misidentified as underground
explosions by the so-called Ms—mp discriminant, may be caused in
two ways: (1) interference between small seismic signals and those of
larger earthquakes and (2) anomalous earthquakes for which the Ms—
mp ratio is like that of an explosion. For events in Eurasia of magni-
tude 4.5 or larger, the number of false alarms has been estimated as
Zero to a few per year. Thus, 99 percent of the earthquakes of magni-
tude 4.5 or larger can be identified as earthquakes. Most of the false
alarms are at the lower magnitudes, that is, a size equivalent to the
lower yields mentioned in the table. Sufficient data are only now
becoming available to ascertain the number of false alarms in the
magnitude range of 4.0 to 4.5. In this range the number of false
alarms probably will be controlled by the interference of small events
by signals from larger earthquakes.
To detect and discriminate events and to reduce the false alarm
rate at the magnitude 4.0 level for Eurasia will require additional
56
instrumentation and data processing. Experience gained in studying
seismic events in the western United States indicates that the seismic
discriminants that work at magnitude 4.5 and larger also work down
to magnitude 4 and below, providing enough sensitive instruments are
installed within about 3,000 kilometers of the source region.
EVASION
Evasion techniques, such as detonation in large cavities, hiding
the signals of explosions in those of large earthquakes, and multiple
explosions with signals designed to resemble those of an earthquake,
may be available for clandestine testing. These methods appear to be
technically feasible and cannot be dismissed from serious considera-
tion. It has been estimated that a 10 to 50 kiloton explosion could
escape detection for stations at large distances from the source if a.
large enough cavity could be constructed. So far this method has not
been tested for explosions larger than a fraction of a kiloton. Networks
conceivably could be designed to reduce this risk to a smaller detectable
yield. Although not tested in practice, it also appears possible to hide
the seismic signal of a 50 kiloton explosion in that of a larger earth-
quake providing the violator is willing to wait for the one or two
opportunities available per year. Unlike cavity decoupling where the
seismic signals are small, large signals are still generated by the hide-
in-earthquake and multiple-explosion techniques. Research on signal
processing methods for counterevasion may render the latter two
techniques less useful for clandestine testing. .
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator MUSKIE. Thank you very much, Professor Sykes.
STATEMENT OF PROF, ABRAM CHAYES, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
Mr. CHAYEs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Much of the talk this
morning has revolved around technical questions of seismology and
nuclear physics. As a lawyer, I cannot contribute very much on those
points. So I will try to summarize my prepared statement, as you
suggested, although there are some points where a lawyer might have
a thing or two to say that I would like to make.
DECISIVE POINTS GOVERNING DECISION
I believe that the fascination and mysteries of science and game
theory often divert us from the basic factors of judgment and common
sense that should govern decision in this field. I want to focus on three
more general and I think decisive points this morning.
First is that a comprehensive nuclear test ban would have been
overwhelmingly in the interests of the United States at all times
since 1958 when the matter was first discussed, even on the basis of
relative weapons technology alone. And it still is today.
The second is that the issue of onsite inspection is now a red herring
or maybe a red, white, and blue herring. Whatever may have been
the case a decade or more ago, there is no reason today to insist on
any inspection or surveillance other than what can be accomplished
by national means.
Third, the United States is now in default on its solemn undertaking
twice pledged with the overwhelming approval of the Senate, to
undertake good faith negotiations for a comprehensive test ban.
57
RECORD OF PAST TWO DECADES
Now, like Dr. York, I think we ought to look backwards a little bit
and see what the record that we can define over the past two decades
shows. I think it shows that in 1958, when the test ban discussions
started on a serious basis, the United States was substantially ahead
of the Soviet Union in practically every branch of nuclear weapons
technology. - .
We knew more about everything. We had larger weapons than they,
smaller weapons, more versatile weapons and everything else. We
had a much larger backlog of information because we had tested
almost twice as much as they did, and they had no underground test
program at all.
In the years since then while we have been worried about inspection
methods and how to make sure that the Soviets do not cheat on an
agreement, the Soviets have inexorably closed that gap. So that now
they are substantially up to us on almost every dimension that I
mentioned and perhaps ahead of us in some. They have closed that
gap not by cheating or by testing behind the moon or in a salt cavern
or something like that, but by making permitted tests that we might
have banned in a test ban treaty if we had accepted it in 1958.
Now, if we had accepted their proposal of no onsite inspection in
1958, and if they had chosen to breach that agreement by atmospheric
tests, where they have made the most important gains, we would
have been able to detect that, and we would have been able to act
accordingly. -
And if they had chosen to breach it by underground testing, I think
the record that Dr. York has cited is very clear. There was not that
much to learn underground. We learned a lot of things about more
economical weapons, more effective weapons in an economic and
technical sense but nothing really that affected the strategic balance
between us. Of course, if they had complied above ground, even
assuming they had tried to cheat underground, they would have been
denied the major advances in weapons technology that they made
in the 1961 tests. So I think you have to say that the absence of a
test ban treaty since 1958, if you look at it historically, has resulted
in a significant closing of the gap by the Soviets in the field of nuclear
technology. It is hard for me to see how we could have gotten worse
off in the field of relative standing in nuclear technology than we are
now, after having held up a comprehensive test ban on this onsite
inspection issue. -
NO ONSITE INSPECTION IN MAJOR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
Next I want to talk a bit about the irrelevance of onsite inspection.
What I have said already goes a little bit to that question, but I
would like to make two other points. One of them has already been
touched on by Senator Kennedy. We have four or five major arms
control agreements now in effect all advised and consented to by the
Senate. There is another one that we hope will come out of the
Moscow talks next week. None of those provide for any onsite inspec-
tion on the territory of the Soviet Union. The Nonproliferation
Treaty, of course, provides for safeguards with respect to nonnuclear
powers.
58
Mr. Farley, when he was here, said, “Well, we make a practical
judgment about risks versus incentives.” But he did not say anything
about the real risks, let us say, of violation of the biological warfare
treaty. You asked him, Mr. Chairman, whether he would make a
judgment about whether the Soviets were likely to cheat in the under-
ground testing area. He refused to make such a judgment. But
obviously we must have made a judgment that there is almost no
risk of the Soviets cheating in the biological field. Now the question
is what are the factors which lead us not to make a similar judgment
in the underground testing field when, as I have suggested earlier, there
is nothing to indicate that a major breakthrough of any kind can be
made there. Even Mr. Farley did not say that. He talked about
“militarily significant” tests. Well, if you can get a weapon for a few
dollars less, I take it that is “militarily significant” in today’s budget
conditions. -
QUESTION OF FUNCTION OF ONSITE INSPECTION
Senator, the other point that I would like to make is a more
technical, perhaps, lawyer's point. I have not seen it made anywhere
and I would like to call the attention of the committee to it. The
question is what is the function of onsite inspection supposed to be?
Now, if you go back historically the demand for thorough inspection
as a part of a system of verification and enforcement dates back to the
Baruch plan for international control of atomic energy in 1946. That
plan contemplated an international enforcement agency with power
to apply severe sanctions to violators. We thought, and it was right,
that such an agency could act only on very convincing evidence of
violation. Onsite inspection was conceived as a way of insuring that
-firsthand evidence would be available to convince a neutral judicial
type tribunal. This judicial model of the enforcement of arms control
agreements continued to dominate American thinking until 1963 and
it still dominates, I think, some of our concepts about it. Onsite
inspection had that same function in relation to the judicial model.
It was thought of as a way of providing unmistakable evidence to
convince a neutral and skeptical judge that violation had indeed
occurred. .
Well, the Limited Test Ban Treaty has changed that model. The
enforcement mechanism is not an outside tribunal of any kind.
Instead a party is entitled to withdraw if it decides that extraordinary
events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized the
Supreme interests of its country. The same clause is to be found in the
Nonproliferation Treaty. And, although I have not seen any proposed
text of the SALT agreement, it is a good bet that similar language will
be found there. x-
This kind of withdrawal clause fundamentally changes the enforce-
ment mechanism of the treaty, and with it eliminates the functional
justification for Onsite inspection.
There is no longer any need for conclusive evidence to convince a
hostile tribunal that a breach has surely been committed. We need
only enough evidence to convince ourselves that action is warranted,
to permit the President to have the basis for making a judgment that
we ought to withdraw from the treaty. And that is a rather different
thing.
59
Even in the case of ambiguous signals, about which a lot of talk has
been heard today, one could inquire and seek clarification of a series
of ambiguous signals. That is what we have done in the case of the
Limited Test Ban Treaty with shots that vent. And the Soviets have,
too. We exchange diplomatic notes and we give clarifying information.
Now, it would be very hard for the other side to lie, to give untrue
information, to that kind of a request because, not only do we have
the seismic data as everybody said, but we have got an enormous
amount of other kinds of surveillance. The other party would have to
lie in such a way that it was consistent with all this data, not all of
which he knows we have. He knows we have a lot, but he does not
know exactly what it is.
The fact is what they would probably do in a case like that if they
really had conducted tests is to decline to respond. Not lie but decline
to respond. And we could take that refusal into account in our own
decision whether to withdraw.
In fact, this method of inquiry is really parallel to how we expected
onsite inspection to work. We never expected that the Russians
would let us in to inspect at any site where we were likely to find any-
thing. We thought that if there were a clandestine test the Russians
would find some pretext for refusing or limiting inspection rights.
That would be the breach that we could prove. We could prove a
breach of our inspection rights, not a breach of the agreement. So
that it would be the refusal to disclose, not the disclosure that would
be the touchstone of the breach. And I suggest that the same devices
are open to us now in the diplomatic area.
U.S. OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE
Now, let me briefly make my final point about where we stand on
our obligations. The main argument against the comprehensive treaty
to this point is really not fear of Soviet cheating or anything else the
Russians might do. It is instead that the gentlemen from the Depart-
ment of Defense and the AEC would prefer to continue underground
testing for themselves. I think they have said this out and out as the
prime reason for not going forward.
Now, I have no doubt, and others have shown it, that such testing
would be a convenient, helpful procedure for the Defense Department
and the AEC. But it is my contention that the benefits of underground
testing, no matter how convenient or economical it may be, are con-
siderations that the United States is not entitled to take into account
in deciding whether to go forward with a comprehensive ban. The
slate is not clean. We do not have an open situation in which we can
weigh the benefits of testing with the benefits of stopping. We have
twice given solemn international undertakings on the subject in which
the Senate participated. We affirmed our desire to achieve the discon-
tinuance of our test explorations for all time in the Limited Test Ban
Treaty. And then in the Nonproliferation Treaty, we reiterated that
and combined it with an undertaking in the text to pursue negotiations
in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date. .
Under the language of those undertakings, fairly construed, it is
not open to us, I think, to decline to enter into a comprehensive treaty
merely on the ground that it would be more convenient for us to con-
60
tinue testing. As I read those undertakings they place us under an
obligation to negotiate in good faith for a treaty, and the only accept-
able reason for refusing to sign such an agreement would be that
despite our best negotiating efforts, we have been unable to devise an
arrangement that would adequately safeguard our fundamental
security interests. & -
In my view, the United States is in breach of those undertakings
right now. We have not changed our position, as the chairman has
pointed out, or offered new proposals on a comprehensive test ban
since the Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed 9 years ago. That is not
bargaining in good faith. And it does not excuse our default that the
U.S.S.R. has been equally delinquent. -
As you pointed out just a moment ago, Mr. Chairman, if we are
not prepared to give up Onsite inspections altogether we certainly
could begin to explore the question of a different number. It is not an
answer to say that the Soviet is opposed in principle because we have
an obligation as well. -
We have talked a great deal about whether the Soviets will comply
with their treaty obligations. The question is: Are we willing to carry
out ours?
We have heard a great deal, in the last week especially, about the
importance of fulfilling our commitments. Do we attribute the same
importance to commitments for peace as to commitments for war?
We have said a great deal about the need for the Congress to assert
its authority in the domain of foreign policy. Will the Senate now
exercise its undoubted powers by enacting these resolutions calling
upon the President to redeem the pledges they have jointly given?
You can help to answer those questions in affirmative by acting
favorably on one or perhaps both of the resolutions before you.
. Thank you.
(Mr. Chayes' prepared statement follows:)
TESTIMONY OF PROF. ABRAM CHAYES, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZA-
TION OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON A CoMPREHENSIVE
TEST BAN TREATY, MAY 15, 1972 -
Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to be here
this morning and grateful for the privilege of testifying before you. I appear in
support of S. Res. 233 and S. Res. 273, both putting the Senate on record in favor
of the prompt negotiation of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
As some of you may recall, . I have appeared before the Foreign Relations
Committee on previous occasions, when I was Legal Advisor to the Department
of State, and most relevant to this occasion, in the hearings on the Limited Test
Ban Treaty in August 1963. I am now a Professor of Law at Harvard, specializing
in international law. -- g
'Much of the talk this morning has revolved around technical questions of
seismology and nuclear physics. This same kind of technical and Scientific dis-
cussion has dominated the arms control debate from the beginning. As a lawyer,
I can contribute little on these questions. But I believe the fascination and
mysteries of science and game theory often diverts us from the more basic factors
of judgment and common sense that should govern decision in this field.
I should like to focus our attention on three such general, and I believe decisive
points this morning. I propose:
First, that a comprehensive nuclear test ban would have been overwhelmingly
in the interest of the United States at all times since 1958, when the matter was
first discussed, and is so today. -
Second, the issue of on-site inspection is a red herring. Whatever may have
been the case a decade or more ago, there is no reason today to insist on any
inspection or surveillance other than what can be accomplished by national means.
61
Third, the United States is now in default on its solemn undertaking, twice
pledged with the overwhelming approval of the Senate, to undertake good faith
negotiations for a comprehensive test ban.
Let me expand a bit on each of these propositions.
I.
The overwhelming national interest in a comprehensive test ban. Most of the time
when we try to judge the national interest we must try to make predictions on
inadequate data about an inherently uncertain future. So it was, perhaps, when
the test ban debate began in the mid-1950’s. But today, almost two decades later,
we have a factual record to inform our judgment. -
What does the record show? i
In 1958, when the Geneva Conference of Experts met to consider control
mechanisms for a possible test ban, the United States was substantially ahead
of the Soviet Union in practically every branch of nuclear weapons technology.
We had larger weapons. We had smaller weapons. We were far ahead on the
critical matter of weight-to-yield ratio. We knew more about weapons effects in
different environments. We had made much more progress in the field of clean
weapons. The United States had conducted 310 tests, 24 of them underground,
to 163 for the Soviets. The USSR had not conducted any underground tests and
had no program for doing so.
In the years since then, United States policy makers have endlessly debated the
intricacies of a system of safeguards to insure that the Soviets could not steal a
march on us under a test ban treaty. Meanwhile, Soviet weapons designers were
systematically and inexorably closing the technological gap between us. Today, in
all the dimensions I have mentioned, the Soviets are known to be very much closer
to us than they were in 1958, and in some they have equalled or surpassed us.
They have made these substantial relative gains not by clandestine testing
behind the moon or in abandoned salt mines, but by an open and notorious test
program that was not forbidden by international agreement—in all environments
until 1963, and thereafter, for the first time, underground.
These relative gains would have been forestalled and the U.S. lead frozen as of
1958 if we had entered into a treaty and the Soviets had complied. What if they
had not? Well, some of the most spectacular gains were made in their atmospheric
test series of 1961 and thereafter. It was then that they tested their big bomb—
larger than any we have made. There, too, experiments were conducted apparently
designed to explore the effects of large nuclear explosions in the atmosphere and
outer space. But those tests needed no elaborate inspection system to detect. They
would have constituted a breach that we and many other monitoring states would
have known about. If the Soviets had been willing to do that, the treaty would
have collapsed, to be sure. But we would have been no worse off than we were
without the treaty, and the USSR would have had to bear the onus of breach.
How about underground testing? Well, we are now able to look back on two
decades of unrestricted underground testing on both sides. What has been the net
of all that effort? Many technical improvements in the weapons on both sides.
More flexibility. More technical virtuosity. But nothing that has had the slightest
effect on the basic strategic balance between the two countries. We began in a situa-
tion of mutual deterrence and we are still in that situation 14 years later. Even if
the Soviets had chosen to run an extensive clandestine underground test program,
and even, if they had been successful in concealing it—which is highly unlikely—
they would not have learned anything that would have made a real difference in the
strategic situation. Meanwhile, they would have been denied the substantially
greater advances they made by atmospheric testing.
The case, it seems to me, is open and shut that we would have been better off
to have accepted a comprehensive ban in 1958 without any inspection at all.
Today, although the differentials are smaller, we seem to face a similar situation.
According to the technicians, one of the fields of weapons technology in which the
Soviets are still behind is that of smaller warheads of the kind needed to convert
existing missiles to MIRVs. A numerical ceiling on launchers, which is expected
in the SALT agreement, would not prohibit this conversion. The Soviets could
certainly achieve the necessary technical dexterity by further underground testing.
If we really are concerned about the threat of MIRVed SS-9s to our land based
ICBM force, a ban on underground testing now would put some constraints on
this development. -
Overall, since the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the United States rate of under-
ground testing has been more than triple that of the Russians. From August 1963
through July, 1970, the latest period for which figures are available, we had
79–879—7.2 5
62
conducted 221 shots to 64 for the Soviets. We should be running out of things to
learn in these experiments. Our current test program, as described by United
States officials in recent testimony, is no doubt useful to weapons technicians.
But it does not suggest the prospect of exciting or portentous new developments.
In fact, I think it is generally agreed that even with unlimited underground testing,
the possibility of either side making a breakthrough that would markedly affect
the relative strategic position of the two countries is nil.
II.
The irrelevance of on-site inspection. The points I have just made bear on the
on-site inspection issue. If the results of continued testing can have no serious
impact on our national Security, then we are justified in taking some risks of
undiscovered clandestine testing under a treaty. Nobody suggests that on-site
inspection gives more than marginal additional assurance in this regard. There-
fore, on this ground alone, it would not be imprudent to drop our demand for
on-site inspection. .
But I would like to carry the argument somewhat further. In the first place, as
you know, the United States is now party to four major arms control treaties,
each advised and consented to by the Senate. They are the Limited Test Ban
Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Non Proliferation Treaty and the Seabed
Treaty. Another major agreement is scheduled to emerge from the Moscow meet-
ing a week hence. None of these agreements contains provisions for inspection on
the territory of the USSR, and except for the Non Proliferation Treaty, all rely
exclusively on national means for verification of compliance.
The record of compliance under all these treaties has been good. With the
exception of a few shots on both sides that released radioactive debris across state
boundaries in technical violation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, there has been
no complaint of anything close to a breach by any party.
Some argue that the absence of attempted violations shows the treaties were
unnecessary. Their prohibitions run only against things nobody would do any-
way. But that certainly was not true of the Limited Test Ban or the NPT. And it
will not be true of any freeze on strategic missiles. *
It is true, of course, that national means of verification provide very full informa-
tion about what the other side is doing in the fields covered by these treaties. But
it is not 100% complete. You will recall, for example, that opponents of the
Limited Test Ban Treaty testified to a number of ways in which our national
detection systems could be evaded.
The Senate, in approving those treaties agreed with President Kennedy’s
statement in his American University speech, that “No treaty, . . . can provide
absolute security against deception or evasion. But it can, if it is sufficiently
effective in its enforcement and if it is sufficiently in the interests of its signers,
offer far more security and far fewer risks than an unabated, uncontrolled, un-
predictable arms race.” All of the agreements I have mentioned meet that test.
So does the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. They represent situations in which
both sides are generally satisfied with the status quo and neither sees great ad-
vantage to be gained by changing it. But internal pressures, potential economies,
marginal improvements and technical challenge make it hard to maintain that
status quo by tacit understanding or “conscious parallelism,” as they call it in
antitrust law. The treaty stabilizes the situation by creating a formal obligation
not to disturb it.
I want to make one further point—this time a more technical lawyer's point—
about on-site inspection in the current contest. The demand for thorough inspec-
tion as part of a system of verification and enforcement dates back to the Baruch
plan for international control of atomic energy in 1946. That plan contemplated
an international enforcement agency with power to apply severe sanctions to
violators. Such an agency could act only on convincing evidence of violation.
On-site inspection was conceived as a way of insuring that first hand evidence
would be available to convince a neutral, judicial tribunal.
This judicial model of the enforcement of arms control agreements continued
to dominate American thinking until 1963. And on-site inspection had the same
function in relation to that model. It was thought of as a way of providing un-
mistakeable evidence to convince a neutral and skeptical judge that violation
had indeed occurred.
The Limited Test Ban Treaty changed that model. The enforcement mechanism
is not an outside tribunal of any kind. Instead, a party is entitled to withdraw
“if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” The same clause
63
is to be found in the Non Proliferation Treaty, and, although I have not seen any
proposed texts of a SALT agreement, it is a good bet that similar language will
be found there.
This modern withdrawal clause, which is the culmination of a long evolution,
fundamentally changes the enforcement mechanism of the treaty and with it the
functional justification for on-site inpsection. There is no longer any need for
conclusive evidence to convince a hostile tribunal that breach has surely been
committed. We need only enough evidence to convince ourselves that action is
warranted. -
Moreover, if national means of intelligence reveal ambiguous or suspicious
activity on the other side, we could seek clarification through ordinary diplomatic
channels. This path has been followed with respect to underground shots that
vented in violation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. It would not be easy to lie
convincingly in response to such inquiries. Our Satellite reconnaissance and other
means of surveillance give us an enormous amount of information about what is
going on in the USSR. The Soviet leaders know this, but they cannot, of course,
know exactly what we know. So it would be hard to be sure their answer would
fit all the facts unless it were the true answer. Of course, they might decline to
respond on the ground that they had no obligation to do so under the agreement.
But we would be entitled to take that refusal into account in deciding to exercise
our withdrawal rights.
Indeed, this method of diplomatic inquiry under a Test Ban-type withdrawal
clause operates in much the same way that on-site inspection was expected to
work in the judicial model. No one ever really thought inspectors would discover
a violation. If there was real danger of that, the Soviets, it was predicted, would
find some pretext to refuse or curtail inspection rights. The refusal to disclose,
not the disclosure would be the touchstone of breach.
III.
Our pledge to negotiate a comprehensive test ban. I feel a bit that, to this point, I
have been flogging a pair of moribund horses. I don’t think any responsible official
seriously contends today that under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, clandes-
time testing by the Soviets might pose a real threat to our Security. Nor, I think,
does anyone maintain that we could get any significant additional assurance of
compliance by on-site inspection.
The main argument against a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at this point is
not fear of Soviet cheating or anything else the Russians might do. It is, instead,
that the gentlemen from the Department of Defense and the AEC would prefer
to continue underground testing themselves, for their own purposes.
Others have shown that the desire of our own agencies to continue testing is
related more to considerations of convenience and economy than to any funda–
mental security requirement. I cannot add anything on that score. But it is my
contention that the benefits of underground testing, no matter how convenient
or economical it may be, are considerations that the United States is not entitled
to take into account in deciding whether to go forward with a comprehensive ban.
The slate is not clean. We have twice given solemn internation undertakings
on the subject, in which this body participated. The Limited Test Ban Treaty
itself affirms our desire “to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions for
all time” and our determination “to continue negotiations to this end”. That
affirmation is reiterated in the preamble of the Non Proliferation Treaty, and is
combined with an undertaking in the text of the Treaty itself “to pursue nego-
tiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date.”
Under the language of those undertakings, fairly construed, it is not open to
us, I think, to decline to enter into a comprehensive treaty merely on the ground
that it would be more convenient to continue testing. -
As I read those undertakings they place us under an obligation to negotiate in
good faith for a treaty. And the only acceptable reason for refusing to sign such
an agreement would be that despite our best negotiating efforts, we had been
unable to devise an arrangement that would adequately safeguard our fundamental
security interests.
In my view, the United States is in breach of those undertakings right now. We
have not changed our position or offered new proposals on a comprehensive test
ban since the Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed nine years ago.
That is not bargaining in good faith. And it does not excuse our default that the
USSR has been equally delinquent. - -
64
Moreover, I believe it is generally agreed that we could make substantial
concessions on the issue of on-site inspection—if not eliminate it entirely—with
no significant danger to the national Security.
That is why I believe Senate action on these resolutions is so important. They
can be the step that is needed to get the negotiating process under way again. At
the very least, they would represent an attempt by the Senate, within the limits of
its own powers, to discharge the obligations to which it advised and consented in
the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the NPT.
Let me say that of the two resolutions before you, I prefer the Kennedy resolu-
tion, S. Res. 230. It calls for an immediate moratorium on underground testing
“to remain in effect So long as the Soviet Union also abstains from testing.” In
this it follows the pattern of President Kennedy's American University initiative,
which led to the successful conclusion of the Limited Test Ban. You will recall
that he announced then “that the United States does not propose to conduct
nuclear tests in the atmosphere so long as other states do not do so. We will not be
the first to resume.” In my opinion that step—the announcement of a reciprocal
moratorium—had much to do with creating the setting for successful negotiations.
But if for any reason the Senate is unwilling to accept that approach, I can see
no possible basis for objection to the Hart-Mathias resolution, S. Res. 273, As I
read it, it calls upon the President to do no more than what we are already com-
mitted to do by Solemn treaty obligation: to negotiate in good faith for a compre-
hensive test ban treaty.
We have talked a great deal about whether the Soviets will comply with their
treaty obligations. Are we willing to carry out ours?
We have heard a great deal about the importance of fulfilling our commitments.
Do we attribute the same importance to commitments for peace as to commit-
ments for war? -
We have said a great deal about the need for the Congress to assert its authority
in the domain of foreign policy. Will the Senate now exercise its undoubted powers
to call upon the President to redeem the pledges they have jointly given?
You can help to answer those questions in the affirmative by acting favorably
on the resolutions before you.
Senator MUSKIE. Thank you, Professor Chayes, for an excellent
statement,
Dean Fisher.
STATEMENT OF ADRIAN S, FISHER, DEAN, GEORGETOWN
IJNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL
Mr. FISHER. Well, I am dealing primarily with the political signifi-
cance of the test ban, Mr. Chairman, and I would just like—I do not
want to repeat what Professor Chayes said about living up to the U.S.
word except to point out that the commitment to which he referred
has been made by three administrations. Now, how did two commit-
ments get to be made by three administrations? The first one was made
by President Kennedy, in the limited test ban; the second was made
in the Nonproliferation Treaty which, while it was negotiated under
the direction of President Johnson, was actually ratified under Presi-
dent Nixon. As a former international negotiator, I am aware that the
other countries of the world take this commitment very, very seriously,
and as long as we are trying to get them to go along with a Nonpro-
liferation Treaty we really cannot do it very well, and at the same time
say, “Well, what you do is something else again, but for our part we
really would like to continue underground testing.” They, many of
them, regard our current insistence on Onsite inspection as a pretext
and in view of the statements made, the public statements made, by
U.S. officials that we would rather continue testing and that verifica-
tion is not the issue any more. It is awfully hard to dispute it too
seriously. - - -
65
PUTTING DAMPER ON QUALITY RACE
Now, the second political consideration relates to the U.S.–U.S.S.R.
relations and I will deal with this briefly because Senator Kennedy
dealt with this earlier this morning.
It is probably true that any agreement that comes out of the SALT
talks will be a limited agreement. Now, I am not making this as a
charge, but whenever you come back with a limited agreement you
always have two competing forces in the administration. One of them
saying, “Well, it is a limited agreement so we are free to continue to
arm in the areas not covered. OK, let us get going.” The others will
say, “Well, since we have cut down the reason for a quality race, the
limitations on ABM, limitations on launchers, why do we need to have
a new quality race?” I am not suggesting that anyone is going into the
SALT talks with a plan to begin a quality race, but my guess is there is
going to be one substantial argument on this issue and it seems to me
that a comprehensive test ban is the best thing to do to make that
argument come out right so you do not push the arms race down here
and have it pop up here. If you have a comprehensive test ban you put
a damper on the quality race.
Now, Dr. York suggested maybe the damper is already on there
because he referred to saturation in weapons quality and there are no
more breakthroughs. Well, I do not mean to say he is right or wrong.
I assume he is right; he knows more than I do, but if he is right all we
are stopping is a colossal waste of money. If he is wrong we are stopping
the possibility of a dangerous escalation.
BARGAINING CHIP ARGUMENT CONCERNING MORATORIUM
Well, what about the resolutions? Well, one resolution speaks
for itself. It calls for negotiations on, along the lines we have chatted
about, but I think a few words are relevant about Senator Kennedy’s
resolution which calls for a moratorium. Whenever you have a pro-
posal for a moratorium, even a reciprocal moratorium, conventional
wisdom always pops up and says, “Oh, do not stop now, because you
are bargaining, and to bargain you have to have bargaining chips.”
That is the bargaining chip argument and in some cases the trouble
with it is that is an extrapolation, way past reality, of a proposition
that has an element of truth in it. We have had historical experience
with three moratoria, and one of them is so obvious there I forgot to
put it in my prepared statement. The first moratorium was President
Eisenhower's moratorium on all nuclear weapons testing. It started
in the late fifties and went through to September 1961. I do not
believe it was helpful. It was a nice try and I say this in no criticism
of him for it. The difficulty with it was that it was substantially
different in its own method of the modalities of verification from the
type of treaty the United States was then trying to negotiate. And so
the real test of whether a moratorium is good or bad is, does it exert
pressures to push the other side in the direction of negotiations, and
one of those pressures is the inevitable argument, both in our NSC
and their Politburo, as to whether the other side is serious.
Now, the moratorium that everyone thinks of, and it certainly is a
great one, is, of course, President Kennedy's American University
speech, which was made on the 10th of June. There were some prior
66
discussions that the people knew about. It was answered through a
rather hidden answer contained in a rather crude speech by Khrushchev
in East Berlin on the 3d of July and there was a treaty on July 26,
less than 6 weeks after the moratorium was initially proposed.
There is another moratorium people have forgotten about, and I
just remembered it when I heard the name of the Senator mentioned.
That was the Pastore resolution. Why I left it out of my statement I
do not know. This resolution was a statement by the Senate as to what
we were going to do and what we were not going to do with respect to
nuclear sharing in the NATO area. It indicated a willingness on the
part of the United States to accept an inhibition much greater than
indicated by the negotiating position the United States had on the
table at Geneva at the time. I was the U.S. representative at the
time; so I remember it quite well.
Conventional wisdom bargaining chip theory says well, once that
has happened, you are dead; you have given your position away; you
have no bargaining chip. Well, the answer is we did not have our last
marbles down on the table at that time. The Soviets were getting ready
to make up their mind, doubtless having an internal discussion as to
whether they were going to come off a position which was really pretty
unreasonable. Part of that argument going on there, was whether or
not we really were going to stay with some of the far-out concepts of
nuclear sharing that were implicit in some of the things that we were
suggesting in NATO discussions. The Pastore resolution indicated
that we were going to behave sensibly. This made it possible for the
Soviet to react on a reasonable basis. They did so and by 1968 we had
a treaty. This is the best example I have seen, and if anyone in debate
in the Senate comes up with the bargaining chip theory I would
respectfully recommend that you ask them to look at the Pastore
resolution. Did that not make the Nonproliferation Treaty possible
and was this not just the same sort of thing? The answer is, it was.
TESTING BY CHINA
Well, I am afraid I have used my time. I do have some comments
about China, and about the peaceful nuclear explosions. My only
problem about China is there may be a natural tendency and say,
“Throw in your hand, we cannot get China and so there is no reason
for doing it.” Most scientists say China can test for 5 or 10 years at
this particular rate of testing without requiring any tests by us in
response. If the tests present a threat to us in 5 or 10 years we can use
the withdrawal clause which will be in the comprehensive test ban
treaty just as in the Limited Test Ban Treaty and is it not worth
while going on that basis?
PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
The last word on Plowshare. I assume that the fellow who had
thought up the name of that program has in mind the quotation from
the second chapter of Isaiah, fourth verse, that the nations “shall beat
their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks ºf * *
neither shall they learn war any more.” Some intensive research in the
Old Testament led me to an inconsistent quotation in Joel, third
chapter, 10th verse, in which the nation of Israel is exhorted to beat
its plowshares into swords and its pruning hooks into spears.
67
Now, both of these comments are true. It is true, although I think
the economics of it have been way overstated, that some of the
techniques for nuclear weapons can be used for peaceful explorations
but the opposite side, the Joel side, is also true, by the time you have
gotten a peaceful explosive device that can be used economically you
have got a highly sophisticated thermonuclear device. The nuclear
innards are the same as a very advanced thermonuclear bomb and any
attempt to deal with the peaceful explosions problems has to be dealt
with with this in mind. That makes control very difficult. Do you want
to have an international body—you certainly do not want to have an
international body like the IAEA go at the nuclear innards of a
peaceful explosive device which is a terribly complicated thermonuclear
explosive device. Maybe you should have instrument checking by
IAEA; maybe you have to have IAEA approval of any peaceful explo-
sion even within a country’s own borders, but you have to do
something. It has to be covered otherwise under this happy name of
plowshare, and quoting only one of the two biblical references on it,
you would turn a treaty—a comprehensive test ban treaty—which
might be a substantial step toward a generation of peace, you might
turn it into a sham and you would not want to do that.
RISKS ARE WORTH TAIKING
In conclusion, sure there are risks, but they are worth taking but
they are less than the risk of not taking, it would seem to me, in a
proliferated world, a possible worsening with our relationship with the
Soviet Union notwithstanding SALT. -
(Mr. Fisher's prepared statement follows:)
STATEMENT OF ADRIAN S. FISHER BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN
RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON MAY 15, 1972
My testimony is directed primarily to the political significance of a comprehen-
sive test ban. I do not believe, however, that we are dealing with a situation in
which we have to rely on political assets to overcome military liabilities because I
am persuaded, on the basis of expert testimony, that from the point of weapons
development, a test ban is, on balance, advantageous to the U.S. The experts
with which I have consulted, and which you have heard, have made it clear that
even allowing for the possibility of some cheating with relation to Small under-
ground tests, the relative position of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would be more
favorable under a comprehensive test ban, monitored solely by national means,
than it would be under the present circumstances which permit testing through a
much wider range of yields.
The political advantages of a comprehensive test ban are considerable. As this
committee is aware, the U.S. in the Limited Test Ban Treaty, signed by President
Kennedy, pledged itself to continue negotiations to ban all nuclear weapons test
explosions. This commitment was reaffirmed in the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
negotiated under President Johnson and ratified by President Nixon. Thus, three
administrations have undertaken this commitment.
It is clear to me that other countries of the world take this commitment of Ours
quite seriously. In the particular context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty I have
grave doubts that it will have any success in persuading certain potential powers
to seriously consider the Non-Proliferation Treaty as long as we are conducting an
extensive series of underground tests.
The second political consideration relates to the continued stability of Our
relations with the U.S.S.R. Put as simply as possible, continued testing by both
always poses the question of a break-through in the quality race, a break-through
which could upset the present balance. No matter how extensive or how limited
the outcome of the SALT talks, it will be in our interest to prevent any extension
of the quality race. -
We have heard a good deal about verification and doubtless will hear more. But
let’s put things in proper perspective: verification of a comprehensive test ban
68
has always been only a part of the problem. The main question which existed in
1958 and exists today, 14 years later, is really this one: do we want to continue
testing nuclear weapons? Is Our overall security better with a comprehensive test
ban even though there is some risk of a few small clandestine tests, or without a
ban, which allows the Russians to test at all yields, encourages additional nations
to acquire nuclear weapons and continues indefinitely the arms race? If we decide
that it is in our best interest to ban tests, I do believe that our present capability
to distinguish earthquakes from explosions at very low magnitudes should be
Satisfactory to permit us to move toward a comprehensive test ban treaty. For
this reason I would hope this Committee could take favorable action. On S. Res.
273 calling for the negotiation of such a treaty, and S. Res. 230 calling for a
moratorium by the U.S. on all nuclear weapon tests so long as the Soviets abstain
from such tests. This is not the first time we have called for a reciprocal morator-
ium. President Eisenhower called for one on all tests in the late 1950's and it re-
mained in effect until September 1961. President John F. Kennedy proposed such
a moratorium in his American University speech on June 10, 1963. It led to the
Limited Test Ban which was agreed to in Moscow on June 26, 1963, little more
than six weeks later.
Consideration of extending the Limited Test Ban to underground tests wil
raise two closely related issues.
The first is that of China, and the second is that of nuclear explosions for peacefu
purposes, otherwise known as the Plowshare Program.
The United States and the U.S.S.R. were prepared to accept the inhibitions
placed on them by the Limited Test Ban Treaty without requiring that China be a
party and accept similar inhibitions. The history of testing underground by both
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. indicates there is nothing under that treaty that has
adversely affected the national security (vis a vis China) of either of our countries,
notwithstanding the fact that China has tested some ten or eleven times since the
Treaty went into force. On the other hand, this argument might become a little
more difficult to maintain if we were to accept a comprehensive ban on all tests in
which China did not participate. The argument would be made that we should not
accept any further self-denying ordinance in the field of testing nuclear devices if
China were left free to test. Perhaps one answer to that would be found in our old
Companion, the withdrawal clause—this time somewhat more strongly drafted;
for example, to provide that non-accession to the treaty by other nuclear weapons
powers might well be cause for withdrawal after a given period of time, perhaps
five to ten years.
The Second issue relating to a comprehensive ban deals with Plowshare—a name
With rather biblical overtones given to the program for the peaceful nuclear
explosive devices. I assume the official who named this program had in mind the
Old Testament prophecy contained in the fourth verse of the second chapter of
Isaiah, where it is predicted that nations “shall beat their swords into plowshares
and their Spears into pruning hooks and nation shall not lift up sword against
nation and neither shall they learn war anymore.” I do not know whether this
Official was aware of the prophecy of the tenth verse of the third chapter of Joel
Where a nation was exhorted to beat its plowshares into swords and its pruning
hooks into spears.
Both of these prophecies turn out to be true insofar as they apply to the Plow-
share Program. The first prophecy is true in that the techniques of nuclear explo-
Sions can be used for peaceful purposes (although there is some doubt as to the
economics and ecological considerations that underlay many of the predictions).
The second part of the prophecy is also true. Any device that can effectively
use thermonuclear explosions for peaceful purposes has to be a very sophisticated
One, whose nuclear insides are indistinguishable from those used in highly sophis-
ticated weapons. Thus, the plowshare can be turned into a sword, and the prune-
hook into a spear. Any treaty which deals with the problem of weapons testing
per se, and does not deal with the problem of testing “peaceful nuclear devices”
has a loophole built in almost as big as the treaty itself. It would be a sham and an
hypocrisy to say that we are going to ban all nuclear weapons tests and then go
ahead with testing under the guise of developing peaceful nuclear explosive devices.
On the other hand, under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we do have a treaty obliga-
tion to make peaceful nuclear explosive devices available to other countries on the
Same basis that we use them ourselves. The best answer to this dilemma may be to
have a treaty which permits the development and utilization of nuclear explosive
devices (primarily or entirely on the form of contained underground explosions)
under truly international direction—including supervision over the instrumenta-
tion—the devices to be provided at cost by the existing nuclear powers. Interna-
69
tional supervision would have a Substantial inhibiting effect on any state using the
program as a subterfuge for weapons development. This may seem a complicated
arrangement, but it is better than having the doubtful economic gains of the
Plowshare Program turn an important instrument for peace—namely, a compre-
hensive test ban—into a sham.
Senator MUSKIE. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
I am hard put to ask questions of you because my inclinations are
so strong in your direction, but let me raise one or two.
TECHNOLOGICAL SATURATION POINT AND WORRY A.B.O.UT MILITARILY
SIGNIFICANT TESTS
First of all, Dr. York made the technological saturation point. This
is certainly the other side of the coin of Mr. Farley's point that we
are worried about very significant military tests and it seems to me we
ought to have some further exploration of both these points for the
record and for the benefit of those who are concerned about the tech-
nical arguments. Is there a connection between these two?
Dr. YoRK. Yes, there is. To a substantial degree they are opposites,
but they involve matters of judgment. A phrase like “militarily
significant” is not an easily quantifiable term.
My statement that it is saturated referred to the fact that we can
already do almost anything anyone can conceivably want to do, in
many different ways and many times over, and that it just is not
possible to change that situation even through the introduction of a
technical novelty. So that is why I reached the judgment that, con-
trary to Mr. Farley's view, it is unlikely that there will be any new
genuine militarily significant nuclear weapons development. If the
weapons we have got now will not deter war either generally or in
Europe, which Secretary Laird has recently focused attention on,
making them more sophisticated will not help. We are already there
insofar as truly militarily or politically significant developments are
concerned. But that is not to say there is nothing more to do; I
simply question essentially whether it matters in the situation that
we are talking about here. The question is, do we go on seeking further
changes, which may be novel and may be ingenious, but which do not
make much difference or do we seek some way to try to stop all of this
finally. If we cannot control this technology, I do not know what
technology it is that we can control. -
TJ.S. FOCUS WITH RESPECT TO SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPON'S DEVELOPMENTS.
Senator MUSKIE. Has not our focus with respect to Soviet nuclear
weapons developments been on the dangers of big explosions rather
than of little explosions?
Dr. York. What was the question?
Senator MUSKIE. As we have viewed the development of Soviet
nuclear weapons technology, we have been concerned about their big
explosions, not about their little explosions.
Dr. YORK. That is right. If you examine what it is that politicians
in this country have expressed fear of, it is the large numbers of large
nuclear weapons on their side. That is where all the major attention
has been focused, and probably correctly. Not on the degree of sophis-
tication or anything else, but simply on the numbers and the size.
70
EXPLOSIONS WHICH COULD ESCAPE SEISMIC DETECTION
Senator MUSKIE. With respect to the present state of the seismic art
could the explosions which could escape detection, be classified as small
explosions or big explosions or somewhere in between?
Dr. YoRK. They would be classified as small. The argument is a
over exactly where that boundary is and, of course, not only over
where it is today but where it is likely to be a couple of years from now.
Senator MUSKIE. Is that boundary the division between tactical
and strategic nuclear weapons?
Dr. YoRK. Not entirely. Speaking very roughly, smaller ones are
tactical and larger ones are strategic, but that is not a clean-cut dis-
tinction. As we go to high multiplicity MIRV’s we are talking about
relatively small strategic weapons for each one. Also, some of our tacti-
cal forces have weapons which are considerably larger than, say, the
reentry vehicle on Poseidon is; so it is not a sharp boundary, but it is
a general sort of one.
RESTRAINT IMPOSED UPON SoviPT MIRV BY COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN
Senator MUSKIE. What restraint would a comprehensive test ban
treaty impose upon the development of the Soviet MIRV, if at all?
Dr. YoRK. I am not sure. I tend to be pessimistic about that in the
sense that I think it is probably already too late to prevent them from
developing MIRV. However, it would restrain them from going beyond
whatever multiplicity they can develop on the basis of their present
technology. But I think that we have dallied too long to prevent a
Soviet, MTRW. -
I do not know what the next development will be that will seem to
destabilize things and get everybody into a sweat. The purpose of a
comprehensive test ban is to try to cut off that possibility. As has been
so ably said before, any time since 1958 at the latest, a test ban would
have to be our benefit because something which is now bothering us,
something which now threatens our security could have been cut off
by an earlier test ban.
EFFECT OF REFINING TECHNOLOGY ON TEST LEVELS *-
Senator MUSKIE. I put one question to Mr. Farley that I would
like to put to you. To what extent does the refinement of our nuclear
weapons technology pose the possibility that militarily significant
tests can take place at lower and lower levels of magnitude?
Dr. YoRK. Well, there are two effects working in opposite direc-
tions. As we learn more and more details, it becomes easier to add to
them by tests at lower yields. On the other hand, as we develop a
greater variety and a greater understanding of weapons, then tests
at any yield become less interesting and less important.
I regard the second as more important than the first because at
lower yields, higher yields, medium yields, any yields, we are long past
the point of diminishing returns.
71
EVIDENCE OF SOVIET INTEREST IN COMIPREHENSIVE TREATY
Senator MUSKIE. What, if any, evidence do we have of the Soviet
interest in a comprehensive test ban treaty?
Mr. FISHER. They say they are interested, they say they do not
tolerate onsite inspections and Onsite inspections are not necessary.
They have said this against the knowledge that our position, as you
pointed out, for 9 years has been that they are.
On the other hand, from my limited experience of dealing with them I
do not believe they bluff that much. In other words, I do not think
they would that consistently reiterate a position if they would be
bluffing and relying on us not to take them up on it. They have, as I
say, they might give us some trouble on the impact of that treaty on
the peaceful nuclear explosions. That is a potential danger to the treaty
since they have got renewed enthusiasm for peaceful nuclear explosions.
I understand, and even more an allergy towards domestic supervision
of programs by an international organization than we have; so that
might be a possible trouble point. On the basic issue of principle,
though, I think they have said it so many times that I cannot imagine
they were relying on us to keep them from having to put their money
where their mouth is, so to speak.
DID SUBJECT ARISE AT SALT2
Senator MUSKIE. Is there any indication that the subject arose at
all in the SALT talks?
Mr. FISHER.. I would doubt it. I do not know. I would, however,
say the State Department and ACDA could tell you. They, generally
speaking, tend to plow a rather straight furrow. For example, when
we went to Moscow to negotiate the limited test ban there was with
us a seismologist. We could not even get an appointment for him to
see anybody in Moscow on the ground that they were—
We are here now not discussing a comprehensive test ban. Both the President
and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers have talked about a limited test
ban and so what is this fellow in here anyhow, just confusing the situation.
They did not insist we send him home, but we could not get an
appointment for him to speak to Soviet opposite numbers. They tend
to put blinders on.
I do not know whether they discussed it or not. My guess is they
discussed it at Geneva and the discussion has been at the level that
Professor Chayes indicated, which is hardly in any great depth.
FORUM FOR DISCUSSION OF TREATY
Senator MUSKIE. It would seem to be such a natural for the SALT
talks negotiations.
Mr. FISHER: Well, it is and it is not. If part of the object of the
exercise to living up to our commitment on a worldwide basis, which
as Professor Chayes has pointed out, is given in the limited test ban
and Nonproliferation Treaty there are certain advantages to having
72
a forum of discussion, a nonbilateral forum. The people that—one of
the people we want to sign up on this treaty are potential nuclear
powers and there would be certain advantages if we are going to move
on this is to move in a forum in which at least some of the targets are
more intimately associated and in which they will not have, “Oh, that
is another case of big power diplomacy.” They cannot object to that
really on SALT because SALT is, after all there are only two countries.
with intercontinental missiles of this character. But somehow the
test ban which they will see as having an effect on them and as a
supplement to the Nonproliferation Treaty there are certain ad-
vantages to having a broader forum.
TIMELINESS OF RIESOL UTIONS
Mr. CHAYES. Just to add a bit to that, I think the move in the
Senate on these resolutions is especially timely because this compre-
hensive test ban treaty is an obvious follow-on to SALT. That is, if
you get SALT then this seems to be the obvious next candidate, a
very easy step to maintain the SALT momentum, not much of a
stretch. So it is very timely that these matters are before the Senate
now, not to introduce them into the SALT context but to raise them
for the follow-on.
Senator MUSKIE. It would seem to me that a reaffirmation of
commitment to work for a comprehensive test ban by the two parties
would be a healthy development. I am struck by the fact that neither
side appears to have seen this as an opportunity and moved to step
into it. -
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S MORATORIUM
I would like to go back, Dean Fisher, to President Eisenhower's
moratorium which you raised earlier.
Mr. FISHER. Yes.
© sºator MUSKIE. Now, that actually spread over what period of
time'.
Mr. FISHER. Well, my personal knowledge does not go
Dr. YoRK. Almost 3 years.
Mr. FISHER. August 1958.
Dr. York. November 1, 1958.
Mr. FISHER. I was not in the Government at the time.
Dr. YoRK. But it is important to note several points about it, if I
might answer. It was originally agreed that it would be in effect for 1
year beginning on November 1, 1958, during which time a treaty was
to be negotiated. After the year ended nothing happened. After 14
months were over and no treaty had been negotiated, the moratorium
was denounced first by President Eisenhower, who said that we were
no longer bound by it but we would not test without giving notice, an
it was denounced the next day by Chairman Khrushchev, who said,
“The Soviets would not test unless the West did so first.”
A few months later the French began testing and the Soviets
labeled this as testing by the West. Despite that, the moratorium
continued in effect for another year and a half. Thus, although the
moratorium itself had been denounced by both executives 14 months
after it went into effect, it endured another 18 months before finally
the Soviets began testing.
73
Senator MUSKIE. Was there any evidence that either side cheated in
that period? -
Dr. YORK. There were some claims in intelligence circles in the Air
Force that they probably were cheating, but there was no evidence.
I was in the Defense Department at the time and involved in those
arguments. When the Soviets finally got ready for testing they just
simply went ahead and did it. In my view that is an indication that
they were not cheating. Some people made the exact opposite inter-
pretation, but I think it is quite implausible.
Mr. CHAYES. Is it not true also, Dr. York, that retrospectively as
you look at their test program since then there is not very much
suggestion that they made any gains in that interim?
Senator MUSKIE. That was going to be my next question. What
happened to the state-of-the-art or effort to advance the state-of-the-
art during that period?
Dr. YORK. Well, during the almost 3 years of the moratorium there
were considerable advances on both sides in the theoretical state-of-
the-art. There had been a lot of tests before the moratorium began.
There were a lot of people working with the data from those tests and
deducing deeper meanings from it.
In the case of our own nuclear program, the number of people in
the program grew very substantially during the moratorium. I do not
know what happened on the Soviet side, but it is conceivable that
their laboratories grew during the moratorium as ours did. Thus,
there was paper progress, certain experiments, and so forth. But I do
not believe, in connection with your original question, there was cheat-
ing during the moratorium.
DIFFERENCE IN LEVEL OF TESTING
Senator MUSKIE. What is the explanation for the apparent dis-
crepancy between the two sides in the numbers of tests that we have
conducted in the last 9 years?
Dr. YORK. It is hard to say. It may simply result from the general
imbalance between the technological strengths of the two countries.
Testing is an expensive thing to do; it takes a lot of work. It has not
only been that way since the moratorium; that particular ratio of
American test program to Soviet test program has always been there.
Mr. CHAYES. I think that point is of interest in connection with
the comments that many Senators made, and you yourself made,
about whether we really think the Soviets have an intention to cheat
or are likely to be a “determined evader.” While it is true that their
general economic and technological capacity are perhaps lower than
ours and, therefore, may account for a difference in the level of testing,
one can assume if they were really determined they would have been
able to match us test for test or even more if that meant something,
if they were really interested in making the breakthrough beyond
where we were.
Senator MUSKIE. Does it suggest they are less interested in sophis-
tication? - -
Mr. CHAYES. It seems to me what it shows is their tests are dic-
tated by their general military requirements. They test when they
have to and not out of any sort of driving desire to get one up, so to
speak.
74.
SOVIET NUCLEAR ADVANCEMENT BY INITIATIVES DIFFERENT FROM OURS,
Senator MUSKIE. To what extent have the Soviets advanced the
state-of-the-art by technological initiatives different from our own?
Dr. YoRK. Are you talking about the nuclear state-of-the-art?
Senator MUSKIE. Yes.
Dr. YoRK. They did explode the largest of all nuclear weapons at
approximately 60 megatons in a clean version and it was said that it
would have been a hundred megatons in a standard version. There
was a great deal of discussion of that point at the 1963 hearings of
this issue. What could it mean? Why did they do it? No one ever came
to any conclusion except to suggest that it was some form of nuclear
bombast or boasting perhaps. There is no evidence they have followed
through on the design of that particular device.
I do not know of anything else I would say they have done that is
novel initiatives in the nuclear weapons field. However, they have
taken some initiatives in methods for nuclear weapons delivery. Their
biggest ICBM is bigger than our biggest ICBM and represents an
initiative on their part. Also, going clear back to 1950, they did put
a higher priority on intercontinental ballistic missiles at that time
than we did. We were then also working on intercontinental missiles.
but not of the ballistic kind.
AIRGUMENT CONCERNING SOVIET ABM SOLUTION
Senator Coop ER. May I ask a question at this point? May I ask
a question on one point you have spoken about concerning the
explosion? Was that the one which led to the argument that this
explosion had given the Soviet Union knowledge
Dr. YoRK. About ABM.
Senator CoopFR (continuing). About ABM, about their ability
to have a defense against incoming missiles?
Dr. YoRK. I do not think it was that particular one. What has
been referred to in arguments on this subject are the Soviet test
Series during 1961 and 1962. In both of those series they conducted.
a number of tests at high altitude, but it was not that one very large.
explosion that people referred to. It was claimed during the 1963.
hearings that they had probably learned something from those
series that would have enabled them to solve their ABM problem and
that we were denied that knowledge. It was even suggested that the
reason Khrushchev was willing to sign the treaty was that they had
solved the ABM problem and they were going to cut us off from a
Solution.
It is evident now, 10 years later, that there was simply nothing to.
that notion, but it was repeatedly expressed by persons who opposed
the treaty at that time.
Senator Coop ER. I remember it was argued in debate.
Dr. York. Yes.
U.S. POSITION BETTER TO DEVELOP Low-YIELD TESTS SUGGESTED
Senator MUSKIE. It would strike me from the relative number of
tests, and this may be a very superficial judgment, that we may be
in a better position to develop military tests of low yields than the
Soviet Union.
75
Dr. YoRK. Probably true, given the vast amount of data we have.
Senator MUSKIE. Which would give weight to the arguments
Professor Chayes made this afternoon that we would be better off if
we had had a comprehensive test ban 10 years ago.
Dr. YoRK. And more.
Mr. CHAYES. I said 1958. -
Dr. YoRK. And probably before that.
BREAKING OF 1958 MORATORIUMI
Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, if you are dealing with Senate Resolu-
tion 230, which uses the word “moratorium” and you are going to have
the 1958 moratorium and going to have a semantic argument as to
who broke the moratorium, I think it is fair to say the Soviets broke
the moratorium only in the sense that there was a moratorium one
day on a day-to-day basis and they announced they were testing and
there was not any more moratorium. They did not break an interna-
tional commitment. What was the shock at that stage, reliving it,
was that they embarked on a program of such intense testing that it
had obviously been made in preparation for a rather substantial
period of time; that we had not done quite the same thing, and that
their contingency planning against this decision they were going to
make which, as I remember it, they blamed on our testing by subter-
fuge through the French, which struck me as a rather unlikely argu-
ment. .
Dr. YoRK. It was more likely then that it would be today.
Mr. FISHER. Yes, but the shock was the shock of the rather ongoing
series of tests, including one which Dr. York has described as a nuclear
bombast, 57 megatons. It would be 100, and that is what caused
everyone to be so shook up. Describing it as they broke the mora-
torium is a nice matter of semantics. They did and no one was testing
1 day and people were the next. But
Mr. CHAYES. There was some discussion earlier in the hearing about
an agreement not to test during that period. I think it is also very
important to remember that there was not an agreement. There were
two unilateral statements, one by our side and one by theirs.
Dr. YoRK. But those had been announced.
Mr. CHAYES. Yes, as Dr. York had said, even that had been with-
drawn or revoked in the middle of what, 1959.
Dr. YORK. At the end of 1959. -
Mr. CHAYES. At the end of 1959. So that when the Soviets resumed
testing each side had said that it did not regard itself as bound any
longer by its unilateral moratorium.
Now, as Dr. York said, the remission for testing went on for another
18 months until September 1961 and then we did get this great shock
when the Soviets started. -
Senator MUSKIE. We had been caught with our pants down.
ASSESSMENT OF PROBLEMs BY ARIPA AND PRIVATE SEISMOLOGISTS
May I ask Professor Sykes one question. Are ARPA seismologists
and private seismologists far apart in their assessment of the problem?
Mr. SYKES. I think not so far as detection and discrimination. I
think the disagreement mainly revolves around the evasion issue.
76
Senator MUSKIE. Let us see. At this point in the record if there is no
objection, I would like to include Professor Chayes' recent Harvard
Law Review article on this subject. (See p. 87.)
SEISMOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY
Senator MUSKIE.I would also like to include for the record a state-
ment by several scientists on the seismological aspects of a compre-
hensive test ban treaty.
(The information referred to follows:)
May 12, 1972.
ScIENTISTS' STATEMENT ON THE SEISMOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF A CoMPREHENSIVE
TEST BAN
At the October 27–28, 1971 Hearings of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
on the Status of Current Technology to Identify Seismic Events as Natural or
Man Made, Dr. Brune submitted a statement endorsed by a number of scientists
knowledgeable on the subject of the seismological aspects of verifying an under-
ground test ban. Enclosed is a summary of the material presented at these hearings
on this subject. This summary has been endorsed by Sir Edward Bullard, Dr. F. A.
Dahlen, Professor Karl Kisslinger, Dr. Peter Molnar, Dr. Robert Phinney, Dr.
Max Wyss, and Professor Frank Press. In addition, Dr. Robert Liebermann
endorsed the statement with a qualification that he felt the last sentence was not
completely clear. Dr. James Brune, Dr. Barry Block, Dr. Freeman Gilbert and
Dr. Richard Haubrich stated that the summary was in general accord with their
views but that they wished to subscribe to the more complete presentation which
appeared in the hearings of the Joint Committee last fall. None of these scientists
queried or expressed any disagreement with the statement.
APRIL 7, 1972.
SCIENTISTS' STATEMENT ON SEISMOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF A CoMPREHENSIVE TEST
BAN TREATY
Recent advances in seismic discrimination between earthquakes and under-
ground explosions indicate that discrimination down to about mp 4 (body wave
magnitude 4), or yields of about 2 KT in hard rock would be possible with high
reliability upon deployment of adequate numbers of available modern instruments.
The discrimination criteria previously established above mb 4.75 have been
found to apply down to about mp 4 (2 KT in hard rock) where data are available.
Presently deployed unclassified seismic systems have a global capability to detect
and identify virtually all explosions down to below 20 KT in hard rock, and this
threshold will certainly be lower for explosions in Eurasia if the capabilities of all
currently available systems are included. -
The seismic identification threshold for explosions in dry uncompacted soil such
as alluvium is higher. However, unless the explosion occurs in very deep alluvium,
a collapse crater would be produced on the surface. Such soil is rarely, if ever,
found at sufficient depths to permit the conduct of clandestine tests of more than
a few KT without serious risk of detection by foreign intelligence.
While certain evasion techniques, such as hiding an explosion in the seismic
noise of an earthquake or decoupling the explosion in a very large hold, may pro-
vide limited opportunities for clandestine testing, they would be very difficult for a
cheater to employ usefully and with confidence. Furthermore, if successful, they
would not provide seismic evidence by which to trigger onsite inspections so that
provisions for such inspections would not increase confidence that cheating by such
means was not occurring.
Senator MUSKIE. Senator Cooper, do you have any further ques-
tions? -
* TJ.S. AND SOVIET DISCONTINUANCE OF TESTING
Senator Coop ER. Do you recall when the United States and the
Soviet Union made their statements that they would not continue
testing?
77
Dr. YoRK. Well, I think I can get the dates fairly close and that
is that it was late, it was in October of 1958 that each of them said
that they would stop by the end of October and would not start
unless the other one did but that the moratorium was to be for 1
year. That is beginning on November 1, 1958. I think I have the date
correct. It started off inauspiciously because the Russians did test
on the 1st of November and again on the 3d of November. Perhaps
they had some kind of technological difficulties and their test series
spilled over into this period, but then they stopped. There followed
attempts to convert the moratorium into a treaty, but they did not
succeed; they were hung up over technical side issues, the very same
questions we are talking about today, a big hole to hide things in,
hiding in earthquakes. None of those ideas are new. They came
out of the fertile minds of those who opposed a test ban treaty, and
then it was the very end of December 1959, after the treaty had
been in effect for almost 14 months
Mr. CHAYEs. Not the treaty, the moratorium.
Dr. YoRK. The moratorium had been in effect for 14 months
which was, 2 months longer than the year we had agreed on in the
first place. Then one day, I think it was the 29th of December, if
one wants to check it out, that President Eisenhower said the United
States is no longer bound. I think the very next day Khrushchev
in some kind of a news conference said the Soviet Union is no longer
bound. They each put it in slightly different terms. If I am not
mistaken Eisenhower said we will not begin testing without prior
notice. He did not even put it on the question of whether they tested
or not but said they would not test without prior notice. The Soviets
said they would not begin testing unless the West began testing first
and that is why the French question is so important. It may only
have been an alibi. I am not saying that is the real reason the Russians
went into a test program, but they said we will not test unless the
West tests first and the French did; so you could say the French
broke the moratorium even though they were not formally a party
to it. But by that time no one was formally a party to a moratorium
of any kind.
RESUMPTION OF SOVIET TESTING
Senator CoopFR. When did the Soviet Union resume its tests?
Dr. YoRK. I am sorry?
Senator Coop ER. You said
Dr. YoRK. The moratorium continued for almost 3 years.
Senator CoopFR. But then there were a series of tests afterwards.
Dr. YoRK. Then they began testing in September 1961. They tested
again in 1962, and I am not sure when they stopped, but it was several
months before the treaty was signed in 1963. There had been no tests
several months before the treaty was signed. So there are roughly 2
years in between during which they and we conducted a number of
tests, underground, atmospheric and so on.
JAPANESE AND CANA DIAN PROPOSALS AT GENEVA
Senator CoopER. Mr. Farley said that Japan and Canada had made
some proposals at Geneva or at Vienna?
Mr. FISHER. Geneva.
Senator CoopFR. They were resisting it, the Soviets. Do you know
what the nature of those proposals was?
79–879 O—72—6
78
Mr. FISHER: I think it would be better to have that supplied by
Phil Farley. My own understanding, however, is that it may be some-
thing in the nature of a threshold, ban big underground tests. That
has been kicked around from time to time in the administration and
in private. At one stage of my life I supported it myself. I think we
have long since passed that point now and they always tend to couple
with threshold treaty, what is your threshold 4.0, with some sort of
moratorium, contrary moratorium, beneath it and that gets a little
fuzzy. That is the area, I think, they were exploring, whether
that might have been worthwhile in 1967, it might have been reason-
able difference on it. I think it would be a diversion now. I think it
would be a diversion from the main track.
Senator MUSKIE. I intended to ask Mr. Farley about that and I
neglected.
Senator Coop ER. I did, too.
Senator MUSKIE. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for very
helpful testimony.
Our final witness for the morning is Mrs. Jo Pomerance of
Connecticut.
STATEMENT OF MRS. JO POMERANCE, COCHAIRMAN, TASK FORCE
- FOR A NUCLEAR TEST BAN
Mrs. POMERANCE. I am grateful for this opportunity, Mr. Chair-
man, to submit for the record more than 2 dozen statements and
resolutions of nongovernmental organizations or their officers in sup-
port of a comprehensive test ban. This impressive compilation of
public opinion has been gathered by the task force for a nuclear test
ban of which I am cochairman. The task includes many leading scien-
tists, arms control experts, and representatives of citizens' groups.
(The information referred to is in the committee files.)
Among those submitting statements are such prominent organiza-
tions as the League of Women Voters, the United Nations Associa-
tion—U.S.A. (New York chapter), the National Council of Churches,
the Federation of American Scientists, the National Student Lobby,
Another Mother for Peace, and the United Automobile Workers. The
task force for a nuclear test ban was formed with the single purpose
of helping keep the appropriate members of government and the
public informed of the facts about nuclear weapons testing and the
need for a test ban. We are encouraged by the extensive support for
the test ban of which the attached statements are evidence.
DANGER OF NUCLEAR TESTING TO CHILDREN
Because of the shortage of time, there is only one other matter
which I will mention. I want to submit for the record a statement
from Dr. David Inglis, professor of physics at the University of
Massachusetts and a physicist with the Argonne National Laboratories.
Dr. Inglis says:
The effects of low levels of radiation on large populations are difficult to estab-
lish with confidence, but the cumulative impression of several investigations,
Some of them individually controversial, adds up to the indication that the low
levels of radiation caused by venting from underground tests over the areas of a
few nearby States cause some infant mortality and malformation, the amount of
which is uncertain.
79
Mr. Chairman, the danger of nuclear testing to children and to the
unborn is only one of several compelling reasons for a ban on under-
ground tests. It is important to note, however, the new evidence now
available to show that infants, particularly in the prenatal state, are
more sensitive to the effects of radiation than had previously been
thought. The comment on this question by Dr. Inglis, cited above, is
of particular interest, since Dr. Inglis is a prominent scientist of
established reputation who has studied nuclear weapons’ tests for
many years. In addition, several recent studies by leading nuclear
physicists and medical authorities support the conclusion that under-
ground tests that vent radioactivity—it is estimated one out of four
vent—can cause cancer, especially in children and malformation in the
prenatal stage.
STUDY ON EFFECTS OF RADIOACTIVE VENTING ON POPULATION OVERDUE
The Atomic Energy Commission has not conducted a full-scale study
to measure the extent of injury caused by the possible 68 U.S. under-
ground tests that vented since 1963 despite the urging of many
scientists that they do so and release their findings. After nearly 10
years of underground testing, we believe the time is long overdue for
an objective study on past and future effects of radioactive venting on
our population, particularly on infants and embryos. Included in this
study should be an evaluation of the consequences to health of further
leakage of the 90 billion gallons of radioactive waste from weapons’
fabrication plants stored in tanks throughout the country. A National
Academy of Sciences report, long suppressed by the AEC, states that
none of the agency’s waste disposal practices meet Academy safety
standards. Unless we limit arms production and conclude a test ban,
the accumulation of this lethal waste under dangerous conditions will
continue. -
We believe the President should appoint an impartial scientific panel
to immediately organize a comprehensive medical investigation.
Among the experts who have recently completed studies on this
question which would be evaluated by such a panel are Drs. Harold
Rosenthal and Barry Commoner, of St. Louis, Morris DeGroot of
Berkeley, Samuel Leinhardt and Ernest Sternglass of Carnegie-Mellon
University.
While this study should not delay the early negotiation of a test ban
treaty, the result may present evidence that a test ban is essential to
health as well as to world peace and our national security.
Thank you very much.
(Mrs. Pomerance's prepared statement follows:)
MAY 15, 1972.
STATEMENT BY MRs. Jo Pom ERANCE, CO-CHAIRMAN, TASK FORCE FOR A NUCLEAR
TEST BAN
Mr. CHAIRMAN: I am grateful for this opportunity to submit for the Record the
more than two dozen statements and resolutions of non-governmental organiza-
tions or their officers in support of a comprehensive test ban. This impressive
compilation of public opinion has been gathered by the Task Force for a Nuclear
Test Ban of which I am Co-Chairman. The Task Force includes many leading
Scientists, arms control experts and representatives of citizens’ groups.
Among those submitting statements are such prominent organizations as the
League of Women Voters, the United Nations Association—USA (New York
Chapter), the National Council of Churches, the Federation of American Scien-
80
tists, the National Student Lobby, Another Mother for Peace, and the United
Automobile Workers. The Task Force for a Nuclear Test Ban was formed with the
Single purpose of helping the appropriate members of government and the public
informed of the facts about nuclear weapons testing and the need for a test ban.
We are encouraged by the extensive Support for the test ban of which the attached
Statements are evidence.
It has been shown in today's hearings that the nuclear test ban issue should be
treated with urgency. While the SALT negotiations now under way are expected
to reach an agreement on a quantative limitation of offensive and defensive
Weapons, the test ban would halt the qualitative development of nuclear weapons,
a step which would signal the end of the nuclear arms race. Without the test ban,
the SALT agreement could bring only transient benefits.
For over a decade the U.S. has been bound by provisions of the Limited Test
Ban Treaty of 1963, to undertake negotiations on the comprehensive test ban.
Moreover, in the discussions which led up to the conclusions of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the near-nuclear nations indicated repeatedly
that the comprehensive test ban—real evidence that the superpowers are prepared
to halt the arms race—would be the most persuasive argument against prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons to additional nations. Today, when at least three powers
are poised to “go nuclear”, test ban negotiations assume a critical importance.
In addition, underground explosions present hazards to the human environment.
One example of this danger is the new data pertaining to the correlation between
radiation from venting underground tests and from the fabrication of nuclear
bombs and the incidents of cancer and malformation in unborn children in the
United States. In this connection I am also submitting for the Record a statement
from Dr. David Inglis, Professor of Physics at the University of Massachusetts
and a physicist with the Argonne National Laboratories.
Dr. Inglis says: “The effects of low levels of radiation on large populations
are difficult to establish with confidence, but the cumulative impression of several
investigations, some of them individually controversial, adds up to the indication
that the low levels of radiation caused by venting from underground tests over
the areas of a few nearby states cause some infant mortality and malformation,
the amount of which is uncertain.”
(Many political and arms control experts believe there is a greater likelihood that
China and France will curb and ultimately stop their atmospheric tests, which
are having a more serious effect on health than tests underground, after a compre-
hensive test ban agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union.)
It seems fitting to ask: Is it logical for Congress to appropriate funds for cancer
research at the same time that it stimulates the cancer rate through the allocation
of funds for underground tests?
Mr. Chairman, the danger of nuclear testing to children and to the unborn is
Only one of several compelling reasons for a ban on underground tests. It is impor-
tant to note however, the new evidence now available to show that infants,
particularly in the pre-natal stage, are more sensitive to the effects of radiation
than had previously been thought. The comment on this question by Dr. Inglis,
cited above, is of particular interest since Dr. Inglis is a prominent scientist of
established reputation who had studied nuclear weapons’ tests for many years.
Moreover, several recent studies by leading nuclear physicists and medical
authorities support the conclusion that underground tests that vent radioactivity—
it is estimated 1 out of 4 vent—can cause cancer, especially in children and mal-
formation in the pre-natal stage.
The Atomic Energy Commission has not conducted a full-scale study to meas-
ure the extent of injury caused by the possible 69 U.S. underground tests that
have vented since 1963 despite the urging of many scientists that they do so and
release their findings. After nearly 10 years of underground testing, we believe
the time is long overdue for an objective study on past and future effects of
radioactive venting on our population, particularly on infants and embryos.
Included in this study should be an evaluation of the consequences to health of
further leakage of the 90 billion gallons of radioactive waste from weapons’
fabrication plants stored in plants throughout the country. A National Academy
of Sciences report, long suppressed by the A.E.C., states that none of the Agency’s
waste disposal practices meet Academy safety standards. Unless we limit arms
production and conclude a test ban, the accumulation of this lethal waste under
dangerous conditions will continue.
We believe the President should appoint an impartial scientific panel to
immediately organize a comprehensive medical investigation. Among the experts
who have recently completed studies on this question, which could be evaluated
81
by such a panel are Doctors Harold Rosenthal and Barry Commoner of St.
Louis, Morris De Groot of Berkeley, Samuel Leinhardt and Ernest Sternglass
of Carnegie-Mellon University.
While this study should not delay the early negotiation of a test ban treaty,
the result may present evidence that a test ban is essential to health as well as to
world peace and our national Security.
My appearance today is as a representative of organizations representing
hundreds of thousands of concerned citizens from all walks of life, but primarily
I want to speak for women—the mothers of this country—who have long felt
that their children and future generations are threatened by a nuclear arms race
that could lead to an atomic war. They now know that great danger exists not
only by the possibility of war, but from nuclear weapons testing. It is time to stop
gambling with the future of the unborn.
Thank you.
Senator MUSKIE. Thank you very much, Mrs. Pomerance.
COMMENDATION OF WITNESS
I would like to say, I think the record ought to show, that you have
been a long time worker in this field, as cochairman of a task force on
the nuclear test ban, and as consultant to the chairman of the Senate
Arms Control Subcommittee; you have been active in this field a lot
longer than I have, about 20 years, as I recall, and I think it is most
appropriate that at the end of what I think has been very useful and
helpful testimony that you should add the note and the point that you
have in your testimony. It has been all too brief and I apologize for
that, but I do so with the knowledge that you will be around these
hearing rooms for a long time into the future as well.
Mrs. PoW ERANCE. Thank you.
Senator CoopER. I would like to join in your commendation of Mrs.
Pomerance.
Mrs. Pom ERANCE. Excuse me?
Senator CoopBR. I say I am joining in his statement.
Mrs. PoW ERANCE. Thank you.
Senator MUSKIE. Senator Cooper was complimenting you as only
he can. Thank you all very much, and this will suspend the hearings
until we resume, subject to call.
(Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, subject
to call of the Chair.)
APPENDIX
CoMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN RESOLUTIONs—STATEMENT OF SENATOR
HUBERT H. HuMPHREY FOR THE HEARING OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMs
CoNTROL, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FoEEIGN RELATIONs, MAY 15,
1972
Mr. Chairman: As a cosponsor of both of the pending resolutions (S. Res. 273
and S. Res. 230) supporting the comprehensive termination of all nuclear weapons
testing, I urge the Committee's prompt and favorable action on them.
It is particularly fitting that the Committee hold hearings on these resolutions
today, just before the President's scheduled trip to Moscow. We have reason to
believe that the President intends to sign an agreement which is the product of
long and extensive negotiations at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. While this
agreement should represent valuable advances in arms control, it will by no means
represent all we should accomplish. It is appropriate, therefore, that the President
pursue further the issue of CTB during his Moscow discussions. -
A comprehensive test ban is the next step in the limitation of armaments
development. A decade after the Limited Test Ban Treaty banning above-ground
testing, in the development of which I was privileged to participate, we now have
the seismology to monitor beyond natural borders a comprehensive treaty banning
underground tests as well.
Senate approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) resolutions now before
it can help to mobilize support for new and promising initiatives and improve the
chances for an agreement at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.
The Committee will recall that in 1963 there was widespread support in the
United States and internationally for an end to all nuclear testing, both to protect
the environment and to slow down the arms race. The failure to reach a compre-
hensive test ban was in large part a result of the importance attributed to on-site
inspection to enforce any agreement. The United States and the Soviet Union
could not agree on inspections and finally compromised in a Limited Test Ban.
President Kennedy wisely decided to agree to a limited treaty banning atmo-
spheric and other testing but not underground tests, and I championed that pro-
posal in the Congress. The Treaty included a pledge, however, that the signatories
would continue to work towards ending all nuclear weapons tests.
That pledge was repeated in the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, and
indeed was a point insisted upon by the non-nuclear nations as a condition for
their agreement to renounce the nuclear path.
Since the time that the first pledge was made, there have been major advances
in seismic technology which would appear to answer the earlier objections that a
comprehensive test ban would require no-site inspections. I discussed the signifi-
cance of these scientific developments, reported in the Woods Hole Report of
July, 1970, during Senate debate early last year on the Amchitka Island nuclear
explosion test. The papers presented in that report, sponsored by the Advanced
Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense, all referred to techno-
logical progress made in our detection equipment. Indeed, according to Mr.
Evernden who made the opening presentation, we can now distinguish accurately
between earthquakes and explosions down to levels as low as 4.0 on the Richter
scale, and with some reliability even at lower levels. The significance this was on
the control of weapons development is extremely important. Very few tests can
now go undetected and such undetectable tests probably would not aid signifi-
cantly in the development of new nuclear weapons. An agreement to ban all
underground testing is, therefore, both feasible and practical at this time.
The Administration, however, continues to insist that on-site inspection is a
necessary element of any CTB. I believe that the reluctance on the part of Our
government to take the initiative in promoting a CTB is most unfortunate,
especially considering the fact that major government agencies have reported
privately to the White House that the new seismological capacity we now have no
longer makes our on-site inspection demands necessary or meaningful. I would
(83)
84
hope that the findings of last year's hearings on the CTB in this Committee and
today’s hearings would help to persuade the Administration to reconsider its own
position.
The attainment of a comprehensive test ban treaty is important. First of all,
as we have long recognized, possession of the capacity and license to test nuclear
weapons always has resulted in actual testing and the competitive continuation of
the nuclear arms race. Had we been able to achieve a CTB in 1963, we might have
saved many billions of dollars we have since spent not only for underground
testing but also for new nuclear weapons systems we felt forced to deploy as long
as the Soviets were also free to test and deploy their own nuclear weapons systems.
We might have staved off further damage to our environment as well.
Unless we now achieve the CTB which is within our reach, the next ten years
may prove as expensive as the last decade, one in which the United States and the
Soviets greatly escalated the arms race but attained no nuclear advantage for
either side.
Moreover, failure to achieve a prompt test ban and curbs on the arms race may
also bring failure for our high priority commitment to prevent more nations from
acquiring nuclear weapons. The 1968 Non-proliferation Treaty commands the
wide approval of the people of our nation, because they understand that the threat
of nuclear war or accident increases with the number of nations who possess
nuclear weapons.
But our commitment to halt the spread of nuclear weapons is in jeopardy as long
as we and the Russians continue nuclear arms testing and development. A number
of the potential nuclear countries have failed to ratify the 1968 treaty. One
explanation of their failure to do so is that the nuclear signatories have not honored
their treaty pledges to seek in good faith to end all nuclear tests and to curb the
arms race between them.
We cannot afford to be complacent. Indeed, only a few days ago reports from
India give us renewed cause for concern about maintaining nuclear weapons
stability under the Non-proliferation Treaty absent its ratification by Some key
non-nuclear nations. I refer to the statement Indian Defense Minister Ram
made in early May. While he emphasized that India remains committed to its
position against development of nuclear weaponry, he also pointed out that
India has an advanced technology, and announced that it is now studying the
technology of underground nuclear explosions in pursuit of its interest in peaceful
nuclear development. Minister Ram’s statement underscores the need for prompt
progress on our pledge to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban, before Some
sixth nation embarks on the course we rightly fear and would forestall.
Finally, I believe that movement toward a comprehensive test ban would help
us to attain the strategic weapons treaties we have been discussing in the SALT
talks with the Soviets. And the attainment of a CTB would improve those treaties.
Those treaties are long overdue and we are most hopeful of their achievement, but
they would not in themselves halt the nuclear arms race. As long as nuclear testing
can go on there will inevitable be the demand for another innovation and modi-
fication in nuclear weapons.
I know that a majority of the members of the Senate are dedicated to the need
for ending the costly and destabilizing nuclear arms race between the United States
and the Soviet Union. Since the ending of testing is one of the important ways of
ending the nuclear arms race, and because a comprehensive test ban is now veri-
fiable without on-site inspection, I am very hopeful that, with a strong recommen-
dation from this Committee, the Senate will adopt a resolution urging the
ending of all nuclear weapons testing.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR GEORGE McGovERN FoR SUBMISSION TO FOREIGN
RELATIONS COMMITTEE HEARING ON MAY 15, 1972
Let me take this opportunity to express my strongest support for the compre-
hensive nuclear test ban resolutions now pending before the Committee. In recent
years this Committee has frequently given its enlightened support to nuclear
arms control measures, and the pending Hart-Mathias and Kennedy resolutions
provide still another important opportunity for progress in the vital area of arms
control and disarmament. I know that members of this Committee are committed
to the maintenance of progress in that direction, and that accordingly the Com-
mittee will report favorably to the Senate on a resolution supporting prompt
achievement of the comprehensive test ban treaty. By ending all nuclear Weapons
85
testing, such a treaty would provide an important permanent brake on the nuclear
arms race which the underground tests have constantly fueled with great expense
but no gain in nuclear security for either the United States or the Soviet Union.
What makes this measure particularly timely are the recent seismology ad-
vances in detection and classification. In 1963 when the limited test ban treaty
was adopted, the impasse with the Soviets on the problem of on-site inspection
seemed to prevent achievement of a comprehensive ban. Nevertheless, we and the
other signatories to that landmark treaty pledged to continue efforts to acheive-
ment of a comprehensive test ban agreement. Now that advances in seismology
permit us to detect and classify underground explosions down to minute levels,
on-site inspection is no longer necessary and we can with assurance offer the Soviets
the extension of the 1963 treaty to include all nuclear testing. They have long
been on record in favor of such a treaty so that its prompt achievement awaits only
Our Government's revision of our proposal in line with the new seismological
capacity.
Indeed, our failure to offer such a treaty when we are no longer troubled by the
detection problem is undercutting the integrity of our solemn commitment to
nuclear arms control undertaken both in the 1963 treaty and in the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty of 1968. In the latter treaty we once again pledged to seek
“to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all
time . . . .” In that treaty we said to the non-nuclear nations of the world that
they should forswear the nuclear path. Integral to the good faith of that plea to
the non-nuclears was our corresponding commitment to seek to end the nuclear
testing to promote “cessation of the nuclear arms race.” To the non-nuclear
nations we were thus saying that although we retain the power of annihilation
which they lack and renounce, the United States and the Soviets will begin
nuclear de-escalation looking toward nuclear reductions and ultimately nuclear
disarmament.
President Nixon personally reviewed the 1968 nonproliferation treaty when
he came into office and gave it his approval for Senate ratification. Now that
seismology advances permit us to honor the commitments of that treaty by ending
all further testing, with no loss of national security, it seems to me that he is
honor bound to offer to the Soviets the comprehensive test-ban measure which
the pending resolutions support. Indeed, all apart from honoring our commitments,
our failure to do this may cost us dearly, for some nations we urgently desire to
ratify the nonproliferation treaty are refusing to do so as long as the nuclear
signatories are defaulting on their corresponding promises to end the testing and
the nuclear race. Further procrastination on our part undermines our earnest and
vital commitment to the nonproliferation treaty which would prevent dangerous
escalation in the number of nations capable of igniting nuclear war and annihilation.
So I urge the Committee to support the pending resolutions to make good Our
solemn commitment in the 1963 and 1969 nuclear treaties and to help to forestall
the frightful prospect of nuclear proliferation. In addition, let me also urge the
vital importance of the comprehensive test ban to the basic purpose we are ad-
vancing in the current SALT negotiations where we seek limitation on particular
strategic weapons programs. That basic purpose is to limit and end the costly
and frightening nuclear weapons race in which we have so long been locked with
the Soviet Union. Each side can kill and overkill the other many times over with
the nuclear weapons it now possesses, so it is the underlying hope of the SALT
talks that they will produce treaties limiting further weapons deployment which
cannot advance either side's security. But without a comprehensive test ban there
is cause for doubt whether an offensive weapons limitation treaty will have real
and permanent significance. While such a treaty would limit the quantities of
Offensive weapons sites or launching systems which each side can deploy, without
a ban on further nuclear testing we are likely to see an undiminished qualitative
nuclear race replacing the quantity race. Thus, without the restraining effect of a
tests—cessation treaty we may achieve no permanent gain in diminuation of the
arms race from an offensive weapons treaty.
For all of these vital reasons—our treaty commitments, nonproliferation, halting
the weapons spiral—I urge the Committee's support of the pending resolutions.
Let me finally add a word about steps which must follow the test ban and the
SALT agreements limiting further weapons deployments. For while I support
these measures it should be emphasized that they are only a beginning on the
road towards nuclear sanity and nuclear disarmament. Like the 1963 and 1969
treaties, these agreements would only put a ceiling on nuclear escalation. That is
vitally important, but it is not enough. For under the ceilings which we are
86
earnestly seeking to put on the nuclear race with these measures we are still left
with the nuclear balance of terror that cannot be permitted to continue year after
year and decade after decade. That balance is tenuous security indeed, for what
each side is saying to the other is that there are circumstances under which na-
tional annihilation and suicide may occur for both if the weapons are ever
launched. Now the probability of a holocaust may be small, but even that small
probability cannot be permanently tolerated for if the unlikely odds do come up
our society and people will suffer instant annihilation. Therefore we must go be-
yond limitation measures and begin on the road to reductions and nuclear dis-
armament which constitute the only genuine nuclear security. Once we under-
stand that the only possible function of our nuclear weapons is to prevent another
nation’s use of its nuclear weapons, then it becomes clear that far safer than the
balance of nuclear terror is the balance of nuclear disarmament. After a decade of
progress in nuclear limitation, soon to be capped by the SALT agreements on a
defensive test ban, we must begin the task of destroying the weapons which could
destroy mankind.
I thank the Committee for its attention to these vital problems, and urge again
a favorable report on the pending resolutions.
87
VOLUME 85 MARCH 1972 NUMBER 5

HARVARD LAW REVIEW
AN INQUIRY INTO THE WORKINGS OF
ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
Abram C hayes X.
Professor Chayes examines the prospects for compliance with
arms control agreements limiting strategic weapons and finds them
good. Drawing on the developing understanding of government
structures and decisionmaking processes, he reviews the forces for
compliance generated by the negotiation and ratification of a treaty,
by the inertia and imperatives of bureaucratic operation under a
treaty, and by the contemplated mechanisms for verification and
enforcement. The results of this analysis are juxtaposed with those
of traditional strategic theory, based on rationalistic assumptions
about government behavior and decisionmaking, to expose the weak-
messes of this approach. Professor Chayes concludes that under a
high visibility strategic arms limitation agreement between the
United States and the Soviet Union the dominant factors governing
compliance and termination will be political rather than strategic or
technical.
. I. STRATEGIC THEORY AND MILITARY PRACTICE
A. The Limits of Rationalism
HE literature of arms control is singularly barren on the
Question of how a treaty or agreement actually affects the
* Professor of Law, Harvard University. A.B. Harvard 1943; LL.B. 1949.
Legal Adviser to the Department of State, 1961–64. --
The work for this article was done under a grant from the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace for an interdisciplinary study of problems of verification
of arms control agreements. The grant was made to Dr. George Ratiºn, Pro-
fessor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dr. J.P. Ruina,
Professor of Electrical Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the
author. Dr. Rathjens was Deputy Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Department of Defense, 1960–62, and subsequently Special Assistant to the Di-
rector, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Dr. Ruina was Director, Advanced
Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense, 1961–63, and has been a mem-
ber of the General Advisory Committee, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Since 1969. - .
After some preliminary work, my colleagues and I concluded that a broader
inquiry into the nature of the arms race and the structure of arms control agree-
ments would be fruitful. The review panel assembled by the Endowment con-
curred, and the Endowment kindly authorized us to pursue the broader study.
The present article draws heavily on the work of my colleagues, particularly in
their fields of special expertise: Dr. Rathjens in strategic, theory, and Dr. Ruina
905 .
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behavior of states." The premises of “strategic theory” or “stra-
tegic analysis” — an amalgam of game theory, operations re-
search, systems analysis, and related disciplines — do not seem to
have progressed very far beyond Holmes' bad-man theory of the
law.” In what has been called “the finest formulation of the prin-
ciples of contemporary strategic thinking,” “Professor Thomas
C. Schelling adopts as a fundamental postulate “the assumption
of rational behavior — not just of intelligent behavior, but of
behavior motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages.
in the technical characteristics of weapons systems. This study has been in the
fullest sense a collaborative effort, and, as is usual in such cases, it is often not
possible to pinpoint the sources of individual ideas or contributions. The help and
stimulus of my colleagues has been pervasive and is inadequately recognized by
the specific references to their work in the footnotes. The responsibility for the
conclusions remains my own. Dr. Herbert Scoville, who shepherded the project
for the Carnegie Endowment, was lavish with his Support and guidance. My re-
search assistant, Barry Goode, was unfailingly resourceful in discovering citations
to support my propositions.
* The words “treaty” and “agreement” are used interchangeably, without refer-
ence to the distinction in United States taxonomy between “treaties,” ratified by
the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, and “agreements,” concluded by the President pursuant to legislation or
in the exercise of his inherent powers. For materials on the distinction, See I A.
CHAYEs, T. EHRLICH & A. Low ENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS 344-7 I
(1968) [hereinafter cited as CHAYES, EHRLICH & Low ENFELD]; 2 id. 987–98. The
article deals with formal and explicit agreements, embodied in a writing and
importing international legal obligation as opposed to tacit or informal under-
standings. Professors Schelling and Halperín have developed perceptively and at
length the significance of such informal accommodations as arms control measures.
T. ScHELLING. & M. HALPERIN, STRATEGY AND ARMS CONTROL 77–86 (1961). See
also T. SchELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE 264–86 (1966). -
In the context of the Strategic-Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the
United States and the USSR, there has been considerable discussion of the relative
merits of formal agreement versus informal understanding, much of it stressing the
advantages of the informal approach. See, e.g., Bunn, Missile Limitation: By Treaty
or Otherwise?, 7o Colux'ſ. L. REv. 1, 16–25 (1970). The considerations raised in
the present article should have an important bearing on the issue, although as a
practical matter it seems unlikely that any significant constraints on strategic
weapons deployment would take the form of an informal understanding. Cf. Arms
Control and Disarmament Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2573 (1970):
[N]o action shall be taken under this chapter or any other law that will
obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed
Forces or armaments of the United States, except pursuant to the treaty
making power of the President under the Constitution or unless authorized
by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States.
* “If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a
bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge
enables him to predict. . . .” Holmes, The Path of the Law, Io HARV. L. REv.
457, 459 (1897).
* G. ALLISON, ESSENCE of DECISION: ExPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
15 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ALLISON].
89
1972.] - ARMS COV TROL QO7
. .” “ The central concern is with “the exploitation of potential
force” by “participants who try to ‘win’. . . .” "
Taken to an extreme, this bad-man, or perhaps rational-actor
approach to international behavior would lead to a conclusion that
the existence of treaty norms should not affect decisions at all. The
coldly rational state would confine its cost-benefit analysis to a
strictly military calculus, and the military value of any particular
deployment, weapons system, or test would be unaffected whether
or not the action is prohibited by treaty." Most strategic analysis,
however, concedes that the purity of the military equation must
suffer some admixture of politics in practice, and probably in
theory as well." And among political factors, the existence of a
treaty bearing on a proposed course of action can hardly be left
out of the account.
A treaty is a legal instrument. It defines a range of prohibited
conduct and gives the prohibition the force of law. In so doing, it
imports a whole set of attitudes and inhibitions associated with
law into what, absent the treaty, was a purely prudential decision.
Even to ignore the prohibition entirely involves a choice, and this
alone introduces a new factor into the process of decision.
States and other corporate bodies, like individuals, obey law
for a variety of reasons: convenience, routine, the pressure of
expectation, the sense that the values of the system outweigh the
gains from violating a particular norm in a particular instance.
In How Nations Behave, Professor Louis Henkin, as an inter-
national lawyer, has catalogued, documented, and analyzed the
operation of these and cognate factors for law abidance in the
international system.* Professor Henkin's conclusions are by no
means irrelevant to an appraisal of the efficacy of agreements in
the arms control field. But ultimately they derive from the same
assumptions as Strategic analysis — that governments behave
more or less like reasonable men, or, at least, that governmental
purposes and actions can be understood by analogy to those of
individuals.” The classical pro-treaty argument that states will
obey the law thus reduces to a claim that ordinarily a proper cal-
culus of advantage will come down on the side of law-abidingness.
But the argument is open to the objection that the constraint of
the treaty fails just when it is needed most: when the prospective
* T. ScHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CON FLICT 4 (1960).
* Id. at 4–5.
* See, e.g., E. TellER & A. LATTER, OUR NUCLEAR FUTURE chs, XV, XIX
(1958).
* See, e.g., T. SCHIELLING & M. HALPERIN, supra note I, at 43–48.
* L, HEN KIN, How NATIONS BELIAve (1968).
* Id. at 7 n.f.
79-879 O – 72 – 7
90
968 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:905
gains of breach, rationally perceived, outweigh the burdens. Then,
the “bad man” takes over. . . . . . . . . .
But is it appropriate to analogize the behavior of a complex
corporate aggregate like the state to that of a rational individual?
How do states really “perceive” the relevant costs and benefits?
And how do they “act” on those perceptions? . . . . .
In fact, the best of the strategic analysts have always recog-
nized the limitations of their model: ” . . . . . . . . -
[W]e seriously restrict ourselves by the assumption of rational
behavior. . . . If our interest is the study of actual behavior, the
results we reach under this constraint may prove to be either a
good approximation of reality or a caricature. Any abstraction
runs a risk of this sort. . . . - . . . . . . . . .
Like any other model, the rationalist model of strategic theory
illuminates the elements of the situation that are thrown into re-
lief by the stated assumptions — in this case, the mathematical
and formal structure of conflict. But it tells very little about those
aspects of the problem that are abstracted out by the assumptions,
and it may even obscure them. The assumption of a unitary actor
deciding by conscious calculation of advantage in terms of an
explicit and self-consistent value system abstracts out most of the
processes by which decisions of governments are actually reached.
A growing body of work by contemporary political scientists,
of whom Graham Allison " and C. E. Lindblom * can be taken as
exemplars, explicitly rejects the “assumption of rationality” as
the most useful premise for understanding governmental behavior.
They stress instead the perception that a government is a corpo-
rate entity, and that policy decisions are the results of con-
tinuous interplay among its constituent parts. These include a
myriad of individuals organized in many offices and agencies.
They are interrelated with each other and with outside groups and
power centers in patterns of infinite complexity. The organiza-
tions involved exhibit great diversity in size, structure, and func-
tion. They are not finely-tuned instruments responding to central
direction; they operate in accordance with routines designed to
accomodate their diurnal tasks while protecting and enhancing
organizational integrity.” The individuals are not united by a
common perspective or, as in Schelling's basic assumption, by “a
single, explicit self-consistent value system.” “On the contrary,
*T. SCHELLING, supra note 4, at 4.
** See ALLISON. . -
*See C. Lisbelox, THE Policy-Makiso PRocess (1968); C. LINDBloxi, THE
INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY (1965).
* E.g., ALLISON 81-82.
“T. Schelling, supra note 4, at 4.
91
1972]. ARMS CONTROL 9C9
they differ in personal and organizational goals, in conceptions of
the national interest, in how they perceive the facts, issues, and
stakes, in roles, power and status in the hierarchy, in constraints
and opportunities.” Men and organizations both respond to the
imperatives of power, interest, or inertia at least as much as to the
dictates of sweet reason.
Although most of the work in this field is based on United
States experience, it purports to be asserting propositions that
hold true to some degree for all contemporary, highly bureau-
cratized governments. Both Allison and Lindblom adduce argu-
ment and evidence that the system operates similarly, mutatis
mutandis, in the Soviet Union."
This line of analysis highlights two aspects of governmental
action left out by “the assumption of rational behavior.” The first
is the set of processes by which bureaucratically organized institu-
tions define and carry out their tasks. And the second is the large
element of internal and external bargaining necessarily involved
in any government decisionmaking.” ... •
. After examining briefly the dynamic of the arms race against
which the treaty must operate, this article explores the question
of compliance with arms control agreements in light of these
newer theories and perspectives on state behavior.” The argu-
ment will be somewhat abstract and general. Its propositions,
though cast in descriptive, analytic, or prescriptive form, are for
the most part hypotheses, with impressionistic support drawn
from events of the 1950's and 1966's.” The discussion will be
addressed primarily to freely negotiated agreements dealing with
strategic forces. No particular treaty draft or proposal is taken
** E.g., ALLISON 144. . . . - - -
* Allison explicitly applies both of his alternative decision models, the Organi-
zational Process Model and the Governmental Politics Model, to the Soviet deci-
sions to emplace and then to withdraw missiles from Cuba. Id. at Ioz–17, 132–43,
210–44. See also id. at 97-98; C. LINDBLost, THE POLICY-MARING Process 44,
90–91, 99 (1968); T. SCHELLING, supra note I, at 276. Among studies of the
Soviet Union, A. MEYER, THE Soviet PoliticAL SYSTEM (1965), applies these
organizational models systematically. -
” Whereas Allison concentrates on different patterns within the executive
branch, Lindblom explores, in addition, how the legislature, political parties and
factions, interest groups, and broader publics relate to the policy-making process.
See C. LINDBLOM, THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS (1968).
* For a critique of strategic analysis within the framework of the assumption
of a unitary decisionmaker, see A. RAPOPORT, STRATEGY AND CONSCIENCE (1964).
* For the most part the events referred to are fully in the public domain, but
occasionally I have resorted to my own recollection of events during my service
in the State Department. Unsupported, dogmatic statements concerning incidents
inside the Government during the Kennedy administration should be referred to
this source.
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9 Io HAR I’ARD LAH/ REVIEW | Vol. 85:905
as a focus. Rather, the analysis is oriented toward a set of pos-
sible agreements in the strategic area. The set would include any-
thing discussed in connection with the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT), as well as other agreements that might, on a gen-
erous estimate, be thought within the range of possibility over the
next decade or so. Finally, the article addresses primarily the rela-
tions between the United States and the Soviet Union as they
would be modulated by such agreements; the impact on the
bilateral situation of a third major nuclear power or of the pos-
sible proliferation of nuclear weapons to smaller powers is not
systematically discussed. These restrictions, I believe, do not
represent inherent limitations on the thesis advanced, which should
have application across the whole field of arms, control agreements,
and perhaps international agreements in general. To establish this
broader validity, however, would require more extensive analysis
— and may even justify some empirical research! ”
B. The “Mad Momentum” ” of the Arms Race
The inadequacies of the rationalistic explanation of govern-
ment decisions are nowhere more tellingly revealed than in tilt.
history of the strategic arms race itself — the seemingly inexor
able increase over time in levels and types of strategic forces
Since a major purpose of arms control agreements is to halt or
moderate this process, a more detailed inquiry is necessary into
the failure of strategic analysis to account for the arms race and
into the availability of alternative explanations.
- For some time, most analysts have characterized the strategic
situation between the United States and the USSR as one of
* See ALLISON 264-77 for a smorgasbord of suggestions.
** Address by Sec'y of Defense McNamara to United Press International Edi-
tors and Publishers, San Francisco, Calif., Sept. 18, 1967, in ABM : AN Eval.UATION
OF THE DECISION TO DEPLoy AN ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM 2.42 (A, Chayes
& J. Wiesner cds. 1960) [hereinafter cited as CHAY Es & WIESNERl.
** Proliferation of weapons systems and secular increases in levels of strategic
forces do not necessarily imply rising military budgets or even increases in spend-
ing on strategic weapons. As a matter of fact, annual cxpenditures for procurement
of strategic weapons, measured in constant dollars, have been below those of 1964
for some years. Hearings on Dep’t of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1972
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 02d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 182 (1971) (table 1). Strategic weapons, however, are relatively durable
goods, and on the whole, with exceptions when a system aborts beiore deploy-
ment, or more occasionally when an obsoletc system is phased out, sec., e.g., I 15
CoNG. REc. 5602 (1969) (statement of Sen. Symington) (expenditures since the
Korean War on “unworkable or obsolete missiles” amounted to $2.3 billion), each
year's purchases add to an existing base so that force levels increase even if the
rate of spending does not.
93
1972] º ARMS CONTROL - 9 II
mutual deterrence.” That is, the number and configuration of
weapons deployed by each side has been such that either could
“absorb” a first strike by the opponent and still have enough
force left to administer “unacceptable damage” in a retaliatory”
attack.” What is more, it is generally conceded that this balance
is a stable one. Neither side can alter the situation decisively by
any foreseeable deployment or technological breakthrough.*
* For the account of the present strategic. balance, I have drawn on pre-
liminary papers prepared by Dr. George Rathjens in connection-with the Carnegie
Endowment study described in note * supra, and his continuing tutelage has been
invaluable in the general area of strategic theory and the arms race. . .
* See, e.g., [1961) Joris F. KENNEDY, Públic PAPERs of Tire PRESIDENTS 231.
(1962); Hearings on Dep’t of Defense 'Appropriations for 1968 Before the Siub- .
comms. on the Dep’t of Defense and on Military Constr. of the House Comm. on
Appropriations, 90th Cong, 1st Sess, pt. 2, at 159, 162 (1967) (statement of
Sec'y of Defense McNamara); T. SCHELLING, supra note. 4, at 232. The definition -
of “unacceptable damage” put forward by Secretary McNamara in the statement
cited above was 20–25% “prompt” fatalities among the adversary population and
50–66%% destruction of its industrial capacity. Hearings, supra, at 154. These
figures have achieved something of the status of official dogma. They do not
appear to be based on any objective data, except, perhaps, that the Soviet Union.
was able to survive World War II with cumulative casualty and destruction levels,
over the four years, of about a third of these figures. See, e.g., B. DMYTRYSHYN,
USSR: A CoNCISE HISTORY 231–32 (1965); I. GREY, THE FIRST 50 YEARS: Soviet
RUSSIA 1917-1967, at 404, 528 nn.2 & 7 (1967). There has always been something
bloodless and abstract about this statement of the mutual deterrence equation. A
political perspective on the realism of this kind of quantification is Supplied by
McNamara's colleague, McGeorge Bundy, in an article that is required reading for
anyone interested in limitation of strategic weapons: . . .
There is an enormous gulf between what political leaders really think.
about nuclear weapons and what is assumed in complex calculations of rela-
tive “advantage” in simulated strategic warfare. Think-tank analysts can
set levels of “acceptable” damage well up in the tens of millions of lives.
They can assume that the loss of dozens of great cities is somehow a real
choice for sane men. They are in an unreal world. In the real world of real
political leaders — whether here or in the Soviet Union — a decision that
would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one's own country
would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten bombs on
ten cities would be a disaster beyond history; and a hundred bombs on a
hundred cities are unthinkable. Yet this unthinkable level of human in-
cineration is the least that could be expected by either side in response to
any first strike in the next ten years, mo matter what happens to . weapons
systems in the meantime. Even the worst case hypothesized in the ABM
debate leaves at least this much room for reply. In Sane politics, therefore,
there is no level of superiority which will make a strategic first strike be-
tween the two great states anything but an act of utter folly.
Bundy, To Cap the Volcano, 48 ForFIGN AFFAIRs 1, 9–Io (1969). We need not
pursue the argument, for whatever assured retaliatory capacity is, it has been
made perfectly clear that both the United States and the Soviet Union have it.
..[1970]. RICHARD M. Nixon, PUBLIC PAPERs of THE PRESIDENTS 117 (1971).
* See Stock Holst INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, YEARRook oF
WoRLD ARMANIENTS AND DISARMAMENT 1969/70, at 57–58 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as SIPRI YEARBook 69/70]. Schelling argues that the stability of the bal-
ance is sensitive to the force levels at which it is achieved. T. ScHELLING & M.
HALPERIN, supra note I, at 56–58. If each side had only ten strategic weapons,
94
912 HARWARD LAIſ REI’IEIſ. [Vol. 85:905
In such a situation, rational calculation would seem to dictate
that each side, pursuing its own self-interest, would simply stop.”
As a matter of fact, of course, neither the United States nor the
USSR has followed this apparently obvious line of policy.
The concept of the “action-reaction phenomenon” has been
advanced as a way of explaining these observed facts within the
rationalistic assumptions of strategic theory.” Each side, it is
Said, is under the necessity of reacting to the other's deployments.
Lead times for strategic weapons are long. One can never be sure
in early stages just what the adversary is deploying and what he
“intends” to do once he deploys it. It is best to be on the safe
side; and “safe,” in this context, means to resolve both imponder-
ables — the character of the opposing deployment and the pur-
pose behind it — as pessimistically as possible. This procedure,
known as “worst-case analysis,” leads to pressures to increase
forces to meet the “worst case.” From the perspective of the
other side, this reaction itself becomes ap action that generates its
own reaction. And so the spiral proceeds. -
This explanation of the arms race is accepted by many on
both sides of the arms control debate.” For examples they point
to the interplay between the first Soviet deployment of an anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) defense around Moscow, and the United
States response with multiple warhead missile (MIRV) deploy-
ment as a way of penetrating the defense. Again, the United
an increase of fifty on one side might be thought to give it a decisive advantage,
since it might now destroy the other side's fetaliatory capability. And so the
balance could be easily upset. With an initial level of 1,000 weapons on each side,
however, an increment of 50 or even 500 could not affect retaliatory capacity.
Neither side would have any incentive to upset the balance, and so it would be
stable. But see Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror, 37 Foreign AFFAIRs
211 (1959). Bundy's analysis, supra note 24, also casts doubt on the proposition
that the balance is unstable at lower force levels. But in any case, with over I,ooo.
ICBMs on each side, plus a good deal of other strategic weaponry, Schelling's
conditions for stability are surely satisfied. -
* Cf. T. SCHELLING, supra note I, at 264–86; T. SCHELLING, supra note 4, at
I87–203. -
** McNamara, supra note 21, at 236. The action-reaction cycle, with its struc-
ture of move and countermove by two opposing players, itself suggests how deeply
perceptions of reality have been influenced by the intellectual concepts of game
theory.
* See, e.g., Shulman, The Effect of ABM on U.S.-Soviet Relations, in CHAYES
& WIESNER 155; STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, YEAR-
Book of WoRLD ARMA: ENTS AND DISARMAMENT 1968/69, at 42—44 (1969) [here-
inafter cited as SIPRI YEAP200K 68/69]; Hearings on ABM, MIRV, SALT, and
the Nuclear Arms Race Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, International
Law and Organization of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., at 196 (1970) (Statement of W. Panofsky); McNamara, supra note 21, at
236, 238.
95
1972] . . . ARMs control 9I 3
States is said to have reacted with an ABM system of its own in
response to the intensive Soviet buildup of its ICBM force. Other
examples often adduced are the expansion of the United States
strategic bomber force in the 1950's in reaction to worst-case
projection of a “bomber-gap” vis-a-vis the Soviets, which turned
out to be nonexistent. The same pattern was rerun in the 1960's.
when the Kennedy administration authorized the expansion of
United States land-based ICBM forces from about two hundred
to about one thousand in the face of a “missile gap” that existed
only in the minds of the worst-case analysts. . . . . . . . .
... On a closer examination none of these frequently cited ex-
amples turns out to provide compelling evidence for any simple
version of the action-reaction cycle. United States development .
work on the ABM began as early as 1954, not in response to any
Soviet deployment, but as an aspect of a more general shift of
emphasis from bombers to missiles as strategic delivery vehicles.
Research and development work proceeded continuously there-
after. At various stages there were proposals for deployment by .
the military services. Three of these — in 1959, 1962, and 1966
— reached and were rejected at the presidential level before the
final executive branch decision in 1967 for limited deployment.”
MIRV’s (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles),
also, were an outgrowth of a dialectic internal to the United
States military services. Work on defensive systems stimulated
thought about how they might be penetrated. Various kinds of
dummies and decoys carried by the offensive missile along with
the real nuclear warhead were thought of as possibilities. It soon
emerged that it was as easy, and probably as cheap, to multiply
the number of actual warheads carried by the missile. Then at
least one was likely to get through to the target. Some sacrifice
of total megatonnage was entailed but each of the “small” multiple
warheads would still be considerably larger than the Hiroshima
weapon. From multiple warheads released in a cluster, proceed-
ing on more or less the same trajectory to the same target (mul-
tiple reentry vehicles, or MIRV’s); it was only a short step to the
, conception of a missile carrying a number of warheads, each of
which could be independently targeted. And so the MIRV was
born. Its deployment, beginning in 1970, came at a time when
Soviet ABM activity had long been quiescent.” *
Similarly, the Kennedy decision to deploy a thousand-missile,
land-based ICBM force came in 1961, months after the ad-
ministration knew that the missile gap was a myth and that
* See Chayes et al., An Overview, in CHAYES & WIESNER 3–4.
* SIPRI YEARbook 68/69, at 44.
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9 I4 HARVARD LAH REVIEIſ. . [Vol. 85:905
ICBM development in the USSR was far behind that of the United
States.” - . . . . . . .
The pattern in the USSR is not very different. Graham Alli-
son concludes on the basis of a survey of Soviet deployments
since World War II that: * . . . . : J . . "
Soviet responses to American procurement typically involve not
the choice of the rational countermove but rather a delayed
option for something on the menu of one of the present organiza-
tions. As A. W. Marshall has argued, the history of Soviet pur-
chases from 1946 to 1962 reveals an interaction between American
and Soviet force postures that is muffled, lagged, and very com-
plex. - ...' . . . .. -
If action and reaction do not account for the continued arms
race, at least in any very simple sense, what other factors are at
work? The evidence suggests that they are primarily bureaucratic
and political, with response to anticipated adversary action play- .
ing a decidedly secondary role.” Rational decisionmaking would
demand that weapons development and deployment decisions be
based on careful analysis of force requirements in terms of as-
signed missions and anticipated adversary capabilities. The total
military budget and its division among the armed services would
be essentially an aggregate of those decisions.”
* T. Greenwood, Reconnaissance and Surveillance: Applications to Arms Con-
trol Verification 16–19 (unpublished paper written in connection with Carnegie
Endowment grant, supra note *) [hereinafter cited as Greenwood]. See also. A.
SCHLESINGER, A THOUSAND DAYS 499 (1965); 1961 CoNGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY
ALMANAC I44. e • * - . . . * ... "
* * ALLISON 98. § . . .
* Economic interpretations are perhaps slighted here, because of the focus on
political and bureaucratic responses to treaty controls: Any comprehensive analysis
of the dynamics of the arms race could not neglect economic factors. For some
materials, see S. LENS, THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL CoMPLEx 1-58, 99-121 (1970); .
E.L.M. BURNS, MEGAMURDER 185-98 (1967); F. Cook, THE WARFARE STATE 20–24,
45–67, 162–194 (1962); Yarmolinsky, The Problem of Momentum, in CHAYES &
WIESNER 144. Cf. C.W. MILLs, THE Power ELITE 211–24, 276–78 (1956). A
cautionary word is in order, however, against the tendency to ascribe the major
responsibility to the evil workings of a “military-industrial complex.” The Soviet
experience has not differed markedly from that of the United States, although they
are presumably not burdened by the contradictions of capitalism or greed for
profits. If the argument is that industrial managers in the Soviet Union exercise
influence and exhibit behavior like that of corporate managers in the United States,
then explanation might be sought in terms of organizational and structural forces
in the production sector not unlike those that operate within governments.
**The emphasis on cost-benefit analysis and Planning-Programming-Budgeting
Systems (PPHS) in the Defense Department during the Kennedy Administration
was an effort to make the budgetary process conform more adequately to this ideal.
See, e.g., C. SchultzE, THE Politics AND EcoxoMICs of PUBLIC SPENDING 19-34
(1968); Hitch, Planning-Programming-Budgeting System, in AMERICAN DEFENSE
97
1973] ARMS CONTROL 9 IS
Careful studies of the actual United States budgetmaking
process show that it turns this rational procedure upside down.”
Decisions on military force levels are made within the framework
of a budget ceiling --- more or less formally established — that
operates as a given.” The ceiling is not derived primarily from
an analysis of military needs. It reflects an overall weighing and
judgment among competing claims on available government re-
Sources. made largely in political terms by or on behalf of the
President.” The process sometimes produces quantum changes
in the military budget in response to changes in the general politi-
cal climate or other extraneous events. Harry Truman's pre-
occupation with domestic programs and his overall post-World
War II economy drive led to deep slashes in military spending,
down to $1.1 billion under Defense Secretary Louis Johnson.”
Korea, in 1951;” and the Berlin crisis a decade later," served as
occasions for substantial overall increases in military expenditures
and force levels. But ordinarily the classic budget-making formula
is employed: start with last year's number, then adjust it margin-
ally up or down, but mostly up." - -
A number of factors generate continuous upward pressure on
the ceiling. Some are peculiar to the military. Inflation is par-
ticularly significant in an organization with such large hardware
and personnel expenditures. It seems characteristic of weapons
systems that they exceed cost projections, even in terms of con-
stant dollars, when they finally reach the stage of deployment.
American fascination with technically complex and thus very
expensive gadgetry may contribute. But the general tendency of
every bureaucratic entity to maintain and increase its share of
the pie is also at work. . . . .
The same forces also operate in the division of the military
Policy 212 (W. Posvar et al. eds. 1965) ;: A. ENTHoves & K. SMITH, How Much
Is ENoucKIP 31–72 (1971); cf. id. at 309-32. . . . . -
*See S. HUNTINGTON, THE COMMON DEFENSE (1961); N. Polsby, CoNGRESS
AND THE PRESIDENCY 82–98 (1964) ; Schilling, The Politics of National Defense:
Fiscal 1950, in STRATEGY, Politics, AND DEFENSE BUDGEts 1 (W. Schilling et al.
eds. 1962). . . . . •
*S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 35, at 223–29; N. PoESBY, supra note 35, at
86–89. - :
* S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 35, at 197-99; A. ScitleSixGER, supra note 31,
at 317 n.”; Schilling, supra note 35, at 250–51. - -
* 1953 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 343 (table 370).
* [1951] HARRY S. TRUMAN, PUBLIC PAPERs of THE PRESIDENTs 63 (1965);
see S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 35, at 201.
* [1961) John F. KENNEDY, supra note 24, at 533–40; see T. SCHELLING, supra
note 1, at 270.
* See, e.g., A. Dow NS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 247–52 (1967); N. Polsby, supra
note 35, at 85; Schilling, supra note 35, at 220–22. - -
98
9 I6 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:905
budget among the services.” The inertia that perpetuates last
year's programs and related expenditures for another year — plus
or minus something — operates within the Defense Department
as well as between the Department and its rivals for budgetary
resources. The basic imperative of maintaining “organizational
health . . . in terms of bodies assigned and dollars appropri-
ated” “...applies to each of the military Services just as much as to
the Defense Department as a whole. Each seeks to maintain and
increase its budgetary share. To this end, each service strives for
a substantial element of each of the essential force missions to
serve as base for high and increasing claims on resources.
This particular form of rivalry has had direct implications for
the size and configuration of strategic forces. It has contributed
to the development and deployment of three separate and inde-
pendent nuclear delivery systems, and to continuing pressure for
ABM deployment.” In the late 1950's the Air Force responded
to the possible obsolescence of the long-range bomber by staking
out its claim to the new land-based, solid fuel ICBM's.” But it
has not ceased to press for new and better strategic bombers or .
to resist the phasing out of the existing system.” The Navy is
securely in the field with missile-carrying submarines, long con-
sidered the most invulnerable of the nuclear weapons systems.
The Army lost out on offensive missiles when deployment of soft,
liquid fuel Jupiter missiles was terminated in 1960, but it is back
in the act as the service responsible for the ABM."
In the USSR also, bureaucratic imperatives seem to win out
over rational ones. Allison believes, for example, that Soviet
deployment of ABM's can be explained by the Russian Air
Defense Command's need for a new defensive project to sustain
its budget after it had exhausted-all the likely sites for conven-
- * See generally S. HUNTINGTON, supra. note 35. Huntington characterizes the
process as “legislative,” defines “legislative” as involving bargaining, negotiation,
compromise, and logrolling among relative equals, and contrasts it to expert plan-
ning or to “executive” decision, which implies a hierarchal Órganizational structure
and absence of controversy about fundamental goals. Id. at 124–65.
* ALLISON 82. -
**See note 53 infra. - . . .
* H. YoRK, RACE TO OBLIVION: A PARTICIPANT's View of THE ARMs RACE
80–98 (1970). - -
* Id. at 51–59. -
* Id. at 139–41, 193–97. According to P. Doty, Can Investigations' Improve
Scientific Advising? The Case of the ABM, Feb. 1972, at 8 (mimeographed ver-
sion of paper to be published in Minerva):
The ABM controversy has its roots in the 1959 decision of Mr. McElroy,
Secretary of Defense, to give the Army responsibility for missile defense.
Many talented and dedicated officers were thereby committed to this mis-
sion. Since it was the only license the Army had in the new dimension of
space it was certain to be pursued with alacrity. -
99
1972] ARMS CONTROL 9 I 7
tional antiaircraft batteries.” Again, the failure of the USSR to
capitalize on its technological headstart to build an ICBM force
in the late 1950's has been a major puzzle for strategic analysts.
Allison convincingly relates this omission to the Organizational
arrangements that put missiles under the artillery Section of the
Soviet ground forces: ”
The mission of the artillery section as well as the experience and
training of its officers encouraged activity related to the Support
of Soviet ground forces in Europe. As a result, the Soviets had
produced some 750 MRBMI's and IRBM's, three times European
overkill. . . . A capability for direct attack against the United
States was . . . a secondary and perhaps even a peripheral goal
of the Soviet army.
In the United States, hardware developments that can absorb
any available resources are continously at hand. They are turned
out by a process that is aptly characterized as technological drift.”
There are, in the first instance, minor improvements in weapons
systems that occur as bugs are worked out and as components
with improved performance are made available to replace older
ones. Something of a technological imperative seems to operate
with respect to changes of this kind. Since this drift is almost
continuous and involves enormous numbers of small and modest
developments, authorization for change at policy levels and,
where necessary, by Congress occurs as a matter of routine, with-
out extensive debate or explicit decision. This is especially true
at the stage of research or exploratory development, but for many
advanced development programs as well, scrutiny is likely to be
pro forma.
This process, operating largely on its own momentum, turns out
a continuous array of new possibilities for adoption by the ser-
vices. Rarely do any of these individual changes — in electronic
circuitry, radar frequencies, propellant composition, warhead de-
sign, etc. — make much difference in overall strategic capabilities.
Cumulatively or in combination, however, they may result in
striking evolutionary changes in particular weapons systems. Ex-
amples are the great increases in range and payload between the
original B-52 and the currently deployed B-52H, the increase
in range from about twelve hundred miles for the Polaris A-I mis-
sile to about two thousand five hundred for the A-3; and the
* ALLISON 97–98.
“Id. at 114–15. See also id at 95.
* This account relies principally on preliminary papers by Professor J.P. Ruina
prepared for the Carnegie Endowment study described in note * supra. He is the
originator of the term “technological drift.” See also SIPRI YEARBook 68/69, at
9I-93.
100
9 IS H.H R J "...[RD L.; ; ; REI’IE}} |Vol. 85; 905
steady improvements in missile guidance and accuracy that have
reduced the miss distance by a factor of about two every three
or four years since the V–2’s.” Occasionally, something very
much like what is here described as technological drift can result
in the development of an entirely new weapons system. The
MIRV may well be a case in point. These developments, as they
energe, generate their own pressures for deployment: they are
there. But neither the cumulative change nor the occasional de-
parture like MIRV has altered the basic strategic balance be-
tween the major nuclear powers.
Strategic analysis in general, and the necessity for response to
adyersary action in particular, provide the intellectual scaffolding
for this process and the argumentation for much of the public
debate.” These can always be used to support upward revisions
of the budget. The threat to be defended against is, in the “worst
case,” the complete destruction of American society — that is
to say, infinite. From a narrowly military point of view, any sys-
tem that gives some promise of preventing or mitigating such an
outcome seems well worth the cost. One example of this kind of .
intellectual backstopping is the doctrine of “the triad,” which has
been developed to support the redundant claims of different ser-
vices for strategic weaponry. Like other mystical threesomes,
this one has an inner and inviolable cohesion. The doctrine has it
that no single strategic system can by itself provide a reliable
deterrent. All three are needed. A more extreme version, often
advanced, is that each of the three forces must independently of
... the others have an assured retaliatory capability.”
* Hoag computes on the basis of open information that “an ICBM CEP of I
kilometer . . . is certainly plausible” and “an overall ICBM CEP of 30 meters
may be expected with reasonable and practical application of science and tech-
nology to the task.” Hoag, Ballistic-Missile Guidance, in IMPACT of NEw TECH-
NoLocIES ON THE ARMS RACE 19, 77, 81 (B. Feld et al. eds. 1971). CEP, or Cir-
cular Error Probability, is the radius of a circle, centered on the target, within
which 50% of the shots may be expected to land.
52.T. SCHELLING, supra note I, at 275–76 & n.4, analyzes the ways in which in-
formation abºt Soviet activity can influence United States decisionmaking. He
lists (1) stimulating “pure imitation,” (2) reminding us of things we have over-
looked or underemphasized, (3) demonstrating the feasibility of particular weapons,
(4) providing a “powerful argument” to one party or another in a dispute over
budgetary or weapons decisions, (5) challenging or belittling American perform-
ance so as to influence the political process, and (6) making particular weapons
“fashionable.” Of these the last three are wholly rhetorical/political rather than
technical/analytic. And political elements inhere in all of the first three as well.
* In addition to underpinning the argument for three separate offensive forces,
the doctrine has become the principal justification for deployment of defensive
ABM's. These are said to be needed for defense of Minuteman, one of the triad of
retaliatory forces. In the ABM debate, there was some effort to argue that all
three components — bombers, submarines, and ICBM's — might be vulnerable to
101
1972] ARMS CONTROL 9 IQ
The psychological and political values of consistency and
intellectual respectability are enough to insure that strategic cal-
culation and action-reaction will have their influence on weapons
and force decisions. In this respect, the position of the strategic
analyst is not so different from that of the international lawyer.
He plays his role, which in any case seems more derivative than
primary, not as the determinant of decision, but as a part of a
complex mix of organizational and political forces.
The remainder of this article explores how an arms control
agreement affects the interplay of these more fundamental
forces. It considers, in turn, pressures for compliance generated
in the negotiating process (Part II), bureaucratic and organiza-
tional constraints against breach of a treaty in force (Part III),
and the enforcement mechanism of the treaty itself (Part IV).
These are not analytically separate divisions and many of the
same issues and phenomena recur in each. They represent, rather,
different perspectives from which to examine the political and
bureaucratic forces bearing on treaty compliance. In this way
we may hope to gain an appreciation of the process of compliance
and enforcement that is richer and more balanced than that pro-
vided by the one-dimensional treatments now available.
II. NEGOTIATION AND RATIFICATION
Treaties are often analogized to contracts.” But unlike the
voluntary exchange of promises between two individuals — itself
increasingly misleading as the archetypal contract — the formula-
tion, negotiation, and ratification of a treaty is an elaborate
bureaucratic and political affair. In the field of arms control, so
intimately connected with national security, the complexity of
the process attains the rococo. For proponents of arms limitation,
this complexity carries very high costs. It is probably fair to say
that the principal reason arms control agreements take so long to
simultaneous attack, but it was not very convincing, since the Navy continued to
insist on the invulnerability of the Polaris force. Thus, the strategic case for ABM
came down, in the end, to the need to insure that the Minuteman force would
have its own assured retaliatory capability, regardless of the vulnerability vel mon
of the other components. For details of this interchange, see Hearings on Author-
ization for Military Procurement, Research and Development Fiscal Year 1970,
and Reserve Strength. Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 91st Cong., 1st
SeSS., pt. 2, at II 26–35 (1969) (testimony of Dr. W. Panofsky); id. at 1258–66
(testimony of Dr. A. Wohlstetter); Wiesner, Some First-Strike Scenarios, in
CHAYES AND WIESNER 7o; Weinberg, What Does Safeguard Safeguard?, in id. at
84; P. Doty, supra note 47, at 13–20.
* See, e.g., I. DETTER, ESSAYS ON THE LAw of TREATIES Ioo (1967); A. Mc-
NAIR, THE LAw OF TREATIES 48, IoS, 185, 233, 253 (1938); Llewellyn, What Price
Contract?, 4o YALE L.J. 704, 728 (1931).
102
92O H.4 RJ'.4 RD L. JJ REI IFI} [Vol. 85:905
negotiate and are not more far-reaching is not so much the diffi-
culty of one side convincing the other as the need for each side to
generate a broad base of agreement and acceptance within its own
and allied policymaking establishments.
But there is something to be entered on the other side of the
ledger. The argument of this section is that this very process of
negotiation and ratification tends to generate powerful pressures
for compliance, if and when the treaty is adopted. At least
three interrelated phenomena contribute to these pressures: (1)
by the time the treaty is adopted, a broad consensus within
governmental and political circles will be arrayed in support of
the decision; (2) meanwhile, principal centers of potential con-
tinuing opposition will have been neutralized or assuaged, though
often by means of concessions that significantly modify the sub-
stance of the policy; and (3) many officials, leaders of the ad-
ministration or regime and opponents as well, will have been per-
Sonally and publicly committed to the treaty, creating a kind of
political imperative for the success of the policy. After a brief
description of the negotiating process as it operates in the United
States and the Soviet Union, this section examines these forces in
greater detail.
A. Dramatis Personae
The procedures of the United States government in the arms
control field involve all individuals and agencies having security
responsibilities.” Below the Presidency, leading roles are played
by the two great cabinet departments of State and Defense. But
neither of these is a monolithic entity responding smoothly to
unified policy direction from the top,
Within the State Department, the responsibilities and terri-
tories of a bewildering array of offices will be engaged: the Bureau
of European Affairs, which itself will need to speak with at least
two voices, one for the Soviet desk and one reflecting NATO in-
terests; the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, dealing
with UN matters; the Office of Politico-Military Affairs, respon-
sible for liaison with the Pentagon; the Legal Adviser’s Office, at
a minimum on the formal aspects of the treaty; the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research; the Bureau of Public Affairs, for pub-
lic statements and information; possibly even the Policy Planning
Council. * e
These internal entities are by no means united in institutional
** The following account draws on H. JACOBSON & E. STEIN, DIPLOMATS, Sci-
ENTISTS AND PoliticiaNS: THE UNITED STATES AND THIE NUCLEAR TEST BAN
NECOTIATIONS 85–87 (1966), supplemented by my own experience from 1961–64
and conversations with others who have been close to the process since then.
103
1972] ARMS CONTROL 92 I
orientation or headed by men who share a consistent philosophi-
cal or policy outlook. Arguments within the Department on arms
control policies often parallel disputes in the government as a
whole both in range and intensity.
The Department of Defense has a similar roster of concerned
subunits expressing a similar diversity of viewpoints: the Office
of the Secretary of Defense; the Bureau of International Security
Affairs, which is the Defense Department’s Foreign Office and
contains a separate Section, headed by a Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary, devoted to arms control; the General Counsel’s office, if for
no other reason than because State's lawyers are in the act; the
Defense Intelligence Agency; the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have,
in addition, an independent statutory position as military advisors
to the President; * and each of the services, with its separate
missions and budget.
Apart from the two main departments, a number of other
agencies are involved. Any agreement concerning nuclear weap-
ons implicates the Atomic Energy Commission. Since 1961,
the semi-autonomous Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in
the State Department but not of it, has had statutory responsi-
bility for preparing and carrying out arms control negotiations.”
And there is the ubiquitous Central Intelligence Agency.
The luxuriantly variegated output of the agencies needs a
certain amount of pruning, which is known as “coordination.”
Until 1969, the formal repository of this function was the Com-
mittee of Principals, made up of the Secretaries of State and
Defense, the Director of the CIA, the Chairman of the AEC, the
Special Assistants to the President for Science and Technology
and for National Security Affairs, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of the USIA. Since that time,
the function of working out differences among the interested
agencies and refining unresolved issues for submission to the
President has been performed by the Verification Panel, made up
of somewhat lower ranking officials and chaired by the President's
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Formal review at
the White House level is by the National Security Council.
This complex congeries of organizations, with a bewildering
variety of formal and informal relationships, deploys hundreds
of people of different roles and ranks in preparing and analyzing
positions, formulating issues and arguments, sifting questions for
consideration at higher levels, and hammering out the answers,
evasions, or compromises by which they are resolved. This proc-
ess occurs not once at the beginning or end of the negotiations,
* See Io U.S.C. § 141 (b) (1970).
*" See 22 U.S.C. §§ 2551 (b), 2574(a) (I) (1970).
104
92.2 HARWARD L.4}}' RE!' I Eſſ’ [Vol. 85:905.
but continuously, although with fluctuations in intensity, through-
out their course. - - -
In the United States, the Congress is also an essential com-
ponent. For a formal treaty, the requirement of bringing the
Senate along is built into the Constitution.” Woodrow Wilson's
experience with the League of Nations Stands as an unhappy
reminder that the process of seeking Senate advice and consent
cannot begin after a treaty is signed. Even as to agreements that
do not require formal concurrence, the practice of advance con-
sultation is now standard. It is reenforced by alliances, stronger
in some cases than others, between particular executive agencies
and particular Congressmen or committees. In this way, the
process extends itself into a larger circle of concerned press and
publics. Some of these — for example, defense industries, on one
side, and a loose group of academic scientists, on the other —
have personal and official connections within the government that
assure a quasi-formal Role in the decision process. - *
A further layer of complexity is added by United States
membership in NATO. The mission at Brussels will obviously not
have the same point of view as the UN delegation. But apart from
this internal problem, the necessities of alliance politics will re- .
quire at least consultation with other members on major features
of an arms control agreement, and a degree of support or acqui-
escence from the most important. This entails intra-alliance nego-
tiation, which will trigger a similar round of bureaucratic process-
ing activity in each of the governments involved. These features
are familiar — perhaps too familiar — to United States partici-
pants in NATO affairs.” -
For the Soviet Union, we have nothing like so clear a picture
of either the organizations or the-procedures involved. And we
cannot simply extrapolate from familiar models. Fundamental
differences from western policymaking processes are rooted in the
authoritarian character of the system. Soviet leaders, presumably,
have no difficulty in securing a compliant legislature. Nor is there
the same need to convince broad Segments of public opinion, al-
though in recent years scientific and intellectual elites seem in-
creasingly to be able to make themselves felt, particularly on
arms control matters." On the other hand, the problem of bureau-
* U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
* See R. NEUSTADT, ALLIANCE POLITICS (1970) for a study of this consultative
process and some of the results of breakdown. In addition to its allies, the United
States may consult in advance other nations who have taken a prominent role on
disarmament issues, particularly members of the UN Disarmament Committee.
* B. LEvytsky, THE SOVIET PoliticAL ELITE 2 (1969); A. WEEKS, THE OTHER
SIDE of CoExISTENCE 136 (1970); Morton, The Structure of Decision-Making in
the USSR: A Comparative Introduction, in Soviet Policy-MAKING 9 (P. Juviler
105
1972] . . . . . ARMS CONTROL - 923
cratic coordination in the Soviet Union may be complicated by the
existence of overlapping hierarchies in party, state, military, and .
secret police." . . . . . . . . . . . .
Recognizing these pervasive differences we can still get some
sense of a complex bureaucratic and political process of decision-
making, not wholly unlike that in the United States,"* . . .
Final power of decision in the Soviet Union rests in the twenty-
one man Politburo of the Communist Party Central Committee,
which is supreme in foreign as in domestic affairs.” Even in
periods of one-man dominance, a degree of consensus has been
necessary within the Politburo for major decisions. At present
the best assessment is that collective leadership is still real, with
the Politburo meeting once a week to discuss important matters.”
& H. Morton eds. 1967); Skilling, The Party, Opposition, and Interest Groups :
in Communist Politics: Fifty Years of Continuity and Change, in THE Soviet
UNION: A HALF CENTURY OF CoMMUNISM 119, 135–40 (K. London ed. 1968). The
Pugwash meetings, during which leading United States and Soviet scientists discuss
arms, control issues in a nongovernmental setting, evidence in themselves an in-
volvement and growing sophistication by the Soviet scientific community on
strategic theory and arms control issues. Cf. J. Rotblat, PUGwash — THE FIRST
TEN YEARs 35–36 (1967). Dr. Paul Doty, who has been heavily involved in the
Pugwash movement, says: the USSR change of position on ABM's was “greatly
aided . . . [by] private discussions that had taken place over several years.” This .
‘is apparently a reference to the Pugwash-related activity. P. Doty, supra note
47, at 31... ." - . . .
* M. FAINsod, How RUSSIA Is RULED 341 (2d ed. 1963). On the secret police,
see P. DERIABIN & F. GIBNEY, THE SECRET WoRLD, app. IV (1959); O. PENkovskiy,
THE PENkovskiy PAPERs 59–93 (1965). On the military, see R. KOLKowICz, So-
viet PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS: CoNTAINED CONFLICT (Rand P-3371) (1966); R.
Kolkowicz, THE Soviet ARMY AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY: INSTITUTIONS IN
CoNFLICT (Rand R-446-PR 1966). .. -
* A cautionary word is in order about the following account of Soviet decision-
making in the arms control field. The text is based on secondary sources available
at the time of writing. Soviet experts have no greater penchant for unanimity
than any other breed, and they often disagree about the exact function performed
by a particular organizational unit or the weight it carries. Moreover, as to matters
of detail, the picture will soon be outdated, if it is not already, by the constant
round of reorganization and reallocation of functions that is a favorite indoor sport
of bureaucracies the world over. These matters; though of utmost importance
to Kremlin watchers, do not offset the main point of the text: despite the
authoritarian character of the Soviet government, decisionmaking on arms con-
trol matters and foreign policy in general is a complicated and extensive bureau-
cratic and political process. - -
*Speech of Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to 24th Congress of the
CPUSSR, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1971, at 3, col. 3; M. FAINSOD, supra note 61, at
337. . -
*See M. TATU, Power IN THE KREMLIN 537 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
TATU]; J. TRISKA & D. FINLEY, Soviet ForeſcN Policy 60 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as TRISKA & FINLEY l; N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1971, at 5, col. 6. As to the
earlier period, see note 113 infra. -
79-879 O – 72 – 8
106
924 . . . . HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:905
The second most powerful institution in the Communist Party
hierarchy is the Secretariat of the Central Committee. It is re-
sponsible for the daily functioning of the decisionmaking appara-
tus and plays a key role in framing issues, preparing the agenda,
and providing information, analysis, and alternatives to the Polit-
buro." In fact, the membership of the two bodies overlaps sub-
stantially. Currently, only 25 men occupy the 31 Politburo and
Secretariat positions. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Almost half of the Politburo members concern themselves with
foreign affairs." Three organizations with foreign policy roles
are responsible to the Secretariat — the Department of Liaison
with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, the
International Department, and the Agitprop (Ideological) De-
partment." Organizational charts of these departments, if they
were available, would undoubtedly display a complex scheme of
supporting offices and staffs upon which the Secretaries and other
party leaders rely. Much of Soviet foreign policy decisionmaking
is the result of the pulling and hauling among these men and
, offices. . . . . - .
The personal nature of political involvement in the Soviet
Union suggests that some, if not all, of the major Soviet leaders
have private staffs.” It is known, for instance, that Mr. Brezhnev
has a “personal Secretariat” headed by a man who has worked for
him since 1960." These personal staffs, like their United States
counterparts, will inevitably be influential. . -
Although the Party maintains ultimate direction of Soviet inter-
national affairs, State organs also play major roles in the discus-
'sion and formulation of arms control policy. Of prime importance
are the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. Indeed the
Ministers of these departments probably attend Politburo discus-
sións on disarmament." The supporting staffs in these two min-
istries are as variegated as their counterparts in the United States.
In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” the Minister, a First
- ** A. DALLIN et al., THE Soviet UNION, ARM’s CoNTROL, AND DISARMAMENT
62 (1964) : [hereinafter cited as DALLIN); M. FAINSoD, supra note 61, at 338;
TRISKA & FINLEY 64–66. ... " -
*TRISKA & FINLEY 82–85.
*" Id. at 66–69; L. ScHAPIRO, THE GoverNMENT AND Politics of THE Soviet
UNION 68–69 (1965).
* Z. BRZEziss KI & S. HUNTINCTON, PoliticAL Power: USA/USSR 204 (1964);
TATU 108. .
- * See N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1971, at 9, col. 1.
” T. LARSON, DISAPMAMENT AND Soviet POLICY, 1964–1968, at 37 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as LARSON]. . - -
** INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE USSR, THE SovieT DIPLOMATIC CoRPS
1917–1967, at 3–7 (E. Crowley ed. 1970); NATIONAL SECURITY STAFFING AND OP-
ERATIONS SUBCOMM. of THE SENATE CoMM. on GoverNMENT OPERATIONs, 88th
107
1972] - ARMS CONTROL 92.5
Deputy, seven Deputy Ministers, and a Secretary-General form
the upper echelon. Below them, several departments are con-
cerned with arms control: all five European Departments, par-
ticularly the First, Second and Third (whose major responsibili-
ties are, respectively, France, Great Britain and Germany); the
Department of the USA; the Contractual Law Department (the
Treaty and Legal Division); and the Department of Inter-
national Organizations. This last has indirect Supervision of
the Ministry’s Disarmament Section, a small staff with authority
to initiate disarmament proposals within the bureaucracy but
apparently with little actual power.” As late as 1964, the Dis-
armament Section was not directly responsible to either the head
of the Department of International Organizations or the USSR
Representative to the UN Disarmament Committee, who prob-
ably has an office and staff of his own.
Less is known about the organization of the Ministry of De-
fense.” It is likely that the Minister, his two First Deputies, and
several Deputy Ministers divide their responsibilities so that
several of them head divisions with an interest in questions of
disarmament. The Main Operational Directorate and the Military
Science Administration (both headed by Deputy Chiefs of Staff)
play significant roles in arms control discussions, as does the GRU
(Soviet Military Intelligence), which is under the supervision of
the Chief Intelligence Directorate. In addition, it has been sup-
posed that the Ministry has a staff organ for direct consideration
of disarmament policy.” .
Although the Minister of Defense has invariably been a uni-
formed officer, the Soviet armed forces, like the United States
military services, have their own representation within the
Ministry of Defense — the Chief of the General Staff.” His
office is undoubtedly involved in arms control decisionmaking, not
only because of his strategic responsibility, but because the mili-
tary maintains a semi-monopoly on technological expertise in
the weapons field. Each of the five services must have a voice in
disarmament debates, particularly the Air Defense Command,
responsible for the SAM’s and the ABM,” and the Strategic
Rocket Forces, wiich controls strategic offensive missiles."
CoNG, IST SESs., STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN THE Soviet UNION,
chart 1o facing p. 31 (Comm. Print 1963).
** DALLIN 60–61.
** This paragraph is based on INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AID: DIRECTORY OF
Soviet OFFICIALs, vol. I USSR & RSFSR I-B8 to I-B I4 (1966).
** LARSON 37.
**INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AID, supra note 73, at I-B8, -B9, -A7.
** ALLISON 97–98, 1 Io.
** Id. at 1 Io. -
108
926 HARWARD LAIF REVIEW [Vol. 85:905
There has been speculation about the existence of a Supreme
. Military Council, consisting of Brezhnev, Kosygin, Defense
Minister Grechko, the Chief of the General Staff, the Commander
of the Warsaw Pact Unified Forces, the head of the Main Political
Administration of the Armed Forces, and the Chiefs of the
General Staff's Operations and Intelligence Directorates. It is
said to be a forum for transmitting the views of the military to the
political leadership, as well as a body for the preparation of a
Statement of military options.
Despite its modest name, the Ministry of Medium Machine
Building is responsible for the development and management of
the USSR's atomic weapons programs. Its present leader has held
his post since 1956, and it is quite likely that he has developed a
power base that guarantees him a voice in disarmament matters.”
Soviet government agencies are supposed to operate on a
principle of collegiality, which requires a Minister to appoint a
collegium consisting of himself, his highest ranking subordinates,
and, often, persons outside the ministry. The collegium meets to
discuss and coordinate the work and policies of the Ministry, and
it may appeal a Minister’s decision to the Council of Ministers.”
At least three state committees * impinge on the disarma-
ment policymaking process. The Committee for State Security
(the KGB) has charge of the operations of the secret police.”
Within that committee, the First Main Administration (the
Foreign Directorate) is responsible for the collection of foreign
strategic intelligence and the supervision of other Soviet intel-
ligence organizations. It is plausible that the State Commit-
tee for Utilization of Atomic Energy, which has a Department
of Foreign Relations,” has some say on disarmament policy. And
it has been reported that a State Committee on Questions of Dis-
armament exists.” " * *.
Although they do not carry much political weight, Soviet
Scholars contribute to the disarmament debates. In 1963, the
USSR Academy of Sciences established a Commission for Scien-
tific Problems of Disarmament.” The Institute of World Econ-
omy and International Relations, and the Institutes of Law,
* Turkevich, Fifty Years of Soviet Science, in FIFTY YEARS OF Coxſ MUNISM
IN RUSSIA 255 (M. Drachkovitch ed. 1968).
** A. MEYER, supra note 16, at 215; L. ScHAPIRO, supra note 67, at 137.
* State committees take a variety of forms but in general they can be charac-
terized as high-level interagency coordinating groups, sometimes including official
representatives of affected Party agencies.
** TRISKA & FINLEY 45–48.
**INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AID, supra note 73, at IB-46.
** DALLIN 62–63.
** LARsox 38.
109
1972] A RAIS COV TROL 92.7
History, and Military History have also done relevant research.”
It is believed that a few leading scientists and scholars are con-
sulted by policymakers on an individual basis.”
Even the problems of alliance leadership may no longer bur-
den the United States alone. A number of observers have con-
cluded that in recent years, “Soviet leaders may be getting a
bigger dose of coalition politics than they would like.” ”
B. Consensus
... The mechanics of making an arms control treaty in a modern
bureaucratic state insure that the decision to adopt a treaty and
accept its obligations as legally binding is far from the calcula-
tion, will, and act of a single man and brain, or even of a small
group. Instead, it tends to represent a widespread consensus
among relevant power centers in each government. The more
formal, explicit, and public the agreement, the more difficult it is
to shortcircuit normal bureaucratic channels and the more likely,
therefore, that the final decision is the result of a consensus-
building process.
When the moment of final decision arrived, the Limited
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was concluded in a few short weeks by
a narrow circle of insiders.” The feverish last minute activity
that produced the treaty, however, was only the tip of an enor-
mous iceberg. The first public suggestion for any kind of limita-
tion on nuclear weapons testing was Prime Minister Nehru's
proposal in the spring of 1954 for a standstill agreement for
atomic explosions, pending the outcome of discussions on prohibi-
tion and elimination of weapons of mass destruction.” The idea
** DALLIN 61.
* Id. at 62. See note 60 supra.
*" T. WolfE, THE Evolving NATURE OF THE WARSAW PACT 21 (Rand Memo-
randum RM-4835–PR) (1965). See also Z. BRZEZLNSKI, THE Soviet BLoc: UNITY
AND CONFLICT 433–35, 453–54 (rev. ed. 1967); TATU IoI-O3.
* The final stages of the negotiations were triggered by President Kennedy's
American University Speech on June Io, 1963. [1963] JoFIN F. KENNEDY, PUBLIC
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 459 (1964). The treaty was initiated on July 25, and
the actual discussions in Moscow took only ten days. In the United States, the
details of the negotiations were very closely held. The selection of newly appointed
Under Secretary of State Harriman as chief of the United States delegation was it-
self an effort to bypass normal channels. For the Soviet Union the negotiations
were apparently conducted by the top leaders personally. See Communiqué, 49
DEP't of STATE BULL. 239 (1963). For an account of the final stages of negotia-
tions, see H. JACOBSON & E. STEIN, supra note 55, at 450–58.
* DEP'T of STATE, I [1945–1959] DocuMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 408, 410
(1960). This volume is one of a series published by the United States Department
of State until 1960, and thereafter by the United States Arms Control and Dis-
110
9 & C A a 4 1 A v. v . 1 4 V 12 L. "I i\ L \ 1 12 } ..., - L V 01. 85.905
was picked up fairly soon by the USSR, which sponsored a test
ban and armaments reduction resolution in the 1955 UN General
. Assembly session." But during the 1956 presidential campaign :
in the United States, when candidate Adlai E. Stevenson pro-
posed a ban on nuclear testing, Vice President Nixon dismissed
the idea as “catastrophic nonsense,” and President Eisenhower
called it “pie-in-the-sky promises and wishful thinking.”.” It
was only after seven years of political and bureaucratic maneuver-
ing had converted this sharp partisan division into substantial
unanimity that the Treaty was finally signed: - -
The road to Moscow was marked by the litter of countless
governmental papers — statements, position papers, drafts, mem-
oranda — each a compromise in itself, laboriously ground out
by the bureaucracies. Internal procedures are such that often
scores of officials, high and low, involved in the preparation of
such a paper must literally “sign off” before it can mature into
an official United States position. In August, 1962, the United .
States and the United Kingdom put before the UN Disarmament
Committee in Geneva a complete draft of a treaty banning tests
in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space.” The very
decision to table treaty language was the product of debate up to
the highest levels in each government, and the document itself
ran the full bureaucratic gauntlet, including extended considera- .
tion by the Principals and their deputies, the White House staff,
and the NSC. This draft became the basis of the Moscow negotia-
tions the following year. Although a number of significant changes
were made, much of the language, particularly the definition of
the basic prohibition in Article I, found its way into the final
treaty text.** . . -
The operation of this internal process bears out Lindblom's
description of decisionmaking: * - -
[A]ny policy-making system has a prodigious effect on the very
armament Agency. Wherever possible, documentary materials in this Article are
cited to that series [hereinafter cited as Documſen TS ON DISARMAMENT].
°91 [1945–1959] Documents on DISARMAMENT 456 (1960); U.N. Doc. DC/
SC.1/26, Rev. 2, May 10, 1955, in DISARMAMENT COMM’N, OFFICIAL RECORDS:
SUPP. APR-DEc. 1955, at 17–25 (1956). . . *
** N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1956, at 1, col. 8.
* K. Davis, A PROPHET IN HIS Own Country 488–89 (1957).
*2 [1962] Documents on DISARMAMENT 804-07 (1963).
* Compare id. art. I (1962 Draft) with 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, art. I, Aug. 5, 1963,
[1963] 2 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (effective Oct. Io, 1963).
The principal differences are caused by the elimination of the peaceful uses pro-
visions of the 1962 draft. - -
**C. LINDBLOM, THE Policy-MAKING PROCESS 101-02 (1968).
111
1972] - ARMS CONTROL 92.9
preferences, opinions, and attitudes to which it itself also re-
sponds. It is not, therefore, a kind of machine into which are fed
the exogenous, wishes, preferences, or needs of those for whom
the machine is designed and out of which come policy decisions
to meet these wishes, preferences, or needs. The machine actually
manufactures both policies and preferences.
From an initial stance of rather violent antipathy to any test ban,
the preferences of the United States policymaking establishment
moved haltingly by stages, each of which had to command its
own consensus, toward the final result: first, acceptance of a
comprehensive ban on testing as part of a broader disarmament
package;" then acquiescence in a ban unrelated to other meas-
ures but safeguarded by rigid inspection and control provisions; ”
later, progressive dilution of the control mechanism; * and ulti-
mately, acceptance of a partial ban without international controls.
A contrapuntal movement was occurring on the congressional
side, powered by competitive hearings conducted by the Disarma-
ment Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,”
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,” and the Preparedness
Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee.” The denouement found Senator Dodd, a strong oppo-
nent of a comprehensive test ban and a generally reputed hard-
line cold warrior, introducing a resolution endorsing a partial ban
that mustered thirty-four cosponsors.”
To some extent, this evolution of administrative and con-
gressional positions reflected changes in the “objective” setting
over the period. The results of test series conducted by both
* 1 [1945–1959] Documfests ON DISARMAMENT 608 (1960); UN Doc. DC/
SC.1/24, Apr. 3, 1956, in DISARMAMENT COMM’N, OFFICIAL RECoRDs: SUPP. JAN.-
DEC. I956, at II-I5 (1957). . . . . -
*" 2 [1945–1959] DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1543 (1960); UN Doc.
A/C.1/PV 1059, 68–71. - - -
* See [1960] Documfests on DISARMAMENT 33–39 (1961); UN Doc. GEN/
DNT/PV.17o, at 3–9; [1961] Documtexts on DISARMAMENT 82–126, 351 (1962); .
U.S. DISARMAMENT ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 7258, GENEVA
CoNFERENCE ON THE DiscostINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONs TESTs: HISTORY.
AND ANALYSIS OF NEGOTIATIONS 475–521, 620 (1961); 2. [1962] DOCUMENTS ON
DISARMAMENT 792–804 (1963); UN Doc. ENDC/58, Aug. 27, 1962. ' -
* See generally Hearings on the Nuclear. Test Ban Treaty Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). -
* See generally Hearings on Developments in Technical Capabilities for De-
tecting and Identifying Nuclear Weapons Tests Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic
Energy, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). -
* See generally Hearings on Military Aspects and Implications of Nuclear
Test Ban Proposals and Related Matters Before the Preparedness Investigating
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1–2
(1963). .
*** S. RES. No. 148, 88th Cong., 1st Sess, Io9 CONG. REC. 9483 (1963).
112
93O H.A.R. 4 RD LAſſ' RE!' I Eſſ' [Vol. 85:905
sides, the entry of China and France into the ranks of nuclear
powers, and improvements in the technology of monitoring
certainly had their effect. So did the slow moderation of the Cold
War and its confrontation psychology. For the most part, how-
ever, the successive positions did not embody the competing
“exogenous preferences” of particular individuals or groups.
They grew out of the interplay and interaction of the policy-
making process. Indeed, they were usually elaborated as solu-
tions to the successive problems posed by the slowly unfolding
process itself. On the side of the USSR, a vast documentary out-
put and the multitude of agencies and officials known to have been
inyolved testify to a similar process, culminating in a similar
broad consensus.
Certainly the Moscow Treaty is not the only conceivable
agreement that could have mustered such general support within
both governments. The process could have culminated success-
fully in any one of a number of variations. Or the result might
have been no agreement at all. The point here is only that the
agreement actually reached was within the limits of the broad
internal consensus hammered out in each government over the
decade of negotiations.
Such a consensus on both sides is an inevitable product of
the successful conclusion of any major arms control agreement.
It will give rise to widespread expectation and demand within
each government for action in conformity with the treaty.
--T
C. Concessions
Despite the consensus-building process, foci of opposition
may, and probably will, remain. Treaty proponents will seek to
minimize or neutralize this opposition. Important elements of
the overall decision may reflect this objective and the bargains
struck in its pursuit.”
Bargaining implies quid pro quo. Like the market and the
price system, the political process and the voting system is one
of the few available devices for comparing a great many incom-
mensurable, and maybe even unknowable utility and preference
functions. The outcome of the policy process, like the outcome
of the market process, tends to register — with very large distor-
tions and imperfections to be sure — not only the comparative
rationality of particular positions but the political and even psy-
chological strength of the interests that propound them.
The final United States position on the Partial Test Ban
*9° Cf. C. LINDBLOM, THE Policy-MAKING PROCESS 95 (1968) (discussing
“bargaining as a fundamental political process”).
113
1972] A.R.M.S C().Y TROL 93 I
Treaty involved a good deal of this political bargaining, some of
the most interesting examples of which do not appear in the
Treaty text. The terms and conditions upon which the Treaty
was submitted to the Senate included some recognition for the
most important groups that might feel their interests threatened.
These included Senators and Congressmen traditionally associated
with a strong military posture, elements in the armed services and
the weapons development laboratories, and supporters and clients
of the Plowshare program.
In submitting the Treaty to the Senate for advice and consent
President Kennedy said:"
Our atomic laboratories will maintain an active development pro-
gram, including underground testing, and we will be ready to
resume testing in the atmosphere if necessary. Continued research
on developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy will be possible
through underground testing.
Each of these assurances was made more specific in the course of
the hearings. The first two — to continue laboratory develop-
ment and to maintain test readiness — were the subject of explicit
undertakings made in form to the Senate leadership but in reality
directed to Senators known to be considering a vote against the
Treaty.” The third — to continue peaceful-uses research — was
reinforced by permitting AEC Chairman Seaborg and other
administration witnesses to testify that some Plowshare testing
would be possible under the Treaty." The final United States
decision was thus not a decision for the Treaty simpliciter, but
for the Treaty plus the undertakings. It was the decision in its
totality that was reflected in subsequent United States action.”
The Soviet underground test program since August, 1963, is
ground for at least suspicion that similar kinds of assurances may
have been made in the Soviet Union.”
Were these concessions “necessary” as a practical matter?
It is fairly clear that they were not needed to secure a two-thirds
majority in the Senate. Their function was a different one: to
*** [1963] John F. KENNEDY, PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 623 (1964);
[1963] Docu MENTS ON DISARMAMENT 3 oo—or (1964).
*** N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1963, at 1, col. 5.
** Hearings, supra note 99, at 211, 213, 239. See also id. at 25–26.
A fourth assurance, designed to assuage the disappointment of comprehensive
test ban proponents, promised continuation of research on detection of underground
teStS.
* See p. 938–39, 941–42 infra.
** The Soviets conducted virtually no underground tests before the Treaty.
They had conducted 64 as of July 3, 1970, a rate of almost ten a year after the
Treaty. This rate was substantially below that of the United States, but was
high enough to provide its own “safeguard.” SIPRI YEARBOOK 69° 7'o, at 386–87.
114
932 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:905
minimize the possibility that powerful opposition groups, dis-
. . sociated from the Treaty, would be favorably positioned after its
adoption to promote and exploit any failures. Some may criticize
the effort to “buy off” the opposition with concessions that, to
some extent, “undermined” the Treaty or the “spirit of the test
ban.” Yet it can hardly be denied that resistance to the Treaty,
not only at the time of adoption, but later, at the stage of opera-
tion, was damped and diverted because significant opposing in-
terests had been partially satisfied. * - *
Again the point here is not whether the right balance was
struck in this case. The proposition is that some such balance is
struck in every case. The result is to enhance the prospects for
compliance by blunting the pressures tending in the opposite
direction. - . . . . . . . . ‘. . . . .
D. Commitment - - .
The negotiating process also influences compliance with a
treaty by generating personal and political commitment. For a
variety of reasons — personal, bureaucratic, political — individ-
uals both within and without the governmental structure commit
themselves to the goal of a treaty. They go out on a limb; they
become advocates.” Advocacy, in turn, pushes the official “to
argue much more confidently than he would if he were a detached
judge,” ” thus reinforcing his public or official commitment.
Bureaucratic and political antennae are very sensitive to moves
of this kind from influential and authoritative figures. Thus, com-
mitment and advocacy work to bridge the gap beyond which
bargaining will not carry the decision process.” - -
Apart from its contribution to consensus, commitment oper-
ates of its own force to provide strong support for compliance
after the adoption of a treaty. Within the permanent official-
dom, those who actively supported the treaty will have an im-
portant stake in the success of the policy. They will become a
built-in pressure group pushing not only for strict compliance
with the treaty, but for avoidance of actions that would create
suspicions or lead to withdrawal or violation on the other side.
More important, the chief political figures will have made
public representations and created public expectations about the
importance of the treaty. Indeed, there is something of an in-
herent tendency to exaggerate the significance of the treaty and
inflate the expectations to which it gives rise. For all the incanta-
tion by both President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev that
”See, e.g., A. Dowss, supra note 41, at 102-09.
*** ALLISON 178. He calls this “The 51–49 Principle.”
*** Cf. D. SchoN, BEYoso THE STABLE STATE 225 (1971).
115
1972] - ARMS coxtrol 933
the Test Ban Treaty was only “a first step” ” toward disarma-
ment, it inevitably came to be seen as an event of immense
political significance in each country and worldwide -— indeed one
that defined the political and perhaps historical position of both
leaders.
Commitment is not only a matter for heads of government.
Leaders, big and small, in or out, from conviction or otherwise,
will have to decide whether and how far to commit – to identify
themselves publicly and politically with the treaty.
In the United States many familiar techniques are available
for the expression of commitment, whether willing or reluctant:
public statements, legislative debates and hearings, votes, the
ethos of bipartisan foreign policy. The negotiation of the exact
form and content of these commitments is an intricate if minor
political art form. - -
Less can be said about how the Soviet government works in
this respect. Certainly the concept of collective leadership is
designed to insure that all major power groups are publicly
identified with all major decisions.” The same result may be
achieved by the promulgation and elaboration of a party line
through the various organizations and organs that make up Soviet
Society. In the case of the Test Ban at least, there was public
identification of all the chief members of the leadership group,
including the military, with the adoption of the Treaty. In the
two months following the signing of the Treaty, it was applauded
by major government and party leaders, all of whom stressed the
unanimity of approval. There were public statements reprinted
in the newspapers and speeches on the floor of both houses of the
Supreme Soviet and in their Foreign Relations Commissions.
Especially significant in the Soviet Union were the appearances
of leaders at public ceremonies connected with the Treaty.”
*** [1963] Johs F. KENNEDY, PUBLIC PAPERs of THE PRESIDENTS 599, 602
(1964) ; 15 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 3o, Aug, 2 I, I 963, at 3
(Pravda, July 26, 1963; Izvestia, July 27, 1963). . . & - -
*** Cf. N. KHRUSHcHEV, KHRUSHcHEv REMEMBERs 256 (1970) (on “collec-
tive sentencing” in Stalin's post-war purges):
In those days when a case was closed — and if Stalin thought it necessary —
he would sign the sentencing order at a Politbureau session and then pass it
around for the rest of us to sign. - -
“See 15 CURRENT DIGEST of THE Soviet PREss, No. 39, Oct. 23, 1963, at 19
(Pravda, Sept. 26, 1963); id. No. 3 I, Aug. 28, 1963, at 4–7 (Pravda and Izvestia,
Aug. 4, 1963) (Statement of Soviet Government criticizing China for failure to
adhere: “When Communists . . . oppose the treaty . . . this cannot but pro-
voke justified astonishment” (p. 5i); id. No. 3o, Aug. 21, 1963, at 3–4 (Pravda,
July 27, 1963; Izvestia, July 28, 1963) (account of official approval of Treaty
by Conference of First Secretaries of Central Committee of Communist and
Worker's Parties and Heads of Government of Warsaw Treaty States); id. No.
116
934 H.4 RITARD L. JJ RE] IF]; [Vol. 85:905
Whatever their personal views, leaders who are identified with
a treaty will have strong political motives for supporting strict
compliance. For their own political careers and the fortunes of
their party or faction will to some degree be related to the success
of the treaty and the policies underlying it.
E. The Sum of the Parts
Consensus, concession, and commitment are all interrelated.
If the required consensus has been achieved, leaders across the
spectrum of parties or factions will have been brought to some
degree of public commitment to the treaty. Likewise, the purpose
of concessions, like those made to the Test Ban skeptics, is not
only to silence opposition. They are meant to induce leaders
who might be expected to oppose the treaty to crawl out on the
limb of public commitment with the proponents. These forces
have operated in every treatymaking exercise of recent years.
It is hard to see how a major arms control agreement could be
concluded between the United States and the USSR without allow-
ing them full play. The consequence is that both states will
embark on the treaty regime with a powerful built-in propensity
towards compliance, towards making it work.
If this analysis is sound, it should quiet one of the principal
fears that has dominated popular discussion of disarmament: the
possibility that a party might enter into a treaty in a preconceived
plan to gain advantage by Secret noncompliance while the other
party, its suspicions lulled, remains subject to treaty constraints.
It is simply not possible to carry out a complex and extended
bureaucratic and political operation of the kind described above
on a foundation of pervasive dissimulation.” There may be a
faction, more or less powerful, entertaining such a secret plan.
Or, as in the United States under the Test Ban Treaty, a group
may be charged with maintaining readiness to terminate and with
reevaluating periodically the consistency of the treaty with the
national interest.
But such plans or evaluations cannot be translated directly
into concrete action inconsistent with the treaty. For that, a new
round of bureaucratic maneuvering and political bargaining will
be necessary to dismantle the old consensus, undo the old commit-
ments, and substitute new ones. In other words, once the treaty
35, Sept. 25, 1963, at 30 (Izvestia, Sept. 1, 1963); id. No. 3 I, Aug. 28, 1963, at
7–8 (Pravda and Izvestia, Aug. 6, 1963).
*** This statement must, no doubt, be qualified for periods of highly concen-
trated one-man rule in the Soviet Union, as in Stalin's last two decades. But cf.
ALLISON 238.
117
1972] . . . . ARMS CONTROL . . . . . . . . 935
is adopted, violation cannot occur as part of a preconceived plan, …
but only as a result of a new decision, itself the outcome of com-º º
plicated and wide-ranging governmental interplay. * . .
III. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON BREACH
A. Parkinsonian Virtues
Max Weber lays it down that one of the defining character- .
istics of bureaucracy is legalism — administration in accordance .
with detailed rules having either directly or mediately the force
of law." It is not just that individual bureaucrats, like their
fellow men, admit the obligation or indulge the habit of obedience
to law." Rules are the integument that makes it possible to
coordinate the fragmentary tasks and specialized functions of
many people in a large organization. Admittedly, some of Weber's
successors may stress the operation of rules as communications Or
as a basis for coordinating expectations,” rather than as legal or
prescriptive norms. And we are learning about informal arrange-
ments within organizations by which the strictures of prescription
may be meliorated.” But when all is said and done, popular
and scholarly judgments agree: rules and regulations are of the
essence of bureaucracy. . . . . . . .
When a formal arms control agreement is adopted, it becomes
just such a rule for the officials of the affected agencies. It not
only creates obligations internationally, but acts as an internal
directive (with the force of law in the United States)” against
certain kinds of government action. The very promulgation of a
formal prohibitory rule, validated by the political processes of the
state, works to unify bureaucratic views, settle old arguments,
and foreclose options. “An administrative mechanism,” said
Henry Kissinger, “has a bias in favor of the status quo, however
arrived at.” ” Once the treaty goes into effect, all the classical
defects of bureaucracy become virtues from the point of view of
arms control. Rigidity; absence of imagination, initiative, or
* See, e.g., M. WEBER, ESSAYS IN Sociology 196 (H. Gerth & C. Mills transl. . .
1958). * * * .
*** See Fisher, Internal Enforcement of International Rules, in DISARMAMENT:
Its Politics AND EcoSOMICs 99 (S. Melman ed. 1962). Fisher argues that the law-
abiding propensities of officials as individuals should be harnessed for treaty en-
forcement by “weav[ing] international obligations into the domestic law of each
country.” Id. at 1oo. . . . .
** See, e.g., A. DowNs, supra note 41, at 59–61; T. Sciſe LLING, supra note 4,
at 53–80 (1960). - - - - -
* See A. Downs, supra note 41, at 61–65, 113–16.
** U.S. Cossr. art. VI. -
* H. KissinceR, NucLEAR WEAPONs AND ForeſcN Policy 432 (1957).
118
930 - HARWARD LAſſ’ REI IFW’ |Vol. 85:905.
creativity; unwillingness to take risks; operation by the book –
all are enlisted in aid of compliance with the agreement.
This general effect of the agreement as a rule of law aligning
typical bureaucratic behavior patterns in Support of its pro-
visions is reinforced by a number of more specific modifications
that the agreement brings about in decisionmaking on military
issues. - *
First, courses of action involving the violation of a significant
arms control agreement ordinarily will not be on the menus of
strategic options generated by military and technical planners
for presentation to their superiors. This inhibition can occur
even without a formal agreement. After President Eisenhower
proclaimed a moratorium on nuclear testing in 1958, the AEC
and Defense Department sharply reduced what had been a routine
activity: cranking out test plans and programs. It was no longer
very profitable, from an agency viewpoint or in terms of the
career line of an official, to sit around thinking up ideas for
interesting weapons, tests or planning their execution. As a result,
when the USSR resumed atmospheric testing in September 1961,
the United States was not ready to respond in kind. It took six
months just to complete the physical preparations. But even
when the logistics were all worked out, no significant tests and
experiments had yet been developed. The tests that were actually
carried out were not very productive for purposes of science or
weapons technology “*— they were essentially political.
To make the same point in a contemporary context, under the
Test Ban Treaty, it is unlikely that there has ever been a con-
scious decision by the United States Government on the question
whether to conduct full scale atmospheric tests. With the Treaty
in effect, there is simply no.occasion for gearing up the elaborate
paraphernalia of national security decisionmaking to consider the
issue. And even if some zealous official *were to press the point,
he would stand little chance of picking up the bureaucratic support
necessary even to precipitate a decision at the policy level, let
alone to Secure ultimate approval of action amounting to treaty
violation. Absent serious indications of breach by the treaty
partner or some fundamental change in the political setting, the
issue, in all probability, will simply not arise.
*** See H. JACOBSON & E. STEIN, supra note 55, at 283; Hearings, supra note
99, at 121–22. But cf. A. SCHLESINCER, supra note 31, at 455–57, who implies there
might have been technical reasons for testing. . .
* Cf. A. Dow Ns, supra note 41, at 92-111. Downs makes “zealots” one of
five major categories of bureaucratic officials. They continue pushing for their
pet projects regardless of political realities. Sometimes, like Admiral Rickover,
they win. - e - -
119
1972] ARMs CONTROL - 937
Second, although the treaty will be directed at a reasonably
well understood range of undesired conduct, it will tend, as well,
to inhibit activities in a kind of penumbra surrounding that core.
A zone of doubtful conduct may arise because the agreement
establishes what Professor Roger Fisher calls “a precautionary
rule,” that is, “a rule some distance back from the interest we are
trying to protect, so that a breach of the rule does not necessarily
offend that interest.” ” Or the penumbra may result from the
familiar failure to define precisely enough, either from inability
or political necessity, the prohibited conduct. For example, how
will an agreement prohibiting or limiting ABM deployment affect
air defense systems? A new surface-to-air missile system designed
to cope with high flying, high speed aircraft would undoubtedly
have powerful, agile radars and high performance interceptors.
It would be designed to operate automatically, without human
intervention. The line between such an air defense system and
ABM is very thin.” One could expect this particular penumbra
to be of intense interest both to officials concerned with maintain-
ing the treaty regime and to those whose main concerns were
elsewhere. Similar doubtful areas might arise with respect to
replacements and spares under a ceiling on strategic missiles.”
Examples could be multiplied. - -
- In general, as long as the treaty regime remains viable, there
will be some tendency to maintain a distance from the line de-
marking the prohibited conduct. An official will have little
incentive to stick his neck out by taking responsibility for an
action that may become the basis for a charge of treaty violation.
Political leaders will be wary of going so close to the line as to
risk undermining the adversary's confidence in the treaty relation-
ship or having to accept the onus for breakdown. There may
be also a reciprocal reluctance to insist on strict compliance from
the other party if the fundamentals of the treaty regime are not
threatened. w
However, the pressures surrounding the penumbra are not all
one way. “The very meaning of a line in the law is that anyone
may get as close to the line as he can if he keeps on the right
side.” ” In fact, this view finds expression in the Soviet strict
constructionist doctrine, which holds that a government is bound
*** Fisher, supra note 1 17, at Ioy.
*** This passage draws on material prepared by Dr. J. P. Ruina for the Carnegie
Endowment study described in note * supra.
*** See T. Schel LING & M. HALPERIN, supra note 1, at 109-10.
* Louisville & N.R.R. v. United States, 242 U.S. 60, 74 (1916) (Holmes, J.).
See Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 280 U.S. 390, 395–96 (1930)
(Holmes, J.). -
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938 * H. : R \'...I RD L. JJ REI IEJJ [Vol. 85:905
- | -
only to the extent of its express consent.” Also, the combination
of a core of clearly prohibited conduct and a more doubtful sur-
rounding penumbra may sometimes provide a tempting setting for
feints and probes, and may even accelerate collapse of the treaty
regime if it begins to show signs of sagging vitality.
Some of the complexity involved in the interplay of these
various conflicting pressures can be seen by comparing the Course
of underground testing after the adoption of the Test Ban Treaty
with that of the Plowshare program.
The United States and the USSR have each continued to
conduct underground weapons tests. Some of these have “vented,”
that is, released radioactive debris. Although the Treaty pro-
hibits any nuclear explosion causing “radioactive debris to be
present outside the territorial limits of the State” ” conducting
it, radioactive matter from some of these tests has been detected
outside the boundaries of the testing State. These incidents have
been the subject only of rather low-key diplomatic exchanges,
largely, it would appear, for the record. Neither side has made
them a serious issue, and it seems likely that absent a compre-
hensive test ban, similar events will continue to occur.”
The Plowshare story was somewhat different. At the time of
the ratification of the treaty, the AEC had been planning an ex-
tensive series of tests designed to develop nuclear devices for
excavation and earth moving. Although the devices were to be
exploded well below the surface of the earth, the tests were de-
signed to produce craters.” Large quantities of radioactive
debris would necessarily be released, and at least some debris
would have been dispersed in the atmosphere,” possibly to drift
beyond the limits of national territory. -
As a technical matter, there were ways of construing the
Treaty to permit these tests to continue. It might have been
argued, for example, that “radioactive debris” meant only fallout
potentially dangerous to health, and that the Plowshare experi-
ments would involve essentially “clean” devices. And as we have
seen, AEC Chairman Seaborg testified that this aspect of Plow-
*** See, e.g., Berman, Law as an Instrument of Peace in U.S.-Soviet Relations,
22 STAN. L. REv. 943, 950–52 (1970); cf. TRISKA & FINLEY 411.
*** Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, art. I, § 1 (b), [1963] 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S.
No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (effective Oct. Io, 1963). *
* For a summary of the experience through 1968, see CHAYES, EHRLICH &
Low ENFELD 1039–44. The record has since then been supplemented most publicly
by the Cannikin test at Amchitka on November 6, 1971. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 7,
1971, at I, Col. 8.
*** 1962 AEC ANN. REP. 241, 244–53.
*** 1963 AEC ANN. REP. 211.
121
1972.] ARMS COV TROL 939
share would not be completely curtailed by the Treaty.” In
fact, however, the United States Government has not taken the
same attitude toward international venting from Plowshare tests
as from weapons tests. Only a few of the smallest events in the
series were authorized. The schedule was stretched out and the
planned test program was never completed.”
Third, there will be greater caution both in evaluating and in
responding to intelligence reports of military activity on the other
side. Interpretations of ambiguous adversary actions relating to
the subject matter of the treaty will be more careful and qualified.
Absent an agreement, we saw that there is a strong tendency to
resolve these doubts on the most pessimistic basis. The essential
premise of worst-case analysis is that nothing is lost by assuming
the worst. Indeed, there may be no very sharp incentive to press
hard for additional information that would clarify the ambiguity.
With a treaty in effect, these presumptions are offset, if not
reversed. Intelligence chiefs and their clients will need persuasive
evidence before taking responsibility for even an internal charge
that the other side has violated the agreement, especially when the
top leaders are politically committed to the treaty regime.” In
effect, the treaty has raised the signal/noise threshold. This may
cost something in timeliness of response, if it turns out on further
investigation that the ambiguous activity is really signal. But if,
as in the overwhelming majority of cases, it is noise, the agree-
ment will have tempered unduly alarmist interpretations.
The elevation of the signal/noise threshold affects not only
the interpretation of intelligence about adversary activity but,
perhaps more important, the decision whether to respond. In the
absence of an agreement, it is relatively easy to move from the
premise that the other side is or might be doing something to
the conclusion, or at least the argument, that some sort of response
** Hearings, supra note 99, at 211. See also note 106 supra.
*** At present writing, the idea of using atomic devices for engineering activi-
ties at or near the earth's surface seems to have been abandoned in the United
States. See Hearings on AEC Authorizing Legislation FY 1972 Before the Joint
Comm. on Atomic Energy, 92d Cong, 1st Sess, pt. 4, at 2345, 2889, 2891 (1971).
The demise of the program seems to be attributable primarily to infeasibility
rather than to any zeal in enforcing the Test Ban Treaty. It remains true, how-
ever, that in the months immediately after the Treaty was adopted, the momen-
tum of the program was significantly arrested by the penumbral effect. Soviet
interest in these activities, however, may well be increasing. Werth, The Soviet
Program on Nuclear Explosives for the National Economy, I I NUCLEAR TECH-
NOLOGY 280 (1971). -
*** Cf. ALLISON 190–92. He argues that one of the factors in the tepid re-
action of the CIA in Washington to their absent Director's suspicions about mis-
siles in Cuba in September 1962 was that “[w]hat the President least wanted to
hear, the CIA found it difficult to say plainly.” Id. at 190.
79-879 O - 72 - 9
122
94O H.4 R \'.4 RD LAW RE! "I Eſſ' [Vol. 85:905
is indicated, usually in kind. It is not so easy to pursue this chain
of argumentation if an agreement is in effect. At a minimum, it
is much more difficult to act without asking the other side to
clarify its conduct. The pressure for consultation would be almost
irresistible.” The terms of the treaty may contain provisions to
this effect.” Even without them, as noted above, the United
States and the Soviet Union have pursued the course of diplomatic
exploration in connection with the venting incidents under the
Test Ban Treaty.
Resistance will be particularly acute where the proposed
response is itself an action prohibited by the agreement, for that
would risk destruction of the treaty regime, which in turn would
require a major readjustment of relations with the adversary.
Apart from any question of Sanctions that might attend such
action,” the existing state of affairs may be desirable on its
own merits. The bureaucratic “bias in favor of the status quo”
and leadership commitments will tend to overstate rather than
disparage this value. A powerful combination of inertial forces
will thus be arrayed against Such a step, unless the evidence is
pretty clear that the adversary has already taken it, or unless
circumstances have changed so drastically as to induce a funda-
mental reappraisal of the bilateral relationship.
Fourth, each of the factors discussed above exemplifies a more
general point: any actions that raise Substantial questions of
compliance or treaty interpretation are likely to be referred to
higher authority for decision rather-than handled as a matter of
... organizational routine. This alone could be significant in braking
what we have called technological drift in systems within the
ambit of the treaty. --~~
In general, the higher the level of decision, the wider the
consultation within the government. Agencies and officials with
a strong stake in treaty compliance are more likely to get an
opportunity to rally their forces, to be heard, and to appeal an
adverse decision. A decision at the policy level will be taken in
a broader perspective, with greater likelihood of attention to
political considerations and questions of values, as well as to
purely military and technical factors. The chief of government
* Even in the Cuban missile crisis, where no breach of a treaty was involved,
a considerable body of respectable opinion thought the President should have
confronted the Soviets privately with his evidence before taking action. See
E. ABEL, THE MISSILE CRISIS 157–58 (1966); Lippmann, Blockade Proclaimed,
Wash. Post, Oct. 25, 1962, at A25, col. I.
*** See, e.g., Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear
Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean
Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, art. III, G.A. Res. 2660 (xxv).
** See pp. 956–61 infra.
123
1972] ARMs coxtrol . . . . . . 941
and his principal associates, as we have seen, are likely to have a
strong political commitment to the agreement, certainly in the
early stages when precedent and practice are being established.
They will thus resist courses of action that may seem to erode or
undermine the treaty regime. Decisions at these levels will in
any case tend toward caution, because these officials will be more
sensitive to the costs of a breakdown of the treaty and the difficulty
of controlling events thereafter.” • .
Again, the Plowshare program, post-Test Ban, is illustrative.
A high-level committee was organized to consider AEC proposals
for Plowshare tests. The Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs was Chairman, and the State and
Defense Departments, the AEC, the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency, the Office of Science and Technology, and perhaps
others were represented. The committee acted on a case-by-case
basis, taking into account not only the technical characteristics
of the proposed explosion and its significance in the AEC pro-
gram, but a multitude of other considerations, including the pre-
vailing winds, both climatic and political.” In the end, as noted.
above, very few Plowshare tests were conducted.
Fifth, both the United States and the Soviet Union are
operating under severe and probably intensifying budget con-
Straints. An arms control agreement provides an easy way of
identifying programs that can be eliminated as candidates for
funds, not only at the stage of deployment, but for research and
development as well. It is not easy to apportion, limited R & D
funds. to systems whose prospects for deployment, even if the
technical problems can be solved, are dim. And it is not easy for
scientists and engineers to get overly excited about working on
such projects. . . . . . .
Again, the history of the Test Ban Treaty may provide an
illustration. It will be recalled that the President personally
undertook to maintain readiness to resume atmospheric testing
in the event of Soviet breach or withdrawal. In the first fiscal
year after the ratification of the Treaty, there was a substantial
appropriation to maintain the Pacific test areas and to keep a
task force in readiness. These amounts have slowly dwindled.
At present there is no substantial United States capability in being
for the resumption of atmospheric or underwater tests.”
* Cf. ALLIsos 128-32, 212, on the sensitivity of both President Kennedy and
Premier Khruschchev to the possibility of events getting out of hand in the Cuban
missile crisis. -
*** See 2 CHAYES, ERHLICH & Low ENFELD Io98–39. -
*** Amounts budgeted for maintenance of standby atmospheric test capability
dropped from $82.9 million in FY 1964 to $15.6 million in FY 1969. SIPRI
124
942 II.ARTARD LAIF REITEII [Vol. 85:905
Maintenance of the weapons laboratories was the Subject of
an additional presidential assurance. This undertaking has fared
rather better than that on testing readiness.” The reason is that
the underground test program has provided a practical outlet for
the work of the laboratories.
Nothing said here should be taken as suggesting that arms
control agreements can be expected to lead of their own force to
substantial cuts in overall military expenditures. The iron law
... that every organization strives to maintain or increase its budget
will continue to operate on the military establishment in both the
United States and the USSR. Forces and systems outside the
scope of the agreement will be more heavily worked to take up
the slack. For example, there has been no difficulty in carrying
out the presidential assurance to continue a vigorous program of
underground tests. As of 1970, the rate of United States under-
ground testing had mounted from about six per year before the
Treaty to thirty-three per year.” Diversion of significant re-
sources from military ends will, in all likelihood, require separate
and explicit political decision. -
B. White Collar Crime
Thus far we have been considering how the structure and
procedures of government bureaucracies constrain action in breach
of an arms control agreement. These same characteristics will
condition the nature and form of a departure from treaty obliga-
tions if that should occur. In general, they tend to minimize the
possibility of successful clandestine technological development
culminating in a sudden, unexpected, and quasi-decisive break-
through. - . . . . .
---,
*~
YEARBOOK 68/69, at 255. The Institute's summary of total obligational authority
in millions of dollars for the four safeguards in the same period, by fiscal years,
is as follows: - -
Safeguard: - I964 I965 1966 : 1967 1968 1969
1. Conduct of under- - - -
ground testing Io.9 2 I.2 37.7 39.9 37.8 42.9
2. Maintenance of labora- - -
- tory facilities and
programmes 55. I 55.8 56.8 53.6 6 I.o 69.6
3. Maintenance of Stand-by - .
atmospheric test
capability 82.9 72.4 33.7 24.5 22.7 I 5.6
4. Monitoring of Sino-
Soviet activity 97.8 III.9 I Io.6 Ioé.7 I I O .2 99.8
Total - 245.6 [sic] 26 I.3 238.8 224.7 23 I.7 22 7.9
Id.
*** See note 141 supra.
*** See SIPRI YEARbook 69/70, at 386.
125
1972] AR.1/S CO.VTRſ) I. 943
Bureaucratic behavior is “an enactment of preestablished
routines.” ''' The hardest thing for a government organization
to do is something it has never done before. Moreover, before a
new weapon can be effectively used for political or military ad-
vantage, it must gain the confidence of government leaders.
Achieving this kind of operational system requires extensive
research and development, confidence testing, the establishment
of reliable production patterns, training of crews, and the like.'"
All this needs patience, a great deal of room for trial and error,
and above all, time --- running on the order of a decade or more
for every new post-World War II strategic weapons system.”
These requirements vastly increase the difficulty of keeping
the weapons program Secret, particularly with today's Sophisticat-
ed surveillance technology.'" If the development process is fore-
shortened in the interest of secrecy, on the other hand, there will
be heavy costs in the form of decreases in the reliability of the
weapon and in the confidence that leaders will place in it.
The kinds of violation that might be within the reach of bu-
reaucratic capacities are less fearsome. If it is hard for govern-
ments secretly to mount something really new in the weapons
field, it is a good deal easier to resume activities that have been
done before and stopped. Old routines and operating procedures
can be revived. There may be people around who participated in
and remember the earlier programs. Still, under forced draft and
without the constraint of concealment, it took the United States
six months from a standing start to resume atmospheric testing
in 1962 after a moratorium of only four years. It is true that the
Soviets were able to conceal their preparations for atmospheric
testing in 1961 for what must have been at least a comparable
period, but this was at a time when the U-2 was blind and mostly
before the advent of effective satellite reconnaissance.”
Easiest of all is to replicate existing activities at a higher rate
or in a new setting. Thus, it should be possible without great
organizational or bureaucratic strain to pierce an agreed ceiling
on an existing weapons system. At most, what will be involved
is the implementation of existing action patterns in somewhat
*** ALLISON 81.
*** This passage draws on material prepared by Dr. J. P. Ruina for the Carnegie
Endowment study described in note * supra.
*** Hearings on Department of Defense tp propriations for 1966 Refore the
Subcomm. on the Dep't of Defense of the House Comm. on Appropriations and
the Senate Comm. on Armed Scrwices, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 132 (1965)
(statement of Sec'y of Defense McNamara).
*** See pp. 951–53 infra.
**See Greenwood, supra note 31, at 14, 77-82.
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944 HAR}'ARD L4 Jj RE | I EJ} | Vol. 85:905
novel ways to provide camouflage or other deceptive measures
during the period in which secrecy is desired.”
This reasoning suggests that there is a real difference in
reliability between, to take a current instance, a zero ABM
treaty and one that imposes a low ceiling of several hundred
interceptors, as has apparently been proposed by the United
States in the strategic arms limitations talks." A ceiling of 200–
3oo ABM's would provide no significant defensive capability.”
But it would permit either side to develop and test weapons,
radars and computers, to get production lines running and the
bugs worked out, to train field crews and develop operational
routines, to work on maintenance and reliability problems. Clan-
destine violation — or what is a more likely eventuality, rapid
expansion upon withdrawal from the treaty — is simply a matter
of extrapolating the existing procedures. By contrast, it is almost
impossible to conceive either a secret or a speedy development
of an operational ABM capability from a zero base.
What experience we have, although it is hardly more than
analogous and must be treated with great caution, tends to bear
out these hypotheses. Professor J. P. Ruina summarizes that
experience as follows:”
We have been surprised by the continued production and extent
of deployment of certain Soviet weapons systems such as the SA2
and the SS-9 though we knew of the original deployment. We
have sometimes been Surprised by a quick geographic redeploy-
ment of existing weapons systems, as was the case of SA3 de-
ployment in Egypt, SA2 and SA3 deployments in the Suez zone
and the IRBM's in Cuba. But it is very important to note that we
have always had ample notice of the deployment of important
components in the Soviet arsenal before they developed any
*** Even the limited departure from established routines required to camou-
flage the Cuban missile emplacements seems to have been beyond the capabilities of
the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces units that installed them. See ALLISON I Io–II.
- ** N.Y. Times, Feb. Io, 1972, at 20, col. 4 (message by President Nixon on the
State of the World). -
*** The statement is strictly true only of an ABM system of 200–300 intercep-
tors defending land-based ICBM's, like the United States Safeguard system. In
a heavy attack, it could easily be overwhelmed; a light attack would be against
cities, not retaliatory forces; and a missile accidentally discharged is unlikely to be
pointed at North Dakota or Montana. A similar system defending a specially
valued target, like the Soviet Moscow System, might, if it worked, have some
utility in protecting against an accidentally fired missle, or in causing a light
attack to be diverted to other targets.
*** A. Chayes, G. Rathjens & J. Ruina, Preliminary Draft of Study on Nuclear
Arms Control, Feb. 19, 1971 (unpublished manuscript prepared in connection with
Carnegie Endowment Study described in note * supra). The quoted material was
prepared by Dr. Ruina.
127
1972] ARMs coxtrol 945
meaningful operational capability. For example Soviet early
warning radars and the Moscow ABM were known to the U.S. ... . . . .
almost from the day construction of these weapons systems was
started, and many years before any operational capability was
realized. Full scale Soviet multiple warhead tests were obsérved
in the Pacific before any meaningful operational capability
existed for the Soviet Union. The U.S. knew of important Soviet.
aircraft from the time of their early ſlights, -
IV. THE ENFORCEMENT MACHINERY
A third set of factors inducing compliance with arms control
agreements derives from the mechanisms by which it is expected
that violations will be detected and sanctions applied. Both policy. .
pronouncements and scholarly analysis have focused almost ex-
clusively on this group. Thus, a cardinal point of United States
arms control doctrine has been “no disarmament without inspec-
tion and control.” This theme, first struck in 1945 in the Baruch-
Lilienthal plan for international control of atomic energy,” was
endlessly repeated in the policy statements, of the 1950's, and
1960’s.” It has been the one point of convergence between the
skeptics, who insist on copper-riveted guarantees of Soviet com-
pliance in any agreement to be signed by the United States, and
the idealists, who see the development of international institu-
tions for verification of disarmament agreements as a first step on
the road to world government. . . . . . . . . .
There is an immense literature on “verification and enforce-
ment” of arms control agreements.” For the most part, it con-
cerns itself with the technical problems of detecting violations;
it contains little systematic consideration of how an inspection
system, whatever its effectiveness, will work to insure compliance
with treaty norms.” The premise seems to be that the rational
* [1945] HARRY S. TRUMAN, PUBLIC PAPERs of the PRESIDENTs 474-75
(1961); I [1945–59] DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT I I, 145–54 (1960). -
*** See, e.g., [1958] Dw1GHT D. EISENHoweR, PUBLIC PAPERs of THE PRESI-
DENTs 635 (1959); I [1945–59] DocuMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 414, so I, 626, 698
(1960); 2 id. 839, I I I I, 1392; [1960] Docu-MENTs ON DISARMAMENT 33, 153
(1961); [1964] DocumſeNTS ON DISARMAMENT 7-8 (1965). • * * *
*** See generally 1–7 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ARXrs CoNTROL AND DISARMAMENT:
A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS under the sub-
heading “Violation, inspection, verification and enforcement of agreements.” A
representative group of studies includes INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSIS, VERIFI-
CATION AND RESPONSE IN DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTs .(1962); S. MEI.MAN, IN-
spectron For DISARMAMENT (1958); WESTING110 USE ELECTRIC CoRP., INSPECTION
AND VERIFICATION TECHNIQUES AND REQUIREMENTs (1964).
**The vast majority of the more than 100 works listed in the QUARTERLY
BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 155, in the past six years have been technical in nature,
often explaining and critiquing recently devised inspection techniques. Ikló, After
128
946 HARWARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:905
actor will disregard the agreed limitations when and as he can do
... so with impunity. And he can do so with impunity if he can
arrange things so that he will not be found out. The operation of
an arms control agreement is seen as a running duel between the
“bad man” and the forces of detection, a kind of computerized
game of cops and robbers.
This formulation of the verification issue dominated the dis-
armament and test ban debates of the 1950's and early 1960's."
It created a gamesman's paradise. The onus of devising a fool-
proof verification system was on the treaty proponents. The
opposition's task was only to demonstrate how each proposed
control scheme could be spoofed or evaded. If they could show, or
even plausibly argue, that some nuclear tests could be performed
without being detected by the proposed system, the round was
over. Back to the drawing board. The debate ground on in a
series of increasingly arcane, quasi-mathematical interchanges
— about the detectability of explosions in huge but hypothetical
underground caverns, for example, or on the other side of the
moon. No doubt all this added to the sum of human knowledge,
but the effect was to stack the cards decisively against an agree-
ment. . . . -
So obsessive was the concern with verification that basic
strategic considerations were disregarded or undervalued. For
example, it would seem that a fundamental question for the
United States in the late 1950's was whether its lead in weapons
technology would be eroded more quickly under a continuation
of unrestricted testing or under a treaty banning testing that
* afforded some possibilities for undetected violation underground.
This issue managed to escape public discussion almost entirely.
As it turned out, during the five-year period of active negotia-
tions the Soviets made significant relative gains in knowledge
about high yield weapons, and weapons effects by conducting
atmospheric tests that were readily detectable.”. If a compre-
hensive test ban had been in effect during this period, and if the
Soviets had contrived to continue underground testing without
being discovered, they still could not have made comparable gains.
Thus even on the assumption of Soviet “cheating,” the United
Detection — What?, 39 Foreigs AFFAIRs 208 (1961), agrees with the proposition
in the text but does little to remedy the lack. But cf. T. SCHELLING & M. HALPERIN,
supra note I, at 91–I off. - -
*** See H. JACOBSON & E. STEIN, supra note 55, at 75–79, 188–95, 198-200, 262,
288, 368, 432–33, .438. Indeed, intensive negotiations on a test ban began with
the 1958 Conference of Experts in Geneva, which was directed entirely to the
verification question.
* Id. at 341–42.
129
107 : ] ARMS CONTROL 947
States would have been better off with a treaty than without it.”
As the foregoing example shows, the preoccupation with detec-
tion is at odds with the premises of strategic analysis. The
rational actor contemplating violation would have to evaluate not
one, but three factors. In addition to the possibility of getting
caught, he would have to assess the gains to be expected from
successful violation and the losses to be expected in case of
discovery. It is only by integrating all three factors in a single
cost-benefit analysis that the “bad man” would reach his decision.
This section first explores some of the implications of this more
comprehensive rational calculus, then examines it in the real-life
setting of bureaucratic and political interplay that is our principal
theme.
A. Crime and Punishment
1. Gains. – United States practice, if not doctrine, is con-
sistent with the position that need for special verification and
enforcement arrangements depends on the magnitude of the gains
a violator might expect to achieve. The greater the possible gain,
the greater the need for such arrangements. For example, the
Non-Proliferation Treaty has an elaborate safeguards program,
the most highly developed verification system to be established
in an arms control agreement since World War II." And properly
so. The development of even a small nuclear capability by some
presently nonnuclear power would represent a radical change in
the local military balance, and might even afford wider oppor-
tunities for mischief. Such a capability could be readily achieved
by withdrawing small amounts of nuclear material from peaceful
installations. -
By contrast, the Outer Space Treaty contains no special pro-
visions for inspection and enforcement of the ban on weapons in
*** A comparable situation seems to hold true in the field of strategic arms
limitation. When President Johnson first proposed a freeze in January 1964,
[1963–64] LYNDON B. JoHNSON, PUBLIC PAPERs of THE PRESIDENTs 171–72 (1965),
the Soviets had only about 200 ICBMs to about 8oo for the United States; they had
no nuclear submarines and the United States had over 4oo submarine-launched
missiles. SIPRI YEARBook 69/70, at 41, 43. Neither side had MIRV’s or ABM's.
Eight years later, as an agreement begins to seem likely, the USSR has closed
much of that gap. One might have expected the Soviets to hang back in such
circumstances, but it is hard to explain the United States' lack of enthusiasm.
** Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, art.
III, [1968] 21 U.S.T. 483, 487–88, T.I.A.S. No. 6839 (effective March 5, 1970);
see A. McKNIGHT, Atomic SAFEGUARDs: A Study IN INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION
66–81, 86–89, chs. vi-xi (1971). It should be noted that the safeguard provisions
apply only to “non-nuclear-weaponſs] Stateſs] Party” to the Treaty, thus ex-
cluding the United States and the USSR from their scope.
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948 HARVARD LAW REITEſ (Vol. 85:905
orbit;" and the United States, at least, has no unilateral capabil-
ity for reliably detecting individual violations." It is generally,
agreed, however, that “bombs-in-orbit” is not very promising
from a military viewpoint." Problems of coordinating and syn-
chronizing the attack are much greater for weapons launched
from orbit than for those launched from land bases or submarines,
which are fully within the physical control of the attacking
forces. And there seems to be no compensating advantage. This
absence of significant potential gain seems itself to have been
regarded as sufficient assurance of compliance."
The relation of special verification requirements to the
magnitude of the gains to be anticipated from the treaty has
special significance in connection with the proposed freeze on
strategic weapons and other measures that have been discussed
in the strategic arms limitation talks. As has already been said,
the bilateral strategic situation between the United States and
the USSR is at present one of very stable balance. Even without
a treaty, there seems to be little either side can do to gain sig-
* Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, art. IV, [1967] 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 (effective Oct. 10, 1967). ,
* Greenwood 58–60, 107. It is generally agreed that it would be possible
to detect the emplacement of the considerable number of such weapons that
would be necessary, in any view, for the tactic to be significant. • . .
*The Soviets have tested a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS),
in which the missile is launched into orbit, but is designed to be depressed from
the orbit and fired at the target before it has made one circuit of the earth. See
Hearings on Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems Before
the Subcomm. on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong, 1st Sess, pt. I., at 278 (1969).
It is not clear whether they have deployed this system, Id. But cf. H. YoRK, supra
note 45, at 23 I. Nor is there much more than speculation as to how it would be
used. See Wiesner, Some First Strike Scenarios, in CHAYEs & WeissER 70-72;
Ruina, Aborted Military Systems, in IMPACT of NEW TECHNOLOGIES oN THE ARMs
RACE 304, 309 (B. Feld et al. eds. 1971). It is apparently considered that the
weapon does not violate the Treaty. See Hearings on ABM, MIRV, SALT, and
the Nuclear Arms Race Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, International
Law and Organization of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 2d
SeSS. 264–65 (1970). • *
* The Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear
Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean
Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, G.A. Res. 2660 (xxv), is essentially similar.
The tactic does not promise advantages over submarine-launched missiles sufficient
to compensate for the loss of positive control. The original US/USSR draft pro-
vided for verification by national means. [1969] DocuMENTS ON DISARMAMENT
473, 474 (1970). A Canadian amendment adopted in the late stages of considera-
tion, however, provides that if, after consultation to clarify any ambiguities, a
party still doubts. the character of a seabed structure, it may inspect it.
131
1972] . . . ARMS CONTROL 940
nificant military advantage over the other.” Thus, an agreed
freeze on strategic deployments at present levels would be an
agreement in which the military gains that could be expected
from even large scale undetected violations would be very small. .
It would seem to follow that the need for special verification
arrangements is minimal and that this issue should not become a
problem in the negotiations.
It may be objected that the paucity of prospective gains has
not prevented competitive deployments over the past decade. As
has been seen above, however, absent a treaty limitation, normal
bureaucratic and organizational forces will press for exploration
and development of all possible lines of action, regardless of the
immediate military advantages, to be expected. The treaty
operates to neutralize or reverse these forces.
2. The Probability of Detection. — Traditional rationalistic
deterrence theory in the law of crimes or torts treats the possi-
bility of getting caught as affecting primarily the cost side of the
would-be law violator’s cost/benefit analysis." That is, he will
first discount the absolute value of the applicable sanction by the
likelihood that he can avoid detection (or, at least, conviction),
and then weigh this result against the gains to be expected from
the conduct.” . - . .
Under an arms control agreement, it is the benefit side of the
* A separate question is whether increased deployments can bring political
gains apart from their military significance. The point is illustrated by the Soviet
emplacement of missiles in Cuba. McNamara, with the support of Bundy, at
first insisted that the Soviet move had not altered the military balance and
argued for a deflating response. E. ABEL, supra note 136, at 51, 53; ALLISON
- 195-96. President Kennedy in his summary of the events some weeks later said:
“It would have appeared to, and appearances contribute to reality.” [1962]
JoHN F. KENNEDY, PUBLIC PAPERs of THE PRESIDENTs 898 (1962). And there is
wide agreement that if the Soviets had succeeded it would have been a major
political reversal for the United States. But special geographical and prestige
elements were associated with Cuba. More recently, the United States has been
overtaken and then surpassed by the Soviet Union in ICBM strength without
any serious political reverberations. See N.Y. Times, Feb. Io, 1972, at 21, cols. 3-4
(accompanying graph to message by President Nixon on State of the World).
* This form of crudely rationalistic analysis of deterrence is being supplanted
in the face of recent empirical and theoretical work on human behavior in response
to legal constraints. See, e.g., Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness
of Legal Sanctions, 1967 WIS. L. REv. 703 ; Rose, Sociological Factors in the Ef-
fectiveness of Projected Legislative Remedies, 11 J. LEGAL ED. 470, 472–73 (1959);
Skolnik, Coercion to Virtue: The Enforcement of Morals, 41 S. CAL, L. REv.
588, 624–26 (1968). -
*** The proposition is not strictly true. Detection that is, or might be, good
enough to catch the violator in the act — or at least in time to force him to dis-
gorge his gains — would affect the calculation of benefits. This case is not dissimilar
to the situation under an arms control agreement, discussed below. -
132
950 HARWARD LAIF REVIEW [Vol. 85:905
equation that is affected. Ultimate discovery of violation is
virtually certain. Unlike the criminal who may escape with the
fruits of his crime, the state cannot avoid disclosure, however
successful it may be in concealing its breach. In the end, increases
in military power must be translated into political terms if the
benefits are to be realized. To do so the violation must be re-
vealed. And unless what is revealed is an overwhelmingly decisive
superiority over the adversary, whatever negative consequences
are attendant on violation must ensue, tempered, perhaps, by
admiration or fear of the success or daring involved.
The military benefits of violation, on the other hand, are in
large part a function of the period for which it can be kept con-
cealed. Given enough time, either party could equalize the force
increases or technical advances of the other. The essence of the
advantage to be gained by clandestine breach is that it gives the
violator a head start. Discovery will reduce the head start. The
. probability of detection is therefore a discount factor reducing
the value that can be assigned to expected gains.
If this analysis is correct, it carries an important corollary
for the stability of arms control agreements in general. For any
given detection system, the probability of discovery increases
with the duration of the breach. Thus, the stability of a particular
setting depends not only on the magnitude of the advantages to
be gained by a change, but on the time needed to accomplish it.
The longer it takes to achieve a fait accompli, the more the
benefits must be discounted, and the less likely is the calculation
to be positive. Again this view confirms the difference in verifi-
cation requirements, suggested above, as between a SALT-type
agreement and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Whatever strategic
advantages could be obtained from a massive shift in force levels
would come only at the end of a long period of build up. A small
nuclear capability, on the other hand, could be obtained quite
rapidly by any moderately advanced nonnuclear power with a
good-sized power reactor. -
The probability of detection depends not only on the duration
of the breach but on the effectiveness of the verification system.
As has been noted, this is the issue that has received most of the
professional and scholarly attention. For most of the 1950's, it
was assumed "" that an acceptable detection system must include
some, and probably extensive, access to and inspection of the ter-
** See, e.g., H. Jacobson & E. STEIN, supra note 55, at 61, 74–79; Fubini,
Reconnaisance and Surveillance as Essential Elements of Peace, in IMPAct of
NEw TECHNOLOGIES ox: THE ARMs RACE 152, 158–60 (G. Feld et al. eds. 1971);
Wiesner, Inspection for Disarmament, in ARMS ContROL: ISSUES FOR THE PUBLIC
112 (L. Henkin ed. 1961). -
133
107 : ] ARMS CONTROL 0.51
ritory and activity of the parties. Seeing was believing. The
on-site inspection issue became a sticking point in the compre-
hensive test ban negotiations, giving rise to debates about the
comparative efficacy of three versus seven onsite inspections and
the vulnerability of unmanned seismic detectors that would have
delighted the heart of any medieval scholastic.'" And the issue
has risen again to plague the renewed discussion of a compre-
hensive test ban.'"
In fact, no agreement actually in force provides for any kind
of inspection on the territory of the superpowers." And, what-
ever the case may have been in the last two decades, the opera-
tional significance of onsite inspection will be drastically reduced
for the future. The advent of sophisticated high-altitude photog-
raphy — first from the U–2, and since 1961 by reconnaissance
satellite — has added enormously to the volume and reliability of
information about opposing deployments and developments that
can be obtained by national means.” Satellite reconnaissance has
'" H. JAcobson & E. STEIN, supra note 55, at 75, 185, 190, 432.
*7° Hearings on Prospects for Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Before
the Subcomm. on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st. Sess. 12–18 (1971). There was
some indication that the United States opening position at the strategic arms limit-
ation talks included a demand for onsite inspection in connection with any ban on
MIRV's, but this demand appears to have been abandoned. See N.Y. Times,
Nov. 27, 1969, at 7, col. 1. On the other hand, a prohibition against MIRV's does
not seem to be under very active discussion either.
"' The Antarctic Treaty provides for free inspection of installations of the
partics in Antarctica. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, art. VII, [1959] 12
U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (effective June 23, 1961). In 1963–64, the United States
conducted an inspection under these provisions without incident. See N.Y. Times,
Jan. 22, 1964, at 17, col. 1. The safeguard provisions of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty are discussed at p. 947 & note 16o supra. They do not apply to the terri-
tory of the superpowers. The exchange of letters between President Kennedy and
Premier Khruschev settling the Cuban crisis provided for onsite inspection of
the removal of the missiles. When Cuba demurred, the United States acquiesced
in an inspection on the high seas of Soviet ships carrying the weapons. Sce 2
CHAYES, EHRLICH & Low ENFELD 1139–41. Suggestions within the United States
government that it might agree to some inspection on its own territory as a part
of an overall settlement were summarily rejected. See, e.g., E. ABEL, supra note
I36, at 94–95.
*** Dr. J. P. Ruina catalogues a number of other “national means” of verifica-
tion: press reports, public documents, statements by political leaders, normal
activities of embassy, personnel, including military attachés, technical literature,
and exchange of unclassified scientific and technical data at meetings. A. Chayes,
G. Rathjens & J. Ruina, supra note 152. Dr. Ruina suggests that there may be
an asymmetry between United States and Soviet intelligence in terms of military
information available in the press and in open technical and scientific literature.
It is not clear how significant this asymmetry is or to what extent it is offset by
other factors, e.g., resources devoted to intelligence. National means presumably
also include the work of intelligence agents.
134
952 HARWARD LAIF REVIEW [Vol. 85:905
been tacitly accepted as a legitimate intelligence activity, at least
by the United States and the USSR. Neither seems to regard it as
violating the rights of the observed state at international law.”
I)etails of the operation and performance of reconnaisance
systems remain closely held secrets on both sides. But quite a
bit can be learned about the state of the art from the open
literature and by not very sophisticated deductions from available
information." Each year since the late 1960's the Department
of Defense has publicly announced an accurate count of each
type of fixed land-based missile actually deployed by the Soviets.”
We seem also to possess accurate knowledge of the location and
dimensions of missile silos under construction.” This suggests
that satellite cameras may be approaching their physical limit,
that is, an ability to distinguish an object on the ground six inches
to one foot in diameter with good contrast." In addition, tele-
vision cameras can now provide real time visual reconnaissance,
although with lesser resolution.” Work is now progressing that
will permit photography by moonlight, starlight, and laser illumi-
nation.” Satellites carry an array of sensors in addition to visible
light cameras: infra red, gamma ray, X-ray sensors, radar, elec-
tronic interceptors, and the like.” Moreover, satellite recon-
naissance is coordinated with a variety of other earth-bound
***In debates in the UN Outer Space Committee on the Outer Space Treaty,
the United States, supported by the United Kingdom and others, took the posi-
tion that Satellite reconnaissance, like any other form of observation of a state
from outside its territorial limits, violated no provision of international law.
See [1962] U.N. YEARBOOK 43 (1964). Eventually, the Soviet Union withdrew its
... draft article banning satellite reconnaissance. See UN Doc. A/AC.105/6 at 3
(June 6, 1962); cf. [1963] UN YEARBOOK 97 (1965). And Premier Khrushchev
seemed to acknowledge that such surveillance was used and useful on both sides. See
T. SchELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE 366 (1966). In these circumstances, it is an
interesting question whether action to destroy another country's observation satel-
lite would be consistent with the provision of the Outer Space Treaty that the
launching state “is internationally liable for damage to another State Party . . .
by such object.” Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, art. VII, [1967] 18 U.S.T. 24Io, 2415, T.I.A.S. No. 6347
(effective Oct. 10, 1967). Except for the ban on bombs in orbit, the “peaceful
uses” provision of article IV of the Treaty seems to apply only to the moon and
other celestial bodies, not to space itself.
*** The following account is based on Greenwood.
*** Greenwood 84.
*** Id. at 84–86. The recent controversy about the significance of the “big
holes” in the Soviet Union openly acknowledges the availability of such infor-
mation. See N.Y. Times, Oct. I I, 1971, at I, col. 8.
*** Greenwood 68–71, 83.
178 Id. at 68.
*7° Id. at 71.
* Id. at 71–74, 92–97. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1972, at 24, col. 4.
135
1972] ARMIS CO.V TROL 95.3
advanced systems. The battery of surveillance techniques is
much more difficult to evade than any single system would be.
This greatly increased unilateral intelligence capability rep-
resents an ability to monitor performance under an arms control
agreement and to detect violations. Greenwood’s Reconnaissance
and Surveillance Applications to Arms Control Verification, a
recent study based entirely on the open literature, concludes:”
The most important arms control issues of the moment concern
the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic weapons sys-
tems. Our conclusion on this subject has been that a numerical
limitation of ICBMs, IRBMs, SLBMs, submarines themselves or
ABMs could be verified by observation satellites with a high de-
gree of confidence. If mobile, land-based ICBMs exist and are to
be included in the limit, the confidence of the verification would
be reduced somewhat. In order to discourage the deployment of
new systems qualitatively superior to current ones, an overall
ceiling could be imposed on missile tests. Such a limitation would
be most useful accompanied by a proscription that tests be pre-
announced and along a specific flight path. It could be verified
with high confidence. A prohibition against new boosters or new
re-entry vehicles could also be verified with high confidence, un-
less the change were so minor as to be unimportant or in the in-
ternal guidance systems. Distinguishing between MRVs and
MIRVs could be difficult and perhaps not very useful. However,
prohibitions against terminal maneuvering and limitations on
ballistic coefficient could be verified, although probably with
lower confidence than the restrictions previously mentioned.
It is no exaggeration to say that President Eisenhower's call for
“open skies” ” has been more than fully realized.
Is there any need for more than this? As we have said, the
main function of verification is to deter clandestine violations of
the treaty by creating the likelihood that they will be discovered
in time to deny the gains of the head start. But even without a
treaty, national intelligence establishments are charged with get-
ting information about adversary dispositions for essentially sim-
ilar purposes: to permit a timely and effective response to the
other side's actions. Why is additional information thought
to be necessary under an arms control regime? The operation
of national intelligence is not constrained by the agreement. It
may even be that by defining and focussing what is to be looked
for the treaty will simplify the task.
*** Id. at IoS,
*** [1955] Dw1GHT D. EISENHoweR, PUBLIC PAPERS of THE PRESIDENTS 715–
16, 859 (1959); see Greenwood IoS ; cf. Levison, Capabilities and Limitations of
Aerial Inspection, in S, MELMAN, supra note 155, at 59.
136
954 . . . . H.R.I.RD Lºiſ REITEſ (Vol. 85:905
The argument for more information must start from the
proposition that the agreement will inhibit the party's freedom .
to respond to intelligence results. The very mechanism by which
the treaty operates is the suppression of response to ambiguous
signals. If self-help is foreclosed, so the argument runs, the
party is entitled to reassurance.— to clarification of the ambi-
guity. This must be provided by the verification mechanism of
the treaty.
Can such clarification be provided by onsite inspection?
What would the inspectors find? What additional information
can reasonably be expected from onsite inspection? When United
States experts got around to analyzing this problem in the test
ban context, they concluded that the odds were very long on the
inspectors being able to prove that a clandestine test had actually
occurred, given the area to be searched, and reasonable con-
straints on time and personnel.” Or, to take a more obvious
example, inspection of a missile may establish that it does not
carry a multiple warhead — at that moment. It would give little
or no assurance for the future. Very little can be learned from
visual inspection about missile accuracy and still less about re-
liability.” ". . . . . . . . . . . . . -
But the question of what the inspector would find can be put
differently: Would a party ever permit an inspection in circum-
stances where discovery of a violation was likely? United States
planning proceeded on the basis that in such a case the other
party would probably refuse to permit the exercise of inspection
rights, and that in itself would be the treaty breach. In other
words, inspection would operate not as an information-getting
device, but as a trigger mechanism. . . . . . .
This triggering function, however, can be performed equally
well by provisions other than Onsite inspection. Consider, for
example, a treaty requirement that the parties make periodic
declarations as to specific aspects of force levels and condi-
tions, or that a party respond with clarifying information to
queries from the other side about ambiguities generated by its
national intelligence. In these cases, given presently available
*H. Jacobsos & E. STEIN, supra note 55, at 253; Hearings on Technical
Aspects of Detection and Inspection Controls of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban
Before the Special Subcomm. on Radiation and the Subcomm. on Research and
Development of the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 86th Cong, 2d Sess, pt. 1,
at 282–96; 369–74 (1960). - .
** No doubt inspection results could be improved by making surprise visits
and adopting other randomizing techniques. To get any very hard information
cn reliability or guidance accuracy, however, might require full physical access to
the missile, its associated manuals, and the like. It is doubtful that the United
States would accept any such extensive inspection system at this stage.
137
1972.] - ARMIS COV TROL 955
national surveillance capabilities, it would be hard for a party
to falsify with any confidence that its statements would be con-
sistent with all the data available to the other side, the exact
contours of which would be unknown to the declarant. As with
onsite inspection, a likelier result would be a refusal to honor
that obligation — itself a treaty breach. An even simpler veri-
fication measure of this kind, although it presents difficult draft-
ing problems, would be to prohibit changes in camouflage or
concealment practices that would interfere with satellite observa-
tion, Breach of this obligation would call in question the treaty
regime,
- The position can be carried a step further. There may be
little gain from specifying these kinds of requirements in the
treaty. Under a withdrawal clause of the type found in the Test
Ban Treaty, as we shall see,” it seems entirely probable that
a party would be justified in treating novel efforts to defeat its
satellite observation as justifying withdrawal. Similarly, as sug-
gested above, ambiguous signals are likely to lead to requests for
clarification even if that procedure is not specified in the treaty.
And again, a plainly unsatisfactory response to a genuine con-
cern could plausibly be cited as grounds for withdrawal.
3. Sanctions, – The reasonable man, if not the rational cal-
culator, might think that the elements already discussed are
sufficient to account for the admirable record of compliance by
the United States and the USSR with extant arms control agree-
ments. In all of them, the prospective gains from violation are
small and the chances of detection high.
Yet despite the record, there has been continuing difficulty in
developing the official consensus necessary to adopt new agree-
ments having similar characteristics — as, for example, a com-
prehensive test ban * or limitations on strategic weapons at
something like present levels.” Nor has strategic analysis been
unanimous in concluding that the prospects for compliance in
such cases are good. These agreements, like most of those in
force, affect the status quo only marginally. There is still less
readiness to endorse the viability of more drastic departures,
*** See pp. 957–59 infra. -
*See Hearings on Prospects for Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1971) (testimony of
Dr. Franklin A. Long); Myers, Extending the Nuclear-Test Ban, 2.26 ScIENTIFIC
AMERICAN 13 (1972); Neild & Ruina, A Comprehensive Ban on Nuclear Testing,
175 SCIENCE 140 (1972).
, *** See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1972, at 1, col. 1 (report on the Annual
Message of the Secretary of Defense); note 159 supra.
79-879 O – 72 - 10
138
956 IIA RIVARD LAH/ REVIEW [Vol. 85:005
where the possible gains from violation may seem proportionally
larger.
The arguments in opposition to such agreements — or, as is
more common, dubitantc — continue to address the positive side
of the calculation, the gains that might accrue to the violator.
True to the rules of worst-case analysis, they stress the possi-
bility, however remote, that clandestine activity could result in a
decisive shift in the political or military balance.” In strictly
rational terms, however, such a possibility could not be regarded
as controlling if the likelihood of detection were high and the
applicable sanctions were effective. Because we know ultimate
discovery is not only probable but certain, the opposition argu-
ment is defensible only if the sanctions are regarded as slight, if
not negligible. In truth, although there is little careful consid-
eration of the question, that probably represents the general
evaluation. ~. . . .
The main sanctions underlying all arms control agreements
that have been adopted or even considered by governments since
World War II are political in character. They consist essentially
of negative responses from the international political environment
in which the violator must continue to operate.” In the present
state of the international system, nobody seriously argues that
violation of an arms control agreement should be the occasion
for punitive action against the offender, either by other parties
to the treaty or by the international community as a whole.
Such attention as is given the problem of sanctions usually
focuses on the sanction of political opprobrium — the unfavorable
reaction of other states and peoples in the international com-
* See, e.g., AMERICAN SECURITY Council, THE CHANGING STRATEGIC MILITARY
BALANCE 11–15 (1967) (report prepared at the request of the House Comm. on
Armed Services); W. KINTNER, PEACE AND THE STRATEGY ConFLICT 240–41 ( 1967).
Much of the ABM debate revolved around the contention of the proponents that
by a sophisticated combination of new weapons and new strategies the Soviets
might be able to overwhelm the United States retaliatory force, or at least some
components of it. See note 53 supra.
* As the history of the late 1950's shows, these forces can operate with some
effect even without a treaty. As atmospheric and underwater testing came under
increasing pressure, both the United States and the Soviet Union interrupted their
test programs with various kinds of moratoria. See, e.g., Decree of Supreme
Soviet Concerning the Discontinuance of Soviet Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons
Tests, March 31, 1958, in 2 [1945–59] Documents on DISARMAMENT 978 (1960);
[1958] Dwight D. EISENHoweR, PUBLIC PAPERs of THE PRESIDENTs (1959) (Ex-
perts' Report on the Detection of Nuclear Tests, Aug. 22, 1958). In the end the
self-imposed limitations broke down, despite the prospect of a considerable outcry.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1961, at 1, col. 8. A treaty adds the force of law to what
are otherwise purely political pressures and may thus have the effect of intensifying,
concentrating, and legitimating them. -
139
1072] ARMS CONTROL 957
munity to the conduct of the violator. There is a strong tendency
to disparage the significance of “world public opinion.” Yet, it
would be wrong to think that political disapproval consists pri-
marily of newspaper editorials and protest marches somewhere
“out there” that can be readily discounted by responsible officials
of the acting state. In the foreign country, such expressions are
domestic opinion. They must necessarily influence to some ex-
tent their government's immediate response and future policies.
In a world where, even for a major power, most national objec-
tives — from security to economic stability to an effective com-
munications system — require the cooperation of other states, it
is not possible to disregard the probable reaction of other govern-
ments to a major breach of an arms control agreement.
Despite these caveats, one may conclude that the major
powers are less sensitive to international disapproval than they
were sometime ago. On a number of occasions in recent years,
both the United States and the Soviet Union have shown them-
selves willing to accept these consequences.” The impact has
not been negligible; nevertheless, political memories are short,
and the other governments involved, like most governments, have
been more pragmatic than their constituencies. On balance, the
best that can be said is that international opprobrium by itself
is a sanction of dubious efficacy.
Preoccupation with the sanction of international disapproval,
however, diverts attention from more meaningful aspects of the
sanction system. As between superpowers, the most significant
constraints are bilateral. The most important responses to be
taken into account are those of the treaty partner. These may
conveniently be considered under two heads: (a) release of the
other party from its treaty obligations; and (b) responses in areas
not governed by the treaty.
(a) Withdrawal. — Under the Limited Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, a party may withdraw on three months notice “if it de-
cides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of
this Treaty, have jeopardized [its] supreme interests. . . .”.”
The clause does not require any decision or action by an out-
side agency. The question whether events are “extraordinary,”
whether they are “related to the subject matter of this Treaty,”
* Examples are the resumption of weapons testing by both countries, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 31, 1961, at I, col. 8; id., Sept. 2, 1961, at I, col. 2; id., Apr. 26,
1962, at 1, col. 8; the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, id., Aug. 21, 1968, at 1,
col. 8; and United States military interventions in the Dominican Republic, id.,
Apr. 29, 1965, at I, Col. 8; Apr. 30, 1965, at I, Col. 8, at 14, col. 4; and in Vietnam.
*** Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, art. IV, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (effective
Oct. Io, 1963).
140
958 HARVARD LAW REI'IEH' [\ol. 85. QoS
and whether they “have jeopardized [its] supreme interests” are
all referred exclusively to the unilateral decision of the with-
drawing party. - .*
. . . The withdrawal clause was one of the few issues of the nego-
tiations that caused any trouble.” In the beginning, the USSR
took its traditional view that there was no need for any with-
drawal provision at all. Sovereign states, it said, have an in-
herent right to withdraw from a treaty at any time.” This
version of rebus sic stantibus is the ultimate extension of the
rigorously consensual Soviet theory of international law.” The
United States and Britain, on the other hand, started from a
rather complicated clause in the draft they put forward in August,
1962.” There the right of withdrawal depended upon either a
breach of the treaty or testing by a nonsignatory that would
amount to a breach had it been conducted by a party. In such
a case, a party was entitled to call for a conference of the signa-
tories to consider the evidence and assess the situation. Regard-
less of the outcome of the conference, the party could withdraw
from the treaty if it deemed that action “necessary for its na-
tional security. . . . . .” The compromise embodied in the Treaty
accepted a formal provision for withdrawal from the agreement,
but broadened considerably the occasions for withdrawal. The
procedure for trying to develop some kind of community judg-
ment on the issues was dropped. -
The Test Ban withdrawal clause is embodied verbatim in
the Non-Proliferation Treaty with—the addition that a party's
notice of withdrawal must include “a statement of the extra-
ordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme in-
terests.”.” Thus it is reasonable to assume that the withdrawal
formula worked out at Mosców is likely to remain for some time
to come a feature of arms control agreements to which the two
countries are parties. .
As a legal matter, withdrawal, either under special provisions
in the treaty or under general principles of international law, is
freely available as a sanction against breach.” Indeed, the ag-
** H. JACOBSON & E. STEIN, supra note 55, at 457–58.
** Hearings, supra note 99, at 27–28, 50 (testimony of Secretary of State
Rusk). See also H. JACOBSON & E. STEIN, supra note 55, at 457.
*TRISKA & FINLEY 410–11; H. Berman, supra note 128, at 950–52.
*** Anglo-American Proposal Submitted to the 18-Nation Disarmament Com-
mittee: 1962 Draft Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 27, 1962, art. III, ENDC Loc. No. 59, in
2 [1962] DOCUMENTS ON DISAR MAM E.NT 804 (1963).
*** Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1969, art. X,
21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839 (effective March 5, 1970). -
*** At the hearings on the Test Ban Treaty, government witnesses took the
141
1972] ARMS CO.V TROL 959
grieved party may feel bound to retaliate even if it sees little
prospect of technological or military gain from doing so. The
United States resumed testing in response to the Soviet atmos-
pheric test series of September 1961, even though the technical
results were relatively uninteresting.
In practice, however, this response may be less than com-
pletely effective. In the first place, to the extent that the violator
has been successful in achieving a head start, withdrawal by the
other party does nothing to offset it. Moreover, the existence of
changed circumstances and their importance to the Supreme in-
terests of a country are not objective facts capable of authorita-
tive determination. The adequacy of the justification for with-
drawal will be largely in the eye of the beholder. A government
considering the exercise of its withdrawal right must therefore
take into account the probable evaluations of its rationale by
other states, and these are likely to be more-or-less rather than
either-or. Even in cases of breach by the other party, the evidence
is rarely unambiguous, and when it is, the breach may not be
regarded as justifying ipso facto a reciprocal withdrawal. When
the United States did resume atmospheric testing in April 1962,
the international outcry was almost as great as that against the
USSR itself for first breaking the four year tacit moratorium on
tests, 198
(b) Beyond Reprisal. — The would-be violator faces more
than simply the withdrawal of the other party and return to the
status quo ante, probably a time of relative calm, caution, and
reciprocal restraint. If the violative conduct cannot be con-
vincingly related to factors outside the bilateral relationship, such
as the need for preparations against a third power, a substantial
breach, or even a withdrawal under the terms of the treaty, will
in all probability be read as an unfriendly act, signalling a far-
reaching shift toward a policy of hostility and confrontation.
Indeed, it is likely to precipitate “a flaming crisis.”” Unless
the breach achieves a decisive and immediately apparent military
superiority, the prospective violator must anticipate a wide-
ranging set of responses, many of them likely whether or not the
position that in the event of a breach by one party of its essential obligations, the
other party would be free to abrogate immediately, without being bound by the
three-month waiting period in the withdrawal clause. Soviet and other authorities
were adduced for the principle, familiar in domestic legal systems as well as inter-
national law, that material breach by one party releases the other, at its option,
from its obligations under the agreement. Hearings, supra note 99, at 37–40.
* Sce N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1962, at 1, col. 2, at 3, col. 5; id., Apr. 28, 1962,
at I, Col. 7.
* This was Secretary Rusk's description of the Cuban missile confrontation.
E. ABEL, supra note 136, at Ioo.
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96.O HARWARD LA || RE! "I Eſſ’ [Vol. 85:905
other side decides to exercise its withdrawal right: the resump-
tion of an intense, uncontrolled arms race, a worsened political
climate, the strengthening of the opposing alliance. -
A generalized hostile response is likely even though it may not
be a “rational” counter to the breach. It will come about through
shifts in power and influence brought about within the offended
government. The hands of treaty opponents, who tend to be the
military and hard-line elements, will have been strengthened. Off-
cials committed to the treaty, who are often those urging relaxed
and accommodating bilateral relations, will have been discredited
and may even overreact for political and bureaucratic self-pro-
tection. -
Whatever the cause, this broad spectrum response is likely
to have a serious impact on the violator. From the Soviet stand-
point, the increase in overall United States force levels and the
generally hardened attitudes that resulted from the Berlin crisis
of 1961 were at least as significant as any response in the imme-
diate Berlin context.” The ultimate effect was on Soviet domes-
tic goals, always an object of the politician's tenderest solicitude.
The United States actions led to the cancellation of consumer-
oriented cuts in the Russian military budget.” w
In the context of this kind of bilateral response, the reactions.
of third states take on added significance. It is no longer a ques-
tion of generalized disapprobation of the violator. What is in-
volved is cooperation or Support for a specific course of action
being pursued by the offended state. Any response of the United
States or the USSR would be heavily dependent for its success
* on the energy and enthusiasm with which allies rallied round.”
The positive action of states beyond the immediate circle of alli-
ance may also be required. "In the Cuban missile crisis, for ex-
ample, a key element was the denial of landing rights to Soviet
aircraft by Senegal and Guinea,” neither of which was renowned
for its susceptibility to suggestions from Washington.
(c) The Effect of Secrecy. — The sanctions will be intensified
in the case of clandestine breach. To look again at the Cuban.
missile crisis, even though no treaty was involved, the speed and
secrecy of the Soviet deployment was an important constituent
in the alarm of the United States leaders and in their sense of
the urgent need for forceful response.” It was, as well, a critical
** T. SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 270; A. ScºtleSINGER, supra note 31, at 404.
* Wolfe, Introduction to V.D. Sokolovsky, Soviet MILITARY STRATEGy 19
(1963).
* See T. SoRENSON, KENNEDY 586–87, 733 (1965).
* Cf. E. ABEL, supra note 136, at 136–38.
*** [1962] John F. KENNEDY, PUBLIC PAPERS of THE PRESIDENTs 806 (1963).
143
1972] ARMS CONTROL - 96.
factor in mobilizing international support or acquiescence.” It
is an interesting speculation whether the United States could have
forced a withdrawal of the missiles on the same terms if the .
Soviets had proceeded openly and deliberately over a considerable
period, justifying their action publicly and with copious citation
of NATO precedents. . . . . .
Similarly, a big part of the United States chagrin and con-
fusion at the disclosure of the U-2 was traceable to the secrecy
of the program. The result was not only the abandonment of
flights over the USSR, but the abortion of the summit conference
at Paris, a centerpiece of the Eisenhower administration's foreign
policy.” - ‘. . . . . . . . . . - -
In both the U-2 and the Cuban missile cases, political sanc-
tions, intensified by the clandestine character of the offending
act, forced the abandonment of major military programs with
self-evidently high military significance. The examples also con-
firm the suggestion that the key sanction is the response of the
other superpower, and that this may be diffused over the spectrum
of bilateral relations rather than limited to the area of the objec-
tionable conduct. -
In neither case was there a breach of an agreement between
the United States and the USSR. Indeed, the deployment of
Soviet missiles in Cuba was entirely “legal.” " It could be ex-
pected that in the usual case, the reaction would be even stronger
to a deliberate, clandestine violation of an arms control agree-
ment. - - • * *
B. The Politics of Enforcement
To this point, we have analyzed the enforcement mechanism
in fairly conventional terms. Sensitivity to the organizational and
political setting has highlighted some points to which insufficient
attention has generally been given. But in the main, we have
dealt with the issues of breach, withdrawal, and response as
though their resolution were determined by a rational calculus
of benefits and burdens. But we know that those decisions will
be the products of a complex organizational structure and process
in which forces of consensus, commitment, and inertia are at
*** See, e.g., the exchange between Ambassador Stevenson and Ambassador
Zorin in the Security Council debates, 17 U.N. SCOR, Io; 5th meeting 1-17
(1962). • -
*9° N.Y. Times, May 17, 1960, at 1, col. 8; id., May 18, 1960, at 1, col. S.
*** The United States never took the position that the Soviet action violated
any norm or agreement binding at international law, nor did it treat the threat
as an armed attack justifying response under article 51 of the U.N. Charter. See
Department of State Memorandum : Legal Basis for the Quarantine of Cuba, Oct.
23, 1962, in CHAYES, EHRLICH, & Low ENFELD, Documents Supp. at 552.
144
902 f 1.-i ſv \ , i. (\ L/ L. i ! ! IV 1", ! I ſº, } | \ Q1. S.S. 905
work. The values assigned to the terms in the calculus are not
objectively fixed, but vary with the different perspectives, in-
terests, and objectives of the participants in the process. The
answers will thus differ also, even though given in the utmost
good faith. - -
Most important, the focus on relations with an external ad-
versary will be diluted by a concern for the responses and moves
of colleagues, organizations, and factions within the deciding
country. The various calculations of benefit and cost will not
operate as the direct determinants of decision, but as elements of
the internal discourse, as means of changing or rebutting the
views of others. This more complex political-organizational anal-
ysis has a somewhat different bearing on breach and withdrawal
than on response. These will be treated separately.
1. Withdrawal and Breach. — Termination of the treaty re-
lationship will necessarily have domestic political consequences.
These may be larger for an outright breach than for withdrawal
under the terms of the treaty. But as suggested above, the justi-
fication for withdrawal, except perhaps in response to the adver-
sary's breach, will never be self-validating. And to the extent it
is not, reactions like those to breach will be generated.
In democratic Societies, the opposition will express itself in
normal electoral politics. In the Soviet Union, emerging elites in
the scientific and intellectual areas, not completely controlled by
state or party, seem to have a special importance on arms control
issues.” This is not to say that public opinion will always favor
the treaty. In Germany after World War I, the repudiation of
the prohibition against rearmament imposed by the victors at
Versailles became a political rallying cry.” One can imagine a
like syndrome emerging out of a period of generally deteriorating
relations and mutual recrimination between the chief treaty part-
ners. Often the public will simply be indifferent; and it may even
applaud the appearance of cnergy and action conveyed by a de-
cision to be free of irksome restraints.
Abandoning the treaty will necessarily involve resistance with-
in the government, as well as outside it. As we have seen, the
process by which the treaty comes into being insures that there
will be individuals, agencies, and factions with power stakes in
the agreement. They will have the incentive, and at least some
are likely to have the opportunity, to ſight to maintain it. Gov.
Crnment structures tend to insure that repudiating a major arms
*” Sec note 60 supra. -
* See, e.g., T R. BURNS & I). URQUIDI, DISAKMAxist IN PERSPEC1 ve: AN
AxA.Yst's OF ST.LECTED ARMS Con TROL AND DISAR &rAxi ENT AGREEMENT S BET WHEN
1 11F. Woº 1.1, WAks, 1919-1939, at 203-04 (1968) (ACI)A RS-55).
145
107 : ] ARMS CONTROL 963
control agreement cannot be the work of a few men in a few
moments. Like the decision to enter the agreement, the decision
to leave it must be a process extending over time, seeking through
familiar techniques of bargaining and persuasion to achieve con-
Sensus among the officers and offices whose positions and juris-
dictions give them a claim to be heard.
The extension of the decisionmaking process in time and
space significantly increases the impediments to successful clan-
destine action already discussed. The bureaucracy is no excep-
tion to the rule that the difficulty of keeping a secret grows in
geometrical proportion to the number of people who know about
it. Efforts are made to offset this phenomenon by limiting the
number of people who are in on the decision. And there have
been some successes.” In general, however, bureaucratic rou-
tines for the distribution of documents, the convening of meetings,
and the like are resistant to the exclusion of those whose normal
bureaucratic business would involve them in the decision.
We should not speak so confidently about the Soviet Union.
Government control over the press makes it very much easier to
avoid public disclosure of secret decisions. It does not necessarily
follow that control of information within the relevant bureau-
cracies is equally effective. Nonetheless, students have noted a
high degree of compartmentalization in the Soviet bureaucratic
structure, which may make it easier for the right hand to be
kept in ignorance of what the left is doing.”
The political and bureaucratic aspects of decisionmaking also
affect the substantive scope of the debate. Termination of the
treaty must be made to appear as the solution not only, and
perhaps not even primarily, to a military problem, but to a po-
litical or bureaucratic problem, and better still to a set of them.***
This in turn works to broaden the range of relevant considera-
tions. It is hard to imagine a decision to terminate, say, the Test
Ban Treaty or the Non-Proliferation Treaty being taken strictly
on the basis of considerations affecting the subject matter of the
treaty itself. A decision to end such an agreement very probably
would require a far-reaching realignment of the country’s foreign
policy stance. This in turn most often comes about not in isola-
tion but as an element of a wholesale policy reorientation. Thus,
attack on the treaty may very well be the cause or symptom of
a major power struggle in the affected country.
* E.g., the recent itineraries of Dr. Henry Kissinger, the President's Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs. N.Y. Times, July 16, 1971, at 1, col. 8;
id., Jan. 26, 1972, at 1, col. 8.
*** See, e.g., M. FAINSOD, supra note 61, at 341, 495.
*** Cf. ALLIson 237–44.
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964 HAR}'ARD L. J.; RE! "I Eſſ' [Vol. 85:905
A democratic system, which finds secrecy in these matters
very difficult to maintain, may gain a compensating advantage in
that the struggle over this kind of decision can work itself out
through normal political processes. In a closed society, however,
the decision to abandon a major arms control agreement seems
likely to be the occasion or a consequence of a significant power
shift, if not at the apex of the leadership group, then in strata
immediately below. In addition to personal costs, such a struggle
will exact some toll in the functioning of the state.
A political leader in any system will hesitate before assuming
the burdens and risks of this kind of a contest. If he does engage,
the stakes are high enough to insure that he will not easily prevail.
2. Response. — The response to termination will also be a
product of government decision processes rather than rational
calculation. We have already suggested that both the need and
the intensity of response may be enhanced by political and organi-
zational forces.” But governmental processes can also work to
inhibit response. Violations of post-World War I treaties for the
disarmament of Germany were well-known to the British and
French cabinets. The failure to enforce the treaty requirements
reflected an inability or unwillingness to accept the political re-
sponsibility for such action.* -
In large part as a reaction to this experience, United States
policy since World War II has stressed the need for elaborate,
formal, and public machinery for arms control verification and
enforcement. Objective determination by a neutral entity, oper-
ated on an international basis and in a kind of adjudicative mode,
has been thought necessary to put pressure on hesitant politicians
to take strong counteraction. We saw that in the partial arms
control measures adopted or under active discussion, international
means of verification and enforcement have been substantially
abandoned in favor of national means.” Nevertheless, the tra-
ditional position remains an element of more general United
States arms control doctrine.
There are good grounds for second thoughts about the value
of international and automatic verification and response, at least
in essentially bilateral strategic arms limitation agreements. On
the most pragmatic level, such a requirement enormously compli-
cates the negotiation and adoption of any treaty. It cuts against a
fundamental feature of an international system still based in the
main on national sovereignty — the deep unwillingness to remit
international issues to third party settlement. And it multiplies
*** See pp. 958–59, 960 supra.
*** 4 R. BURNS & D. URQUIDI, supra note 209, at 17.
*** See note 171 supra.
147
1972] . . . . ARMS CONTROL . . . . . . . 965
the problems of draftsmanship. Since the parties will not be in
control of the verification process in operation, the tendency – a
perfectly typical lawyer's reaction – is to try to preprogram the
process in the agreement. This leads to a degree of detail in
language that is more appropriate to a tax treaty than an arms
control agreement. And it provides innumerable additional occa-
sions for internal and external dispute. . .
On the merits, it is by no means clear that an automatic link-
age between the verification system and response is desirable.
The Test Ban-type withdrawal clause is not keyed to violations
of the Treaty, but to the occurrence of extraordinary events jeop- -
ardizing the supreme interests of a party. The question of re-
sponse is open even in the absence of breach; and conversely,
withdrawal is not necessarily indicated even when the other par-
ty's violation seems clear. The clause makes explicit what is true
in any case: the problem of response to adversary activity under
an arms control agreement is a political problem calling for
judgment and discretion, . . . . .
Judgment is required at two levels: (1) What is the suspected
party really doing? (2) What, if anything, should be done about
it? Very often the first kind of question is not one on which
additional empirical data will be particularly helpful. It may
come down essentially to interpreting and analyzing the data so
as to predict the adversary's future course of conduct. The prob-
lem is classically formulated as that of divining the other party's
“intentions.” But by this time it should not come as a surprise
that such a lapse into anthropomorphism is misleading. Consider
a United States weapons program about which almost everything
is public — the ABM. The configuration and location of ABM
sites; the kinds, performance ratings, and probable numbers of
interceptors; the types of radar; the computer requirements —
all of these have been the subject of endless public hearings.”
The reliability of the system and the tactics that might be used
against it have been publicly debated.” But even an American
citizen — even a government official — following the question
closely could not confidently predict the mission of the weapon
*** See, e.g., Hearings on Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM
Systems Before the Subcomm. on International Organization and Disarmament
Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969);
Hearings on Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development,
FY 1970, and Reserve Strength Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 91st
Cong, 1st Sess. (1969); Hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for
1970 Before the Subcommi, on the Dep’t of Defense of the House Comm. on Ap-
propriations, 91st Cong, 1st Sess. (1969). -
* Compare, e.g., CHAYES & WIESNER with AMERICAN SECURITY Council, THE
CHANGED STRATEGIC MILITARY BALANCE: USSR v. USA (1967).
148
966. HARWARD LAW REVIEW’ [Vol. 85:905
or the size of the ultimate deployment. On these questions of
role and scale, whose “intentions” are the significant ones? The
President's? Those of the Congress? Which Congressmen? The
Secretary of Defense? The Joint Chiefs? The Director of
ACDA2 And at what point in time?
To put the question this way is to demonstrate again that the
concern is not with governmental “intentions” in a psychological
sense at all. The effort is to predict probable future lines of
political and military policy. The difficulties of this prediction
have been circumvented by resort to gross simplifying assump-
tions, often highly ideological in character. In the recent Cold
War period, the rubric has been that since it was impossible to
be sure of the other side's intentions, policy decisions should be
based on its capabilities. But oversimplification has not always
been a monopoly of the warlike. In the interwar period, an equally
simplistic rule of attributing benign, or at least satiable, inten-
tions to the adversary had catastrophic results. -
Both of these methods of assuming away the problem of care-
ful judgment about the likely course of action on the other side
have proven poor guides to policy. In such a judgmental process
more information about the nature, personnel, and characteristic
modes of operation of the other party's governmental structure
may be a great deal more helpful than more information about its
weapons systems.
The very existence of the treaty may ease the problem to
some degree. If the agreement is observed, a particular set of
real-life phenomena is stabilized and does not enter as a variable
into the overall analysis of the other side's positions. Since the
Test Ban Treaty, for example, neither United States nor Soviet
intelligence has had to worry about the significance to be attrib-
uted to the other side's atmospheric, space, or underwater tests.
There haven’t been any. Conversely, if the Soviet Union should
continue to deploy SS-9's in the absence of an agreed ceiling,
the inferences to be drawn would continue to be subject to debate
and speculation. But if deployment were to proceed in violation
of an express treaty prohibition, the political significance of the
action, would be quite plain, even though the military conse-
quences might be rather doubtful.
This leads us to the second level of judgmental issues: What
is to be done in response to evidence of an adversary's violation?
Even when the evidence of violation is conclusive it is by no
means certain what the appropriate action should be. The effect
of formal and public verification and enforcement procedures,
especially in neutral or international hands, would most likely
be to strengthen the forces within the offended government seek-
149
1972] ARMS CO.V TROL 967
ing a harsh or drastic reaction. Even if these forces are over-
borne and the violation overlooked, the publicity tends to coin-
promise the efficacy of the treaty restriction. In either case third
party control does not enhance the stability of the treaty regime.
The experience with the Test Ban Treaty illustrates the
values of a less rigid system. Iłoth the United States and the
Soviet Union have conducted tests that vented outside their
territorial limits.” The language of the Treaty prohibits such
tests, but the restriction, as we have seen, is a precautionary
rule. It is not fundamental to the purposes of the Treaty, and
its breach does not significantly frustrate the expectations of the
parties. With informal verification by national monitoring sys-
tems, these venting incidents have received but little public atten-
tion. The parties have exchanged diplomatic correspondence to
clarify their significance.” In the end, both parties have been
able to continue their adherence to the Treaty apparently without
serious internal political resistance and without formal dilution
of its norms. Meanwhile the main benefits sought — the suppres-
sion of atmospheric, Space, and underwater testing — have been
preserved.
V. CONCLUSION
This excursus through the terrain of arms control agreements
has consisted chiefly of the elaboration of some rather common-
sensical propositions that may seem self-evident to anyone who
has spent some time in government. The primitive character
of these statements and the Supporting documentation is testi-
mony that we are at the very beginning of our understanding of
how, when, and why states obey international law in general and
comply with arms control agreements in particular. The question
is a branch of a broader field of investigation, equally virgin:
how and why do States — and other large corporate aggregates —
order their activities in response to law? “” Much more work
needs to be done before we will know how to shape laws to en-
hance the prospects of compliance by the corporate and organiza-
**See p. 938 supra.
*19. See id.
* Forty years ago, in What Price Contract 2, Karl Llewellyn stopped in mid-
passage to lament the distortion introduced into all legal analysis by unspoken
assumptions, like those of strategic theory, that the responses of groups and organi-
zations to law can be fairly assimilated to those of individuals. The approach of
the printer's deadline prevented Llewellyn from reanalyzing his problem in terms
of the “groupness” of modern life. And, in the four decades since, nobody has
renewed the quest. See Llewellyn, supra note 54, at 733 n.63.
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968 HARWARD LIII: RETIEiſ [Vol. 85:905
tional entities on which the effectiveness of the law increasingly
depends. - -
But despite these reservations, the analysis of arms control
agreements permits us to hazard a number of conclusions that
cast serious doubts on the dominant orthodoxies in the field.
Recall that our principal attention has been directed at the gen-
eral area of strategic arms limitation as between the United States
and the Soviet Union. The set of possible agreements to which
the discussion has been oriented takes some account of the con-
straints of political reality: it would include agreements for sub-
stantial reductions in strategic weapons, by category or overall,
and significant quality controls, but nothing approaching strategic
disarmament. What does the analysis suggest about this set of
agreements?” - - . .
In the first place, we would conclude that the prospects for
compliance are very high — much higher than is implicitly as-
sumed in a public and official debate that makes the decisive
issue the possibility of “cheating.” -
Secondly, verification and enforcement mechanisms do not
provide the only forces operating to insure compliance, and prob-
ably not the most important ones. An agreement that is adopted
by a modern bureaucratic government will be backed by a broad
official consensus generated by the negotiating process, and will
carry personal and political endorsement across the spectrum of
bureaucratic and political leadership. These are exceedingly hard
to undo or reverse, the more so since, once the treaty goes into
effect, they are reinforced by the ponderous inertia of the bureau-
cracy. w
Third, even in the area of verification proper, the special ar-
rangements set up by the agreement are likely to be marginal at
best, given the immense capabilities for unilateral surveillance
afforded by satellite reconnaissance and associated advanced tech-
niques. The importance of onsite inspection is still more limited,
and for all practical purposes, it should be eliminated as an issue.
To the extent that supplementary verification provisions are nec-
essary, they can be “legal,” relying on a variety of disclosure and
declaration devices, rather than technical/scientific. This is not
to say that verification questions do not deserve careful profes-
sional attention from analysts, technicians, and lawyers, in gov-
ernment and out. But these are second and even third order
Questions. The risks from failure of the verification mechanism
— and in general they are very small — are only one category of
risks to be weighed in decisions on arms control agreements. The
* In fairness, it should be said that these conclusions are consistent with the
views I held before beginning this study. ' -
151
1972] ARMS CONTROL 969
focus on the issues of verification, detection, and onsite inspec-
tion in the debate of the last two decades has condemned arms
control to the fate of Achilles in Xeno's paradox, who could never
overtake the Tortoise, because by the time he got to where the
Tortoise had been, the animal was already further on his way.
Fourth, a decision to terminate the agreement, if it comes,
will be governed principally by political considerations rather
than technical or military ones. And in fact, it is likely to be or
to accompany a political decision of major proportions, with wide-
spread ramifications in the terminating government. The Dr.
Strangelove fantasy — of a superweapon, discovered and de-
ployed in secret, and unveiled to revolutionize the relative mili-
tary situation — is just that: a fantasy.
Similarly, the timing of the termination and the choice be-
tween breach and withdrawal will essentially reflect political
urgencies and schedules, rather than the effort to make military
capital out of the decision. Once it is decided to terminate, it is
possible, and perhaps probable, that there will be a period of
clandestine or unacknowledged activity inconsistent with the
treaty before the termination is made public. This is most likely
to consist of a hasty effort to resurrect abandoned projects, re-
vive old activities, and expand existing ones. These prospects do
not portend significant, much less decisive, military gains in case
of breach. The analysis reinforces the healthy commonsense
instinct that the best way to limit particular weapons systems is
to stop them before they get started. Modest or token as opposed
to zero ceilings greatly simplify the problems of expansion and
deployment after breach. *
These conclusions do not appear in the reassuring nimbus of
quantification. But if they are anywhere near the mark, they
suggest that United States arms control policy, at least in the
last decade, guided by the assumptions of strategic analysis, has
erred spectacularly on the side of caution. We could have pur-
sued a much more aggressive program, pressing for much more
extensive constraints on strategic weapons, without accepting
significant risks of violation or of adverse consequences in the
event of termination. If we had been successful, the military
and civil gains of more extensive disarmament would now be in
hand. - -
*
152
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
May 12, 1972
Honorable J. W. Fulbright
Chairman, Committee on
Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman :
The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of
March 3, 1972, requesting coordinated Executive Branch
comments on S. Res. 273 concerning the extension of the
nuclear test ban treaty, to include underground testing.
It appears to us that from a substantive standpoint
S. Res. 273 is very similar in meaning to S. Res. 230.
Although S. Res. 273 does not address itself to the
matter of a moratorium, which S. Res. 230 does , the two
resolutions in effect urge the President to propose
negotiations with a view to concluding a comprehensive
nuclear test ban. Accordingly, we believe that the com—
ments expressed in my letter to you of April 14, 1972,
with respect to S. Res. 230, are pertinent to S. Res. 27
The Office of Management and Budget advises that from
the standpoint of the Administration's program there is
no objection to the submission of this report.
Sincerely yours,

*…4.4.
David M. Abshire
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations
O
3
7
/ &
FUNDING OF RADIO FREE EUROPE
AND RADIO LIBERTY
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 3645
To FURTHER AMEND THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION
AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE ACT OF 1948
JUNE 6 AND 7, 1972
§§
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
TJ.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79–237 WASHINGTON : 1972
DEPOs TED BY THE
UNITED STATEs of AMERICA
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
EDMUND S. MUSEIE, Maine CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois
WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR., Virginia
CARL MARCY, Chief of Staff
ARTHUR M. KUHL, Chief Clerk
(II)
C O N T E N T S
Pagé
Statements by: .
Johnson, Hon. U. Alexis, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs- 51
Stikker, Dr. Dirk U., Chairman, West European Advisory Committee
to Radio Free Europe----------------------------------------
5
FUNDING OF RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO
LIBERTY
TUESDAY, JUNE 6, 1972
UNITED STATES SENATE,
CoMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
- Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221,
New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman),
presiding. - -
Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Symington, Aiken, Javits,
and Percy.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
OPENING STATEMENT
The committee meets this morning to consider the issue of funding
for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.
On May 25, I introduced—at the administration’s request—author-
ization legislation that would provide the two radios with a total of
$38.5 million for the coming fiscal year. This is $2.5 million more than
last year’s request and it is $6 million more than was actually appro-
priated for fiscal 1972. .
If this request is approved, the amount of U.S. Government funds
spent to support the radios since 1949, will total $553 million and in
addition there were some $46 million collected from private sources
which, I think, was tax deductible, amounting approximately to some
$600 million.
(Text of S. 3645 follows:)
[S. 3645, 92d Cong., second sess.]
A BILL To further armend the United stºre; information and Educational Exchange Act
Of Ji.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That section 703 of the United States Informa-
tion and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 is hereby amended to read as
follows: -
“SEC. 703. There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State
$38,520,000 for fiscal year 1973 to provide grants, under Such terms and condi-
tions as the Secretary considers appropriate, to Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty. Except for funds appropriated pursuant to this section, no funds ap-
propriated after the date of this Act may be made available to or for the use of
Radio Free Europe or Radio Liberty in fiscal year 1973.”
The CHAIRMAN. In considering this funding request, I hope that
Serious attention will be given to the emerging spirit of cooperation
and accommodation on the part of the United States and the Soviet
(1)
2
Union as evidenced by the President's recent trip to Moscow. And I
might also mention the agreement signed between the West German
Government and Moscow over Berlin and other matters.
During the course of that trip, the President addressed the Soviet
people and assured them that—and I quote—“We believe in the right
of each nation to chart its own course, to choose its own system, to go
its own way without interference from other nations.”
Similarly, very serious consideration must be given to the apparent
lack of interest on the part of our European allies to help shoulder the
financial burden imposed by these radio operations, particularly at a
time when the United States is wracked by huge budget deficits, record-
breaking balance-of-payments problems, seemingly endless inflation
and an unemployment level that has not dropped below 6 percent in
a year and a half. All of this, of course, is in considerable contrast to
the general prosperity being enjoyed by our European friends.
In view of these considerations, it is difficult for me and some of the
others on the committee to understand why we should continue to go
it alone in support of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, especially
at a time when there appears to be an opportunity for improving our
relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe;
and the fact that the Western European nations do not wish to con-
tribute financially to the radios makes one wonder if this is just another
program which is strongly supported by them, but only so long as
the United States picks up the cost for it and takes any diplomatic
flak that comes from it. To date, this has been the history of Radio
Free Europe and Radio Liberty.
DR. STIKKER’s APPEARANCE
To discuss Some of these matters this morning, we have with us
Dr. Dirk Stikker, former Secretary General of NATO and current
chairman of the Western European Advisory Committee for Radio
Free Europe.
Dr. Stikker’s appearance is the result of a request from Gen. Lucius
Clay asking that I and other members of the committee meet with
Dr. Stikker and some of his European colleagues to discuss the Radio
Free Europe matter on an informal basis. Although the committee
rarely receives testimony from foreign nationals, I wrote to General
Clay and suggested that a formal hearing with Dr. Stikker might be
appropriate. I will put into the record the correspondence on this
matter. - -
(The information referred to follows:)
RADIO FREE EUROPE,
FREE EUROPE, INC.,
. New York, N.Y., May 26, 1972.
Hon. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN : Thank you for your letter of May 22 inviting Dr. Dirk U.
Stikker to testify at a public hearing.
At the request of Dr. Stikker, who is in Europe, I am writing to confirm that
he will be available to you and your Committee at the time and place Suggested
by your staff: Tuesday, June 6, at 10:00 A.M., Room 4221, New Senate Office
Building. .
3
Dr. Stikker is Of Course aware that, as you stated, “Normally, the Committee
does not invite foreigners to testify on pending bills authorizing the appropriation
Of funds.” His Original proposal, which I COnveyed to you at his request in my
letter of May 18, was that he and Some Of his associates Confer with you and
interested members of your Committee. Dr. Stikker has asked me to Say that,
in response to your letter, he would be happy to appear at a hearing instead.
He has asked me to make clear, however, that he does not claim competence
and would not expect to testify On the pending draft legislation. His purpose
would be to give your COmmittee a report On recent discussions in Europe Con-
cerning Radio Free Europe.
I do not propose to accompany Dr. Stikker, though I appreciate your saying
that I would be welcome to do so. As Chairman of the Board of Directors of an
independent organization, I have felt all along that it is not my job to testify
as to the government’s participation, as this is a matter for the government
itself to determine. I know you Will understand that in Saying SO I intend no
disrespect to the Committee, and I am always ready to provide you and your
Committee with any information that might be helpful to you. I do Want you
to know that we are prepared to continue broadcasting under any arrangement
that will insure the necessary government contribution while leaving the present
professional integrity of the Organization unimpaired.
Sincerely,
LUCIUS D. CLAY.
MAY 22, 1972.
GENERAL LUCIUS D. CLAY,
Chairman of the Board, Free Europe, Inc.,
New York, N.Y.
DEAR GENERAL CLAY : I Wish to acknowledge your letter about a meeting With
Dr. Dirk U. Stikker and his a SSOciates On June 1st. -
As you of course are aware, draft legislation has been submitted to fund
Radio Free Europe for another year for approximately $38 million, and
since this matter is pending and will be considered by the Committee in the near
future, it occurs to me that it would be more appropriate for the Committee to
hear Dr. Stikker in open meeting relative to this legislation.. I assume from
your letter that Dr. Stikker is not coming On a purely social visit but wishes
to COmmunicate his views to the Committee on this legislation. The unique
background Of this Operation, and the recent recognition of its now being pub-
licly financed, strikes me as a case in which the public interest would require
public hearings rather than executive hearings or informal meetings to discuss
this legislation. Normally, the Committee does not invite foreigners to testify
On pending bills authorizing the appropriation of funds, although there are
precedents for Such action. In this case, however, it would seem appropriate in
View Of your request, to Suggest that this meeting be a public One rather than
an Off-the-record, private meeting. -
If this Suggestion meets with your approval, the Committee can arrange a
public hearing on the morning of June 1 at 10:00, or in the afternoon at 2:30
On the same day. If you and Dr. Stikker wish to testify at Such a meeting, it is
Customary to present a formal Statements, with several copies, the day before
in Order to give the members and the staff an opportunity to distribute the
statements, although a formal statement is not absolutely required. It is not clear
from your letter whether or not you intend to accompany Dr. Stikker, but I
can assure you that we would be very pleased to have you, if you are able to
COIYAG.
With best wishes, I am
Sincerely yours,
- J. W. Fu LBRIGHT.
RADIO FREE EUROPE,
FREE EUROPE, INC.,
New York, N.Y., May 18, 1972.
Hon. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. -
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN : Dr. Dirk U. Stikker, a distinguished European states-
man, who is Chairman of Radio Free Europe's West European Advisory Com-
mittee, will be in the United States at the end of this month for the periodic
discussions he and his Committee have with the Directors of Radio Free Europe.
4
Dr. Stikker and Several Of his European associates plan to be in Washington
On Thursday, June 1. They WOuld appreciate an Opportunity to meet with you
and Other interested Members. On their behalf and at Dr. Stikker's request, I
WOuld like to respectfully ask if it WOuld be possible for them to meet with you
and interested Members Of your Committee On that date and, if SO, at a time and
place COnvenient to you.
Sincerely,
LUCIUS D. CLAY.
P.S. The associates who may accompany Dr. Stikker to Washington are:
Per T. Federspiel (Denmark) : Barrister; former Minister of Special
Affairs.
Kurt Mattick, (Germany) : Member of Federal Parliament, SPD ; Vice
Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee. -
Max Schulze-Vorberg (Germany) : Member of Federal Parliament, CSU ;
Editor of Bayerischer Rundfunk.
The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Stikker, on behalf of the committee, I welcome
you this morning, and I would be very pleased if you would come
forward and sit there, please, at the table. You have, I believe, a
Written Statement.
STATEMENT BY SENATOR PERCY
Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, I have a very short statement I would
like to make. - -
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy wishes to make a statement.
Senator PERCY. I am afraid when I make my statement my bias
will show a little bit, but I certainly welcome you, sir, to give us first-
hand information on a subject that is of great interest to all of us. *
As we are all aware, détente has gone forward and especially in the
past few weeks at a remarkable and dramatic rate. President Nixon
only recently returned from his historic trip to Moscow where he
signed an unprecendented arms limitation agreement and joint declara-
tion of principles. Also, the four powers have signed the Berlin agree-
ment, and real progress is now promised in getting talks on MBFR
(mutual and balanced force reductions) and European Security
underway.
Surely these agreements and the other treaties signed during that
visit make for substantial improvement in relations between the two
Superpowers, and through that improvement, a real contribution to
international peace and stability. -
IIowever, while relations between the two superpowers and the
states of Europe improve, many millions of persons who live in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are still subjected to internal ideo-
logical warfare. The citizens of these nations are dependent upon
carefully managed news put out by official government organs. Ap-
parently, even in these times of reduced tension between East and West,
the rulers of the nations of Eastern Europe deny their people unre-
stricted access to the facts of domestic and international life.
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty fill a vital role in this area,
in my judgment. Even though they receive funds from the United
States—and Eastern European propaganda has spent countless hours
making sure all their citizens know the stations are U.S. supported—
they are still listened to and valued highly for their independent opera-
tions and presentations. It must say something for the quality of their
programing when after more than 20 years of jamming in a mas-
*
9
sive, official countercampaign, they still enjoy an extremely large
listenership.
It is a sad fact that a man in Leningrad may not know the major
news events in Kiev or Prague or Paris or New York unless Radio
Liberty or Radio Free Europe informs him. We cannot change this
situation. But, by providing the funds to continue the operation of these
stations, we will continue to make it possible for that man to continue
to hear the facts. Of course, we all hope Someday for an open Society
where anyone would have access to whatever is going on in the world.
I certainly welcome you at this time.
The CHAIRMAN. Will you proceed, Dr. Stikker, please?
(Biographical sketch of Dr. Stikker follows:)
IBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF DIRR U. STIKKER
Dr. Jur. ; Netherlands politician and diplomatist; b. 5 Feb. 1897; ed. Univ. of
Groningen. Former Man. Dii. of branches of Twentsche Bank at Leyden and
Haarlem ; Man. Dir. of Heineken Lagerbeer Brewery Co. Ltd. 35–48; Dir. of
S.A. des Bières Bomonti & Pyramides, Cairo ; mem. Of board of Société Inter-
nationale de Brasserie, Brussels; Founder and Chair. NethS. Foundation Of
Labour ; Founder (46) and Pres. Of Party of Freedom and Democracy ; mem. Of
Senate; Minister of Foreign Affairs 48–52; Political Conciliator, later Chair.,
OEEC 50–52; Amb. to Great Britain 52–58; Minister, later Amb. to Iceland
54–58; Head, combined Dutch perm. representation to North Atlantic Council and
OEEC with rank of Amb. 58–61, Sec.-Gen. of NATO 61–64; Dir. Royal Dutch
Shell Group 64–; Consultant to UNCTAD ; Hon. LL.D. (Brown Univ.); Hon.
G.C.V.O., Hon. G.B.E. Publ. “Men of Responsibility” 66.
Villa “Belfaggio,” Menaggio-LOveno, Lago di Como, Italy. Telephone : 2361.
—“International Who's Who,” 1972.
STATEMENT OF DR DIRK U. STIKKER, CHAIRMAN, WEST
ICUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO RADIO FREE EUROPE
Dr. STIKKER. Well, Mr. Chairman, in the first place, I would like to
say I welcome this opportunity to meet with you and your distin-
guished committee; and I fully appreciate the consideration that led
you to suggest that this meeting take the form of a public hearing.
It is clear that the future of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty
has become a matter of the most widespread public interest and dis-
cussion, not only in the United States, but also throughout Western
Europe and in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as well.
I am here today in my capacity as Chairman of Radio Free Europe's
West European Advisory Committee, a position to which I was elected
nearly 3 years ago. As General Clay, the Chairman of the Board of
Radio Free Europe, wrote you at my request on May 25, I am well
aware that it is most unusual, if not entirely without precedent, for a
foreigner to testify before a committee of Congress on a subject con-
cerning which there is pending draft legislation to authorize the
appropriation of funds. As General Clay explained on my behalf, how-
ever, I do not claim competence nor presume to testify on the pending
bill, which deals with the proposed financial contribution by the
American Government to the two Radios.
Accordingly, I propose to limit my remarks to a report and assess-
ment of the discussions and comments that have occurred in Western
Europe in recent weeks with respect to the work and future of Radio
79–237—72——2
6
Free Europe and Radio Liberty, and to the nature of Western
Europe's interest in those operations.
WEST EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Perhaps I should begin by saying a word about our committee.
Established in 1959, it is an informal group of prominent Europeans,
Members of Parliament, former Ministers, scholars, diplomats,
businessmen—who used to meet once or twice a year with officers and
directors of Radio Free Europe and who are individually always
available to discuss and advise on East-West relations, East Euro-
pean developments, the work of Radio Free Europe, and on our own
organization and terms of reference.
In recent years, its meetings have been enlarged by invitations to
nonmembers. An advance written report is submitted to participants
by RFE, which also covers the costs and provides the necessary con-
ference services. Representatives of Radio Liberty have taken part in
recent meetings, and I trust will continue to do so. -
With your permission, I would like to submit for the record at this
point a list of the individuals who have taken part in one or more of
the WEAC conferences over the past 5 years. -
Our committee was established at the initiative of Radio Free
Europe. It might therefore be appropriate for me to quote from
RFE's own statement, which was included in its presentation last
year to your committee, with respect to the role and value of the
WEAC sessions to date:
Radio Free Europe's meetings with the members and guests of WEAC have
served RFE beneficially in three ways: they give RFE a range of current West
EurOpean Opinion. On East European policy and prospects ; they elicit specific
recommendations with respect to RFE's broadcasting and its relations in West
EurOpe; and they acquaint a new group Of distinguished Europeans each year
With the policy, analytical capacity and impact of Radio Free Europe.
When I was invited to chair this committee, I asked three questions:
1. Who finances this large operation? I learned that the funds came
largely from the U.S. Government and partly from private U.S.
contributions; I was informed that the budget and the expenditures
were handled with great care, and that there were no problems in
this field. -
2. What are the terms of reference of WEAC 2 I got the impres-
sion that they could be improved.
3. What could I, at my age, still do for RFE: I learned that per-
haps I could bridge a short period and try to change somewhat the
composition and terms of reference of WEAC.
RFE's IMPORTANCE AT BEGINNING OF LIMITED DETENTE
When we had just started our first discussions on these last prob-
lems, the financial difficulties which have affected the very existence
of Radio Free Europe started. This has blocked our discussions on
future changes in our structure. We have deplored this because our
group believes that the work of RFE has become even more impor-
tant now that there is a beginning of a limited détente.
Now, I ask, is détente which reduces the exchange of information
truly a détente? There exists now real contact at the summit, but
7
not yet—and that is more important—between the peoples of East and
West. Under the present circumstances, our only means to learn to
understand each other is by radio, by oral communication, by ex-
change of news and opinion based on objective research.
In an era of negotiation and with the prospect of new conferences,
the free flow of information across international frontiers becomes
more rather than less important. I believe thoughtful Europeans fully
share the views recently expressed by President Nixon on this. In his
statement of May 10, 1972, the President declared that these Radios
“* * * are expressions of our profound conviction that a responsible
independent, and free press plays an indispenable part in the Social
and political processes that look to better understanding and more ef-
fective cooperation, not only within a nation, but also among nations.”
POSSIBILITIES OF WESTERN EUROPAN FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION
Although, as I said, our work on future changes of our structure
has been blocked for some time, we have nevertheless enlarged our
traditional role by undertaking a preliminary examination of the pos-
sibilities for bringing about a West European financial participation
in the two Radios.
It is important to note that these Radios began as purely American
undertakings and no question was ever raised regarding a European
financial participation. Only recently have circumstances been altered
in such a way as to bring a European financial contribution within the
realm of possibility. First, there could have been little question of a
West European contribution so long as that of the American Govern-
ment could not be publicly confirmed. That obstacle has, of course,
been removed as a result of the introduction last year by Senator Case
of legislation authorizing appropriation to the two Radios.
Secondly, in the past months there has been an extraordinarily
enlarged expression of understanding in Western Europe about the
purpose and performance of the Radios. In the past, of course, many
well-informed persons interested in the area—Government officials
Members of Parliament, journalists and scholars—have been aware of
the Radios’ broadcasting and appreciative of the objective research
material distributed to them. Indeed, it is fair to say that a clear con-
Sensus favorable to the continuation of the Radios has now been ex-
pressed in the newspapers, radios and television of the countries of
Western Europe.
I am bound to concede that this salutary change owes far more,
Mr. Chairman, to your own exertions in regard to the Radios than to
the modest efforts of our Advisory Committee. I am informed by my
American friends that much the same has been true in this country.
Let me state most emphatically that I personally fully agree with
your stated view that it is time for West Europeans to being sharing
the financial burden of these radio operations. I believe that the out-
pouring of news reports, editorial comment and public statements in
Europe over the past 3 months has effectively laid the foundation of
public understanding needed for such support. I must caution you,
however, that the development of such support will require long, hard
work on our part and patience on yours.
8
WESTERN EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR CONTINUING RADIOS
Between February 17, the date of Senator Fulbright's speech on the
subject, and April 30, 1972, at least 89 editorials, articles and commen;
taries were published in the leading newspapers of nine countries of
Western Europe. Of that total, 79, representing a broad spectrum of
political coloration, expressed support of the continuation of Radio
Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Only 10 West European newspapers
opposed continuation of the Radios and of those, nine were organs of
the Communist party.
To cite just one example, in its editorial of March 4, 1972, the Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung, an independent West German daily, said:
There exists in Eastern Europe, just as in the times of the Cold War, a terrible
lack of uncensored information. Anyone who has spent even a few days On a
trip there will confirm this. As long as the hunger for information in Eastern
Europe is not filled in a normal way, the two Munich stations must Continue
to fulfill their task, regardless of the furious tantrums of Communist governments
who don’t want to have their information monopoly affected.
Behind this conclusion lies a conviction which has been expressed by
so many commentators in recent weeks that, as Joseph Luns, the
Secretary General of NATO, put it on February 17, “* * * for us (in
the West) détente means the improvement of relations and exchanges,
cultural and economic, between nations and involves freer movement
of ideas and persons.” - -
In one way or another, Mr. Chairman, those views have been ex-
pressed almost universally by the press of Western Europe. Rather
than impose on your time by quoting more such comments, I should
like, with your permission, to submit for the record at this point a list
by country of the editorials and articles, pro and con, that have ap-
peared in Western Europe in just the 10 weeks between February 17
and April 30.
If I may inject a personal note in this connection, Mr. Chairman, I
must say that the tenor and import of this commentary in Western
Europe has reminded me forcibly of what was an important and, for
me, a most pleasant occasion in the summer of 1949. On July 11 of that
year, as Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, I met the ship Volen-
dam, in Rotterdam Harbor and greeted a group of its passengers
with these words:
On the moment of your arrival On the European Continent, I must think Of
another landing 5 years ago under Quite different circumstances. I am thinking
of the Allied armies which brought us freedom. It is this freedom which makes
it possible for you to make this trip and for us to receive you here in Our Own
country in Our Own Way. It is this freedom which enables you to visit a part of
Europe and get a personal impression of it. I do hope that you will make last-
ing, friendly relations with the inhabitants of Holland and of this continent as
mutual understanding and appreciation seem to be most essential in attaining
that lofty ideal we should always keep in mind and which has been expressed
SO well in the WOrdS “One WOrld.”
The occasion, Mr. Chairman, was the arrival in Europe of the first
contingent of Fulbright scholars.
Mr. Chairman, I believe in Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty
for the same reason I believe in the Fulbright scholarships; and I be-
lieve this view is now widely shared in Western Europe.
Similar views have been expressed since then by numerous Mem-
bers of Parliament in Western Europe. In the 18-nation Consultative
9
Assembly of the Council of Europe, 12 European Members of Parlia-
ment introduced a resolution on March 21, 1972, which declares that:
“Freedom to exchange ideas and information between West and East
is one of the essential corollaries of a policy of detente,” and recom-
mends that the council’s Committee of Ministers “request member
governments to take the necessary measures to keep these two stations
in existence in the interests of the free exchange of information.” The
question of the future of the Radios is expected to be taken up at the
plenary session of the assembly in October. A spokesman for the as-
sembly’s Political Committee has indicated that there is general ap-
proval, and favorable action in some form seems likely in October. The
subject has also been taken up by a standing committee of the unofficial
15-nation NATO parliamentary body, the North Atlantic Assembly,
and is expected to receive further consideration in the course of the
annual plenary meeting in November.
In short, Mr. Chairman, on the basis of extensive evidence it may be
concluded that in Western Europe the climate is clearly favorable to
continuation of the Radios and, by careful and patient handling, to
the development of a more active European participation.
TRAN SLATING FAVORABLE CONDITIONS INTO TANGIBLE RESULTS
The further question, quite properly, is how can these favorable con-
ditions be translated into tangible results? -
In order to explore this matter, we held a meeting in Munich in
January of a few WEAC members and invited guests. A meeting of the
same participants was held in New York last week with officers and
directors of Radio Free Europe, to which were invited representatives
of Radio Liberty. -
While I am sure you would not expect me to be able at this point to
offer definitive answers, I can inform you as a result of these meetings
that we told those present that we might proceed on the following lines:
(1) The West European Advisory Committee, perhaps under a new
name, will be revamped to provide a broader and younger geographic
and professional representation of West European society; (2) a sub-
committee of the WEAC will systematically explore the possibilities
of financial support from West European sources.
It is obviously impossible to predict with any assurance what the
results of this undertaking will be or how soon we will have them.
There are a number of difficult problems, including political, economic
and tax considerations. For example, corporate contributions in Eu-
ope are not tax deductible as they are in the United States. It is also
rue that European traditions of giving funds are rather different from
*I]]6. I’l C8,1]. - -
IMPORTANCE OF ASSURANCE OF CONTINUED U.S. SUPPORT
Above all, Mr. Chairman, the success of our effort, indeed our ability
to initiate it, will depend upon a clear indication that the United
States wants these organizations to remain on the air. I know that you
ill appreciate that if West Europeans are to be encouraged to begin
contributing their own funds, it will be important to them to have
whatever assurance may be possible that the Radios will be continued
in operation with the support of the United States.

















10
According to a Council of Europe spokesman, action there was post-
poned until October because the United States was currently engaged
in trying to find a solution for the continuance of U.S. Government
support, and it was felt that “a European intervention at this stage
might be premature.” In the deliberations of the committee of the
North Atlantic Assembly, to which I referred earlier, the Secretary
General of the Assembly advised that it would be premature to raise
the question of financial support before the summer holidays. In the
British House of Commons on March 27, 1972, there was an interesting
colloquy between a conservative Member and the Minister of State
at the Foreign Office. The latter said he was “aware of the interest
in a number of European countries in the future of Radio Free Europe
and Radio Liberty,” and added that—and I quote again: “Their fu-
ture is at present under active consideration in the United States, and
until the position is clear it would be premature for us to consider
what might happen thereafter.” - -
TIMETABLE OF EUROPEAN AND U.S FUNDING
If we are assured that the radios are to continue, we in Europe will
be able to embark without delay upon the program I have outlined
above. On the basis of experience in similar work in other organiza-
tions, I believe it will take at elast a year to carry out such a program.
Thus, an appreciable European contribution should not be expected to
be available in the next year.
Hopefully, this timetable would dovetail with establishment of the
definitive funding arrangements which I understand are still under
consideration with respect to the future contributions of the U.S. Gov-
ernment. In his statement of May 10, 1972, President Nixon points out
that different views as to the best funding mechanism have been ex-
pressed in Congress and that no consensus has yet emerged. The Pres-
idential Study Commission which Mr. Nixon said he will appoint to
examine this question would, in the President's words, “render its re-
port and recommendations by February 28, 1973, so that the adminis-
tration and Congress can take them into consideration in formulating
authorization legislation for fiscal year 1974.”
It is reasonable to suppose that the Presidential Study Commission
will wish to take into account in its report the findings and prospects
that may emerge from our efforts in Europe. I expect that we will have
reasonably definite information for the Commission in time for their
consideration. - • *
IMPORTANT AND GRATIFYING TASK
I regard this, Speaking personally, as an extremely important and
gratifying task. Those who like myself have lived for 5 years in
occupied territory know what it means that the only contact with the
outside world is the radio. That contact was in our darkest hours the
source to keep alive our courage and our hope. The American way of
life has always included the right of free speech and press. Americans
have always believed that an informed public opinion is essential to the
development of better mutual understanding among men and nations.
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are doing a great deal to
assure that the peoples of East Europe and the U.S.S.R. are kept in-
11
formed. I can think of no time when this function has been more essen-
tial than right now.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity.
(Documents referred to follow :)
WEST EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO RADIO FREE EUROPE
(Members And Invited Guests Who Have Attended Meetings, 1968 Through 1972)
BELGIUM
Philippe Deshormes—Secretary General, North Atlantic Assembly.
Norbert Hongardy—Senator; Vice President of the Parti pour la Liberte
et le Progres; former Vice President of Senate.
Paul F. Smets—Director, Faculty of Law, University of Brussels. -
Paul Van Zeeland”—Former Prime Minister, for Minister of Foreign Affairs.
DENIMARFC
Per T. Federspiel"—Member of Parliament. -
Per Haekkerup—Parliamentary Spokesman and Floor Leader of the Social
Democratic Party; former Minister of Foreign Affairs.
FRANCE
Pierre Abelin—Member Of the Chamber Of Deputies. -
Georges Berthoin—Chief Representative to the United Kingdom for the Euro-
pean Economic Community and the European Coal and Steel Community.
Francois-Didier Gregh—Minister Of State; Inspector General Of Finances
(French Government); former Assistant Secretary General for Economy and
Finance, NATO.
Etienne Hirsch—President, Central Committee Of the European Federalist
MOVement.
Jean Lecanuet”—Senator and recent Candidate for President of France.
GERMANY
Jorg Kastl—Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, NATO.
Kurt Mattick—Member of Federal Parliament; Vice Chairman, Foreign Af-
fairs Committee; Chairman, SPD COmmittee for Foreign and All-German Re-
lations; Member, Executive Committee of West Berlin SPD Organization
(1963–1968 Chairman); Member SPD Party Council.
Joachim Raffert—Member of the Socialist Party Parliamentary Group.
Gerhard Schroeder—Former Federal Minister of Interior, Foreign Affairs,
Defense; Member of Federal Parliament; Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee;
Member, Executive Committee of Christian Democratic Union (CDU).
Stephan Thomas—Director, Deutschlandfunk; former Director, Ostbureau;
former Director, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
Wolfgang Wagner—Publisher, Europa-Archiv. -
Gebhardt von Walther—Acting President, German Society for Foreign Affairs.
GREAT BRITAIN
George Brown—Deputy Leader of British Labor Party; Member of Parlia-
ment; former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. - -
Lord William Carron—Director, Bank of England; former President Amal
gamated Engineering Union. * -
Sir Geoffrey de Freitas—Member of Parliament; Director, Laporte Industries,
Lts. ; former President, Consultative Assembly, Council of Europe. -
Lord Harry Douglass—Former Chairman, Trades Union Congress; forme
General Secretary, Iron and Steel Trades Confederation.
Hugh Fraser—Member of Parliament; Director, Ionian Bank; former Minis-
ter. Of Air.
Jo Grimmond*—Member of Parliament; former leader of the Liberal Party.
*Members.
12
John Pinder—Director, Political and Economic Planning.
Sir Frank Roberts—President, British Atlantic Committee, Atlantic Treaty
Association ; former Ambassador.
Lord Robertson of Oakridge—Chairman, Advisory Council, Independent Tele-
vision Authority; former Commander-in-Chief, British Forces in Germany ; for-
mer Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Land FOrces.
Kenneth Younger—Director General, Royal Institute Of International Affairs;
former Minister Of State.
ITALY
Giuseppe Bettiolº—Professor in the University of Padua ; former Member of
the Foreign Affairs Commission Of the Chamber Of Deputies.
Don Guido Colonna di Paliano—President, “Rinascente”; former Deputy Sec-
retary General, NATO; former member, Combined Commission of EEC, ECSC,
and Euratom. - -
Alberto Folchi—Professor of Law, University of Rome; former Minister of
Sports and Tourism ; former Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Randolfo Pacciardi”—Member of the Chamber of Deputies; former Minister
Of Defense. -
Pietro Quaroni—President, Italian Radio-Television ; former Ambassador.
Altiero Spinelli—Director, Institute of International Affairs, Rome.
THE NETHERLANDS
Henrik N. BOOn—Ambassador to Italy.
Jerome L. Heldring—Editor, NRC-Handelsblad (Rotterdam/Amsterdam).
L. G. M. Jaquet—Secretary General, Nederlandse Genoots chap voor Interna-
tionale Zaken.
W. K. N. Schmelzer—President, Catholic People's Party; former Under Secre-
tary Of State. , ' - -
Dirk U. Stikker*—Former Secretary General, NATO; former Minister of For-
eign Affairs.
NORWAY
Birger Kildal”—Former Editor-in-Chief, Morgenbladet, Oslo; Norwegian Poli-
tician and Journalist. - -
Haakon Lie—Secretary, Norwegiena. SOcialist Party.
|PORTUGAL
Paolo A. W. Cunha”—Professor in the University of Lisbon; former Minister of
Foreign Affairs. -
Armando Roboredo e Silva—Rear Admiral; Chief of Portuguese Delegation
with the Portuguese-German Mixed Committee. -
SWEDEN
Karl E. Birnbaum—Director, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
SWITZERLAND
Samuel Schweizer—Chairman of the Board, Swiss Bank Corporation; Vice-
Chairman, CIBA Ltd.; Member, International Chamber of Commerce.
TJNITED STATES
Harlan Cleveland–Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
and European Regional Organizations.
Stewart S. Cort—Chairman, Bethlehem Steel Corporation; Chairman of the
BOard, Radio Free Europe Fund. -
Michael L. Haider—Chairman, Executive Committee, Radio Free Europe Fund,
Inc.; Member of the Board, Free Europe, Inc.; former Chairman, Standard Oil
Co. (New Jersey).
Howland H. Sargeant—President, Radio Liberty Committee.
Marshall D. Shulman—Director of Russian Institute, Columbia University.
*Members.
13
WEST EUROPEAN PRESS CoMMENT ON RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADro LIBERTY
(Editorials and Articles and Commentaries—February 17 to April 30, 1972)
Positive --------------------------------------------------------------- 9
Negative 9
- 9
1.
Communist Party Organs
Other -
POSITIVE
AllStria.
Tiroler TageS&eitung (Innsbruck)—March 13.
Fra/7ce: -
le Monde (Paris)—February 25.
G Crºl any : -
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt)—“Superfluous?”—Febru-
ary 19. - - • -
Hannoverische Allgemeine Zeitung (Hanover)—“The Voice of Freedom”—
February 19.
Die Welt (Hamburg)—“Liberty to the Graveyard”—February 19.
Die Zeit (Hamburg) —“Free Airwaves”—March 1. - .
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt)—“Important Radio Sta-
tions”—March 4. -
Die Welt (Hamburg)—March 22. *
Die Zeit (Hamburg)—“Fulbright's Mistake”—April 7.
[In addition, these favorable British editorials were reprinted in German
papers. They are not included in the Overall tally..] : t
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt), Reprint of Daily Telegraph,
editorial Of February 23–February 24.
Die Welt (Hamburg), Reprint of Daily Telegraph, editorial Of February 23–
February 24. -
Stuttgarter Zeitung (Stuttgart), Reprint of Daily Telegraph editorial—Feb-
ruary 24.
Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), Reprint Of Sunday Times editorial of Feb-
ruary 27—February 28.
G?'66tt Bºitatiºn.
Daily Telegraph, (LOndon)—February 23.
The Times (London)—“Mr. Fulbright Strikes a Blow at Freedom”—Febru-
ary 25.
Sunday Times (London)—“In Defense of Radio Free Europe”—February 27.
Economist (LOndon)—March 3.
The Guardian (London & Manchester)—March 7.
Greece: . • ‘
Nea Politia (Athens)—“The War of Mr. Fulbright”—March 1.
Netherlaſmºds: - -
N. R. C. Handelsblad (Rotterdam)—“The Lessening of Tension and Informa-
tion”—February 26.
Norway:
After postem (Oslo)—March 3.
SQUitzerland. - - -
Die Tat (Zurich)—“A Vital Instrument of Communication”—February19.
La Tribune de Geneve (Geneva) —“Propaganda”—March 3.
La Tribune de Geneve (Geneva)—“Waves of the Airwaves” (by Alexandre
Bruggmann)—April 14. -
Other: . .
Malawi Times (Republic of Malawi, E. Africa)—March 27.
NEGATIVE
Austria :
Volksstimºne (Austrian CP daily)—Editorial sign G.M.–April 11.
S^{jeden.
Ny Dag (CP daily)—March 17.
14
EUROPEAN ARTICLES AND COMMENTARIES ON RADIO FREE
EUROPE AND RADIO IIHERTY
(February 17—April 30)
POSITIVE
Austria :
Linzer Volksblatt (Linz)—by Christian Deysson—March 13.
Belgium: -
le Soir (Brussels), “Munich Radios and Opinion in East Europe: Instru-
ments of the Cold War or Irreplaceable Sources of Information?”, by
POl Mathil—March 4.
le Peuple (Sociálist Party Organ)—March 22.
De????vark; :
Jyllands-Posten (Viby), “Fulbright Fulfills Kremlin's Desire to Suffocate
Anti-Soviet Radios,” by Kai Meiritz—March 13.
Weekendavisen (Copenhagen), “Stubborn U.S. Politicians Will Stifle the
Voice of Liberty,’” by Eigel Steinmetz—March 24.
Politiken (Copenhagen), “U.S. Lower Voice in Europe”—by Samual Rachlin
—March 26. -
Danish TV—(A program on RFE and RL by Ole Arndal)—April 17.
Germany:
Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), Interview with SPD Chairman Herbert
Wehner—February 15. e
Die Welt (Hamburg), “People Cannot Live Without Truth and Freedom”—
February 29.
Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), Bavarian Journalists’ protest the clos-
ing of RFE—March 1.
Abendzeitung (Munich), Critical comment on Senator Fulbright by Frank
Schoenhuber—March 3.
Frankfurter Rundschau (Frankfurt), “Sen. Fulbright Wants to Have Them
Silenced,” by Monika Metzner—March 4.
Welt am Sonntag (Hamburg), “Is Moscow Winning The Radio War?”
by Botho Kirsch—March 5.
Die Welt (Hamburg), “Citizens Committee Wants to Save Radio Liberty
and Radio Free Europe,” by Heinz Barth—March 8.
Bayern Kurier (Munich), “Television : Werner Hoefer's Twilight”—
March 11.
Rhein, Neckar-Zeitung (Heidelberg)—March 13. -
Deutsche Zeitung—Christ und Welt (Stuttgart), “Free Europe Still Broad-
casting : Argument About American Stations in Europe,” by Norbert
Muehlen—March 17.
German TV Second Network: “Magazine Program”—March 22
Der Tagesspiegel (Berlin)—March 24.
Die Welt (Hamburg), “Berlin. Thinks Threat Cheap Election Tactics,” by
Die Welt Berlin Correspondent “B.I.”—March 24.
Quick (W. German Newsweekly), “Propaganda : War of Nerves Against
Munich Station—MOSCOW Fears Free Europe”—March 24.
Muenchmer Merkur (Munich), “Fulbright—A Contradiction in Himself”—
March 24.
Die Welt (Hamburg), “Fulbright: or The Disassembling of Western Soli-
p- darity,” by Heinz Barth—March 24. -
Die Welt (Hamburg), “Gaggers of the Free World”—March 25.
Deutsche Zeitung—Christ und Welt (Stuttgart), “Stumbling Block: SPD
Attack Against U.S. Radios,” by Martin Bernstorf–March 30.
Die Welt (Hamburg), “With Courage Against Sen. Fulbright,” by H. B.-
April 7.
Augsburger Allgemeine (Augsburg), “Airwaves Overcome Sensors’ Block-
ade,” by Jean Bodensee—April 8.
Tages Zeitung (Munich), A COmmentary by Hans Habe-April 8.
West German Domestic Network, “American Stations Are Object Of Con-
troversy”, (A talk by Walter Stegner, Director, Deutsche Welle)—
April 9.
15
Kulturpolitische Korrespanden2 (Bonn), “Information or Propaganda over the
Ether ?—Function and Practices of the U.S. Radios in Munich.”, by Werner
W. Muhlen—April 10.
Koelnische Rundschau (Koln) and Bonner RundSchau (Bonn), “America
Seeks New Concept for Radio Free Europe—U.S. Politicians Do Not Want
to Jeopardize New East-West Relations”, by Washington Correspondent
HanS B. Meyer—April 12. -
Berliner Liberale Zeitung (Berlin), “Quarrel About Airwaves—Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty”—“Relics of the Cold War?” by Manfred Fue-
ger—April 12.
West German Student Organization, (RCDS), Pronouncement—April 13.
Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), “DJW Supports Free Europe” (A report
on West German Journalists’ Union supporting RFE and RL)—April 21.
Great Britain, ; - - - -
Daily Telegraph (London), Review of book “Uncensored Russia” by Foreign
Affairs Editor David Floyd—February 24. -
Sunday Times (London), “Cheers from the Kremlin”, by William Shaw-
CrOSS—February 27.
B.B.C.—(Interview with Sunday Times correspondent William Shawcross,
in the Series “The World. This Weekend”)—February 27.
The Times (London), “The Voice We Cannot Afford to Stifle”, by Bernard
Levin—February 29.
Daily Mirror—(London), by Woodrow Wyatt—March 3.
The Times (London), “The World Tunes Into Bush House” by Richard
Davy—March 4.
Daily Telegraph (London), by Richard Beeston—March 7.
Daily Telegraph (London), “Communists Increase Broadcasts” by David
Floyd–March 8. -
The Tablet (London), “Europe Needs This Voice”—March 10.
Italy: -
Corriere della Sera (Milan), “The Voice that Comes from the West”—
March 22. -
Il Tempo (Rome), “Fulbright Fighting Against Short-Wave Stations: He
Wants to Suppress the American Radios for Communist Countries”—
March 30.
Netherlands:
Elseviers (Amsterdam), “Mr. Stikker Jumps Into the Breach for Radio
Free Europe Against Attacks by Senator Fulbright”—March 10.
N.R.C. Handelsblad (Rotterdam), “Radio Free Europe Seriously Threaten-
ed”, by Hands Hofland—March 11.
Het Parool (Amsterdam), “Opinion”—“Radio Free Europe Will Have
Monetary Worries After July”, by Victor Meier—March 23.
Sweden.:
Arbetet (Malimo), by Alvar Alsterdal—March 10.
Dagens Nyheter (Stockholm), by Lars Ake Berling—March 13.
Switzerland:
Neue Zuercher Zeitung (Zurich), “Fulbright Friends and Opponents in East.
Europe: the Controversy About the American Radio Stations in Munich”,
by Alexander KOrab–March 7.
Neue Zuercher Zeitung (Zurich), “The Future of Radio Free Europe and
Liberty: Senator Fulbright's Appeasement Policy”, by Ernest Kux-—
March 11. -
Der Bund (Berne), “A Window is to be Closed : Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty Fear for Their Existence”—March 9.
2eit Bild (Berne), Commentary by Christian Breugger—March 22.
Tages-Anzeiger (Zurich), “The Tug-Of-War Over American Foreign Aid De-
mands Unusual Sacrifices—Radio Free Europe Is To Serve as an Exam-
ple”, by Peter Studer—March 24.
T'diges-Anzeiger (Zurich), “Information for the East: Much Beloved and
Much Scolded Radio Free Europe”, by Adolf Baumann–March 24.
Finanz und Wirtschaft (Swiss Semi-Weekly), “Fateful Mistakes,” by Sal-
vador Madariago–March 29.
Neue Zuercher Zeitung (Zurich), “Moscow Upset About U.S. Stations in.
Munich. : Attacks. On Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe”—by E.
Grieser, Moscow Correspondent—March 31. -
Neue Zuercher Zeitung (Zurich), “Soviet Ukrainian Campaign Against the
Munich Stations—Praise for Senator Fulbright”—April 11.
t
16
NEGATIVE - -
All Strid :
Volksstimme (Austrian CP daily)—“The Role of Free Europe”—March 9.
Volksstimme (Austrian CP daily)—Article on espionage containing refer-
ence to Radio Free Europe—April 10.
Fraºce: . .
L'Humanite (French CP daily)—An item on continuation of RFE—
March 13. -
Germany:
Unsere Zeit (West German CP weekly)—“The Same Atmosphere Of Friend-
ship Among Nations Must Reign in Munich.”—February 18.
Unsere Zeit (West German CP weekly)—“Stations Disturb Munich Olym-
pics”—March 10.
Unsere Zeit (West German CP weekly)—Short item by Klaus Waller—
March 13. - -
Unsere Zeit (West German CP weekly)—“Worry About Munich Games”—
April 4.
Greaf Britai"). - -
New Statesman (London)—item in “London Diary”—March 3.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Stikker.
ANALOGY WITH EXCHANGE PROGRAM, QUESTIONED
Your analogy with the exchange program seems to me to be rather
unusual. All the exchange programs are by mutual agreement. Do
you have an agreement with the countries of Eastern Europe for the
conduct of these programs? - -
Dr. STIRRER. I couldn’t follow your question. -
The CHAIRMAN. I say, the exchange program is a mutual program
with the countries that participate. You mentioned Holland as one
of them. It is on the basis of mutual agreement; is it not? We don’t
send our scholars to Holland without your agreement. We negotiate
an executive agreement with your government; do we not?
Dr. STIKKER. When I was in the Government, when you sent those
people, we were only too happy to get them.
The CHAIRMAN. Didn’t you agree to receive them?
Dr. STIKKER. We naturally agreed. It was quite natural.
The CHAIRMAN. Do the countries of Eastern Europe agree to re-
ceive Radio Free Europe information? You call it uncensored infor-
mation. It is a Government radio, isn’t it? - -
... Dr. STIKKER. Yes, but they are sending out, equally, a lot of infor-
mation and a lot of things and there is no agreement here to receive
them. They don’t have an agreement in the United States to receive
all the information on their side. -
The CHAIRMAN. You used the analogy of the exchange program.
That is based upon a mutual agreement between the countries con-
cerned ; is it not ?
Dr. STIKKER. Yes, but
The CHAIRMAN. I don’t quite See the analogy when these people do
not quite agree to receive this information, which you say is so useful
to them. -
Dr. STIKKER. Well, now, I make another analogy and ask you,
does your country agree to receive all the information after the Mos-
cow meeting—which I appreciated very much and I was full of praise
for-which the Russians broadcast on that subject. When you follow
what has gone on in the press in Russia and the Eastern European
#7
countries since the meeting, you find them saying that the ideological
struggle will continue. That also is not based on an agreement.
The CHAIRMAN. That might be a proper analogy. I raise a ques-
tion of whether using the exchange program, which is based upon
mutual agreement, as an analogy is appropriate. If you wish to Say
the Russians are also seeking to influence opinion in Western Europe,
that is a proper analogy. I don’t know.
RUSSIANS DON'T HAVE RADIO FREE AMERICA
The Russians, so far as I know, do not have a Radio Free America.
At least I am not aware of it.
Dr. STIKKER. I don’t think they have a Radio Free America.
The CHAIRMAN. I don’t think they have.
FINANCING OF WEAC
Mr. Stikker, with regard to the Western European Advisory Com-
mittee, who finances that committee? Do the Europeans pay for that
committee”
Dr. STIKKER. We don't—we have only our costs of transportation
and when we go to Some meeting, but otherwise nobody has paid any
money for such a meeting. - - * ,
The CHAIRMAN. The GAO report to this committee states that the
Western European Advisory Committee costs for 1971 totaled $51,000,
of which $39,000 were charged directly to conference costs. That was
paid by the United States; wasn’t it? It was not paid by Western.
Europeans? - -
Dr. STIKKER. I think so, but when you look, for instance, at what
I have been doing lately, and I have been in constant contact now
with Munich and with the organization here in New York, practically
in daily contact, there is not anything in my mind that I should be
paid for that. It is only the costs of the telephone communications
and the costs of the journeys I have to make on behalf of this that is
being paid for, and you shouldn't forget that it has never been asked,
because that is the point that was impressed upon you, that Europe.
should participate in the cost of this whole enterprise. . . - -
Now, the problem has come up. All right. We are willing to accept.
that as a challenge and we will try to bring about a new system that
Furope—and I share your views, as I said in my statement—that the
time has come, but the time couldn’t come earlier because it was not.
certain how the U.S. Government was going to handle this problem.
The CHAIRMAN. I am not criticizing you, Mr. Stikker; I only
wish to make a record. The fact is that the GAO report states that
WEAC, as you call it, costs totaled $51,000 for 1971 of which $39,000.
was for conference costs, all of which was paid from U.S. funds.
Dr. STIKKER. I agree. - -
The CHAIRMAN. That is all the point I wish to make.
Dr. STIKKER. I agree.
TJ.S. PAYMENT OF SALARIES AND LICENSE FEES
The CHAIRMAN. I also wish the record to show, and I think you
confirm it, that in addition to the salary payment to European em-
18
ployees—most of the employees of Radio Free Europe are Europeans
I believe—we also pay license fees. We pay $15,350 as an annual license
to the Federal Republic of Germany. - .
Radio Free Europe in 1963 signed a 10-year agreement with Por-
tugal providing for $700,000 for the privilege of a license to use their
territory to broadcast. With the exception of certain pieces of equip-
ment, the facilities in Portugal are the property of and will revert
to the Portuguese Government.
Radio Liberty pays $285,000 annually to the Spanish Government
for a license to operate there. For its broadcasting from Taiwan, Radio
Liberty pays $16.50 per hour to the Government of Taiwan.
In the 1971 fiscal year this amounted to $144,000.
If it is so beneficial to everyone, it seems rather odd to me that they
charge us for the privilege of broadcasting from their territory. It
would seem the least they could do would be to allow us an opportunity
to conduct these without rather substantial payments.
Dr. STIKKER. Mr. Chairman, is this a question you asked me, be-
cause I would not like to be -
The CHAIRMAN. It is a statement. Is it not a correct statement?
Dr. STIKKER. I think it is correct. -
The CHAIRMAN. That is all. I wish to put it in the record.
Dr. STIKKER. May I make one remark about this?
I think it is a correct statement, although I haven’t got all these
figures and I never went into all these detailed figures, but an Ameri-
can operation, financed from America, is operating on European ter-
ritory, and if it were operating on European territory on the basis
of the commercial value, I think the figures would be completely dif-
ferent. So here is the side of Europe that they are willing—you started
this whole business in the United States—and they are willing to give
their land and make it possible to do this operation and I think that
is something which should be recognized also, to have the record quite
clear.
PURPOSE OF RADIOS
The CHAIRMAN. Of course, Dr. Stikker, I didn’t wish to imply
these were commercial operations. These Radios were started as a
part of the cold war. They are propaganda radios; their purpose was
to encourage the people of Eastern Europe to throw off their govern-
ment; was it not?
Dr. STIKKER. I don’t think so, because
The CHAIRMAN. What was the original purpose in 1951?
T}r. STIKKER. In 1951 I knew about it because I was Minister of For-
eign Affairs at that time in The Netherlands, in my own country, and
we were living in a time when Marshall aid was coming and helping us
to get out of our problems. That Marshall aid was intended originally
for the whole of Europe and not only for a part of Europe. It was
refused, for instance, Czechoslovakia would have been quite happy
to join. I was chairman of the committee to divide all the money
which was made available and, at that time, as I think the majority
in your country believed that it was necessary to have also these
Badios here.
Now, whether that was cold war or not—I think in the beginning
it was in a way cold war, but that has been changed completely. I
19
think some of the appointments in the beginning have been Wrong
and if you had asked my advice at that time I would have given some
advice about it. This did not happen, but it was an American operation
started in Europe and without much advice from the European coun:
tries. We were agreed that it should take place and that it could
play an important role because the only thing which is essential is
that the peoples of the two parts of the world begin to understand
each other. And I do not believe that it is possible to understand each
other when there is no contact whatsoever possible. If you were to
read in the press at the moment what the press on the site, the press
in Eastern Europe and the press in Russia—and I would be quite
happy to give you information on that—after the declarations which
have been agreed upon, you would be surprised to see how fierce the
struggle for the opinion of the people is still and I believe that what
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are doing is an essential
problem to bring the peoples together, to create a “one world” I have
been speaking about, and that is the only analogy I wanted to make
which is essential for the continuation and the creation of a peaceful
world. -
The CHAIRMAN. I merely wished to make that a part of the record.
The Radio Liberty Committee advised the GAO (General Account-
ing Office) that the purpose is “to actively influence and accelerate
internal trends in the U.S.S.R. in directions favorable to the interests
of the U.S. and the free world. Internal trends which can result in
limitations on Soviet interests in and ability to engage in outside ad-
ventures.” The whole statement will be put in the record. But whether
or not that is a proper purpose is subject to anyone's interpretation.
(The information referred to follows:)
Excerpt from “U.S. Government Monies Provided to Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty,’” Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States
Senate, by the Comptroller General of the United States, May 25, 1972.
RLC advised us in September 1971 that its mission was: “* * * to actively
influence and accelerate internal trends in the U.S.S.R. in directions favorable
to the interests of the U.S. and the free world. Internal trends which can result
in limitations on Soviet interests in and ability to engage in Outside adventures.
Trends which will change the power structure of the Soviet Government to
where a genuine detente with the U.S. becomes possible—a detente based. On the
best interests of the citizens of the U.S.S.R., as differing from a tactical detente
based. On Self-perpetuation interests Of the ruling elite.”
U.S. GRANTs, LOANS AND CREDITS TO weSTERN EUROPE
The CHAIRMAN. For the record the Secretary of State's foreign
policy report for 1971 provides the following data for government
grants, loans and credits to Western Europe: -
Grants are $31.7 million; loans and credits, $491.5 million; sales,
including Public Law 480 and military sales, $467.4 million, making
a total of $990.6 million, which is, of course, in addition to the cost of
Radio Free Europe and other costs of ours in connection with NATO.
BEARING RADIOS’ COSTS IN ADDITION TO OTHERS QUESTIONED
. The point I am trying to make, and I think this background mate-
rial is useful for those who consider it, is that I have no objection to
the Europeans continuing these radios if they think they are useful
20
to them. They are perfectly free to do so. I think the time has come
that the United States no longer should bear the costs of these radios in
addition to all the other costs that they are now bearing. That is only
a part of them that I mentioned.
MERGING RADIOS
Dr. Stikker, has your committee given any thought to merging the
two radio programs, that is, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe,
for the purpose of saving some money for the taxpayers of the United
States?
Dr. STIKKER. I do not think so, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Why not? -
Dr. STIKKER. It is a different region; it is a different part of the
world we are working on, and I think it is better that they be kept
Separate. -
The CHAIRMAN. For the record, the GAO reports as follows, and I
quote:
It appears that the cost of providing an uncensored news Service to the peoples
Of Eastern Europe and USSR could be reduced if these organizations were con-
solidated and if some or all of their activities were merged. Both organizations
have separate executive Offices and SOme programming offices in New York, N.Y.
In addition, both Organizations have extensive news-gathering operations and
radio studio operations located in Munich, Germany. -
It seems to me that they serve exactly the same purpose and in a very
closely allied geographical territory. The GAO seems to think if they
should be continued they ought to be merged in the interest of economy.
You do not think they should be? - -
Dr. STIKKER. I think if Europeans had to give advice on it, then
the advice from the European countries would be, in general, that it
should not be merged. -
ORIGINAL IMPRESSION OF RADIOS
The CHAIRMAN. Originally, of course, these radios were considered
by and presented to the public as being private operations by private
citizens, not governmental. Is that not the original image? The original
impression was created to the public generally that these were private
organizations. Is that not correct?
Dr. STIKKER. You mean in the old times?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, up until last year.
Dr. STIKKER. Nobody had the impression that it was completely
privately organized in Europe, maybe here—I can’t judge that—but
in Europe not. -
The CHAIRMAN. It was never admitted by our government until
last year that they were government financed. Is that not correct?
Did you not know that? -
Dr. STIKKER. I mentioned already that when I was asked to chair
this group of WEAC, I asked the information who is financing it,
and I was told largely by the government, partly by private contri-
butions, and that has been my understanding always right from the
beginning because it is an enormous operation that is taking place and
I cannot imagine that there is a possibility that private sources would
be able, for instance, in Europe, to contribute to such an extent that

21
this would be an operation that could be taken over by private
contributions.
The CHAIRMAN. Did they tell you which governmental agency
financed it? - -
Dr. STIKKER. No, sir; but it is in most countries there are—and it
was so in my time in my own—there are special funds from which
the government can take Some money. -
The CHAIRMAN. Did they not tell you when you took this position
that it was the Central Intelligence Agency’s financing?
Dr. STIKKER. I understood it was a governmental contribution that
was given, but I was not told that it was CIA.
The CHAIRMAN. They did not tell you?
Dr. STIKKER. Not that I have anything against CIA because at
the time I was working in NATO I have been working always in close
cooperation in many instances with CIA, but I was not told that it was
CIA.
The CHAIRMAN. They didn’t tell anybody else either; so you are
in the same position as the public.
PRESENT CAPABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF RADIOS’ PHYSICAL EQUIPMENT
Are you familiar with the present capability and effectiveness of the
physical equipment of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty? Are
they modern and up to date? -
Dr. STIKKER. I don’t think they are modern enough and I think it
would be a good thing if on the side of Europe we tried to make pri-
vate contributions to modernize the equipment because it is only with
modern equipment that you can really reach the people you would like
to reach. So there is another reason why I believe it is essential that
also Europe take part in the financial system of this whole operation;
but I do not believe that the equipment at the present moment is
modern enough. It is able to work; it is able to reach the people, but
it certainly could be improved. -
COST OF RADIOS PLANS FOR MODERNIZATION
The CHAIRMAN. For the record, the GAO report says that Radio
Free Europe has prepared a two-phase modernization program with
a total estimated cost of $17.5 million at current rates. In addition,
operating costs are expected to increase by $800,000 over the long term.
The reason for the modernization program is that, with out-of-date
facilities, Radio Free Europe is finding it increasingly difficult to com-
pete with other broadcasters.
The GAO report states that there are extensive plans to modernize
and replace the Radios’ present facilities. These are intended to up-
grade the Radios in their effort to compete with other radio stations
for listeners in the target countries.
Radio Liberty also has a modernization plan, the cost of which
could exceed $20 million.
So if they are to continue, apparently they are faced with almost $40
million—$37 million in costs for equipment—if they are to continue to
be modern.
22
ARE EUROPEANS PREPARED TO PICK UP MODERNIZATION COSTS 2
Are the Europeans prepared to pick up that cost? tº
Dr. STIKKER. Mr. Chairman, it is extremely difficult for me to dis-
cuss with you all these financial details because the GAO report has
never reached me. I don’t know for whatever reasons
The CHAIRMAN. Do you have access to any money in any case? What
could you do about it? You personally would like to do it, but you
can’t personally finance it. Who is going to pay for it, assuming you
wish them to do it? Do you think the governments of Western Europe
are going to pay for it? e
Dr. STIKKER. If we get sufficient support also on your side, Mr.
Chairman, because we consider it of extreme importance that the
United States is going to continue to make its contribution and then
we will have a full possibility to search for contributions, govern-
mental and private contributions in Europe.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any government in Europe that has
offered to pay anything for the support of these Radios ?
Dr. STIKKER. I know something about it, but it is all confidential
and I am not free to discuss that aspect.
URGING OF EIGHT BUNDESTAG DEPUTIES THAT RADIOS BE CLOSED
The CHAIRMAN. We had a recent news account of March 24 from
the Bonn Bureau of the Baltimore Sun, which reads as follows:
It says:
Bonn : Eight members of Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Socialist Party wired
President Nixon yesterday and urged that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty
be closed. The Bundestag deputies called upon the President to terminate United
States Government financing for the Munich-based radio stations by June 30 and
to make appropriate recommendations regarding closing the facilities to Congress.
Furthermore, the deputies said the mere existence of the U.S. controlled and
financed stations raises doubts about the Sovereignty of West Germany.
They also addressed Chancellor Brandt, urging him to support the termina-
tion of Operating licenses for the stations as Of the end of June.
I will put the entire article in the record simply to complete it.
(The information referred to follows:)
[From the Baltimore Sun, Mar. 24, 1972]
EIGHT IN BONN ASK END TO BROADCASTS
BONN.—Eight members of Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Social Democratic party
wired President Nixon yesterday and urged that Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty be closed. *. -
The Bundestag deputies called upon the President to terminate United States
government financing for the Munich-based radio stations by June 30 and to
make appropriate recommendations regarding closing the facilities to Congress.
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which beam their broadcasts to five
Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union, recently have come under
attack in Congress, where Senator J. William Fulbright (D., Ark.), chairman
Of the Foreign Relations Committee, has called them relics of the cold War.
“SOURCE OF OFFENSE”
The West German legislators said the stations are pursuing a realistic
information policy in contrast to the anti-Communist propaganda line of the
early post-war years, but they remain a “source of Offense” to Eastern European
governmentS.
Furthermore, the deputies said, the mere existence of the U.S.-controlled and
financed stations raises doubts about the sovereignty of West Germany.
23
They also addressed Chancellor Brandt, urging him to Support the termina-
tion of operating licenses for the stations as Of the end Of June.
NO OFFICIAL COMMENT
Commenting on the action, Conrad Ahlers, a Bonn spokesman, Said the im-
portance of the stations for the “free information of the population in the East
bloc” was well realized in Bonn. But the Brandt government also has to aSSure
that the further development of its contacts with Eastern Europe is not dis-
turbed by their activities.
Social Democrats in the Bundestag made no official comment On the tele-
gram, but the opposition Christian Democrats in Bonn ardently defended the
Stations.
The party's manager, Konrad Kraske, said in an interview that Radio Free
Europe's activities should be welcomed by all democrats, for the station helped
“all those who are defrauded of their freedom of Opinion and information by
the Communist system.”
SUPPORT OF GERMAN MEMBERS ON WEAC
Dr. STIKKER. May I then put into the record also, Mr. Chairman,
that on the committee of which I am chairman of WEAC there are
two German members at the present moment; one belongs to the CDU
Party in Germany and one belongs to the SPD Party and we had
the strongest support possible from both participants for a continua-
tion of this organization.
RFE's RELATIONS WITH ACADEMIC COMMUNITY
The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Stikker, what are the relations of Radio Free
Europe with the academic community ? Does it have any mutual inter-
est and how do they cooperate?
Dr. STIKKER. Let me explain to you, Mr. Chairman, that one of
the activities of Radio Free Europe is an enormous research depart-
ment, and I think it is the best research department, of what is hap-
pening in Eastern Europe, which exists in the world. We are willing
to help all those who are working in research, which means academic
circles or whatever circles they are and give them all our research docu-
mentation, and we make it available to them.
The CHAIRMAN. It is free of charge; isn’t it?
Dr. STIKKER. Not completely free of charge, but it is a very small
and minor charge we ask for. -
WHY DON'T EUROPEAN's PAY FOR RFE KNOWLEDGE AND RESEARCH 7
The CHAIRMAN. The GAO report states that Radio Free Europe
puts together a publication entitled “East Europe News.” It is a
monthly and it is sent upon request and free of charge to about 475
Scholars. In addition, RFE puts out research analysis reports which
have a worldwide distribution of about 800. All of that is very com-
mendable. The only question I raise again is what is the overriding in-
terest of the United States to pay for all of this? These are all laudable.
I do not criticize anyone who wishes to research that or anything else,
but I raise a question again. Why should the United States pay for it
if it is for the benefit of the scholars and information of the Europeans?
They have great respect for knowledge and research. Why don’t they
pay for it?
24
Dr. STIKKER. It is just as much benefit to the U.S. Scholars who ask
for that information as to Europeans and the charge we ask for it is
very low indeed.
The CHAIRMAN. The West Germans funded yesterday—and I have
applauded very much Willy Brandt—the Chancellor gave 10 million
marks to start a foundation of European studies of the Marshall plan.
Why doesn’t he give 10 million marks to support the Radio Free
Europe if he thinks it is so beneficial to everybody?
Dr. STIRRER. I am not responsible for Willy Brandt—
|Laughter.] -
Dr. STIKKER (continuing). And I consider, Mr. Chairman, that this
gift which has been made, and I thought it was very much larger
than the figure you mentioned, was an expression of gratitude for the
Marshall Plan aid and I think this is a tremendous action taken by
the German Government, and I go back in my own memory again
when I was Foreign Secretary of my own country and when we had
all the benefits of the Marshall aid for many years and I had been
working for it, for the moment to come when I could tell the United
States “We don’t need that aid any longer so please stop it.” I couldn’t
make it myself because it was 2 months after I had resigned that my
successor could make that statement.
That is the same feeling which exists at the present moment in
Europe. Europe is—we are most grateful for what the United States
has done, but we would like—and we must be on our own feet also—
and when an organization like this needs money because the United
States is going to change perhaps its system, then all right, then the
time has come, and I personally believe that the time has come; and
then we should make an effort to create some system in which there is
also a European contribution to the Radio Free Europe.
TJN CENSORED NEWS AND INFORMATION
... The CHAIRMAN. One last question: I notice you use in your state-
ment, and it occurs very often, that you broadcast uncensored news
and uncensored information. Is that not correct?
Dr. STIKKER. It is uncensored; that is true, but there is not any gov-
ernmental influence on what we send out.
The CHAIRMAN. Would you speak up a bit? I want to get this clear.
What did you say?
Dr. STIKKER. It is uncensored. The information we are sending out
in Radio Free Europe, there is no governmental influence on what we
are doing. Naturally we have discussed—it is like a formal paper. I
owned some papers myself for a certain period in my time and when
I talk with the editor and I ask, “What is your policy and what is it
going to be?” and then I gave him a free hand. I think that is the
Same way as it happened here.
The CHAIRMAN. It is a free press, you think?
Dr. STIKKER. It is a free press.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know any other example of a government-
run operation that is considered a free press and uncensored? Do you
have any other analogy that you can think of ? Do you consider Radio
Cairo a free press and uncensored?
Dr. STIKKER. No.
25
The CHAIRMAN. What is the difference between a radio run by the
Government of the United States and a radio run by the Government
of France or -
Dr. STIKKER. Well, the difference, to my mind, is the difference be-
tween the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe. The Voice of
America
The CHAIRMAN. They are both controlled and operated by the Gov-
ernment of the United States.
Dr. STIKKER. They are both financed by the United States.
The CHAIRMAN. That's right. .
Dr. STIKKER. But they are not both controlled by the United States.
The Voice of America brings the opinion of the U.S. Government;
Radio Free Europe is a free press.
The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Stikker, I wish you would elaborate a little bit.
Just how free is it, Doctor? Do you expect us to believe that it could
put out something that wasn’t approved by the Government of the
|United States? Do you really think we should believe that?
Dr. STIKKER. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, it is very Seldom in
my life that anybody doubted my words. Radio Free Europe is com-
pletely independent from governmental influence and I state it es:
pecially here. It is different from the Voice of America. The Voice of
America gives the policy of the United States. We are an independent,
free press and if it had not been an independent press, if it had news
distributors dependent on the United States, I would not have been
chairman of the committee to advise them of Western European
opinion. I hope you will believe me now.
INDEPENDENCE OF GOVERNMENT-FINANCED OPERATION QUESTIONED
The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me it is inherently inconsistent. I can't
imagine that they would allow the broadcast of information directly
contrary to the interests and polices of the United States. If so, I
would think the Congress would think certainly much longer about
financing it. I am sure the Congress is under the impression that these
broadcasts are consistent with our policies or we wouldn’t be spending
half a billion dollars to finance operations which were antagonistic to
the Government of the United States. If it is so, I am quite sure the
Congress has been under an illusion, including myself. I never heard
of any government financing an operation that is contrary to its
policies, if it knows it. Maybe we don’t know about it, but this would
seem to me to be, inherently, an inconsistency.
Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, if you could—
The CHAIRMAN. Let me finish. - . -
Could you cite any other example in your long experience in this
field, being Foreign Minister, in which a government has operated a
government radio or a government newspaper which carried policies
or statements inconsistent with that government? Could you think
of any other examples?
I will yield to the Senator from Illinois later. I know he is a very
avid advocate of Radio Free Europe and we all respect his views. He
will have his turn. -
Senator PERCY. The chairman has asked a very good, logical ques-
tion.
26
The CHAIRMAN. I would like Mr. Stikker's answer. I can get your
answer a little later, if you don’t mind. I would like to know if there
is any example. Can you cite any example of any other government
which has financed an informational program which is not consistent
and required to be consistent with its own policies?
Dr. STIKKER. First of all, I don’t think that what Radio Free
Europe is bringing is inconsistent with the policy of the United
States, but it is independently
The CHAIRMAN. Just coincidental, then? It is just a coincidence?
Dr. STIKKER. It is just as a free press and the people who are the
shareholders of the free press and there is a relationship to talk about
it and relive it to the
The CHAIRMAN. Did Radio Free Europe publish the Pentagon
Papers, after they picked them up from the New York Times, I
Suppose?
Dr. STIKKER. I think most certainly—
The CHAIRMAN. They didn’t
Dr. STIKKER. We talked about it to all the different countries to
which we sent out our information.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the Voice of America broadcasts un-
censored news? :
Dr. STIKKER. I would say that the Voice of America broadcasts
the opinion of the U.S. Government.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that uncensored news, in your opinion?
Dr. STIKKER. In a way it is censored. .
The CHAIRMAN. Is it censored or uncensored news in your view 2
Dr. STIKKER. What do you consider as being censored?
MEANING OF “UNCENSORED NEws”
The CHAIRMAN. I am asking you what you consider it. You used
the words “uncensored news” that they are putting out. What do you
mean by that? * {
Dr. STIKKER. Let me say it this way, then : I have been speaking,
once in another committee of your Senate; it was the Jackson com-
mittee and he asked me—also one of the Senators who was there:
“Do you think that it should be an independent organization and
should it be, for instance, controlled by the Senate?” I refused to
reply to that question because it is not up to me to give you informa-
tion how a bill—how a certain thing—because I am a foreigner; I
wouldn’t like to get mixed up in the policy of the Senate or in the
policy of the Government here. The only thing I said—I would like
to see it to remain independent as it is at the present moment, and
at the present moment Radio Free Europe is an independent, uninflu-
enced by Government, by CIA or whomever it is, an independent
expression of opinion, and we hope that we bring the truth. We check
it continuously. I read myself hundreds of documents every week to
try to find out what are they bringing, what is the real purpose of
it, what are we doing, and to my opinion—but it is a personal opinion,
naturally, and I don’t censor.
Sometimes I have a remark and I say, “Well, could you do it in
this way?” or “Is it possible to do it in a different way?” But it is up
to them who are sitting there how they look at the problem and we-
27
it is an independent press and I attach the greatest importance that
it should remain independent. That is the real purpose of the whole
system. -
INDEPENDENT, GOVERNMENT-SUPPORTED BROADCAST FACILITIES
The CHAIRMAN. You didn’t answer my question. Can you think of
any other independent, government-supported broadcast facilities?
Dr. STIKKER. I have got some in my mind at the present moment,
but why should we talk about these things at the present moment?
SENATOR PERCY. Mr. Chairman, would you yield on that?
I could give you two illustrations if you would be interested.
The CHAIRMAN. I will yield in a moment.
witness’ TESTIMONY BEFORE JACKSON COMMITTEE
Lastly, I didn’t understand. Did you say you have just testified be-
fore the Jackson committee? What committee is that?
Dr. STIKKER. Last year.
The CHAIRMAN. Last year?
Dr. STIKKER. Last year on international relations.
The CHAIRMAN. Not on Radio Free Europe?
Dr. STIKKER. And I made some remark—when you talk about in-
ternational relations, it came quite suddenly and I testified on different
problems and I gave some opinions also on Radio Free Europe.
WITNESS’ INFORMAL TALK WITH MORGAN COMMITTEE
The CHAIRMAN. Is that the only other occasion when you have been
here to support Radio Free Europe?
Dr. STIKKER. I talked in the beginning of this week in the House
with the Morgan committee. -
The CHAIRMAN. This week?
Dr. STIKKER. Informally; last week. It was on Thursday, I think.
DHD GENERAL CLAY REQUEST THAT WITNESS TESTIFY 2 .
The CHAIRMAN. Did General Clay request you come over to testify
before the Congress? -
... Dr. STIKKER. I suggested it myself and they were happy to support
it.
The CHAIRMAN. I will yield to Senator Sparkman or do you wish to
comment on that?
Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to be able to stay
long. I would like to get in a few questions, if I may.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. Senator Percy can give us examples on
his own time.
IS ANY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL CONNECTED WITH RADIO OPERATIONS
Senator SPARKMAN, Dr. Stikker, is there any U.S. Government of.
ficial connected with these Radio operations?
Dr. STIKKER. Not to my knowledge.
Senator SPARKMAN. Not on the staff?
Dr. STIKKER. No.
28
BOARD CONTROLLING RADIO's OPERATIONS
Senator SPARKMAN. Is there a board that controls the operations of
the Radios'
Dr. STIKKER. The only man who really controls the operation is
General Clay who is chairman of the board.
Senator SPARKMAN. There is a board that actually controls it. Is
that right?
Dr. STIKKER. There is a board, right.
Senator SPARKMAN. Are all the members U.S. citizens?
Dr. STIKKER. They are all U.S. citizens up until this moment.
Senator SPARKMAN. They are private individuals. They are not in
the government in any capacity?
Dr. STIKKER. As individuals.
THRUST OF WITNESSES’ STATEMENT CONCERNING FUTURE OPERATION
Senator SPARKMAN. As I understand the thrust of your Statement,
it is that this matter of future operation is being carefully studied,
not only by the committee that you head up but also by NATO, the
Council of Europe and perhaps other governments?
Dr. STIKKER. No, sir. My idea is that it should continue in the way
that it is at the present moment. When we can get support for this
from the Council of Europe or from the NATO Assembly, that is all
to the good. I don’t see anything against it, but it does not mean to say
that they should control it. There is a board and Lucius Clay is at the
present moment its chairman. In a way, I, as Chairman of the Western
European Advisory Committee, have perhaps a little bit to say also on
the policy of the whole business; some others may have; but it is mainly
that the directors, who have the function to run the business, that they
can ask for advice; they ask for advice and then we give it.
Senator SPARKMAN. President Nixon, I believe you pointed out, is
having a study made himself. I believe President Nixon said that this
Presidential Study Commission is supposed to render its report and
recommendations by February 28 of next year. It is your thought that
certainly it would be well to continue it as it is, wait for that recom-
mendation to come out to see if any changes should be made, and also
to take into consideration the fact that other organizations such as you
mentioned—the Council of Europe, NATO, the North Atlantic As-
sembly—are considering the possibility of helping support the pro-
gram. Is that right?
Dr. STIKKER. That’s right.
Senator SPARKMAN. But it would still be your view that in any event
it should be carried on as an independent organization, an uncensored,
free press. Is that correct?
Dr. STIKKER. That is correct.
Senator SPARKMAN. Without governmental control?
Dr. STIKKER. Correct.
Senator SPARKMAN. You make a distinction between governmental
support and governmental control. The financial support is what you
referred to ?
Dr. STIKKER. Yes.
29
RADIOS’ ROLE IF BETTER RELATIONS AND FREE COMMUNICATION
Senator SPARKMAN. This would be purely speculative, I suppose, but
let us assume that relations between the powers in Europe will im-
prove following the détente that is hopefully being established, not
only as a result of President Nixon's trip to Moscow, but also the
progress that has been made under Chancellor Brandt of West Ger-
many, the treaties that have been executed there. If there is an improve-
ment to the point that we do enjoy better relations and free communi;
cation, then we could consider whether or not to carry it on. Would
you say that would be true? d * -
Dr. STIKKER. You added one thing, sir, to which I attach the greatest
importance, that is, free communications. The moment free communi-
cations are possible, I don’t think there is any role to play whatever for
an organization like Radio Free Europe. -- e -
Senator SPARKMAN. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken?
DEFINITION OF “FREE” IN RADIO FREE EUROPE
Senator AIKEN. Dr. Stikker, what does the word “Free” stand for in
“Radio Free Europe”? Does it mean free the rest of Europe or free
news that goes over the station ? What does the word “Free” stand for?
Dr. STIKKER. Well, that, sir, is quite a problem to give a definition
of the word “Free.” Ithink freedom, which is one of the most important
things in the world, only exists when it is accompanied with responsi-
bility and tolerance. We get a little bit more in philosophical discus-
sion, but that is the way I would interpret the word “Free.” Once I
started a political party in Holland and I called it a Party of Freedom.
Senator AIKEN. I can’t understand you; maybe if you could get your
microphone closer we could all hear you better. • *
My question is, why is it called “Radio Free Europe”? For what does
the word “Free” stand primarily
Dr. STIKKER. Well, that all depends. I tried to explain what is the
meaning of the word “freedom.” - -
Senator AIKEN. Yes.
Dr. STIKKER. That is more or less a philosophical question.
Senator AIKEN. You mean freedom to broadcast the news as it is or
freedom for the Eastern European countries?
Dr. STIKKER. No; it is only the news as it is.
Senator AIKEN. There is no political purpose at all? -
Dr. STIKKER. It may have been at the beginning, but it is finished.
GREATEST WALUE FROM OPERATION
Senator AIKEN. Yes. If there is no political purpose, what is the
greatest value received from the operation of this system? -
Dr. STIKKER. We try to bring what we consider to be the truth, the
true picture, and we collect all the information from the countries con-
cerned to which we are -
Senator AIKEN. You don’t mean that there are no other radio stations
in that vicinity that broadcast the truth to Eastern Europe?
Dr. STIKKER. We think it is completely different because when we
listen, because we are monitoring all the radio stations in Eastern
79–237—72—5
30
Europe every day and we get all reports that are coming in from those
COuntries.
Senator AIKEN.Yes, but aren't there any other stations in Germany
or other countries?
Dr. STIKKER. There are stations—
Senator AIKEN. That broadcast?
Dr. STIKKER. Naturally there are other stations.
Senator AIKEN. News?
Dr. STIKKER. Yes, the Deutsche Welle.
Senator AIKEN. Italy, Greece?
Dr. STIKKER. No, not Greece, I wouldn’t think.
Senator AIKEN. I was wondering about that. Would you say, then,
that the greatest value received is from the knowledge that people of
Eastern Europe get news which they otherwise would not receive?
Dr. STIKKER. That is the fact.
ECONOMIC RETURNS
Senator AIKEN. Is there any economic value in this?
Dr. STIKKER. Economic value?
Senator AIKEN. Do we get any economic returns? -
Dr. STIKKER. I wouldn't Say that there is an immediate economic re-
turn, but the better the peoples understand each other the better it is
possible
p Senator AIKEN. We have been told in hearings that American
corporations, industries, have contributed considerably to the support
of Radio Free Europe, looking for business in the Eastern European
area. Do you think it has helped them get business?
Dr. STIKKER. It has helped to get business from the moment on that
a people in a country like Romania and Bulgaria begin to understand
what our way of life, our thinking is, and I know, for instance, my
own son was just shortly in Romania and started there a new business.
Well, these possibilities do exist and— -
Senator AIKEN. Western Europe is getting an increasing amount of
business from the Eastern European countries; aren’t they
Dr. STIKKER. It is increasing; there is no doubt about it.
Senator AIKEN. Particularly West Germany, I believe, has heavy
investments in Romania?
Dr. STIKKER. West Germany in Romania.
REASON WESTERN EUROPEAN CORPORATIONS DON'T CONTRIBUTE
Senator AIKEN. But you say that Western European corporations
and countries don’t make the contributions that the American corpora-
tions do because such contributions are not tax deductible. Is that
correct?
Dr. STIKKER. I Only Say that they don’t do it because they have
never been asked. You shouldn’t forget this has been started as a
purely American operation, an operation, an American operation, on
European territory. We were happy to receive them, but nobody has
ever asked for any European contributions.
Senator AIKEN. I see. We have been asked for a lot lately. I am sure
of that. -
31
Dr. STIKKER. Well, the moment has come and I believe that the time
has come that we should make our contribution from Europe, but that
takes time and we can only do it when we are certain that we also have
the support of the U.S. Government and the Congress.
Senator AIKEN. If contributions by the business interests of Western
Europe, which are pretty strong these days, were made tax deductible,
do you think those corporations would contribute?
Dr. STIKKER. It would be much easier, naturally.
Senator AIKEN. You don’t know for sure?
Dr. STIKKER. I don’t know for sure. We have to find that out.
Senator AIKEN. Do we have in the Western European countries many
tax deductible provisions in the law?
Dr. STIKKER. Frankly, no.
Senator AIKEN. You don't! Maybe we have gone too far. Sometimes
we have. [Laughter.]
TJNCENSORED NEWS BROADCAST BY REE
But Radio Free Europe broadcasts uncensored news. That is correct?
Dr. STIKKER. That is correct.
Senator AIKEN. Who selects the news?
Dr. STIKKER. That is the people on the spot. They know what is
going on in these countries; they study it and there is a board which
controls the operations. There is a board here in New York.
Senator AIKEN. I see. Ithink that is all I have now.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington?
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
EFFECT OF SALT PROGRESS ON NEED FOR REE -
Dr. Stikker, do you think that the successful progress in the SALT
talks lessens the need for Radio Free Europe? -
Dr. STIKKER. No, sir. I don’t think so.
Senator SYMINGTON. Does it increase it?
Dr. STIKKER. I think it is absolutely necessary we continue to have
the free exchange of opinion and that is something which Radio Free
Europe can do and nobody else can do. When we discussed this matter,
for instance, last week with our German colleagues on our committee,
they were-both of them—strongly in favor of continuation and they
said, “Well, what does it mean a détente, when the détente means only
less information about what is really happening in the world to the
peoples of Eastern countries in Europe?”
TIENGTH OF TIME WE SHOULD CONTINUE PROGRAM
Senator SYMINGTON. How long do you think we should continue
with this program? -
Dr. STIKKER. I think you can’t put a time limit on it; that is an im-
possibility because you can’t Say at a certain moment now communica-
tions are free enough and there is no reason any longer for the con-
tinuation of an operation which operates in the way that Radio Free
Europe operates. So it all depends on the psychological situation, on
the development of the relations between the peoples, not only the gov-
ernment, because we have real contact at the summit but we do not yet
have real contact between the peoples of these countries. The moment
32
that exists, I don’t believe there is any more need for an organization
like Radio Free Europe, and I think Radio Free Europe understands
itself and would like that moment to come because then it can turn to
other business. .
COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE IN WESTMENT
Senator SYMINGTON. I looked at the figures; and whereas it is gen-
erally considered that this is a private enterprise undertaking, the
government has put in over ten times as much money as any private
investors have. - -
Dr. STIKKER. Yes, that is true.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RFE AND USIA
Senator SYMINGTON. What is the basic difference between this group.
and the USIA% -
Dr. STIKKER. We are not Government-involved, Government-con-
trolled; it is not the money, but we don’t ask for instructions of the way
we should send out the information we have received; and I have the
impression that the Government here and the State Department and
the White House are quite favorable to the way we handle this prob-
lem, but there is nobody who tells us how we should handle it.
WHY PAY FOR UNCONTROLLED ORGANIZATION ?
Senator SYMINGTON. Suppose someone would say to a member of
the Senate, “We are putting up the money for the USIA and that
runs into hundreds of millions of dollars; and we are also putting up
the money for this organization, where there is no governmental con-
trol, but we taxpayers are paying for it to the tune of hundreds of
millions of dollars.” What is the answer you would give to that, es-
pecially as there is no participation whatever from the countries of
Europe? - * ,
Dr. STIKKER. The first thing is that I think there should be a par-
ticipation in Europe in this business but, again, only on the basis
that it remains an independent organization so we shouldn’t be a BBC
or a broadcasting system as it exists in Germany which is again under
the influence of the German policy. We should remain an independ-
ent organization, but there should be contributions for the financing
of the whole operation. - -
Senator SYMINGTON. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator from New York?
Senator JAVITs. I thank the Chair and, if Senator Percy will for-
give me, I have pressing business elsewhere.
COMMENDATION OF WITNESS
Dr. Stikker, first let me welcome you; you are a very eminent world
statesman and it is a distinct privilege to have you before us, which
is unusual, but understandable in this case. I am deeply gratified that
our chairman has seen fit to call you.
33
AGREEMENT WITH WITNESS
Also, I would like to express my agreement with you, that what has
|been interpreted as an abrasive criticism of this operation has only
been our chairman waking us up to the fact that the time has long
gone by when it should be a solely American venture. I am very
pleased to note your agreement with me. That is a distinct service for
us all.
I have watched these Radios from their inception and I agree with
you that there is a gray prison in satellite Europe and the Soviet
Union and that these Radios are essential voices. We have the testi-
mony of Nobel Prize winner Solzhenitzyn, who has said that it is
necessary for Soviet citizens to listen to Radio Liberty in order to
know what is happening in their own country. •
QUESTION Is WHO IS TO MAINTAIN OPERATION
Now, the question is, is it not, Dr. Stikker, who is to maintain this?
Correct? . -
Dr. STIKKER. Yes.
WITNESS’ BELIEF ABOUT WHAT AGENCY SHOULD BE
Senator JAVITs. You believe, however, that it should be an inter-
nationally autonomous agency without, necessarily, governmental
control even though governments would contribute; is that your
feeling?
Dr. STIKKER. Yes, sir; that is correct.
Is THERE ANY REASON EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS SHOULDN'T CONTRIBUTE 2
Senator JAVITs. Is there any reason why European governments
should not contribute?
Dr. STIKKER. I don't think so.
MIXED BOARD REPRESENTING GOVERNMENTS AND PRIVATE SECTOR
SUGGESTED
Senator JAVITs. And is there any reason why conceivably it might
be a mixed board representing governments and the private sector?
Dr. STIKKER. I would prefer that it remain independent.
Senator JAVITs. That is essentially private people?
Dr. STIKKER. Private people recognized for their good sense and
their understanding of all these problems and naturally when some-
thing goes wrong there is no reason to interfere. There has been a
period where that information was not handled in the right way; it is
finished and I don’t think it will ever come back to that system, dur-
ing what we called the cold war period; we have passed by that stage.
But from my opinion, from my experience, what I have seen in this
organization—and I have worked with it several years; I visited it
many times and I think it handles the problem in an excellent way,
and if I have an opportunity to pay a tribute to the staff, which is

doing the business at the present moment, I would like to have it on
record here the way it has handled this business, in my opinion, is
absolutely perfect.
GOVERNMENT FINANCING AND ADMINISTRATION BY PRIVATE CITIZENS
Senator JAVITs. You see no inconsistency, however, between gov-
ernment financing and the administration by private citizens who are
not representing governments? They are all nationals of Some country
but not representing governments? -
Dr. STIKKER. No, I think the way it has been handled at the present
moment is the best way it could be handled; but, naturally, I would
not like to interfere in the way you have to make up your decisions
how they should be handled because I, as a foreigner, I shouldn’t
interfere in a bill for appropriations here at the present moment.
When you ask me the question, then I fully believe that an independ-
ent organization to which all the governments, the U.S. and European
governments and private enterprise and private contributors, should
pay their contributions, that that is the best way to handle it and leave
it in the hands of the people who run the business at the present
moment in such an excellent way.
CARRYING ON ACTIVITY BY UNITED STATES MOMENTARILY
Senator JAVITs. Nonetheless, Dr. Stikker, you are certainly imply-
ing that this activity should be carried on, if necessary, momentarily
by the United States alone, as we have carried it on for so long, to give
an opportunity to other countries and individuals to participate in its
financing. Is that what you mean to tell us?
Dr. STIKKER. That is what I mean at the present time and we
would like to make an effort in that sense, and we hope, strongly, that
we can get the support of the U.S. Government and of Congress so
that we can start, because, don’t forget, up to now it has been purely
an American organization, but that we can start exploring the field
in how far it is possible to get support, financial support, from gov-
ernments and private enterprise and private persons in Europe.
IMPOSSIBILITY OF MAIKING TRANSITION WITHOUT U.S. SUPEPORT
Senator JAVITs. In your prepared statement you say, “On the basis
of experience in similar work in other organizations, I believe it will
take at least a year to carry out such a program.”
To wit, what you have just testified to respecting Europeans and
European governments, am I correct in saying that you feel that really
unless we support it for a year it is impossible to make the transition?
Dr. STIKKER. It is definitely impossible to start because how can
you go to a government and to people if it is a question of, “Well, we
haven’t even got the support from the United States,” or the U.S.
º or the Senate or whoever it is, but we can’t proceed on such
8, 98 SIS.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY
Senator JAVITs. Now, the Council of Europe is not the organization
which is the parlimentary representative of the European economic
community; is it?
35
Dr. STIKKER. I agree. -
Senator JAVITs. So the Council of Europe has no plenary authority
or source of funding except from the contributions of governments;
is that correct?
Dr. STIKKER. Yes.
Senator JAVITs. The same is true of the North Atlantic Assembly?
Dr. STIKKER. The same is true of the North Atlantic Assembly, but
they have influence within their parliaments and in that way they can
influence the government to make a contribution.
Senator JAVITs. In addition, I have the honor to chair a special
Committee of Nine of the North Atlantic Assembly to appraise the
future of NATO. If I have anything to do with it, I would hope that
this question will be a subject also of a recommendation by the Com-
mittee of Nine so as to help that process.
Dr. STIKKER. Ivery much hope so.
OBLIGATION OF EUROPEANS TO SEE YEAR IS NOT WASTED
Senator JAVITs. Tr. Stikker, I agree with you; I think that we ought
to carry it on for the year and give Europe the opportunity; but I
would like to emphasize that if we do that there will be a real obliga-
tion on the part of Europeans like yourself and other leaders, Jean
Monnet and others, to see that this year is not wasted and that the
collaborative effort which is called for is forthcoming. For I believe,
as our chairman has emphasized, that the time has come to make this
an Atlantic community enterprise and no longer solely a U.S. enter-
prise. Would you agree with that?
Dr. STIRRER. I agree with that and the moment you have made up
your mind, you have taken a decision, we can start on our side and
we are looking forward to being able to do so.
Senator JAVITs. Thank you very much. I thank Senator Percy for
his indulgence. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy?
BBC AND U.S. PUBLIC BROADCAST SERVICE
Senator PERCY. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I think I would like to start
with the questions you asked on whether there is any other govern-
ment that actually pays for broadcasts, underwrites the costs, but does
not use the broadcasts for propaganda purposes, if that is the proper
phrasing of your question.
I think BBC—I am not familiar with how BCC is financed, but
it has no commercials—must be underwritten by the government, and
I think it is highly respected in radio and TV journalism. Never at
any time I have ever appeared on it have there been the slightest
restraints of any kind as to what I could say, and I have said some
highly critical things of the British Government.
In our own case, last year we funded the Public Broadcast Service
at the level of $35 million. This is the U.S. Government appropriating
$35 million for educational television in America. Yet, I have never
heard the slightest doubt or insinuation that there ever was any gov-
ernmental control of public broadcasting. I can’t imagine anyone in
the Nixon administration going and telling Edward P. Morgan, who
was news director for a number of years, what to say and what not
36
to say. In fact, there is a feeling by the administration, and I have
heard it expressed, that PBS is far too liberal, that it does not repre-
sent a cross section of opinion. PBS has been highly critical of the
administration and yet we have appropriated that money. -
APPROPRIATIN G MONEY FOR AND CRITICAL BROADCASTING BY RADIOs
I could make a very strong case that it is in the interest of the
United States to have U.S. money appropriated for Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty and have material broadcast which is
critical of the administration or critical of the United States, if only
to establish the credibility of the stations. We have no mission other
than to get information on what is going on in the world to millions
of people who are denied this information, and I feel certain that
Radio Free Europe has reported the failures in our space program,
that we have had deaths, as a result of those failures, and that two of
the President's Supreme Court appointments were turned down by
the Senate of the United States. I think the record is very clear in
that regard. - -
- SOVIET RELIANCE ON RADIO PROPAGANDA
I would like to ask about the Soviet Union and their view of radio.
From all indications, they seem to consider international radio broad-
casts very important. In addition to Radio Moscow, the Soviets have
Radio Peace and Progress and these stations—especially Radio Mos-
cow—beam broadcasts around the world. The broadcasts are espe-
cially heavy to Western Europe.
I understand that Radio Moscow even beams Ukrainian programs
to North America. -
Why, in your judgment, do the Soviets rely so much on radio
propaganda? -
Dr. STIKKER. I didn’t quite get your point, Senator Percy,
because -
Senator PERCY. If it is not in our interest to support Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty, why does the Soviet Union rely so heavily
on broadcasts around the world by Radio Moscow and Radio Peace
and Progress, even to the point where they broadcast programs in
|Ukrainian to North America, to get their message across? Why do
you think this is in their national interest?
Dr. STIKKER. Because they want to have their opinions just as much
known in the rest of the world as we would like to have our opinions
known in their part of the world. I am not so much aware of the work
of Radio Liberty as I am of the work of Radio Free Europe, for Radio
Liberty has no advisory committee and it has no European group of
people who talk to them.
But, I think, the essential point is what you said earlier, that we
must have a possibility to have communications between the different
peoples, and if they believe that they must have their form of com-
munication with North America, all right. I know for certain that also
several of the governmental authorities in Eastern European coun-
tries are listening to what we are broadcasting at the present moment
and, in a way, they are influenced and they know, and they are aware
of what is going on on our side of the world. That is the only reason
we want to continue with our business until the moment comes that
37
there is a free exchange of communication and of persons so that we
don’t need it any longer. That is all that we are asking for.
I hope I answered your question, but I was not quite certain.
BROADCASTING CONCERNING PRESIDENT’s TRIP TO PEKING
Senator PERCY. I understand that the 300 million people of the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were given only a 20 Second an-
nouncement about the President’s trip to Peking. Radio Free Europe
and Radio Liberty gave a full understanding and explanation of the
trip. Do you think it is important that 300 million people be advised
of the historic trip of the President of the United States to Peking and
why was Moscow trying to keep this information from their people
and jamming your broadcasts?
Dr. STIKKER. From what I have seen of this broadcasting from
Moscow, and I receive every week I don’t know how many papers
of the broadcasting system we have, it was not only that it was very
short, but it was not always correct, also. That makes it even more
necessary that from other sources the information can go to these
people. We know that of the 85 million people who are living in
Eastern Europe we have at least a number of people—I would say 30
million people—who are listening to our information and we also know
that when the jamming becomes stronger, when it is more difficult to
listen to, the amount of people who are listening increases because the
people have the feeling “Now there is Something going on we should
not hear at the present moment.” That, to us, is proof the people's
opinion in those countries—and we are concerned about the opinion of
the people.
We accept completely the fact there is a beginning of a détente at the
Summit and there is a possibility to understand each other at the sum-
mit, but the peoples have not had a chance to understand each other,
that is the main point, sir, and we know that there is an appreciable,
a very definite interest in a continuation of the information we are
able to—in an objective way—we never use any vituperation in our
expressions—we try to be as calm and as easy in our way of expression;
we don’t attack and that is the way people appreciate it also in that
part of the world. And Senator Javits already mentioned that the
Nobel prizewinner, Solzhenitsyn—there are many more who always
come out with these statements and I could give you a pile of docu-
mentation of how much this is appreciated in those countries, that
we try to give them the information they need and they want.
RFE's RELATIONSHIP To FURTHER DíTENTE witH SoviFT TNION
Senator PERCY. Senator Fulbright has raised very pertinent ques-
tions with respect to Radio Free Europe. First, what its relationship
would be to further détente with the Soviet Union, and I think my-
Self that it would be a matter of grave concern if the nature of the
broadcasts were such that it might endanger our ability to carry on
the détente.
Do you think that Radio Free Europe in any way does damage
to the efforts of the West for further détente with the Eastern bloc?
Dr. STIKKER. It all depends on what you understand on the détente.
79–237—72 6
38
If you believe a détente is already there, when it is only at the very top,
the Summit, that people can talk and can understand each other, that is
not what we understand on a détente. The détente is really there when
the peoples of the different countries are beginning to understand each
other and are willing to cooperate.
But when we see at the present moment that the whole purpose of
the declaration of principles which has been decided on May 29 be-
tween the United States and the U.S.S.R., that the whole purpose of
it is that the ideological struggle has to go on, and when you listen
at the present moment and if you were to listen to what has been sent
out, and I have here a paper of about 20 stations, 20 papers, 30 even,
that underlines this aspect, that the struggle against imperialism
which means to say anti-Americanism, or the ideological struggle has
to continue just in any way, you see it from Bulgaria, from Romania;
you see it from all these countries and from Moscow.
I could give you many quotes at the present moment; then I do not
consider that that is already a real détente. The détente is there when
they are beginning to understand each other.
Nobody wants more a détente than I do. I have always been working
for it and if we can achieve that, then I think the moment has come
and I would be very happy that that moment came, that Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty could disappear completely and then there
is a free exchange of opinion and persons between the different coun-
tries. That is the essential point.
CHANCELLOR BRANDT’s REFUSAL TO RESTRICT RFE BROADCASTs
Senator PERCY. In recent times the Federal Republic of Germany
has been asked by the Soviet Union to restrict or end Radio Free
Europe broadcasts from German soil. But Chancellor Brandt has
refused to do this. Do you think this refusal on his part has in any
way hindered Brandt’s efforts for détente with the Soviet Union and
the other nations of Eastern Europe? -
Dr. STIKKER. No, sir; I don’t think so, that it has hindered in any
way the negotiations. Russian negotiators are very matter of fact and
if they want to obtain something and they have obtained it, well, all
right, they forget about other things they might want also. But a
unilateral détente on our side by stopping this information which is
given to the peoples of these countries would be, to my mind, some-
thing definitely wrong.
WITNESS’ EXPERIENCES witHI FOREIGN BROADCASTING DURING
WORLD WAR II
Senator PERCY. Dr. Stikker, because of the unique background that
you have had, could you describe in any greater detail your own
experiences when, during World War II, you lived in occupied Hol-
land? How much did you listen to foreign broadcasting during that
period? What did the broadcasts mean to you and why did so many
Europeans take the risk of listening to Western broadcasts in those
davs?
}. STIRKER. I listened at that time of day twice, and you had to
do it in secret, because we had at the end of the war, we had no elec-
39
tricity anymore. So I had to devise a new system that I could bring
over the canals where I was living, some sort of electricity that I
could listen to it. When I had heard the information I had to go to
different places and explain to people what was going on. This whole
business of the radio was the only source of information and in our
darkest situation, at the moment when we were absolutely depressed,
when people were killed and when my sons were imprisoned, when
all those things happened, this was the basis which made us survive
and made us continue to hope for a change.
EASTERN EUROPEANs’ FEELING OF ISOLATION AND DESTRE FOR
INFORMATION
Senator PERCY. Can you draw an analogy between your personal
situation in World War II and that of the people in Eastern Europe
today? Do you think they have that same feeling of isolation and
desire for information and knowledge of what is going on in the
World?
Dr. STIKKER. I think they have. I saw one report not long ago
which explains that when, for instance, the jamming increased in a
certain spot there were always places where there was little jamming:
so everybody went to those places where there was little jamming,
to be able to understand what was going on in the world because
the people don’t know what is going on in their own country; they
don’t know what is going on in their own country. They don’t know
about what was happening in China and I don’t think they absolutely
knew what was going on in Moscow.
EASTERN EUROPEANs' REACTION II" RFE WERE SUIDDEN LY CLOSED DOWN
Senator PERCY. What would be the reaction of the people of East-
ern Europe if suddenly today Radio Free Europe were closed down?
What impact would it have on them?
Dr. STIKKER. The psychological impact would be, to my mind,
tremendous. They would lose hope, not hope for a freedom in their
own way, but they would lose psychologically every hope that there
would be for freedom for themselves in some way or other. That is
the basic problem for them, not that we would want to change the
economic or their ideological system, but these people should under-
stand what is happening in this world. They don’t know it anymore;
they lose confidence in the future and it is that confidence in the
future which is essential for many people in the world, just as it was
so essential for us in the war years.
EFFECT OF CLOSING STATIONS ON DíTENTE
Senator PERCY. If we did close the stations down, obviously some
money would be saved, but can you see that there would be any advan-
tage to us in our ability to accelerate our détente with Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union? Is there any reason to believe that, for in-
stance, if we closed ours down, the Soviet Union would decide to
close down their own broadcasts to the world?
40
Dr. STIKKER. Well, I can only quote what has been now said in
Some of the Soviet press after the declaration of principles which was
concluded and when I see it here:
It is necessary to wage an irrecOncilable Struggle in the future against the
aggressive imperialist forces.
Maintaining endurance and high vigilance, the Soviet Union is pursuing a
resolute anti-imperialist course on the international scene, consistently and
firmly defending the interests of socialism, the freedom of peoples and the cause
Of international peace.
The international struggle will go on. Whatever you do, if you
close these radios this struggle will continue and this is now a paper
of May 29 or May 30, and you see the same words are being expressed
again in Radio Moscow and in Nepszabadsag, Radio Bratislava and
Radio Hvezda, Radio Kossuth and in Trybuna Luda, Den Morgen,
and it goes all over the world, and to close down at the present mo-
ment would be an indication to their side, to them, that we are giving
up. It is a unilateral position we accept and we will not get back from
them in exchange.
SHARING OF COSTS
Senator PERCY. Dr. Stikker, I would lastly like to comment on
Senator Fulbright's feeling that there should be a sharing of the
costs.
I have concurred 100 percent with him in this, even though I am
a strong supporter of Radio Free Europe. I feel that the time has
long since passed when the United States should underwrite the total
cost of projects which are done in the mutual interest of Western
Europe and the United States. I can assure you that these programs
will be endangered if there isn’t a sharing of the costs.
Now, as I understand it from your testimony, there is strong support
by members of government, by journalists, by practically everyone
in Western Europe, for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Now,
I think that actions would speak louder than words. I was shocked to
find that our Government has not been steadily asking for burden
sharing in this area, and I think Senator Fulbright has done a great
service in stressing this. I regret it is going to take a year, but it will
help a great deal if the Governments of Europe will back up their
enthusiasm with support. If the journalists over there who are so uni-
versally supporting the Radios will encourage contributions and, if
necessary, changes in law to give tax deductibility for corporate con-
tributions, and foundations will help, this would certainly take the
pressure off here. - -
wheTHER RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY ARE CARRYING ON
COLD WAR
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to insert into the
record of these hearings part of a summary I have made from the
excellent study that the Congressional Research Service carried on at
your direction. :
It would be a direct answer to your question as to whether Radio
Free Europe and Radio Liberty are carrying on the cold war now.
In the Radio Free Europe audit that was made by Mr. James Price,
he shows that in the early 1950's, the change was made to liberaliza-
41
tion and that they at no time ever tried to encourage the overthrow of
government or imply—even imply—that there could be any kind of
support from any Western countries for it. And I ask unanimous
consent that part of my summary be included in the record at this
point. º
The CHAIRMAN. I have no objection to it. We put the entire study in
the Congressional Record already, as you know.
Senator PERCY. I think the extract is pertinent to these hearings, be-
cause we did not have as full an answer as I think can be provided by
the independent audit.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, of course, if the Senator wishes,
it will be put in. In connection with that, I will insert a biographical
résumé of the author, which shows, among other things, that he is a
former employee of the CIA. I will put his biographical record in as
part of your insertion. [Laughter.]
(The information referred to follows:)
ExCERPT FROM A STATEMENT BY SENATOR CHARLES H. PERCY, CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD–SENATE, MARCH 17, 1972, PAGE S4080
RL and RFE came into existence in the early 1950's, at the height of the cold
war. However, there is evidence, as Mr. Price writes, that as early as 1952, RFE
policymakers had become wary of the “liberation” approach. During the discussion
of “containment” versus “liberation” at the time of the 1952 presidential cam-
paign, RFE issued a special guidance for broadcasts on “liberation” which said,
and I quote :
“Not One word in these Statements (on liberation) can be used to encourage
militant anti-communists to go over from passive to active resistance in the
exception that such resistance will be supported by Western elements.”
Already in 1953, the report says, after the abortive uprising in East Berlin
following Stalin’s death, RFE switched from being an exponent of “liberation”
to “liberalization” instead. During the Poznan riots in Poland in June 1956, the
report Says :
“RFE conducted its Operation in a manner that received virtually no criticism
from responsible Observers.”
There were criticisms of RFE. Hungarian broadcasts during the Hungarian
Uprising later that year. According to the report:
“The Western German Government reviewed all of the tapes of broadcasts
from RFE to Hungary during the period in question and concluded that there
had been no incitement and no promises Of Western aid to the rebels. Adenauer
added, however, that SOme Of the broadcasts had contained ‘remarks Subject to
misinterpretation.’”
RFE took the criticism, mild as it was, Very seriously, instituting appropriate
changes in both policy and perSOnnel. The report documents the evidence that
its broadcasts were models of restraint during the Czechoslovak events of 1968
and the WOrkers’ riots in the Baltic cities Of Poland late in 1970. Mr. Price Sums
up the current view at RFE as follows:
“Here at Radio Free Europe there are no illusions about Sudden changes in
governmental forms in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union has convincingly demon-
strated, mOst l'ecently in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, that there continue to be limits
to what will be tolerated. Communist regimes are likely to remain in power for
the foreseeable future regardless of the Wishes Of the East Europeans. But the
pace of change in today’s World Will not bypass East Europe and modifications are
taking place. Thus, within the framework of the Communist system, positive
evolution can be encouraged, and we try to do this. At the same time, we try to
discourage actions which could intensify trends toward greater repression.”
R£SUME OF JAMES ROBERT PRICE
James Robert Price, presently a member of the Foreign Affairs Division, Con-
gressional Research Service, Library of Congress, was born on January 3, 1927,
in MOntgomery, Alabama, and educated in the public schools there and at the
42
University Of Alabama and the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced
International Studies. He holds a bachelor's degree in political Science and his-
tory from the University Of Alabama (1949) and a master’s degree from Johns
Hopkins (1950). His academic record won him membership in Phi Beta Kappa.
From 1950–57, he was employed by the U.S. Department of State and the
Central Intelligence Agency. He served on the Indonesian Desk until October
1951. From October 1951 through November 1953, he was assigned as Vice Consul
at the American Embassy, Djakarta, Indonesia. His duties included political and
economic reporting, as well as administrative Supervision of local Chinese and
Indonesian employees. He then return to the Indonesian Desk in Washington.
In addition to his other duties, he served on the Indonesian Working group of
the National Security Council's Operations Coordinating Board.
In March 1957, he was assigned to Madrid, Spain, as general assistant to the
president of Jani’at al Islam, Inc., Mr. Ahmad Kamal, and to Superwise and
develop relationships between the Moslem foundation and all non-Moslem govern-
mental and private organizations. He traveled extensively in Europe, North
Africa, and the Middle East, conducting negotiations with private, governmental,
and United Nations agencies relative to the establishment of programs for
refugee relief and rehabilitation in Austria, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon,
Syria, Iran, and the United Arab Republic. He Supervised negotiation of con-
tracts between Jami’at al Islam, Inc. and the U.S. Department of State and the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
In May of 1959, he was transferred from Europe to Washington, D.C., to serve
as the foundation’s representative On the Eastern coast Of the United States.
His duties included the supervision of contractual relationships with the U.S.
Government, maintenance Of liaison with the Moslem diplomatic corps in Wash-
ington and New York, and general liaison with legislative and executive branches
Of the U.S. GOvernment. -
From 1957 through December of 1962, he was Washington, D.C. Representa-
tive and Executive Director, Jami’at al Islam, Inc., P.O. Box 347, San Francisco,
California. (An international Moslem humanitarian and educational foundation.)
From December 1962, to October 1970, he was Manager, Cultural Information
Analysis Center, Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS) of the Amer-
ican Institutes for Research, Kensington, Maryland, where he was responsible
for the development, administration, and Supervision of an Organization of 29
professional Social science research and information specialists and related
Support personnel. The Organization developed and maintained an information
Storage and retrieval activity in the fields Of CrOS-cultural information and Com-
munication and internal defense and development. CINFAC also provided a rapid
response information analysis service to government agencies and to private re-
Search and academic Organizations performing government-sponsored work.
Mr. Price also served as cochairman of a social science research team preparing
an intercultural communications study of the Republic of Vietnam.
From October 1970 to April 1971, he was technical director, National Media
Analysis, Inc., 1875 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. National Media
Analysis provides, for a private clientele, research reports on public opinion in the
United States. As is implied by its name, National Media Analysis reports are
based upon a Specialized Content analysis of U.S. mass media according to tech-
niques developed in collaboration with the late Dr. Paul M. A. Linebarger of the
Johns Hopkins University. Mr. Price has served as a Consultant Technical Direc-
tor Of this firm since 1960 and continues to serve in this capacity on a part-time
basis.
Mr. Price was appointed an analyst in National Defense, Congressional Re-
search Service, Library of Congress, in April of 1971.
Some of Mr. Price’s published studies are the following:
1. “Algeria (1954–1962),” in Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict (by
D. M. Condit, et al.). Cress, 1968.
2. Attitudes of Selected Audiences in the Republic of Vietnam (U) (S) (with
W. C. Manee and C. B. Brooks). Cress, 1966.
3. Cress Research on Vietnam : A bibliographic Essay (with Skaidrite Fallah),
Cress, 1968.
4. Giving Credit to the Republic of Vietnam (U) (C). Cress, 1964.
5. Intercultural Communications Guide for the Republic of Vietnam (U) (C)
(with F. A. Munson, et al.). Cress, 1967.
6. Irrigation as a Factor in the Economic Development of Thailand. Cress, 1964.
7. Research Notes on Communist Strategy and Tactics in Negotiating Situa-
tions (J. R. Price, et al.). Cress, 1968. -
43
S. Witchcraft. Sorcery, Magic, and Other Psychological Phenomena and Their
Implication on Military and Paramilitary Operations in the Congo (coauthor,
with Paul A. Jureidini). Cress, 1964. -
His linguistic attainments are a fair knowledge of Spoken Japanese and of
written and spoken Spanish, and an acquaintance With Indonesian Malay.
Senator PERCY. I think he is recognized as a Scholar.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
COMMENDATION OF STUDY.
Senator PERCY. I know the chairman has some questions that have
been raised about the study that was made, but I commend him for
having the study made and for even raising further questions about it.
But I think that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are going to
stand the scrutiny, from all the record I have pored through, of any
kind of audit that is made. It is an outstanding and commendable
operation, and Ithink we can be very proud of it.
STUDY AUTHORED BY MIR. PRICE FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The CHAIRMAN. For the record, it is also called to my attention,
that Mr. Price was the author some time ago of a highly reputable
study for the Department of Defense, entitled “Witchcraft, Sorcery,
Magic, and Other Psychological Phenomena and Their Implications
on Military and Paramilitary Operations in the Congo.” This matter
was discussed on the Senate floor.
That is a very interesting study we explored on the floor of the
Senate as a justification for the research program of the Department
of Defense all around the world. He has had quite a long experience
in this general area.
Senator PERCY. I say he is a Scholar.
The CHAIRMAN. He is a Scholar; so the biography will go in as a part
of your insertion.
PEOPLE
RESPONSIBLE FOR OPERATION
I also wish to put in the record a list of the Board of Trustees of
Radio Liberty Committee, the officers and executive committee of
Free Europe, Incorporated, and the Board of Directors of Radio Free
Europe Fund, Incorporated, which gives some idea of the distinction
and interest of the people who have been responsible for the operation.
(The information referred to follows:)
RADIO IIIBERTY COMMITTEE–BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Mrs. Oscar Ahlgren, former President, Henry V. Poor, Attorney
General Federation of Women’s Clubs
John R. Burton, Chairman Of the Board,
National Bank Of Far ROCka Way
Honorable Charles Edison, former
GOverl) Or of New Jersey
J. Peter Grace, president, W. R. Grace
& Company
Allen Grover, vice president, Time-Life,
Inc.
General Alfred M. Gruenther, former
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
H. J. Heinz II, Chairman Of the board,
H. J. Heinz Company
Isaac Don Levine, author, editor, and
specialist on Soviet Affairs
Howland H. Sargeant, president, Radio
Liberty Committee
Whitney North Seymour, past presi-
dent, American Bar Association,
partner of Simpson, Thatcher &
Bartlett
John W. Studebaker, vice president and
chairman . Of the board, Scholastic
Magazines, Inc.
Reginald T. Townsend, former vice
president, Radio Liberty Committee
William L. White, editor and publisher,
EnvipOria Gd26tte
Philip H. Willkie, attorney
44
FREE EUROPE, INC.
OFFICERS
General Lucius D. Clay, chairman of
the board
The Honorable John C. Hughes, honor-
ary chairman of the board
Mr. William P. Durkee, president
The Honorable Eli Whitney Debevoise,
chairman of the executive committee
ExECUTIVE COMMITTEE
The Honorable Eli Whitney Debevoise, Chairman
Mr. William P. Durkee
The Honorable Ernest Gross
The Honorable John C. Hughes
RADIO FREE EUROPE FUND, INC.
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Mr. Eugene N. Beesley, chairman, Eli
Lilly & Co., 740 South Alabama St.,
Indianapolis, Ind.
General Lucius D. Clay, Lehman Broth-
ers, One William St., New York, N.Y.
Mr. Winthrop Murray Crane, 3rd, Vice-
president and secretary, Crane & Co.,
Inc., Dalton, Mass.
The Honorable Eli Whitney Debevoise,
Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons & Gates,
320 Park Ave., New York, N.Y.
Mr. William P. Durkee, president, Free
Europe, Inc., 2 Park Ave., New York,
N.Y.
The Honorable Ernest A. Gross, Curtis,
Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, 100
Wall St., New York, N.Y.
Mr. Michael L. Haider, Room 1250, One
Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N.Y.
Mr. John D. Harper, chairman, Alumi-
num Co. of America, 1501 Alcoa
Bldg., Pittsburgh, Pa.
The Honorable John C. Hughes, ROOIn
1223, 230 Park Ave., New York, N.Y.
Mr. Roy E. Larsen, vice-chairman, Time
Inc., Time and Life Bldg., Rockefeller
Center, New York, N.Y.
The Honorable Neil H. McElroy, Chair-
Ralph E. Walter, vice-president, Europe
Mr. Bernard Yarrow, senior Vice-presi-
dent
Mr. J. Allen Hovey, Jr., vice president
and Secretary
Mr. Eugene O’Brien, treasurer
Mr. H. Gregory Thomas
General Lucius D. Clay
Office Box 599, Cincinnati, Ohio
Mr. Donald H. McGannon, Chairman,
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc.,
90 Park Ave., New York, N.Y.
The Honorable Robert D. Murphy,
chairman, Corning Glass Interna-
tional, 717 Fifth Ave., New York,
N.Y.
Mr. William B. Murphy,
Campbell Soup Co.,
Ave., Camden, N.J.
Mr. James M. Roche, chairman, General
Motors Corp., 767 Fifth Ave., New
York, N.Y.
Dr. Frank Stanton, president, Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., 51 West
52nd St., New York, N.Y.
The Honorable Theodore C. Streibert,
special assistant to the dean, School
Of International Affairs, 207 Mc-
Wickar, Columbia University, New
York, N.Y.
Mr. H. Gregory Thomas, president,
(‘hanel, Inc., One West 57th St., New
York, N.Y.
Mr. Leslie B. Worthington, director,
U.S. Steel Corp., 525 William Penn
PI., Pittsburgh, Pa.
president,
375 Memorial
man, Procter & Gamble Co., Post
PIROSPECTS FOR SUPPORT FROM EURO i*EAN SOURCES
The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Stikker, you referred several times and the
members of the committee have also referred to the great part I played
in inspiring renewed interest in these Radios. It started nearly a year
ago. It was last year and you say that the Western Europeans have
become deeply interested. Can you tell us whether anyone, private or
public, corporation or government, has done anything whatever
toward raising the contributions or making commitments to the con-
tinuation of these Radios other than your own statements? I notice
in your biography you are a director of Shell Oil and other important
45.
companies. Have any governments or corporations shown a disposi-
tion to contribute any money at all, even $100 to the continuation of
Radio Free Europe? - -
Dr. STIKKER. Mr. Chairman, I made it, I hope, clear in my state-
ment, that we cannot start a really organized effort to raise money in
Europe, either from governments or from private persons, before we
really know that there is also support from the side of the United
States, from the Government, from the House, from the Senate.
The CHAIRMAN. We have been supporting it for 20 years. I don’t
quite get the implication of that. What do you mean by that 4
Dr. STIKKER. We were talking about the future and you were asking
me a question.
The CHAIRMAN. Personally, I know what the position of several
members is. I suppose they will have the votes, if the administration
wishes, but it really comes down to who is going to support this activity
and you know of no commitment made by anyone in Europe to con-
tinue the support of these radios?
Dr. STIKKER. I know about several people who are willing to con-
tribute at the present moment, but they have to wait until finally a
decision has been taken also by your committee.
The CHAIRMAN. The decision to do what—to continue to pay for
it? That is the only decision before us. -
Dr. STIKKER. That’s right. -
The CHAIRMAN. So if we continue to support it, then you will con-
tinue to applaud it? What is there that is a tangible prospect of any
tangible support from European Sources? You have talked about it
and I don’t see that there is, because this isn’t new. As you say and as
has been pointed out, it has been many months since this matter has
been raised. Even Senator Percy says he thinks you have to raise some
money. This is very much like troops in Europe. Everybody is for our
keeping the troops there, but they hesitate very much to pay for them.
SERIOUSINESS OF SITUATION IN UNITED STATES
I don’t like to burden this record too much, but the situation in this
country is very serious. You know we have had a budget deficit run-
ning $23 billion in 1971. It is estimated this year somewhere in the
neighborhood of $30 to $35 billion and the projected deficit in our
budget for 1973 is between $25 and $30 billion.
Our balance-of-payments deficit in 1971 was $22 billion. You know
all these facts. Doesn’t this impress you at all as a Western European
ally? Have you no concern for the solvency of the United States?
Dr. STIKKER. It is not a very nice question to answer when you have
lived as I did, trying to bring about this burden sharing in all the
efforts we should do together at the present moment. I am continuing
in that work and I am willing to make an effort, but we cannot start
making an effort unless you have made up your mind in this com-
mittee and definitely there is going to be a continuation. The date that
decision is taken, I can assure you we will start an organization to try
to raise money in Europe, but you shouldn't start by doubting whether
we will. -- -
46
EUROPEAN INCENTIVE IF U.S. CONTINUES TO PAY QUESTIONED
The CHAIRMAN. We took the decision to continue it to the end of this
year Several months ago. I thought the understanding was that if there
was any interest in Europe in coming forward with anything tangible
we were certainly receptive to any ideas. But nothing other than kind
words has developed from that. I don’t see what assurance there is that
if we continue for another year there will be anything more than what
you say. I don’t quite know what the implication of your statement is.
If we continue to pay it all, $38 million, then there is certainly not
much incentive for the Europeans to pay it. They will say once again,
“The American are willing to do it; they are big, rich and stupid; go
ahead and let them pay for it.” I don’t see why that would not just
as likely be the reaction if we said we were going to.
Dr. STIKKER. No, sir; up to now nobody has asked Europe to do
anything.
The CHAIRMAN. I have. I have suggested very positively that Europe
ought to take it over.
Dr. STIKKER. I can only repeat again that nobody from the U.S.
Government has asked anybody in Europe to do anything.
The CHAIRMAN. But you have been insisting
Dr. STIKKER. We are willing to explore and we are waiting for de-
cisions to be taken on your side; the moment that we can start to ex-
plore when we see a real chance to obtain it. The conditions in Europe
are much better than they have ever been before, although also the
situation, economic situation in Europe is, I would say, just as bad as
in your country.
The CHAIRMAN. I am Sorry to hear that. It is the first time I have
heard that.
|Laughter.] -
Dr. STIKKER. I agree with you and so I am sorry about the situation
you described about the United States.
NO GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF OPERATION QUESTIONED
The CHAIRMAN. There is one other point. I find it very difficult to be
positive about what you believe about these radio stations. The existing
law which was enacted earlier this year, section 703, carries this exact
language: “There are authorized to be appropriated to the Department
$36 million for fiscal year 1972 to provide grants, under such terms and
conditions as the Secretary considers appropriate to Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty.” .
In face of that, you still insist this is a private, uncensored, free—
I don’t know what other language you could use—broadcast? It is
under such conditions as the Secretary considers appropriate, and you
still think that this does not give the Government control of the
operation?
Dr. STIKKER. I don’t like to repeat all the time what I have been say-
ing many times and which I am sure is in the record. -
47
NO U.S. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES IN DIRECTION OF RADIOS QUESTIONED-
The CHAIRMAN. I want the record to be clear, however, on this.
point. You have stated, I believe, that there were no U.S. Government
personnel involved in the direction of the radios. Do you know that to
be a fact? You wouldn’t want the record to stand there if it is not a
fact. Are you positive that you know there are no Government em-
ployees in the direction of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty?
Dr. STIKKER. I was positive. I checked again with one of the people
in the organization and he says it is correct; it is positive there are
no Government officials working in the organization.
The CHAIRMAN. Could I ask you one further thing?
Pº you consider an employee of the CIA a Government official or
not'.
Dr. STIKKER. Sir, I don’t know your system. I know about how it.
works in my own country and I explained very carefully in the begin-
ning that I do not presume that I can discuss with you the contents of
your bills or the system.
The CHAIRMAN. But you make positive statements that you know
there are not any in there and I am trying to elicit this. I don’t want.
the record to go out of here and not be accurate because I think you
are inaccurate. I want to give you a full opportunity to state that you
don’t know or that there is something about it that is mysterious. Maybe.
you don’t regard a CIA operative as a Government official. Is that
your attitude?
Dr. STIKKER. Mr. Chairman, I have just asked again a representa-
tive of Radio Free Europe—he is also here in this room—and he tells.
me there are no Government officials working in Radio Free Europe.
The CHAIRMAN. What I am trying to elicit is what do you consider
to be a Government official? Do you consider me to be a Government
official?
Dr. STIKKER. No.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not?
Dr. STIKKER. I consider, well, there you have the difference because:
in our system in Holland, as a Secretary of State in a way I was a
Government official but as a parliamentarian I was not. I have been a
member of the Senate for several years, but I was not a Government
official. *J .
The CHAIRMAN. Then do you know what the CIA is? You know it is.
our intelligence gathering Operation? .
Dr. STIKKER. Oh, yes. I know it quite well.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you consider an operative, a member of the CIA
staff or people employed by it not to be Government officials?
Dr. STIKKER. To my mind, yes, he is a Government official.
The CHAIRMAN. He is a Government official?
Dr. STIKKER. To my mind he would be, but I have to look at it.
carefully.
48
The CHAIRMAN. And you know of your own knowledge that no
representative of the CIA has been in the direction and concerned with
the direction of the policy of Radio Free Europe?
Dr. STIKKER. The only thing on which I can give an answer that I
know and I have been informed just now that there are no Government
officials working in the Radio Free Europe.
NO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND NO POLICY GUIDANCE QUESTIONED
The CHAIRMAN. Can you say that the people who run the Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty have not been provided with Government
policy lines used by the USIA%
Dr. STIKKER. I would like to stay with the statement which I just
made, that I have been now informed by Radio Free Europe that there
is no Government official working in the apparatus of Radio Free
Europe. . . - - -
The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us when the last one left?
Dr. STIKKER. No.
The CHAIRMAN. You don’t know that?
Dr. STIKKER. I don’t know whether there has been one.
The CHAIRMAN. You don’t know if there have ever been any?
Dr. STIKKER. Now, sir, what are we discussing at the present mo-
ment? I come here as a free man, as a man from Europe, and I have
been working on I don’t know how many organizations and interna-
tional organizations. I shall raise my voice a little at the present
moment because I am Sorry, you make me excited; you make me angry
at the present moment by continuation of these things which you know
I shouldn’t give an answer to. You know fairly well, and whether a
CIA man is a Government official or not, that is not my concern. I
know there is no Government official working in Radio Free Europe,
and when you continue to ask me, “Do you know when the last one
1eft,” I think that is a question I don’t like to answer.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stikker, you understand you came here at your
own request. We did not initiate this invitation. I thought you were
coming here to give usinformation. You are Chairman of the Advisory
Committee. -
Dr. STIKKER. And so it is. .
The CHAIRMAN. And I don’t like to see the record stand with a man
who should know saying that there is no Government official and no
policy guidance, which just does not happen to be a fact.
Dr. STIKKER. Well, then, you have your opinion on the record and
my opinion is on the record.
The CHAIRMAN. It isn’t my opinion. These are based upon the in-
formation from our own Government which ought to know about its
own operations. It is quite possible and I can understand in your
position that you don’t know. It is not a full time job with you. As you
say, it is a labor of love. You have undergone great privations, as you
Say, in occupied territory and while in an occupied territory you like
to receive broadcasts from outside. I can understand that background.
It wasn’t my impression that Eastern Europe is an occupied territory.
We recognize most of those governments. Your analogy of your own
experiences in Holland during the occupation of the Germans does not
seem to me to be quite correct, that what you are doing is the same
thing.
49
But I think this involves a great deal of money of this Government
and I don’t wish you to come here at your own request and leave a
record which I think is inaccurate. I was trying to give you an oppor-
tunity to correct the record if you wish to, but if you don’t wish to,
that is sufficient. •
Thank you very much.
Senator AIKEN. This is purely a private, educational institution.
Why don’t we put it under the same category as our contributions to
universities and Schools abroad, then, rather than have separate legisla-
tion for it? It is a private, educational institution.
The CHAIRMAN. Of course, that is what they say, but it is not.
Senator AIKEN. I don’t say that the CIA does not have people in
some of those other educational institutions, too.
The CHAIRMAN. They are part of the foreign aid program.
Senator AIKEN. It properly should come under the foreign aid bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Stikker.
The committee is adjourned.
(Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the hearing adjourned subject to the
call of the Chair.)
FUNDING OF RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO
LIBERTY
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 7, 1972
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONs,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:00 a.m., in room 4221,
New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Fulbright and McGee.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
OPENING STATEMENT
The committee meets this morning to give further consideration to
S. 3645, an administration bill to authorize for fiscal year 1973, $38.520
million in support of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.
With us this morning to discuss the administration’s position on this
issue is the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the Honorable U.
Alexis Johnson.
During the discussion with the Under Secretary, I hope we will be
able to clear up some of the confusion that developed during yester-
day’s hearing, namely, the degree to which the Government is involved
in setting policy for the Radios and in monitoring their performance.
Dr. Stikker, chairman of the West European Advisory Committee
for Radio Free Europe, maintained throughout yesterday's hearing
that there is no government involvement in the policy direction of the
Radios’ operations. Dr. Stikker made this claim despite the fact that
existing law provides for grants to the Radios “Under such terms and
conditions as the Secretary considers appropriate”—that is, the Secre-
tary of State. The administration’s proposal extends these provisions
for the coming fiscal year.
Mr. Secretary, I hope very much that you will enlighten us on this
and other subjects.
We are very pleased to have you this morning. Will you proceed,
please, sir?
STATEMENT OF HON. U. ALEXIS JOHNSON, UNDER SECRETARY OF
- STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
Mr. JoHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, may I express my thanks for your courtesy in arranging
this—my appearance this morning rather than yesterday, with which
we had great difficulties personally.
(51)
52
Mr. Chairman, I will seek to answer the question you have raised
this morning as well as present the administration’s position on this
legislation.
I am particularly pleased to appear before this committee in the
wake of the President's report to the Congress last Thursday night
which described several steps forward in our relations with the Soviet
Union. The Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems,
the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Lim-
itation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Quadripartite Agreement on
Berlin and others are important milestones along the path to a more
Secure and peaceful world and a more stable Europe. It is of para-
mount interest to us that we continue to move forward along this path.
The more Secure Europe, which we have long envisaged, is several
steps closer to realization as a result of the agreements signed last
week.
However, we should not assume that because both we and the
U.S.S.R. want a more Secure Europe we would necessarily agree on
the definition of what a more secure Europe is. In the Soviets we have,
as the President has said, a “dedicated competitor” with which we can
reach mutually useful agreements, not by unilaterally abandoning our
assets, but by showing a willingness to defend and promote our own
interests and those of our allies and friends.
It is within the framework of this view of recent developments and
of our objectives in Europe that I would like to comment on the legis-
lation before you. This legislation provides for U.S. Government
grants totaling $38.520 million in fiscal year 1973 to two important
instruments of communication in Europe, Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty, organizations on which your committee has obtained
exhaustive documentation.
PRESIDENTIAL STUDY COMMISSION ON TWO RADIO ORGANIZATIONS
Concurrently with the submission of this bill, President Nixon
announced on May 10 that he would appoint a Presidential study com-
mission to carry out the further studies supported by the majority of
Members of both Houses of Congress and to make recommendations.
for the future relationship of the Government to the two radio organi-
zations. That commission will be made up of five distinguished pri-
vate citizens. The commission's mandate will be a short one and it will
be under the requirement to report its findings and recommendations
to the President no later than February 28, 1973. That will provide
time for the report and recommendations to be considered fully by
Congress in the process of formulating legislation for fiscal year 1974.
In announcing the plan to appoint a commission, the President stated
that in making its study the commission would be particularly con-
cerned to consult with Members of Congress.
In his statement the President noted that a number of different views
had been expressed in Congress as to how the radios might best be
funded for the future and that no consensus on this important matter
had emerged. The commission will be directed to conduct a full exami-
nation of that question.
While the Department of State developed the proposal we submitted
to you last year, we believe that this should be only one among a number
53
of alternatives for the commission to examine. We believe the com-
mission should be particularly sensitive to the problem of proposing a
structure for the radios which would preserve their role as independent
broadcasters. Only if the radios preserve that role can we legitimately
hope to broaden the financial backing for them.
in view of your familiarity with these radio organizations I will re-
frain from describing them again. Rather, I would like to touch upon
a number of points about them before addressing the question of the
legislation itself.
EFFECTS OF RFE, RL BROADCASTING ON NEGOTIATIONS
An important point is the argument which has been heard in this
committee that international radio broadcasting of the type provided
by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty obstructs the negotiation of
important agreements such as Strategic arms limitation agreements, I
do not think that there is room now for any doubt that this adminis-
tration’s effort to achieve the first SALT agreements was a completely
successful one. This success was in no way diminished by its continuing
strong support for freedom of international communication nor was
the achievement of the agreements jeopardized by the continued broad-
casting of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.
RADIOS FACILITATE UNDERSTANDING AMONG NATIONS
It is not enough, however, to say that these radios do not, quoting
from the President’s statement, impede “better understanding and more
effective cooperation * * * among nations” as the President under-
lined in his May 10 statement, which I would like to submit for the
record. It needs also to be said that they facilitate such understanding.
We believe that all the peoples of Europe, both East and West, want
to see the same thing we want: a workable structure of Security in
Europe as a whole, rather than the division of Europe into Separate
spheres of influence. They want it both because they fear the nightmare
of a new war and because it is a necessary base for the advancement
of their own interests. So far as the peoples of Eastern Europe are con-
cerned, they are also greatly interested in such things as the implemen-
tation of meaningful economic reform, the application of increased
resources to the Satisfaction of their human needs and, eventually, more
open societies which will be in a better position to establish more nor-
mal trade, technological, cultural and, finally, political relations with
the rest of the world.
Even in closed societies, public opinion can influence leaderships
toward greater responsiveness if people have the information which
belongs in the public realm. We have no doubt that the peoples of
Eastern Europe want their countries to develop policies which are
more responsive to their needs and welfare. They also want the knowl-
edge on which to base intelligent judgments about what those policies
should be.
A clear indication of the thirst for this kind of knowledge was con-
tained in an article which appeared in the Washington Post on June 2
about a public lecture in Moscow in the wake of the summit meeting.
The author describes Soviet citizens asking why the published text of
54
President Nixon's speech on Moscow TV omitted certain key passages
and why the press conferences held by Soviet and U.S. spokesmen dur-
ing the summit meetings were not broadcast. This latter question could
not have been asked if those press conferences had not been fully re-
ported in international radio broadcasting in Russian. That these ques-
tions were asked illustrates the thirst that these people have for more
information about world events than they can get from their own
media. They want to hear not only the official statements of other gov-
ernments but also how world events may effect their own lives. Even
more, they want to know what their officially controlled media will not
tell them about what is happening in their own countries. -
The most dramatic proof of this latter point was the interview this
spring in which the Nobel Prize-winning author, Alexander Solzhenit-
syn, criticized the lack of fairness and completeness in the Soviet press
and said about Radio Liberty “If we learn anything about events in our
own country, it's from there.”
RECOGNITION OF DIVERGENT POSITIONS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH
NEGOTIATIONS
A second point I would like to address is the notion that the frank
recognition of divergent positions is incompatible with or even renders
impossible the attempt to identify common interests through negotia-
tion. The events of the week before last illustrate the complete unten-
ability of such a contention in today’s world. We had very frank dis-
cussions with the Soviets in Moscow. We negotiated useful agreements
on some issues. We disagreed on others. We did not deceive ourselves
that we were changing the other side's basic outlook; nor did the
Soviets.
It is the Soviet view that disagreement about certain of the funda-
mental differences between us in no way precludes successful negotia-
tion. The day after the President's departure from Moscow, Radio
Moscow praised Soviet foreign policy for combining “a readiness to
develop mutually advantageous relations with states possessing oppo-
site social systems if they display a realistic, businesslike approach to
settling existing differences,” on the one hand, and on the other hand
what they called the “irreconcilability in the ideological struggle.”
As the President emphasized in his address to the Congress last
Thursday night, we should bear in mind that while we have started to
build a new structure of peace, we are only at the beginning of that
process. In that process accommodation and competition will exist side
by side for some time to come.
AVOIDING IPROLONGING COLD WAR
A third point which has been made in this committee is one which
f would be among the first to support. That point is that we should
avoid prolonging habits dating from the depths of the cold war.
“Irreconcilability in the ideological struggle” is Pravda's militant
watchword; it is not our phrase.
It is not our objective in presenting the legislation now before this
committee to prolong the cold war or to perpetuate cold-war attitudes.
In its studies of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, the Congres-
sional Research Service has not found these two radio organizations
55
ermeated with any desire to prolong cold-war hostilities, to overthrow
ny country's regime or to take any role other than that of responsible
media of information. The objective is to build contact through infor-
mation because we seek a Europe stabilized by more prolific and peace-
ful interaction and not by an Iron Curtain which isolates one-half
from the other. Information facilitates and is a part of such a peace-
ful interaction. Censorship, jamming and dedication to an irreconcil-
able ideological struggle are the cold-war relics which obstruct it.
Division and isolation were hallmarks of the cold war. Communication,
interaction and freedom of information should be hallmarks of the
structure of peace we have now begun building.
VOICE OF AMERICA OFFICIAL RADIO VOICE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT
A fourth point is the suggestion that, as a result of our acceptance
last year of the initiative in this committee in favor of public funding
of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, we find ourselves Speaking
through two voices where one might do. In reality, the situation has not
changed. We speak through only one official radio voice to the world,
the Voice of America, and it is only the Voice of America which, in
its commentaries to its many listening audiences, is required to present
an official American viewpoint.
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are independent news media.
Their analysts and commentators represent only themselves or the
radio which provides them with the microphone. They do not speak for
the U.S. Government. This situation, by contrast with VOA, permits
them to analyze a much wider range of developments, including key
events in the country to which they are broadcasting. The value of this
function is testified to by the listeners.
Nobody is forced to listen to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty
in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. To the contrary, there are often
inhibitions of a Social or political nature against doing so. Yet, many
millions of people choose to do so every day. Sophisticated audience-
research techniques indicate that the average daily listenership of the
five countries to which Radio Free Europe broadcasts is around 30
million people. To achieve this result, Radio Free Europe must clearly
be fulfilling a need for information not available from the more easily
accessible domestic media or from official foreign radio broadcasting
organizations such as VOA or BBC. It is certain that this unique
function would be significantly attenuated if these radios were to accept
the constraints of being official broadcasters.
COST OF RADIOS AND HOW IT SHOULD BE BORNE
A fifth and final point is the question of the cost of these two Radios
and how it should be borne. The authorization amount requested for
fiscal year 1973 is $38.520 million, as compared with an authorization
amount of $36 million for fiscal year 1972 and an appropriation of $32
million. The requested increase is primarily to provide for mandatory
wage and price increases. Notwithstanding the fact that during the
past fiscal year both Radios have cut personnel and programs, the most
important fiscal change was the adjustment in international rates of
exchange at the turn of the year. Because approximately 75 percent of
the expenditures of the Radios are in foreign currencies, these adjust-


56
ments represented a loss in overseas purchasing power of about 13
percent. Concurrently, the appropriation actually received for fiscal
year 1972 was 20 percent below the requested amount. Thus, the radios
found it necessary to postpone obligations and to terminate Such im:
portant activities as the Institute for the Study of the USSR in
Munich. I will not attempt to cover the full financial details in this
statement because I believe the material prepared for the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees has already been submitted to the
committee. Both these committees found the justifications submitted
satisfactory and reported out the figure requested. -
In connection with financing, the question has been asked why thes
stations, broadcasting only to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,
cost almost as much to operate as does the worldwide Service of the
Voice of America. The answer is that these are, in fact, networks. Radio
Tiberty broadcasts in 20 languages with each program tailored to a
specific target audience. Radio Free Europe broadcasts in six languages
to five countries. Each has to maintain its own research staffs, libraries
and news bureaus, and meet their personnel costs. These support facil-
ities monitor and analyze the news from the countries to which the
Radios broadcast in order to tell the listener the most possible about
how that news will affect him. - -
By contrast, the Voice of America has the mandate to describe
American official policies in the world and in relation to the United
Nations. It depends for its news on the wire services and it has the use
of USIA libraries and other support facilities. Even if those USIA
facilities could somehow be made available to the other radios, they
would not serve the purpose since they are geared to American develop-
ments rather than those of the target countries. We are gratified to
note that as a result of the study of the Radios done at your request, th
Comptroller General reached the conclusion that
The two Radios and respective corporations have exercised adequate fiscal
COntrols Over the Federal funds made available to them and that Such funds
have been used in an effective and efficient manner for the purposes intended.
The question of who should be covering these costs is indeed a rele-
vant one. I am aware, Mr. Chairman, of your interest in getting a
greater participation in this financing from sources other than th
U.S. Government. I fully share the view that, to the extent possible,
funds other than U.S. Government funds should be solicited to support
these programs. There has been for some years a corporate fundraising
effort by the Free Europe Fund. It is continuing successfully this year
under the leadership of Mr. Stewart Cort. There is now an effort by
friends of the Radios in Europe to examine the possibilities for fund-
raising there. You have heard a statement from Dr. Dirk Stikker, who
is leading this effort. Dr. Stikker made it clear that it will require at
least a year before an appreciable European contribution can be ex
pected; that is, I don’t think it is reasonable to expect that we will be
able to get substantial contributions from Europe in this fiscal year
which is beginning on July 1. -
I have assured Dr. Stikker and I can assure you, Mr. Chairman,
that we will be happy to cooperate with and support Dr. Stikker's
effortin any way he feels useful. -
It is our view that the commission which the President will appoint
to present recommendations on a future legislative proposal for fund-

















57
ing the Radios will wish to consult with fundraisers on both sides of
the Atlantic so that their recommended proposal is one which best
facilitates contributions from outside the U.S. Government.
CONSIDERATION AFFECTING LEGISLATION SUBIMITTED
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1973
Mr. Chairman, in considering what legislation should be submitted
to Congress for fiscal year 1973, we took into consideration the legisla-
tive history of this year's bill, Public Law 92–264, the studies of the
activities of the Radios which had been carried out in answer to your
request by the Congressional Research Service and the General Ac-
counting Office, and the fact that there are further studies of the Radios
being prepared by the Congressional Research Service which focus on
the methods for financing them and on their relationship to U.S.
foreign policy goals. We took note of the fact that both the bill pro-
posed last year by the House of Representatives and the Sense of the
Senate resolution cosponsored by Senators Percy and Humphrey and
65 other senators evidenced a strong desire that further study should
be given to the Radios and to methods of funding them before the
presentation of more definitive legislation. One way in which we have
attempted to meet these concerns has been by the submission of the
present legislation which is, in effect, an interim bill.
We remain convinced that these Radios continue, as the President
wrote in a December 23 letter to the Chairman of the Radio Free
Europe Fund, to “serve a fundamental national interest.” Their func-
tion remains thoroughly consistent with the process of building the
new structure of peace which has been so significantly advanced in the
past few weeks. - -
RELATIONSHIP OF RADIOs POLICY DIRECTION TO U.S. GOVERNMENT
Mr. Chairman, in response to your question on the relationship of
policy direction on these radios to the U.S. GoverIment, I want to
point out first, as I pointed out in here, this legislation, this method of
funding was not one that was originally sought by the administration.
We, last year, as you recall, submitted a proposal for the funding of
these radios and their relationship to the U.S. Government which did
not receive the approval of the committee at that time. - -
This interim funding arrangement, through the Department of
State, does provide that the Secretary of State shall set the condi-
tions under which the funds shall be made available. Naturally, those
conditions involve the accounting for the funds that are made avail-
able—but they do not provide nor do we intend to provide that the
Secretary of State or the U.S. Government will exercise detailed
policy direction and control.
The theme, Mr. Chairman, of these radios from the beginning, the
theme that I think we will have to continue to maintain, is that they
are an independent, responsible and free press, and they carry out that
function in regard to the target countries to which they are directed.
The fact that these countries themselves do not have an independent
and free press creates a need which these radios are seeking to fulfill
and a need which is quite different, and an objective which is quite
different, from that of the Voice of America.
58
I believe that their continuation is very important.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
ENLIGHTENING PEOPLE ABOUT THIER GOVERNMENT
You know, Mr. Secretary, it seems odd to me how anxious you and
your colleagues are for us to inform the Russians about their Govern-
ment, and how reluctant you are to inform this committee or the
American people about our own Government—such as the policy
guidance of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and information
on the USIA. -
It is very difficult for me to understand how you can be so con-
cerned about the Russian people knowing what goes on in their Gov-
ernment and yet do everything possible to keep from this committee
reports regarding our own operations.
I have requested, as you know, studies that have been made by the
Executive on both Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and also the
country programs of USIA. My requests have all been refused.
Why do you think they need enlightenment more than we need
enlightenment about our own Government :
Mr. JoHNSON. First, Mr. Chairman, I think we both agree that we
have in this country a free and independent and very effective press,
not only press but also TV and radio news which is entirely absent
from these countries. .
Next, as far as the question of what information should be made
available by the Executive to the press and to the Congress, of course,
is a longstanding and an old one.
The CHAIRMAN. I don’t wish to go into the—
Mr. Johnson. May I just say, Mr. Chairman, we have made avail-
able to you substantial information on this. I don’t know any two or-
ganizations that have been more thoroughly studied than these two
organizations. -
Now, as far as the documents which have not been made available
to you thus far, they are not State Department documents.
The CHAIRMAN. They are National Security Council documents,
but they are studies of these activities. I asked the State Department,
and Assistant Secretary Abshire stated that the executive branch has
conducted various studies on the radios, but since they were done under
the auspices of the National Security Council, they are not available
to the committee. I wrote on April 14 to Mr. Abshire for a list of the
studies and Mr. Abshire responded on May 30, but did not furnish
information that would identify the interagency studies made
regarding the radios. - -
I don’t suppose there is anything I can do about it. You seem to
have the votes; you overrode the committee on the USIA and you can
on this. -
It just seems very odd to me that especially dealing with informa-
tion activities—if it were the Defense Department there might be
Some color of justification for it—but it seems such a hypocritical
attitude that we are so anxious to inform the Russian people, but you
are so reluctant to inform this committee about these activities. This
whole thing has become, Ithink, a little extreme.
59
ROLE OF CIA IN FUNDING AND OPERATION OF RADIOS
I suppose the executive branch still refuses to discuss or even knowl-
edge the role that the CIA agency has played in the funding and op-
eration of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Is that right? You
don’t wish to discuss this; you won’t acknowledge it?
Mr. JoHNson. I think the whole question of the previous history
of the Radios, their funding and operations, has been discussed with
committees in executive Session.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, but why in executive session? It is very
widely known now. Why will you not furnish these studies? We have
some inkling through unofficial channels about what is in the studies,
and we see no reason why they should not be made public. I think the
acknowledgement of the CIA's role would enhance the credibility of
the Radios, if anything, simply on the general ground of telling the
truth about them. -
You say Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are independent
news media, that their analysts and commentators represent only them-
selves or the Radios which provide them with a microphone; they do
not speak for the U.S. Government. That is a very unequivocal
Statement. -
Then you add detailed policy control. You know the fact is they have
had overall policy guidance that is consistent with the guidance of
the USIA. You know that to be a fact. Why would you try to mislead
the committee or the public?
Mr. JoHNSON. We were talking about the present situation, Mr.
Chairman. I was directing my statement to the present situation.
The CHAIRMAN. I will talk about the present situation. Do you
assert there are no Government people, no employee of CIA or any
other agency present in the operations of these Radios today?
Mr. JoEINSON. I do so assert. I do assert that there are, as of today,
as of the present time, there are no U.S. Government employees, and
that includes employees of the CIA employed or engaged in the
operations of the Radios.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, does this mean that there are no employees
presently there who were in the CIA but have been transferred—
their pay—to Radio Free Europe? Is this what you are trying to say?
I don’t see why we get bogged down in this kind of a controversy
because you know very well that other reports that we have had clearly
state that there are such people giving guidance.
Mr. JoHNSON. Mr. Chairman, as far as the past history of employ-
ment, some of the employees of the agency, of the Radios, may be
concerned -
The CHAIRMAN. You have always insisted—
Mr. JoFINSON. I am not going into that.
The CHAIRMAN. You have always insisted they are independent
and have nothing to do with the Government. You state that and you
believe that? Dr. Stikker did.
Mr. JoELNSON. That is correct; they do not. Their relationship as
far as their broadcasting policies are concerned and their handling of
news, their relationship is the same—to the U.S. Government—as that
of any other news organization. They naturally come to us for infor-
mation; they naturally come to us for briefing, the same as any other
* 60
news organization does, and we naturally provide them information.
The point I am making, Mr. Chairman, is we do not give guidance
to them as to how they shall handle developments.
Now, naturally, they are responsible—the organizations are respon-
sible—to their own boards of directors and their trustees.
The CHAIRMAN. There is a vote, Mr. Secretary. Excuse me for 5
minutes; I will have to go vote. We will be right back.
(Recess).
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
Senator McGee wishes to ask questions.
Senator McGEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think, given the letters that I get from constituents and questions
that have been raised on the floor, that we want to make sure, Mr.
Secretary, of the sharpness of some of the highlights of what you said,
because there are genuine apprehensions about a number of aspects of
the program.
EFFECT OF RADIO ON FUTURE RELATIONS
The first of those has to do with the potential mischief that this
program might represent in the light of the new climate with Moscow
in the wake of the President’s return from there.
As I understand it, what you were saying in your testimony—and
I came in a little late and caught only the tail end of it—was that the
Radios did not appear to be a serious stumbling block during the
conference. -
Can you tell us any more in that regard or is that all, or do you
know whether it came up as a question?
Mr. JoHNSON. Well, the point I was making, Senator, in my state-
ment was that the fact of the existence of these Radios and the broad-
Casting they have been doing did not interfere with the ability to
enter into these agreements with the Soviet Union on SALT and the
other matters that the President was—in which we were interested.
It seemed to me that the results showed that the thesis that these
Radios interfered or prevented our entering into agreement or under-
standings with the Soviet Union was simply not borne out by the facts.
As far as the facts are concerned, I pointed out in my statement
that the Soviet Union itself insists upon its right to broadcast ideo-
logical programs to other countries, including the United States, and
it has insisted since the President's visit that the ideological struggle
still continues between the two systems and that, therefore, we feel
that these Radios still continue to have an important place in the
development of understanding in these countries. We proceed from the
thesis that exchange of information in itself is good and that even
in states which have totalitarian systems public opinion still has some
influence. The fact that the countries to which these Radios broad-
cast do not have a free and independent press makes it important that
these Radios to some degree try to serve as a responsible, independent
and free press, in the role of that kind of a press in those countries,
and thus contribute to understanding between us.
We don’t see a conflict between these Radios and their objectives
and increased understanding. In fact, quite the opposite, we think it
leads to better understanding.
61
Senator McGEE. Aside, then, from the point that you have made,
that it obviously didn’t prevent a Moscow dialog and some agree-
ments, do you go so far as to say that you don’t see this type of radio
activity as complicating the problem of better relations in the future?
Mr. JoHNSON. No; my answer to that is no, I do not see it com-
plicating; in fact, quite the opposite, I see the fact of these Radios
contributing to better understanding because it contributes to better
understanding in these countries of what is going on in the rest of
the world and contributes to a better interchange between us which,
in the absence of other means of communications with these people,
would otherwise not exist.
Senator McGEE. Perhaps at this point it would be helpful, because
of the concern of many of my constituents, very intelligent individuals
who are well-informed on these things, who still see in this some of
the hangover in the wake of the origin of the Radios in the beginning—
I had a very knowledgeable lady from Casper discuss this at length
with me when I was out there 2 or 3 weeks ago. She fears that be-
cause of the tension right after World War II that brought these into
being that they perhaps are looked at in the wrong context of what
was the earlier, the colder aspect of the cold war, the tougher aspects
of the cold War, and she says that it is—it may be another weapon in
the cold war as such and, therefore, she takes a questioning view of it.
CHANGES IN FUNCTION, ROLE, TECHNIQUES OF RADIOs
What has happened, if there is anything, that has changed the func-
tion, the role, the techniques of these Radios in contrast, let’s say, to
20 years ago? . . . -
Mr. JoHNSON. In contrast to 20 years ago, at that time there was
Some tendency within the Radios, as they were viewed by some, to
look upon them as the voice of the revolutionaries, if you will, against
the existing regimes in these countries. That phase has long since
passed and the Radios now, as they developed over the years, have
developed into simply independent voices and free voices, not revolu-
tionary voices, and the whole objective of the Radios is not to foment,
stir up revolt or revolution in these countries; the whole objective
of the Radios is simply to provide a channel of information: and
that it does so, that they do so, and do so fairly effectively, I think, is
borne out by the opinion of many independent people. - -
You will recall, Senator, that when the question of the Radios
came up in this country, the citizens’ committee was established with
such people as George Ball and Averell Harriman and other people
who can’t be accused of being old-fashioned cold war warriors' strong
Support. You will recall also-I think it has been submitted for the
record of the committee—the fact there has been overwhelming sup-
port among the press in Europe, in Western Europe, not only just in
the NATO countries but also in neutral countries such as Switzerland.
And you will also recall that following the Hungarian revolt in 1956
there were charges that the Radios had fomented that revolt. This was
thoroughly investigated by the German Government at that time
which went through the scripts and they came to the conclusion there
was no foundation for this.
62
So as far as the present position of the radios is concerned, I would
like to think of it as simply an independent press, furnishing the role
of an independent press which does not exist in these countries, and I.
think that role is being carried out, and the commentaries we get
from within the countries, commentaries we get from travelers within
these countries, indicate that most of the population of these countries
feel that that is the role that is being carried out and carried out fairly
effectively. .
Now, obviously, governments which are trying to control informa-
tion to their people don’t entirely welcome that activity of this kind
and—
Senator McGEE. Governments sometimes don’t welcome an in-
dependent press. -
Mr. JoHNSON. That’s right.
Senator McGEE. I mean, that is part of the price you pay for dif-
ferences in points of view.
Mr. JoHNSON. That is correct.
Senator MCGEE. But that does not mean you shouldn’t have an
independent voice or another voice that expresses another point of
view 2 .
Mr. JoHNSON. That’s right. -
Senator McGEE. I think it is a rather interesting analogy that you
suggest there.
OverLAP BETWEEN VOA AND RFE, RL
What about the overlap between what the Voice of America does
and these radios? -
Mr. JoHNSON. There is very little overlap. .
Senator McGEE. There is bound to be some, I suppose.
Mr. JoHNSON. Of course; there is some overlap, of course there is,
but very little as a matter of fact. The Voice of America is talking
about what is going on in the United States, American developments,
what the U.S. Government policy is, statements made by U.S. Govern-
* leaders and so on; that is the role of the Voice of America, to get
that Out.
These radios are focused rather on what is going on within these
countries to which they are directed and between the countries to
which they are directed. They are talking about events within Czech-
oslovakia or events—they are talking to Czechoslovakia about events
within Romania, or in the Soviet Union about events in Yugoslavia or
in Poland. There objectives are quite different objectives from that of
the Voice of America. They are talking about what, you might say, are
more local concerns and local interests.
FENDING COMMISSION REVIEW OF AREA OF OPERATIONS
Senator McGEE. The upshot of our genuine search for the answers
to some of these questions and updating the operation, really makes the
next point, I suppose. That is that there is a pending commission re-
Yiº; study, reassessment of this whole area of operations; is that not
true .
Mr. Johnson. That is entirely correct, Senator. You will recall, I
pointed out previously, that we have submitted last year a proposal
for a mechanism for funding and handling these radios which was not

63
pproved by this committee. Then there was legislation submitted for
nterim funding, and the bill that is before this committee now that we
re discussing is simply this interim funding bill for this next fiscal
year pending the receipt of the report of this Presidential commission
which will be appointed within the next few days and will be required
to report by the end of February.
SenatorMoGEE. February this next year?
Mr. JoHNSON. This next February, yes, and the hope is that the
Congress and the Executive will be able to consider the report of this
commission and that we will, by the following fiscal year, be in a posi-
tion to establish a mechansim with which we are all satisified.
OBTAINING FUNDING FOR RADIOS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES
In this connection, I might point out that as far as obtaining fund-
ing from other countries or assistance of funding from other countries,
and particularly Western European countries, up to the present time
we have been greatly inhibited by the fact that there was no certitude
that the Congress was going to approve the continuation of the
Radios, to begin with. -
Next, there has not been a mechanism to which a country or a people
could contribute even if they wanted to contribute to it. In effect, at
the present time they would be contributing to a State Department
appropriation which is not very attractive to a foreign government.
So I think we–the commission—certainly wants to consult with the
Congress and will want to consult with our European friends, I think,
on what kind of a mechanism or channel will be best suited to putting
these Radios on a sound footing for the future. -
POINTS MADE BY PENDING COMMISSION EXAMINATION
Senator MCGEE. It seems to me this pending commission examina-
tion does make two points for us that are worth our pondering and,
I think, heeding: One is that there is change, that circumstances do
shift and that we ought not to be caught in cement in some yesteryear
that no longer might be relevant.
Mr. JoHNSON. I agree.
Senator McGEE. Therefore, there ought to be a constantly changing
reexamination and measure which is a part of the process of this com-
mittee's actions here—
Mr. Johnson. That is correct.
Senator McGEE (continuing). To require that examination.
The second thing, however, that I think follows very closely is that
now that the commission is about to be appointed, as I understand
it.
Mr. JoBNSON. Yes.
Senator MCGEE (continuing). And will be in business, that it would
Surely not be in the best interests of equity and statesmanship to
preclude or prejudge the commission’s findings by a precipitous act
on the part of the Congress. We ought to abide for the interim in
the fact that the study of change and new approaches is underway,
and that what we are seeking to do is to not impede that, but likewise
not cave in the program—
64
Mr. Johnson. Yes.
Senator McGEE (continuing). Or seriously curtail it until we get a
judgment. It may be that they might even recommend we ought to
do more of it; we don’t know what they are going to recommend. I
do think that in the interest of the genuineness of the intent of re-
examination here, that certainly that would give me pause to change
it seriously in midstream, as it were, in the interim.
RADIOS HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE RECORD AND SERVE USEFUL PURPOSE
But I want to close this off, Mr. Secretary, by saying again that over
the years I have visited most of the centers of the operations of the
Radios. Just within the last 2 or 3 months I have been in London talk-
ing to people involved there and I have been in Munich—in one in-
stance it was in February and the other it was May, last month. I
am not a communications specialist, but I have gone into the particu-
lars of the operation as carefully as I can, and I must say it continues
to be impressive to me, so much for relatively very little, and rather
well done.
I was impressed with expertise of the personnel in their linguistic
and their rather large-picture philosophical backgrounds that did
Seem to make them rather important persons in these programs.
I just wanted the record to show that I think it is a constructive
record and it is an ongoing record that seems to acquire a cumulative
effect toward a better type of climate that we all seek. We sometimes
disagree on how we get there, but this is one of the ways, I think, we
can get there. Nowhere that I have traveled, and I think I have been
in all the Iron Curtain countries, nowhere have I ever encountered
among individuals who were involved in this at all or recipients of it
who thought that it ought to be terminated, except official government
personnel and that is understandable.
Mr. JoHNSON. Yes. . . - -
Senator MCGEE. But not others; and I think for this reason that it
probably does serve a useful purpose of considerable dimension. We
ought to weigh very carefully that we keep it in a useful vein at the
highest possible level of integrity and keep it in tune with the chang-
ing circumstances of the world as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
CONTINUING IDEOILOGICAL WARFARE
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, in your answer to the Senator from
Wyoming, you said that you had a right to continue the ideological
warfare—this was acknowledged in Moscow—the implications being
yes, that is the purpose for the radio operations.
How does that compare to your view in your statement that it is
completely free of any governmental policy direction and so on ? It
can’t be both a weapon for ideological warfare and wholly independ-
ent, too. You can’t have it both ways; so which way is it? The real way
is it is a part of the ideological warfare: isn't it? -
Mr. JoEINSON. Mr. Chairman, I don’t recall that I said we had the
right to continue ideological warfare. I said—I meant to say in any
65
event—that the Soviet Union was the one that was saying that ideo-
logical warfare had not been ended.
Now, to the degree that free and independent information con-
stitutes an element of ideological warfare, I suppose you can say that
it is ideological warfare. -
RADIOS PROVIDED POLICY GUIDELINES BY U.S. GovKRNMENT
The CHAIRMAN. I don’t know that there is any point in belaboring
it. The statement of our most recent survey of this clearly states that
the people in the Radios from the Government are providing the gen-
eral Government policy lines used by USIA:
Thus key officials of both Radios are kept apprised of the basic tenets of U.S.
foreign policy toward their respective target countries.
Mr. JoHNSON. I am Sorry, Mr. Chairman, I didn’t quite catch what
you were saying. Would you mind repeating that?
The CHAIRMAN. I don’t know why either you or Mr. Stikker keep
denying that these Radios are provided policy guidelines by our Gov-
ernment through representatives of the Government. They always
have been and they still are as of a week or two ago. You may have
taken these people and transferred them from the payroll, but they
have been in there and this review states that they are intended to
be phased out. Of course, the whole thing may have been phased out
except that you are now reviving it.
The point is that to pretend that the Radios have no governmental
guidelines is, I think, quite contrary to the facts. They were supported
by the Congress; they were created originally by the Congress be-
cause they were to be a vehicle for the conveying of our views and
our policies to the people of Eastern Europe.
It isn’t a point of whether we have a right to do it; I have never
raised that. Nobody has ever suggested that these puny little opera-
tions would be sufficient to interfere with an agreement with Russia
On arms control; I certainly have never suggested that. The real point
of it is that they are of marginal importance. Why should we spend
$38 million ? -
I don’t think the Radios bother the Russians all that much. I am
sure the Russians wouldn't think of canceling anything of any signif-
icance over our Radio Liberty because it is a very insignificant opera-
tion overall, except that it costs $38 million. I have no objection to
carrying it on so long as you don’t tax my constituents $38 million and
put it down the drain.
DEFICITS AND FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES OF U.S. GOVERNMENT
It is true these are good jobs for people. I feel sorry for anybody
who has a good job that is threatened by restriction in costs. On the
other hand, I assume you are aware of the deficits and the financial
difficulties of our Government. If you are not, I have the figures here
and I will put them in the record. -
(The information referred to follows:)
ECONOMIC INDICATORS
1. Budget deficits :
Fiscal year 1971, $23.0 billion
Fiscal year 1972, $30–38.8 billion (estimated)
Fiscal year 1973, $25–30 billion (projected)
66
2
. Balance of payments deficits :
Calendar year 1971—$22.2 billion—the largest deficit in the history of
the United States
Calendar year 1972—first quarter $3.5 billion
3. Public debt :
As of May 22, 1972–$430 billion
4. Inflation :
Current rate of 6 percent
. Unemployment level :
6 percent for the last 17 months
The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever heard of that or is that not within
the purview of the State Department to keep up with the finances of
our Government? -
Mr. JoHNSON. I think this is a good investment for the people of
the United States.
The CHAIRMAN. This is the point at issue.
Mr. Johnson. Yes.
5
EXCHANGE PROGRAM MORE EFFECTIVE THAN RADIO BROADCASTS
The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me about as Sorry, as poor an invest-
ment, when compared to our—I think it is generally agreed by most
of our own ambassadors that the actual exchange program is far more
effective in most countries than this type of radio broadcasts, either
VOA or Radio Liberty. I have had many communications from our
own ambassadors in many countries. You spend only a very small
fraction of the amount spent on the Radios for exchange programs in
these same countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
In 1971, I think, you spent $1.7 million on the cultural and educa-
tional exchange program in contrast to the $38 million here. .
I would dare say an honest poll taken of our own ambassadors or
people who know about these things would rate other activities as far
more important than broadcasts which may or may not reach anybody.
You don’t really know whom they reach, I don’t think.
IISTENERSHIP OF RADIO FREE EUROPE
Mr. JoHNSON. Mr. Chairman, in that regard, I think we do, partic-
ularly with regard to Radio Free Europe. The organizations have
been able to get a pretty good reading on listenership by travelers
from the countries as well as people who live in the countries. I myself
as a former ambassador in Prague was very well aware there and even
in my limited contacts with the Czech people at that time, of the fact,
that these programs had a wide listenership. But the point is not that
any one of these things is exclusive of the other; these Radios are
simply one element in our relations with these countries in trying to
establish better relations.
EXCHANGE PROGRAMS SUPPORTED
As far as exchange programs are concerned, as you know, we thor-
Oughly support that and if the Congress—if the conditions in these
countries would permit and the Congress would authorize additional
funds for additional exchange programs to these countries—we cer-
tainly would be delighted with that.
67
GovKRNMENT DIRECTION OF RADIOS’ POLICIES
The CHAIRMAN. How do you reconcile your exchange with regard
to the right to pursue ideological warfare with the statement in
principles of the President in which he says, “We believe in the right
of each nation to chart its own course, to choose its own system, to go
its own way without interference from other nations”?
Mr. JoHNSON. We also believe in the right of the flow of informa-
tion between countries.
The CHAIRMAN. But this is Government information; it is Govern-
ment supported. I can’t accept the idea that our Government does not
direct the policies of these Radios. The evidence is conclusive in the
official reports that you do and you always have. I think the very idea
that you have denied all through these years and still refuse to admit
it was CIA—goodness knows, I like the CIA as an operation; it is
probably one of the most responsible agencies in the Government.
It isn’t because of the CIA ; it is simply the hypocrisy and the refusal
to admit what was a clear fact that, I think, casts a real reflection
upon our own Government. The same way that I think your refusal
to make available to the committee the studies of these operations
raises the same kind of question.
You keep insisting that these are uncensored and you don’t check
On them. If you don't—if it is all that free from operations—how
do you know it is uncensored? What makes you believe it is uncensored
if you have nothing to do with it completely?
Mr. JoHNSON. Well, certainly not censored by us.
The CHAIRMAN. Not by you?
Mr. JoHNSON. I don’t quite get your point.
The CHAIRMAN. Not by you personally, but by people who have
represented the CIA in the past. I still think people may have been
transferred, like Mr. Price at the Library of Congress; he is an old
CIA man So he comes up and makes a report on Radio Liberty and
how wonderful it is.
Mr. JoHNSON. Mr. Chairman, as far as policy direction is concerned,
I want to repeat what Isaid previously.
The CHAIRMAN. I know what your positionis.
Mr. JoHNSON. We are not directly or indirectly giving policy direc-
tion to these radios. I think we would have the right to do so if we
wanted to. -
The CHAIRMAN. Of course you have the right to do so.
Mr. JoHNSON. But I am just telling you as a matter of fact we are not
doing so; we are trying to keep them as an independent organization.

REPORT OF GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
The CHAIRMAN. Then you are directly contradicting the report of
the GAO. We have more confidence in the GAO than we do in the
State Department.
Mr. JoHNSON. I don’t know what the GAO report says.
The CHAIRMAN. Show it to him; let him read it. Look at it from the
point of view of Congress. If you could really get across to the Congress
that you are Supporting nothing but a free, completely untrammeled
entertainment and news service, why would they then say: “We will
spend $38 million for it”?
68
CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT QUESTIONED IF RADIOS ARE FREE AND
INDEPENDENT
They are under the impression—clearly the Congress has been under
the impression—that this is a part of our effort to Sustain the idea of
capitalism and free enterprise vis-a-vis the Communist world. This i
why they have supported it all this time; this is why they have Sup-
ported the war in Vietnam; and that is why your department origi-
nally came up and submitted it. We had to go into Vietnam in order to
contain communism and under that same obsession you support this,
Now, to come and say this is not that at all, it is just like the CBS or
the AP, I don’t think the Congress ever would have at any time sup-
ported it. It is not our business to go around furnishing people with
free news Service any more than we subsidize or pay for the operation
Of UPI. Or CBS. - .
You See, what gets me is you can’t have it both ways. If it is in our
interest, it is promoting our policies, and then it is not a free and un-
trammeled independent agency. It can’t be both at once; it can’t be both
free and government restricted.
If it is completely free, I don’t think the Congress, if they had this
brought to their attention and believed it, would ever support it. I
think it is somewhat like RIAS (Radio In America Sector, Berlin); it
is a great station; everybody admits it plays the most beautiful classical
music in Europe; it is the best equipped. Nobody objects to that, ex-
cept I don’t know why we should be furnishing it to the Germans who
are quite able to furnish their own music and entertainment and news.
They can get their news by Subscribing to the AP or Los Angeles Times
service or UPI or any of them if they want to. It is a question of money
and my own position is entirely on that. This is a peripheral, marginal
operation of a kind which we should not have to pay for. I have no ob-
jection to Somebody else carrying it on and paying for it if it is for the
amusement and entertainment of the people of Eastern Europe. I am
not at all sure they suffer from lack of entertainment; but anyway if
anybody wants to do it they can do it. I don’t see why we ought to
pay for it. -
This is a lot of money. We put nearly $600 million into these two
little radios for this very restricted part of the world and I do not see
how it is justified on economic grounds.
STATE DEPARTMENT'S FUNDING RELATIONSHIP
Mr. JOHNSON, Mr. Chairman, if I might make a couple of points:
First, as far as the State Department funding relationship that we are
now talking about is concerned, this began, you will recall, in March of
this year, I believe it was, wasn’t it, when the present authorization
was approved, and the statements I am making are valid, accurate as
far as the department's and the Government's relationship with the
radios is concerned since this relationship was established in March of
this year.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, that at least clears the air a little bit.
Mr. JoHNSON. Now, the statement deals with previous arrangements
which I am not discussing here. I am discussing our present arrange-
mentS.

69
UNITED STATES NOT PROVIDING POLICY GUIDANCE TO RADIOS
Now, as far as policy guidance, as far as the United States is con-
erned on this, by saying that we are not providing policy guidance,
what I am saying is we are not telling these radios or their commenta-
ors exactly what they should say day by day.
The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that.
Mr. JoHNSON. We are not saying you have to do this or you have to
o that so far as the news is concerned. As far as the Radios are con-
erned, they are responsible through their boards of directors and
heir board of trustees to the Department of State and to the execu-
ive for their, you might say, the general performance of their duties—
shouldn’t say duties—of their function and they have to satisfy
us in the executive that they are carrying out a role which we feel
s justified and useful and the money is being well spent, and they will
lso have to do the same thing as far as the Congress is concerned under
he present situation. -
On the one hand we are not telling them exactly what to do; on
he other hand they will have to satisfy us and they will have to satisfy
he Congress that the function they are performing is being performed
well and in a manner that contributes to our overall interests; and we
hink that an independent press voice in these countries does con-
ribute to our overall interest.
I am distinguishing between these two things. -
The CHAIRMAN. It contributes something to understanding. What
ou are saying is that the State Department as such since March has
not itself directly given policy guidance to Radio Free Europe?
Mr. JoHNSON. Nor has any other agency or element of the U.S.
OVernment. - -
The CHAIRMAN. Well, you are going a little further than that report.
Mr. Johnson. Pardon 2 -
The CHAIRMAN. You are going a little further than that report.
It says that they expect to phase it out. -
Mr. Johnson. This report is talking about, as I read it, what ex-
isted in the past.
The CHAIRMAN. There is another section; look at the preceding
page; they say they expect to phase them out as of the end of this
fiscal year. The preceding page in that same report
Mr. JoHNSON. Well, what I have said to you is, was, that process
was phased out and what I have said to you is that as of now there
are no U.S. Government employees within the Radios.
TjSE OF RADIOS TO PRESENT FREE AND UNTRAMMIELED NEWS
The CHAIRMAN. All right, let's accept it then on this basis: if it were
ſery clear to the Congress that these Radios would not be used in any
way simply to promote the official policy of the United States, that
it will be pure and simple untrammeled free news, and without any
coloration by the Government; do you think they would buy that?
Mr. JOHNSON. I would hope that they would feel that free and un-
trammeled news in these countries would be of interest to them.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any government that does that?
Mr. JoHNSON. Does what?


















70
The CHAIRMAN. That conducts for another government or another
people free and untrammeled news that is not designed for the pro-
motion of its own official policy? I don’t know of any precedent for
that. I don’t quite know why we should do it.
Mr. JoHNSON. I think we, as a people, feel that free and untram-
meled news both for our own people and people who do not receive free
and untrammeled news is in our interest; do we not? I mean, this is the
whole basis of our Society.
The CHAIRMAN. And you believe it is justified for us to be doing
this all over the world or any part of the world? -
Mr. JoHNSON. I believe it is justified for us to do so in areas which
do not have free and untrammeled news. Now, I wouldn’t carry that
to an extreme; I believe our interest
The CHAIRMAN. You are not doing it in Greece; are you?
Mr. JoEINSON. Pardon? -
The CHAIRMAN. Do you do it in Greece?
Mr. JoHNSON. No; we are not doing it in Greece.
The CHAIRMAN. How about China?
Mr. JoHNSON. No; we are not doing it in China. t
The CHAIRMAN. Why do you think the Russians should be the sole
recipients of our largesse?
Mr. JoHNSON. I think that our particular interests in Europe and
our particular interests in relations between ourselves and Western
Europe and the relationships of both Western Europe and ourselves
to Eastern Europe and to the Soviet Union make this a matter of par-
ticular interest and concern to the United States.
RADIOS INCONSISTENT WITH PRESIDENT's STATEMENT
The CHAIRMAN. I don’t quite see how it is consistent with the Presi-
dent's statement of principles of what he is apparently trying to
achieve in both Russia and China. It seems to me inconsistent with
it, even if it isn’t propaganda, if for no other reason than the assump-
tion that we are dealing with benighted people who are so ignorant
and backward we have to enlighten them even on daily news events
seems to me to be a presumption which wouldn’t be very flattering to
them. They are not all that backward. There are many countries that
I can think of—I had better not name them in public—which have
fewer facilities, I would think, and have just as rigid a censorship
as Russia does. There are quite a number of them that you well know,
which are under dictatorships and we do not feel that it is our duty
to do it in that case. k -
I think the only reason we are doing this here is the momentum. It
was started as a cold war agency and it has a big bureaucracy and you
have a vested interest in it and you want to continue it. It is a little
like the war in Vietnam; it is going on and it has a vested constituency
and there is no way to stop it and it goes on under its own momen-
tum. I guess that is what happens here until we go broke.
Thank you very much.
The committee is recessed.
(Whereupon at 11:20 a.m., the hearing was completed and the com-
mittee proceeded to meet in executive session.)

APPENDIX
SUMMARY OF RADIO FREE EUROPE—A PRELIMINARY ANNUAL REPORT
Following is a summary of portions Of the Preliminary Annual Report Sub
mitted May 31, 1972 by Radio Free Europe to the Secretary of State. -
The Preliminary Annual Report, COvering the period July 1, 1971—March 31,
1972, was in turn excerpted from RFE's regular Quarterly Operational Reports
for that period. A final Quarterly Report, and an Annual Report, will be avail-
able in due course following the close Of fiscal year 1972.
These reports are prepared for the information of the Directors of Radio Free
Europe, the members of RFE's West European Advisory Committee, and the
Department of State. Copies are available to Others On request while the supply
lasts or may be consulted at the offices of Radio Free Europe in New York.
This summary is confined to two subjects—Budget and Funding, and Content
Of Broadcasting. Not included in the Summary, for reasons Of brevity, are those
Sections Of the Quarterly Reports dealing With developments in East Europe,
public comment on RFE, and the annexes. - -
During the nine-month period under review, RFE broadcast a total of more
than 22,000 hours to its five audience COuntries. These programs provided 30
million listeners with a range Of news reporting, news analysis and press reviews
not otherwise available in East Europe. The Section On Content Of Broadcasting
describes RFE's reporting and analysis of major developments, and compares
this with the treatment of those subjects by East European media.
I. BUDGET AND FOINDING
Since July 1, 1971, RFE has maintained the integrity of its broadcasting service,
despite inadequate government funding, by using Cash assets including publicly
raised funds and by deferring Wage increases, a major pension payment and
Capital investment. - - -
These stop-gap measures are beginning to cause problems. The labor unions,
after what they consider a long period. Of patient Waiting, are demanding wage
increases. In New York the Newspaper Guild has filed a grievance calling for RFE
to pay the 8% increase required in its three year contract. They say they are
prepared to go to arbitration and then to the courts if RFE refuses.
A growing number of dissatisfied German technicians who are vital to the
oragnization are leaving us to seek higher wages elsewhere. In most cases it is
almost impossible to find replacements because of RFE's below-standard wages
and uncertain future. Within the past two Weeks Several key members Of Ameri-
can Management have also announced their intention to leave RFE.
During the three year period preceding July 1, 1971. Severe economy measures
were taken resulting in a reduction Of 126 employees. In addition, all non-radio
activities and 42 employees were terminated. Our efforts to economize have been
negated by the upward revaluation of European currency and the devaluation of
the dollar—over $4.8 million since October 1969 and an increase in 1972 of $1.4
million Over 1971. By the end Of the fiscal year almost all Cash assets will have
been Spent. -
Without reasonable Wage increases it is highly doubtful that the integrity of
the broadcasting Service can be maintained. -
We have, therefore, requested a supplemental appropriation for FY 72. The
request has been forwarded to the Office of Management and Budget.
(71)
72
RADIO FREE EUROPE—SUMMARY OF EXPENDITURES AND FUNDING AND STATUS OF ASSETS, FISCAL YEAR 1972
[In thousands of dollars]
July 1, 1971 to July 1, 1971 to
March 31, 1972 June 30, 1972
actual estimated
Expenditures/funding:
Expenditures:
Radio free Europe------------------------------------------------------ $15,767 $21,566
Non-RFF--------------------------------------------------------------- 390 548
Total---------------------------------------------------------------- 16, 157 22, 114
Funding:
Grant-U.S. Government------------------------------------------------- 12,660. 19,680
Reduction of cash assets------------------------------------------------- 2,415 2, 434
Pºit----------------------------------------------------------------- 1,082 --------------
Total---------------------------------------------------------------- 16, 157 22, 114
Status of cash assets (estimated through June 30, 1972):
Working capital—Actual July 1, 1971-------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - $1,321
Fund raising (estimated)------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1,010.
Miscellaneous income (estimated)-------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 104
Total assels---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1.2, 435
€SS:
Estimated expenses for RFE---------------------------------------------------------------------- 1,886
Estimated expenses for non-RFE phaseout and liquidation------------------------------------------ ** as 548
2, 434.
Total reduction in assets----------------------------------------------------------------------- -----
1
Balance (estimated) June 30, 1972------------------------------------------------------- -- - - - - - -
1 Does not include $788 1971 pension payment accrued but not yet paid.
II. CONTENT OF BROADCASTING
A. East–West Relations
Three major continuing developments demanded primary attention in the
field of East-West relations. Eagh of them was of direct concern to East European
populations. Yet the controlled media of East Europe provided only distorted or
incomplete information on each of the three.
1. Summit Meetings and Chinese Relations with the West.—The July announce-
ment that the President would visit China was treated with suspicion by Eastern
media (other than Rumanian) as an anti-Soviet move by the USSR's two rival
“superpowers.” Citing a wide range of Western press analysis and official state-
ments, RFE demonstrated the positive potential Of the meeting.
Again, regime media were cool to Peking's admission to the UN (in spite of
Soviet formal support of it), and critical of the new member's Conduct after
admission. RFE explained both the positive and negative elements of the UN
decisions on admission, and made sure that the Peking delegation's activities
were reported objectively and completely.
As the President's Peking visit approached, Eastern media reportage On the
subject was scanty and misleading: the U.S. and China were said to be “in collu-
sion,” Mr. Nixon was accused of exploiting Soviet-Chinese differences and Peking
of “betraying” Hanoi. To enable East European peoples to understand and form
their own judgments on the event, RFE provided extensive background on past
Chinese developments and in U.S.-Chinese relations; it reported the generally
held Western view that the meeting was a major historical event which could
contribute positively to world peace. Broadcasts on the event itself were among
the most extensive ever devoted by RFE to an international event: they totaled
2,321 minutes of original air time exclusive of newscasts. (Eastern television net-
works failed to take advantage of live TV coverage from China available through
Eurovision, so that RFE's hour-by-hour radio coverage provided the Only Con-
tinuing account of events for most East Europeans.) -
As the President’s Moscow visit approached, RFE used world press comment,
official statements and background analysis to help insure a clear, undistorted
understanding of this event by East Europeans.

73
2. Other Aspects of East-West Relations.—Throughout the period, RFE gave
special news and commentary attention to the potential for practical, mutually
beneficial East-West contact in economic and other fields. It gave particular notice
to the prospective enlargement of the Common Market by the entrance of Great
Britain and others, to the problems of over-centralization in Comecon at the
expense of individual East European economies, and to the consequent need for
a more realistic approach to trade, credit and other relations with the West by
Eastern leaders. RFE amplified the scanty East European reporting of Comecon
sessions by careful piecing-together of official statements and Western press re-
ports and evaluations. Rumania’s application to the Common Market for pref-
erential trade arrangements was reported and explained from Western and Yugo-
slav sources. RFE comment—supplemented by Western Official and media State-
ments—emphasized the need for Eastern leaders—beginning with the SovietS—
to recognize the reality of EEC and prepare to deal with it. On March 20,
Leonid Brezhnev made a foreign policy statement which said the USSR was “far
from ignoring the actual existing situation in Western Europe, including the
existence of such an economic situation as the ‘Common Market’”—a statement
interpreted by Western commentators as a possible breakthrough toward closer
East-West economic relations.
3. West German Treaties.—During the long process leading up to West Ger-
Iman ratification of treaties with Warsaw and MOSCOW, RFE news, press-review
and background programs contributed to understanding of democratic practices
in general and the significance of the West German debate in particular. Back-
ground broadcasts explained the ratification process in the two German houses,
while balanced coverage was given to the parliamentary debate itself. Together
they served to offset East European media attacks On German Opposition parties
as “hysterical” and determined to revive the cold war.
Meanwhile, coverage of the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Willy Brandt,
and Western comment on that event, provided a corrective to East European
propaganda giving credit exclusively to the Soviets for progress toward East-
West détente.
B. East European Affairs
RFE found numerous Occasions, between July 1971 and March Of this year, to
supply needed information and perspective On East European news develop-
ments to listeners whose leaders and media chose to play down important events
Or viewpoints. Among important topics Of the period were :
1. Intra-Bloc Pressure for Conformity.—Attacks on Rumania by her Warsaw
Pact partners, because of her independent initiatives in foreign affairs, as well as
polemics with Yugoslavia by the same group, were reminiscent of Soviet reaction
to Czechoslovak divergence in early 1968. To Hungarian and Czechoslovak audi-
ences, RFE pointed out how their media were being used, in this Soviet-inspired
campaign, against their neighbors and to the detriment of good relations among
East European nations. RFE broadcasts also reported Rumanian and Yugoslav
statements which these media suppressed. During the period of heightened ten-
sion, RFE minimized Original comment and relied on the multitude of reports
and editorials in Western and Eastern media. Tension increased further, during
the Crimean conference of all bloc leaders except (pointedly) Ceaucescu, but
was then abruptly eased at the end of the Summer by Brezhnev’s decision to visit
Tito and his reaffirmation. Of past guarantees Of Yugoslav freedom from Soviet
interference. In broadcasts to Czechoslovakia, RFE contrasted this MOSCOW atti-
tude with the COntinued denial Of Similar freedom to Prague.
The third anniversary Of the August 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia, and the 15th anniversary of the Soviet Suppression of the Hungarian
revolution, both were treated with virtual silence by Soviet and internal media.
RFE reported Western comment on, and worldwide observances of, the Hun-
garian anniversary, and devoted considerable air time to the Czechoslovak story.
In September, after suggestions from several Czechoslovak listeners, a series of
special programs reviewed the history of the “Prague Spring” and its aftermath.
particularly for the benefit of young listeners. The programs included expressions
Of Sympathy from Soviet citizens which had recently appeared in Russian “samiz-
dat” publications, as well as a newly published interview with the late Hungarian
Marxist philosopher Gyorgy Lukacs.
2. “Inside” Criticism.—The period produced a striking collection of criticisms
Of Communism-in-practice, and protests against Soviet conduct toward Czecho-
Slovakia, by highly qualified experts from inside the System—some of them cour-
ageous intellectuals still living in East Europe. Notable were :
74
A study by Prof. Leszek Kolakowski, probably Poland’s most renowned living
philosopher and now a teacher at Oxford University, for a dissident French Com
munist periodical, describing the system now imposed by the Soviets on Eas
Europe as “despotic socialism” incapable of reform without vigorous change, and
Calling freedom of information an indispensable condition for the proper func
tioning of the economy, of education, and of cultural activity. RFE broadcas
the Substance Of his ideas in a total of 14 programs reaching all five audiences
Three Poles still inside the country offered trenchant analyses of the shortcom
ings of Polish communism : Prof. Wlodzimierz Brus discussed current Polish
realities in an Italian Communist theoretical journal; RFE repored his analysis
to all five COUntries. In Paris appeared the fourth major Critical work of Veteral
Communist and former Education Minister Wladyslaw Bienkowski, often com
pared to Yugoslavia’s OutSpoken Milovan Djilas. It was entitled “The Sociology
Of Defeat”, and offered an informed analysis of Gomułka's 14-year leadership
RFE broadcast it into Poland in extenso. Also reaching the West was a shari
critical letter by Gomulka’s predecessor as Party leader, Edward Ochab, which he
had addressed to the Central Committee on the eve of the December Party Con-
gress; RFE broadcast its full text. -
In Czechoslovakia, Josef Smrkovsky, One of the four central poltical figures
of the Prague Spring, criticized the current leadership and state of socialism in
his country in an Italian leftist journal, thereby provoking a sharp debate be-
tween the official Czechoslovak and Italian Party dailies; the whole exchange was
reported in detail to RFE's five audience Countries.
In addition, RFE continued to report on disagreement by Western Commu-
nist Parties with the 1968 Soviet action in Czechoslovakia and the Subsequent
process of “consolidation” there. Notable cases were criticism by French Com-
munist dissidents, sparked by Brezhnev’s October visit to Paris; a strong dissent
on the Czechoslovak issue by the Italian Party’s Deputy Secretary Berlinguer;
and rejection of an effort to modify the British Party’s stand on the issue, at its
November Party Congress. All items had of course been ignored or distorted by
Czechoslovak media. -
3. Intellectual and Political Repressions.—Full airing of Communist effort to
control or suppress cultural freedom and intellectual dissent continued through-
Out the period. Specifically :
The Rumanian leadership’s “mini Cultural Revolution”, designed to harness
the nation’s journalists, writers, educational System and arts as ideological instru-
ments, was examined in eight RFE programs and reported as it developed there-
after. Rumanian Works banned under the new policy, such as Paul Goma’s
Ostimato, which was published in the West, as well as banned Western literature
and music, were read Or performed Over RFE.
Soviet intellecutal and political dissents, and Official reprisals against them,
were given little or no COverage by East European media : RFE made them
known by reports from responsible Western press Sources and roundups of
Western Opinion. A notable case was the trial Of Vladimir Bukovsky, who had
revealed details Of the forcible treatment of political dissidents by Soviet psy-
chiatric hospitals: RFE's programming included the full text of his eloquent
1,700-word Court plea. Also reported were the difficulties of Aleksandr Solzhein-
tsyn after he was voted the Nobel Prize in Literature, the same author’s letter to
the Russian Orthodox Patriarch reproaching him for subservience to the gov-
ernment and desertion of the people, and much material from Russian “samizdat.”
publications. -
The wave of arrests, around the turn of the year, of Czechoslovaks prominent
in the 1968 “Prague Spring” was reported extensively by all RFE services, as
were the resulting protests of Western intellecutals, the Italian Communist and
Socialist Parties, and others. RFE reviewed the long series of assurances from
Party leader Husak that there would be no staged political trials against those
prominent in the 1968 events, and broadcast the text of a newly revealed 1970
letter to HuSak from Milan Huebl, One or those arrested. -
4. Other Internal Affairs.—RFE reported fully back to Hungary the details
Of Cardinal Mindszenty’s departure from Budapest after 15 years Of asylum in
the American Embassy, his reception in Rome and his decision to take up resi-
dence in Vienna, in contrast to the brief and misleading references to these
events by Hungarian media.
RFE, reporting on Party and government actions in East Europe, Sought
to provide more balanced coverage with the aid of Western press reports and
analysis. In October RFE welcomed the Bulgarian Central Committee’s call On
75
he Politburo and Secretariat to keep the public as well as the CC regularly
informed about their work. In November it discussed the Validity Of the Prague
regime's pretense that its carefully organized election results signified genuine
)ublic Satisfaction with current Party and government poiicies—especially When
id against the regime's Open concern Over threats to its internal stability, and
he continued presence of Soviet troops. In December RFE reviewed policies
mplemented during the new Warsaw leadership's first year in Office.
J. Other Topics
1. U.S. Foreign Policy.—During this period, RFE continued to call attention
:0 the Specific OmissionS and distortions Of Eastern media with respect to U.S.
foreign policy. It provided an accurate account Of President Nixon's eight-point
peace plan for Vietnam, and of the major report to Congress by Secretary Rogers
bn U.S. foreign relations throughout the World. In the case Of the Rogers report,
it was only through RFE (or such other foreign broadcasters as might touch. On
ſhese points) that Bulgarians COuld learn that American relations with their
Bountry were “more limited” than with many other countries—that Czechoslovaks
Were informed that relations between Prague and Washington Were “unsatisfac-
Bory and strained” by arrests of American citizens and Prague's obstruction of
travel and academic exchanges—and that Hungarians could be assured that
the United States shared their desire to expand existing relations. The Secretary’s
favorable reference to U.S.-Polish relations, reported by the Polish agency PAP
but Only in its English-language news Service, Was fully COvered by RFE.
2. India-Pakistan, Crisis.-RFE reported extensively. On developments from
November On, refraining from taking sides but COmpensating for One-Sided East
European media COverage keyed to SOviet Support Of India.
3. Palestine Proposal.—King Hussein’s March proposal to Solve the Palestine
question by a federated-state formula was uniformly treated by East European
media, following the Soviet lead, as a probable deal between Jordan and Israel
and/or the United States. RFE Offered its listeners a chance to judge for them-
selves by reporting the reactions of the Western press, which were by no means
unanimous.
4. Sudan, COunter-004p.—Eastern COverage of the Coup d’etat in Sudan became
markedly laconic after the quick reversal of the situation by General Numeiry
with Egyptian and Libyan aid. RFE reportage and reviews of the Western press
demonstrated the setback to Soviet Middle East objectives and the way in which
Bulgarian and Czechoslovak regimes had shaped their postures in the affair to
SOviet interests.
5. U.S. ECOnomic Measures.—East European media gave extensive but often
tendentious coverage to the trade and monetary measures announced by Wash-
ington in August. RFE responded With Objective analyses Of the measures and
heir aims, plus a broad selection of varied Western press reaction.
6. Near Eclipse of a Nobel Prize Winner.—Awarding of the Nobel Prize in
Physics to Prof. Dennis Gabor—Hungarian-born but now a British citizen—Of-
fered an interesting example of Eastern news handling. Hungarian media Vir-
tually ignored Prof. Gabor in favor of the Chilean Communist poet Pablo Neruda,
until RFE broadcast an interview with Gabor : Three days later Radio Budapest
offered its own “interview”, adapted from the RFE material. However, when
the awards were presented in Stockholm, Hungarian media again ignored Gabor
if favor of Neruda, while an RFE correspondent reported the full ceremony.
7. Ecology.—The Worldwide and growing problems of curbing pollution and
protecting man’s environment, and their application to East Europe, received
increasing attention from RFE. A. Series of programs to Czechoslovakia was com-
pleted in January, similar programs to Bulgaria were under way, and research
was begun on the situation and anti-pollution efforts (or lack of them) in each
East European COuntry, looking toward the June international conference on
the Subject in Stockholm. .
RADIO LIBERTY-A PRELIMINARY ANNUAL REPORT
DETENTE, DISSENT AND RADIO LIBERTY
Operations and Funding
Budget Cuts, increased Operating costs due in part to currency revaluations,
and uncertainties over passage of legislation for authorization and funding dur-
ing FY 1972 have forced Radio Liberty to retrench its operations. Only through






76
reduction of ancillary and support activities has it been possible to continu
reaching the audience in the Soviet Union on an undiminished broadcastin
Schedule.
Liquidation of the Institute for the Study of the USSR and stringent economic
in programming Support Operations allowed Radio Liberty to maintain regula
programming in each Of its 20 language Services and full transmitter time. Dur
ing the last quarter of FY 1972, Radio Liberty was on the air 24 hours a da
from 17 transmitters in Germany, Spain, and Taiwan. Despite budget cuts, pro
gram Support bureaus in New York, LOndon and Paris remained Open to serve thi
Central StudiOS in Munich. - -
Details of the retrenchments in expenditures in FY 1972 follow. Althoug
Operating costs for Radio Liberty to maintain the same level of Operations il
FY 1972 as FY 1971 were anticipated at $14,600,000, RL had to operate unde
continuing resolutions based on the FY 1971 approp. through February 22, 1972
The following cutbacks in Operating expenses were made starting in July 1971:
. Headquarters salary increases and all promotions postponed.
Purchases of books and publications were reduced.
Home leaves Were Suspended.
Freelance contributions and Overtime pay were reduced.
Essential maintenance and repairs were deferred.
When appropriations legislation for FY 1972 Was passed in December 1971
the level of appropriation was cut from the proposed authorization of $36,000,000
for both RL and RFE to $32,000,000. Further continuing resolutions and funding
for the last half of FY 1972 were based on this level, which meant that RL was
forced to absorb in the second half of the fiscal year a reduction in appropriations
from $13,880,000 to $12,320,000 while operations were at the level of $14,478,000
In addition to the cutbacks listed above, the following major retrenchments
became necessary in January 1972:
1. The Institute for the Study of the USSR, an auxiliary operation, was
closed down.
2. Including the Institute staff, approximately 10 percent Of the Staff Of
RL was discharged. - -
The total staff terminations for RL and the Institute represented a decrease in
authorized personnel strength from 1004 to 891. -
Despite these reductions and the retrenchments On Services made earlier, it
was impossible for RL to remain Within its appropriation of $12,320,000. Th
expense of terminating Staff members Was higher in almost all instances than th
cost of keeping them on the payroll, but with Radio Liberty’s future funding
uncertain, it would have been fiscally irresponsible not to take this action. Be-
cause of high costs, including $950,000 for devaluation of the dollar and the One-
time-only liquidation and termination expenses of $900,000, RL was forced to
dig deep into its working capital and to request use of a liquidation reserve which
will be applied when received in Order to meet expenses. The total expenditures
for FY 1972 are expected to reach approximately $14,478,000.
The proposed budget of $14,820,000 for FY 1973 is therefore only $342,000
higher than the expenditures for FY 1972 and may actually come Out lower
than FY 1972 expenditures if further inflation and currency revaluations are
taken into account. The $2,500,000 increase over FY 1972 appropriations is in-
tended to cover mandatory expenses for resumption of payments for Within:
grade salary increases, deferred promotions, cost-Of-living and Other increases
due to inflation, free-lance contributions and premium pay for Overtime, pur.
chases of books and publications, deferred maintenance and repairs, as Well as
rent increases and foreign currency revaluations. Unless Such expenses can be
met by adequate funding in FY 1973, the quality of future Operations Will be
imperiled. -
i

Programming
On the eve of President Nixon's arrival in Moscow, a group of Soviet Scientists
and scholars led by Academician Andrei D. Sakharov made declarations of theil
hopes for the President's visit. One of them, the historian Alexei Tumerman, Was
immediately arrested. As soon as word of this declaration reached the West
Radio Liberty's newscasts broadcast Sakharov’s words (uttered in the name
of the Soviet Human Rights Committee) :
“Soviet-American talks should favor greater tolerance between Socialist and
capitalist countries . . . because ideological conflicts and the struggle for firs'
place in the world and for spheres of influence are terribly dangerous and coun
* =w
( ſ.
for little compared with such Worldwide problems as food and health . . . social
progress, and the guarantee Of freedom and Security for each human being.”
Sakharov and Others also expressed their Wish for the end Of arrests and the
release Of those already jailed Or interned in psychiatric hospitals “because of
heir ideas and their efforts to live freely in accordance With their ideas.”
Sakharov’s is Only One Of many dissenting domestic voices which have been
heard by SOviet citizens through Radio Liberty broadcasts. RL gives Special
prominence to Such unofficial Voices, but its broadcasts are by nO means aimed
Only at the disaffected Or alienated. RL sees Open manifestations of dissent merely
as the tip Of the iceberg Of a COncealed public Opinion, representing views and
aspirations which are held in One Or another degree by large numbers Of Soviet
citizens, including many whose loyalty to their System is undoubted.
Radio Liberty’s fundamental approach to detente is spelled out in its Policy
Manual: “IDetente is an objective on which the peoples of the Soviet Union
and the United States can agree. However, achievement of detente rests to a large
extent on mutual confidence. This raises the issue of Open versus closed SOcieties,
propaganda versus free access to information.”
Last July, the Soviet Human Rights Committee, founded in 1970 by a group
of scientists headed by the same Academician Sakharov, affiliated with the
International Institute for Human Rights in Strasbourg. This action signalled the
coming of age of what is now generally called the “Democratic Movement” in
the Soviet Union, and the growing recognition, in the Outside world, Of the MOve-
ment’s efforts to bring about detente with the West and liberalization at home.
The link between internal liberalization and detente is implicit in the title
of Sakharov’s book “Progress, Intellectual Freedom, and Coea;istence.”
However, Sakharov’s book is Only One Of the thousands of dOcuments, unpub-
lished in the USSR, that have reached Radio Liberty, now the prime center in
the West for collating this unique source of uncensored information about the
USSR. Reading from and discussions Of these documents Of “Samizdat” (WIritings
circulated in type script to avoid censorship) now make up about 25% of RL's
Russian feature broadcasts, 30% in Ukrainian and a high percentage of its 18
Other languages Of broadcast.
Also, as a Service to Scholars, journalists and government Specialists, the RL
annotated and indexed “Samizdat Archive,” now grown to 22 volumes, is Supplied
to a number Of institutions for further dissemination : to the Library Of Congress ;
the Center for International Studies at MIT; and the Center for Slavic and East
European Studies at Ohio State University, as well as Several European Centers.
Many of the themes Of Samizdat—and thus Of Radio Liberty—were topics Of
discussion when President Nixon met with the SOviet leaders in MOSCOW last
month. Through their Own Official media, Soviet citizens could learn next to noth-
ing about the Vast quantities Spent by their government. On armaments, the pro-
Osals for arms control made over the years by the United States, debates On
the Subject going On abroad and—privately—within the Soviet Scientific COm-
munity. This they got from Voices from abroad, chiefly from Radio Liberty.
Pollution—also a prime concern. Of Sakharov and his aSSOciates—has also been
given less than full treatment in SOviet media, in which Only “approved” debates
are aired. This year, as in previous years, RL has deepened its listeners' knowledge
of the subject—including the Soviet Union's own pressing and unsolved prob-
lems—by broadcasting the texts of Samizdat and reporting On the support Of the
international Scientific community for their SOviet colleagues, thus helping to
build pressures toward international agreements. Another subject, expansion Of
East-West contacts, was dealt with in a Semi26tat book by a biologist, Zhores
Medvedev, whom Soviet authorities incarcerated in a psychiatric hospital but sub-
Sequently released when Soviet scientists rallied around him and his case became
an international cause celebre.
The phenomenon. Of Samizdat is not confined to individual documents. There
are also periodicals, laboriously typed Over and Over again in many copies. Social
Problems, edited by the brilliant young physicist, Valery Chalidze, is the Organ
of the Human Rights Committee. The Chronicle of Current Events records illegal
acts perpetrated by government authorities and reports On the activities Of those
Who are fighting for human rights. The Ukrainian. Herald is similar to the
Chronicle but comes out in the Ukrainian language; Ea:0ſlus is the organ of Soviet
Jews, and has been effective, along with publicity abroad, in pressing the govern-
ment to permit thousands Of Jews to emigrate to Israel. For all such uncensored
publications, Radio Liberty has served as an echo chamber, beaming the text
back, Often into tape recorders.
















78
The Jewish dissent movement in the USSR has been a topic Of continueſ
emphasis in RL programming during the past year. It has been treated in Severa
Way S :
(1) Verbatim broadcast back to the Soviet audience of Samizdat, letter
petitions, issues Of the Chronicle of Current Events, etc., which document thi
regimes's violation of the civil and human rights of Soviet Jews and which
articulate their demands for emigration to Israel;
(2) NewScasts about hunger Strikes, sit-ins, and Other forms of protest by
Soviet Jews; news of arrests and other harassment. This information goe:
unreported in the SOViet media ; RL regularly reports to its Soviet listener:
about these internal events which are Of interest not Only to the Jewish
population but also to Other nationalities deprived of their rights;
(3) Reports of support inside the Soviet Union for the Jewish dissenters
leading Russian and Ukrainian intellectuals (Sakharov, Chalidze, Dziuba)
have championed the cause Of SOviet Jews;
(4) Reports of support outside the Soviet Union for the Jewish dissenters
On the part Of American and Western European public Opinion, Jewish and
non-Jewish ; for example, COverage Of Such events as the “Day Of Solidarity
with Soviet Jewry” in the United States on April 30, 1972; interviews with
U.S. Congressmen, leading academics and recent Soviet Jewish emigres;
(5) ReportS On the exodus to ISrael : information COncerning the numbel
of arrivals from the USSR in 1971–72; interviews about their new life and
their Continued efforts On behalf Of their friends and relatives Still in the
Soviet Union ;
(6) Anniversary programs COmmemorating events Of historical and Spirit-
ual significance for Soviet Jews: 30 years since the Babi Yar massacre ; Yom
Kippur, Chanukah and Other religious holidays.
As a result Of the above-described programming, RL is a vital medium for
Soviet listenel's concerned with the Jewish dissent movement. Among the evi-
dence availabie is the following quote from an appeal by recent emigres to Israel
to the United States Senate :
“Most of us, the undersigned, just arrived from Russia. We still remember
Very Well these evening hours during Which We tried to get and listen to the voice
Of the free World. Sometimes it was very difficult to Catch the voice—the Soviets
are doing everything to Silence the transmission . . . [With Out Radio Liberty]
the GOld War will increase, because nobody inside Russia will be abie to Say a
WOrd about the real affairs Of their government and in a Certain measure to in-
fluence the little public Opinion in their COuntry.”
The appearance in the West Over the past year Of thousands Of Jewish emi-
grants, many Of them highly educated professionals from all walks of life, has
provided RE. With unparalleled evidence Of effectiveness.
The extent Of the Ukrainian democratic movement may be judged partly b
the efforts taken Since the beginning Of this year to Crush it. Arrests and *
trials have been reported via Sahvićdai and Western Correspendents, which indi-
Cate that at least 200 Ukrainian intellectuals have been arrested. These include
the historian Valentin Moroz, the mathematician Leonid Piiushch, the literary
critics Svitlichny, Sverstiuk and Dziuba, the radio-tv journalist Chornovil, the
professor of journalism Michael OSadchy. According to the Ukrainian, Herald,
One Of them, the physician Mukola PlachtOniuk, was asked to give up his position
at the Kiev Miedical Institute by the Institute’s dean, who explained that if
Plachtoniuk were fired, “in two days, “Liberty’ will howl about it.” Although
Such periods of repression alternate with periods of relative freedom Of eXpres-
sion, virtually all of those involved in the democratic movement welcome pub-
licity, since it not only helps to spread their ideas, but gives them reason to be-
lieve that they will not disappear without a trace Or a protest. In May, Radio
JLiberty carried a statement of eleven U.S. Senators and Congressmen, asking
that American newspapermen be allowed to attend the trial Of these intellectualS.
Ukrainians and Soviet Jews, of course, are not the only national and religious
groups that concern RL. Russians make up only slightly more than half of the
|USSR’s population, and the non-Russians, living for the most part in peripheral
areas, have their Own distinct Cultures and aspirations. -
The past year has been One Of particular significance to the Moslems of Central
Asia and for the inhabitants Of the three Baltic republics, particularly for Lith-
uania. The case of the Crimean Tatars—deported by Stalin during the Second
World War—has been an important Source Of Samizdat, including petitions
signed by three million persons asking that the Crimean Tatars be permitted to

79
'eturn to their homes. In Lithuania, where police Struggled for two days in May
With demonstrators shouting “Freedom for Lithuania,” 17,054 Roman Catholics
signed a petition enumerating acts Of persecution and demanding the right to ex-
3rcise their faith freely. -
The Soviet Listener’s Economic Life ‘. .
RL's economic research, policy guidance and programming concentrate pri-
marily On how Soviet economic performance and the System Of planning, manage-
ment and incentives affect listeners as producers and GOnSumerS.
During the past year, Six main themes have been emphasized : -
(1) A detailed analysis of all aspects of the current Five Year Plan covering
the period 1971–75 using both Western analysis and also propagating the think-
ing Of liberal Soviet economists (which generally appears in low-circulation, Spe-
Bialist journals) On Such topics as the structure of the economy, consumption
Versus investment, regional economics and the public Versus the private Sector.
(2) Prospects for Soviet economic growth during the coming decade. Based
On a NATO symposium devoted to this theme, RL has explained to specialist and
non-specialist listeners the experts’ projections for future economic growth, What
these will mean for the population, and what Courses Of actions are Open to the
Soviet leadership. -
(3) The unresolved problems Of Soviet agriculture which result in the poorest
diet of any major developed economy and a brake upon overall economic growth.
. (4) International economic relations, i.e., foreign trade and aid, with special
reference to the prospects for increased East-West trade, the enhanced integra-
tion of Comecon, the changing attitude toward the EEC and the Soviet stance at
UNCTAD. -
(5) A COntinuing examination of the use and abuse Of economic statistics and
SOviet disinformation Concerning Other nations.
(6) The Soviet response to environmental disruption. RL has examined do-
mestic aspects such as the incidence and Scale Of pollution, COnServation, the
economics Of pollution, Organization of COunter-measures, legislation, deterrence
and public attitudes. Strict control of Soviet media has meant that, without
foreign radio, the Soviet officials, executives and technicians concerned, as well
as the broad public, are poorly informed as to the Success and shortcomings Of
Other nations in curbing environmental disruption. It has also meant that only
“approved” debates are aired : thus, the misgivings of some Soviet Scientists re-
garding the harmful ecological effects Of SST flights have not been disseminated
by Radio Moscow, but they have been aired by R.L. -
SOAyiet Citizens 0%d the WO?"ld,
Radio Liberty, like other broadcasters, gives extensive coverage to interna-
tional life and developments in countries other than the USSR. Its unique con-
tribution among radios heard in the Soviet Union is that its emigre staff,
and its research and monitoring facilities, make it possible to take into account
the interests of the listener and what he has been told—or not told—by Soviet
domestic media. During the past year, RL has dealt exhaustively with the proc-
esses and debates that Culminated not Only with the MOSCOW agreements but also
with ratification last Of month of West Germany’s treaties with Moscow and
Warsaw. It has similarly followed the latest moves toward the unification of
Western Europe and encouraged the growing Soviet awareness that the USSR
must accept the Common Market as a vital fact Of international life.
The epochal visit of President Nixon to China, played down in the Soviet
Central press and Virtually ignored in the MOSłem areas of Soviet Central
Asia which Only RL (among Western broadcasters) reaches in the local lan-
guages, was covered in straight reports and in extensive press round-ups. RL
Scrapped regular programming to give extensive coverage to world comments on
the death of Nikita Krushchev, on which it scooped the USSR's own media by
nearly two days; this event was followed by RL almost immediately with
retroSpectives employing taped excerpts from Krushchev’s Speeches and other
audio as well as analyses of the impact Khrushchev made during the decade he
ruled the country. -
Audience Reaction and Regime Counter-Measures
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, widely acclaimed as the Soviet Union's greatest liv-
ing Writer, went out of his way to praise Radio Liberty in his only press
interview of recent years: “If we ever hear anything about events in this
country, it’s through them.” Solzhenitsyn also commented on One of his favorite
RL programs in a subsequent letter to a Western scholar :
80
“I have long been listening with Spiritual enjoyment to Radio Liberty O
Sunday nights, whenever it has been possible, to the sermons of a doctor O
philosophy, Father Alexander, and I am struck by how genuinely modern an
elevated is his style of preaching . . . and I have thought : that is whose temple
that is whose Services I should like to attend. One night recently I heard hi
talk about my letter to the Patriarch and was COmpletely moved. Please show
him this letter Or tell him what is in it. I bow low to him.”
|U.S. correspondents reporting the Soviet Scene from Moscow have helped t
document the impact of Radio Liberty (in a country where normal audience
research practices are Out of the question). Charlotte Saikowski reported in th
Christian Science Monitor on May 12 that recent questioning of the value O
Radio Liberty was followed with great concern by “knowledgeable Russians.
She singled out a statement by One of them :
“‘If they Only knew how we count on these broadcasts to tell us what i
going On, they WOuld not think about the COst,’ commented One SOviet in
tellectual with genuine feeling. ‘That is the best gift the United States can
give us.’” -
The Chicago Tribune published on March 25, a letter from Gherman Smirnow
sky, MOSCOW intellectual and physicist, pleading for continuation of Radić
Liberty. The author reported with respect to “agitation to make things public
for civil rights” that “the biggest influence in this has been Radio Liberty.”
The Washington Post on April 9, published a long article entitled “Radić
Liberty and the Russians” by Susan Jacoby, who had recently returned from
a two-year MOSCOW assignment. Following is an excerpt :
“On a Snowy day during the winter of 1971, an unidentified young man
from a small village arrived at the Moscow apartment of Andrei Amalrik
author of ‘Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984' and “Involuntary Journey
to Siberia.” The young man had heard On the radio that Amalrik had been Sen.
tenced to three years in a labor camp, and he wanted to do something to help
“Because Amalrik Wanted COmments from readers, his home address had been
broadcast several months earlier when his books were read Over Radio Liberty.
“Conservative Soviet citizens often Oppose Radio Liberty’s contention that
complete freedom of information should prevail in their country, but they,
too, Want to hear ideas that do not necessarily fit into the Official Soviet version
of reality. “After all,” says One Soviet journalist, ‘you can always turn Off the
radio if you don’t want to hear Something.’”
Since the MOSCOW Summit meeting, the Soviet Union has shown no sign O
àbating its jamming Of foreign broadcasts. In the case of RL, this mean
round-the-clock electronic interference on all frequencies, usually from multiple
jammer sites. (The jamming is, of course, only partially effective.) A key to
continuing opposition to the free flow of information is to be found in a Pravda
editorial published on the eve of President Nixon's departure from the Soviet
Dnion. Commenting On the results Of the summit, Pravda wrote:
“. . . It is necessary to continue in future to carry on unremitting struggle
against the aggressive imperialist forces, against any and all Opponents Of peace
and the Security Of the peoples.
“. . . the Communist Party Of the Soviet Union does not retreat a single Step
from its ideological positions, from the unshakable principles Of Marxism-
Leninism . . .”
As President Nixon noted in his June 11 address to a joint session of Congress.
“We must remember that Soviet ideology still proclaims hostility to Some of
America’s most basic values.”
Something of the official attitude toward détente in relation to political liber.
alization is witnessed by this report in the Christian Science Monitor of May 27,
“Hundreds of known dissidents in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev were arrested,
interned, or drafted [in conjunction with the Summit].”
RADIO FREE EUROPE AND THE PENTAGON PAPERS
(Supplied by Free Europe, Inc.)
The policy which has governed Radio Free Europe's coverage of the Pentagon
papers story has been to broadcast the broadest possible spectrum of published
articles, however delicate or controversial, from respected Western press Organs.
at the same time scrupulously avoiding editorial comment which would associate
81
FE directly Or inadvertently with either the US government's position or that
f the American newspapers. (*) In short, RFE's conscious role has been that
f an intermediary—providing East European listeners with the facts, opinions,
nd analyses available to informed citizens in the West, and thereby encouraging
hem to decide for themselves on the manifold aspects of the affair by supplying
he where withal for the formation of independent judgment. -
Implicitly, the case is a trenchant illustration of one of the fundamental dif-
erences between American-style democracy and the pervasive political control
hich characterizes the East European systems—that of a free versus a con-
rolled press, a press which serves the broad interests of institutions and prin-
iple in a democratic society or the more narrowly defined and controlled inter-
sts Of party policy in a communist state. On this issue as well the lines of
pinion were drawn not by RFE, but by the station’s accurate reflection of
Western opinion. -
The primary philosophical aspects of the case—a free and unhampered press
s an important keystone of a truly democratic Order; the right of the govern-
ent to exercise censorship in the interest of national security; and the right,
ndeed the obligation, of both parties to turn to an independent judiciary to
resolve the dispute—were treated in the fullest fashion by the extensive broad-
asting of Western press commentaries. From the point of view of policy, it
was not the task of RFE to propagandize an issue which by its nature would
have lent itself to such treatment. As the summaries of all RFE programs and
he translations of representative scripts appended hereto show, RFE did not
lwell on the respective degrees of press freedom in the two systems. If criticism
f the East European controlled press emerged, it was generated in the mind of
he listener by the inevitable and striking comparison offered him by simply
being informed of the matter. This form of coverage reflects Radio Free Europe's
eneral sense of purpose in its news broadcasts and its overriding concern to
end the greatest credibility to the news it broadcasts. With an eye to these
principles, the radio did not conceive of its central role as that of replying to
he criticism of the disclosures of the Pentagon papers which appeared inevitably
n the communist press. Such accusations as that of the Czechoslovak media
hat the affair has confirmed the collapse of freedom of the press in the US, or
he Soviet TASS news agency's claim that the documents showed that successive
JS administrations had practiced “official duplicity,” were not responded to
irectly. The desire to avoid being taken for a participant in the controversy or
supporter of a particular position precluded any counter polemics. When and
f a reply was deemed necessary it was accomplished not by associating RFE
ith one or another position in the controversy, but rather by drawing the simple
:ontrast—in a low-keyed, somewhat ironic fashion—between actual or hypo-
hetical cases of press restraint in Eastern Europe. . . . .
Finally, as the program summaries prepared for internal RFE use (see
ºppendix I) and the radio script themselves (see Appendix II) indicate, the
tation's news programs have tended to focus on the issues of substance and/or
political philosophy which have emerged from the Pentagon papers dispute,
rather than on the political infighting, rivalries, repercussions, or personalities
in the affair. While RFE listeners were made aware of secondary aspects such
s the reported role of Mr. Ellsberg, or the statements of Senators Goldwater
nd Symington, they would, on the basis of information supplied by Radio Free
Europe and denied to them by their domestic media, tend to focus on the more
important issues. If the typical East European listener were to draw a lesson
from RFE's presentation of this important news event it would be this—that in
its essential aspects the crisis of the Pentagon papers demonstrated that even
in times of internal division in the US, the general political consensus concern-
ing the recourse to institutional guarantees for the Orderly resolution of funda-
mental political disputes—the very core of American democracy—remains
intact.
1 Exceptions to this rule were a Hungarian commentary of 16 June (see Appendix 1 for
summary) in which the viewpoint of The New York Times was taken, and some comments
in a Polish roundtable discussion on 5 July (see Appendix 1 for summary) in which the
motives of the New York Times were questioned. An exchange of differing views is, of
course, an inherent feature of roundtable discussions.





























82
MAY 10, 1972.
OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, STATEMENT
- BY THE PRESIDENT
Under Public Law 92–264, which I signed on March 30, 1972, grants in support
of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were authorized through the end of
fiscal year 1972.
The decision to continue Government support for these radios was approved
by large majorities in the Congress and reflects the judgment that has been ex:
pressed overwhelmingly by newspapers throughout this country and by leading
citizens in all walks of life that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty continue
to perform a unique and Valuable service. As I stated in a recent letter to the
Chairman of the Radio Free Europe Fund,
“. . . We have followed closely the work of RFE and are satisfied that
it Continues to Serve a fundamental national interest.”
I also said that - -
“. . . the free flow of information and ideas among nations is indispensable
to more normal relations between East and West and to better prospects
for an enduring peace.”
I have therefore asked the Secretary of State to submit today a bill which
would continue Government support to the radios through fiscal year 1973. A
With the fiscal year 1972 authorization, this bill would make the grants to th
radios through the Secretary of State under such terms and conditions as he
deems appropriate. -
A number of different views have been expressed in the Congress as to how the
radios might best be funded for the future. No consensus on this important mat-
ter has emerged. The House Version of the fiscal year 1972 authorization an
Senate Resolution 272 make clear that majorities in both Houses believe this
should be given further study before a definitive solution is adopted.
To this end, I plan to appoint a Presidential Study Commission with instruc-
tions to render its report and recommendations by February 28, 1973, so that the
Administration and the Congress can take them into consideration in formulating
authorizing legislation for fiscal year 1974. In making its study, the Commission
will be particularly concerned to COnsult exhaustively with members Of the
Congress. -
In undertaking this task, the Commission will have the benefit and will take
full account of the in-depth studies of each radio that were prepared by the Con-
gressional Research Service at the request of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee together with companion studies recently completed by the General Ac-
counting Office. Two subsequent studies by the Congressional Research Service—
one a survey and analysis of the available options with respect to future funding
methods and the other an examination of the foreign policy aspects Of these
broadcasting operations—will also materially assist the Commission.
It is evident that the choice of the method or mechanism for future funding Of
the radios must depend upon a proper perception of the relationship Of those
operations to the national interest and specifically to this nation’s foreign policy
objectives. In my view, that relationship exists for One fundamental reason, but
one reason only : namely, that it has always been and must always be part Of Our
national purpose to promote free, responsible communication among nations, not
just at the government level, but at all levels. Thus, these radios are not Spokes-
men for American official policy—that role belongs in broadcasting to the Voice
of America. Rather, they are expressions of Our profound COnviction that a re-
sponsible, independent and free press plays an indispensable part in the SOcial
and political processes that look to better understanding and more effective
COOperation.
It is this conception, I believe, that lies at the base of that article of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights which declares it to be the right Of everyOne
“to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and re-
gardless of frontiers.” International broadcasting is of course only a part of that
process; our international exchange programs are another important part.
The Commission will render a great service by undertaking a Critical examina-
tion of this subject and by providing the best possible basis for determining the
methods by which support for these valuable Organizations can be maintained
without impairment to the professional independence upon which their present
effectiveness depends.
83
While this Commission produces its recommendations, it is essential that the
uthorization providing Support to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty be ex-
ended for fiscal year 1973. While I continue to believe that the Department of
tate is not the appropriate channel for grants to the two radios, I believe that
iscussion of the alternatives should be deferred until We have the benefit of the
ecommendations of the Commission. I therefore Strongly recommend that the
ill which we are submitting to the Congress for a 1973 authorization be given
avorable consideration before the beginning of the new fiscal year.
O
ić -
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
(OMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
EXECUTIVE L, 92D CONGRESS, 2D SESSION
THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE
LIMITATION OF ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS (ABM
TREATY)
AND THE
INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITA-
TION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (INTERIM AGREE-
MENT), INCLUDING AN ASSOCIATED PROTOCOL, SIGNED IN
MOSCOW ON MAY 26, 1972
AND
S.J. Res. 241 and S.J. Res. 242
JUNE 19, 20, 21, 26, 28, AND 29, AND JULY 20, 1972
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
§
peposſ-ract, BY THE
R J N TED STATES C F A
* Firº (c. A
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
(OMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
EXECUTIVE L, 92D CONGRESS, 2D SESSION
THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE
LIMITATION OF ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS (ABM
TREATY)
AND THE
INTERIM. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITA-
TION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (INTERIM AGREE-
MENT), INCLUDING AN ASSOCIATED PROTOCOL, SIGNED IN
MOSCOW ON MAY 26, 1972
AND
S.J. Res. 241 and S.J. Res. 242
JUNE 19, 20, 21, 26, 28, AND 29, AND JULY 20, 1972
Printed for the use Of the Committee On Foreign Relations
§§
TJ.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
80–942 O WASHINGTON : 1972
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
GALE W. MCGEE, Wyoming JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois
WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR., Virginia
CARL MARCY, Chief of Staff
ARTHUR M. KUHL, Chief Clerk
NOTE.-Sections of these hearings have been deleted at the request of the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Department Of Defense On the ground that such
deletions are in the interests of national Security. Deleted material is indicated
by the notation [deleted] or [Deleted.].
(II)
C O N T E N T S
Statements by:
Bennett, Roy, Americans for Democratic Action; accompanied by Page
John Isaacs, legislative representative- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 291
Brennan, Donald G., senior fellow, professional staff, Hudson In-
stitute----------------------------------------------------- 186
Buckley, Hon. James L., U.S. Senator from New York_____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 256
Burch, Cordell, Northern Virginia Committee for Victory Over Com-
munism---------------------------------------------------- 335
Clark, Hon. Joseph, former U.S. Senator, chairman, the Coalition on
National Priorities and Military Policy------------------------- 271
Dornan, James, member, Board of Policy, Liberty Lobby, and as-
sistant professor, Department of Politics, Catholic University;
accompanied by L. A. Hooser, legislative aide, Liberty Lobby----- 306
Garwin, Richard L., IBM Watson Laboratory, Yorkton Heights,
Calif------------------------------------------------------- 349
Goldberger, Marvin L., chairman, Department of Physics, Princeton
University-------------------------------------------------- 345
Gottlieb, Sanford, executive director, SANE, Citizens’ Organization
for a Sane World-------------------------------------------- 319
Hoffmann, Stanley, professor of government, chairman, West European
Studies; faculty member of the Center for International Affairs,
Harvard University------------------------------------------ 191
Kº Jerome H., senior fellow, Brookings Institution, Washington,
* *-* - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 201
Kennedy, Hon. Edward M., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts__ _ _ _ _ _ _ 245
Kolkowicz, Prof. Roman, Department of Political Science at UCLA_ _ _ 142
Laird, Hon. Melvin R., Secretary of Defense; accompanied by Paul H.
Nitze, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, SALT-- - - - - - - - 60
Morrer, Adm. Thomas H., U.S. Navy, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff; accompanied by Lt. Gen. Royal S. Allison, U.S. Air Force,
Assistant to the Chairman for Strategic Arms Negotiations, and
Col. Robert M. Lucy, U.S. Marine Corps, Legal Adviser, Legisla-
tive Assistant to the Chairman, JCS.---------------------------- 65
Panofsky, Wolfgang K. H., director, Stanford Linear Accelerator
Center, Stanford University, California_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 357
Rathjens, George W., Council for a Livable World_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 297
Rogers, Hon. William P., Secretary of State_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 3
Schlafly, Phyllis, member, National Board of Directors, Association
of Pro America---------------------------------------------- 324
Shulman, Dr. Marshall, director of Russian Institute at Columbia
University-------------------------------------------------- 137
Smith, Hon. Gerard C., Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency----------------------------------------------- 20
Teller, Dr. Edward, associate director, Lawrence Radiation Labora-
tory, Livermore, Calif---------------------------------------- 219
Tucker, Prof. Robert C., director of the Russian Studies Program at
Princeton University ------------------------------------- 133
Warnke, Paul C., former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-
national Security Affairs-------------------------------------- 178
IV
Insertions for the record: Page
Text of Senate Joint Resolution 241, 92d Congress, second session---- 2
Text of Senate Joint Resolution 242, 92d Congress, second session---- 2
“The Arms Accord: Everyone Gains,” article by Alton H. Quanbeck
and Barry M. Blechman, the Washington Post, June 4, 1972------ 29
“Missile Numbers Game,” article from the New York Times, June
19, 1972---------------------------------------------------- 46
Questions by Senator Percy and responses of Secretary Rogers------ 51
Questions by Senator Percy and responses of Ambassador Smith_ _ _ _ 53
“The Soviet Naval Threat: Reality and Illusion,” the Defense Moni-
tor, Center for Defense Information, volume 1, No. 1, May 1972.____ 75
Time needed for ABM system to be effective, supplied by Department -
of Defense-------------------------------------------------- 86
Working paper on provisions of SALT Agreements, Senator Henry M.
Jackson---------------------------------------------------- 90
Unilateral statement by U.S. Delegation to SALT, May 20, 1972, and
comment by Secretary Nitze, supplied by Department of Defense-- 101
Different ranges of the strategic cruise missile, Supplied by Depart-
ment of Defense--------------------------------------------- 103
Excerpt from testimony of Secretary of Defense in “Strategic and
Foreign Policy Implications of the ABM Systems,” hearings before
the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament
Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 91st
Congress first session, part I---------------------------------- 111
Selected Portions of National Security Act of 1947, supplied by
Department of Defense--------------------------------------- 117
Questions by Senator Fulbright and responses of Secretary Liard_ _ _ _ 124
Questions by Senator Percy and responses of Secretary Laird-- - - - - - 130
Biographic sketch of Dr. Roman Kolkowicz----------------------- 147
“The Arms Race: What's the Hurry?”, article from the Washington
Post, June 26, 1972------------------------------------------ 161
Prepared statement of Paul C. Warnke, former Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs-------------------- _ _ _ 183
Biographical sketch of Donald G. Brennan_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 190
Prepared statement of Stanley Hoffmann, professor of government,
chairman of West European Studies, and faculty member of the
Center for International Affairs Harvard University - - - - - - - - - - - - - 197
Prepared statement of Dr. Jerome H. Kahan---------------------- 210
Comments on the Moscow Agreement, by Edward Teller, University
of California------------------------------------------------ 224
Iletter and supplemental statement from Dr. Edward Teller, June
30, 1972---------------------------------------------------- 243
Prepared statement of Senator James L. Buckley------------------ 262
“Salt and Afterward,” the Defense Monitor, vol. 1, No. 3, June 30,
1972------------------------ - - - - - - - - - — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 274
Prepared statement of Joseph S. Clark, chairman of the Coalition on
National Priorities and Military Policy------------------------- 287
Prepared statement of George W. Rathjens_-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 301
Prepared statement of Dr. James S. Dornan, Jr., special consultant,
Liberty Lobby-----------------------------... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 311
Prepared statement of Sanford Gottlieb, executive director of SANE
A Citizens’ Organization for a SANE World_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 321
Prepared Statement of Phyllis Schlafly--------------------------- 329
Attachments to statement of Dr. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky--------- 367
, V
Appendix:
Remarks of the President at a congressional briefing on the Arms
Limitation Treaty and Agreement, June 15, 1972–. --------------
Congressional briefing by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, June 15, 1972----------
Question and answer session after a briefing by Dr. Henry Kissinger,
#tant to the President for National Security Affairs, June 15,
1972-------------------------------------------------------
“Limited Agreements and Long-Term Stability: A Positive View
Toward SALT,” article by Jerome H. Kahan, Stanford Journal of
International Studies, Spring, 1972-----------------------------
Statement of Edward F. Snyder on behalf of Friends Committee on
National Legislation on the SALT Agreements.-----------------
Statement on the Moscow Agreements by Herbert Kriedman, Ph.D.--
Letter to Senator J. W. Fulbright from Mr. Herman Will, Jr., associ-
ate general secretary, Board of Christian Social Concerns of the
United Methodist Church, June 21, 1972-----------------------
Page
391
393
402
416
429
431
STRATEGIC ARMs LIMITATION AGREEMENTS
MONDAY, JUNE 19, 1972
UNITED STATES SENATE,
CoMMITTEE on Foreign RELATIONs,
Washington, D.C.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 318,
Old Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (Chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Symington, Pell, McGee,
Spong, Aiken, Cooper, Scott, and Percy. -
The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order.
OPENING STATEMENT
The Committee on Foreign Relations is very pleased to welcome
this morning the Secretary of State, Mr. William P. Rogers, and the
Chief American Negotiator and Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Dr. Gerard Smith.
It would have been better for the security of the world had we been
able to hold this hearing sometime ago.
Many years of intricate negotiations, both tentative and formal,
have passed to bring us to this point. The Committee has before it now
the proposed treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missiles and the
interim agreement on offensive missiles.
Now we have before us the prospect of further negotiations. The
results, when added to the treaty and agreement before us, should at
last bring the two superpowers and the rest of the world to a point at
which worldwide destruction can be a more remote prospect.
Giving up the anti-ballistic missile, with the exception of the option
On each side of the two sites, may be the most significant commitment
made by the United States and the Soviet Union to the principle of
co-existence. Insofar as each side is willing to abandon the effort to
make itself invulnerable to attack or retaliation by the other, it also
commits itself to peace and to the survival of the other.
DANGER OF HAVING ACTIONS BELLE WORDS
We must ask ourselves, however, whether we are not in danger of
having our actions belie our words. Already there have been sounds
of alarm and cries to abandon any euphoria. Some say we must have
an accelerated program for the development of a new type of missile
submarine called Trident and of a new supersonic bomber to replace
our B-52 fleet, as well as other offensive weapons not covered by the
Moscow agreements. -
(1)
2
Can we in good conscience and good sense engage the Russians in
an accelerated arms race at the same time we have each conceded the
survival of each other's position and political system? -
As we all realize, no one can be invulnerable in the world now. In-
deed we are in a situation of mutual vulnerability. The anti-ballistic
missile treaty before us has in it the central fact that the United States
and the Soviet Union are indeed each other's hostage for reasonable
behavior in a nuclear era. e
More force, greater spending and additional weapons will not make
either side more secure. More can only lead to a deepening of the bal-
ance of terror which has enslaved this world for more than a decade.
A further drive for more to achieve a shifting parity can only heighten
the possibilities of a holocaust which neither side should consider
thinkable.
We must be able to trust ourselves to arrive at Sound judgments and
policies as we try to curb the disastrous arms race. We must listen to
fear and foreboding, but to try to set a pace that will lead us with the
Soviet Union to a less formidable future. We must not carelessly assume
the worst of our foes and the best of ourselves while promulgating poli-
cies of mutual disadvantage. e
During the course of our hearings we will explore the major issues
surrounding the proposed treaty and agreement. We will hear com:
prehensive testimony on the implications of what has been proposed
for the Soviet Union and for us. We will explore the possibilities of
further agreement and what might be entailed in that. And we will give
thorough analysis to the strategic questions that so clearly now are at
ISSUL6.
FHEARING PROCEDURE
I would like to suggest, if the committee is agreeable, that in the
first round of questions, which I would like to limit to ten minutes in
order to give everybody an equal opportunity, that we discuss the treaty
first and then the agreements in order to keep some orderly discussions
going and to avoid confusion. After that is done we can certainly ex-
plore at length the relation of the two, but I believe it would be helpful
if we would start in this fashion. I hope that is agreeable to the Secre-
tary of State and perhaps he could approach it this way. I think it
would help our understanding of it and it certainly would mine.
(S.J. Res. 241 and 242 follow :)
[S.J. Res. 241, 92d Cong., second sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Authorization of the President to approve an interim agreement
between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That the President is hereby authorized to ap-
prove On behalf Of the United States the interim agreement between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on certain meas-
ures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, and the protocol
related thereto, signed at Moscow On May 26, 1972, by Richard Nixon, President
of the United States of America, and Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of
the Central Committee Of the Communist Party Of the Soviet Union.
[S.J. Res. 242, 92d Cong., second sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION Approving the acceptance by the President for the United States
Of the interim agreement between the United States of America and the Union of
#. Socialist Republics on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic
OIL 6-In SIWe arm S
3
Whereas an interim agreement between the United States of America and the
|Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on certain measures with respect to the
limitation of strategic Offensive arms and an associated protocol Were signed
On May 26, 1972; and
Whereas the Said interim agreement provides that it shall enter into force upon
exchange of written notices of acceptance by each party, Such exchange to take
place subject to and concurrently with the exchange of instruments of ratifica-
tion. Of the Treaty On the Limitation Of Anti-Ballistic Missiles; and
Whereas this interim agreement is a significant first step away from an era. Of
nuclear confrontation and toward an era of mutually agreed upon restraint
and arms limitation between the two principal nuclear powers; and
Whereas the new era toward which this agreement points can be a time When
the dangers of war are substantially lessened and when nations can turn more
Of their energies to the Works of peace ; and
Whereas this agreement and the treaty limiting ballistic missile defense were
made possible by the maintenance in the United States of a strategic defense
pOSture Second to none ; and
Whereas the success of these agreements and the attainment Of more perma-
nent and comprehensive agreements are dependent upon the Continuing main-
tenance of that strategic posture and a sound strategic modernization program :
Therefore be it - -
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That acceptance by the President for the United
States Of the aforesaid interim agreement and the associated protocol is hereby
approved.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased to have you. You
have an opening statement I believe.
STATEMENT OF HON, WILLIAM P. ROGERS, SECRETARY OF STATE
Mr. RogFRs. Yes, sir, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do support the
Suggestion you made about the manner of proceeding and my prepared
statement follows that same plan.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before you in support of the
Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems and the Interim Agree-
ment on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.
In his letter to the Senate of June 13 transmitting my report and its
enclosures, the President urged your support so that the two agree-
ments can be brought into force as soon as practicable. These agree-
ments are important not just for our people; they are important for
all people. They are important not only for the achievements they
represent, but also for the opportunities they present. Strategic arms
limitation is not a one-time effort but a continuing process.
These agreements are a significant achievement.
They constitute an unprecedented step in controlling strategic arms.
They are tangible evidence that both sides are moving into an era of
negotiation. The two sides now have an important investment in
cooperation which they are not likely to risk lightly. The United
States and the Soviet Union have thus indicated a recognition that
their relations can be improved by cooperation in some areas even
though there remain important differences in others.
This success in SALT recognizes that global security is interde-
pendent, and that unconstrained weapons competition is contrary to
the interests of the nuclear powers, and of the world.
During the SALT negotiations over the last two and a half years
we have kept in mind the need for wide support, both nationally and
internationally, for any agreements reached. To that end the Admin-
4
istration has closely consulted the Congress. We have also regularly
consulted with our allies.
I believe there is wide support for these agreements. The Adminis-
tration welcomes this opportunity to consider them with you. We are
pleased to know that the Congress plans full consideration of these
two documents, both with officials of the executive branch and with
the public. This is a process that is fundamental to our American
system. It will broaden the base of understanding and support for
what has been achieved, and will assist in the search for additional
strategic arms limitations.
Let me place the SALT agreements in perspective.
STRATEGIC, SITUATION FACING ADMINISTRATION IN 1969
When this Administration entered office early in 1969, we faced a
strategic situation in which the USSR was engaged in a broad and
dynamic buildup of its strategic offensive missile launchers. It was
clear that a rough balance in strategic forces between the United
States and the Soviet Union was approaching. However, there was not
then—and there is not now—any question that the United States could
and would maintain strategic forces adequate to meet its security
requirements, forces second to none. As President Nixon stated in his
Foreign Policy Report of February, 1971:
Both sides would almost surely commit the necessary resources to maintain
a balance. The President further noted that any Soviet attempt to obtain a
large advantage would spark an arms race which would, in the end, prove
pointleSS.
Through negotiation—rather than competition—we had an oppor-
tunity to achieve a more stable strategic relationship with the USSR
and to seek—over time—to create a situation in which both sides could
use more of their resources for purposes other than building more
strategic weapons.
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALES
After thorough preparations by the new Administration, SALT
began in November, 1969, in Helsinki. Initially, the talks concentrated
on exploration of strategic principles and development of an agenda
for future work. The next phases focused on comprehensive proposals.
However, problems over definition of strategic systems and over the
basis for limitation of such systems made clear that it would be ex-
tremely difficult to negotiate a single comprehensive agreement. The
Soviets then pressed for an initial agreement limiting only anti-ballis-
tic missile (ABM) systems. We believed that such an agreement would
not make as great a contribution to stability as limitations on both of.
fensive and defensive strategic systems. -
This impasse was resolved by the breakthrough announced by the
President on May 20, 1971. The two governments agreed to work out
arrangements limiting deployment of ABM's, and at the same time to
agree to certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic
offensive arms. -
After the May 20 understanding, the principal issues were how
broad a coverage of offensive forces could be agreed, and how to frame
in concrete terms agreement in principles to limit ABM's to a low level.
5
These general questions contained numerous and complex specific
issues, which took another year of hard negotiating to work out. The
two agreements before you are the successful result of that work.
Mr. Chairman, a detailed analysis of the two agreements was made
in my letter of submittal to the President, which you have before
you. I believe it would be helpful this morning to consider what these
agreements would do. I will touch on certain of their most important
provisions. Following my statement, Ambassador Smith is prepared to
join me in answering questions you may have.
APPROACH USED IN AGREEMENTS
Let mesay as a preface to this discussion that in both agreements the
U.S. has sought, where necessary, to set forth detailed obligations in
the text of the agreements themselves. Where one of the sides preferred
to put clarifying material or elaboration in agreed interpretations, and
where this was sufficient, that approach was used. These agreed inter-
pretations have been transmitted to the Congress; they include ini-
tialed statements and other common understandings. In certain cases
where agreement could not be reached, U.S. views were stated formally
in uniliateral statements. Those, too, have been transmitted to the
Congress. There are no secret agreements.
I would like to address first the ABM Treaty.
COMMITMENT NOT TO BUILD NATIONWIDE ABM DEFENSE
Under this treaty, both sides make a commitment not to build a
nationwide ABM defense. This is a general undertaking of utmost sig-
nificance. Without a nationwide ABM defense, there can be no shield
#. retaliation. Both great nuclear powers have recognized, and in
effect agreed to maintain mutual deterrence.
Therefore, I am convinced beyond doubt that the possibility of nu-
clear war has been dramatically reduced by this treaty.
A major objective of SALT has been to reduce the tensions, un-
certainties and high costs which flow from the upward spiral of
strategic arms competition. While the cost savings from these first
SALT agreements will be limited initially, over the long term we
will save the tens of billions of dollars which might otherwise have
been required for a nationwide ABM defense.
\
BREAK IN PATTERN OF ACTION AND REACTION
Furthermore with an interim limitation on offensive weapons—
which we hope will lead to a more comprehensive and permanent limi-
tation—there will be a break in the pattern of action and reaction
under which each side reacts to what the other is doing, or may do,
in an open ended situation. This cycle until now has been a major
factor in driving the strategic arms race.
PROVISIONS CONCERNING DEPLOYMENT OF Two LIMITED ABM systEMs
The heart of the treaty is Article III, which spells out the provisions
under which each of the parties may deploy two limited ABM com-
plexes, one in an ICBM deployment area, and one at its national
6
capital. There can be no more than 100 ABM launchers, and 100 as-
Sociated intercepters, at each complex—a total of 200.
The two ABM deployment complexes permitted each side will serve
different purposes. The limited ABM coverage in the ICBM deploy-
ment area will afford some protection for ICBM's in this area. ABM
coverage at the national capitals will permit protection for the national
command authority against a light attack, or an accidental or unau-
thorized launch of a limited number of missiles, and thus decrease the
chances that such an event would trigger a nuclear exchange. In addi-
tion, it will buy some time against a major attack, and its radars would
help to provide valuable warning. -
ABM radars are strictly limited. There are also important limita-
tions on the deployment of certain types of non-ABM radars. The
complex subject of radar control was a central question in the negotia-
tions because radars are the long lead-time item in development of an
ABM system.
OTHER IMPORTANT QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS
The treaty provides for other important qualitative limitations. The
parties will undertake not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or
components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile
land-based. They have also agreed not to develop, test or deploy ABM
launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a
time from each launcher; nor to modify launchers to provide them
with such a capability; nor to develop, test or deploy automatic or
semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM
launchers; nor to develop, test, or deploy ABM missiles with more than
One independently guided warhead.
Perhaps of even greater importance as a qualitative limitation is
that the parties have agreed that future exotic types of ABM systems,
i.e. systems depending on such devices as lasers, may not be deployed,
even in permitted areas.
One of the more important corollary provisions deals with pro-
hibiting the upgrading of anti-aircraft systems, what has been called
the “SAM-upgrade” problem. The conversion or testing of other sys-
tems, such as air-defense systems or components thereof, to perform
an ABM role is prohibited as part of a general undertaking not to pro-
vide an ABM capability to non-ABM systems.
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION
The undertakings in the ABM Treaty, and in the Interim Agree-
ment, have been devised so as to assure that they can be verified by
national technical means of verification. For the types of arms control
measures in these agreements, modern national technical means of
verification are the most practical and a fully effective assurance of
compliance. The treaty also contains the very important landmark
commitments not to interfere with each side's national technical means
of verification and not to use deliberate concealment measures to
impede the effectiveness of these means.
7
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
The treaty contains another significant “first” in Soviet-American
arms control. A Standing Consultative Commission will, on a regular
basis, consider the operations of the treaty as well as questions of com-
pliance. The commission will also have the function of considering
proposals for further increasing the viability of the treaty. It will
assure that even after the completion of the follow-on negotiations
there will be a continuing strategic dialogue between the two powers.
DURATION OF ABM TREATY AND WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE
The duration of the ABM Treaty is unlimited. But it contains a
withdrawal clause of the kind which has characterized post-war arms
control agreements. Each party can withdraw if it decides that extra-
ordinary events relating to the subject matter of the treaty have jeo-
pardized its supreme interests. Notice of such a decision, including a
statement of the extraordinary events involved, must be given six
months prior to withdrawal. -
EXPRESSED INTENTION TO CONTINUE ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS
The interrelationship between limitations on offensive and defensive
strategic arms which the U.S. has repeatedly stressed is reflected in
the expressed intention to continue active negotiations for limitations
on strategic arms. As was pointed out in my submittal letter, the spe-
cial importance attached by the United States to this relationship was
set forth in a formal statement by Ambassador Smith recording the
position of the United States Government that if an agreement pro-
viding for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not
achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized,
and should that occur it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from
the treaty. Not necessarily withdrawal, but it would constitute a basis
for withdrawal from the treaty. I believe that this withdrawal right,
which is exercisable on our judgment alone, fully protects our security
interests in the event that the follow-on negotiations were not to suc-
ceed and that the strategic situation became such that we felt obliged
to exercise it.
Mr. Chairman, I would like now to turn to the interim agreement
and its protocol.
FREEZE ON NUMBER OF ICBMI AND SLBMſ LAUNCHERS
This agreement freezes at approximately current levels the aggre-
gate number of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and sub-
marine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers operational and
under construction on each side for up to five years. We hope that it
will be replaced well before that time by a more complete agreement
in treaty form covering strategic expensive weapons.
Under the agreement, in Articles I and II, the parties undertake a
commitment not to construct additional fixed ICBM launchers and
not to convert launchers for light or older ICBM's into launchers for
modern heavy ICBM's. This undertaking by the Soviet Union should
be viewed in terms of the concern in this country during the past
8
several years about the continued buildup in numbers of Soviet
ICBM's, particlularly the heavy SS-9 ICBM's. The growth in numbers
of both light and heavy Soviet ICBM launchers has now been stopped.
The agreement does not specify the number of ICBMs operational
and under construction when it was signed. We have made it abun-
dantly clear to the Soviets, however, that we consider this number for
the USSR to be 1,618. I would like to stress, however, that specifying
the number of ICBM's in the agreement is not important, since na-
tional means of verification will reveal if any new ICBM construc-
tion, which is prohibited by the agreement, were to take place.

LIMITATION OF SLBMI LAUNCHERS AND MODERN SUBMARINES
Article III and the Protocol limit SLBM launchers and modern
ballistic missile submarines. The agreement contains undertakings not
to build such launchers and submarines above a given number.
A ceiling of 62 has been set for the USSR on the number of opera-
tional modern submarines (Y-class nuclear-powered submarines). A
ceiling of 950 SLBM launchers has been set for the USSR. This ceil-
ing is to include all launchers on nuclear powered submarines (Y-
class and H-class submarines) and modern launchers on older sub-
marines (G-class diesel-powered submarines). There are only a few
such launchers on older submarines.
In effect, the agreement freezes SLBM launchers at present levels
except that additional SLBM launchers can be built if they replace
older strategic launchers on a one-for-one basis.
The Soviets are permitted to have no more than 740 launchers on
nuclear-powered submarines of any type, operational and under con-
struction, unless they effect replacement in accordance with agreed
procedures. The purpose of the figure 740—which is a negotiated
figure—is to establish a clear and unambiguous baseline which avoids
uncertainty or debate over the definition of “under construction.”
To reach 950 SLBM's on modern submarines, the USSR must re-
tire older ballistic missile launchers—specifically, those of SS—7 and
SS—8 ICBM's on H-class submarines. The first SLBM launcher after
the 740th launcher must be a replacement. The older ICBM or SLBM
launchers being replaced will be dismantled beginning no later than
the date on which the submarine containing the 741st launcher begins
sea trials.
I might add that this one-way mix concept—permitting replacement
of land-based launchers with submarine-based launchers—was first
suggested by the U.S. early in SALT as a way of achieving greater
strategic stability.
The USSR could retain the existing older launchers on G-class
submarines, in addition to 950 launchers on modern submarines. How-
ever, any launchers for modern SLBM's on these older diesel-powered
submarines would have to be included in the 950 ceiling.
MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT PROVISIONs
The modernization and replacement provisions of the interim agree-
ment will permit both sides to improve their missile forces, but the
restrictions on converting launchers for light ICBM's or older heavy
ICBM's to launchers for the modern heavy ICBM's will place impor-
9
tant qualitative restrictions on Soviet programs. The conversion of
current U.S. ICBM launchers to handle Minuteman III missiles and
the conversion of current Polaris submarines to handle Poseidon mis-
siles, as well as the construction of new submarines as replacements
for older ones, will not be prohibited.
VERIFICATION, NONCONCEALMENT, NONINTERFERENCE AND STANDING
CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
The agreement provides for application of the same verification pro-
cedures and commitments about non-concealment and non-interfer-
ence as contained in the ABM Treaty. The Standing Consultative
Commission will also be used to promote the objectives and the imple-
mentation of the interim agreement.
COMMITMENT TO CONTINUE ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS

There is a commitment to continue active negotiations for more
complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The agreement also
stipulates that its terms will not prejudice the scope and terms of the
limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in
the follow-on negotiations.
OFFENSIVE ARMS LIMITATIONS TEMPORARY AND NOT COMPREHENSIVE
The offensive arms limitations are temporary and not comprehen-
sive. They do not cover all strategic delivery vehicles. For example,
strategic bombers, where the U.S. already has a very large advantage,
are not limited by the interim agreement.
The interim agreement does not limit on-going U.S. offensive arms
programs. It does stop the Soviet Union from increasing the number
of its strategic offensive missile launchers. These limitations on Soviet
strategic offensive forces, in conjunction with very low limits on
ABM’s on both sides, clearly advance U.S. Security interests.
SUFFICIENCY OF U.S. FORCES
Looked at overall, our forces are clearly sufficient to protect our, and
our allies', security interests. U.S. strategic forces are qualitatively
superior to and more effective than Soviet strategic forces. The USSR
has more missile launchers. The U.S. has more missile warheads. We
have many more strategic bombers. Moreover, numbers alone are not
an illuminating or useful measure for judging the strategic balance.
MORE SECURE AND STABLE RELATIONSHIPS WITH USSR
With these two agreements, we should have a more secure and
stable strategic relationship with the USSR.
Both sides gain assurance that their strategic missile deterrent
forces will not be rendered ineffective by the others’ ABM system.
U.S. FORCE MUST BE KEPT UP-TO-DATE
But even with the advantages that these two agreements will bring,
we must keep our strategic forces up-to-date if these are to continue
10
their central role for deterrence. Our forces must be adequate to deter
attack on—or coercion of the U.S. and its allies. The relationship
between U.S. and Soviet strategic forces must be such that our ability
and resolve to protect our vital interests and those of our allies will
not be underestimated by anyone. I am sure the Congress agrees.
Mr. Chairman, I have presented an overview of the basic under-
takings of these agreements and of their significance.
WRONG TO ASE WHO WON OR LOST
I think it wrong to ask who “won” or “lost” the initial SALT negoti-
ations. In matters involving the central Security interests of two great
powers, any arms limitation agreement must respond to each side's
interest or it will not last very long. Both sides must gain from SALT
or neither does.
NEW ERA IN ARMS CONTROL
With these two agreements we enter a new era in arms control, and
what may have been difficult or impossible in the past may now be
attainable. It should now be possible for both sides to agree to addi-
tional limitations, including reductions.
The security of the United States will be strengthened by these two
agreements.
They will make possible a more rational and stable strategic
relationship.
They should help to improve American-Soviet relations and pre-
serve and strengthen international security and world order.
The threat of nuclear war will be dramatically reduced.
These agreements will give the world greater hope for the future.
SUPPORT FOR AGREEMENTS URGED
Mr. Chairman, I urge that this committee and the Senate support
the ABM treaty and its accompanying interim agreement.
TRIBUTE TO NEGOTTATING TEAM
Before I close, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that I think it's
appropriate to pay tribute to the negotiating team, Ambassador Ger-
ard Smith and his colleagues, Paul Nitze, who is here today, and
General Allison, Jeff Parsons, Phil Farley, who served as alternate
chairman of the delegation, all of the members of the staffs who worked
So diligently and capably and for such a long period on these agree-
ments. Harold Brown, of course, was a member of the delegation.
And I think they deserve a great deal of credit. Had it not been for
them, these agreements would not be possible. I think it was an unusu-
ally capable team and it deserves the very sincere appreciation of all
Americans and I am sure this committee joins with me in that senti-
ment.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I think that is a very
clear and very good statement and I think it is a hopeful development.
11
HEARING PROCEDURE;
For the benefit of the committee, before some of the members came
in I announced we would try to proceed under the ten minute rule so
everybody would have an opening opportunity. I will ask a few
questions.
LIVES OF PEOPLE OF EACH COUNTRY HOSTAGE TO OTHER
Mr. Secretary, is it correct to say that this treaty assures the Rus-
sians that we will not attempt to prevent the effectiveness of their in-
tercontinental ballistic missiles and we will not interfere with their in-
telligence gathering by satellite—what is generally called national
means—and, of course, that the Russians assume the same obligation?
In effect the lives of the people of each country are hostage to
the other and there can scarcely be a more effective guarantee of each
nation’s restraint in the use of nuclear weapons.
Secretary RogFRs. Yes, I think that is an accurate statement, Mr.
Chairman, and I think it is of great importance to realize the effect
of this treaty for the reasons that you have mentioned, and that is
why I say that I am of the conviction that it dramatically reduces
the possibility of a nuclear war between these major nations.
The CHAIRMAN. If each side lives up to it, I think that is correct.
It reminds me of the argument made during the very long hearings on
the ABM. ABM was considered by many of the witnesses at that
time as a destabilizing development. If it were permitted to proceed,
it would contribute to the arms race rather than otherwise. Is that
not correct, too? -
You are in disagreement. You are undoing that. You are saying we
will not proceed to attempt to create a regional defense against inter-
continental ballistic missiles.
Secretary RogFRs. Yes, sir, I think with both sides agreeing as they
have under this treaty that is a correct conclusion, Mr. Chairman.
OPTION TO HAVE TWO ABM COMPLEXES
The CHAIRMAN. While the option is given to have two ABM com-
plexes, there is no requirement that each side proceed with that. They
have the option of doing it if they like. If they both decide this sys-
tem of defense is not an effective one, there is nothing to prohibit them
from agreeing to have none at all; is that right?
Secretary ROGERs. That is right; but I think the assumption was
in the discussions that probably both sides would proceed with—
The CHAIRMAN. That depends upon the development of the degree
of confidence between the countries; doesn’t it?
If, as nothing upsets or disturbs either country as to the goodwill
or intentions of the other, this is a possibility at least.
Secretary ROGERs. Well, let me say, Mr. Chairman, the statement
that you have made initially is correct, that there is nothing in this
treaty that requires either side to construct the additional site
The CHAIRMAN. That is a limitation only. -
Secretary ROGERs. It is a limitation only. But, as I say, I think the
negotiations did clearly indicate that each side was going to con-
tinue and I think that the Soviet Union felt that because we had an
80–942 O—72—2
12
ICBM site protected, that they felt for obvious reasons they wanted
to have one of their ICBM sites protected. -
The CHAIRMAN. That is true. It assumes, of course, that an ABM
system is an effective one. If either side decides that after all was the
wrong project and it wasn’t really an effective one, it could easily be
overcome. They are free to decide not to proceed. That is the only
point I wished to make.
Secretary ROGERs. Yes; I think it is quite clear that neither side
would proceed if they thought the system was ineffective. I don’t
think either one would build an ABM system—an additional site—
if they thought it was not going to be effective.
INSISTENCE ON OFFENSIVE wºAPONs PROGRAM QUESTIONED
The CHAIRMAN. If this is the real meaning of the treaty, which to
me is the most significant part of it all, I am unable to understand
the insistence of the Secretary of Defense that we must go forward
immediately with a very large accelerated program of offensive weap-
ons beginning with the Trident, one of the most expensive, B–1 and
F–14, and various other weapons systems. If this treaty is adopted,
which I certainly expect it could be and I shall certainly support it,
it seems that we ought to have a little time for each side to evaluate its
effectiveness and to evaluate the attitude of the other side. To put it
another way, when I read Mr. Laird's statement, as it was published,
immediately it occurred to me that it raises the question of the sincerity
of our undertakings. If this agreement is to be used as an excuse for
a greatly increased arms race, it seems to me it raises serious questions
of the seriousness with which we regard this agreement. I am still
puzzled by that and worried about it.
You are familiar with the statement that the Secretary made, I
take it.
Secretary RogFRs. Well, I am familiar in a general way.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me refresh your memory with one very brief
Sentence.
Secretary RogFRs. Could I say, Mr. Chairman, I think that in some
instances the newspaper stories do not accurately reflect what Mr.
Laird said. But, in any event, I know what you are driving at; so
you don’t have to explain that. ---
We feel that this treaty and the interim agreement are agreements
of considerable significance.
The CHAIRMAN. I do too.
Secretary RogFRs. We think that one of the reasons that we were
able to achieve these agreements was because we maintained our
strength and that we proceeded with an ABM system and we were
able to negotiate from a position of strength.
Secondly, the proposals that have been made in the Defense budget
are not new proposals, they are proposals that the Administration
Submitted before these agreements were completed. We think they are
essential to our national security and should be supported by the
Congress.
Third, we think at this time when we know perfectly well, particu-
larly we know from the conversations between the President and Gen-
eral Secretary Brezhnev that the Soviet Union plans to continue to
13
build up its systems within the limitations imposed by these agree-
ments, particularly the interim agreement, and he said so in no uncer-
tain terms, made it perfectly clear to the President they were going to
do that, so there was no misconception on our part that we should
continue to have a defense posture that is strong and provides for Our
national security. We think any change in that course now would make
the possibilities of negotiation in the second phase of SALT much
more difficult. - . . .
Now, I don't personally state it in precisely linkage terms, I say we
present these agreements to the Congress because we believe they are
significant and we are pleased that the Congress appears to support
them, and we also submit the Defense budget believing that it is in our
national interest and our strength as a nation requires expenditures in
that order of magnitude, and we think it is particularly important at
this time that we not indicate to the Soviet Union we are all of a sud-
den going to undertake unilateral disarmament which makes the
Second phase of SALT unnecessary.
So I strongly support what the President said in his letter and when
he said that just as the maintenance of a strong strategic posture was
the essential element in the success of these negotiations, it is now
equally essential that we carry forward a sound strategic moderniza-
tion program to maintain our Security and to insure that more perma-
nent, comprehensive arms limitations agreements can be reached.
I think that states it very well and I strongly support that position,
Mr. Chairman.
DEFENSE SECRETARY's TESTIMONY BEFORE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I have no doubt that the Adminis-
tration has coordinated its thoughts on this matter, but you said that
the newspapers don’t always report these things properly. I wasn’t
referring to a newspaper account. I want to read the record to see.
This is a quote from the Secretary of Defense's statement after tésti-
mony before the Armed Services Committee, and I don’t believe there
are any grounds for questioning its accuracy. If so, I think the Secre-
tary ought to correct it. -
It reads as follows: On June 6th, Secretary Laird said before that
committee:
I Could not Support the agreements if the Congress fails to act on the move-
ment forward of the Trident system, on the B-1 bomber and on the other pro-
grams that we have Outlined to improve our strategic offensive systems during
this five year period.
I think that is accurate.
Secretary RogFRs. Yes, sir.
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN TREATY AND ARMS RACE
The CHAIRMAN. If we were considering only the Interim agreement,
I think there would be some logic in proceeding with these weapons
Systems. But if what I stated in the beginning is the real significance
of the treaty, which I rate much more important than the interim
agreement, which is supplementary and temporary in nature and sub-
ject to change, as you have stated, and if we are in good faith about
14
the treaty, then it makes the interim agreement of a very different
character. In that case, to proceed in the normal traditional manner
of an arms race seems to me to be out of phase with the treaty itself.
There is an inherent inconsistency in that approach because there is
no doubt that if there is no effective defense the existing weapons are
quite sufficient to destroy and to mutilate irreparably each country.
In all of the testimony we have had, when you put together the large
numbers of nuclear weapons, as Isaid, each country's whole population
is hostage to the other because they could be destroyed. It is an incon-
sistency which I, at least I, would like to have clarified. Perhaps it is
the duty of the Congress to do that in dealing with the size and the cost
of these ongoing weapon systems. But my time is about up.
I would end by saying that I have no question in my mind about the
usefulness and the validity of the treaty itself and the numbers game
that arises out of the interim agreement is an interesting one. But given
the nature of these weapons, I am not worried about it other than the
fact that we are going to use this excuse to greatly enlarge the store
of destructive weapons. I don’t think that would be in our interests or
the Russians. -
You say that you presume the Russians will proceed. It may well be,
of course, that they will feel compelled to if we proceed. It is a case
of tit for tat, as we always have.
But in any case, I hope we can in the Congress at least try to recon-
cile these two different approaches. I am very much in favor of the
spirit and I think the meaning of the treaty itself.
Secretary RogFRs. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a couple of
brief comments.
SECRETARY LAIRD’s STATEMENT
As far as Mr. Laird's statement is concerned, the statement that you
read, of course, is the accurate one, where he said: “Some movement
forward,” I think are the words he used. Some of the reporting, par-
ticularly the headlines, did not carry out that thought. But I think
that Secretary Laird was expressing the same thought that the Presi-
dent was expressing in the letter of transmittal. We think now is cer-
tainly the wrong time to unilaterally disarm. We have just demon-
strated
The CHAIRMAN. Nobody is proposing unilateral disarmament. That
is a red herring. We are not proposing unilateral disarmament at all.
It is a question of going forward with a vastly increased thing. Each of
these Trident submarines is twice as big as existing ones and much
longer range and it costs really ten times as much. It isn’t unilateral dis-
armament not to go forward with that kind of weapon. I am not saying
we should unilaterally disarm and no one else is.
SOVIET STATEMENTS AND IMPORTANCE OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS
Secretary RogFRs. Mr. Chairman, as I said, when you say we think
or we conjecture that the Soviet Union may proceed, the fact is they
say so, they told us—let me finish. Chairman Brezhnev told the Presi-
dent they were going to proceed with their programs within the limita-
tions imposed by the interim agreement and he wanted to make it clear
there was no doubt about that so we weren’t misled.
15
The CHAIRMAN. I didn’t say you were mislead.
Secretary RogFRs. I am saying that is what he said. He explained
to us that the Soviet Union was going to proceed within the limitations
of the interim agreement, and we on our part should proceed with our
programs. These are not what you suggested, greatly enlarged pro-
grams; they are programs that we submitted before these agreements
were signed. So we do believe they are important. We believe they are
important not only to the security of the United States but we think
they are particularly important to the successful negotiations in the
Second phase, of SALT, and when I said unilateral disarmament, I
meant that if we unilaterally decided not to proceed with offensive
weapons systems that we had planned, based on these agreements, we
would be making a mistake because the Soviet Union is not going to
and we are prepared to work out mutual arrangements on limitations,
further limitations of a permanent nature on offensive weapons. But
partly because we had programs, on-going programs, particularly be-
cause we had an ABM program, we were able to succeed in these
negotiations.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN STATEMENTS OF MIR. RISSINGER AND MIR. LAIRD
The CHAIRMAN. I don’t want to belabor, but at the briefing on Thurs-
day this question was asked of Mr. Kissinger and he does not link these
two together. This to me is a very significant difference. When he was
speaking for the President at the White House at a public meeting.
As you know, I asked him and he said they are not linked. He did not
put it this way. Mr. Laird says he could not support the agreement if
Congress fails to act. Mr. Kissinger said that these two stand on their
own feet. This could be checked. He says the treaty is there and it is
good or bad on its own feet. He said whether or not the weapons systems
should be proceeded with stands on its own feet regardless of the treaty
º that they should be judged on their merits. I say exactly that same
thing.
If Congress thinks that the Trident, a submarine costing a billion
dollars, is an extravagant waste of the taxpayers' money, they are quite
free to do so and this in no way undermines or reflects upon the treaty.
I think it is a rather significant difference to be told, “Now you want
the treaty; we are all for the treaty, but if you are going to take the
treaty you have to give us everything we want.” I think this is a very
bad way to approach it. I think the Congress ought to be free and feel
free to exercise its own discretion whether or not it is profitable to go
forward with a submarine of that size and cost, together with some of
the planes.
There was great question before this ever came up whether the F-14
is any better than the Phantom jet. It costs four or five times as much.
These questions should be free to be judged on their merits without
tying it into the ABM limitations and saying if you want the treaty
you have to give us the weapons. I think this is not quite playing it fair
myself and I didn’t understand Mr. Kissinger's briefing to say that.
Secretary RogFRs. My view is each of these stands, each of the two—I
am speaking about the agreements on the one hand and the question
of weapons on the other—stands on its own two feet. I think they should
be judged on their merits. *
16
Now, secondly, I think, Mr. Chairman, when you said that Secretary
Laird said he won’t favor ratification unless we get everything we
want, that is not what he said. He said some forward movement on the
programs.
The CHAIRMAN. That isn't what this says. I don’t think that is a
Secretary RogFRs. Do you want to read back what he said?
The CHAIRMAN. “I could not support the agreements if the Congress
fails to act on the movement forward of the Trident system, on the
B–1 bomber, and in other programs that we have outlined to improve
our strategic offensive systems during this five year period.” I read
that. - -
Secretary RogFRs. I think we are talking about the forward move-
ment. -
The CHAIRMAN. Unless we give him these weapons, he will not Sup-
port the ABM treaty. I don’t feel that way at all about it. And he
is very adept at Semantics on particular programs.
We now find bombing raids are called reaction strikes. I don’t know
whether he means what he says. As I read that language it means to
me he does not support the ABM unless we give him everything he
Wants.
My time is up. I yield to Senator Symington who actually was
at the meeting. I think he can give his own version of what the Sec-
retary said.
Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, you are correct, that is what
the Secretary said.
COMMENDATION OF AGREEMENTS AND AMBASSADOR SMITH
Now, I am glad to note, Mr. Secretary, that we reached these agree-
ments and I congratulate Ambassador Smith for the fine job he and his
people did.
I am especially glad to note we are going to cut down on ABM costs
because I never thought the ABM was worth the staggering price. We
would have knocked it out last year, in my opinion, except that the
argument developed that it was a bargaining chip for SALT. It is
clear most everybody is happy now. All the doves are satisfied because
we have a treaty; all of the hawks are satisfied because the Secretary
of Defense says he is not going to go along, and he is a very powerful
man in the Cabinet, unless he gets the armament he wants.
Some of that armament we need; but some we need about as much as
we need a hole in the head. -
QUESTION OF COSTS AND WIABLE ECONOMY
In addition, there is that little problem of limited resources. It has
been known for sometime that the cost of the new nuclear carrier in
* production was going to be nearly a billion dollars for the ship
8,10][162.
But now we plan a tremendous new program on submarines, and
each of these submarines is already going to cost hundreds of millions
of dollars more than that latest figure on the new nuclear carrier.
At the meeting at the White House three committees were asked to
come up. I am a member of all three committees. The President talked
about 15 minutes. Dr. Kissinger talked for over an hour, and then
17
received questions. I left shortly before the end. To the best of my
knowledge there wasn't a single question addressed to what is mighty
important to true national security, namely, a viable economy. Not one
question involved costs. All questions had to do with diplomatic mat-
ters and military matters, none about economic matters.
If these treaties are going to stand or fall on this also demanded
tremendous escalation in the arms race, our economy, with the unprec-
edented deficit we are now showing, is going to get steadily, into
deeper trouble. Apparently as I read this proposal, it is going to be
essential, for an indefinate future, for us to keep all of our people in
Europe, because nothing was said about forward based aircraft. We
are continuing to run a big war in the Far East. Whether or not we
get out of Indochina is almost incidental to the tremendous build up
of our fleet, and Air Force in Thailand. If in addition we are now
going to spend over a billion dollars per submarine, that will be some
five times the cost of any previous submarine. -
How do you expect this economy to continue to remain viable under
this heavily increased request for this type of and character of military
appropriations as justification for making this treaty?
Isn't a viable economy with a sound currency equally important to
national security? - -
Secretary RogFRs. Well, yes, of course, Senator, and we think the
economy is viable. We agree that there have been problems and I think
we all recognize them, but the economy is certainly in much better
condition than it was and we think it is going to continue to improve.
Now, we think, as I have said in my statement, that these agreements
are going to mean reduced costs, particularly in the long run, and we
also think that the requests that have been made by the Administra-
tion for our defense establishment are realistic costs and we think they
stand on their own merits. We didn’t submit those requests after these
agreements were reached; we submitted them beforehand because we
thought they were important and they are permitted within the limi-
tations of the agreements.
CHANGED EXPENDITURES FOR HUMAN RESOURCES AND DEFENSE PURPOSES
So, of course, I think all Americans are concerned about a healthy
economy. I think we have a healthy economy. We have some problems.
We have changed our priorities, as you know. The expenditures for
national defense purposes in 1969 were about 45 percent of the budget.
And they have gone down to about 31 percent of the budget or some-
thing of that order. And our expenditures for human resources have
gone from 31 percent to 45 percent. So there has been a complete turn-
around of the amount of money we are spending percentagewise for
human resources contrasted with defense purposes.
Now I think that is a very significant fact, which people seem to
ignore. It is true because of reasons that we know, and because of infla-
tion, that the precise figures can be misconstrued, but the fact is the
percentage that we are now spending for human resources is about
45 percent of the national budget.
Senator SYMINGTON. Don't you think a large part of that expense is
because we have slighted, for so long, our social obligations over here
in order to Satisfy our apparent desire to rule the world, tell people
how to live and govern themselves?
18
Secretary RogBRs. I don't agree with the latter, but I think it may
be we neglected human factors in running the government and I am
very happy I am a part of the Administration that has changed that.
TREATY's TIE witH INCREASED ARMS RACE UNFORTUNATE
Senator SYMINGTON. I am glad you feel the economy is in good
shape, even though our debt continues to rise rapidly. Our large cities
are bankrupt, freely admitted; our States are in deep trouble. They
can’t spend more than they take in. For such reasons, I think it un-
fortunate this treaty is tied, based on the statement by Secretary Laird,
with such a tremendous increase in the arms race.
I must go to the floor to protest this morning against the deal made
with Portugal re the Azores, also Bahrain. Apparently we are now
going to take the place of the British in the Persian Gulf, regardless
of what the Senate does or does not think about it. My leaving now
does not mean I have any less interest in your testimony. Let me assure
you you give me a deep satisfaction when you say our economy is in
good shape and getting better.
Secretary ROGERs. Thank you, Senator. I am not sure in which place
I would rather have you be.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.
Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, you pretty well covered the ques-
tions that were on my mind and what I have to say or ask briefly is
likely to be partly repetitious.
NEGOTIATING FROM STRENGTH
First, does the Administration believe that we were able to negotiate
these agreements because we have what the Mansfield-Scott resolu-
tion calls a defense posture second to none?
Is that right?
Secretary RogFRs. Yes, sir, that is right.
Senator AIKEN. We have a defense posture second to none and does
the Soviet Union also believe that it must negotiate from a position
of strength?
Secretary ROGERs. Well, I would assume so, yes, Senator.
Senator AIKEN. At the next round of negotiations which nation
do you think will have the greatest strength from which to negotiate?
Secretary RogFRs. Well, I think it is difficult to answer that question.
We believe we are second to none. I am sure that the Soviet Union
feels that it is strong and is able to negotiate from a position of
strength; so we enter, assuming the Congress supports us on the re-
quests we are making, certainly generally supports us—I don’t mean
to every item, but we get general support—then I would think we
would both enter the second phase of the SALT talks from a posi-
tion of relative strength. -
Senator AIKEN. It will be of equal strength. .
Secretary ROGERs. Well, as I say, I hesitate to say equal. We cer-
tainly are both in a strong position. We think we are. We don’t think
there is anyone ahead of us, put it that way. -
19
ABM DEFENSE OF WASHINGTON
Senator AIKEN. The other question I was going to ask related to
Secretary Laird's statement the other day in which he said in effect, as
I interpreted it, he couldn’t support this treaty unless the Congress
gave him all he needed to maintain or increase strength. That would
include the Trident submarine, the B–1 airplane—and I certainly
couldn’t put the submarine in the same class with other factors of
defense—and also the ABM around Washington.
To comply with this treaty do we have to construct the ABM launch-
ers, the radars, interceptors around Washington?
Secretary ROGERs. No, we do not, Senator. .
Senator AIKEN. Then you would accept the treaty even if Con-
gress didn’t provide the money for the ABM defense of Washington?
Secretary RogFRs. Well, I don’t want to put it in those terms. -
In answer to the question the Chairman asked, I said that we feel
that both of these should stand on their own merits. We think the
agreements should be considered as agreements of great significance
and should be supported and we think that the requests the Adminis-
tration has made for appropriations also have merit and should be
supported by the Congress.
I think though, Senator, I don’t want to continue to refer to Secre-
tary Laird's comments because I know he is going to be before this
Committee and he is amply capable of answering these questions.
But he didn’t say everything he wants, he said forward movement on
these requests. The headlines said everything he wants, something to
that effect, but that is not what he said. What he said and what I
say is that we should not abandon these programs which are very
essential, we believe, not only to the strength and security of this na-
tion but also to the success of the second phase in the SALT negotia-
tion. So we would hope that Congress would give support to our
requests.
Senator AIKEN. What he meant and what we agree with is that we
should maintain defenses which would be in effect second to none.
Secretary RogFRs. That is correct.
Senator AIKEN. Has another site been selected for the ABM de-
fense of Washington, do you know?
Secretary RogFRs. No, the locations have not, but I think there is
an item in the budget, I am not sure, I know they haven’t been selected
yet. -
EFFECTIVENESS OF SAM MISSILES
Senator AIKEN. In your statement you refer to the SAM (Surface
To Air Missiles) missiles. Do you consider them especially effective?
I note that the treaty states we are not going to have any upgrading
of them to take the place of the ABM. Do you consider the SAM
to be effective? -
Secretary ROGERs. Well they certainly are effective to a considerable
degree for the purpose intended, but they are not involved in this
treaty at all except as I mentioned in my statement. That is that we
Wanted to be sure that the radars in connection with SAM’s could
not be used in any way to provide for more than air defense and the
provisions in the treaty and the interim agreement, I think, give
that protection.
20
EFFECTIVENESS OF LASERS AGAINST ABM SYSTEM
Senator AIKEN. I have been reading lately in several places about
the effectiveness of the laser guided bombs in wiping out SAM’s in
North Vietnam. If a laser can be used in wiping out the SAM's, could
the laser also be effective in the ABM system?
If the laser had come three years ago, one would have voted against
the ABM system when it was first proposed.
Secretary RogFRs. Under the agreement we provide that exotic ABM
systems may not be deployed and that would include, of course, ABM
system based on the laser principle.
Senator AIKEN. Is the ABM system getting somewhat obsolete?
Secretary RoGERs. Excuse me? / --
Senator AIKEN. Is the ABM system getting obsolete? If the lasers
can be used to knock out the SAM’s, wouldn’t they be effective against
other types of missiles also?
STATEMENT BY HON. GERARD C. SMITH, DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Mr. SMITH. Senator Aiken, I think it is an entirely different prob-
lem with respect to the use of lasers to help guide offensive missiles
and from their use to guide defensive missiles, but we have covered
this concern of yours in this treaty by prohibiting the deployment of
future type technology. Unless the treaty is amended, both sides can
only deploy launchers and interceptors and radars. There are no in-
hibitions on modernizing this type of technology except that it cannot
be deployed in mobile land-based or space-based or sea-based or air-
based configurations. But the laser concern was considered and both
sides have agreed that they will not deploy future type ABM tech-
nology unless the treaty is amended.
SUBJECTS OF NEXT ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS
Senator AIKEN. Have you decided what the subjects for discussion
and possible treaty agreements will be at the next round of discus-
sions, which I hope and believe will come this fall if the next round of
discussions is dependent on Congress accepting this treaty?
Mr. SMITH. We have no definite guidance as yet, but I think one can
anticipate that subjects such as the Secretary mentioned earlier, in-
cluding reduction of forces, I hope personally that we will get into the
question of a possible MIRV ban. There will be problems about how
you control qualitive improvements, and basically I think the central
problem will be to get an agreed aggregate on all strategic offensive
weapons. The Interim Agreement just covers two types of strategic
offensive weapons. I think our first business will be to try to extend
that coverage so that it will include strategic bombers. §
POSSIBILITY OF AGREEMENT WITH HANOI
Senator AIKEN. Do either of the witnesses believe we will come to
some agreement with Hanoi within the next few days?
That may have some influence on the next round with Moscow?
21
Secretary RogFRs. Senator, I think anybody in Washington who has
been in Washington for a long time, in fact almost anybody who has
followed events in the world, would hesitate to make any prophecy
about what would happen in that area.
Senator AIKEN. I didn’t ask for promises.
Secretary RogFRs. Prophecy, I said.
Senator AIKEN. I thought you said promises.
Secretary RogFRs. We also have hope.
Senator AIKEN. That is all.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.
MEANING OF “suPFICIENCY”
Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was struck by the
excellence of the President's word, “sufficiency” in moving into these
negotiations. Some years ago we used to talk about negotiating from
strength. Then as we studied the problem more we became aware that
if we are dealing with pretty much a man of equal strength we must
accept parity or, as President Nixon put it, sufficiency. Now I find a
turning around of the cycle. I was curious if it is semantic or if there
is some thought we must retain the old idea of nuclear superiority, a
position second to none, because you in your own testimony earlier re-
ferred to negotiating from strength and the preamble of the agreement
before us talks about a position second to none.
This is counter to President Nixon's views of 2 years ago when
it was sufficiency. Is there more in this than meets the eye or is it all
the same ball of wax?
Secretary RogFRs. No, I think it is important to point out that when
we use the word sufficiency we mean a strong national defense capa-
bility second to none.
Now, there have been some tendencies on the part of some to give
the word sufficiency the meaning that somehow we are prepared to be a
little bit inferior or considerably inferior because we will show our
good faith. We want to make it quite clear when we use the word suf-
ficiency we mean a strong national security second to none. We don’t
claim it has to be anything except that, second to none, and it should
be sufficient for purposes of our national defense and we think that
that kind of a posture, one of sufficiency, second to none, strong, will
give us the best negotiating position in the second round of the SALT .
talks.
Senator PELL. But the possibility of retaliation and with devastat-
ing results on the second round would not be considered sufficiency in
itself? - -
Secretary RogFRs. No.
NO CONFLICT WITH SEABED ARMS CONTROL TREATY
Senator PELL. On another subject, the Seabed Arms Control
Treaty, which Mr. Smith and Mr. Leonard and his agency negotiated,
also very successfully, is there any inhibition or conflict between the
terms of the Seabed Arms Control Treaty prohibiting ABM's and
weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and this treaty?
Secretary RogFRs. No, there are not, but I would be glad to have
Ambassador Smith comment on this.
22
Mr. SMITH, I agree with the Secretary; there is no conflict at all.
This treaty does not permit the deployment of an ABM system except
on the continental territory of both countries and one cannot have
sea-based ABM systems under this treaty.
ABM DEPLOYMENT IN CLIENT STATES NOT PERMISSIBLE
Senator PELL. Under the treaty, if either side had a client state that
was willing to have an ABM system planted in it, would that be
permissible?
Secretary ROGERs. No, you cannot deploy ABM systems abroad
and you cannot transfer an ABM system to third countries.
Senator PELL. Thank you.
POSSIBILITY OF COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN DURING PHASE Two
Is there any further thought to moving ahead with the idea of a
comprehensive test ban treaty as part of phase two?
Secretary RogFRs. Well, as you know, over a long period of time
the hang up has been verification. At the moment we think that
still is an obstacle. I don’t think we exclude it totally as a possibility,
but we think in view of that obstacle it is possibly not realistic at
the moment.
Senator PELL. I would imagine that the Senate will certainly give
its assent to this treaty. I as one member looked forward to con-
gratulating you on negotiating them.
SENATE PARTICIPATION IN NEXT ROUND
In connection with the advise portion of the advise and consent
phrase in the Constitution, as you move into phase two, and I am not
talking about the extra briefing Mr. Farley gave us and you gave
us, is there any thought being given to Senate participation in the
advising of the delegation in the next round? *
Mr. SMITH, I would think, Senator, I believe, as was the case, we
certainly will be consulting with appropriate congressional commit-
tees before we start actually negotiating in the second round; yes, sir.
Secretary RogFRs. I think in the process of consultations we get a
good deal of advice. -
Senator PELL. Was there thought given to representatives of the
Senate being part of the delegation in the next round?
Secretary RogFRs. I don’t think so. I think this has worked out so
well we ought to continue the process that we have followed up to
In OW.
I think it is worth pointing out that in my experience there never
have been such extensive consultations with congressional committees
as in SALT. I think that the figures show that we have briefed con-
gressional committees 30 times during the course of the negotiations.
Mr. SMITH. I think in addition to the considerations the Secretary
mentioned one should keep in mind that a comprehensive test ban
presumably will be a multilateral negotiation because it is much
broader than just Soviet-American relations. We think of the next
round of SALT as limited to Soviet-American strategic relations and
I wouldn’t think of them in the same negotiating forum.
23
Secretary RogFRs. I also think I should add we have consulted very
actively with our allies and there is great satisfaction on the part
of our allies all over the world about the consultation process and we
expect to continue that. -
IMPLICATIONS OF EXPANSION TO LIMITS OF AGREEMENTS
Senator PELL. I think probably Ambassador Smith would best be
able to answer this question. If the Soviets do what is allowed in land
and submarine based forward movement on their side, what are
the implications for us? If the Kremlin or Pentagon move ahead on
the same basis and expand as much as they can within the frame-
work of the agreement, would that put us in the very inferior posi-
tion after a few years? -
Mr. SMITH. I think one of the keys to the answer to your question is
your last few words, “after a few years.” Now, one cannot tell how
long this interim freeze will last. People shorthandedly say this is a
5-year agreement. I hope it won’t be. It may be a 1-year agreement; it
may be a 2-year, agreement, depending on when we succeed in the
follow-on negotiations.
Now, it is our calculation that nothing that the Soviets can do even
if it went the full term of five years could upset the strategic balance.
We will be going ahead, as you know, with substantial programs in
the Poseidon and Minuteman field and in other strategic areas, so
that it is our confident calculation that the strategic balance will re-
main firm during that period.
ARE BOTH SIDES GOING FULL STEAM AIHEAD 2
Senator PELL. Basically what you are saying is that both sides
really told each other we are going to go full steam ahead within the
terms of the agreement. Would that be correct?
Mr. SMITH, I think “Full steam ahead” is much too strong a term.
Certainly as far as any programs I know of, if we wanted, we could
go much further and much faster. For instance, in such programs as
the MIRV programs, you could step that up if you wanted to. There
are a number of ways that the United States could produce more
launchers rather quickly if it wanted to. So I don’t see this as a full
steam ahead situation, but it is our understanding that the Soviets are
not going to be hesitating and reducing their programs because of
the fact that a preliminary SALT offensive agreement has been
reached. It is by no means a completed agreement.
MOVING AHEAD TO EXTENT INDICATED QUESTIONED
Senator PELL. In conclusion, as one individual member of the body,
I would share the doubts of my chairman and Senator Symington that
we should move ahead to the extent Secretary Laird indicates he
would like us to move. I would think that it would behoove us to see
if we really feel if moving ahead in one or two of those weapons sys-
tems would not be enough to meet your bargaining purposes and by
the same token would perhaps give us some effect to our economy,
which is also needed at this time. -
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper.
COMMENDATION OF THOSE WHO WORKED ON NEGOTIATION
Senator CoopFR. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say to the Secretary
and to the negotiators and Ambassador Smith, Mr. Nitze, General
Allison, Dr. Brown, Mr. Gartoff and all of the staff, Mr. Farley and
his staff who worked on these negotiations, I believe you deserve the
greatest thanks from the country for the painstaking work that you
have done throughout these years.
I want to say I had the good fortune to attend as an observer to three
of these meetings, two in Vienna and one in Helsinki and have a good
idea of what a difficult painstaking process you had to go through. I
Say that as to what Ibelieve and also to ask this question.
DECISIONS IMADE IN LAST 48 HOURS IN MOSCOW
Some publicity has been given to the view held by some that agree-
ment was largely determined in Moscow in the last 48 hours through
Quick decisions, and some of them to the disadvantage of the United
States, particularly on the submarine launched missiles. Again based
upon my experience at the SALT negotiations and from your briefings
in Washington, I believe that it is not possible to make sudden changes
at the last minute. A constant interchange of proposals and ideas was
made during the last 21% years and the treaty and agreement reflect
that background. But is there any truth that the decisions made in
the last 48 hours were harmful and disadvantageous to the United
States of America?
Secretary ROGERs. Senator, I can answer
Senator PELL. What essential agreement was made there that had
not been agreed upon in your prior negotiations—
Secretary RogFRs. Let me say that when you are dealing with agree-
ments that are as complicated as these agreements are it requires a
coordinated effort on the part of many, many, people, and in order
to complete the agreements that effort has to be a long one and it has
to be carefully planned. In the final analysis when there are differ-
ences of views that prevent the agreement from being consummated,
they have to be decided at the highest level. Now that was done in this
instance. I think this was as well coordinated and well prepared a
negotiation as possibly our country has ever engaged in and it re-
quired teamwork of the highest order and we had that teamwork.
There were major agreements worked out in Helsinki and Vienna
over a course of two and a half years, each one of them difficult in
itself, and combined extremely difficult, because each related to the
other.
At the end of that process, just before the agreements were signed,
there were still some problems, which is not unusual in negotiations.
That is why negotiations haven’t been completed, because there are
problems. These problems were ones that we had more or less antici-
pated, they were the ones that remained as a result of long discus-
sions that Ambassador Smith and his team engaged in, and it was
understood they would be discussed at Moscow.
As you say, they were well thought through and we knew where
the areas of disagreement were and there had to be a decision taken
by the President himself about what he would finally be willing to do
or not do. That was done. And I don’t believe it was a disadvantage
25
at all. I think if it had not been done we wouldn’t have these agree-
ments today and I submit Gerry Smith and all his team agree those
final decisions of the President, too, were extremely important, were
vital in fact to the success of these negotiations and were not harmful
in any degree.
Now, each side had to give a little in order to reach the result we
reached but, as the chairman said, and I think the sentiment and the
general view of what he said is shared; these are very good agree-
ments and no one has been taken advantage of. I don’t think the
Russians are at a disadvantage, we are not at a disadvantage. I think
these agreements reflect the maturity of national interest. They are
going to benefit both the Soviet Union and the United States and the
people of the whole world and I don’t believe anybody lost or won.
I think that the world was the winner, and I think it will improve
the relations between our two countries to a great extent.
I am not sure that any useful purpose is served by talking about
what the disagreements were and how they were resolved. Every-
thing that has been agreed to is before the Congress. We are going
to have another series of negotiations that we have to undertake
soon. I can only say I am absolutely convinced myself that nothing
that happened at Moscow, no decision that was made by the President,
in any way disadvantaged this country. On the contrary, I think it was
essential to the successful completion of these agreements, which I
think serve our national interest.
WITHOUT AGREEMENT OFFENSIVE ARMS RACE AND ABM WOULD CONTINUE
Senator CoopFR. What I am saying is indisputable; it is a fact, but
for an agreement, the offensive arms race and the ABM, defensive mis-
siles, would continue with no essential additional protection to the
United States or either country, and certainly greater danger to both
sides. All this futile, dangerous weaponry could be at tremendous
cost to both countries. Isn’t that correct?
Secretary RogFRs. That is correct.
OTHER UNSUBMITTED DOCUMENTS
Senator CoopFR. The President submitted the treaty, the interim
agreement and protocol, and also understandings agreed to by both
the Soviet Union and the United States, unilateral statements by
both countries. In those papers, particularly those dealing with
understandings, unilateral statements of both the Soviet Union and
the United States, references were made to some other documents
which were not included in the papers that were sent up. You already
have said there were no secret understandings. Is there anything in the
papers to which reference was made in the unilateral statements of
both countries and the agreed understandings which are of such sig-
nificance that they should be sent to the Senate also :
Secretary RogFRs. Well, I would like to ask Ambassador Smith to
elaborate.
Senator CoopFR. The question has arisen many times recently but
also in past history, particularly in the early days of this Republic
the Executive was asked if the negotiators’ papers and instructions
'26
were sent to the Senate on various treaties. Should not these papers—
the full papers, the complete record—be given to us now?
Secretary RogFRs. I would like to have Ambassador Smith answer
that, but let me before he does say that we very carefully considered
everything that may be thought of as an agreement or understanding
of any significance and everything that is agreed to of any significance
we think has been fully reflected in the treaty, in the agreed under-
standings that are included in this document. In the interim agreement
and protocol. Nevertheless, everything that has been agreed to has
been submitted to the Congress for its consideration and perusal.
I don’t believe there is anything else that is of any consequence.
EXPECTED SOVIET PROGRAMS
Now, there was not any complete transcript maintained of the
plenary sessions; so I think the Congress has everything that reflects
in any way on what the treaty and agreements involve.
Senator CoopFR. Reference has been made to the President's state-
ment that the Soviet Union intends to build up its offensive missiles
strength. Agreement has been reached upon the number of land based
missiles, submarine launched missiles, protection against upgrading
of SAM to the anti-ballistic area. What are the things that you ex-
pect the Soviet Union to continue to do, Ambassador Smith.
Mr. SMITH. Well, I think, Senator Cooper, the Soviet Union
throughout this negotiation made it very clear that their moderniza-
tion process should not be interfered with in connection with this first
agreement and we, in general, agreed with that proposition. This is to
a considerable extent a numerical limitation although there are some
qualitative limitations in these arrangements. I think that what the
Soviets had in mind is that they want to keep their missile systems
up to date. Their missiles are not as efficient as ours. They want to
have the opportunity too of having more modern missiles. A lot of
their missiles are liquid fueled. They want to probably make them
solid fueled. They want to have them more efficient and that is why
we had a good deal of discussion about what could be done within the
numerical restraints. For instance, one of the questions was, could you
increase the size of launchers for an ICBM, and it was agreed that
you could not increase the dimensions “significantly.” It was subse-
quently agreed that “significantly increased” meant more than ten or
15 percent. So I would expect that the Soviets will be engaged in pro-
grams which would involve some increase in the dimensions of their
silo launchers.
In addition to that, the whole submarine program I look on as a
modernization program. They apparently are willing to modernize
their strategic forces by building more submarines at the price of
phasing out ICBM's. I would anticipate we will see that moderniza-
tion phenomena continue in their forces just as we continue to modern-
ize our forces by improving the warhead situation in our MIRV
program, by hardening our silos and otherwise.
Senator CoopFR. Then what you are speaking of is the moderniza-
tion of their ABM system, and their land based missiles systems, and
submarine launched missiles systems, which is permitted under the
treaty and agreement?
27
Secretary RogFRs. That is correct. º
Senator CoopFR. Do you anticipate they will continue to work upon
MIRV, deployment of MIRV which is not prohibited by the agree-
ment?
Secretary RogFRs. I wouldn’t be at all surprised if the Soviets fol-
low a MIRV approach.
POSSIBILITY OF SOVIETS INCREASING SS-9's
Senator CoopFR. You have spoken of the enlargement of their silos.
Does that offer a danger that by enlarging their silos the Soviets could
somehow increase their SS-9's? There is a fixed limit on SS-9's; is
there not? -
Secretary RogFRs. Yes, sir, they have agreed that they will not con-
struct any new ICBM silos and that means that they are frozen not
only at their present level of ICBM silos, but at their present level of
what we call heavy ICBM silos, which are SS-9's and any subsequent
class of that sort. -
They presently have something on the order of 300 operational and
under construction and under this agreement they will be limited to
that.
Senator CoopFR. Could they by increasing the diameter of the silos,
which you say is permitted up to 15 percent, would that permit the
deployment of heavy missiles comparable to the SS-9?
Secretary Rogers. We believe not.
SUBJECTS FOR NEXT PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS
Senator CoopFR. What is there then to negotiate in the next phase?
There are bombers. What else? -
Secretary RogFRs. The first thing—
Sºnator CoopFR. Is reduction of launchers agreed upon in phase
OIlê
Secretary RogFRs. There are not reductions agreed upon in the
present situation, except in connection with the SLBM inclusion where
the Soviets will have to go in for a substantial reduction program if
they want to build up to the levels of submarines and SLBM launchers
permitted. I would think that a reduction program would be an im-
portant component of any follow-on negotiations but, firstly, what I
think we need to get an agreement on is what weapons systems.
Strategic offensive weapons systems, must be included in a treaty to
match the defensive treaty, and that means including bombers.
Now, the Soviets, as you know, made a strong point in the past of
Saying it also should include some other aircraft that we do not con-
sider as strategic. These forward based systems
Senator COOPER. In addition to placing the interim agreement in the
form of a treaty, achieving launcher number reductions, you might go
into subjects such as bombers, forward based aircraft, the aircraft on
carriers, that type of thing?
Secretary RogFRs. Our position is that aircraft on carriers and sys-
tems based on the Far East and in Europe are not correctly charac-
terized as strategic. -
80–942 O—72—3
28
PERIOD OF RESTRAINT BEFORE WEAPONS BUILDING PROGRAM
Senator CoopFR. Now, some discussions have been had about the
pushing forward of larger offensive weapons development programs.
I know you have stated that you were talking about modernization,
but would it be good to have a period of restraint for a year or two be:
fore we engage in such a building program to determine whether or not
the Soviet Union also has shown some restraints? \
Some scientists connected with the SALT talks of great ability,
knowledge and integrity told me restraint could be very helpful to the
agreements and could perhaps help in reaching a more favorable out-
come in phase two. It is their view that if the Soviets do not show simi-
lar restraint there would be plenty of time in the 3 years remaining
of the interim agreement to take such steps as would be necessary to
protect the security of this country. -
It seems to me a very reasonable position and it conflicts somewhat
with the position of going forward full speed with the weapons build-
ing program. -
Secretary RogFRs. I want to emphasize
CHANGE IN BUDGET PRIORITIES
Senator CoopFR. Let me say I am glad you brought out the point,
which I don’t think has been very thoroughly gone into, that while
the defense budget has increased without question, it is also true, to
anyone who studies it, that the relative priorities have changed
wholely. -
Secretary RogFRs. There has been a total shift. -
Senator CoopFR. It has been reversed. We now spend 45% on social
needs and about 30% on defense. -
QUESTION OF RESTRAINT
I want to ask further about the question of restraint.
Secretary RogFRs. I think Ambassador Smith has pointed out some-
thing we should emphasize constantly and that is there a lot of things
we could do within the limitations of these agreements that we are
not doing. So when we use expressions like full speed ahead and So
forth, I think it is misleading. What we are talking about now is
continuing with the programs that we had earlier included in our
budget submissions and I think that we should continue those pro-
grams. I think the Soviet Union would wonder what was happening
in this country if under these circumstances, when the President has
been So successful in concluding these agreements, that he was not
Supported in his requests. If we change our budgetary requests now
and had unilateral action, I think first it would cause a good deal of
concern here in this country and I think the Soviet Union would
wonder why the Congress didn’t support the President at this time.
Second, I think it would weaken the negotiating position very
measureably because the Soviet Union would ask itself why should
it bother to negotiate reciprocal limitations if in fact, the Congress of
the United States is not going to support the President. I think that
would be very harmful, not only to our security interests, but to our
foreign policy. So I strongly urge the Congress to support the Presi-
29
dent and I do not think it is appropriate to indicate that we are not
acting with restraint. The programs that we have asked for, we think,
are very reasonable programs that are necessary unless we can work
out some kind of a further limitation in the permanent arrangement.
And to me at a time when the country is very supportive to the
President, and I think the committee is, and we all agree these are
very significant agreements particularly the ABM agreement, which
I think has great importance may be not fully understood in this
country, that is not the time to fail to support the President. The
things that he has suggested in the past that were necessary, pro-
grams such as ABM, it has turned out right. There is no doubt in my
mind that those programs, that ABM program, contributed very sub-
stantially to the success of these negotiations and I think we should,
I think the Congress should, support the President in the request he
has made. I don’t necessarily mean everything; I don’t think Secre-
tary Laird said everything we want, but he said forward movement
On these programs and I think that is essential.
ARTICLE CONCERNING ARMS ACCORDS AND QUESTIONS FOR RECORD
Senator CoopFR. My time has run out. However, I would like to offer
for inclusion in the record an article from the Washington Post, dated
June 4, 1972, entitled “The Arms Accords: Everyone Gains.”
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.
(The information referred to follows:)
[From the Washington Post, June 4, 1972.]
THE ARMS ACCORD : EVERYONE GAINS
(By Alton H. Quanbeck and Barry M. Blechman)
The authors are members of the defense analysis staff at the Brookings In-
8titution. Their views should not be attributed to Brookings.
The Strategic arms limitation agreements signed in Moscow a week ago are
landmark accords, symbolizing a marked reduction of U.S.-Soviet rivalry in Stra-
tegic armaments and formalizing the mutual acceptance of Overall nuclear parity.
While the Specific limits on weapons systems incorporated in the agreements are
important in their own right and will result in greater security and substantial
economies for both nations, the significance of the agreements, as stated by
Henry Kissinger, “transcends the importance of individual restrictions.” Most
importantly, by explicitly agreeing to forego nationwide population defenses, the
Signatories have removed the greatest threat to each Other’s deterrent. In them-
selves, therefore, these accords are major steps toward stabilizing the strategic
relationship.
Two agreements have been concluded: One, a formal treaty of unlimited dura-
tion, limits the development of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM); the second,
a five-year executive agreement, limits offensive missiles.
It is unfortunate that in the domestic debate Over the advisability of these
agreements, the overall sufficiency of U.S. strategic forces and our technological
superiority will be largely ignored. The fact is that we have sufficient forces to
deter potential enemies, singly or in combination. The large number of U.S.
nuclear weapons carried by diverse delivery systems assures that even in retalia-
tion to a preemptive first strike, enough weapons would survive to destroy the
attacker's population and industrial base. Our technology lead insures that this
will be the case for the indefinite future. - - w
Critics of the agreement will argue, based on simple comparisons of numbers of ,
launchers, that the United States is frozen into a position of inferiority. In fact,
however, the United States is better Off, by any measure, with the agreements
than Without them. - -
30
The table appearing on page B4' projects the strategic balance for mid-1977,
both with and without an agreement. If the momentum of the Soviet missile
building program had not been stopped, the U.S.S.R. by that time would have
almost twice as many missiles as would the United States. To counter this
buildup, the United States could have chosen to launch a new building program
of its own, at great expense and with no assurance of great security. The
MOSCOW accords Offer a much more favorable OutCOme. -
Although the Soviets will still have 2,300 launchers compared to 1,700 for the
|United States, the Ongoing U.S. MIRV program will ensure a substantial margin
Of missile-deliverable Warheads in favor of the United States. Number of war-
heads together with equivalent megatons (EMT, an index of nuclear weapon
destructive potential) provide much better measures of deterrent capability than
number of missiles alone. The restraints provided by the agreements on pro-
jected Soviet capabilities are particularly apparent in the projected EMT index.
There is no possibility that the Soviets can reverse the U.S. advantage in num-
ber Of warheads Over the course of this decade. Although the Moscow agreements
do not prevent the Soviets from replacing their present warheads with MIRVs,
both their Submarine-launched missiles and SS—11 land-based missiles are too
small for effective conversions. Any Soviet MIRV program is likely to be
restricted to the approximately 300 large SS—9 missiles, the unidentified missile
for Some new silos under construction, Or a follow-On to current sea-based Sys-
tems. In any case, U.S. defense officials indicate the U.S.S.R. is unlikely to
jachieve the requisite technology before 1980, long after the duration of the
preSent agreement. - -
Furthermore, the United States has a larger, more modern and more surviv-
able bomber force than do the Soviets. These forces are not limited by the Mos-
cow agreements. Soviet strategic bombers, which entered service in 1956, are
comparable to aircraft that were phased out by the United States many years ago.
In addition, the late model U.S. B-52 strategic bombers are now being equipped
with up to 20 short-range attack missiles (SRAM). The Soviets have not demon-
Strated any comparable capability.
MOSCOW’s TRADEOFF
In a more general context, the agreements provide substantial benefits for both.
COuntries. -
From the Soviet perspective, the accords establish the U.S.S.R. as a great
power Second to none, and the Strategic equal of the United States. The agree-
ments and Other documents issued during the Summit represent formal recogni-
tion of this status by the United States, and our acceptance of nuclear parity.
Such recognition has long been an important objective in Soviet foreign policy.
Second, the agreement terminates the U.S. deployment of the Safeguard ABM,
a system which the Soviets may see as potentially negating the advantages of
their Offensive missile buildup. Third, the agreements give the Soviets numerical
Superiority in both land and Sea-based Offensive missile launchers, an advantage
which they may believe will yield political dividends.
TO Obtain these advantages the U.S.S.R. has made considerable concessions.
The Soviets had to accept the United States technological lead ; our advantage in
warheads, for example, will continue to grow. It has not been able to restrict our
great advantage in Strategic bombers, nor limit Our deployment of forward-based
Systems (land- and Sea-based tactical aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weap-
ons to the Soviet Union due to their deployment in Europe and elsewhere).
The latter, especially, provided considerable delay in the negotiations, reflecting
its importance to the U.S.S.R.
The advantages of the agreements from the United States' perspective stem
from two sources. First, they will result in considerable dollar Savings. Much
more importantly, however, the agreements effectively constrain the momentum
Of the strategic arms buildup which has been underway in the Soviet Union
since 1965. Since that year, the U.S.S.R. has deployed more than 1,200 ICBMs
and 25 modern strategic submarines (Yankee class). An additional 17–18 Yankee
Subs are under Construction. - - -
The buildup had reached such alarming proportions that some were beginning
to fear the Soviets’ quantitative superiority would Overwhelm the United States’
technological advantages and gain for Moscow substantial political, if not mili-
tary, advantages. Even though the agreements permit the Soviets to deploy up to
62 missile-firing submarines, they terminate this buildup below potential uncon-
trolled levels, and are a more effective counter than similar deployments by this
31
nation. This is particularly true since new U.S. strategic Systems such as Trident
and B–1 would not be deployed before the late 1970s, even under the accelerated
schedules announced by the administration this past Winter. - .
More importantly, both nations benefit by the change in attitudes reflected in
the agreement. The superpowers have clearly indicated their determination to re-
duce the risk of nuclear war and, as stated in the joint communique issued at the
end of the President's visit, “to contribute to the relaxation of international
tension and the strengthening of confidence between states. . . .” -
NEW OPTIONS FOR U.S.
The Moscow accords directly curtail the Safeguard system to two sites, One at
a Minuteman site (now under construction at Grand Forks AFB, N.D.), the
other around Washington. Beyond that, the achievement of these agreements
should cause reconsideration of some of the major strategic programs presently
planned.
On the one hand, we will want to continue certain programs in Order to hedge
against the unexpected and to modernize or replace existing Systems. The Min-
uteman II and Poseidon MIRV programs are likely to fall into this group. Addi-
tionally, there probably will be increased spending on basic research for Strategic
Systems as well as for increased strategic reconnaissance.
On the other hand, because of new explicit constraints on Soviet deployments
and because of our improved understanding of Soviet intentions, it may be desir-
able to modify or redirect Other major programs. Some possibilities are:
Since it is no longer necessary to accelerate the development of Trident (a new
submarine system incorporating a longer-range missile) as a bargaining chip, or
to match the Soviets in sea-based missile, should the program revert to its
earlier slower schedule? Furthermore, should we reconsider the characteristics
Of the new Submarine? - -
Is it necessary or desirable to plan to defend Washington with ABMs, even
though it is permitted under the agreement? The survivability of our national
leadership now depends on airborne command posts together with an extensive
and redundant communications net.
Since both sides now have agreed to forego nationwide defenses of their popula-
tion against missiles, there is little point in trying to protect cities against So-
viet bombers. Should we reduce our objectives for air defenses to a surveillance
role against unauthorized penetration of U.S. air space and defense against
light attacks?
While answers to these questions are Only partly dependent upon the agree-
ments, a new element has been introduced into the strategic calculation which
requires careful evaluation. Potential Savings realizable from these measures
are estimated in the table below, expressed in terms of average annual savings
from fiscal 1973 to fiscal 1979, in billions Of fiscal 1973 dollars : - -
Direct result: Limit ABM deployments to two sites - $1.4
Other possible actions: -
Do not deploy ABM defense for District of Columbia 0.2
Slow down Trident development - 1.0
Limit air defense to Surveillance rule 2. 2
Gross potential annual savings 4.8
Incremental Spending for additional Surveillance and research__________ O. 5
Net potential annual savings - 4. 3
AGENDA FOR SALT II
Negotiations on further arms limitations are likely to be prolonged and difficult.
The prominent issues remaining are complicated and involve forces and concepts
that are hard to define and isolate.
Topics likely to be discussed at future SALT meetings include possible limits
On forward-based Systems, bombers, land-mobile ICBM's, air defenses, anti-sub-
marine Warfare forces, and intermediate range missiles. Additionally, one would
expect that the two sides will eventually discuss mutual force reductions in Stra-
tegic Systems already limited. w
One of the problems most likely to be resolved in the follow-on negotiations
concerns the mutuai Vulnerability of both sides’ land-based missiles. Conceivably,
32.
improvements in missile accuracy and warhead proliferation Could still lead to the
attainment of a counterforce capability against the land-based component in
either the U.S. or Soviet strategic force. Such a development could be
destabilizing.
TWO forms of limitations would ameliorate these problems: reductions in the
number of deployed Warheads, and mutual agreement to shift land-based missiles
to Sea, or simply to phase them. Out altogether. In this sense, the provision in the
present agreement permitting the shift Of Older land-based missiles to Sea, is an
important precedent.
While these subjects are made difficult by problems of definition, verification
and the interrelationship of strategic and general purpose forces, the atmosphere
Of COOperation engendered by the MOSCOW agreements and the Summit in general
should help ease these difficulties. In any case, independent of any future agree-
ments, the measures agreed upon in MOSCOW are major StepS in a SSuring the
Security of this nation.
The following table estimates the projected strategic balance in mid-1977, at
the expiration of the new 5-year agreement On Offensive weapons, based On admin-
istration statements about present U.S. planning and On Observed deployment
rates for SOviet Systems:
Without MOSCOW Under MOSCOW
Agreement Agreement
United United
U.S.S.R. States U.S.S.R. States
Land-based missiles----------------------------------------- 1,900 1,054 1,330 1,000
Sea-based missiles------------------------------------------ 1, 200 656 950 710
Heavy bombers--------------------------------------------- 140 500 140 500
Deployed strategic Warheads--------------------------------- 3, 400 11,000 2,600 11,000
Equivalent megatonnage------------------------------------- 5,500 4, 550 4,000 4, 450
15% Weapons characteristics based on the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ “The Military Balance,
The CHAIRMAN. Senator McGee.
CHARACTERIZING BUILDUP AS FULL STEAM AHEAD QUESTIONED
Senator McGEE. I would not begin without reference to the phrase
already used, Mr. Secretary, as to whether we were going to proceed
full steam ahead. If we do, we will end up back in the 1930's. It went
out of style a couple of years ago to characterize the arrangement of
our buildup that way.
AGREEMENT ON TERM “HEAVY MISSILE”
But I wanted to phrase this particular question now in the wake of
the questioning of the Senator from Kentucky. Was there agreement
on the meaning of the term “heavy missile” or did the United States
simply file its interpretation of what it meant to us?
Mr. SMITH. Senator McGee, there is good agreement. This was
reflected in the exchanges, going back quite a bit, as to what is a heavy
missile and what is a light missile at the present time.
There is no doubt that the SS—7's and the SS-8's and the SS—9's
are heavy missiles, and the SS-11’s and the SS-13's are light missiles,
and that the Titan on the American side is a heavy missile and the
Minuteman is a light missile. The question came up as to the future.
Supposing some sort of a missile is developed that is in between 2 There
we tried to get a specific definition of future missiles that would
qualify for that term “heavy” and the Soviets were loath to get pinned
down to a specific number.
33
One of the arguments was, if you have a specific number and you
are just over that in volume by one cubic meter, there would be a
violation, and how can one be so precise about the future as to know
exactly what technology would require? -
The best that we were able to do was to make a unilateral statement
that if the Soviets deployed a missile significantly larger than the
SS—11, we would consider that a heavy missile and we expected the
Soviets to take our point of view into consideration. -
They replied, saying that the record showed we had been unable
to reach a specific agreement on the definition of heavy and that the
executive agreement should stand as it was written.
I think that there is no doubt about the state of consensus as to the
present. There is some possibility that in the future there may be a
discussion between us as to whether a new class of missiles would be
light or heavy and we have a Standing Consultative Commission that
we will set up and it is that sort of problem, I believe, that will be
referred to that commission.
Senator McGEE. Is there no uncertainty or equivocation in your
judgment as it affects the SS-9? I single that out because that is a
straightforward statement. One of our very distinguished colleagues
in the Senate on this matter said that the ambiguity led to no agree-
ment and thus it leaves the SS-9 and its status in sort of quiet limbo.
Mr. SMITH, I think the record is clear that the SS-9 is accepted by
both sides as a heavy missile. - -
DOES AGREEMENT GIVE SOVIETS MORE OF EVERYTHING 2
Senator McGEE. A second statement has been made by one of our
colleagues, and I read this because it was lifted out of a printed rec-
ord. News Day I think. He says that the agreement gives the Soviets
more of everything, more light ICBM, more heavy ICBM's, more sub-
marines, more submarine launched missiles, more payloads, even more
ABM radar.
In no area covered by the agreement “is the United States per-
mitted to maintain parity with the Soviet Union.”
Mr. SMITH. Well, I think that this is a straight, simple statement on
the numbers of launchers. The present situation is that the Soviets
have more ICBM's and they have more SLBM's under construction
and Operational. The recitation of the present numerical situation does
not affect the value of these agreements.
It is our position, which is supported by our military authorities,
that we have a position of sufficiency, that we have advantages in a
number of other respects. We have a very substantial advantage in the
number of warheads; we have doubled the number of warheads in our
arsenal in the last three years. They are programed to be again doubled
in the next two or three years. -
The quality of our forces is substantially better than the Soviets.
We have a bomber force that is something like three times the size of
. and there is no comparison between the efficiency of our bomber
OPCeS.
We have a capability to add new armaments to our bomber force
and we have them programed. So I think that there is no question
§: this agreement does not result in any inequality for the United
tates.
34
Senator McGEE. In other words, the statement which I read from
the Senator is not untrue? It is partly true?
Mr. SMITH. Well, the statement about radar, for instance, is based,
I take it, on the assumption that the Soviets are permitted to retain
some quite obsolescent radars that are not phased-array radars. They
are mechanical dish radars that have been around Moscow for some
years. And under the agreement, in one of the interpretative state-
ments, we have agreed that they don’t have to scrap those. But in all
other respects the radar situation is precisely the same and these old
radars give them no advantage at all. I would expect they would
scrap them pretty soon and go to the modern technology.
Senator McGEE. What it leaves out is the number of warheads, for
example, where we have distinct advantage, the aircraft that are com-
mitted to the strategic balance system and the Sophistication of some
of the weaponry that is involved. Is that correct?
Mr. SMITH. That is correct. In addition to that we have a number
of advantages that are given to us by geography. -
In the case of our submarine deployments, I believe Dr. Kissinger
pointed out the other day that in order to keep the same number of
submarines on station as the United States does, the Soviet Union at
present would have to have a larger number of submarines than the
United States has.
AVOIDING WARPED WIFW OF AGREEMENTS
Senator McGEE. Statements like the two that I have just read are
going to have to be explained, I think, very carefully, if the public
is to avoid a warped view of to what the agreements agree and to
what they did not agree.
It is easy to lift something out of context. I suspect we are all guilty
of it at one time or another. But I can’t stress strongly enough how
urgent it is we try to make sure the full story gets out, not just a part
of it. The moment there are any gaps, it is going to complicate it for
a good
Mr. SMITH. I agree completely and I take it that is the purpose of
your line of questioning right now. I think that has been very useful.
Secretary RogFRs. I think it is well to keep in mind we have another
negotiation coming and we want to be somewhat careful about how
we state some of these things.
For example, forward basing, and geographical advantages, it is
important for us to take those factors into consideration, too.
We have taken the position that they are not to be negotiated in
the next round. But there is no doubt, as Ambassador Smith said, that
the areas where we are away ahead are not included in the limitations,
MIRV’s and airplanes, and so forth.
IS MOVING AIHEAD AS DESCRIBED WIOLATION ?
Senator McGEE. Let me ask again, for the record, if we move ahead,
not at full steam, full whatever it takes in the nuclear age, in the terms
that have been described, the B–1 the Trident submarine, and the like,
does that in any way violate the understanding or the treaty with
MOSCOW 3 -
35
Secretary RogFRs. No, not at all. In fact, it is quite consistent with
what Mr. Brezhnev said they were going to do. He explained they
were going to go ahead with their ongoing programs within the
limitation permitted in the interim agreement, and our position is we
should do the same thing until we negotiate further.
Senator McGEE. That is why I think it is important again that this
be kept very sharply in front of us so that the innuendos that somehow
we may be doing violence to a negotiating stance and an agreement
with Moscow do not enter the picture. -
It is for us to decide up here as a separate issue whether that is a
wise policy in terms of the next round. We should not have no choice
but to nod our heads and say, I favor the treaty. So I have to go
along with the full arms program as outlined by the Secretary of
Defense. -
Secretary RogFRs. No, we certainly have not taken that position.
But our position is both of these things should be considered on the
merits and we hope Congress would support President Nixon on
both of them.
COST OF ITEMS AND COST OF UNBALANCED STRATEGIC CAPABILITY
Senator McGEE. We are going to likewise hear a great deal more
than we have heard this morning about how horribly costly these items
º * in the non-treaty field, the B–1, the Trident submarines, and
the like.
The issue, it seems to me, ought to be, at least for the moment,
whether or not it complicates or enhances the chance for success in
stage two. I think that is the basic question involved. Cost is also a
frightening thing. But there are some things I think we have learned
in our history even worse than an unbalanced budget. We found that
in World War II. I suspect an unbalanced strategic capability could
be even more costly than the frightening cost of these items.
BENEFIT OF DOUBT RESIDES WITH CONTINUING LEGAL BUILDUPS
But we should consider those, in my judgment, separately. I must
say at this stage Ilean toward gambling on the request for these defense
articles while we prepare for the next stage. I didn’t always think
thus, but I think the record is rather impressive, as we remember that
Only when the Russians acquired a capability in the nuclear areas
with us was it even possible to open feelers for discussion ultimately
culminating in the SALT talks. And only as we maintained an equiv-
alent balance was it possible to bring those talks to fruition.
I think that the burden of proof lies with those who think otherwise
as to what our chances would be if we sat tight here in the steam age
and waited placidly for the next stage to get underway.
I think really the benefit of the doubt now has to reside with the
request for continuation of the legal buildups, the treaty permissive
buildups in capabilities, if we are to preserve the chance for still more
progress in disarmament agreements.
Secretary RogFRs. That is the view of the Administration.
Senator McGEE. I think it is very risky, Mr. Secretary, as we do
that, but I think it is well we remember that it is risky if we don’t.
36
If we are going to get two-thirds of the Senate to agree on some-
thing, there is going to have to be a bit of give, a bit of reservation
from both directions, those who think we can stabilize the world by
fortressing America, and those on the other hand who think we can
do it by rolling over. I think the balance of capability may hold the
key to a new breakthrough.
Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Scott.
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Senator Scott. First of all, Senator Percy regrets he has an engage-
ment which has made him leave early and he expresses the hope there
will be an afternoon or later session with the opportunity to question
the Secretary and Ambassador Smith. If not, he would like permission
to submit certain questions to them and include their answers in the
record. (See p. 51.)
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir, without objection.
DESIRE FOR PROMIPT ACTION
Senator SCOTT. Mr. Secretary, first of all, the Majority Leader and
I have had a colloquy this morning in which we have indicated that if,
after full opportunity for the purpose of hearings, the treaty could
be reported expeditiously, it would be our joint desire to bring it up
before the July recess. If that cannot be done, then we would wish to
have the Senate debate and act on the treaty following the first of the
two conventions.
I put this in the record as indicative of the desire, which I am sure
is shared by this committee, for prompt action, as consistent with the
importance of the matter before the committee.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DIET AND FAST
There is much controversy on the use of the word “unilateral” dis-
armament. It seems to me that the difference between following the
treaty and refusing to go along with the buildup is somewhat the dif-
ference between a diet and a fast. Both of these countries have agreed
upon a certain diet which would still leave them quite strong. But if
the United States, urged on by unilateral disarmers and neo-isola-
tionists is to engage in not a diet but a fast, while Russia is not engag-
ing in a fast, we will end up much the weaker for it.
I have sat here in this room for 30 years off and on and I heard the
same arguments when we were discussing lend-lease, when Wendell
Willkie was testifying in favor of it 30 years ago in this room. I have
heard these arguments by each new brand of isolationists as they
come on and they have always been wrong and they always have had
the arguments before them that indicated the worst disasters could
occur to this country.
I don’t know how much we need, but I know that if we do without the
treaty, then we break the backs of both our peoples in supporting an
impossible spiraling arms race. But if we do less than the treaty or
we do less than the forward movement indicated in the treaty, we
will reduce the chances for future limitation.
So I speak for the diet rather than the fast concept.
37
UNILATERAL OBSOLESCENCE
Moreover, there are those who do not like to be called unilateral dis-
armers. I would suggest what certainly will clearly define the issue. If
we are not to proceed with Trident, if we are to let the Russians build
beyond us in submarines, if we are not to proceed with the new bomb-
er, and allow the old ones to be withdrawn, if we are not to proceed
with those things, with which the Russians, themselves, admit they will
proceed, then those who advocate this withdrawal into a shell of pre-
sumed security are advocating unilateral obsolescence.
To my mind unilateral obsolescence is even more dangerous than
unilateral disarmament, because on unilateral disarmament you can
make political adjustments and prepare to be a second-class power, but
on unilateral obsolescence you don’t know whether your weapons are
any good until you suddenly find you need to use them and it is too
appalling and too apparent. -
APPROVAL OF APPROPRIATIONS BY CONGRESS
I might point out, too, that we have had discussions here on how
heavy our appropriations are, how much these things cost, what we
have been spending, how heavy the national debt is. Every appropria-
tion has been approved by Congress. That is the only place they are
approved. -
REORDERING PRIORITIES
We have, indeed, reordered our priorities from 31 percent on the
general welfare and 45 percent on the defense, as you pointed out, to
31 percent on defense and 45 percent on general welfare.
So those who call for reordering priorities have already seen them
reordered. That is why it is so difficult in this three-year period to
* reorder the priorities for well known and admitted domestic
Ilee CIS.
ADEQUACY OF NATIONAL MEANS OF INSPECTION
The question I had is this: Will the national means of inspection
be enough? Is there adequate certainty that cheating can be avoided?
Secretary ROGERs. Yes; we are fully convinced that that is the
fact, Senator. This is a matter that was very carefully considered by
our negotiators and all who worked in the field and there is no doubt
in my mind that they will be adequate.
I am sure that subsequently you will have witnesses who will
testify to this and maybe Ambassador Smith would like to add to that.
Senator SCOTT. Each nation now admits it will not undertake to
interfere with or to prevent the other's national means of inspection;
is that correct?
Secretary ROGERs. That is correct.
Senator SCOTT. Senator Cooper reminds me this is almost exactly
the open skies proposal of President Eisenhower. We are getting to-
ward that; are we not?
Secretary ROGERs. Yes, I think that is one way to put it. I think
national means of verification are fully adequate for the purposes
of these agreements. - -
38
CONGRATULATIONS FOR ACHIEVEMENT
Senator SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and Mr. Ambassador. I
do congratulate all of you upon your achievement here. -
I had so many people say while you were working at it that you
would never get it done. Now the usual reaction is that it won’t work
or we won’t cooperate with you.
I think the thing to do is to congratulate you for having done what
we all know was difficult, and to help make it work.
VERIFICATION OF SOVIET MOVEMENT TOWARD MOBILE ICBMS
There is no agreement on mobile ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles); is there? Could we verify any movement on the Soviets’
part towards mobile ICBM's?
Mr. SMITH. Senator Scott, you are quite correct in saying the
agreement does not cover mobile ICBM's. There are no mobile ICBM's
in existence.
It is far from clear that the Soviets have any aim to deploy such
a system. I think that their reluctance to include them in this initial
agreement was to avoid prejudicing their subsequent position about
mobiles in the second negotiation.
We made a very strong unilateral statement saying that if we saw
any mobiles being deployed we would consider that as inconsistent
with this interim agreement.
On the question of verification, while verification of a ban on mobiles
would be somewhat more difficult than a ban on fixed ICBM's, we
believe that we have adequate capability even on mobiles. You might
not pick up the first one in the world, but before any significant num-
ber of mobile missiles were deployed, one would be aware of it and if
there were a ban, that would be a clear violation.
WORLD REACTION TO AGREEMENTS
Senator Scott. Finally, when I last saw you in Helsinki, as you
know, I went on to Russia and in Moscow had the privilege of a long
discussion with Mr. Vladimir Semenov. I have made the statement be-
fore that I said to him I thought that the overriding reason for a
treaty of this kind was in addition to the obligations we owed our own
Nation, the obligation we owed the rest of the world, so that they
would stop being so frightened of both of us. Do you think this really
does represent some movement toward reducing the fear that other
nations have of the growth of both super powers?
Mr. SMITH, I think clearly the answer is yes, to that, Senator Scott.
In addition, I think these agreements represent very solid earnest
of the seriousness of the American and Soviet intentions to fulfill their
obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Senator SCOTT. That has been the world reaction; has it not?
Mr. SMITH, I haven’t seen any specific commentary, but I am sure,
having talked to people from all over the world about this Article VI
problem, that it will be taken as quite responsive to those obligations.
Of course, there will always be claims that we are not moving fast
enough to implement that article, but I think this will be taken as
very serious evidence that we are moving.
39
Secretary RogFRs. Senator, the answer to your question is yes. I
think, without exception, the nations of the world have reacted favor-
ably to these agreements, and have concluded that they may very well
mean a reduction of tensions. -
Now, as you know, I went to the NATO meeting right after the
Moscow Summit and without exception all of our NATO allies made
exactly that statement, that they not only thought these were signifi-
cant agreements in a bilateral sense, but they were confident that they
would have the effect of reducing tensions in the world. That certainly
is true among our Asian friends and allies.
I had a study made of the world reaction. In fact, I will give you a
copy of it. Without exception, the reaction has been tremendously fav-
orable, favorable for the reason that I think you mention. There is a
feeling that this will result in reduction of tensions and thereby con-
tribute to the security of the world.
Senator SCOTT. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Spong?
Senator SPONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
ExCLUSION OF U.S. FORwaRD BASED AIRCRAFT
Mr. Secretary, you have touched on this matter in answers to Sena-
tor McGee and Senator Scott, but I would like to pursue it.
It has been said that the United States secured an advantage in the
negotiations by obtaining the exclusion of our forward-based aircraft.
Does this really represent an overall advantage or is it more realisti-
cally a recognition of, for lack of a better phrase, “spheres of influence”
and the fact that our European alliance would be thrown into turmoil
if there were a limitation on our bombers and forward-based systems
without some comparable agreement on the estimated 600-plus Soviet
medium range missiles presently targeted on Western Europe?
Secretary ROGERs. We certainly don’t think it was an advantage in
this sense and we have attempted to avoid the use of the word “ad-
vantage,” who won or who lost.
We felt in the beginning we were not in a position to talk about for-
ward basing and we stated that to our allies, we insisted on it, and Am-
bassador Smith made two statements to that effect in May, we are not
in a position to negotiate on that basis.
So I don’t believe that it is accurate to say that we have claimed an
advantage. This is one of the things that we were able to exclude from
the agreement. t
Senator SPONG. I don’t know that I said you claimed it as an advan-
tage. I think it is among the observations that I have seen with regard
to the 1
Secretary RogFRs. Yes.
Senator SPONG. With regard to the negotiations.
How SALT FITS INTO OVERALL U.S. POLICY PLANs
On June 15, in a Congressional briefing, Dr. Kissinger noted, and
I quote:
* * * Early in 1971, with the Stalemate threatening, the President took a major
new initiative by Opening direct contact with the Soviet leaders to Stimulate the
40
SALT discussions and for that matter, the Berlin negotiations, and providing
progress could be achieved on these two issues, to explore the feasibility of a
Summit meeting.
That statement, which refers to SALT, the Berlin accords, and the
Summit, suggests that SALT is only part of a broaderstrategy.
Could you address yourself to how SALT fits into our overall policy
plans for Europe and the Soviet Union? -
Secretary ROGERs. The SALT talks, of course, were considered by
the United States as a great significance in and of themselves. The
Berlin agreement, which has now been concluded, was also a very im-
portant agreement.
The President felt from the beginning, and I think he said the
other day in his introductory remarks that it was important before
the summit meeting to have assurances that there were going to be
concrete results from such a meeting.
Consequently, we worked very diligently to be certain that there
were concrete results that would occur in Moscow. So to that extent
they were related and we have talked very fully and constantly with
our allies in Europe to be sure that they could understand our attitude
about the Berlin agreement, about a European security conference,
about the SALT talks, about the other specific agreements that we have
made with the Soviet Union at the Moscow meeting.
So they do understand, I think, that this is our policy, that inasmuch
as we possibly can, we want to work out concrete agreements with the
Soviet Union which will reduce tensions. We want to do it realistically
On a mutual basis, taking fully into account the interests of our allies,
that we have to do it from a position of strength, that if the Soviet
Union should decide that we are going to become isolationists, none
of these things would have been possible. - -
Therefore, we have resisted any attempt to reduce our troop strength
in Europe on a unilateral basis and I think we have convinced our
allies that we are engaging actively in an era of negotiations, as the
President said, to reduce the prospect of a confrontation, but not at
their expense, and not in a way that is unrealistic.
That is why we have agreed to the European security conference
Sometime in 1973. That is why we have said we want to have that
conference well prepared and we are willing to engage in discussions
in Helsinki Sometime at the end of this year to be sure that the prepara-
tions go forward and that the European security conference would
result in some concrete results. A
We have also indicated we would like to engage in mutual and
balanced force reduction in Europe, for the same reason.
So all of these things fit together in a consistent policy which I
think has reassured our allies and also has resulted in reduction of
tensions and will continue that way. -
IFORUM FOR DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN ARMS SITUATION
Senator SPONG. Do you anticipate the talks later this year will in-
clude discussion of the European arms situation, or do you believe
that will be left to the European security conference when that is
held 2 -
Secretary RogFRs. Well, no—you mean in the SALT talks?
41
Senator SPONG. Yes. .
Secretary RogFRs. The SALT talks would not. We would not con-
sider that, but we have indicated a willingness, in fact we would like
very much to engage in mutual and balanced force reductions in
Europe, separate negotiations, but those will be mutual negotiations,
including all of the nations involved, but that will not be involved
in the second phase of the SALT talks.
Senator SPONG. Then the mutual and balanced force reduction will
not be part of the second phase of the SALT talks and, as I under-
standit, they are not to be part of any agenda at the European Security
conference; is that true? … . . .
Secretary ROGERs. Yes, sir.
Senator SPONG. The Soviets have resisted that?
Secretary RogFRs. Yes, sir. `.
Senator SPONG. You are hopeful that these will be on the agenda of
some other conference in the future?
Secretary RogFRs. Senator, we expect the SALT talks to continue
in the second phase. We expect the European security conference to be
convened in 1973. It might in some minor way discuss mutual re-
straints of a military nature, but any serious discussions of mutual
and balanced force reduction, we think, would take place in a separate
forum. -
We have indicated a willingness to engage in those discussions on
a parallel basis. By that I mean at about the same time as the European
Security conference is taking place. - -
So if things go well, as we hope they will, we would anticipate a
continuation of the SALT talks, the European Security conference
sometime in 1973, and mutual and balance force negotiations, includ-

ing those nations involved—I am speaking about the nations that have tº
either their territories involved or their forces involved—which would
be parallel to the European security conference. This is all reflected
in the communique at Moscow. -
Senator SPONG. Thank you very much. -
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I don’t believe anybody has men-
tioned this. I have a few odds and ends.
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
Article XIII provides for the establishment, in the first paragraph,
of a standing consultative commission “to promote the objectives and
implementation of the provisions of this treaty, the parties shall
establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the
framework of which they will . . .” and there are several things.
Would you say a word about that Commission, either you or Mr.
Smith, about what you anticipate its setup will be and how it will
function? - - -
Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, we have in mind as a priority item
in the follow-on SALT negotiations, to draw up a charter for this or-
ganization. This is unprecedented in Soviet-American relations; SO
I can only speculate and say that personally I see, at least in the early
days and the early years, a rather simple structure, perhaps four or
five individuals only, both sides, meeting periodically, perhaps three
or four times a year, largely dependent. It will have no decisional au-
42
thority. It will be a straight consultative body to look into the questions
that are recited in the subparagraphs of Article XIII.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you anticipate it being purely military or will
it be civilian?
Mr. SMITH. I think it will be both. I would think that it will be
headed up by the civilian side certainly for the United States and I
think there will be high level military and technical advisers.
The CHAIRMAN. Potentially it could be very important, as you say.
It says, “provide on a voluntary basis such information as either party
considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obliga-
tions assumed.”
That, I would think, if it can be made effective, could be very im-
portant. That is the whole basis of at least finally working out to our
mutual advantage, and I would hope it would be made effective.
I want you to say whatever you can for the record about it. If that
is done, and done properly, it could be very important.
Secretary ROGERs. I agree. .
The CHAIRMAN. No one has mentioned the general principles that
were stated in the obligations to proceed to other mutual undertakings
in the fields of health, space, and culture. All of this is not directly in-
volved in this. There were statements of principle. All of these will be
greatly influenced by the effectiveness and the good faith with which
we live up to the central treaty which is now before us.
Secretary ROGERs. No doubt about that.
The CHAIRMAN. If we go forward with this in the proper spirit,
all these matters in the long run could be perhaps more important
than just the treaty itself. If we go forward, that commission could
be very important in that connection. -
Mr. SMITH. We look on it as a very serious piece of machinery that
recognizes that in this field you cannot for the indefinite future fore-
see how the evolution of the strategic relationship is going to go, and
this is a good piece of machinery, we think, to oversee the operations
of this new relationship.
TREATY's RELATIONSHIP TO U.N. OBLIGATIONS
The CHAIRMAN. Would you care to make a comment about the re-
lationship of this treaty with our mutual obligations under the United
Nations? , te
No one has said anything about the United Nations. Did it come into
the discussions, at all, or how would you regard that?
Mr. SMITH. In Article XVI there is the procedural provision to reg-
ister this treaty, pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United
Nations.
I think that it is perfectly clear that strategic arms limitations cor-
respond with the purposes of the United Nations. There was no spe-
cific discussion of any obligation under the United Nations Charter
during the negotiations, but I think that we all felt that what we were
trying to do was completely consistent with the spirit and the letter of
the charter. • * g
Secretary RogBRs. In fact, some of the language is quite consistent.
In fact, sometimes verbatim with the charter.
43
The CHAIRMAN. I did not intimate it was inconsistent. I was hoping
this would be considered, at least, supportive of our obligations under
the United Nations Charter.
Neither of these big countries has shown great confidence in the
United Nations. Maybe this will instill a little, if they can develop
any confidence in one another. is
There are one or two other questions:
AGREEMENT'S RELATION TO CHINA
No one has mentioned China, so far in the hearings, the discussions
or the considerations. Could you say anything about the relation of
this agreement to China?
Will it in any way
Secretary RogFRs. No, sir, I don’t think so. I don’t think there is
really much to say about it. China is not involved in these agreements.
The CHAIRMAN. The thing that occurred to me was the ABM. When
you first presented the program, I believe it was called Safeguard. It
has had several names, the Sentinel. Maybe in the early stages it was
defended or justified on the basis that this would give us a defense
against the Chinese threat. Much was made of that until it was
demolished and they changed it to a different threat.
You don’t regard the ABM as being significant versus China any
longer?
º SMITH. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me there are two aspects of
an answer to that question.
One, the Administration considers obtaining the Soviet commitment
not to go for a nationwide AMB system as of such importance that
another consideration such as the possibility of a defense against a
light Chinese attack took lesser precedence. In other words, we did not
want to give up the opportunity to get this greater prize to protect
against the lesser risk and since the statement in March 1969 about
the purposes of Safeguard I think it is quite clear that there has been
improvement in our general relations with China. I believe that the
possibility of an attack by the Chinese is given a lower value at the pres-
ent time than back in
The CHAIRMAN. I am glad to hear you say that. You are not deeply
concerned about a Chinese attack at this time?
Secretary ROGERs. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. That is progress, anyway. Part of the obsession
Seems to be receding from our minds. *

DICTATED NOTES CONCERNING MEETINGS
It was reported in the press, I believe, that during the meetings the
President dictated notes on some of the meetings he had with the
Soviet Chairman.
Secretary RogFRs. He is the General Secretary.
The CHAIRMAN. The General Secretary or Chairman.
QUESTION OF GENERAL SECRETARY OR CHAIRMAN OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
. That reminds me. Someone raised the question, and I don't know. He
is not the Chairman of the Council of Ministers; he is the General
80–942 O—72—4
44
Secretary of the Party, and it properly and legally and constitution-
allv should have been the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.
šº, RogFRs. We didn’t raise that question.
The CHAIRMAN. I didn’t raise it, either. I am raising it now to give
you an opportunity to comment on it.
Secretary RogFRs. I am going to resist the opportunity.
The CHAIRMAN. Being an old Attorney General, I thought you
would be the proper one to give the interpretation of this.
Secretary RogFRs. No.
The CHAIRMAN. Of the constitutional question.
Secretary RogFRs. I prefer to be called a former Attorney General
rather than old.
The CHAIRMAN. I saw somewhere the other day, and it hadn’t oc-
curred to me. Wasn't Khrushchev both the General Secretary and the
Chairman?
Secretary RogFRs. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN, That is a little interesting for the academics to
ponder. I thought maybe you should set the matter at rest.
Secretary RogFRs. There was a discussion about his title and Gen-
eral Secretary was his correct title and we refer to him as General
Secretary. ,
The CHAIRMAN. It is not for me to question their system. It was an
interesting question raised.
NOTES AND ITEMIS RELATIVE TO TREATY
This was called to my attention in Jefferson’s Manual concerning
treaties, and I am not trying to inject any politics in this.
I assume you have some regard for Jefferson now, even though he
was identified with the other party.
It reads as follows:
It has been the usage for the Executive, when it communicates a treaty to the
Senate for their ratification, to Communicate also the correspondence of the
negotiators. This having been omitted in the case of the Prussian Treaty, was
asked by a vote of the House of February 12, 1800, and was obtained. And in
December, 1800, the Convention of that year between the United States and
France, with the report of the negotiations by the envoys, but not their instruc-
tions, being laid before the Senate, the instructions were asked for and COmmu-
nicated by the President.
I wondered if there are such notes and items relative to the treaty,
and would it be agreeable to the Administration to submit them on a
confidential basis, if you would like, to the committee.
Secretary ROGERs. Mr. Chairman, I do not think there is anything
that exists that affects the agreements in any way that hasn’t been
submitted to the Congress.
Now, there may be, you know, if there are questions of interpreta-
tion that arise in the future, we certainly will go back and look at the
memoranda because there wasn’t a complete transcript kept of the
plenary sessions, and because there are so many documents, but we
think we have selected everything that could possibly affect the agree-
ments between the two nations.
The CHAIRMAN. You are saying there aren’t such minutes relevant
to the treaty that haven’t been made available?
Secretary RogFRs. That is correct.
45
CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES
The CHAIRMAN. You referred a couple times to consultation with
allies. Did you consult with allies before the negotiations were com-
pleted, or did you inform them only after they were completed?
Secretary RogFRs. Both.
The CHAIRMAN. Primarily, I assume, the NATO allies?
Secretary RogFRs. The NATO allies. -
The CHAIRMAN. Not everybody? -
Secretary ROGERs. No; but we did consult with others, too.
The CHAIRMAN. And that was in depth with all of them?
Secretary RogFRs. That is correct.
QUESTION OF ADVANTAGE TO SOVIETS AND DISPARITY IN MEGATONNAGE
The CHAIRMAN. There was one other thing raised, and maybe this
is the proper time to raise the question, especially with Mr. Smith.
As you know, some members of the Senate, and maybe others, have
raised the question that this treaty will result in a great advantage
to the Soviets. They also mentioned the disparity in the megatonnage.
There is an interesting piece in the Times, and, Mr. Smith, I think
it is a good opportunity for you to clarify this. I will read it for you
for your comment: - -
But the number and size of missiles is less important than the destruction they
can inflict. One large nuclear weapon cannot destroy as large an area as several
Small weapons. Two one-megaton bombs can destroy an area as large as one four-
megaton bomb. The measuring rod used by the Pentagon in its Secret studies to
Obtain a single figure for the total destructive capability Of nuclear weapons of
varied sizes is known as “equivalent megatonnage.” A Soviet sixteen-megaton
bomb WOuld Seem to give Russia a four-fold advantage Over four One-megaton
American bombs. But in floor area of destruction both amount to four “equivalent
megatons” or parity. . .
This argument, especially, I think Senator Jackson, has raised. He
thinks and believes the Russians have 16 or 20 or 56-megaton bombs.
I think this would be a good opportunity for you to clarify this.
Is that statement approximately accurate?
Mr. SMITH. Well, I would like to have an opportunity to study the
statement carefully, Mr. Chairman. But as a general matter, it is cor-
rect that the amount of destruction does not go up as you go up in
numbers in megatonnage.
To put it very simply, if you have a bomb that can destroy New
York City, a bomb that is twice the size and yield is not a very valu-
able instrument, as far as we can see, and it won’t destroy twice as
much as a bomb that has half the megatonnage.
Now, we long ago made a decision that just to increase megatonnage
was not the best way to approach an efficient strategic weapons system.
A number of Secretaries of Defense considered this question, I think
at least three, and they decided against going to weapons that had
higher megatonnage.
I think this process of understanding started as early as 1952 or
1953. It was certainly clearly understood after the first thermonuclear
weapons were tested in 1954, and we concluded long ago that it was
much more appropriate to have a number of accurate and smaller yield
weapons rather than to have very large yield weapons. One of the rea-
46
sons, I think, you See an apparent or numerical discrepancy now is
that the Soviets went in for the opposite philosophy. They for some
reason or another—perhaps because they like the Tsar Cannon, which
was the biggest cannon in the history of the world, and the Tsar Bell,
which was the biggest bell that ever was built—have gone in for very
large yield weapons.
One of the advantages that has been overlooked in talking about
this submarine arrangement, for instance, is that, if the Soviets go up
to their permitted levels in submarines, they will have to destroy,
Scrap these SS-7 and SS-8's, which are very high yield weapons in
terms of this megatonnage question. If they convert those into sub-
marines, their total megatonnage will be substantially reduced.
We don’t think that megatonnage differentials are useful ways of
determining whether one side or the other has an advantage.
The CHAIRMAN. I think it is important for you to state that.
I think I recall recently one of the principal complaints about this
treaty is that it allows them to retain over 300 SS—9’s. These are de-
Scribed as the weapons that could destroy practically everything, and
I think you explained that.
I think it would be useful to put this article in the record.
EQUIVALENT MEGATONNAGE
I should have read this, I guess, in the beginning. It says:
Two members of the defense analysis staff of the Brookings Institution, Colonel
Alton Quanbeck and Barry Blechman, who are both former Pentagon Officials,
have calculated the “equivalent megatonnage” of Russia's supposed threefold ad-
Vantage. They have found that the five-year SALT I agreement on Offensive
Weapons would leave the Russians in mid-1977 with 4,000 “equivalent megatons”
compared with 4,450 for the United States.
It goes on and refutes the idea. It is consistent with your general
statement, but I think that is useful for the people to understand. It
is not easy for a layman to understand these complicated questions of
equivalence of megatonnage.
(The information referred to follows:)
[From the New York Times, June 19, 1972.]
MISSILE NUMBERS GAME
President Nixon was right to urge the Congress to speed approval of the missile
curb pacts with Moscow. There was no winner-loser outcome in the SALT I
negotiations; as the President emphasized, “Both sides W.On and the whole world
won.” Moreover, the central argument being made by critics of the agreements
has now been refuted in a study made by former Pentagon Officials.
Critics of SALT I, such as Senator Henry Jackson, argue that the edge per-
mitted the SOviet Union in numbers and size Of Offensive missiles will ulti-
mately give Russia a dangerous degree of strategic Superiority Over the United
States. The edge includes 40 per cent more intercontinental ballistic missiles and
missile-launching submarines, One-third more submarine-launched ballistic mis-
Siles and an alleged threefold Soviet advantage in megatonnage of total missile
payload.
But the number and size of missiles is less important than the destruction
they can inflict. One large nuclear weapon cannot destroy as large an area as
Several Small weapons. Two One-megaton bombs Can destroy an area as large as
one four-megaton bomb. The measuring rod used by the Pentagon in its secret
studies to obtain a single figure for the total destructive capability Of nuclear
weapons Of Varied sizes is known as “equivalent megatonnage.” A Soviet sixteen-
megaton bomb would seem to give Russia a fourfold advantage Over four One-
47
megaton American bombs. But in floor area of destruction both amount to four
‘equivalent megatons,” Or parity.
Two members of the defense analysis staff of the Brookings Institution, Col.
Alton Quanbeck and Barry Blechman, who are both former Pentagon Officials,
have calculated the “equivalent megatonnage” of Russia's Supposed threefold
advantage. They have found that the five-year SALT I agreement. On Offensive
weapons would leave the Russians in mid-1977 with 4,000 “equivalent megatons”
compared with 4,450 for the United States.
Refutation of Russia’s “megatonnage advantage” Over the United States brings
into question the argument made by the Administration for pressing ahead with
deployment of the MIRVed missiles, Minutemen III and POseidon, and acceler-
ated development of the B-1 bomber and the long-range Trident missile Sub-
marine. Deployment already underWay Of MIRV multiple Warheads gives the
United States more than a two-to-One advantage in deliverable Warheads. There
is no reason to press ahead to achieve a four-to-One advantage by 1977 if there
is any chance that American restraint would encourage Similar SOViet restraint
and a permanent Offensive weapons agreement at a lower level.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington.
ABM SITE CHANGES AND PROBLEMIS OF WASHINGTON SITE
Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Ambassador, I would ask. When the Sen-
tinel system was originally proposed, before it became Safeguard, the
system designed to defend us from a Chinese light attack, it all looked
pretty silly to me, but we had quite a problem here on the Hill, espe-
cially from those who constantly warned us there could be no agree-
ment with the evil Communist nations because of the monolithic
Communist conspiracy.
Re the ABM of that day, Boston said you may put them in Some
places, but you are not going to put them around here; Chicago Said
don’t put them around here, and so did Seattle.
Then a decision was made to change it from area defense to a point
defense. Whether or not those cities had anything to do with that
decision I don’t know, but I do think it makes more sense, at least in
theory, to have us defending the missiles instead of the cities.
There was quite a little discussion about whether we would have a
choice, keep Grand Forks and Malmstrom and they keeping Moscow.
Now, however, the final decision, which I shall support, is to keep
Grand Forks, let Malmstrom and the other two go, build one around
Washington. The latter I do not support at this time.
Why did we shift from consideration of keeping both Malmstrom
and Grand Forks and what do you think the problems will be in build-
ing up such a unit in this high density populated area of Washington.
What do you think the chances will be of getting it against such
objections as those of the three previous cities I mentioned?
Mr. SMITH. Senator Symington, in regard to the abandonment of
the option to go for the second ICBM defense and the election to go
for defense for the national command authority, when we reached
the general area of agreement with the Soviets that we would both
have two sites, both have the option of two sites, it was the clear mili-
tary judgment on our side that it would be more useful militarily to
have protection of our national command authority in lieu of having
a second site to defend ICBM's. In view of that we negotiated it out
that way.
On the question of the problems and chances, I think, on the ques-
tion of chances, this is an intangible judgment involving congressional
opinion that you are much more expert on than I.

48
In connection with problems, I think they are fewer than were exist-
ent back when you are talking about defending Boston or Seattle.
I think that when the country comes to understand that we are not
talking here about protecting population, we are not talking even about
protecting bureaucrats or Congressmen or population, we are talking
about protecting a few persons and a few pieces of hardware, and in
general our national command and control system. That is the sole
purpose of protecting the national command authority, and to my
mind it is a useful purpose and I hope that the Congress will support it.
I think that there are, as I say, fewer problems. One of the reasons
is that the real estate acquisition problems, as I remember, were difficult
in connection with other cities. I understand that here the real estate
acquisition problem is perhaps already solved because the military do
have a number of areas in the Washington vicinity that could be used.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. Again I congratulate you and your
staff.
CONSIDERATION OF RELINQUISHING ABM SITES
The CHAIRMAN. To follow up on that, was a proposal ever made to
have no ABMZ Was it ever considered that both sides would relinquish
any ABM sites?
Mr. SMITH. There were exchanges about that. We proposed the pos-
sibility of a complete ban on ABM in connection with a comprehen-
sive agreement whereby there would be a treaty that would cover all
strategic offensive weapons as well as defensive.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee has had, during the last several
years, testimony that the large system around Moscow was very ques-
tionable. They started it out, I think, to be 120 and stopped around
50 or 60 and didn’t proceed. We got the impression it was because they
had serious doubts about its effectiveness. Now, they are not proceed-
ing, as far as you know, with the alternative sites comparable to Grand
Forks; are they?
Mr. SMITH. We do not see any comparable site. We do understand
#. they are developing ABM systems for the purpose of defending
The CHAIRMAN. You mean they are doing research and trying to im-
prove the one they have?
Mr. SMITH. More than research. I think that—
The CHAIRMAN. Would it be feasible to consider, at least in the on-
going negotiations, if the Russians would agree to give up theirs
around Moscow if we give up ours around Grand Forks and neither
One have to go through the rather futile extravagance? Is that clear
Out of the ballpark, or is there something that could be considered in
your new negotiations that may take place this fall?
Mr. SMITH. Well, as I say, we don’t have any guidance on specifics,
The CHAIRMAN. I know you haven’t. *
Mr. SMITH, I think if you ask us is it feasible, is it in the ballpark,
I would think the answer would be yes.
On the other hand, the Administration has faced up to this question
about possible deferral and has concluded it would be in our interest
not to do so and to proceed with the second option permitted under
the treaty. Both the Soviets and ourselves understand that we are free
to proceed.
49
The CHAIRMAN. I understand the present situation. You can tell
from what has been said by several members that there is certainly no
unanimity among the Congress about putting one around Washington.
They are all elected people. What are we going to say to our consti-
tuents when they hear we are spending $20 million to protect Congress
where we sit and not protect them? They are under the illusion these
things are effective. I don’t think they are. I would have to explain it.
We are not going to protect ourselves and leave everybody else
helpless, assuming they have validity. You are going to have a difficult
time, I think for various reasons, getting the money for the Wash-
intgon site.
Wouldn’t we be better off if the Russians were persuaded to abandon
all of theirs? It seems we would be ahead of the game if they would
agree to give up theirs at Moscow. I am sure they love Moscow just as
much as we do Washington. *
Secretary ROGERs. I think that, in answer to your question, Ambas-
sador Smith says he thinks it is feasible. Of course it is feasible to
propose it. I do not think it is feasible to expect it will be successful.
The CHAIRMAN. What if you are faced with the situation that Con-
gress won’t appropriate the money for one around Washington?
Wouldn't you be better off to go back and say, why don’t we get rid
of all of them?
If we did that would you be content to allow them to have Moscow
protected and we have Grand Forks protected? Would you be content
with that?
Secretary ROGERs. I think we ought to stand on the treaty as it has
been completed, and— ->
The CHAIRMAN. You have already said it doesn’t force us to do it.
You said we have the option to do it. You said that a moment ago. I
am trying to explore it a little.
Mr. Smith says a proposal was made by someone, whether the U.S.
or Russia, to consider no ABM at all.
Secretary RogFRs. That was part of a comprehensive agreement,
though. N
POSSIBILITY OF RELINQUISHING ABM SITES

The CHAIRMAN. But at that time it wasn’t utterly unthinkable both
countries would relinquish. Is that not true?
Secretary ROGERs. It is not unthinkable, that is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. You may be faced with the situation that the
Congress is not willing to spend that kind of money on a very ques-
tionable system around Washington, because I expect there will be a
lot of people, not only in Congress, but others, who will object to it,
as they certainly did in Seattle and Boston and several other places.
I am just exploring the possibilities. I personally would not vote
to pay for the ABM around Washington for various reasons I won’t
go into now. I detect a number of my colleagues feel the same way
about it.
Would you be content with Grand Forks and let them have Moscow,
and that is all?
Secretary ROGERs. No; I think the treaty provides what we can
reasonably expect at the moment and I think we would hope that
Congress will give the President the support that he needs.
50
- NO WIOLATION IN NOT GOING FORWARD WITH WASHINGTON ABM
The CHAIRMAN. Of course, you do. But we would not be failing to
support the treaty, as I understand it, if we do not go forward with
ABM around Washington. That isn't a serious defection from the
treaty. Russia wouldn’t regard it as a violation of the treaty; would
they
Secretary ROGERs. No.
The CHAIRMAN. So no member could be accused of running out on
the treaty or not supporting the treaty if he didn’t support an ABM
around Washington. Is that not correct?
Secretary RogFRs. It is not accurate. What the treaty does is limit
the number of ABM deployments that can be—
The CHAIRMAN. If we chose to do it?
Secretary RogFRs. Yes, sir. -
The CHAIRMAN. We don’t undertake to do it. We don’t undertake to
create deployments?
Secretary RogFRs. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. I want to make it clear.
Secretary RogFRs. You have made it clear.
APPARENT VALUE TO SOVIETS OF CAPITAL DEFENSE
Mr. SMITH, I think, Mr. Chairman, if I may throw in a thought,
when you consider the value or lack of value of a capital defense, you
should keep in mind that the Soviets apparently put a very high
value on having such a defense. That is to me some evidence of its
importance. -
The CHAIRMAN. I don’t know. You have said they put a high value
on big megatons. We think that is foolish. You don’t think they are in-
fallible. They make foolish mistakes, as we do, and thank goodness.
If they hadn’t been that way, we would have been in bad shape. They
have matched pretty near every mistake of ours with one of their
OWIl. -
SUPPORT FOR TREATY BUT NOT ABM FOR WASHINGTON
We have a vote coming up, but I want to make it very clear I am very
much for the treaty and I don’t regard being against the ABM for
Washington in any way being inconsistent with the treaty. I shall
vote certainly for the treaty and do everything I can, as soon as I can,
to get it approved. - -
PROTECTION BY ABM AND GALOSH SYSTEMI QUESTIONED
But I go back: We have had testimony in other hearings, endless
testimony, that the ABM and the Galosh system could easily be over-
come by a concentrated barrage of ICBM's. Both of them could be
easily overcome and there is really no protection despite a sop that
has been thrown out to make people feel satisfied. I don’t blame them
too much for it, under the circumstances, because on the whole we
got a good result. But you don’t have any doubt and you wouldn’t say
indeed these 200 launchers—Is it 200 launchers provided for?
Secretary ROGERs. Yes, sir. -
51
The CHAIRMAN. Couldn’t be easily overcome with 300 missiles.
Secretary RogFRs. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. What protection is it?
PURPOSE OF NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY DEFENSE
Mr. SMITH. The purpose of the national command authority defense
is different from what you have been thinking about for defending a
country or defending ICBM's. The purpose is to protect against, for
instance, an unauthorized launch, and if you could avoid total nuclear
war because you are able to knock down four or five unauthorized mis-
siles, that investment, in my judgment, would be a tremendously suc-
cessful one. -
The CHAIRMAN. It sounds an awful lot like the defense against the
Chinese. That was the sort of thing we did on the accidental thing and
you have abandoned almost all of that. . -
Mr. SMITH. We have entered into an agreement with the Russians
to try to control nuclear accidents. This would be an implementation of
that agreement and a recognition that nuclear accidents and unauthor-
ized attacks can take place. - -
The CHAIRMAN. Unfortunately, that amendment you spoke about,
Mr. Secretary, on Bahrain and the Azores is now being voted on; so I
think my duty calls on me.
ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS HARDLY CONTINUATION
Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, one point should be brought out and
that is that while defensive forces are being reduced, it is hardly a
continuation of the offensive proposals of Secretary Laird and the
Administration to increase by 168 millions of dollars over and beyond
continuing programs. I think that point should be made clear.
WEAPONS TO BE CONSIDERED IN PHASE II
Second is a specific question on Phase II. Will there be any other
weapons, the strategic weapons in development, that would be consid-
ered in Phase II?
Mr. SMITH, I think not. Ithink we have our hands full with strategic
delivery systems for nuclear weapons.
Senator PELL. Ithank you very much.
In the absence of the Chairman, the committee on Foreign Relations
is now adjourned until 10 o’clock tomorrow morning, when we will
meet in executive session with Mr. Helms.
(Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m. the Committee adjourned, subject to the
call of the Chair). -
(Questions by Senator Percy and responses of Secretary Rogers and
Ambassador Smith follow :)
QUESTIONS BY SENATOR PERCY AND RESPONSES OF SECRETARY ROGERS
1. Question. Could you describe the situation we would face in the absence of
these agreements? -
Answer. The Soviet Union has been building new ICBM and SLBM launchers
at the rate Of Over 300 per year. In the absence of an agreement, they would have
been capable Of Sustaining this program indefinitely. The U.S. Was not in a
52
position to deploy new strategic offensive systems within the five year period
Of the Interim Agreement.
In the absence of the ABM Treaty, we would have expected the Soviets to go
far beyond the 200 ABM launchers and interceptors at two sites permitted by the
Treaty. The U.S., for its part, would have continued with its Safeguard ABM
deployment.S. -
2. Question. It has taken more than three years of concerted effort to pro-
duce the two agreements before uS. Could the terms have been Substantially
improved, or the coverage broadened, if we had kept at the negotiating table
longer? What real disadvantages could have resulted from continuing negotia-
tions? -
Answer. After 1% years of attempting to negotiate a more comprehensive
agreement, both sides decided on May 20, 1971, to conclude initially an ABM
Treaty and an Interim Agreement COvering certain strategic offensive weapons.
Prolonging the first phase of SALT would not have been useful, particularly in
view of the fact that the U.S.S.R. was constructing new ICBM aand SLBM
launchers at the rate Of Over 300 per year. The sides have pledged to attempt
to work Out more complete limitations On Strategic arms in a follow-On phase Of
SALT, which we hope will begin in October.
3. Question. How important was the President’s visit to Moscow in terms of
actually producing the final arrangements? Could they have been accomplished
(without his presence there? -
Answer. The President's Visit to MOSCOW was clearly Of importance in produc-
ing the final SALT agreements. As the President noted in his COngressional brief-
ing On June 15, One of the reasons for this has to do with the System Of Govern-
ment in the Soviet Union. He said “We have found, in dealing with the system of
government in the Soviet Union, that where decisions are made that affect the
vital security and in fact, the very survival of a nation, decisions and discussions
in those cases are made only at the highest level. Consequently, it is necessary for
us to have discussions and decisions at the highest level if we are going to have
the breakthroughs that we have had to make in order to come to this point of a
Successful negotiation.” In this case, Such breakthroughs Occurred at the Summit
On Several issues that were still unsettled when the Summit began.
4. Question. What is the relationship between the SALT agreements and the
Joint Declaration of Principles? Is the latter the Symbol of the intent to carry
Out the agreements in good faith 3 -
Answer. The “Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” signed at he Moscow Sum-
mit expresses important Objectives and attitudes shared by the two sides. The
SALT Agreements are concrete measures reflecting Such common Objectives
and attitudes. It is fair to Say that One effect Of the former document is to Sym-
bolize the intent of both parties to carryout the SALT agreements in good faith.
Thus, the fourth of the basic principles expresses the intention of the parties
“to exert the necessary efforts so that bilateral agreements which they have con-
cluded . . . are faithfully implemented.” -
5. Question. Article XIII of the ABM treaty, which provides for the Standing
Consultative Commission, may consider changes in the general strategic situa-
tion which have a bearing on the provisions of the treaty. Could this be inter-
preted as providing methods of consultation to deal with changes in the strategic
situation brought about by China and that the Chinese may read any US–USSR
anti-China purpose in this commission.” -
Answer. No anti-Chinese purposes is involved in the provisions for establish-
ment Of the Standing Consultative Commission, or in any other provision. As
stated in the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed at the Moscow Summit on
May 29, 1972, “The development of U.S.-Soviet relations is not directed against
third Countries and their interests.” In his news briefing on this document on
the day it was signed, Dr. Kissinger stated that “... we have made clear through-
out that Our policies toward either of these countries [the People's Republic of
China and the Soviet Union] is not directed against the other. We did not
discuss the Soviet Union in Peking and we did not discuss the People's Republic
in MOSCOW.”
6. Question. Did Chinese concerns as to the possible impact on their own se-
curity of a US-Soviet SALT agreement in any way inhibit our negotiation pro-
cedures, or presentation of proposals?
***s-,
53
Answer. No. There would be no basis for Such COncerns.
7. Question. Did we keep Japan as equally well informed as Our NATO partners?
Answer. We have kept our Japanese allies well informed on SALT. Since the
conclusion of the SALT I agreements, Mr. Smith and I have personally briefed the
Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Ushiba. In addition, there have been extensive dis-
cussions with officers from the Japanese Embassy throughout the SALT negotia-
tions.
8. Question. What has been the reaction of our major allies to the Agreements?
Answer. We have consulted with Our allies closely and regularly during the
entire course of SALT. There has been great Satisfaction. On the part Of Our
allies all Over the world about this consultation process. For example, at the
latest consultations with NAC on June 16 our NATO allies explicitly welcomed
both SALT agreements and expressed their appreciation to the US for safe-
guarding allied interests during the negotiations.
9. Question. One area of disagreement within the press and among some public
figures has been the impact of the so-called “secret clauses” to the SALT agree-
ments; those understandings, interpretations and wnilateral statements and safe-
guards, made available to this Committee by the Administration when it for-
warded the treaty for consideration. What will prevent differing interpretations
of these “clauses” from causing a major misunderstanding and hinder the success-
ful implementation of the agreements?
Answer. These materials were intended to avoid misunderstanding Of the
underlying agreements and to facilitate successful implementation Of Such agree-
ments. The clarification provided by these interpretations and Statements is
believed to far Outweigh whatever risk there may be that they, in turn, might
become subject to differing interpretations. - & .
10. Question. Would it be safe to say that these clauses are really another form
of Safeguard particularly Since they deal with Such crucial areas as COncealment,
ABM technology advances, and missile modernization?
Answer. Yes, they do constitute a form of safeguard against misunderstandings
in these Crucial areas.
11. Question. Will these clauses, other than the unilateral Statements, have
ea, actly the same force as if they were included in the teart of the agreements?
Answer. The agreed interpretations will clearly be binding On both parties.
12. Question. Why were they not included in the teats?
Answer. I do not think any single answer I could give would apply to all of
the cases involved, except that both parties concluded that these matters could
be adequately dealt with by agreed interpretations. In some cases, such as state-
ments made On the last day Of the negotiations, timing and convenience were
factors. In other cases, such as the statements on standstill arrangements, inclu-
SiOn in the agreements WOuld have been anomalous, in that they dealt with the
period before the agreement entered into force. To take One other example, the
Statement. On the Standing Consultative Commission was designed to apply Only
pending the Working Out of more definitive arrangements. -
13. What kind of impetus do you see these agreements giving to other arms
COntrol negotiations, such as test ban, CBW and conventional weapons, particu-
larly in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva 3
Answer. While I cannot give you any precise answer, the conclusion of these
agreements should certainly be helpful in giving impetus to other arms control
negotiations, particularly at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
in Geneva. It has been our experience that each major post-war accomplishment
in arms Control has made further progress in this field more readily attainable.
This should be particularly true in the case of the SALT agreements, not only
because of their inherent significance but also because they should help meet
Clemands Often expressed at Geneva and elsewhere that measures constraining
non-nuclear-Weapon States be balanced by measures placing constraints on
nuclear-Weapon States.
QUESTIONS BY SENATOR PERCY AND RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR SMITH
1. Question. Since we both now have one ABM site, why in Strategic terms
Should either Side build a Second 3
Answer. The purpose of the two ABM sites is quite different. The ICBM de-
fense will provide a light defense for a portion of the ICBM force. ABM defense
Of Washington and Moscow will reduce the possibility that a light accidental
Or unauthorized attack could destroy the National Command Authority and,
54
in the resulting confusion and disorder, lead to a precipitate response that
could mean a full-scale nuclear war. It will provide defense of our National
Command Authority and could give the President additional time to make a con-
Sidered response should an attack occur.
3. Question. Even if the Soviets went ahead and constructed a second ABM Site,
why would we have to build a second site around Washington?
Answer. Neither side is obligated by the terms of the treaty to construct a
Second ABM site. However, we believe that an ABM defense of the National Com-
mand Authority, which the Soviets already have, could make an important con-
tribution to stability and to our security.
3. Question. On ABMs, is there any possibility that potential difficulties
irº identifying just what the specific purpose of a radar may be, by national
*nean 8, Could prohibit the construction of space activity or air defense related
Tradars?
Answer. We believe that national means of verification will be adequate to
distinguish between ABM radars and air defense and space tracking radars.
There are a number of parameters, such as location, orientation, size, power
and Signal characteristics, which taken together, should provide sufficient in-
formation to make this distinction. If an ambiguous situation regarding radars
Should nevertheless arise, the situation could be clarified through discussions
in the Standing Consultative Commission.
4. Question. What was the rationale behind agreeing to Article VI of the
treaty which prohibits the future deployment in third countries of early warning
7:00aº's 2
Answer. Neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. believed that it is necessary to
deploy future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack in
third Countries in Order to obtain Sufficient warning of such an attack. There-
fore, consistent with the goal of placing tight constraints on systems which could
contribute to ABM capabilities beyond those envisioned in Article III of the
treaty, the sides agreed to prohibit such deployments. Article VI does not affect
existing ballistic missile early warning radars. r
5. Question. In view of our own acknowledgment as to the total number of
ICBMs that we possess, why did we not insist on obtaining a similar public
acknowledgment from the Soviets?
Answer. The Specific Commitment in the Interim Agreement is not to build
even One more ICBM launcher for Operational purposes, and we are satisfied
that we can monitor Whether One more launcher is constructed just as well
without having a number Specified as with having a number Specified. We have
the highest degree of confidence that we can detect violations of this commitment.
The Soviet Union has been extremely reluctant to declare current force levels
which were not actually necessary to the agreement. They have Only declared
force levels where absolutely necessary, as in the case of SLBMs, where we are
projecting future ceilings. We believe that 1618 Soviet ICBM launchers are
currently Operational and under Construction, and we have made clear to the
SOviets that if Our intelligence should in the future reveal numbers which
significantly exceed that number, a basic premise of the agreement would be
in question.
6. Question. Did the Soviets indicate during the course of negotiations just
what their estimated ICBM strength would be as of July 1, 1972, or are we rely-
tng completely On intelligence estimates?
Answer. The Soviets did not indicate what number of ICBM launchers they
would have Operational and under COnstruction as Of July 1, 1972. We are using
the number of 1618, which is derived from Our Own national means of verifica-
tion. The Soviet Delegation was made aware of our estimate, and did not chal-
lenge it. We are confident that we can detect any attempt to deploy additional
ICBMS.
7. Question. Article XII, which deals with verification, and the non-interference
there with, also allows the continuation of current construction, assembly con-
wersion and overhaul practices. Are there any such practices going on now within
the Soviet Union, immune from our spy satellites? If there are, don’t these con-
stitute an obvious and potentially dangerous loophole in the treaty?
Answer. I must refer you to Mr. Helms for any discussion of current Soviet
practices. - - - -
8. Question. The Offensive Agreement does not cover forward-based aircraft -
or heavy bombers, areas where we have a major advantage. In Order to Cou?vter
this advantage is it not likely that the Soviets will continue to develop even
55
more formidable SAM systems, which because of their own compleqvity and
advance technology could be a potential enlargement of the Soviet ABM Systems
and which we might not be able to identify as Such 3 -
Answer. With regard to Soviet plans regarding future SAM systems, you
should consult the intelligence community. In View of the concern of U.S.
defense planners that Soviet SAM Systems might be developed Or COnverted to
perform an ABM role, we insisted that the ABM Treaty contain a clear Obliga-
tion not to make such conversion and not to test non-ABM missiles, launchers
and radars in an ABM mode. With the aid of this provision of Article VI, we
are confident that Our national means Of Verification will be able to distinguish
between ABM and SAM Systems. -
9. Question. How important a consideration was the ability to use foreign
submarine bases to us when we agreed to a numerically inferior relationship on
SLBMS and modern, Wu Clear SubS 3
Answer. In evaluating these agreements, it is misleading to COnSider Only
One element, such as SLBMs. We agreed to accept a temporary Soviet advan-
tage in numbers of ICBM and SLBM launchers because the U.S. has Offsetting
advantages in other areas. The use of submarine bases in other countries is one
of these, but we also have advantages in aircraft, in numbers of warheads, and
in other respects. The consequences of all Of these asymmetries were carefully
COnsidered within the U.S. government.
10. Question. The unilateral statement made by both sides and their reception
by both Sides could raise an interesting problem. Doesn’t the Soviet Statement
Teferring to their right to increase the number of their SLBM submarines if our
NATO allies increase their present deployment of Such Submarines in effect make
the continuation. Of a bilateral agreement dependent on third party actions?
Answer. NO. The Soviets did not indicate that third party actions would affect
continuance of our bilateral agreement. They attempted to assert a “right” to
take action inconsistent with the terms of the agreement if the stated circum-
stances should occur. We clearly rejected this claim. The SALT agreements do
not cover activities by third parties, and no such “right” exists.
11. Question. Further, doesn’t this statement attempt to get us to restrain our
allies in this area or commit us to the restriction on the transfer of offensive tech-
nology to them ż
Answer. Whatever it may have attempted to accomplish, we rejected it; and
it does not bind or commit us Or our allies in any way. Moreover, it contains no
reference to the transfer Of Offensive technology.
12. Question. The SALT agreements appear to be a formal acceptance of a
“stop where you are” position. On launchers, radars, ABMs, etc. Neither we nor
the Russians are going to dismantle any System. Other than the second ABM Site
we started at Malmstrom. Given this situation in the Interim Agreement, do you
think that there is any possibility of negotiating rollbacks in the SALT II
Twegotiations? -
Answer. In the preamble to the APM Treaty, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. declared
their intention “to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms.”
It is possible that We Will be able to WOrk Out SOme reductions Or rollbacks
in the next phase Of SALT. The U.S. position for this next phase is now under
COnSideration. -
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS
TUESDAY, JUNE 20, 1972
UNITED STATES SENATE,
CoMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONs,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice at 10:00 a.m. in Room S-116,
the Capitol Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (Chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Pell, McGee, Spong,
Aiken, Case, Cooper, Scott, Pearson and Percy.
The CHAIRMAN. We might as well start. It's 10 o'clock.
We are very pleased to have this morning the Director of Intelli-
gence, Mr. Helms, to give us your advice about verification of the new
interim agreements in Moscow.
[Deleted.] -
(Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the Committee adjourned, subject to the
call of the chair.)
(57)
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 21, 1972
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 318,
Old Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (Chairman),
presiding. t
Present: Senators Fulbright, Symington, Pell, Spong, Cooper,
Javits and Percy.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to Order.
OPENING STATEMENT
We are very pleased this morning to have the Secretary of Defense
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Moorer. We
are very pleased to have both of you gentlemen. Our hearings with
you have always been interesting and I am very glad to say you have
been candid with the committee, not that we have always agreed, but
at least I think you have presented your views most forcefully and
clearlv.
In ăis instance, your views about the current business before the
Senate, the treaty and the agreements, have been well publicized in the
press for the last several days. I confess that I am very puzzled that
what is called an arms limitation agreement is to be used as an excuse
enormously to increase the arms race. You usually say, Mr. Secretary,
as you have on numerous previous occasions, that since you have as-
sumed your position as Secretary of Defense you have a very special
responsibility for the security of the country, the implication being
that as a Congressman you didn’t have quite the same responsibility
or the Senators don’t have that same responsibility. -
Secretary LAIRD. I was able to share it at that time. -
The CHAIRMAN. I can assure you that we on the committee are also
very deeply concerned about the security of this country. Some of us
believe, including myself, that the security of the country consists of
more than enormous stores of arms, that there are other elements in
our society these days that are equally, if not more, important. In fact,
some of us believe that your policies are seriously undermining the
strength of this Nation and, therefore, you are endangering our Se-
curity. We believe that the exorbitant expenditures for military af-
fairs since World War II are the basic reasons for the disarray of our
economy, both domestic and foreign, and that they have contributed
enormously to the alienation of so many of our citizens, and the con-
(59) --
80–942 O—72—5
60
cern with which all the affairs—economic, political and Social—are
viewed in this country today. -
So I think the issue is fairly clear: It is whether or not priority is
always to be given to military expenditures or whether or not we should
take this effort at arms control seriously and that it be used in a way
that can actually bring about Some control and Some even decrease in
the future on military expenditures. I think that is really the issue.
There are many subsidiary questions which we no doubt can cover,
but, as I see it, that is the main issue. -
It has been a great shock to me to read that this agreement, which
we have favored, on the ABM in particular, is now to be used as an
excuse for a vast increase in military expenditures. This is the dilemma
which I hope you will clarify to our satisfaction.
We are very pleased to have you and you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. MELVIN R, LAIRD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE;
ACCOMPANIED BY PAUL H. NITZE, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SALT
Secretary LAIRD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I certainly .
will clarify the issues which you have raised, and I think that the short
statement which I have addresses the issues that have been raised by
you in your opening statement.
PERSONS ACCOMPANYING WITNESS
I have with me today the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ad-
miral Tom Moorer, and Paul Nitze, who is the former Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense, former Secretary of the Navy, and who has served as
my special assistant in the SALT area. He was a member of the dele-
gation at Helsinki and Vienna. General Allison, who serves as the
special assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, is also accom-
panying us as we appear before the Foreign Relations Committee this
morning. -
I am pleased to have this opportunity to be here today to discuss
with you, Mr. Chairman, and members of this committee matters re-
lated to the ABM treaty and the interim agreement on offensive weap-
ons and to pursue the consultative process with the Congress and with
this committee which the President emphasized in his meeting with
you this last week. -
TRIPLE PLAY FOR PEACE
It is my view that what we are considering is a triple play for peace.
We must take into account at the same time all three elements of this
triple play: first, the ABM treaty; second, the interim agreement on
offensive weapons; and, third, the President’s national security budget
as presented to this Congress.
The specifics of the agreement and the other considerations relating
to them are, of course, being treated by other officials of the Adminis-
tration, such as the Secretary of State, the Director of the Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency and the Director of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency.
.61
The President has asked me to concentrate on the relationship of
the agreements to the Security of the United States with appropriate
emphasis on the critical importance of proposed U.S. strategic pro-
grams to the viability of the agreements already reached, and those we
hope to reach in the follow-on talks that could begin this October.
I believe the ABM treaty and the interim agreement on offensive
Weapons now before the Congress are in the interest of America and
the World. They enhance our Security. They permit us to maintain
needed strength. They help us to maintain confidence in the effective-
ness and realism of our strategic deterrent. I am confident they can be
verified by national means. But by themselves they do not automati-
cally guarantee these national Security gains. -
In my view, the national Security requirements of the United States
make it equally urgent that (1) the Senate ratify the ABM treaty;
(2) the Congress approve the interim agreement on offensive weapons;
and (3) the House and the Senate reinforce these initiatives for arms
limitation with strong support for the President’s budget requests for
the Department of Defense. - -
As the President has made clear, the merits of each case—the agree-
ments and Our pending strategic programs—require affirmative con-
gressional action in both cases.
NECESSITY OF CONTINUED STRONG SUPPORT FOR ADEQUATE DEFENSE BUDGET
Security, the basis of a peace, cannot be bought cheaply. The op-
portunities for enhanced security embodied in the SALT agreements
would be nullified and our national security jeopardized unless there
is continued strong Support for an adequate defense budget. The suc-
cess of SALT and prospects for ultimate peace depend on sustained
strength. -
If we do not maintain this strength by going forward with the stra-
tegic programs we are recommending, we will face the problems simi-
lar to those we had to face in SALT I: an onrushing and unchecked
Soviet momentum in development and deployment reflected by the
addition of ballistic missiles at the rate of some 250 per year for the
past five years; a reluctance on the part of the Soviet Union to accept
limitations on certain ongoing programs and other developmental
programs; and, with the the exception of Safeguard, no major U.S.
deployment programs, but rather qualitative improvements in existing
SVStemS. -
sº by intense negotiations were we successful in achieving the
limitations contained in the interim agreement. Wishful thinking
about what we might want the other side to do has no place in success:
ful negotiations; nor does it have a place in planning our national
security. As you know from your briefings on the agreements, limita.
tions advocated by some were the subject of discussion and negotiation,
but we could not reach agreement in all areas. I am, of course, referring
to MIRV limitations, among other things. -
In short, the agreements reached were dictated by the strategic
balance and ongoing programs. They reflect what could be obtained
through negotiations, not what some might have advocated as more
desirable.
62
. The programs that we are recommending are designed not to
jockey for Some unilateral advantage within the bounds of these
agreements but in full recognition of the fact that they are necessary
for Our national Security. The President reported last week that Mr.
Brezhnev and his colleagues in Moscow had made it absolutely clear
that they intended to go forward with defense programs in the
offensive area not limited by these agreements. It should be no sur-
prise when I report to you that this is precisely what they are doing.
Both as a Member of Congress and when I became Secretary of
Defense, I thought it was essential to apply the brakes to the onrushing
Soviet strategic weapons momentum. With ratification of these agree-
ments, we will have accomplished this objective.
As a legislator and as a member of the executive branch, I have
always felt that it is essential for us to maintain technological supe-
riority. With approval of the President’s budget request, this objective
also will be sustained. -
The defense programs that are before the Congress are needed to
preserve the effectiveness of our deterrent, both with and without
SALT. Without the current agreements before you, we would be taking
further measures to protect our deterrent capability. With the agree-
ments, we can continue our programs in prudent fashion as we move
into follow-on negotiations, hopefully in October.
Let me briefly summarize the major programs we have proposed in
the 1973 budget and the 1973 defense report, which was submitted to
this Congress in February:
TRIDENT PROGRAM
We need Trident, formerly called the Underseas Long-Range Mis-
sile System, at the earliest possible date. Last year we made the deci-
sion to accelerate Trident as the most appropriate new strategic initia-
tive to preserve the sufficiency of our deterrent for the future. We
should move forward to be in a position to deploy the first submarine
on schedule.
It should be noted that our program will not get the first Trident
Submarine into operation until after the scheduled expiration date of
this interim agreement. Even though an increase from the present
41 to 44 boats is permitted, the U.S. total number of operational
ballistic missile submarines will not increase during the period of this
agreement. As you know, Trident is also presently planned as a re-
placement system. This request is contained in our 1973 budget esti-
mate, which is currently being considered by the Congress.
The House Armed Services Committee has already marked up the
procurement bill and has included the funding requested by the
President in the 1973 budget submission to the Congress for the
Trident program. . -
B—1 BOMBER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
Similarly, the B–1 bomber development program must be kept on
schedule. It is designed to provide us an option to deploy the first
aircraft in the late 1970's. -
63
NCA DEFENSE
With regard to the NCA, defense contemplated in the ABM treaty,
we can fund the NCA defense in fiscal year 1973 and still reduce, as
a result of this treaty, the ABM budget request for fiscal year 1973
by $650 million from the amounts included in the 1973 budget sub-
mitted by the President.
As I have reported to you, system components originally slated for
defense of Minuteman sites will be continued with the objective of
using these components at Washington. During fiscal year 1973 we
propose to continue studies of NCA defense, continue advanced site
preparation and keep open options for specific national capital au-
thority defense configuration.
There is $28.7 million included in the President's 1973 budget re-
quest for this advanced preparation. But the ABM reduction in the
1973 budget as a result of this particular treaty currently before
the Congress amounts to $650 million. \
SITE DEFENSE PROTOTYPE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
The site defense prototype development program, which is per-
mitted by the treaty, preserves the option to deploy a terminal de-
fense of U.S. ICBM's should that ever become necessary. The pending
site defense program will provide for earlier availability of develop-
mental hardware, earlier development of software and earlier test and
demonstration. -
REVISED SATELLITE BASING PROGRAM
The revised satellite basing program will provide more rapid move-
ment of our strategic bomber force to inland United States bases and,
in addition, makes provision for reducing the time required to get
them airborne.
DEVELOPMENT OF SLCM SYSTEM
The development of the Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile—
SLCM-system is necessary to assure availability of future U.S. op-
tions for additional U.S. strength, if needed. This particular research
and development program was included in the 1972 supplemental re-
quest submitted by the Administration earlier this year. A decision
was made by the Armed Services Committee to consider this supple-
mental request in conjunction with the 1973 budget and, as you know,
the House will be considering this request with the approval and with
the gºommendation of the House Armed Services Committee next
Week.
The funding we are proposing will allow accelerated study of the
SLCM System and initiate development of critical technology com-
ponents such as propulsion and guidance.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the Soviets, as you
know, now have significant numbers of submarine-launched cruise
missiles deployed on nuclear boats, and they have on-going an active
production program in this area.
64
IMPORTANCE OF EFFECTIVE COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS
The SALT agreements, in my view, underscore the importance of
effective Command, Control and Communications—C". That is why
we are recommending additional funding in the 1973 budget to im-
prove secure communication with the airborne command post, ad-
vance our satellite technology, improve survivability of future com-
puter data systems and conduct system engineering studies of the
world-wide military command and control system.
IMPROVED REENTRY VEHICLE FOR BALLISTIC MISSILES
We are also requesting in the 1973 Department of Defense budget
request moderate increases in funding to move forward with work
on improved reentry vehicles for our ballistic missiles.
VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES
Clearly, adequate and effective verification capabilities are neces
sary. We have such capabilities now and are proposing moderate in
creases in funding to assure that verification of these agreements by
national means will remain adequate in the future.
We must continue to preserve our Security and to negotiate from a
position of strength.
INTERDEPENDENT CON VICTIONS WITH WHICH AGREEMENTS ARE ENTERED
I want to repeat what I told the Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee yesterday: We enter these agreements with the following inter-
dependent strong convictions:
Our security will be enhanced.
We have applied brakes to the momentum of Soviet strategic missile
deployments. -
We have adequate means of verification.
Congress will support the strategic programs we have proposed in
the 1973 budget.
We have taken the initial steps and have laid a solid foundation
for further arms limitation and potential arms reductions in the
future.
SUMIMARY

In summary, Mr. Chairman and members of the Foreign Relations
Committee, the agreements are good, but we should not overlook the
fact that the negotiations will continue, since we have only an interim
agreement on offensive limitations.
We will realize significant savings in strategic expenditures through
these agreements that could be about $5 billion over the next five years
even with approval of our on-going program and proposed programs
contained in the 1973 budget request as submitted by the President.
We can and must take those further steps to insure continued Secur-
ity while at the same time enhancing prospects for successful follow-
on negotiations. This is the way to move toward future benefits with
respect both to our security and to our defense expenditures. But
we are not in this position yet.
165
SUPPORT OF AGREEMENTS AND PROGRAMS URGED
We can and we will move ahead with your support. I urge your
support of these agreements and continued support of the programs
necessary for the future sufficiency of our deterrent forces.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has a statement to present to
Oll.
y EIEARING PROCEDURE
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased to have the
chairman. I have just been handed a note that you have an engage-
ment and must leave early. I wonder if, that being the case, we
shouldn’t question you and allow you to leave. Is that correct? I
was told you had to leave early. -
Secretary LAIRD. There should be no surprise on that. I think you
were informed that I had a 12:30 luncheon.
The CHAIRMAN. We want to have an opportunity to question you,
but it is perfectly all right with me.
Secretary LAIRD. But that was communicated, I am sure, Mr. Chair-
man, to you. Some days ago. -
The CHAIRMAN. It isn’t important. I only wondered whether or not
we should proceed with your questions so you could leave. It is per-
fectly all right with me if you say—
All right, Admiral Moorer, you may proceed. -
Secretary LAIRD. I am concerned that that surprised you, Mr.
Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. We had other meetings. I am not current with all
the details of all meetings.
Secretary LAIRD. But I do have a 12:30 luncheon.
The CHAIRMAN. I wouldn’t want to interfere with your luncheon.
Admiral Moorer, do you wish to add something to the statement?
STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, U.S. NAVY, CHAIRMAN,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; ACCOMPANIED BY LT. GEN. ROYAL S.
ALLISON, U.S. AIR FORCE, ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN FOR
STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATIONS, AND COL. ROBERT M. LUCY,
U.S. MARINE CORPS, LEGAL ADVISER, LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT
TO THE CHAIRMAN, JCS
Admiral MooRER. I have a statement that I would be happy to
present, Mr. Chairman, if you would like.
The CHAIRMAN. Could you summarize it and put the entire state-
ment in the record? I assume you are in agreement with the Secretary;
that is customary. [Laughter.]
If you are going to take issue with him, why you can read it all.
Admiral MOORER. Well, most of the time I am in agreement with
him, but not always. -
The CHAIRMAN. All right; proceed. -
Admiral MooRER. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: I am
grateful for the opportunity to discuss with you today the SALT
agreements and their inter-relationship to our strategic force posture.
/
66
The Treaty on the Timitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the
Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limita-
tion of Strategic Offensive Arms, and our strategic forces have been
designed to serve a common purpose—to preserve peace.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff share with all the people of the United
States a sincere desire to relieve mankind of the burden and terror of
modern weapons. On 23 October 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
advised President Truman that they “regard it as of great military
importance that further steps... be promptly and vigorously pressed
. . in an effort to forestall a possible race in atomic weapons . . .”
At that time, they further suggested, as a matter of immediate im-
portance, measures for “restricting or outlawing the use of atomic
weapons and for encouraging the full development of atomic energy
for the benefit of mankind.”
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, recognized in 1945 and still
maintain today that a credible strategic deterrent is indispensable to
peace. For that reason, no task is more important, from a military
standpoint, than that of maintaining and protecting such a force. Our
strategic nuclear weapons have but one essential purpose—to deter
conflict. The real objective is that these weapons never be used. Arms
control agreements, to be either enduring or effective, must mutually
enhance the security of both parties. We must, in order to survive as a
nation, retain the power needed to deter aggression; not as a symbol
of national aggrandizement, but as an essential shield for the preserva-
tion of our Security. It is in this context that the treaty, the agreement,
and the United States strategic posture must be viewed.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were officially represented on the SALT
Delegation and were consulted prior to signature. If we press forward
vigorously with our programs designed to protect against a degrada-
tion in national security posture, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that
the deterrent capability of our strategic forces will not be impaired,
that the peace of the world may be enhanced, and that the undertak-
ings will be in the best interests of the United States.
There are two essential ingredients in any analysis of the strategic
consequences of these undertakings: first, the relative balance between
the U.S.S.R. and U.S. projected over the life of the Agreement; and
Second, drawing upon that analysis, a discussion of the essential con-
tinuing steps we must take to preserve U.S. Security and the stability
of international order as we move into the future.
THE STRATEGIC BALANCE
It is necessary that we examine a little of the past in order to under-
stand the present and to put the future in perspective. In discussing the
FY 1971 budget with the Congress, Mr. Laird and I both said that
the United States no longer had clear superiority in strategic nuclear
weapons. In the course of considering our relative military posture
during the FY 1972 budget hearings, I reported that the “balance is
tenuous.” This year my report to the Congress reflected that the bal-
ance is turning us in quantitative terms and that short of an effective
agreement on strategic arms limitations, the momentum of the Soviet
strategic force buildup would likely carry Soviet forces well beyond
the level planned for our forces in the mid or late 1970's. This momen-
67
tum resulted from the fact that the USSR has had an active ICBM
and SLBM construction and deployment program since the mid-
sixties, while in a quantitative sense, the United States remained
static—concentrating instead on qualitative improvements. We, there-
fore, must examine the impact of these agreements on the basis not
Only of what they freeze, but also upon what they forestall.
I would like now to briefly analyze the strategic military balance
and project it into the future in order to describe how the Strategic
Arms Limitations (SAL) undertakings affect that balance. I will
address specifically those forces affected by the undertakings: ICBM's,
SLBM's, and ABM's. In addition, the three general quantitative
measures which have been used to summarize the overall strategic
military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union—
numbers of delivery vehicles, megatons, and warheads—will be
discussed.
ICBMI, LATUN CEHERS
Turning now to the numbers of U.S. and Soviet ICBM launchers,
the USSR is expected to have approximately 1,550 ICBM's on launch-
ers by 1 July of this year. They have been deploying ICBM's at the
rate of about 250 per year. Thus, if unconstrained, they could have
had by mid-year 1977 well over 2,000 such missiles on launchers. The
number of ICBM launchers projected for the Soviets under SAL is
between 1,600 and 1,400, depending on how many they choose to con-
vert to SLBM's. In the SAL environment, we actually consider the
lower number of ICBM launchers to be the more severe threat. The
reason for this apparent anomaly is that a lower number of ICBM
launchers reflects the phaseout and replacement of older missiles with
modern SLBM's. It should be noted, however, that the maximum num-
bers of ICBM's and SLBM's that the Soviets could have had without
the constraints of the undertakings were much in excess of those per-
mitted by the agreement. U.S. ICBM's as projected in our five-year
defense program would not have increased beyond the current level
of 1,054.
SLBMſ LAUNCHERS
SLBM launchers are the next item of interest. The USSR is esti-
mated to have about 580 operational SLBM’s and is building at the
rate of about 128 per year. They were, therefore, capable of operating
about 1200 SLBM's by 1977. A Soviet maximum of 950 modern launch-
ers is all they are permitted by the undertakings. The U.S. SLBM
launcher level will remain constant through 1977 at 656. Although
under the agreement we are permitted to build up to 710 SLBM
launchers by converting our 54 Titans to SLBM launchers, we can-
not deplov our first new Trident submarine until 1978 and, thus, add
to our SLBM launcher force. . .
INTERCONTINENTAL DELIVERY VEHICLES
The total number of intercontinental delivery vehicles projected
for the United States and the Soviet Union should now be considered.
The 140 USSR and 457 U.S. bombers must now be added to the
numbers of intercontinental delivery vehicles previously discussed.
They are unaffected by the agreement. Approximately 2100 deploy-
68
able vehicles are now available to each party. The Soviet Union was
expected to overtake us in this measure by mid-1972 and to have over
3000 delivery vehicles operational by 1977. Under the terms of the
undertaking, our best estimates reflect a level of 2167 U.S. and 2499
USSR delivery vehicles. This factor, more than any other, points out
the significance of interrupting Soviet momentum. Granted, we have
a freeze at a ratio of about 2499 to 2167 in favor of the Soviet Union,
but we have forestalled a 1977 ratio of about three to two in their favor.
INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE MEGATONNAGE AND waRHEADs
The USSR was already far superior to us in total intercontinental
strategic offensive megatonnage. Only in the numbers of strategic of
fensive warheads was the United States projected to maintain a lead
over the Soviet Union during the next five years. Even here, the USSR
has the potential to overtake us. Given the technology which we have
every reason to believe the Soviet Union either has or is acquiring, it
is anticipated that they will move vigorously into MIRV's, both in
their ICBM's and SLBM's. The considerably greater “throw weight”
or payload capacity of the Soviet missile force, particularly the SS-9
type missile, is especially adaptable to this task. It is still anticipated
that they will considerably narrow our lead in terms of numbers of
warheads by the late 1970's. However, the restraint on their deploying
more than the 313 SS—9 type missiles now operational or under con-
struction will impact upon this growth. Here we benefit from both
what we freeze and what we forestall.
SUIMIMARY OF OFFENSIVE BALANCE
As I have noted on several prior occasions, an objective evaluation
of the overall strategic balance between the United States and the So-
viet Union requires consideration of all the factors in the strategic
equation—delivery vehicles, megatons, and warheads—in an appro-
priate combination, together with pre-launch survivability, reliability
accuracy, range, and penetrability of enemy defensive systems.
To summarize the offensive balance:
The agreement stops Soviet ICBM deployment at some 1600 mis-
siles, and, if the USSR elects to exercise the option of replacing SS-7
and SS—8 ICBM's with SLBM launchers, it would result in a net
decrease of ICBM's to around 1400. It also limits their modern large
ballistic missiles to the 313 SS—9 types now operational or under con-
struction. The agreement also limits SLBM's to 950 modern launchers.
Additionally, there is a limit of 62 modern nuclear-powered sub-
marines. The number 740 was used as a base figure for Soviet SLBM's.
To reach the 950 limit, the Soviet Union must dismantle and remove
from the inventory either older ICBM or SLBM launchers or a selected
combination thereof. The United States will be limited to the current
levels of ICBM's and SLBM's (1054 and 656, respectively), but has the
option to modernize the 54 Titan launchers or replace them with light
ICBM's or SLBM's. •.
The agreement thus permits the Soviet Union more strategic offen-
sive launchers than the United States, but prevents them from having
the strategically significant lead previously projected. We had no
69
plans to construct additional strategic launchers in the five-year time
frame of the agreement. We thus reduced the growth of the Soviet lead
through negotiations rather than by adding to our force structure.
ABM TREATY: STRATEGIC DEFENSE BALANCE
Now, I would like to discuss the strategic defensive balance with
regard to the ABM Treaty. Both sides are limited to a maximum of
two sites, with 100 launchers at each site. The USSR currently has
one site deployed around Moscow, with a total of 64 launchers. We
have one site under construction at Grand Forks, North Dakota, which
is about 90 percent complete at this time. The Soviet Union is limited
to one additional site at an ICBM field, and we are limited
to an additional 100-launcher site around Washington, D.C., for de-
fense of our national command and control mechanism. As far as ABM
launchers are concerned, therefore, both sides can have a comparable
defense. This defense will protect our decision-making process and
command and control facilities and provide additional time to imple-
ment appropriate retaliatory measures. The perception of assured re-
sponse by those who would be our adversaries reduces the potential for
attack. Further, the undertakings are structured to provide a degree
of strategic equality and balance. Our failure to construct the Wash-
ington site to balance off the Soviet capability would leave an unde-
sirable asymmetrical relationship which could be destabilizing and
weaken our overall deterrent posture.
ACTIONS REQUIRED NOW
No discussion of these undertakings would be complete without con-
sideration of the future. We must look beyond the five-year period
of the interim agreement and consider the actions required now to
preserve an appropriate strategic equilibrium should follow-on ne-
gotiations fail. The relaxation of tensions evidenced by the mutual
determination to agree, reflected by these undertakings, reduces the
probability of war. There is, however, no guarantee that successive
arms-limiting steps can be taken so that a more permanent solution will
be reached. The present undertakings, if properly pursued, should as-
sist us in achieving a substantial diminution in tension and lead to
peaceful progress. In the meantime, however, we must continue taking
those essential military steps designed to maintain our deterrent. If
we fail to follow the legitimate dictates of our own security, the lead-
ership of the USSR will chalk it up, not to goodwill, but to a fail-
ure of will; not to our confidence, but to our weakness. They, thus,
might be encouraged to engage in acts which could threaten the peace
and security of the world. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, believe
that action to achieve the following assurances must be taken now if
the United States is to guard against a degradation of its national
Security posture: - . -
Assurance I.-‘A Broad Range of Intelligence Capabilities and Op-
erations to Verify Soviet Compliance in a Strategic Arms Limitation
Environment.” - -
Provide high confidence monitoring of Soviet compliance with the
terms of the ABM treaty and the interim offensive agreement.
70
Provide information on Soviet strategic activity, capabilities, and
achievements as insurance against both technological and strategic
surprise and for use in follow-on arms limitation negotiations.
Assurance II.-‘Aggressive Improvements and Modernization Pro-
grams.” -
Maximize strategic capabilities within the constraints established
by the ABM treaty and the interim offensive agreement.
Plan for rapid augmentation of strategic forces beyond the con-
straints of the treaty and agreement to be made in the event of abroga-
tion, withdrawal, or collapse of negotiations.
Assurance III.-“Vigorous Research and Development Programs.”
Maintain weapons systems technological superiority.
Continue testing to insure the effectiveness of new and existing
nuclear weapons systems. -
WIHAT PROGRAMIS WILL DO
The Secretary of Defense has already outlined, in his statement,
the major programs designed to provide the assurances that I have
enumerated above. It is the conviction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
that these programs are essential in order not to jeopardize the future
Security of the United States. Furthermore, these programs will:
Firstly, place the United States in a position to negotiate further
acceptable limitations on offensive systems,
Secondly, prevent the United States from being placed in a position
of strategic inferiority in the years ahead, and
Finally, provide positive evidence to our allies of our intention to
maintain our strategic deterrent power, so necessary to their security
within the SAL environment.
When the discussions leading to these undertakings began on 17
November 1969, President Nixon advised the delegation:
You are embarking upon One Of the most momentous negotiations ever en-
trusted to an American delegation . . . .
-r
I do not underestimate the difficulty of your task . . . I am nevertheless
hopeful that your negotiations . . . will serve to increase mutual security.
I have stated that, for Our part, we will be guided by the concept of main-
taining “sufficiency” in the forces required to protect Ourselves and Our allies.
I recognize that the leaders of the Soviet Union bear similar defense responsi-
bilities. I believe it is possible, however, that we can carry out our respective
responsibilities under a mutually acceptable limitation and eventual reduction
Of Our Strategic arsenals.
JCS ACCORD WITH PROPERLY SAFEGUARDED UNDERITAKINGS
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in accord with the undertakings that
are before you today, provided they are properly safeguarded, as dis-
cussed earlier. They may well constitute the essential first step toward
an era of negotiation and a generation of peace.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
WITNESS’s POSITION ON weAPON REQUEST AND TREATY
Mr. Secretary, is it your position that unless Congress authorizes
your request for new weapons that you will oppose the treaty?
71
Secretary LAIRD. My position has been, and continues to be, that all
three—the ABM Treaty, the agreement on offensive weapons systems,
and the requests contained in the President's 1973 budget—should be
approved by the Congress, and I have so recommended.
DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN WITNESS AND PRESIDENT SUGGESTED
The CHAIRMAN. In the public briefing at the White House when
Mr. Kissinger was authorized to speak for the President, he stated
that the treaty should stand on its own feet, its own merits, and that
the weapon systems should be considered on their merits. He did not
tie them together. I asked him specifically. It seems to me there is same
difference of view between you and the President as described by Mr.
Kissinger. -
Secretary LAIRD. I do not think there is any difference of opinion,
but, as a witness before this committee, I believe that you would want
me to state my opinion. -
The CHAIRMAN. You state, Mr. Secretary, “an adequate defense
budget.” Of course, that is exactly the question before us. Incidentally,
I think we should proceed under the ten minute rule in order for every-
body to get an opportunity. You keep time, Mr. Marcy, so that every-
one can have an opportunity to question the witnesses, because we have
such limited time this morning.
Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, in further response to your ques-
tion, I do believe that our defense budget should stand on its own
merits, and I have tried to present it in that way to each of the con-
gressional committees. I have made certain recommendations. I realize
that the Congress is a co-equal branch of the Government; as I have
said on many occasions. The Congress has the right to make different
decisions, but as a witness, I would assume that this committee would
want my opinion.
The CHAIRMAN. That's right.
ADEQUATE DEFENSE BUDGET WITH REGARD TO ABM TREATY
You refer to an adequate defense budget, which is really the ques-
tion. What is adequate is the question with regard to the ABM Treaty.
If the treaty is lived up to, if both sides take it seriously—you have
stated and other witnesses have stated that we have adequate means
of verification, that there could be no serious cheating on this agree-
ment. Helms is very positive about it and, I take it, from your testi-
mony you feel we have adequate means of verification. If that is so
and if each side has given up the idea of an effective defense against
strategic weapons, it seems to me this has a very important bearing
on what is adequate because it is acknowledged, I think, by everyone
that the existing weapons now in being are quite adequate to destroy
effectively each country. We have sufficient weapons, if their delivery
is not thwarted, to destroy them, and the same on the other side.
Therefore, it strikes me this has a very important bearing upon what
is adequate. If you insist upon these enormously increased weapons
with enormous costs, you will force them to respond in kind. All you
are doing is continuing the arms race. The whole purpose of the ABM
treaty, we thought, was to stop the arms race. There is, to me, an in-
herent inconsistency in these two positions. -
72
I wish you would clarify that. If they do not have an effective de-
fense against our present capacity to destroy, I don’t quite see why it
is necessary to continue these enormous increases because, obviously,
they will respond in kind if they are capable of it, and they have
proved to be fairly capable in the past.
Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, as you know, the numbers that are
contained in the offensive agreement, which is a first step toward fol-
low-on negotiations in the offensive field, do give a numerical ad-
vantage to the Soviet Union.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, numerically—
Secretary LAIRD. I do not feel that this is a difficulty. It does not
present a problem for the realism of our deterrent because we have
ºlogy which is, I believe, from 18 to 24 months ahead of the Soviet
Ill OIl.
I believe that our friends and allies, as well as the Soviet Union and
our adversaries in the world, recognize the fact that we will maintain
this technological superiority during this period. So that does not con-
cern me, the fact that there is this imbalance as far as numbers are
concerned. -
But I am aware of the fact that the Soviet Union has stated that it is
going forward with programs permitted under the agreement. And
not only have they stated this, but they are also going forward with
very effective test programs. I believe that they have the MIRV tech-
nology. They have done tests in this particular area and they will, I
believe, flight-test this MIRV technology within the next six to nine
months.
QUESTION OF SUFFICIENCY
The question of sufficiency is one that involves a judgment factor.
I personally believe that we have a realistic deterrent today. I be-
lieve that our friends and allies—as well as the Soviet Union and the
world—understand that. But I do not believe that we can take action
today that does not permit us to carry forward with these programs for
maintaining our technology and maintaining our replacement capabili-
ties until we have achieved an adequate follow-on agreement. I believe
we are moving from arms competition to arms limitation, but I would
remind this committee and you, Mr. Chairman, that this particular in-
terim offensive agreement applies primarily to numbers. Each time
that we tried to get qualitative limitations included in the negotiations
and the agreement, these efforts were unsuccessful.
I would be hopeful that in the follow-on negotiations such forward
movement would be possible between the Soviet Union and the United
States, but I do not believe that we should take unilateral action with-
out the benefit of these negotiations.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary e
Secretary LAIRD. As far as the ABM Treaty is concerned, Mr. Chair.
man, as you know, I testified before this committee in 1969 in favor of
a 12-site ABM program. I pointed out at that time why we wanted to
change the concept of the Sentinel system which was announced in 1967
and approved in principle by the Congress in 1968, which was for a de-
ployment of 17 sites. I supported that program and the Congress, in its
wisdom, has gone along by approving the follow-on Safeguard pro-
gram on a phased basis. Presently we have four sites that are approved
73
for either deployment or advanced site preparation. Contracts have
been let and we were going forward on that basis.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we are all aware of that.
Secretary LAIRD. Now, with this particular treaty we are abandoning
that momentum which was started with the approval of the Congress
in the defensive area. The Soviet Union is abandoning the extreme
momentum which they had going in the offensive area. This was a mu-
tually acceptable course of action for both countries at this time. I do
not believe that we should read into the interim offensive agreement
considerations which you read into that agreement, and you use as the
premise of your question—
The CHAIRMAN. Every time we have a ten-minute limitation you
take up the whole ten minutes and you leave no opportunity for ques-
tions. We are familiar with that. I will remind you that was approved
by a 50–50 vote on the ABM. It was not unanimous in the Senate by any
Iſle?...I].S. -
Secretary LAIRD. I am sorry if I implied it was unanimous.
The CHAIRMAN. That is not very significant.
Secretary LAIRD. I have been in politics a long time.
The CHAIRMAN. It is a close question.
Secretary LAIRD. One vote is just as good as two, three, or four;
so I don’t want to argue how it was approved.
EFFECT OF WITNESS' PROGRAM ON PARITY
The CHAIRMAN. I don’t think you have answered or even responded
to the questions. We have a sufficiency. The President himself has stated
in no uncertain terms that one reason why there has been a favorable
response is that these agreements cannot last unless each side feels
that it has security. He reiterated as did Mr. Kissinger that you should
not describe these agreements as either party having an advantage,
that either won the game. He is trying to promote, if I understand
him, that each has a degree of parity. - -
Secretary LAIRD. That is what I am promoting, too.
The CHAIRMAN. What your program is doing is to upset that. You
continually refer to superiority as you go along. -
Secretary LAIRD. I have referred to it in the area of technology and,
Mr. Chairman, we do have a superior position as far as technology is
concerned. That is the reason why I am confident that the disparity
in numbers that exists in the offensive agreement does not prevent us
from maintaining sufficiency as far as our deterrent is concerned.
I would quote the President to vou and perhaps we could put this
in the record at this particular noint. The President did cover this in
his briefing to the members of the committee last week at the White
House, and it might be well to restate his position.
The CHAIRMAN. I would like for us to give as many members of the
committee as possible some opportunity to make observations.
Secretary LAIRD. Could I put that in the record without reading it?
º CHAIRMAN. Yes, you can put anything you would like into the
Teo Or'Ol.
Secretary LAIRD. Thank you. I appreciate that. (See appendix.)
74
EFFECT OF SEEKING ADVANTAGE ON SEPIRIT OF AGREEMENTS
The CHAIRMAN. The point comes back to this. It will destroy the
whole spirit of these agreements if you persist or if our government
persists in seeking an advantage, and a clear advantage, in any of these
fields. The basis of the agreements is a high degree of parity. The
numbers are not so significant if there is no defense against them. If
the weapons are more than adequate and they can’t defend against
them, the fact that you have 100 or 500 more missiles doesn’t make any
appreciable difference. In addition, you have already stated you believe,
we have Superiority in technology. Our own government made a
decision to develop Minuteman, which is smaller than the SS-9, because
it is a more efficient way to use your material. A 16-megaton weapon
or a 25-megaton weapon is not an efficient way to proceed. We made
that decision ourselves; so there is a degree of parity. In fact, there are
Some very good authorities who believe that we have on balance
various very much stronger systems today.
If we go forward with your proposals we will upset that balance
and I think we are likely to destroy the effectiveness of the treaty itself
and that is what we wish to protect.
ADEQUATE DEFENSE ISSUE IN VIEW OF ABM AGREEMENT
I think the issue about the adequate defense in view of the ABM
agreement is the very crux of the matter and I don’t quite think you
have addressed yourself directly to that question. -
We have had some very interesting hearings with other members of
the government, and some who have recently left, particularly the
Navy. Information has been supplied the committee from the Center
for Defense Information which, as you know, is headed by an admiral
who just retired and who is thoroughly aware of the relative strength
of the American government versus the Russians. He says, for example,
“The Center for Defense Information has made its own study of the
naval balance and has reached the following conclusions: The balance
is heavily in favor of the United States. The Soviet Union is doing
little which would significantly change the balance in the next few
years. There is little evidence to support the request for a large increase
in money for ships designed to project U.S. power overseas and to
greatly expand U.S. strategic weapons capability.”
(The document referred to follows:)
75
THE DEFENSE

MONITOR
C E N T E R F O R D E F E N S E
I N F O R M A T | O N
Volume One Number One
May 1972
THE SOVIET NAVAL THREAT:
REALITY AND ILLUSION
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, has told Congress that “a major shift in the naval
balance between the United States and the Soviet Union”
is taking place. ---
“Unless we accelerate the modernization of our fleet,”
he told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Febru-
ary 15, 1972, “the Soviets will increasingly challenge our
control of the seas in those maritime regions essential to
the success of our forward defense strategy, as well as in
ocean areas closer to our shores.”
On the basis of these arguments, the Defense Depart-
ment has asked Congress for $9.7 billion in new Navy
procurement funds for fiscal 1973, about $1 billion more
than in 1972, which was in turn about $1 billion more
than in 1971. These funds are part of a Navy “moderniza-
tion” program: 42 major combat ships and 21 submarines
now under construction or authorized by Congress and
more than 60 major surface ships and a new fleet of bal-
listic missile submarines contemplated (see tables 4 and 5).
The Center for Defense Information has made its own
study of the naval balance and has reached the following
conclusions:
• The balance is heavily in favor of the United States.
• The Soviet Union is doing little which would signifi-
cantly change the balance in the next few years.
• There is little evidence to support the request for a
large increase in money for ships designed to project US
power overseas and to greatly expand US strategic weap-
ons capability.
A Look at the Balance
Defense Department testimony to Congress on the
Soviet naval threat stresses such trends as an increase in
the number of Soviet major combat surface ships in the
last five years (from 185 to 215, including two new heli-
copter carriers, seven new missile cruisers, 18 new missile
destroyers and 36 new escorts). It stresses Russia's numeri-
cal advantage in submarines (about 343 Soviet to 138 US),
new Soviet anti-ship missiles, and increases in Soviet naval
operations in the world's oceans.
But these presentations fail to give a fair picture of the
relative strengths of these two navies. The diagrams and
data on the following pages give a fair picture. They show
that:
1. The Soviet Union has no nuclear-powered combat
surface ships and is not reported to be building any. The
United States has four and is building seven more.
80–942 O—72—6
2. The United States has 14 attack aircraft carriers
which carry from 40 to 90 jet aircraft each, used for strik-
ing land or sea targets. Two nuclear carriers are under
construction. The Soviet Union has no attack carriers and
no sea-based fixed-wing aircraft. The Defense Department
has asked for funds in 1973 to start building the power
plant for a fourth nuclear attack carrier. It also has asked
for funds to design a new fleet of at least eight smaller
follow-on carriers to be called Sea Control Ships.
3. The United States has two anti-submarine carriers
which carry helicopters and fixed-wing anti-submarine air-
craft. The Soviets have two anti-submarine carriers which
are actually cruisers with large helicopter landing decks.
One 35,000-ton ship is under construction in the Soviet
Union which may be a carrier or some other type of ship.
4. The United States has seven “assault” helicopter car-
riers designed to move marines ashore. Five more, twice
the size of the existing ones, are under construction. The
Soviet Union has no comparable ships.
5. The United States has nine cruisers. The Soviets have
25. But four of the Soviet cruisers are pre-World War Two
and are probably being retired. Ten of the Soviet cruisers
are smaller than many US destroyers. The US Navy wants
to build two 2200-ton prototypes of what would eventu-
ally be a cruiser-size hovercraft called a “surface effects
ship.”
6. Soviet missile-firing destroyers are fewer and smaller
than their US counterparts. Congress has already author-
ized 30 new destroyers (DD963 Spruance Class), which
are larger than any destroyers of the Soviet Union. The
US Navy is asking for funds for 50 new “patrol frigates”
which will be larger than most Soviet destroyers. By the
late 1970s all US destroyers and patrol frigates are to be
ºuipped with the new Harpoon surface-to-surface missile.
7. The present US fleet of 41 strategic ballistic missile
submarines has 2800 separately targetable warheads."
Russia's ballistic missile submarines have about 500 war-
heads (see Table 1). Also, a greater percentage of the US
ballistic missile submarines are on station at a given time
than is the case with the Soviet submarines. By 1976, the
Continued on Page 2
“To put in context with overall US strategic capability, Secretary
#: gave these comparative figures for nuclear weapons for mid
Total offensive strategic nuclear weapons (warheads)
US USSR
5700 2500
76
THE DEFENSE MONITOR
REALITY Continued from Page 1
number of separately targetable US submarine-launched
warheads will increase to almost 7000. This figure does
not reflect the proposed new ULMS ballistic missile sub-
marine system which will be the subject of a subsequent
edition of The Defense Monitor.
8. The Soviets have a fleet of 68 submarines armed
with anti-shipping “cruise” missiles. The United States
decided in the 1950s not to develop a capability in this
area and abandoned its Regulus missile program. Recently,
the Pentagon decided to go ahead with development of a
new cruise missile for a new attack submarine.
9. The US has more than twice the number of nuclear-
powered attack submarines as the Soviet Union. The Rus-
sians have 190 diesel attack submarines as compared to
41 for the US, but these are being phased out of both
navies. The total number of Soviet attack submarines has
decreased from 430 in 1960 to 283 in 1972, and Admiral
Moorer states that he expects this number will continue to
decline as newer submarines are introduced at a slower
rate than older units are withdrawn. The US is building a
new class of nuclear attack submarines (SSN 688 Los
Angeles Class).
Construction
Admiral Moorer told Congress: “The rate of moderni-
zation in the Soviet surface fleet is expected to accelerate
during the next few years.”
The Russians are building mainly light cruisers and
destroyers. These include Kresta II cruisers, and Krivak
and Kashin destroyers. Recently these have been built at
a rate of about one per year in each class. Defense De-
partment reports have suggested another “possible” cruiser
construction program and a “possible” carrier.
But in view of the US construction program already in
progress, Soviet “acceleration” would have to be enormous
to make a significant difference in the overall balance.
Regional Balances
When talking about a shifting balance, Defense Depart-
ment witnesses limit themselves to comparing the US and
Soviet navies. Yet, many NATO allies have modern effec-
tive navies that must be taken into account. When NATO
and Warsaw Pact forces are compared the balance clearly
favors NATO (see Table 2). - -
The balance is even more striking when naval forces in
the Mediterranean, for example, are examined alone (see
Table 3). (Not shown in the table are the more than 50
' PAGE TWO
small patrol boats armed with anti-ship missiles which the
Soviet Union has given many of her allies in the area,
These boats normally operate relatively near shore.)
Other Factors
The map on page seven shows that Soviet fleets suffer
geographic and climatic handicaps—limitations not faced
by the US Navy. Some fleets are partially iced-in during
winter. Others can be bottled up in home waters because
of narrow passages through which they must travel. These
“choke points” also facilitate NATO's monitoring of So-
viet fleet movements.
In discussing the US-USSR naval balance, Defense
Department witnesses neglect to consider the US Coast
Guard—a force which possesses over 50 ocean-going cut-
ters of naval destroyer size, armed with guns and anti-
submarine weapons.
Conclusions
The overall naval balance favors the United States. The
Soviet Union is not likely to change this status in the near
future.
The naval “balance” argument does not, therefore, jus-
tify, by itself, the kind of naval buildup which the Defense
Department has under way now or plans in the future. .
However, Defense Department testimony makes clear that
the Navy has other purposes in mind. Admiral Elmo R.
Zumwalt Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, told Congress
that the Navy's four “capabilities” are:
“Assured second strike”
(This refers to the Polaris-Poseidon fleet retaliating
with strategic missiles after a Soviet nuclear attack
on the United States.) -
“Control of sealines and areas”
“Projection of power ashore”
• “Overseas presence”
The first “capability” is defensive. In view of the over-
whelming second strike capability which the US possesses,
the new ULMS program is not needed at this time. The
American public deserves a much clearer definition of the
other Navy “capabilities”: What kind and degree of
“control of the seas” has the US decided to pursue?
Under what conditions and in what areas of the world
will it “project power ashore”? What portion of the pres-
ent Navy and what portion of the “modernization” pro-
gram is designed for overseas presence? These are ques-
tions which must be publicly asked and answered before
additional programs are approved by Congress.
Yº Yº Yº Yº Yºr
“Every addition to defense expenditure does not automatically increase
military Security. Because security is based upon moral and economic,
as well as purely military strength, a point can be reached at which
additional funds for arms, far from bolstering security, weaken it.”
President Eisenhower
* X X X X
77
THE DEFENSE MONITOR PAGE THREE
TABLE ONE
CURRENT BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE COMPARISON
Number of
Inde-
Number of endent Total
Number Launchers Total arheads Number
Missile Missile per umber of per of
Type Submarines Type Range Submarine Launchers Submarine Warheads
US 1 Poseidon 12 Poseidon º 2500 nm 16 192 192 2304
Polaris 21 A-3 2500 mm 16 336 16 336
Potaris 8 A-2 1500 rºm 16 128 16 128
Totals 41 656 2768
USSR 2 Yankee 26 SS-N-6 (Sawfly) 1300 nm 16 416 16 416
Hotel Il 9 SS-N-5 (Serb) 650 nm 3 27 3 27
Golf || 25 SS-N-5 (Serb) 650 mm 3 75 3 75
Totals 60 518 518
1 Figures as of June 1972
2 Figurés as of February 1972
TABLE TWO
MAJOR NAVAL COMBATANT COMPARISON
(Figures as of February 1972)
NATO WARSAW PACT
(U
&
§
S *: > § > º
- tg >
• 2 e5 2 & 5 § § 8, § - § § 3 ; ; b ş
# # # 5 # 5 # s ; ; ; ; ; ; § 3; # # 35 # 5 §
- - as SS º sº === *- *- ** co - * *. *-
S Sé, S㺠º 3 & #5 s 3 & 5 § $3 § 3 ; Ś §§ # & #
Attack and ASW Attack and ASW
O 16 2 2 0 0 0. 0 O 0 O 0 Carriers 0 0 0 0 0 0 O
Hº! Helicopter
Carriers 12 7 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O Carriers 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cruisers 16 9 3 2 0 0 2 O 0 O 0 0 Cruisers 25 25 0 0 0 0 0 0
Destroyers and Destroyers and
Escorts 460 214 76 48 20 2 18 24 5 11 12 10 20 Escorts 206 195 2 4 3 O 2 0
Submarines 259 138 34 20 4 6 5 10 15 4 2 10 11 Submarines 350 343 2 0 0 O 5 0
Totals 767 384 118 74 24 8 25 34 20 15 14 20 31 Totals 583 565 4 4 3 0 7 0
TABLE THREE
MAJOR NAVAL COMBATANTS IN MEDITERRANEAN AREA
NATO AND US ALLIES WARSAW PACT AND USSR ALLIES
W.P. Yugo- Al-
Totals NATO 1 Spain 2 Israel Morocco Totals (USSR) Egypt slavia 2 bania 2 Others 3
Attack and ASW Carriers 5 4. 1 0. O Attack and ASW Carriers 0-0 0-0 0 O 0 O
Helicopter Carriers 3 3 0 0 0 Helicopter Carriers 0–1 0-1 0. 0. 0 0
Cruisers 3 2 1 0. 0 Cruisers 2–4 2-4 0 O 0 0
Destroyers and Escorts 106 86 17 2 1 Destroyers and Escorts 14-17 5-8 7 2 0 O
Attack Submarines 47 41 3 3 O Attack Submarines 27-32 7-12 12 5 3 0
Totals 164 136 22 5 Totals 43–54 14–25 19 7 3 0



1 NATO includes US 6th Fleet; United Kingdom forces normally in the area;
f
one
Turke
2 One half of the Spanish navy.
half of the French navy; and the naval forces of Italy, Greece, and
1 USSR totals are normal and highest observed.
2 Yugoslavia and Albania are included though the political situation with the
US
may be strained at the moment.
3 Others include Syria, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Lebanon.
78
THE DEFENSE MONITOR - PAGE FOUR

TABLE FOUR
SUMMARY OF MAJOR Us combataNT SHIPs
AUTHORIZED OR PRESENTLY UNDER CONSTRUCTION
2—Nuclear Attack Carriers
5—Large Amphibious Helicopter Assault Carriers
5—Large Nuclear Guided Missile Destroyer Leaders
16—Large All-Purpose Destroyers (DD963 Spruance Class)
14—Large Escorts (DE1052 Knox Class) -
12—large Nuclear Attack Submarines (SSN688 Los Angeles Class)
9—Medium Nuclear Attack Sumbarines (SSN637 Sturgeon Class)

TABLE FIVE
SUMMARY OF MAJOR US COMBATANT SHIPS
FISCAL YEAR 1973 REGUESTED
will cost an estimated $95i million.
$10 million for contract, design for a “first buy" of eight new follow-on carriers called Sea Control Ships
(SCS). (Eventual total program will cost an estimated $1 billion.)
$50 million for two 2200-ton prototypes of a new major surface combatant called Surface Effect Ship (SES),
which will be a large hovercraft. (Eventual total program cost is not available.)
$945 million for advanced development of a new strategic-missile nuclear submarine called Undersea Long-
Range Missile System (ULMS). (Eventual total program will cost an estimated $11.2 billion as
“presently constituted.")
$612 million for procurement of seven additional , all-purpose destroyers of the DD963 Spruance Class.
(Eventual total program will cost an estimated $2.7 billion.)
2 million for the lead ship of a new fifty ship class called Patrol Frigate (PF). (Eventual total program cost
is estimated at $2.4 billion.)
$1.05 billion for procurement of six additional nuclear #. submarines of the SSN688 Los Angeles Class,
(Eventual total program will cost an estimated $6.8 billion.
$299 million for long lead items for * additional nuclear attack carrier (CVN-70). (Eventual total program
:
$t
9
(All total program cost estimates are based on Department of Defense figures.)

TABLE SIX
US AND USSR MAJOR NAVAL COMBATANTS,
(Figures as of February 1972)
US USSR
SURFACE
Aircraft Carriers - 16 0
Helicopter Carriers 7 2
Cruisers (with missiles) & 8 11
Cruisers (without missiles) 1 + 14
Destroyers and Escorts (with missiles) 65
Destroyers and Escorts (without missiles) 149 - 155
SURFACE TOTALS 246 222
SUBMARINES
Nuclear Submarines (with ballistic missiles) 4t 35 (est.)
Diesel Submarines (with ballistic missiles) O 25
Nuclear Attack Submarines (with cruise missiles) O 40 (est.)
Diesel Attack Submarines (with cruise missiles) 0 28
Nuclear Attack Submarines (without missiles) 56 25
Diesel Attack Submarines (without missiles) 41 190
StJBMARINE TOTAL #38 343
MAJOR NAVAL COMBATANT TOTALS 384 565
79
deactivated)
|. º program cost estimates are based on Department of Defense
Igures.
! The surface-to-surface missile (Harpoon) will be put on these units and
almost all other destroyers by the late 1970s. These units are shown
because of this fact and their large size.
THE DEFENSE MONITOR ? PAGE FIVE
TABLE SEVEN
US AND USSR MAJOR NAVAL COMBATANTS
(Figures as of February 1972)
US USSR
No. of Class or Operational No. of Class or Operational
Ships Type Tonnage Status Dates Ships Type Tonnage Status Dates
NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
1 Enterprise 75,000 Active 1961 None
2 Nimitz 81,000 Under construction 1974-6
1 Nimitz 81,000 Requested FY1973
299 million for
long lead items
(Est. total cost—
$951 million)
- CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT CARRIERS CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
4 Kitty Hawk 60,100 Active 1961-8 hone
4 Forrestal 59,650 Active 1955-9
3 Midway 51,000 Active 1945-7
2 Hancock 32,800 Active 1944-
2 Ssex 32,800 Active 1943–5
8 Sea Control Ship 17,000 (est.) Requested FY1973 late 1970s
$10 miſſion for
contract design
Est. total cost—
1 billion)
HELICOPTER CARRIERS - HELICOPTER CARRIERS
7 Iwo Jima 17,000 Active 1961-70 2 Moskva 15,000 Active tº 67-8
5 Amphibious 35,000 (est.) Under construction 1973-6 1 (Possible carrier 35,000 (est.) Under construction late 1970s
Assault Ship or merchant ship)
NUCLEAR CRUISERS NUCLEAR CRUISERS
Long Beach 14,200 Active 1961 None
CONVENTIONAL CRUISERS CONVENTIONAL CRUISERS
1 Salem 17,000 Acti 1949 10 Sverdlov 15,450 Active 1951-60
3 Albany 13,700 Active 1945-6 1 Dzerzhinski 15,450 Active
4 Cleveland 10,670 Active 1944-5 2 Chapaev 11,500 “Probably” being 1948-50 2
7 Surface Effect 10,000 (est.) Requested FY1973 late 1970s deactivated (old)
Ship (Hovercraft) $50 mil for two f Missile Cruiser 9,000 (est.) Under construction late 1970s
200 ton prototypes 2 Kirov 8,500 “Probably" being 1938-44
- (Est. total co deactivated (old)
not available)
(The following Soviet cruisers are smaller in size than US destroyers.)
2 Kresta || 6,000 Active 1968-7
NUCLEAR DESTROYERS 4 Kresta 5,140 Active 1967–8
5 California 9,000 (est.) Under construction 1972-5 Kynda 4,800 Active 1962-5
1 Truxton 8,200 Active 1967
f Bainbridge 7,600 Active - 1962 NUCLEAR DESTROYERS
CONVENTIONAL DESTROYERS AND ESCORTS Mone
63 Missile 3,370- Active 1953-67
Destroyers 6,
30 Spruance 6,000 (est.) Under construction late 1970s CONVENTIONAL DESTROYERS AND ESCORTS
50 Patrol Frigate 1 3,400 (est.) Requested FY1973 late 1970s 40 Missile 2,850- Active 1954-?
; |on for Destroyers 5,200
46 Knox i 3,011 º p 1971-2 (The USSR has about 155 additional older non-missile destroyers and
(14 still under escorts. Some are being converted to missile ships.)
construction)
(The US has about 115 additional older destroyers and escorts.)
NUCLEAR SUBMARINES WITH BALLISTIC MiSSILES NUCLEAR SUBMARINES WITH BALL!STIC MISSILES
4? Polaris/Poseidon 5,900- Active 1959-67 35 Yankee ,30 Active 1969-?
7 ULMS 16,000 (est.) Requested FY1973 late 1970s Hotel il 3,700 Active 1961-?
$945 million for
advanced development
Est. total cost—
11.2 billion)
DIESEL SUBMARINES WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES DHESEL SUBMARINES WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES
None 25 Golf Hil 2,300 Active 1950-65
NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINES WITH CRUISE MISSILES NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINES WITH CRUISE MISSILES
None | 40 Echo 1+H 5,000 Active 1961-8
(The US decided not to pursue this weapon system in the late 1950s, but Charlie 4,000 Active 1969-?
a cruise missile weapon system is presently under development.)
DIESEL ATTACK SUBMARINES WITH CRUISE MISSILES D1ESEL ATTACK SUBMARINES WITH CRUISE MISSILES
None - 28 Juliett 2,200 Active 1962-7
Whiskey 1,200 Active 1950-7
NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINES NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINES
56 Sturgeon 2,317- Active 1954-? -
w - 25 Victor 3,600 Active 1969-?
and others 3,860 (Nine more under i - -
construction) November 3,500 Active 1959-65
12 6,000 (est.) Los Angeles Under construction 1967-?
(Six more requested in
FY1973 budget)
.DIESEL ATTACK SUBMARINES 190 Fox Trot bestºck *nes 1950-67
d oth 1,850- Acti t943- ox i fo - lve . . -
41 Guppy and others ; §ºsing 59 and others 2,000 (Most being
deactivated)
(Question marks denote continuing construction.)
| Cruiser forward with large ASW helicopter deck aft
2 Construction began in 1938 -
23
In addition to the over-all numerical superiority of the US major naval combatant
force and its preponderance of strength in ballistic missile capability, the US Navy
also enjoys fewer climatic and geographic limitations in its normal fleet operations.
The Soviet North and Pacific Fleets are restricted by severe winter weather. The
Baltic and Black Sea Fleets can easily be blocked if necessary to prevent them
from exiting their home waters into international seas. Also, due to geographic
factors, it is easier for NATO to keep the Soviet fleets under surveillance than it
is for the Soviets to maintain continuous surveillance of NATO naval operations.
TABLE EIGHT
US AND USSR FLEET OPERATIONAL COMPARISONS
US USSR
Estimated Estimated .
o. of Climatic of No. of Climatic or
oring Major Major Geographic Normal Major Major §§
Operations (Jnits Facilities Limitations Operations Units Facilities Limitations
FIRST FLEET: Extensive training 125 San Diego, Long Beach, Mone BLACK SEA FLEET: Normal in-area 123 Batumi, Sevastopol, Narrow exit via Turkish
operations in eastern Pacific year- San Francisco training operations in Black Sea Novorossik (USSR) Straits
e *:::::::::: .*g. de §.
terranean a. Infrequeſt
SEVENTH FLEET: Extensive training 61 Pearl Harbor, Guam, None g
operations in Western Pacific year- Midway, Japan, Philip- gºallons in Atlantic or Caribbean
round. Frequent operations in Sea pines, Formosa, Vietnam -
of Japan and Sout ina Sea. War MEDITERRANEAN FLEET: Normal 21 Egypt Narrow entrance via Strait
operations in Gulf of Tonkin and operations in Eastern and Central of Gibraltar and Turkish
Philippines Sea. Infrequent opera- editerranean Sea. Extensive time Straits
tions in indian Ocean. Patrols US spent at anchorages or in ports.
Trust Territory of the Pacific Submarines deploy from North or
Islands. Baltic Fleets. Most surface com-
sº. F. ." § 179 tº None * deploy trom Black son
operations in , western Atlantic, Charleston, Mayport, Key *
orwegian and North Seas, and in West, New London, BALTIC FLEET: Normal in-area train- 74 Riga, Kaliningrad (USSR) Partial winter freeze in
the Caribbean Sea year-round. An- Spain, Scotland, Iceland, ing operations in Baltic Sea year- - both ports/Narrow exit
nual operations around South Cuba, Bermuda, Puerto round. Out-of-area operations in via The Soun
America. Deploys to Mediterranean Rico, Azores North Sea. Infrequent operations in
Sea and to the Indian Ocean. - the North Atlantic or Caribbean
SIXTH FLEET: Extensive training 231 Ports in 1taly, Greece, Narrow exit via Strait of Sea.
operations throughout the Mediter- France, Spain, Turkey, Gibraltar NORTH FLEET: Normal in-area train- 197 Kola, Murmansk Partial winter freeze in
anean Sea year-round. Quarterly Maita ing operations in White and Bar- Severodvinsk (USSR) all ports -
ºgºn; of 2-3 destroyers into ents Seás during summer months. -
the Black Sea. gº; exercises ! Nº.
s t operations in No
MIDDLE-EAST FORCE: Normal train- 2 Bahrein, Diego Garcia Narrow exit from Persian ea. Infrequen
ing operations in Persian Gulf. (Indian Ocean) Gulf via Strait of Hormuz Atlantic and Caribbean Sea -
PACIFIC FLEET: Normal in-area train- 161 Vladivostok, Nakhodka, Partial winter freeze in all
ing operations in Seas of Japan Petropavlovsk (USSR) orts/Narrow exits v
* includes two attack carriers and amphibious, landing ships with embarked Marine Battalion Land- and Okhotsk. Infrequent out-of-area uril islands and Korea
ing Team. operations in Nort no Central and Tsugaru Straits
Pacific during summer months only
Deployments to the Indian Ocean.
|NDIAN OCEAN DETACHMENT: Ex- * 5 None. Use friendly ports Narrow entrance via
tensive time spent at anchor in the for support Strait of of Malacca/Lon
Socotra lsland area. or in y- distance from Pacific an
cheſſes and Maldive Islands. Minor North Fleets
training operations in Arabian Sea.
3 None. Use Conakry, None
GUi NEA PATROL: Off west coast of
Africa,
Guinea for support
:
81
PAGE SEVEN
THE DEFENSE MONITOR
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THE DEFENSE MONITOR
THE CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION
The enormous size and complexity of the military effort
in this country has outrun the institutions established for
citizen understanding and control of public policy. An in-
formed public opinion on national defense and foreign
commitments is lacking in our society.
For these reasons the Center for Defense Information
has been established. The Fund for Peace has encouraged
and made possible the initiation of this Center. Further
funding will be provided by private foundations and in-
terested individuals. The Center will be under absolutely
no financial or other obligation to any government, mili-
tary, industrial or individual special interest.
The Center will concentrate exclusively on analyzing
and circulating public information on matters of national
defense and overseas commitments, as well as scrutinizing
our national defense program on a day-to-day basis. Its
appraisals will challenge existing assumptions about na-
tional defense and provide the basis for rational alternative
Real Admiral Gene R. La Rocque retired from the United
States Navy on April 1st 1972 to become Director of the
Center for Defense Information.
He commanded destroyers in the Pacific in World War
Two and holds the Bronze Star and Navy Commendation
Medal. He commanded a fast carrier task group with the
Sixth Fleet, a division of destroyers, a cruise and Cruiser-
Destroyer Flotilla. He served on the staff of the Naval War
College, and more recently, in the Strategic Plans Di-
vision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral La Rocque
recently received the Legion of Merit and left his position
as Director of the Inter-American Defense College to
direct the Center for Defense Information.
PAGE EIGHT
policies and budgets, to be measured against those of the
Department of Defense.
The Center will disseminate its research and informa-
tion to the broadest public possible through position
papers; a journal, The Defense Monitor, of which this is
the first edition; and material designed for the news and
other media. In addition, the Center will respond to re-
quests for information on defense matters. Future editions
of The Defense Monitor will include analysis of the de-
fense budget, ULMS (Underwater Long-range Missile
System), the B-1 Bomber, technological superiority, the
proposed attack carrier, US forces overseas and military
commitments to foreign nations, as well as other topics
of vital national and military concern.
The Center and its rapidly developing inventory of in-
formation will be a reliable and non-partisan resource for
all individuals and groups insisting upon a military that
will genuinely defend and strengthen American society,
not weaken it by overcommitments and waste of resources.
THE STAFF
Rear Admiral Gene R. La Rocque, US Navy (Ret.)
• Director
Lindsay Mattison
Assistant Director
Donald May
Assistant Director
Sally Anderson
Robert Berman
David Johnson
William Ronsaville
Dean Rudoy
Judith Weiss
Center for Defense Information
201 Massachusetts Avenue NE
Washington DC 20002
202 543 0400
When quoting any material from The Defense Monitor, please give
credit to the Center for Defense Information.
83
The CHAIRMAN. Isubmit he is a very good authority and, as I say, he
retired recently, within the last, I think, 60 days, from the Defense
Department. So there is room for honest difference of opinion.
QUESTION OF LIVING UP TO SPIRIT OF TREATY AND AGREEMENT
It comes down to this question, as I see it, of our living up to the
spirit of the ABM treaty and the agreement and to give them a
chance to operate. I must say I was greatly surprised that before we
even had an opportunity to consider the ABM treaty you gave the
impression that unless we went forward with these three new pro-
grams the treaty would not be in our interest. It gives me the
feeling
Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman—
The CHAIRMAN. One last comment and my time is over. -
It gives me the feeling in order to get your support, the President
had to agree to these weapon systems whether he liked it or not.
We know this goes on in all governments. I suppose that in Russia
Marshal Grechko said if they didn’t do this he wouldn’t support it.
It has happened before. I remember on such minor matters as the
Antarctic Treaty and other treaties we ran into this jockeying. It is
not unknown and it is not necessarily an illegitimate matter, but it is
up to this committee and the Congress, it seems to me, to exercise its
own judgment, viewing both of these matters, as the President said
through Mr. Kissinger, on their own merits. That is about the way
I look at them. -
My time is up.
Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I feel that I should respond.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I hope it won’t take up all the time.
Secretary LAIRD. If I could have 30 seconds to respond.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, certainly; you have taken an hour to begin
with. Go ahead.
Secretary LAIRD. All right. I won’t respond.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell?
Senator PELL. Out of my time I would like the Secretary to respond.
Leave me, if you would, a few minutes in my time.
Secretary LAIRD. Well, thank you, Senator Pell.
REQUESTED PROGRAMS AND PROJECTED SAVINGS
I would merely state that all we are asking for is congressional
approval of these programs that are in our 1973 budget. We have a
ship construction program to which you refer and on which you
quote an authority from whom you have certain information.
The CHAIRMAN. It is Admiral La Rocque. You know Admiral
La Rocque.
Secretary LAIRD. And I would certainly feel that the military advice
that I have from the Chiefs of Naval Operations as far as our ship
construction programs are concerned is very good military advice.
I have consulted with the best authorities that I can on our submarine
programs, all the way from Admiral Rickover and Admiral Smith to
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Chief of Naval Operations,
i. I do Support the ship construction program that is in our 1973
udget.
84
As for the B–1 and the Trident, which are in the strategic area, the
Congress last year supported the Department of Defense as we went
forward with these two programs. We are merely asking for a con-
tinuation in the 1973 budget of these programs which were approved
last year.
We are coming to Congress with a reduction in the 1973 budget as
a result of the ABM treaty of some $650 million. We are projecting a
five-year savings as a result of the ABM treaty of up to $5 billion. We
are projecting a saving through 1981 as far as the ABM treaty is con-
cerned over the period of some $8.6 billion. I think that these things
should be pointed out and an amendment is coming forward to the 1973
budget, which in part reflects the impact of these particular agree-
ments, although it does not affect the B–1 or the Trident requests which
we have before the Congress. There were some people, it seems to me,
who were reading into these agreements the assumption that a reduc-
tion could be made in these on-going offensive weapon programs which
we have asked the Congress to continue. That is a point that I think is
Sometimes overlooked.
DECREASED DEFENSIVE AND INCREASED OFFENSIVE WEAPON'S BUDGETS
Senator PELL. I think the record should also show that while there is
a decrease, as you justly say, Mr. Secretary, in the defensive weapon
budget, there is an increase, although not as great, in the offensive
weapon budget. -
I have two questions.
Secretary LAIRD. But that is not true to any great extent for fiscal
1973 expenditures in the offensive area. That, of course, is not the case.
Our expenditure level for 1973 is projected in the budget at $76.5 bil-
lion. When you get into the large ship construction and other procure-
ment and R & D items in our budget, our increases in expenditures
are much less than the increase in budget authority for 1973. The ship
construction is on a full funding basis; those expenditures do not show
up much until 1974, 1975 and beyond.
Senator PELL. Correct, but I think that to simplify, and I realize
how confusing it is for the American public, the fact remains from
the viewpoint of strategic nuclear weapons, the budget is being re-
duced in defensive weapons, but it is being increased in offensive ones.
Is that not correct?
Secretary LAIRD. That is correct.
Senator PELL. Thank you.
Secretary LAIRD. That is correct because of the ship construction
that is involved; that increase will not show up in expenditures how-
ever until about the 1975 period, but we are asking for full funding
on the authorization. * - -
Senator PELL. I have two questions. I hope we can get through in
my time. If not I will wait around and I hope I will be able to bring
up the rear guard on it. -
EFFECTIVENESS AND PURPOSE OF NCA INSTALLATION
First, in connection with the National Capital ABM, I am a little
concerned here because a quick look at the charts shows that a Soviet
submarine could be within 125 miles of this Caucus Room and be in
85
international waters. Is there any ABM systems in the world that is
So effective that in the 30 seconds it would take for a missile to go that
distance it could protect the center from that missile with no warning?
Secretary LAIRD. With no warning?
Senator PELL. Right. -
Secretary LAIRD. The NCA ABM defense will be able to defend
against a ballistic missile fired at the NCA from a distance of 125
miles. The ballistic missile flight times are much longer than the 30
Second figure you have mentioned, Senator Pell.
Senator PELL. But I think, again, from the viewpoint of all of us
who are not too informed in this field, we should bear in mind that the
Capital ABM center is really a bargaining chip and not much else
from the viewpoint of military effectiveness. I am not sure
Secretary LAIRD. No, I don’t think
Senator PELL. It is not a bad idea that we should take our risk be-
cause, gosh knows, we are expendable with the rest of the country.
Secretary LAIRD. I don't agree with your military assessment. I
would like the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to comment on your mili-
tary assessment. -
Senator PELL. Thank you.
Admiral MooRER. Senator Pell, the purpose of the NCA installation
is to protect the decision-making process in the government. We look
On the decision-making process as a very important component of the
overall deterrent package; and if a would-be attacker feels that he can
destroy the decision-making process without too much effort with full
assurance, that weakens the deterrent.
We have confidence in our operating forces that they can execute
the task assigned provided they get timely instructions; consequently,
the whole purpose of the NCA installation is to provide more time for
decision, and to ensure that the proper instructions do, in fact, reach
the executing forces. It is not related to the protection of industry or
population over all.
Senator PELL. I thank you very much, but the fact remains that for
the time being until these new devices are developed, this is basically
a bargaining chip, not a protective device.
Secretary LAIRD. I would disagree with that. I have not used that
term and I would not use that term in connection with the NCA de-
fense. The question of the construction of an NCA defense, of course,
will be covered in the fiscal 1974 budget submission. There is no con-
struction money in the 1973 budget for an NCA defense except for a
Small amount for advanced preparation. I would only add one point,
and it is that I have confidence in the ASW (anti-submarine warfare)
capabilities and I believe that we would have warning on any sub-
marine that was within 150 miles of our coasts.
Senator PELL. We would certainly have warning, but I think there
is a certain inconsistency in your statement because we both agree that
as of now -
Secretary LAIRD. Your question was no warning.
Senator PELL. No warning in the sense—exactly, but if there is no
legal reason
Secretary LAIRD. I was answering your question, not one I proposed.
Senator PELL. I understood, but there is no legal reason why a
submarine should not be 125 miles away.
86
Secretary LAIRD. No legal reason, but I can assure you we have an
ASW capability such that I do not believe a question of no warning
would be a viable question at this time. I would be glad to get into the
ASW capabilities at this time, but I have confidence that we would
have some warning of a submarine located that close to our shores.
TIME, NEEDED FOR ABM SYSTEM TO BE EFFECTIVE
Senator PELL. Would it be possible to say in an open meeting of
this sort how much time is needed for an ABM system to be effective?
Secretary LAIRD. I will supply that for the record.
Senator PELL. On the record, or classified ?
Secretary LAIRD. Ihestitate—classified.
Senator PELL. There is no way of giving a public statement in that
regard? * -
Secretary LAIRD. I do not believe it would serve a useful purpose to
get into those times in public testimony, but I will be glad to supply it
for you, Senator Pell. º
(The information referred to follows:)

TIME NEEDED FOR ABM SYSTEM TO BE EFFECTIVE
(Supplied by Department Of Defense)
SAFEGUARD interceptors can be warmed up and launched within [deleted]
after threatening objects are detected. As you know, nuclear release must be
granted in Order to launch these interceptors. At all times the SAFEGUARD
radars are actively performing their search functions, and incoming SLBMs
will be detected and tracked as SOOn as they break the radar horizon. For a Sub-
marine launching ballistic missiles from 100 NM Offshore, there is ample time
for the interceptors to be warmed up and launched during the time it takes the
radar to track the incoming SLBMs. Even for SLBMs launched from Such close
range, ample flyout time is available after radar track and missile launch for
the SPRINTS to intercept the incoming RVs in time to protect NCA facilities.
Senator PELL. All right. I think my time is up. I will come back
later. -
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper?
ATTENTION GIVEN TO DOMIESTIC PRIORITIES AND DEFENSE
Senator CoopFR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will first make a gen-
eral remark to get into the subject to which the chairman alluded and
that is the attention we give to the domestic priorities and defense. I
certainly would agree, we are taking care of the domestic needs the
best we can. I only want to repeat what Secretary Rogers said the other
day: In the last three and a half years the United States has changed
its priorities. The ratio was 45 percent for defense and 31 percent for
domestic priorities; it is now 31 percent of our budget for defense and
45 percent for domestic priorities. -
I want an adequate defense. I was the first one to offer an amendment
to strike ABM's. We lost on that on a tie vote of 50 to 50. You have
been very straightforward, Mr. Secretary, and Admiral Moorer has
given us a thorough statement of the outer limits of the numbers of
launchers that each side could have under this treaty, very clear.
87
TJ.S. SECURITY NEEDS FOR NEXT FIVE YEARS
The question I want to address myself to is what are our security
needs for the next five years.
Now, it has been admitted that the Soviets could, under this treaty,
interim agreement, have superiority in numbers of launchers and
megatonnage. They could, if we do nothing and they go all out, have
Superiority in warheads if they deployed MIRV on all their systems,
ICBM’s and SLBM's. Is that correct?
Secretary LAIRD. That is correct.
Senator CoopFR. Do you anticipate in the next five years or have
any reason to believe that they would try to achieve superiority in war-
heads or could achieve superiority in warheads? -
Secretary LAIRD. Senator Cooper, it is very difficult—
Senator CoopFR. We have now superiority of 2 to 1 in deliverable
warheads; don’t we? -
Secretary LAIRD. It is very difficult for me to give you a projection
on Soviet intentions. I believe they have the technology and the ca-
pability to move forward in this area because of the tremendous throw
weight that they have with their systems.
Now, when you asked me to interpret their intentions, I know they
are going forward with test programs. Since the President left Mos-
cow, very important tests have been conducted with their ICBMs and
with other offensive systems.
I cannot project the intentions of the Soviet Union other than to
say they stated quite categorically that they would be going forward
during the five-year period with all of the programs permitted in the
offensive area.
Senator CoopFR. Well, at present, though, the United States has
over a 2 to 1 superiority in the number of deliverable warheads.
Secretary LAIRD. Yes, and we have supplied to this committee a
breakdown of all of those figures. I have no question about the ade-
quacy and the realism of our deterrent at this time.
Senator CoopFR. With regard to the SLBM system you stated they
could have a numerical superiority within a five-year period, if they
go ahead with it. But I would like to ask you, Admiral Moorer, isn’t it
correct that the U.S. Poseidon-Polaris fleet, with its launchers, with
its MIRV's, is superior in present capabilities and effectiveness to the
Russian marine missile fleet?
Secretary LAIRD. There is no question about that. At the present
time we not only have more modern operational submarines in the
Polaris and Poseidon area, we have a greater number operational.
They, however, have operational and under construction a greater
number than the United States, and they are building at the rate of 8
to 9 a year. We do not have a capability of bringing any new ballistic
missile submarines to operational status during the period of this
agreement. They, without the agreement, could have gone up to 90 if
they had continued their current momentum. At the end of five years
they could have had up to 90 and we would still have been at 41.
Senator CoopFR. Now, considering the fact of this superiority not
only in numbers of launchers, deliverable warheads, but also the range
of our missiles and the ability to stay on station close to the Soviet
Union, would you say there is any possibility of the Soviet Union at-
taining superiority over our SLBM fleet in two years?
88
Secretary LAIRD. In a period of two years, I would say no. I would
like Admiral Moorer to comment on that question as Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but I think if you limit it to two years the
answer would be no. Of course, for us to build a submarine would take
at least five years from the time that we went forward, but I would
like the chairman to comment on that question.
Admiral MooRER. Senator Cooper, Secretary Laird and I have re-
peatedly said that we are confident we have adequate deterrence for
today. What we are really talking about in proposing these programs
is the future. I don’t think that the people at large, the American pub-
lic as a whole, recognize the very long lead time involved in develop-
ing any modern weapon systems. We are concerned about slipping
back into a state of obsolescence and, consequently, we must move
ahead now in order to maintain modern systems and maintain this
deterrence that we are talking about. *
Senator CoopFR. I understand your argument. Secretary Laird said
just a few minutes ago that he couldn’t state that within five years
that the Soviet Union would be superior to us in warheads.
QUESTION OF RESTRAINT OR NEW WEAPONS PROGRAM
My question now goes to the question whether we should exercise
restraint for two years and see what we can do to achieve nuclear
offensive missile system reductions or move into a big new weapons
program. You said flatly that you don’t think that for two years we
would be in danger. Admiral Moorer said that unequivocally.
Now, I will ask you this: The history of the arms race with the
Soviet Union is that we first got the atomic bomb; they wouldn’t
agree to any restraint until later when they came up with it. We ob-
tained superiority in numbers of ICBM's; they wouldn't agree to
restraints until they deployed over 1,000 ICBM's.
They agreed to restraints on ABM's, ICBM's and SLBM's only
when they deployed them in similar numbers.
Are the Soviets really bargaining from strength or are they just
saying, “You have this system of weapons; so we will not agree to
any limitations until we come up on a level with you.”? The funda-
mental question is, if it is correct that for almost 30 years every deploy-
ment we have made has been matched by an equivalent deployment
and the only agreements we have reached have been on the basis of
parity, why shouldn’t we show restraint for two years instead of this
demonstrably futile “bargaining from strength” so they will not do
what they have done, it seems to me, in the past 30 years, “to not agree
on any limitations until we get up to you.” If we build up in two years,
they will undoubtedly do the same and the arms race will go on.
Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, and Senator Cooper, I think we
have shown that restraint. When you talk about the position we will be
in in two years, what I am really talking about and what the President
has submited to this Congress for the B–1 and the Trident system are
programs that will place us in a position where we can have this suf-
ficiency, this parity of systems, during the period of the 1980's.
Now, the Soviet Union, if we were to stop research and develop-
ment on a unilateral basis in these offensive areas, if we were to stop
building a capability to go forward with these systems—and there

89
we are talking about the period of 1978 and beyond—if we were to do
that for a period of two years, I believe the safety and the Security of
our country would be jeopardized.
SIGNIFICANCE
Senator CoopFR. Well, I respect your opinions.
Secretary LAIRD. And I am sure that is
Senator CoopFR. I don’t think our security would be jeopardized if
we had rejected your assumptions about Soviet intentions of three or
four years ago, but we will never know for sure about that. But my
time is up. -
I would like to say here that I think that it is significant that the
military, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approve this unprecedented agree-
ment and should receive credit for their participation in achieving
the treaty and interim agreement.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Spong?
TECHNICAL SUPERIORITY
Senator SPONG. Mr. Secretary, yesterday in the Armed Services
Committee hearing—and here this morning—you said that the United
States retained a technical superiority under the treaty and under the
agreements. In response to Senator Cooper you have compared sub-
marine weaponry capabilities. Would you further elaborate on what
you consider technical superiority?
Secretary LAIRD. Well, I believe that the disadvantage that shows
up in the numbers in the offensive agreement is offset by the 18 to 24
month lead that we have because of our technology in the MIRV
area—M-I-R-V area. That is perhaps the best example of what I am
talking about.
Senator SPONG. Do you expect the Soviets to reach a MIRV capa-
bility within the next two years? t
Secretary LAIRD. I do. In the defense report and statement which
Admiral Moorer and I submitted to this Congress in February, we
projected in that that such a capability could be acquired and deployed
but not for 18 to 24 months, and I stand behind those reports. I think
that that generally has complete and total agreement within our
government.
Senator SPONG. Then your assessment of technical superiority may
not go beyond 18 to 24 months in the future?
Secretary LAIRD. If we were to stand still and not support the pro-
grams that are in the 1973 budget, I think that assessment that you
make is correct. w
SENATOR JACKSON’s workING PAPER
Senator SPONG. Yesterday Senator Jackson submitted a working
paper on provisions of the SALT agreement. Admiral Moorer, in his
very thorough statement on the numerical limitations, gave us figures
this morning. I wonder, Admiral Moorer, if you would care to com-
ment in any way on Senator Jackson's paper. -
(Senator Jackson’s paper follows:)
90
WORKING PAPER ON PROVISIONS OF SALT AGREEMENTS
In absence
of SALT
: & º º agreements,
Weapon system Soviet Union United States Soviet Union
Heavy ICBM------------------------------------------ 313'--------------- 0--------------------------------
Light ICBM------------------------------------------- 1,305'------------- 1954----------------------------
Submarine launched ICBM----------------------------- Up to 950?--------- Up to 710°-----------------------
Submarines, Y-class----------------------------------- Up to 62------------ Up to 44--------------------------
Submarines, diesel equipped with nuclear missiles-------- ??----------------- 0--------------------------------
ABM radars, NCA----------- ; : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 10--------------- -- 6--------------------------------
Total force payload capability (throw Weight ratio)-------- 4------------------ !------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Size of light ICBM permitted under modernization-------- — Cubic meters--- — cubic meters-----------------
Size of heavy ICBM permitted under modernization------- — cubic meters--- 0 (no ºw - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
permitted).
ICBM test launchers----------- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
MIRV--------------- ---------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - Unlimited.---------- Unlimited------------------------
1 U.S. intelligence estimate. The Soviets refuse to state the number of ICBM's to which the executive agreementlimits
em.
2 Requires the Soviets to trade in old submarine launch tubes and/or old missile silos to achieve a number in excess
O e
3 Requiresthe United Statestotrade in Titan ICBM's to achieve a number in excess of 656.
Note: This working paper presents those weapon systems covered by the SALT agreement in which the United States
and the Soviet Union are permitted different deployment levels.
Admiral MooRER. Yes, sir.
The figures that he had, as I recall, with respect to ICBM's and
SLBM's, in general, were correct.
AGREEMENTS’ EFFECT ON U.S. NEED FOR NAVAL FACILITIES ABROAD
Senator SPONG. I would like to ask both of you gentlemen if, in your
opinion, the treaty and agreement either increase or diminish the
United States need for naval facilities abroad?
Secretary LAIRD. I do not see anything in these agreements, in the
treaty or in the offensive agreement, that diminishes the need for the
current requests we have pending here in the Congress. A large part of
the requests that we have pending here in the Congress are dealing
with manpower requirements which we have, and the personnel prob-
lems which particularly the Navy faces because of the long separations
that their sailors have as far as their families are concerned. -
As for the follow-on programs that we are advocating, such as th
Trident, this system would diminish the need for forward basing—
although it will not come into being during the existence of this agree-
ment—because the Trident submarine would be based within the
United States. But during the period of the agreement the answer to
your question is no. -
I would like to point out that the Trident system does have home
basing within the United States.
AGREEMENTS’ EFFECT ON NEED FOR AIR FACILITIES ABROAD
Senator SPONG. Would you comment on whether the treaty and the
agreement would increase or diminish our need for air facilities
abroad 2 -
Secretary LAIRD. No, they would not affect that area. The mutual
and balanced force reduction discussions, which could start within the
next 12 months, may impact on that particular question. But as for
91
this treaty that we are testifying on today, and the offensive agreement
which we are supporting before this committee today, they do not
have an impact. -
ATTITUDE OF EUROPEAN ALLIES
Senator SPONG. Now, Secretary Rogers touched on this in his testi-
mony before the committee on Monday, but you may also want to com-
ment upon it. What has been the attitude of our European allies since
the announcement of the treaty and agreement? -
Secretary LAIRD. We have carried on very close and continuing con-
sultations in the spirit that the President outlined in his first meeting
with the NATO council in 1969; and I believe that there is general
support and understanding for the agreement and for the treaty
among our NATO allies. We have also stressed in our briefings of our
NATO allies that we are going forward with the various programs
that are contained in the 1973 budget.
Senator SPONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.
The CHAIRMAN. Are you through 2
Senator Javits has agreed to allow Senator Symington to have his
time at this time. -
Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that and express.
regret at not being here all the time, but we had the privilege of hear-
ing the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
yesterday in the Senate Armed Services Committee. I would make
a couple of observations and then have the comments of the Secretary.
CLARITY CONCERNING ABM's AND SUBMARINES
To me, the treaty agreement is clear so far as the ABM's are con-
cerned. It is reasonably clear also so far as the submarines are con-
cerned, although I worry a great deal about the cost of the submarines.
If the costs stay firm, I would oppose the rapid development of these
new ships, ten of them, especially as you could put the new missile in
the Poseidons.
FUZZY ASPECT OF ICBM
What worries most is the fuzzy aspect of the ICBM. The more
I listen to the questions and answers from Senator Jackson, like the
capacity to MIRV in heavy quantities, perhaps 20 each, the SS-9's,
of which they have 313, it worries me.
TJ.S. ECONOMY
As mentioned vesterday, when I was at the White House, Dr.
Kissinger talked for an hour and the President for 15 minutes, then
he took questions for an hour, but not one word was brought up about
the economy. In fact, Secretary Rogers, day before yesterday, before
this committee, said he thought the economy was in very good shape
and getting better. Perhaps he doesn’t think the growing size of the
gigantic Federal debt is important. Today it is the third largest cost
to the American taxpayer—interest on that debt.
80–942 O—72—7
92
INCREASED SPENDING RESULTING FROM SALT AGREEMENT SUGGESTED
It would seem the SALT arrangement has been designed to create
a heavy increase in arms costs, and this at a time when the taxpayer
is already heavily burdened with those costs. Those of us who had
hoped any agreement comparable to the SALT agreement would
mean less arms costs, less of a burden on the taxpayers’ shoulders, at
least to the point where we could put more money in our domestic
problems, now realize we are faced with the fact that the result of the
SALT agreement means you believe we must spend many billions of
dollars more in arms. -
Secretary LAIRD. I don’t think that is the case, Senator Symington.
I have already presented
Senator SYMINGTON. Please let me finish.
Secretary LAIRD (continuing). A reduction in our 1973 budget.
Senator SYMINGTON. You have talked about a new Soviet test of a
new missile. We are always getting to the “Scare” aspect as we ap-
proach these military budget problems.
So, to me, SALT in some ways is now becoming exactly the opposite
of what we had hoped for. -
I have finished my statement, and before going back to the markup,
would appreciate your comments. -
Secretary LAIRD. Well, Senator Symington, I believe that we can
move into arms limitations and arms reductions but I think that it has
to be done through the negotiating process. These are the first steps
in that process—the treaty and the interim offensive agreement.
We are submitting a reduction in our 1973 budget as a result of this
agreement in the strategic area. We will reduce, and an amendment
is coming to your committee which will cover net reductions in the
strategic area of over $500 million. The projected reductions are $5
billion during the five-year period; the projected reductions through
1981 are over $8.5 billion; these reductions are in the strategic area of
our budget.
I believe, Senator Symington, that we are moving in the right di-
rection as far as defense spending is concerned.
When I became Secretary of Defense, we were up over 9 percent of
our gross national product that was devoted to defense spending. As
Senator Cooper remarked, close to 45 percent of our budget was in
defense. Now 30 percent of our budget is devoted to defense.
We have been able to reduce the size of our military forces from
Over 3.5 million men and women down to less than 2.4 million men
and women and we are making further reductions in the 1973 budget.
We have reduced defense-related employment in industry by over 1.3
million. We have reduced Civil Service employment within the De-
partment of Defense by 250,000; so we are moving in that direction.
My concern is that we should not go too far unilaterally in these
reductions before the negotiations are completed in these various areas.
We have made the first step in these negotiations with these two
agreements that we have before you today. There will be further
agreements in the strategic area, I am confident. There will be, I be-
lieve, negotiations within the next 12 months on mutual and balanced
force reductions. I believe we can have negotiations in the field of
military assistance to limit the military assistance programs in places
93
like the Middle East, the Far East, and other areas of the world. So
I believe that we are moving from this confrontation of the past to an
era of negotiations and I believe we can be successful.
These negotiations will make possible further reductions, but the
reductions as far as costs in defense should be made on a negotiated
basis and not on a unilateral basis by the executive branch of this
government or by the legislative branch of this government.
NET RESULT OF REDUCTIONS QUESTIONED
Senator SYMINGTON. I remember one time when we were discussing
the aid program, I said we hear all about your reductions, but when we
add all the reductions up there turns out to be a large addition. As you
make the point about various things we have reduced, but net what
you are asking for is a great deal more, especially when you carry—
Secretary LAIRD. Senator
Senator SYMINGTON. Just let me finish now—when you carry the
programs out. That is the first point I want to make.
The second, inasmuch as we did not put in our FBA’s, forward-based
aircraft, and they unilaterally refused to put in mobile ICBM's, it looks
as if before we get any mutual reduction of troops in Europe it is going
to be a long, Hong time. In the meantime, the billions continue down the
drain.
I am not saying there was anything political in all this, but it is very
clever. That is why I am so glad we are having these hearings and you
are being frank. Those who think we are spending too much and want
to see peace and disarmament look to the SALT agreement. They are
happy; they want to sign. Those who are not too keen about peace be-
cause it might affect their ideologies or their business, and so forth, are
happy because they know they are going to get billions of dollars more
for military production orders. Looking at it that way, everybody is
happy today.
If events don’t proceed the way you hope and plan, most assuredly
you are going to end up with a much larger military budget than ever
before, especially if these ten new ships are going to cost over $13 bil-
lion. These are thoughts that run though my mind.
Secretary LAIRD. But that is not because of SALT, Senator
Symington.
Senator SYMINGTON. I beg your pardon.
Secretary LAIRD. That is not because of SALT, Senator Symington.
The programs, such as our ship construction, whether they be in the
strategic field or the conventional field, are programs that are not re-
lated to the SALT agreement.
INCREASE IN PEOPLE-RELATED COSTS
I would only like to state that I know you are marking up the au-
thorization bill for the Department of Defense and you are familiar
with the fact that the greatest increase in our budget is not in weapon
systems; our greatest increase is in people-related costs and I think
that we have made the right decision, in cooperation with the legisla-
tive branch of our government, to carry our labor costs and our costs
of manpower in the defense budget, but we have increased those costs
94
by some $20 billion since 1964. Yet we have over 300,000 less men than
we had in 1964. We have gone from personnel costs in our budget which
were $22 billion in 1964 up to $43 billion in this particular budget, but
I believe we should be paying these young people on the basis of the
current, going rate for labor. We do not have to have every young man
in America in military service. Those who are in military service should
be paid adequately and fairly, and I believe that it was long overdue
for these labor costs to show up in the defense budget.
Senator SYMINGTON. You made that point before and I think it a
good point. I would say this. I don’t remember what my salary was,
and I really didn’t care, when I was a private in the Army, and I
doubt if you remember what your salary was when you were in the
Navy. We both wanted to defend our country.
Today you have this problem—these young people don’t want to go
into the Army or Navy or Air Force as they used to; so you have to
pav them a lot more to get them. My time is up.
Secretary LAIRD. When you only need one out of seven young people
in the military service today, Senator Symington, there is no reason
why that one should be levied with a most regressive type of indirect
taxation. - -
Senator SYMINGTON. You are a very able witness and I want to
thank the able Senator from New York for yielding to me. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Javits?
Senator JAVITs. Mr. Secretary, first let me welcome you here and
join my colleagues in appreciation for your frankness. I have to ask
you some questions about your frankness.
QUESTION OF LINKAGE OF AGREEMENTS WITH WEAPONS SYSTEMS
I was at the White House on the occasion of the presentation of this
matter by the President and Dr. Kissinger. From what they said and
from what you are quoted as saying yesterday, the question of the link-
age of the approval of these agreements with the authorization for the
new weapon systems is rapidly, in my judgment, overshadowing the
matter of ratifying the treaty and approving the agreement—which,
I am confident, both houses will do overwhelmingly.
I refer to the following. You are said to have answered a question
on linkage as follows: “I could not support the agreements if the
Congress fails to act on the movement forward of the Trident system,
on the B-1 bomber and on the other programs that we have outlined
to improve our strategic offensive systems during this five-year period.”
On the other hand, Dr. Kissinger said, and I quote from the pub-
lished statement of his briefing: “Therefore, our position is that we
are presenting both of these programs on their merits. We are not
making them conditional. We are saying that the treaty is justified
On its merits, but we are also saying that the requirements of national
Security impel us in the direction of the strategic programs and we-
mind you, the use of the word “we”——“hope the Congress will approve
both of these programs as it examines each of them on its merits.”
Question: What is the President’s policy? Does he link the approval
of the weapon systems to the approval of the agreements or does he
not,’
95
Secretary LAIRD. Well, I think that the President would want the
Congress to consider each of these three items on a separate basis. I
would want the Congress to consider them on a separate basis. It so
happens that the Congress is now moving on the defense authorization
bill, which will be debated in the House, I believe, next week, and has
been reported out of the House Armed Services Committee. There is
not attempt in anything that I have said to indicate that these should
not be considered by the Congress on a separate basis. -
In answer to a question as to my support for the treaty and my Sup-
port for the interim agreement on offensive weapons, my support for
these particular agreements does anticipate that we will go forward
with the requests of the President in the 1973 budget which he has
submitted to the Congress.
I would only add that the President has stated that these are all
equally essential and I would like to put quotes around the President's
words “equally essential.” I think that that answers your question as
adequately as I can.
I am sure, Senator Javits, that you would want me to give my opin-
ion as long as I serve in this position as Secretary of Defense. When
I am asked questions by committees, I will be as frank and candid as
I can with you because I sat on that side of the table for a good many
years, and I did not like witnesses coming from the executive branch
who did not treat the Congress frankly, openly and fairly. I have
always done that and I will continue to do just that.
Senator JAVITs. So, linking the approval of the weapon systems to
. approval Of the agreements is your opinion; it is not the Presi-
ent’s?
Secretary LAIRD. The President has stated that they were “equally
essential.” *
Senator JAVITs. He has not tied them together?
Secretary LAIRD. I have never used the word “linkage” that I can
recall. I think that has been used by others. I have said that all three
are equally essential.
WITNESS’s POSITION CONCERNING weAPON systEMS AND AGREEMENTS
Senator JAVITs. You say you stand by your statement that if we fail
to ºpprove the weapon systems then you could not support the agree-
ments'
Secretary LAIRD. If we failed to move forward during this particular
period, I think that other recommendations would have to be made
by me as Secretary of Defense in order to give you the best judgment
that I can make as far as the security requirements of our country
during this period are concerned. I am sure that you would want me
to make those recommendations. Those recommendations, of course,
would be reviewed not only in the executive branch of our government;
they would also be reviewed, I would hope, by the legislative branch of
Our government.
VOTE FOR AGREEMENTS. NOT COMMITMENT TO WEAPONS SYSTEMS
Senator JAVITs. Right. When I am considering the conscience of
every Senator who has to vote yea or nay, when I vote yea on these
96
agreements and upon the treaty I am not thereby committed to every
One of the weapon systems; am I?
Secretary LAIRD. Certainly you are not. I don’t want to get into the
political science ramifications of this, but the legislative branch is a
co-equal branch of the government. I am giving you my recommenda-
tions. Those recommendations can be rejected by any member of the
House or Senate.
WHAT DOES ADMINISTRATION ASR CONGRESS TO DO 2
Senator JAVITs. But I am going with the President. He is not giving
me a package; he is giving me two separate packages, right?
Secretary LAIRD. No, the President has stated, and I can quote from
the President: “It is now equally essential that we carry forward a
Sound strategic modernization program.” - -
This sound, strategic modernization program is in the President’s
1973 budget request to this Congress.
Senator JAVITs. Yes.
Secretary LAIRD. And I support that request.
. Senator JAVITs. Yes, but Dr. Kissinger has said, “We are present-
ing both of these programs on their merits. We are not making them
conditional. We are also saying that the requirements of national
Security impel us in the direction of these strategic programs and we
hope that the Congress will approve both”—et cetera.
The thing I am trying to get at is are we being presented with a
package or are we being presented by the President with two separate
packages? Now, he says— - -
Secretary LAIRD. I think there are three packages involved here.
Senator JAVITs. If I may just finish, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary LAIRD. I think I stated
Seantor JAVITs. As I understand Dr. Kissinger, speaking for the
President, he says: We believe both are essential, but they are not neces-
Sarily to be approved or rejected together.
This is very important to all of us. Many of us want to have freedom
of action on the weapon systems but are very pleased with the agree-
ments. I may vote for some; I may vote against others. I want to know
what the Administration asks us to do.
Secretary LAIRD. The Administration asks you to approve all three—
the 1973 budget, the treaty and the interim agreement on offensive
weapons.
Senator JAVITs. I am sorry; that is not responsive to my question.
Secretary LAIRD, Well, that is as responsive as I will be, Senator.
Senator JAVITs. That is as responsive as you will be. That is all I
need to know.
NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS RELATED TO STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT
Mr. Secretary, one other point: Are all of these new weapon sys-
tems related to the American nuclear capability? Do they have any:
thing to do with conventional weaponry or conventional capability?
Secretary LAIRD. The B–1 and the Trident—
Senator JAVITs. All of them—Trident, B–1, NCA Defense and So on.
Secretary LAIRD. These are systems, related to the strategic nuclear
deterrent of the United States.
Senator JAVITs. Very well.
97
WHAT IS THERE TO ADD TO DETERRENTº
Now, do you or do you not subscribe to the following proposition,
again what we understand to be stated as Administration doctrine, and
I quote again from the briefing which we had: “As long as it lasts,
offensive missile forces have in effect a free ride to their targets. Beyond
a certain level of sufficiency, differences in numbers are therefore not
conclusive.”
Now, if missiles have a free ride to their targets and if, as we under-
stand it, the United States has enough offensive missiles to obliterate
the Soviet Union and they have enough offensive missiles to obliterate
us, what else is there to add to the deterrent? Why do we need all these
missiles? -
Secretary LAIRD. Senator Javits, I earlier today discussed the ques-
tion of the difference within the agreement as worked out—the fact
that the Soviet Union is given a greater number of missile launchers,
the fact that we are not concerned about that greater number because
of the position that the United States has as far as technology is con-
cerned, and the fact that we will continue these programs. The question
of deterrence is a question of what the potential adversaries or our
allies think is a sufficient deterrent. I believe we have that sufficient
deterrent today, and I believe our allies and our adversaries recog-
nize that fact.
The important thing about deterrence is to prevent the use of nuclear
weapons at any time and that is what these programs are all about.
We would hope that the money spent on these programs would be
completely wasted in the sense the weapons would never be used; then
deterrence has been completely successful. But as far as the numbers
are concerned in this agreement that I am testifying on today, I be-
lieve, because of the technological lead that we have in this area, that
we have a sufficient deterrent and it will prevent the use of nuclear
weapons. That is the important thing for us to be considering.
I would like the chairman to comment on that because I think it does
get into the military aspects as well as the political aspects of what
deterrence is all about.

WHAT ELSE DO WE NEED AND WHY?
Senator JAVITs. May I sharpen my question, Admiral Moorer, be-
cause although I am a lawyer, and I speak in terms of adequacy, I
assure you that I don’t feel that way. I really want to be instructed
and I am perfectly ready, as I have been throughout my career, com-
pletely compatible with my liberal reputation, to vote for arms if I
consider them needed. I have always done that; it is important.
My question is this: If the deterrent consists of our ability to
obliterate them and their ability to obliterate us, what else makes any
difference? I mean, whether you have a bomber or you have a Trident .
or anything else, how many times do we have to eliminate them? How
many times do they have to eliminate us? What is really the purpose-
of these terribly expensive weapons? If the deterrent is the mutual
capability of obliteration and we have that and it isn’t going to be
changed, says Dr. Kissinger, says Secretary Rogers, for the measur-
able period of time, what else do we need and why?
**-----
98
Admiral MooRER. Well, Senator Javits, as I explained to Senator
Cooper, we all agree that as of today we have adequate forces to pro-
vide a stable deterrent for the United States. However, if we simply
stop now and do nothing to improve our system for the future, bear-
ing in mind the fact that it takes many, many years to build any of
these systems, we will simply slip back first to a state of obsolescene
and then into a position where we will not have adequate deterrence
in the minds of the other side. Consequently, they may be tempted to
try some kind of offensive action. I just don’t think you can stop at
this point and never make any improvements and never move forward
with new systems.
Now, we look on the Trident submarine, for instance, as a replace-
ment for the well-known Polaris system. The Polaris, by the time that
the Trident is operational, will be around 20 years old, which is the
generally accepted life of a submarine. We will have to replace it. We
must move forward to modernize these systems.
As ASW capabilities become more developed, it is going to take
quieter submarines to insure the survivability of the Trident systems.
If we have these survivability systems which can do as you suggest—
inflict unacceptable damage on the other side—then we will be in a
position where we have, in our view, a viable and valid deterrent
posture. - - - -
Senator JAVITs. Gentlemen, my time is up but I would just like to
say this: If you will be good enough to confirm or whatever you choose
on that—So as I understand it, a proper standard of judgment as to
the new weapon systems is that they must be judged by the ability to
maintain the present situation. If I or any other legislator feels that
to maintain the present situation he needs new weapon systems, he
must vote aye; if he feels that to maintain the present situation he does
not, then he may in conscience vote no?
Admiral MooRER. Well, I agree, sir. The objective of the new systems
is to maintain the current deterrent posture.
Senator JAVITs. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Could I ask one question?
NOTICE OF SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE BY RUSSIANS
Under our intelligence system as of now, if there were any substan-
ºl, hange by the Russians, we would have notice of it; would we
In Otº -
Secretary LAIRD. That is correct and that is one of the difficulties that
we have had. You get notice, but then it takes 3 to 7 years in order
for action to be taken on the part of the United States.
The CHAIRMAN. It takes them 7 years, too; I mean, it takes equally
the same time. -
Secretary LAIRD. Senator Fulbright, when I first came up to testify
as Secretary of Defense and used some of the construction figures on
the Soviet submarine construction program, there were editorials all
over this country and there were people condemning those figures. Now
the production rate for the Soviet submarine swstems, particularly in
the strategic area, has gone far beyond even the figures that I projected
in 1969. - -
| } -
99
The CHAIRMAN. We have known about it. I know that, but I want to
yield to the Senator. - -
Secretary LAIRD. For us to go forward -
The CHAIRMAN. The point is, we knew they were doing that. It
wasn’t any great surprise. -
Secretary LAIRD. You don’t know until they move well down the
road. I can tell you by the time we have our first Trident, if they were
depending upon the same means that we have to depend on, the So-
viets would have known about it for five years and that is an impor-
tant thing. That is the difference between a closed society and an open
Society and that is what causes some concern to me as a defense plan-
ner and as Secretary of Defense.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy?
COMMENDATION OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE ADMINISTRATION
Senator PERCY. Mr. Secretary, I would like to say that when we vote
on this issue we will be the best informed Congress on such a complex
problem, and I think that is due to the great care and cooperation of
the administration in providing full information about the agree-
mentS. - -
We have all had a chance to be briefed by what I consider to be the
finest American negotiating team I have known. I have been briefed
in Helsinki, as have other members of Congress, and in Washington,
and the cooperation of the administration, the executive branch, as
offered in this regard, has been very good.
The President said to us last week that he did not want to give us
a pep talk on these agreements; he wanted us to be well informed and
he considered these hearings vital, not to just inform us but the coun-
try, to have the country behind these agreements. So our questions are
not antagonistic; they are searching questions as we try to carry out
the intent of the President and our chairman in clarifying all aspects
of the agreements.
RELIABILITY OF FIGURES CONCERNING RUSSIAN MISSILES
I was on two national television programs with Senator Jackson
and he has raised many very searching questions. One that has not
been totally, satisfactorily answer to date is why the Russians are un-
willing to certify the exact figures as to their number of missiles, the
1,618, we presume, and 313 SS-9's, while we acknowledge 1,054 of our
own ICBM's. w
In your judgment, having available all the intelligence you have,
are you as certain as you can be that we are dealing with known figures
and that there is no hidden deterrent they may have that we are not
aware of, and that we can rely on these figures as reasonably accurate?
Secretary LAIRD. For those particular items covered by this agree-
ment, that is correct.
RUSSIAN NUMERICAL ADVANTAGE IN SUBMARINES
Senator PERCY. On the question of why they should have 3 subma-
rines for our 2, are you convinced, that this numerical advantage
really leaves us at parity, considering the basing and the fueling for
100
submarines, and the geography involved, and that they will have no
advantage in having a larger number of submarines than we have?
Secretary LAIRD. No, I would not look at one system at a time like
that. So I would answer your question no, that I would not be satisfied
on the basis of the premise of your question.
Senator PERCY. You feel that they have an advantage then as it
relates to submarines in the allowable number that they are permitted
to have in terms of the agreement?
Secretary LAIRD. They have an advantage in the allowable number
and right, on its face they have that advantage, but the problem
during this five-year period is that we couldn’t build new SSBN’s
if we wanted to. -
We are trying to prevent an even greater numerical advantage and
that is why I support the agreement.
Senator PERCY. In other words, they were in construction and we
were not in construction and we had no program for going into
construction?
Secretary LAIRD. That's right.
Senator PERCY. So we can at least put a limit on that?
Secretary LAIRD. We have had no new program since 1958 to go into
construction on this kind of submarine. In 1958 the Polaris program
was approved by the Congress, and it was limited to 41 boats; and
since 1958 there has been no change in that basic program.
TJ.S. ADVANCE IN MIRVING AND ACCURACY
Senator PERCY. Would you feel that with our advance in MIRVing
and with our accuracy that even in this field we do have at least parity
then during the term of this agreement? -
Secretary LAIRD. We have; we are in a superior position as of today
in this area because they have approximately 25 of their Y-class
submarines operational and we have 41 of our submarines operational
at this particular time. But I thought your original question involved
the figures in the agreement?
POSSIBILITY OF LIMITING PRESENTED Sys"TEMIS IN SALT II
Senator PERCY. In Admiral Moorer's fine statement, he said “A
sincere desire”—the Joint Chiefs have a sincere desire—“to relieve
mankind of the burden and terror of modern weapons” and repeated
the statement the Joint Chiefs had stood on since 1945, that they
wished—“restricting or outlawing the use of atomic weapons.” Would
it be your hope, Mr. Secretary, that in SALT II, the next phase of
negotiating, that we might find a way to negotiate a limitation on the
very systems that are now being presented to Congress for the B–1
bomber, the Trident and other systems?
Secretary LAIRD. I think that is quite possible, and I think that that
is the direction in which we want to move. That is what these negotia-
tions are all about, but you cannot take unilateral action now in
that direction before we have some indication of success along that
line.
Senator PERCY. In other words, it is your feeling that continuing
these programs not now covered by our agreements will strengthen
the hand of our negotiating team in SALT II?
101.
Secretary LAIRD. I firmly believe that.
SoviFT DEVELOPMENT OF MIRV CAPABILITY NOT PROHIBITED
Senator PERCY. If the Soviets test MIRV on a large ICBM, would
we consider that an extraordinary event which jeopardizes our supreme
intºts and provides a basis, for, say, withdrawal from the agree-
Iment
Secretary LAIRD. No; we would not. We expect the Soviets to de-
velop a MIRV capability and the defense report which I presented to
this Congress in February pointed out that such a program was
within the technical capability of the Soviet Union. It would not be
prohibited under this agreement.
DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MOBILE MISSILES WITH ICBM RANGE
Senator PERCY. What would be our reaction if we observed deploy-
ment of Soviet mobile missiles with ICBM range?
Secretary LAIRD. There is an interpretation in which we have stated
unilaterally that we would—and I can quote that provision to you
and I would like to put the full provision in the record—this is not
agreed to by the Soviet Union; however
Senator PERCY. I wonder if this wouldn’t be a good opportunity
to explain to the American people and Congress why it was neces-
Sary to make certain unilateral assertions and not have an absolute,
verified and certified response back from them as to what they would
understand as being in violation of the spirit of the agreement?
Secretary LAIRD. I would like
Senator PERCY. If you would like to put the statement in the record,
go ahead.
Secretary LAIRD (continuing). Secretary Nitze, who was part of
the negotiating team, to comment on that question, but I would also
like at this point to put in the record -
Senator PERCY. Yes; of course.
Secretary LAIRD (continuing). The U.S. unilateral statement. I
will just insert it in the record here. Secretary Nitze will also provide
a comment for the record. This particular position is not agreed to by .
the Soviet Union. -
(The information referred to follows:)
UNILATERAL STATEMENT BY U.S. DELEGATION To SALT
(May 20, 1972) and Comment. By Secretary Nitze
(Supplied by Department of Defense)
In connection with the important subject of land mobile ICBM launchers,
in the interest of concluding the interim agreement the U.S. Delegation now
Withdraws its proposal that Article I or an agreed statement explicitly pro-
hibit the deployment of mobile land-based ICBM launchers. I have been in-
Structed to inform you that, while agreeing to defer the question of limitation
Of Operational land-mobile ICBM launchers to the subsequent negotiations on
more COmplete limitations on strategic offensive arms, the U.S. would consider
the deployment of Operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of
the interim agreement as inconsistent with the objectives of that agreement.
102
MR. NITZE'S COMMENT FOR THE RECORD
The agreement does not cover mobile ICBMs. At present, neither side has
deployed such Systems. [Deleted.]
CRUISE MISSILE SITUATION
Senator PERCY. What would be our reaction if the Soviets started
building submarines equipped with long-range strategic cruise mis-
siles?
Secretary LAIRD. They are deploying submarines with cruise mis-
siles now that have a range in the area of a few hundred miles. I am
not sure what you mean by a long-range cruise missile. That is a long
Tail Oe- -
šutor PERCY. In excess of 3,000 miles.
Secretary LAIRD. A cruise missile in excess of 3,000 miles?
Senator PERCY. Yes.
Secretary LAIRD. It would not be limited by this agreement, but I
would doubt that such a deployment would be made in any substantial
number during this period. They have already deployed a few
hundred. -
Senator PERCY. What if 2 years from now we had evidence they
WOI’e
Secretary LAIRD. This cruise missile is not covered by this agreement.
They have already deployed cruise missiles, as you know, Senator
Percy. They are not covered in this agreement.
Senator PERCY. What do you think the Soviets’ reaction would be if
we start to deploy and undertake such a program & -
Secretary LAIRD. They would expect it.
Senator PERCY. In other words, they would not respond. What we
are trying to prevent, of course, is one escalation counteracted by an-
other escalation.
Secretary LAIRD. No, they already have the cruise missile deployed
and I believe they will be deploying more than the few hundred they
have deployed at the present time. I would not anticipate any reaction
as far as the Soviets are concerned. I think they will go forward with
this program and I would expect them to.
Now, it is hard to read their intentions on all of these programs
but when MIRV was brought up for discussion, they did not want
to go forward with limitations on testing in this first step agreement.
The cruise missile situation is something that is entirely outside of
this agreement, and although I hate to make projections or forecasts,
I would anticipate that they would increase the number they presently
have deployed in that particular area—that they would continue that
program. They have that system in production and I would assume
that they would go forward with their production and would not shut
down their production facilities.
- RELIEVING MANIKIND OF BURDEN OF MODERN WEAPONS
Senator PERCY. I would like to come back later, Mr. Chairman, to
try to pin down how close we are getting to starting a process of reliev-
ing mankind of the burden and terror of modern weapons or whether
we are just controlling one phase, but going to go hell-bent for elec-
tion with another phase.
103
Secretary LAIRD. Well, you are talking about the giant step—this is
the first step; this is a small step, but it is an important step. The agree-
ment and the treaty that we are testifying on today represent that im-
portant first step toward that giant leap that you are talking about.
Senator PERCY. SALT II is then crucial to see how far we are going
to go? .
sºciary LAIRD. Yes, and SALT II may not be the ultimate, but
certainly we would hope to move in the direction that was outlined
in the statement of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Senator PERCY. Thank you.
whAT CRUISE MISSILE IS
The CHAIRMAN. I think for the record, a cruise missile is not gen-
erally considered a strategic weapon. It is for surface ships. It has a
limited range from 30 miles to 300, about; hasn’t it?
Secretary LAIRD. No, the cruise missile can be used at a longer range
than that, and it is effective against both Sea and land targets.
The CHAIRMAN. It is designed primarily
Secretary LAIRD. It comes in at a very—I can go into it briefly—it
comes in very low. . -
, The CHAIRMAN. It is not comparable to the Minuteman and the
ICBM. It is not that kind of a missile? -
Secretary LAIRD. No; it is not a ballistic missile and that is why it is
Outside of this agreement.
The CHAIRMAN. It is not. That is one reason it is not there. I didn’t
want the record to be misunderstood that this was comparable to the
ICBM's. -
Secretary LAIRD. No; it is not covered in the agreement on offensive
weapons. I am Sorry if I gave that impression. -
The CHAIRMAN. No, you didn’t. Nobody said what a cruise missile is,
but it is a relatively short-range missile and primarily designed for
destruction of ships on the surface and that type of thing?
Secretary LAIRD. Ships and land targets.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, limited range.
Secretary LAIRD. It could be coastal target type of weapon.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. - . -
sºtary LAIRD. I will supply the different ranges of it for the
I’êCOI’Ol.
(The information referred to follows:)
DIFFERENT RANGES OF THE STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILE
(Supplied by Department of Defense)
The Cruise missile I was discussing was the newly-proposed submarine-
launched Cruise missile. This is conceived as a submarine-launched, air-breathing,
SubSonic missile, flying at low altitude [deleted]. We currently are studying two
Versions—One capable of launch from a torpedo tube, and the other from a Polaris
type launch tube. [Deleted.]
The CHAIRMAN. You said a moment ago that since the President—
104
UNITED STATES DOES NOT HAVE CRUISE MISSILES
Secretary LAIRD. We do not have them, by the way, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. I understand. We don’t need them; I guess.
Secretary LAIRD. We are hopeful we can do some research and
development on that particular system.
The CHAIRMAN. I can’t think of anything that you are not hopeful
of examining—
|Laughter.] - -
The CHAIRMAN (continuing). All the way from witchcraft of the
Congo on up to ICBM's. [Laughter.]
ARE) SOVIETS TESTING MIRV 2
The CHAIRMAN. You said a moment ago, sort of incidentally, that
since the President was in Moscow the Soviets have made a new and,
you think, very significant test. I think it could leave the impression
that you believe they are testing MIRV. &
Secretary LAIRD. Well, I do not believe they will test—flight-test—
MIRV, and I think I made that clear, for from 6 to 9 months. They
are going forward with the development and testing of MIRV tech-
nology but not flight-tests, and I do not expect a flight-test for from
6 to 9 months. There is some disagreement on the MIRV testing—
MRV testing—of 1970 as to whether that had any MIRV capability,
with an “I” in it. I never get into that discussion because I don’t be-
lieve it serves any useful purpose. Their system that was used in those
tests does give the capability of changing the impact pattern, but it is
in no way comparable to the MIRV system which we have developed.
The CHAIRMAN. I wanted to make that clear. There is a disagree-
ment as we found over the years between the intelligence community
and the Defense Department.
Secretary LAIRD. There is no disagreement that I know of in this
8,I’68,. .
The CHAIRMAN. There has been in the past, but the intelligence com-
munity does not believe that they have tested MIRV and that they
have anything other than the MRV. That is what they believe.
Secretary LAIRD. And I never have gotten into that discussion.
The CHAIRMAN. We have gotten into it with them and that is what
they tell us. I am just telling you. I don’t want this scare psychology
to arise from this meeting because I don’t think you intended to say
that they have had a MIRV test and that they have arrived at that
technology.
Secretary LAIRD. I will be glad to supply for the record, your classi-
fied record, the number of tests conducted since the President
The CHAIRMAN. We already have had it, at least from the intel-
ligence community.
Secretary LAIRD. Well, we develop that material, as you know, and
we will supply it to this committee if requested.
SECRETARY M’NAMARA's STATEMENT ON UNITED STATES
AND SOVIET BUILDUP
The CHAIRMAN. It is interesting, particularly growing out of Sena-
tor Javits' and Senator Cooper's questions about the effect of our
105
moving forward in the face of this agreement. It reminds me of one
of your predecessors, Secretary McNamara, in discussing. this inter-
action between what we do and what the Russians do. I think it is in-
teresting for the record to recall it. You can comment on it if you
like. :
In 1967 he was discussing circumstances which led to our vast in-
crease in our arsenal of strategic weapons which did, I think, unbal-
ance the situation, and did create great Superiority on the part of the
United States. I want to read this, which is a quote from his statement
at that time: -
Thus, in the course of hedging against what was then only a theoretically
possible Soviet buildup, we-the United States—took decisions which have
resulted in our current superiority in numbers of warheads and deliverable
megatons. But the blunt fact remains that if we had had more accurate informa-
tion about planned Soviet strategic forces, we simply would not have needed
to build as large a nuclear arsenal as we have today.
Now let me be absolutely clear. I am not saying that our decision in 1961 was
unjustified. I am simply saying that it was necessitated by a lack Of accurate
information. Furthermore that decision, in itself—as justified as it was—in the
end, could not possibly have left unaffected the Soviet Union’s future nuclear
plans. What is essential to understand here is that the Soviet Union and the
United States mutually influence one another's strategic plans. Whatever be
their intentions, whatever be our intentions, actions—or even realistically
potential actions—on either side relating to the buildup of nuclear forces, be
they either Offensive weapons or defensive weapons, necessarily trigger reactions
On the other side. It is precisely this action-reaction phenomenon that fuels an
a.I’InS Tà Ce.
Now, in strategic nuclear weaponry, the arms race involves a particular irony.
Unlike any Other era in military history, today a substantial numerical Supe-
riority of weapons does not effectively translate into political control or diplo-
matic leverage.
Now, I have pointed out that in strategic, nuclear matters the Soviet Union
and the United States mutually influence one another’s plans. In recent years the
Soviets have substantially increased their Offensive forces. We have, Of course,
been watching and evaluating this very carefully. Clearly the Soviet buildup is
in part a reaction to Our Own buildup since the beginning of this decade. Soviet
strategic planners undoubtedly reasoned that if our buildup were to continue
at its accelerated pace, we might conceivably reach, in time, a credible firstStrike
capability against the Soviet Union.
What would be your comment on Mr. McNamara’s statement?
Secretary LAIRD. Well, I have no disagreement on the period of time
with which Secretary McNamara is dealing. I think the statement is
a very good statement dealing with that period. -
The question of the missile gap in the 1960 period and the effect of
that during the 1960 campaign—I know that Senator Percy, who was
chairman of the platform committee for his party in that particular
year, remembers the amendments that were debated at that time. The
fact is that during that period of time we did not have the open skies.
President Eisenhower had talked about the open sky policy; we did
not have the means of verification that we do have today. I can assure
you the figures I have given in the defense report and the figures that
the chairman has given in his briefing on the capabilities of the Soviet
Union as compared with the United States are reasonably correct as-
sessment because of the improvement that we have had in the verifica-
tion area. .
Secretary McNamara and the Congress during that period of time—
political leaders during that particular period of time—we did not
have the same kind of information available to us. .
106
PROCEEDING WITH BUILDUP QUESTIONED
The CHAIRMAN. I agree; I think that is one of the principal reasons
why both sides felt they could enter into this agreement. It is acknowl-
edged that both sides have this very capable, what they call national
means of verification. This, I think, was a critical consideration in al-
lowing this agreement to be made.
Secretary LAIRD. You know, Mr. Chairman, in 1960 Senator Percy
was promoting an amendment to his party's platform to add five bil-
lion dollars to the defense budget and I was opposing that amend-
ment in 1960 because I had served on the Defense Appropriations
Committee and I felt that we had an adequate defense budget in the
year 1960. -
The CHAIRMAN. I hope you won’t divert me. I am trying to make this
point: With this verification being as reliable as our government be-
lieves it is, and certainly the intelligence community believes it is,
and you apparently believe it is, if we proceed with this very substan-
tial buildup, they will certainly know all about it. Even without the
verification, it seems to me, as Secretary McNamara said, inevitably
what you are doing is triggering a comparable buildup by them and,
therefore,
Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman
The CHAIRMAN. Let me finish. Therefore, the end result is we are
both resuming the arms race and there is no particular advantage to
either. There is a very great disadvantage in that both are thereby
obligated to spend an enormously increased amount for weapons which
both of them need for much more urgent requirements to their na-
tional Security. -
DIFFERENCE IN CONCEPTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
I come back to my first statement: I think that the great difference
between the Defense Department and the Congress is how one con-
ceives of national Security. I suppose it is natural, being in the defense
business, that military arms are your principal reliance for security,
whereas, I believe and I think a number of other believe that is only
one element. If you have a sufficiency, the strength of your economy
and especially the spirit of your people and the unity of your peo-
ple is as important or more important.
If a country is afflicted with tremendous disunity and dissatisfac-
tion among its people, it will rot at the center, and it will be weakened.
This is what I think has been the great tragedy of the Vietnam war.
It has undermined the security of this country. -
Those who profess to be fighting communism in Vietnam are play-
ing the communist game. They are undermining the strength of the
United States and its allies. I mean, there is nothing that could have
increased the prestige and the influence of the communist world as
effectively as our pursuit of the Vietnam war.
ENHANCEMENT OF SECURITY BY MORE WEAPONS QUESTIONED
So we come back here. Does this really enhance our security? In view
of Mr. McNamara's statement, and your agreement with it, I can’t see
107
how it increases it at all. At best, it is a standoff at great expense be-
cause they will react. You don’t deny they have the technology to do it.
So if it is action-reaction, then the net result is we just have a much
higher level of nuclear weapons. Mr. McNamara at least had the
excuse he didn't know what they were doing and he took a guess and
resolved everything in favor of more weapons because they did not
have the kind of surveillance and information gathering that we now
have.
There is no excuse for us now to proceed down that line because we
know what they have. We would have notice, if they began to violate
the spirit of the agreements. I understand our surveillance, we would
know it, in a relatively short time, and we could then take whatever
measures are necessary. I don’t believe they will since they know
we will know that they are doing it.
Secretary LAIRD. Could I have one minute?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
DIFFERENCES IN CONDITIONS SINCE 1961
Secretary LAIRD. I would just like to say that there are two very
important differences since 1960.
The CHAIRMAN. This was '67 he made the statement.
Senator PERCY. Incidentally, what was the defense budget then?
Secretary LAIRD. He was referring to 1963.
The CHAIRMAN. He was referring to decisions taken in 1961.
Secretary LAIRD. Then I will answer your question. There are two
very important differences: One of them is the question of verification.
We can verify and we can react from verification; the reaction time
on weapon systems, of course, is from four to seven years, but we do
have that verification capability and we are basically—
The CHAIRMAN. They have agreed not to—
Secretary LAIRD. Could I finish : Let me make the second point,
then, and I would appreciate it if I could finish this one brief state-
ment, that verification is important.
Secondly, and this is also very important, we know what the Russians
plan to do as a result of these discussions. We know that they plan
to go to 62 modern submarines.
The CHAIRMAN. That's right.
Secretary LAIRD. We know that now even though we can’t verify
the construction of those submarines at this time. But we know that
for us to be in a position even to go to the 44 that are permitted by
this agreement it would take us the complete five-year period before
we could build the 42nd one to add to our strategic deterrent force.
So the conditions with which we are dealing in this year 1972 are
completely different from the conditions that the decision-makers
faced in 1960, and I think that is an important difference.
SIGNIFICANCE OF NUMBERS IF NO DEFENSE QUESTIONED
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, it isn’t all that important because
of the denial of our right to interfere with these weapons. That is the
relinquishment of the ABM. You think it is effective—you did. I never
did think it was very effective, but in any case we have officially given
up the right to that defense.
80–942 O—72—8
-(.
108
Secretary LAIRD. We have abandoned the 12-site ABM program with
this treaty. -
. The CHAIRMAN. This in itself makes all these numbers much less
significant because you have to treat these two together. If we go
through with the ABM relinquishment then the fact that we have
42 against their 62, is not significant. No one maintains that 42 or 62,
Whatever they may have, constitutes a first-strike capability, in other
words, that they could completely overwhelm the United States.
No one that I have heard of has said that. I don’t know what that
number would be, but, you see, you keep coming back to these numbers
games which are not really significant if there is no defense agains
the weapons. - -
Secretary LAIRD. But our programs are not aimed at numbers. Our
programs that are in this budget which I have presented to the Con-
gress for its consideration and decision are aimed at survivability,
modernization and replacement, which I believe are absolutely es:
Sential. But we do make these decisions on the basis of being able to
verify what the Soviets are doing and what they tell us they plan to
do; and we do know what their capabilities are.
SOVIET AND U.S. SUBIMARINE SYSTEMS
The CHAIRMAN. Did they tell you they are planning to build a
Trident, 2
Secretary LAIRD. We know they are building a Trident. We have
verified the fact that they are going forward with a modernized mis-
sile submarine, of the Y class.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. -
Secretary LAIRD. —which has longer range. Our particular Trident
Submarine will be worth two of their modified Y-class submarines in
numbers of missiles and we are doing that for a purpose.
The CHAIRMAN. But how do you say they are going forward with a
Trident when in the next sentence you say.
Secretary LAIRD. It is almost the same range as far as the missile
is concerned. It is approximately in that range area of the Trident
system. Now, the Trident system that we are asking the Congress to
go forward with in research and development in the 1973 budget, is a
system that has 24 missiles. Their follow-on or improved Y-class sub-
marine has 12. We have made that conscious decision to go with twice as
many missile launchers, and not only on a cost effectiveness basis. We
have done it on the basis that our manpower problems in the 1980's
are important problems for us to consider and with the long deploy-
ments at Sea we can get a greater deployment ratio with fewer
men in the United States Navy with the larger launch platform.
The CHAIRMAN. Are you saying that the extended Y-class submarine
is going to be that superior to our existing Poseidon in range? .
Secretary LAIRD. What I am saying is that it will have a longer
range and a larger missile; it will have a missile system that has an
inertial guidance system which we do not have. It will have certain
improvements.
Now, I am not raising this question as a question that concerns me
because I believe we do have in our budget the follow-on programs
that are needed and necessary, not only to assure survivability but
also to ensure modernization in the period of the 1980's and beyond.
109
The CHAIRMAN. I can see that, of course, if you wish to go with the
Trident it is twice as big as the existing submarine. It is not planned
to be— -
Secretary LAIRD. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. —twice as big?
Secretary LAIRD. At the present time.
The CHAIRMAN. And I expect twice as vulnerable, but anyway
obviously it would be a much bigger target than a smaller one?
Secretary LAIRD. I would like to say, Senator Fulbright, that I will
be glad to see that a classified briefing is given you on the survivability
and on the capabilities, the breakthroughs we made in submarine con-
struction. I think it would be a mistake not to use this new technology
as far as the new submarine is concerned. I do not believe that we
should build carbon copies of old submarines that were designed in the
1950s. I believe that we should use this modern technology that we have
developed and it will give us a greater capability to deal with the ASW.
The CHAIRMAN. I know that is the same argument Mr. Teller used
to make in his opposition to the test ban treaty. Because we are capable
of doing it, he believed we ought to do it. I mean, it is the pursuit of
knowledge and technological superiority has that purpose all its
OWI).
Secretary LAIRD. I know, Seantor
The CHAIRMAN. from a scientific point of view.
GOING FORWARD WITH ABM
Secretary LAIRD. you did not support my position on the ABM.
I believe that going forward with the ABM was most important and
I think that it has contributed considerably to the success we have had
in SALT. -
The CHAIRMAN. I don’t think there is any way you can prove that at
all. You do not know what would have happened if we had done it.
The Russians have never had any confidence in their own Galosh
system.
Secretary LAIRD. They are going forward in building new ABM sites
around Moscow and they are going forward and developing and de-
ploying new technology in the ABM field.
TESTIMONY OF WITNESS AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
The CHAIRMAN. This is again the difference between the way you
testify and the way the intelligence community testifies, but, of course,
unfortunately, it is secret.
Secretary LAIRD. There is no difference, I can assure you, of that,
because the information is developed in the Department of Defense,
as you know.
The CHAIRMAN. Your informationis, but not all of it.
Secretary LAIRD. Their information is, too, in this area.
The CHAIRMAN. Unfortunately, it doesn’t seem to jibe because we had
a long session yesterday, but it is classified.
Secretary LAIRD. Well, Senator Fulbright, that comment of yours is
not COrrect -
The CHAIRMAN. I think it is correct.
110
Secretary LAIRD. and I do not believe—
The CHAIRMAN. We had, years ago—this is not new, Mr. Secre-
tary—
Secretary LAIRD. It is not fair to put out that kind of information
because it is not correct.
The CHAIRMAN. Years ago, at least four or five years ago, we had
this testimony. We examined the intelligence community representative
in detail about the Galosh system during the ABM debate. They de-
Scribed it; they had pictures of it and all of this. It was planned to be
about 120, 125. They had installed 64. They had abandoned going for-
ward with it. Now after all these years it is approximately in the same
state and the only reasonable explanation of why they didn't go for-
ward with it is because they didn’t believe it was effective and they
didn’t want to spend the money on it. Are you saying today they have
completed it? *.
Secretary LAIRD. We have notified your committee at all times of
this information; and there has been no disagreement within the in-
telligence community at any time. To give the American people the
impression that the verification figures which we are using here and
which are used by the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, or the
Department of Defense, are at variance is doing a disservice, Mr.
Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. We went all over this. -
Secretary LAIRD. They are not at variance and the information
The CHAIRMAN. When you first came before this committee -
Secretary LAIRD. The information we have supplied this committee
has been correct in all cases and we have used the intelligence estimates
that have been verified by all groups. This goes to the very heart of
this agreement. If we cannot accept these verification figures, then
truly we are in difficulty. I believe we can accept these verification fig-
ures which have been agreed upon by the entire intelligence community.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we went through this when you first
came into office. You made statements about the first-strike capability
of the Soviet Union and you aroused a great deal of fear and conster-
nation. We had the testimony of Mr. Helms and then you yourself re-
Quested that you and Mr. Helms come before the committee—
sºlars LAIRD. And there was no difference between our figures
at all.
The CHAIRMAN.
opinion.
Secretary LAIRD. Well, I can guarantee vou that and I don’t believe
that it is fair to attribute anything else to Director Helms. .
The CHAIRMAN. I was greatly concerned at the time that I might
cause Mr. Helms to be relieved of his responsibilities, and in my own
VIOW. - -
Secretary LAIRD. I am sure you were reading into it something
that - -
The CHAIRMAN.—my own view—listen -
Secretary LAIRD. was not in any way of concern to Mr. Helms.
in executive session. You are stating your own
DIFFERENCE IN VIEWS OF WITNESS AND MIR. HELMS
The CHAIRMAN. I allowed you to speak without interruption for a
minute. Now you might allow me to speak for a minute.
111
The fact of the matter was there was a difference in your views.
Secretary LAIRD. There were no differences as far as the projection
of the figures was concerned, and you know that full well.
The CHAIRMAN. I know full well—
Secretary LAIRD. There was a difference of opinion as far as future
intentions were concerned, and that is an entirely different question.
The CHAIRMAN. I know full well that you sought to give the im-
pression to the public and this committee in public Session that the
Soviets were probably going for a first-strike capability. It scared
everybody to death and you got your appropriations. But I know that
the intelligence community at that time, after detailed examination,
said they had never found, never made an opinion, in any effect that
they believed the Soviet Union was going for a first-strike capability;
and you remember this went on for a long time.
Secretary LAIRD. Would you want the facts on that? The statement
that I made was, of course, that the SS-9 was a weapon system that
had, I believe, a first-strike, counterforce, capability. If that particular
system were developed and went forward at the rate it was then being
deployed, the Soviet Union could possess a first-strike capability
against our land-based ICBM's. I stated at that time that I was dis-
cussing capabilities and not intentions. The intentions are something
different, and the record is crystal clear. I do not believe that it is fair
to interpret it in the manner in which you currently are interpreting
it, and I cannot sit here as a witness and allow that to go on.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, you are entitled to your opinion. I interpreted
it that way at that time and I think the record will show you were
wrong in your estimate or your opinion.
(The statement referred to follows:)
(Excerpt from “Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of the ABM Sys-
tems,” Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organization and
Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 91st
Congress, 1st Session, Part I, March 6, 11, 13, 21, 26 and 28, 1969, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, 1969.)
Secretary LAIRD. Well, we were and still are going for a second strike capa-
bility, as you know. With the large tonnage the Soviets have they are going for
Our missiles and they are going for a first strike capability. There is no question
about that.
Secretary LAIRD. Well, I have not— -
The CHAIRMAN. They have not gone for a first-strike capability; the
very fact we have an ABM treaty is evidence of that and your hunch
or whatever you want to call it was not correct. That was 3 years
ago.
Secretary LAIRD. I was talking about capabilities and I told you I
would not read the Soviets’ intentions. I still believe if you went for-
Ward on the basis of the present deployment at that time, you would
be in a position where that could come about.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, you are a genius at semantic
confusion.
(Laughter.)
You invent such terms as “protective reaction strikes.” The stories
which have now come out about General Lavelle, completely demolish
your Semantic ingenuity. They were not protective reaction strikes.
They were plain only bombing strikes.
112
Why do you do this sort of thing? You are a genius at it.
Secretary LAIRD. I appreciate your compliment. -
The CHAIRMAN. You are a genius at it. I never have seen anybody
who could think of these semantic terms that confuse the public. You
know, you were trying to give the impression, whatever the words you
used, that the Soviets represented an enormous danger. We had to react
and we did. We gave you the ABM, but, in any case, I will come back
to this question of the submarines.
EQUIVALENCY OF Y-CLASS SUBMARINE TO TRIDENT QUESTIONED
As I say, I don’t think that what information we have received con-
firms the view I think you have left that the new USSR sub which is
an extended Y class, a little larger—there are no secrets about it—is the
equivalent of the Trident. If I have understood the Trident, it intends
to have a much longer range missile; it is a much larger ship; I think
it is 15,000 tons; isn’t it? It has all been in public.
Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I am talking about something that
the Soviets have in being today and something that the United States
may have in being five or six years from now. -
The CHAIRMAN. But the point about it— - -
Secretary LAIRD. The point I was making—and you completely
missed the point—is that they currently have such a submarine
launched missile and the United States does not. -
TRIGGERING ANOTHER ARMS SPIRAL WITH TRIDENT
The CHAIRMAN. But the point is you want to get this and my point is
that if we give it to you— -
Secretary LAIRD. Irecommend it, yes. -
The CHAIRMAN. If we give it to you, all you are going to do, in the
words of McNamara, is trigger another arms spiral in which they will
go all out and spend all their money, which they need for other things
for an equivalent of Trident. Then neither of us will have any advan-
tage, except we will be at a great disadvantage by spending so much
money on weapons that neither of us need. This is the whole point I
am trying to make.
Secretary LAIRD. Well, that is your opinion. It is not mine.
The CHAIRMAN. I understand that. -
Secretary LAIRD. And I respect your opinion.
The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.
SIGNIFICANCE OF SENATE VOIE
What is significant is not your opinion or mine but how many votes
we can get in the Senate. That is why I am trying to clarify the record.
Hopefully, they will vote without being scared to death by some mis-
information that you have been capable of spreading in these hearings.
That is all I am trying to do.
Secretary LAIRD. Well, I appreciate your very nice interpretation of
my testimony, and if you believe it is misinformation -
The CHAIRMAN. I think it is because you are testifying from a differ-
ent point of view. It is the duty of this committee and the Senate to
weigh all of these matters, both the military and the others.
1.13
IDENTITY OF RESPONSIBILITY QUESTIONED
If I were a military man and in your job, no doubt I would take your
position. But what I want to make plain is there is not this identity of
responsibility between the Secretary of Defense and a Member of the
Congress because it is not your responsibility to have concern for the
budget, for the deplorable state of our domestic economy. It is not your
responsibility to be concerned about the conditions in New York and
Chicago and San Francisco.
Secretary LAIRD. Ithink it is, Senator. *
The CHAIRMAN. It is not your primary responsibility.
Secretary LAIRD. I believe I would be willing to stack up my record
in health, education, and welfare and other domestic areas against
yours any day.
The CHAIRMAN. You are talking about when you were a Congress-
man. You deserted us and went over to the other side.
TESTIMONY OF WITNESS
Secretary LAIRD. I will stake my record and stack it up against yours
any time, and I resent the fact that you refer to any of my testimony as
misinformation.
The CHAIRMAN. Well
Secretary LAIRD. I think you have gone far beyond the reasonable
position for a Member of Congress to take on testimony which I have
given to you on the best information which is available to me as the
Secretary of Defense. I believe you cannot dispute it with the kind of
allegations that you make. “. .
The CHAIRMAN. I gave you examples here. I think your information
about the little first-strike-capability incident is an example of that. I
think today you leave the impression that the present sub the USSR is
building is equivalent; therefore we have to have a Trident. That is the
impression you left.
Secretary LAIRD. I did not leave that impression and you are trying
to create that impression. I am letting you run because I think it is just
fine. If you want to create that impression that is up to you.
PROTECTIVE REACTION STRIKES
The CHAIRMAN. How do you explain the protective reaction strikes.
How do you explain that ?
Why did you impose upon the American people the idea that you
only responded to attacks upon our planes when now, with Genéral La-
valle's revelations, it is perfectly obvious it is not so? How do you ex-
plain that?
Secretary LAIRD. Well, I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that those
were the orders.
The CHAIRMAN. You don’t deny what happened, do you, that La-
valle did attack the north without any provocation from the north?
You don’t deny the facts as being -
Secretary LAIRD. As soon as that was determined and as soon as the
investigation was made, and there were some 28 instances—
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Secretary LAIRD. —action was taken. --"
114
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Secretary LAIRD. But I just want you to understand as best I can—
The CHAIRMAN. So far as I know you invented that term.
Secretary LAIRD. Pardon”
The CHAIRMAN. You invented the term “protective reaction strike.”
Secretary LAIRD. I also approved the authority under which the
strikes were being carried out, and the orders were not followed.
Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for a brief comment?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. -
INTERPRETATION OF ATTEMPT TO SELL SYSTEM BY OTHER SIDE
Senator PERCY. Secretary Laird, I think that the chairman is mak-
ing an excellent point. Many times what is said in an attempt to sell a
system is interpreted by the other side in an entirely different way that
could be detrimental to our interests. We well know that the attempt
to sell the APM several years ago alarmed the Soviet Union to the
point where it was difficult to even get the talks underway. There was
a breakdown of communications.
I am hopeful that as a result of these talks that we can have suf-
ficient on-going communication that neither side will misinterpret
the other's intentions and I hope as we go into this next phase that
there is intimate communication with them so that they do not inter-
pret what we are doing as just an attempt to work around the agree-
ments. In principle, we are saying let's put a ceiling on things. We
are concerned about the interpretation that could be made if we escalate
in One area of technology and armament as we put a ceiling in another
area. This is our concern. I think the country is concerned that we are
Once again on another spiral; at the very time we see Some hope on one
hand, the other hand is carrying us forward.
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Now, Mr. Chairman, I have a number of other questions and I ask
permission to submit those for the record so they can be answered.
(See p. 130.) Because I did have some more questions for Secretary
Rogers and Ambassador Smith, I ask unanimous consent that my
questions be inserted in the record for answering by the Department
of State. (See p. 51.)
The CHAIRMAN. I would also like to submit a few, if the Secretary
will be able to supply for the record some answers to other questions.
(See p. 124.)
The Secretary is going to have to leave. Admiral Moorer, can you
stay for a few minutes? -
Senator PELL. I have one very brief question, if I could.
PROMOTION OF GENERAL ABRAIMS
This concerns the sanctity of the civilian chain of command, which
I think is a little removed, but you brought it up yourself in that
protective reaction strikes were enlarged beyond your authority. I
think this gets to the heart that worries many of us, as civilians, be-
cause we want to see men like yourself, the civilian side, retain control
of the direction of our armed forces. When we have so many raids that
1.15
were not protective reaction raids but were called protective reaction
raids carried on with very little action taken, it upsets us. I noticed
today in the press that the commanding general there, who pre-
sumably was the direct superior of General Lavelle, General Abrams,
was named Chief of Staff. -
Could you explain to us so we could understand it the line of rea-
soning that permits a commanding general, who must have been aware
of what was going on because otherwise he couldn’t have been a
commanding general, being promoted, having permitted this viola-
tion of the civilian directives?
Secretary LAIRD. I would only state that we will be going into this
matter—and have—before the House Armed Services Committee, and
we will be going into it at a later time before the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee; but I can assure you that General Abrams was not
involved in any way with the abuse of authority exercised by General
Lavalle.
Senator PELL. He must have been aware of it, sir, if he was an effec-
tive, immediate boss. -
Secretary LAIRD. I have been satisfied that General Abrams, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Forces, General Ryan, and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not aware of this.
Senator PELL. I see.
INFORMING CIVILIAN SECRETARIATS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
There is one further point along this line which surprised me from
the viewpoint of the civilian control. I realize the civilian secretaries
are not in the direct line of command, but Secretary Seamans, I think,
said on a Today Show that the first he knew about the increase in raids
in North Vietnam was when he saw it mentioned on the show. The
former Secretary of the Navy, my own opponent for reelection, men-
tioned that he would have opposed the Hanoi and Haiphong minings,
and had no inkling of it. He said this a very few days after it occurred.
I am wondering if the civilian secretariats are not informed of mili-
tary operations?
Secretary LAIRD. They are informed of military operations. Secre-
tary Seamans happened to be on leave at the time, but the Under
Secretary of the Air Force was completely informed. As you know,
the National Security Act as revised in 1958 does not include the
services secretaries in the operational chain of command; it is the
President, the Secretary of Defense, and the the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs and runs in that line and in that order. The service Secre-
taries, under the National Security Act, are not in the operational
chain of command, but I do see that they are informed about these
particular operations. It is true that Secretary Seamans made the
statement that you referred to, but he was on leave at the time.
Senator PELL. The former Secretary of the Navy said he would
have opposed the mining of Hanoi-Haiphong if he had been asked,
but had “no inkling.” He was not on leave. Why would he not know?
, Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chaffee left office a few days before the Pres-
ident's announcement. -
Senator PELL. I see, because he said afterward he had no inkling,
but we will let that stand. Thank you very much. .
116
. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, it has been a very interesting hear-
ing. I think you have been very frank and candid and you always
make a good record; you never fail to make a good record.
TESTIMONY OF WITNESS
Secretary LAIRD. Well, I hope the misinformation of this morning
does not concern you as much as you seemed to let it concern you a
few minutes ago, because I can assure you that the testimony I have
given you is the best information I can as Secretary of Defense
and I will continue to be frank, open and honest with you in any subse-
quent testimony, and I hope you will respect that as I respect you.
The CHAIRMAN. I think the word “misinformation” might be a
wrong word. -
Secretary LAIRD. I did not use it.
The CHAIRMAN. I did. If it is offensive to you, I think maybe I can
state it differently than misinformation. I recognize you have a differ-
ent responsibility. The first meeting you came before the committee
you emphasized that you felt a very special responsibility for the
security of the United States, the implication being that none of us
do. I think that simply is a way of stating that you feel that you have
a responsibility for a particular part of our government, whereas, I
think the Congress has responsibility for all of it and has the respon-
sibility of weighing one against another. It is a misinterpretation of the
fact, I guess. I don’t mean to say that you had lied about anything or
deliberately misinformed on factual matters. I think you look at them
from a different point of view and this leads to a misinformation on the
part of the public. That is, they misunderstand it as they did in the
case of the first-strike capability and as we have misunderstood the
protective reaction strikes.
This was always considered to be a defensive move, that we were
not taking offensive action. This, in a sense, is misinformation to the
public. -
Secretary LAIRD. I can assure you
The CHAIRMAN. Whatever you mean about it
Secretary LAIRD. (continuing). Any protective reaction strike con-
ducted under the authority and directive granted by me as Secretary
of Defense was a defensive activity. The authorities were quite clear
and should not have been capable of misinterpretation by any military
official of our government. - -
The CHAIRMAN. But we have had
RESPONSIBILITIES OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE UNDER NATIONAL
SECURITY ACT
Secretary LAIRD. I would like to add, Senator Fulbright, that it was
the Congress, and I was a part of that Congress, in 1958, that rewrote
the National Security Act. Perhaps the Congress did not mean what
it said in the National Security Act Amendments of 1958, but the
Congress in all of its wisdom did charge the Secretary of Defense
with certain responsibilities. It spelled out in that National Security
Act what those responsibilities would be as the principal assistant to
the President in this particular field and I believe that the Congress
meant what it said. Evidently there are some who do not believe that
117
when the Congress passes a statute it means what it says, but I believe
that it did mean exactly what it said.
The CHAIRMAN. What did that statute mean?
Secretary LAIRD. In the National Security Act, and I would like to
put it into the record at this point—
(The information referred to follows:)
SELECTED PORTIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
(Supplied by Department of Defense)
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled,
SHORT TITLE
That this Act may be cited as the “National Security Act of 1947”. [This
statement of the short title is part of the first section of the Act of July 26, 1947,
ch. 343. 61 Stat. 495. The remainder of that section is the table Of Contents, which
is omitted as covered by the table of contents set forth at the beginning Of this
committee print.]
DECLARATION OF POLICY
SEC. 2. In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a
comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide
for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments,
agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to
provide a Department of Defense, including the three military Departments of
the Army, Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine
Corps), and the Air Force under the direction, authority, and control of the
Secretary of Defense; to provide that each military department shall be sep-
arately organized under its own Secretary and shall function under the direc-
tion, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide for their
unified direction under civilian Control Of the Secretary Of Defense but not to
merge these departments or services; to provide for the establishment of unified
or specified combatant commands, and a clear and direct line Of command to
such commands; to eliminate unnecessary duplication in the Department of
Defense, and particularly in the field Of research and engineering by vesting its
Overall direction and control in the Secretary of Defense; to provide more ef-
fective, efficient, and economical administration in the Department of Defense
to provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their
Operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team
of land, naval, and air forces but not to establish a single Chief of Staff Over the
armed forces nor an Overall armed forces general staff. [Section 2, Act of July
26, 1947, ch. 343, 61 Stat. 496, as amended by section 2, Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 514; 50 U.S.C. 401.]
TITLE I–COORDINATION FOR, NATIONAL SECURITY
NATIONAL SECURITY council.
SEC. 1. (a) There is hereby established a council to be known as the National
Security Council (hereinafter in this section referred to as the “Council”, [The
National Security Council was incorporated into the Executive Office of the
President by Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1949, 63 Stat. 1067.] r
The President of the United States shall preside over meetings of the Council :
Provided, That in his absence he may designate a member of the Council to
preside in his place.
The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the
integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national
Security SO as to enable the military services and the other departments and
agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving
the national Security.
The Council shall be composed of—
(1) the President;
(2) the Vice President;
118
(3) the Secretary of State;
(4) the Secretary of Defense ;
(5) [Formerly the Director for Mutual Security. All the functions Of the
Director for Mutual Security, including his functions as a member of the
National Security Council, were transferred to the Director of the Foreign
Operations Administration by section 2(a), Reorganization Plan No. 7 of
1953, 67 Stat. 640. The Office of Director of the Foreign Operations Adminis-
tration and the functions of the Director in his capacity as a member Of the
National Security Council were abolished by section 303, Executive Order
No. 10610, May 9, 1955, implementing section 525, Mutual Security Act of
(1954, 68 Stat. 856.]
(6) [Formerly the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board.
Most functions of the Chairman, including his functions as a member of the
National Security Council, were transferred to the Director of the Office of
Defense Mobilization by section 2(a), ReOrganization Plan No. 3 of 1953,
67 Stat. 634. The functions Of the Director Of the Office Of Defense Mobiliza-
tion as a member of the National Security Council were transferred to the
Director of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization by section 4,
Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, 72 Stat. [1800. The title of this office
became Director of the Office of Emergency Planning by the first section of
the Act of September 22, 1961, Public Law 87–296, 75 Stat. 630.] ; and
(7) The Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive departments
and Of the military departments, when appointed by the President by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve at his pleasure. [The for-.
mer memberships of the Chairman Of the Munitions Board and Of the Chair-
man Of the Research and Development Board terminated when those Offices
were abolished by section 2(b), Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, 67 Stat.
638.] - -
(b) In addition to performing such other functions as the President may di-
rect, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions
of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national Secu-
rity, it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council—
(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the
United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the
interest of national Security, for the purpose
::: :: Sk :: sk :* :k
TITLE II—THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
SEC. 201. (a) [Repealed and restated in sections 131 and 133 of title 10, United
States Code. The language of section 133 appears under section 202, below.
[$131. Executive department.
[The Department of Defense is an executive department of the United States.]
(b) [Repealed by section 307, Act of September 7, 1962, Public Law 87–652,
76 Stat. 526.]
(c) Section 158 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, is amended to read as
follows:
“SEC. 158. The provisions of this title shall apply to the following Executive
Departments:
“First. The Department of State.
“Second. The Department of Defense.
“Third. The Department of the Treasury.
“Fourth. The Department of Justice.
“Fifth. The Post Office Department.
“Sixth. The Department of the Interior.
“Seventh. The Department of Agriculture. -
“Eighth. The Department of Commerce. t -
“Ninth. The Department of Labor.” [Section 201 (c), Act of July 26, 1947, ch.
343, as added by section 4, National Security Act Amendments of 1949, 63 Stat.
579.] -
(d) Except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, the pro-
visions of title IV of the Revised Statutes as now or hereafter amended shall be
applicable to the Department of Defense. [Section 201 (d), Act of July 26, 1947,
§: 343, as added by section 4, National Security Act Amendments of 1949, 63
tat. 579.] -
119
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SEC. 202. (a) [Repealed and restated, along with subsections (b), (d), and
(f), in section 133 of title 10, United States Code. \
[S 133. Secretary of Defense: appointment; powers and duties; delegation by
[ (a) There is a Secretary of Defense, who is the head of the Department of
Defense, appointed from civilian life by the President, by and With the advice
and consent of the Senate. A person may not be appointed as Secretary of De-
fense within 10 years after relief from active duty as a commissioned Officer of a
regular component of an armed force. -
[(b) The Secretary is the principal assistant to the President in all matters
relating to the Department of Defense. Subject to the direction of the President
and to this title and section 401 of title 50, he has authority, direction, and Con-
trol over the Department of Defense.
[ (c) The Secretary shall report annually in writing to the President and the
Congress on the expenditures, work, and accomplishments of the Department Of
Defense during the period covered by the report, together With—
[(1) a report from each military department on the expenditures, Work,
and accomplishments of that department;
[(2) itemized statements showing the Savings of public funds, and the
eliminations of unnecessary duplications, made under Section 125 of this
title ;
[ (3) a report from the Reserve Forces Policy Board on the reserve pro-
grams of the Department of Defense, including a review of the effectiveness
of chapters 51, 337, 361, 363, 549, 573, 837, 861, and 863 of this title, as far as
they apply to reserve Officers; and
[ (4) such recommendations as he considers appropriate.
[(d) Unless specifically prohibited by law, the Secretary may, without being
relieved of his responsibility, perform any of his functions or duties, Or exercise
any of his powers through, or with the aid of, such persons in, Or Organizations
of, the Department of Defense as he may designate.]
(b) [Repealed and restated in section 133 of title 10, United States Code.
See Subsection (a), above.]
(c) (1) [Repealed and restated, along with clauses (2), (4), (5), and (6),
in Section 125 of title 10, United States Code.
[$125. Functions, powers, and duties; transfer, reassignment, consolidation,
or abolition
[ (a) Subject to section 401 of title 50, the Secretary of Defense shall take
appropriate action (including the transfer, reassignment, consolidation, or aboli-
tion of any function, power, or duty) to provide a war more effective, efficient,
and economical administration and Operation, and to eliminate duplication, in the
Department of Defense. However, except as provided by subsections (b) and (c),
a function, power, or duty wested in the Department of Defense, or an Officer,
official, or agency thereof, by law may not be substantially transferred, reas-
signed, consolidated, or abolished unless the Secretary reports the details of the
proposed transfer, reassignment, consolidation, or abolition to the Committees On
Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives. The transfer,
reassignment, Consolidation, Or abolition concerned takes effect On the first day
after the expiration Of the first 30 days that Congress is in continuous Session
after the Secretary so reports, unless either of those Committees, within that
period, reports a resolution recommending that the proposed transfer, reassign-
ment, Consolidation, or abolition be rejected by the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, because it—
[ (1) proposes to transfer, reassign, consolidate, or abolish a major
Combatant function, power, or duty assigned to the Army, Navy, Air Force,
or Marine Corps by section 3062(b), 5012, 5013, or 8062 (c) of this title;
and
St. [ * WOuld, in its judgment, tend to impair the defense of the United
3.16S.
If either Of those Committees, within that period, reports such a resolution and
it is not adopted by the Senate or the House of Representatitves, as the case
may be, Within the first 40 days that Congress is in continuous session after that
that resolution is so reported, the transfer, reassignment, consolidation, or aboli-
tion concerned takes effect on the first day after the expiration of that forty-day
period. For the purposes of this subsection, a session may be considered as not
120
continuous only if broken by an adjournment of Congress sine die. However, in
COmputing the period that Congress is in continuous session, days that the Senate
Or the House of Representatives is not in session because of an adjournment of
more than three days to a day certain are not counted. [Clause (3) of section
202(c) was repealed and restated in section 303, Act of September 7, 1962, Public
Law 87–652, 76 Stat. 525.] -
[SEC. 303. (a) For the purposes of this section, any resolution reported to
the Senate Or the House of Representatives pursuant to the provisions of section
125 of title 10, United States Code, shall be treated for the purpose of considera-
tion by either House, in the same manner as a resolution with respect to a re-
Organization plan reported by a committee within the meaning of the Reorga-
nization Act of 1949 as in effect on July 1, 1958 (5 U.S.C. 133z and the following),
and Shall be governed by the provisions applicable to the consideration of any
Such resolution by either House of the Congress as provided by sections 205 and
206 of that Act.
[(b) The provisions of this section are enacted by the Congress—
I (1) as an exercise of the rule-making power of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, respectively and as such they shall be con-
sidered as part of the rules of each House, respectively, and Supersede
Other rules Only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith ; and
[(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to
Change the rules (as far as relating to the procedure in that House) at any
time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other
rule Of that House.)
I(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), if the President determines it to be
necessary because of hostilities or an imminent threat of hostilities, any func-
tion, power, or duty, including one assigned to thf Army, Navy, Air Force, or
Marine Corps by section 3062(b), 5012, 5013, or 8062 (c) of this title, may be
transferred, reassigned, or consolidated. The transfer, reassignment, or con-
SOlidation remains in effect until the President determines that hostilities have
terminated or that there is no longer an imminent threat of hostilities, as the case
may be. •
[(c) Notwithstanding subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense may assign or
reassign the development and Operational use of new weapons or weapons sys-
tems to One Or more Of the military departments or One or more Of the armed
forces. However, notwithstanding any other provision of this title or any other
law, the Secretary of Defense shall not direct or approve a plan to initiate or
effect a substantial reduction or elimination of a major weapons system until
the Secretary Of Defense has reported all the pertinent details of the proposed
action to the Congress Of the United States while the Congress is in Session.
[(d) In subsection (a)(1), “major combatant function, power, or duty” does
not include a supply or service activity common to more than one military de-
partment. The Secretary of Defense shall whenever he determines it will be
more effective, economical, or efficient, provide for the performance of Such an
activity by One agency Or Such other Organizations as he considers appropriate.]
(2) [Repealed and restated in section 125 of title 10, United States Code.
See clause (1), above.]
(3) [Repealed and restated in section 303, Act of September 7, 1962, Public
Law 87–652, 76 Stat. 525. See clause (1), above.]
(4) [Repealed and restated in Section 125. Of title 10, United States Code.
See clause (1), above.] -
(5) [Repealed and restated in section 125 of title 10, United States Code,
See clause (1), above.]
(6) [Repealed and restated in section 125 of title 10, United States Code.
See clause (1), above.]
(7) [Repealed and restated in sections 136 (c ) and (d), 3010, 3012(b) (third
sentence), 6011 (first two sentences), 5031 (a) (third sentence), 8010, and 8012
(b) (third sentence) of title 10, United States Code.
[Section 3010, title 10, United States Code:
[$3010. Organization
[The Department of the Army is separately organized under the Secretary of
the Army. It operates under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary
Of Defense.
[Section 3012 (b) (third sentence), title 10, United States Code:
121
[The Secretary [of the Army] is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for
the operation and efficiency of the Department. -
[Section 5011 (first two sentences), title 10, United States Code:
[The Department of the Navy is separately organized under the Secretary
of the Navy. It operates under the authority, direction, and control of the Sec-
retary of Defense.
[Section 5031(a) (third sentence), title 10, United States Code :
[The Secretary [of the Navy] is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for
the operation and efficiency of the Department.
[Section 8010, title 10, United States Code:
[$8010. Organization
[The Department of the Air Force is separately organized under the Secretary
of the Air Force. It operates under the authority, direction, and control of the
Secretary of Defense. -
[Section 8012 (b) (third sentence), title 10, United States Code:
[The Secretary [of the Air Force] is responsible to the Secretary of Defense
for the operation and efficiency of the Department.
[Section 136 (c) and (d), title 10, United States Code:
[ (c) Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, an ASSistant Secretary
may not issue an order to a military department unless— -
[(1) the Secretary of Defense has specifically delegated that authority
to him in Writing ; and
[(2) the order is issued through the Secretary of the military department
concerned, or his designee.
I (d) In carrying out subsection (c) and sections 3010, 3012 (b) (last two
sentences), 5011 (first two sentences), 5013 (a) (last two sentences), 8010, and
8012 (b) (last two sentences) of this title, the Secretary of each military depart-
ment, his civilian assistants, and members of the armed forces under the juris-
diction of his department shall cooperate fully with personnel of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense to achieve efficient administration Of the Department
of Defense and to carry out effectively the authority, direction, and control of
the Secretary Of Defense.] -
(8) [Repealed and restated in sections 141 (e), 3012 (b) (last sentence), 5031
(a) (last sentence), and 8012 (b) (last sentence) of title 10, United States Code.
[Section 3012 (b) (last sentence), title 10, United States Code:
[After first informing the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary [of the Army]
may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of
Defense as he may COnSider appropriate.
[Section 5031 (a) (last sentence), title 10, United States Code:
[After first informing the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary [of the Navy]
may make Such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department Of
Defense as he may consider appropriate.
[Section 8012 (b) (last sentence), title 10, United States Code:
[After first informing the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary [of the Air
FOrce] may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department
Of Defense as he may consider appropriate.
[Section 141 (e), title 10, United States Code:
[ (e) After first informing the Secretary Of Defense, a member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the
Department Of Defense as he may COnsider appropriate.]
(d) [Repealed and restated in section 133 of title 10, United States Code. See
Subsection (a), above.] -
(e) [Repealed and restated in section 132 of title 10, United States Code.
[$132. Seal
[The Secretary of Defense shall have a seal for the Department of Defense.
The design of the seal is subject to approval by the President. Judicial notice
Shall be taken Of the Seal.]
(f) [Repealed and restated in section 133 of title 10, United States Code. See
SubSection (a), above.] -
(g) Under such regulations as he shall prescribe, the Secretary of Defense
with the approval of the President is authorized to transfer between the armed
services, within the authorized commissioned strength of the respective services,
Officers holding commissions in the medical Services Or COrps including the reserve
components thereof. No officer shall be so transferred without (1) his consent,
122
(2) the consent of the service from which the transfer is to be made, and (3)
the consent Of the service to which the transfer is to be made. [Section 202(g),
Act of July 26, 1947, ch. 343, as added by section 3, Act of September 9, 1950, ch.
939, 64 Stat. 828. This provision is temporary law and will expire on July 1, 1967,
unless otherwise extended. See (1) section 7, Act of September 9, 1950, ch. 939,
64 Stat. 828, as amended by section 8, Act of June 27, 1957, Public Law 85–62, 71
Stat. 208, and (2) section 9, Act of June 27, 1957, Public Law 85–62, 71 Stat. 208,
as amended by section 4, Act of March 23, 1959, Public Law 86–4, 73 Stat. 13, and
section 4, Act of March 28, 1963, Public Law 88–2, 77 Stat. 4.]
(h) Officers transferred hereunder shall be appointed by the President alone
to Such COmmissioned grade, permanent and temporary, in the armed Service to
which transferred and be given such place on the applicable promotion list of
such service as he shall determine. Federal service previously rendered by any
Such Officer Shall be Credited for promotion, Seniority, and retirement purposes
as if served in the armed service to which transferred according to the provisions
Of law governing promotion, seniority, and retirement therein. No Officer upon a
transfer to any Service from which previously transferred shall be given a higher
grade, Or place On the applicable promotion list, than that which he could have
attained had he remained continuously in the Service to which retransferred.
[Section 202(h), Act of July 26, 1947, ch. 343, as added by section 3, Act of Sep-
tember 9, 1950, ch. 939, 64 Stat. 828. This provision is temporary law and will
expire on July 1, 1967, unless otherwise extended. See note following subsection
(g), above.] -
(i) Any officer transferred hereunder shall be credited with the unused leave
to which he was entitled at the time of transfer. [Section 202(i), Act of July 26,
1947, ch. 343, as added by section 3, Act of September 9, 1950, ch. 939, 64 Stat.
828. This provision is temporary law and will expire on July 1, 1967, unless other-
wise extended. See note following subsection (g), above.]
(j) [Repealed and restated in section 124 of title 10, United States Code.
[$ 124. Combatant commands: establishment, composition; functions; admin-
istration and support
[ (a) With the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Presi-
dent, through the Secretary of Defense, shall— -
[(1) establish unified combatant commands or specified combatant com-
mands to perform military missions; and
[(2) shall prescribe the force structure of those commands.
[ (b) The military departments shall assign forces to combatant commands
established under this section to perform the missions Of those COmmands. A force
so assigned is under the full operational command of the commander of the
command to which it is assigned only by authority of the Secretary and under
procedures prescribed by the Secretary with the approval of the President. A
force not so assigned, remains, for all purposes, in the military department
COncerned.
[ (c) Combatant commands established under this section are responsible to
the President and to the Secretary for Such military missions as may be as-
signed to them by the Secretary with the approval of the President.
[ (d) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary, each
military department is responsible for the administration of forces assigned by
that department to combatant commands established under this section. The
Secretary shall assign the responsibility for the support of forces assigned to
those commands to One or more of the military departments.]
RESPONSIBILITIES OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSF, AND CONGRESS
The CHAIRMAN. What is the relevance to this? What does it mean?
Secretary LAIRD. because it charges the Secretary of Defense
with this responsibility in the national security field and it is very clear
and very precise.
The CHAIRMAN. What about the Constitution of the United States
which gives the Congress the responsibility of providing for the de-
fense of the United States? Do you just ignore that? It is no longer
123
relevant at all? The Congress has the responsibility for providing for
the defense? .
Secretary LAIRD. No, I do not disregard that at all.
The CHAIRMAN. It doesn’t say the Secretary of Defense.
Secretary LAIRD. I believe the Congress exercised its constitutional
authority in passing the National Security Act, and the National Se-
curity Act is based upon the constitutional rights given to the Con-
gress of the United States. º
The CHAIRMAN. You don’t think we have delegated all our responsi-
bility for the defense of the United States?
Secretary LAIRD. No, I do not.
The CHAIRMAN. I don’t think Congress can. -
Secretary LAIRD. And that is why I respect this committee and this
Congress as a co-equal branch of this government.
NECESSITY OF wFIGHING ALL ASPECTS
The CHAIRMAN. Here we are dealing with a treaty that is also under
the constitutional responsibility of this committee and of the Senate.
The military aspects are only one aspect of this whole matter. There
is also the effect of this upon our economy and the arms race.
I don’t blame you for making the best case you can for your par-
ticular department, but I think in order for the other members of the
Congress and of the public to judge whether or not you are correct,
you have to weigh these other matters, which are such things as
McNamara mentioned. Here you are getting ready to take action
which will simply stimulate the Soviet Union to take similar action.
You don’t deny that, I think; you just said you agreed with that state-
ment. That is what Mr. McNamara is saying and this is a very impor-
tant consideration. -
RNOWLEDGE OF WHAT SOVIET UNION IS DOING
Secretary LAIRD. I would like to point out that the conditions
under which Secretary McNamara made those decisions are much
different from the conditions under which I operate as Secretary of
Defense. We are in a position today where we know what the Soviet
Union is doing. We know essentially where they will be in 1977 at the
close of the interim agreement. -
The CHAIRMAN. You don’t know that; nobody can possibly know
that. You can influence them to do that. You can take actions that
make them do it. -
Secretary LAIRD. We know on the basis of conversations with them
what they expect to do, and we know what they have in being at the
present time. - -
The CHAIRMAN. There is nobody that can possibly know that. You
can’t know it even about our own because it is dependent upon so many
other actions, such as in this case the vote of the Congress. They don’t
know nor do you know whether or not we are going to have Trident
unless we pass on it; do you? You are just hoping. -
Secretary LAIRD. You supported it last year, Senator, and I hope you
will support it in 1973.
The CHAIRMAN. I didn't support it; I didn't support it. I voted
against it.
80–942 O—72—9
124
Secretary LAIRD. Ithought you voted for it?
The CHAIRMAN. Ivoted against the appropriations. / w
Secretary LAIRD. You voted for the authorization bill? Perhaps I /
am Wrong and I apologize if I am wrong. <s . . .
... The CHAIRMAN. I didn’t knowingly support it. As you know, I
didn’t knowingly support the ABM. Now there has been— - . . .
Secretary LAIRD. I know you voted against the ABM, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. You know that we had hearings at great length.
These are legitimate differences of judgment as to what is in our in-
terests and you are quite right about the dangers—
Secretary LAIRD. It is not fair to say that merely voting for the au-
thorization bill is necessarily a votein favor of every program.
The CHAIRMAN. Every item in it.
Secretary LAIRD. Of the bill. -
The CHAIRMAN. But you talk about the differences. I thought Mr.
McNamara had a better explanation to go blindly forward with ex-
ceSS Weapons than you do because he did not have the information you
had. You have stated, and others have, that we do not know what they
are doing now. We have much better information-gathering facilities
than we had then. There is less excuse for us going down this road than
he had. So there are those differences, important differences.

PREVIOUS U.S. RESTRAINT ON SLBM's AND ICBM's
Secretary LAIRD. Our previous restraint on submarine-launched bal-
listic missiles and on ICBMs since 1965 has certainly not been recipro-
cated by the Soviet Union.
The CHAIRMAN. But on the restraint everyone has testified, and I
thought you agreed, that because they have made some progress and
reached some degree of parity is the only reason why we have the treaty
before us. As Senator Percy made very clear, they would not make any
kind of an agreement until they had reached at least what they con-
sidered to be reasonable parity. So that restraint has paid off. I mean,
we wouldn’t have any hesitation even in the arms race had it not been
for that restraint; that is much more significant, I think, and meaning-
ful than saying because we built the ABM you have it. I don’t thin
there is much validity to that argument.
I apologize for detaining you, although it has been a very lively dis-
cussion. Ithank you very much. -
Secretary LAIRD. I am delighted to have been with you this morn-
ing, but I was disappointed that you did not know of my commitment
this morning. I notified you earlier about that and I agreed to come
at 8:00 this morning.
The CHAIRMAN. It is all right. I am sorry we have kept you beyond
the proper time.
(Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, subject to
the call of the chair.)
(Questions by Senators Fulbright and Percy and responses of
Secretary Laird follow :)
QUESTIONS BY SENATOR FULBRIGHT AND RESPONSES BY SECRETARY LAIRD
Question 1. Has the Soviet Union made any major improvements in ASW
techniques that would measurably increase the threat to our Polaris/Poseidon
fleet? Are any such specific threats on the immediate horizon 2
125
Answer. There has not been, in recent years, any marked improvement in So-
Viet ASW, [deleted] the Soviets are actively pursuing an intensive research and
development program. On ASW related sensors. [Deleted.]
The Soviets presently possess a limited capability to localize US/NATO Sub-
marines, both diesel and nuclear powered, Once initially detected. [Deleted.]
Question, 2. What precise reasons have you for desiring an accelerated
TRIDENT Submarine program at this precise point 2 If there is leeway, might
it not be better to continue research, and development for a while to achieve a
better TRIDENT 2
Answer. Secretary Laird : The basic objective of our strategic policy is to pre-
serve the sufficiency of our deterrent, to make nuclear attack unattractive. That
sufficiency is placed in serious doubt by Soviet momentum in building up their
already powerful strategic forces, particularly their sea-based forces. We believe
it is imperative that this country have a credible and logical means of insuring
that the Soviets do not gain a position of clear nuclear superiority. The
TRIDENT program is part of that credible and logical means.
We accelerated the TRIDENT program initially as a step to preserve nuclear
sufficiency in the face of such a significant Soviet construction program for bal-
listic missile submarines. The on-going Soviet SSBN building program—without
an agreement—would have given them an even greater numerical Superiority
advantage than they will have under the Agreement. At the expiration date of
the Interim Agreement the Soviets still will have an active production base
for these submarines. Unless we maintain the accelerated schedule, we will be
in a distinctly unfavorable strategic situation should the Soviets decide not to
continue the Agreement. Alternatively, we would not have the negotiating lever-
age to help reduce the present imbalance. .
The proposed acceleration of the ULMS submarine program would commenc
design, development and construction of the ULMS submarine now rather than
Waiting another year or two and would provide the first operational ULMS sub-
marine in late CY 1978, approximately three years earlier than in the previous
development Schedule. This acceleration does not compress the overall program
into a “crash” basis, but simply provides for commencement, earlier than origi-
nally planned, of a logical, orderly phase of the program (the submarine develop-
ment).
Thus We believe that a delay of a few years would not necessarily produce a
better TRIDENT. The technology base upon which the TRIDENT program is
being structured is well in hand. We believe that the presently planned TRIDENT
Will have the capability to adjust to Soviet ASW characteristics as well as would -
One delayed by several years.
Question 3. Compare in terms of (a) numbers of launchers, (b) potential
7.4/mbers of warheads, (c) missile range, and (d) boat dimensions and Size, the
U.S. Poseidon, the U.S. Poseidon with the ULMS-I missile and the U.S. Trident
tºith the ULMS-II missile with the Soviet Y-class 16-missile submarine and the
Soviet eaſtended Y-class 12-missile submarine. Be as open as possible for the
*ecord, and provide, if necessary, for further clarity a classified response for the
Committee files.
Answer.
Potential number of Approxi-
Number of warheads mate Submarine Size, dis-
launchers e a missile length placement
per boat Per missile Per boat range (NM) (feet) (tons)
SSBN/Poseidon--------------------- 16 (1) (1) 2,500 425 825
SSBN/Trident 13------------------- 16 - (1) (1) (deleted] 425 830
Trident/Trident II 3------------------ 24 (1) (1) Ideletedl ------------------------
Y-Class/SSN6------------------_____ 16 (1) (1) 1,300 426 900
Mod Y-Class/SS-N-8-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12 (4) (4) (5) (3) (3)
Potential number of warheads is not releasable. [Deleted.]
* Trident I missile not operational until late 1970's.
* Trident II missile not firmly programed or defined, not estimated in inventory until mid-1980's at earliest.
: º not releasable at this classification level.
Ver 3,000.
126
Number of Warheads
Number of Missile Submarine Size, dis-
launchers Per Per range length placement
per boat missile boat (NM) (feet) (tons)
SSBN/Poseidon--------------------- 16 Ideleted] 425 8, 250
SSBN/Trident | 1-------------------- 16 deleted] 425 (deleted]
Tridentſ rident || 2------------------ 24 (deleted] (deleted] [deleted
Y-Class/SSN6----------------------- 16 (3) (3) 1, 30 425 (deleted
Mod Y-Class/SSN84----------------- 12 (3) (3) [deleted] (5) (5)
1 Trident I missile not operational until late 1970's.
2 Trident Il missile not firmly programed or defined, not estimated in inventory until mid-1980's at earliest.
P ºnly 1 warhead per missile. With appropriate development could be MIRV with potential payload similar to
OSBICI011.
4 SSN8 not yet operational–Estimated in inventory in Ideleted].
5 Information not releasable at this classification level.
Question 4. “It is generally assumed that the new eastended Y-class 12-missile
Submarine of the Soviet Union uses a larger missile to achieve longer range.
What would be the advantages to the Soviet Union of this achievement, and
100tuld they be worth the obvious eastra costs, ea penses and Smaller number of
launchers? Is it possible that the larger missiles are being deployed for purposes
Of warhead yield or application of multiple-warhead techniques? If so, could
Q/Ou analyze fully the implications of that prospect? Estimate the new missiles’
throw weight.”
Answer. The new class nuclear powered ballistic-missile submarine (follow-
On to the Y-class unit) currently under construction in the Soviet Union is ap-
parently designed to carry 12 of the new 3000+ NM range (SS—NX–8) ballistic-
missiles (SLBMs). When Operational, probably in early 1973, this new submarine
will appreciably enhance the flexibility of the Soviet navy's primary SLBM strike
force. The new missile, [deleted] more than the missile presently carried. On
Y-class submarines. Its 3000+ NM range more than doubles that of the SS—N–6
On the Y-class units, and is primarily achieved as a result of its larger propel-
lant Capacity. º
[Deleted.] Presently, the Y-class submarines are required, because of missile
range constraints, to patrol relatively close to the US East and West coasts,
[deleted]. Since the patrol areas Of the new class Submarine will be expanded,
and could include coverage on some US targets, while Operating in the vicinity
of Soviet submarine bases, the US/NATO ASW problem will be aggravated.
Should the new class submarines exhibit improved sound quieting, as estimated,
the problem Of initial detection and Subsequent tracking Will be further Com-
plicated. [Deleted.] Therefore in terms of cost, the Soviets undoubtedly view
the slight additional price tag as Worth the advantage gained.
While within Soviet technological capabilities, there is no evidence or indica-
tion that multiple warhead techniques are currently associated With the new Or
any other SLBM. The advantage gained by employing multiple warheads is an
increase in retaliatory threat (more warheads per missile), an increase in target
coverage, and improved ABM penetration capability. If testing of an SLBM
multiple warhead commenced immediately, it is not likely that the Soviets could
attain operational status of such a system before the mid-1970s. Throw weight of
the new missile is assessed at about [deleted].
Question 5. What Specific reasons have led the Joint Chiefs to favor a Washing-
ton ABM defense? Would not a single ABM site or no ABM sites at all be better
on both sides? What was the position of the Chiefs Om that?
Answer. The deployment of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense for
Washington, D.C. is considered essential by the JCS. An ABM defense will:
Protect the decision-making process against small attacks and unauthorized
Or accidental launches. ... "
Provides a high assurance that unauthorized or accidental launches
would not destroy the command and control mechanism. Only a deliberate
mass attack would saturate the defense.
Such a defense would protect against an irrational attack and reduce
the credibility of nuclear blackmail.
Would provide the additional critical time in which to perform the com-
mand and control functions of assessing the threat, making decisions, and
issuing appropriate execution Orders. -

127
For an SLBM attack, a relatively large force of submarines would
be required to Saturate the defense. A force of this size would signif-
icantly increase the probability of detection and should provide strategic
Warning. -
One of the major considerations in developing an ABM defense of the
Washington area is the amount of time that can reasonably be gained
against a surprise attack before defense exhaustion or penetration
Occurs. This added decision time permits additional flexibility in
strategic forces management. This increased time would provide a higher
aSSurance that appropriate responses COuld be executed.
WOuld enhance the Credibility Of Our deterrent.
This defense will protect our decision-making process and com-
mand and control facilities and provide additional time to implement
appropriate retaliatory measures. The perception of assured response
by those who would be Our adversaries reduces the potential for
attack.
The protection Of Our decision-making process will Serve to COn-
vince others, including our allies and potential foes that we have the
will to resist aggression anywhere in defense Of U.S. interests.
Would provide additional benefits including:
The necessary assurance that the nuclear decision is made by the
President Or his Civilian Statutory SucceSSOr.
Provide a base for rapid expansion of the defense in the event Of
treaty withdrawal. Additional interceptors could be expeditiously added
to the authorized defense thereby increasing its Overall effectiveness.
Indicate Our resolve to abide by the treaty limitations and to Send
a signal for subsequent negotiations that the United States intends to
provide the measures necessary to insure the security of the United
States and its allies within the established SAL COnStraintS.
Question 6. If all options were eaſercised, how many warheads could the U.S.
have in its arsenal at the end of five years? What are the options that could
be easercised to yield the varying warhead totals?
Answer. Options available to the U.S. to increase the number of warheads
in the U.S. strategic inventory and the number currently planned for 1977, in-
clude the following: |
Convert all 1000 Minuteman missiles to MM III [deleted].
Buy up to 20 SRAMs per B-52 [deleted].
Refit POSeidon with [deleted] RWS per launch tube [deleted].
These deployments would be additions to the presently planned [deleted]
strategic weapon warheads for 1977.
Question 7. Senator Fulbright. The proposed agreement would limit Soviet
Strategic land-based launchers to the present level or less. In March, your
Director of Defense, Research and Engineering, Dr. John Foster, said, “In cases
^where Small Soviet growth, is assumed, Minuteman forces do not appear threat-
ened until the early 1980s or beyond.” Has that estimate changed? If so, for what
precise reasons? -
Answer. Secretary Laird. The quoted material was taken from page 8 of Dr.
Foster’s statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 21 March 1972 in
which the Soviet ICBM threat was being discussed. The excerpt is not a threat
estimate, but rather part of a section which describes possible Soviet actions.
To fully understand this statement, it must be read in context, as follows:
“Analysis of the latest projections concerning Soviet missile growth rates and
accuracy improvements indicate considerable variation in the time period in
which Our Minuteman forces would be seriously threatened. In cases where Small
Soviet growth is assumed, Minuteman forces do not appear threatened until the
early 1980's or beyond. For middle range assumptions, Minuteman could have less
Survivors in 1980. Or before. If the most severe of the postulated SS—9 and SS—11
type missile forces were directed at Minuteman, the Minuteman force (assuming
that the Silo's are undefended, but are upgraded in hardneSS) could be drawn
down as early as the mid-70's. Prudence requires that we take the more pessi-
mistic projections seriously.”
Question 8. Senator Fulbright. Project the total number of warheads the
United States will have in its arsenal under eaſisting programs five years from
now, at the end of the Spam, of the SALT agreement, and contrast that with the
best official estimates of the Soviet warhead totals five years from now.
128
Answer. Secretary Laird. The U.S. presently plans to have [deleted] strategic
nuclear warheads in 1977. The present U.S. “best estimate” of Soviet strategic
nuclear Warheads in being at that time is [deleted]. I would point out that
Such an estimate requires very specific assumptions regarding Soviet deployment
programs for their warheads, assumptions about which there will always be
uncertainties.
It is certainly true that the Soviets could decide to do nothing to upgrade their
ICBM force. In this situation, even with the numbers allowed by the Interim
Offensive Agreement, Minuteman survivabilty would not be in serious question.
However, the Soviet R&D program in this area is vigorous and it is not prudent
in the light Of recent statements made by the Soviet leadership to assume a
Sudden termination of the ongoing Soviet ICBM programs. Finally the agreements
do not prohibit qualitative improvements and Our ICBM defenses, with the
number of interceptors limited to low levels, are such that future accuracy
improvement of Soviet single warhead systems could, by itself, reduce Minuteman
Survivability to an inadequate level.
Question 9. Do we not a SSuºme that the Soviet Union needs more Submarines to
have the same number on station in strike position? Would you give that ratio?
Would the ratio change importantly during the meat five years under the pro-
posed SALT agreements?
Answer. We do not assume that the Soviets would necessarily require more
Submarines than the U.S. to have the same number in strike position.
Present Soviet deployment practices, if retained, would require more Sub-
marines than the U.S. to maintain the same number on Station. Factors which
apply here are the long transit distances required for Soviet Submarines to reach
their patrol stations, the limited range of the currently deployed Soviet SLBMs,
and the Single Crew manning practices employed.
The SOvietS Can Change any rigid ratio of total Submarines to On Station Sub-
marines which we might assign to them at the present time. These actions are
not COnStrained by the SAL agreement. For example, continuing deployment
Of the SS-N-8 missile will, for constant target coverage, substantially decrease
transit time thereby increasing On-Station rates. While it is not possible to predict
which Other changes the Soviets will implement in the future, they could reduce
this ratio during the five year interim period.
Question, 10. Looking ahead to the end of the five years covered under the
Interim, Offensive Agreement, could you project the Strength of the U.S. and
USSR in relative terms measured by equivalent megatonnage in the arsenals of
each, Side?
Answer. The U.S. Currently plans to have [deleted] equivalent megatons in
strategic Weaponry in 1977. The presently projected corresponding value for the
SOviet Union in 1977 is [deleted] equivalent megatons. Soviet equivalent mega-
tonnage is Only illustrative Or a “best estimate”, since any number of MIRVing
Options is open to them, and we have no way of knowing exactly how the Soviets
Will shape their forces with the constraints Of the interim agreement. -
Question 11. What specific ASW technique would the TRIDENT be better at
countering than POLARIS/POSEIDON and estimate the time available before
these techniques might be applied?
Answer. The TRIDENT system is expected to be able to counter any open
Ocean ASW technique which we can foresee. A good part of the gain will be
realized through use of the long range TRIDENT I missile, which provides
significant additional Operating area. Over Poseidon. Greater safety can be
added by an even longer range TRIDENT II missile which can be deployed
only in TRIDENT submarines. The TRIDENT submarine will be capable of
fully exploiting this greatly increased Operating area by transiting at high
Speeds while remaining quiet.
In addition to the benefits derived from the much greater Ocean patrOl areas,
survivability of the TRIDENT submarine is also enhanced through efforts to
reduce acoustic observables and non-acoustic observables such as [deleted]
magnetic anomaly and mast and antenna exposure. Noise goals, as well as goals
for non-acoustic observables, are more stringent for the TRIDENT submarine
than for any previous class Of nuclear Submarine.
If detected the TRIDENT. Submarine would be more capable Of evading by
use of speed while operating in a quiet mode, by use of COuntermeasures de-
vices and/or defensive weapons.
A further enhancement of Survivability is the capability to deploy from
CONUS bases, and not require overseas bases. This would permit greater
security in port exit, including the use of auxiliary U.S. forces to aid therein.
129
Question 12. Why does either side need 20 radars at each missile complea, with
Only 100 launchers allowed.?
Answer. According to the provisions of the ABM Treaty, a Party may have no
more than twenty ABM radars at the ICBM defense site, with eighteen of these
radars having a potential less than that of the Smaller of the two large phased-
array ABM radars, (the SAFEGUARD Missile Site Radar). These specified
limitations On radars evolved during the course of extended negotiations.
At present, the Army is continuing its construction of the two large radars
(PAR and MSR) at Grand Forks, North Dakota. For the reasons discussed
below, additional radars may be desirable at the ICBM site and the Army is in-
vestigating this possibility. - -
The Interim. Offensive Agreement limits the quantity, but not the quality of
the Soviet strategic missile forces. With feasible technological improvements to
these forces (such as improved accuracy), the U.S. ICBM force could be
threatened. Additionally, if the Interim Offensive Agreement is not replaced
by an effective permanent agreement prior to its expiration in five years, the
Soviet threat to Our ICBM force could be further increased. Radars are the
long lead time deployment component in providing defense of the U.S. ICBM
force. By deploying additional radars at the ICBM field, the U.S. would be able
to respond in minimum time to a threat to Our ICBM’s [deleted].
Question, 13. Given the general assumption of Strategists that any ABM of
present technology can be overwhelmed, estimate the time saving for Washing-
ton before destruction between a situation with no ABM system and a situa-
tion with the system designed and deployed as allowed. Assume full-scale attack.
Answer. With no ABM defense against an SLBM attack, the NCA could have
aS little as [deleted] minutes prior to arrival Of the attack in which to learn that
an attack had been launched and to attempt to take appropriate action. With
an active ABM defense, this time would be increased by about [deleted] or more
minutes. The range in added time varies depending primarily On the size, type and
SOphistication of attack. For those cases where the attacker attempts to rapidly
Overwhelm the ABM with a large SLBM force located close to the US shore line
and to which the smaller added times apply, there may be an increased prob-
ability that the element of Surprise would be degraded due to ASW detection
Of the large number Of Submarines close to US Shores.
I would add that, while the NCA defense would not provide a large increase
in the time between warning and Saturation Of the defense in a full-scale attack
by a large missile force, that is not the major reason for deploying the NCA
defense. Such a defense will provide additional time that is critical for the func-
tioning of the command and control System, which is an essential aspect Of Stra-
tegic deterrence. In addition, the NCA defense would provide protection against
unauthorized Or accidental launches, and reduce the Credibility Of nuclear black-
mail.
Question 14. Please provide the total projected system costs of the following
programs: B-1 Bomber, the Short-Range Attack Missile, the TRIDENT Sub-
marine system, National Command Authority ABM defense, Site defense of
Minuteman, accelerated basing of strategic bombers and the submarine-launched
Cruise missile. -
Answer. The following table provides the information requested :
TOTAL PROJECTED ACQUISITION COSTS FOR SELECTED STRATEGIC PROGRAMS
[In billions of dollars)
Fiscal year
72 and Fiscal year T0
prior 1973 complete Total
!----------------------------------------------- 0.7 0.4 10. 0 11.1
SRAM-------------------- 4------------------------ ... 8 .2 ... 3 1.3
Trident"------------------------------------------- ... 2 1.0 [deleted] [deleted]
Safeguard NCA site?----- p- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ... 2 ... 2 1.8 2.2
Site defense developmentſ.--------------------------- 1 ... 2 1. 3 1.6
Bomber rebasing (Milcon only)----------------------- .02 .05 ... 3 - .4
SLCM development------------------------------------------------ .02 (deleted] (deleted]
1 Decision on eventual Trident force level has not been made at this time. Acquisition costs shown here are for illustrative
10-boat program and are still being refined.
2 Decision on NCA configuration has not been made at this time. Acquisition costs shown here are for least costly NCA
configuration now under consideration.
|
130
QUESTIONS BY SENATOR PERCY AND RESPONSES OF SECRETARY LAIRD
Question, 1. What would we do if the Soviets wish to easercise their Stated
Tight to eaceed their submarine ceiling when our NATO allies deploy a seventh
submarine which, together with our allowed 44 would be beyond 50? Would we
cut our limit below 44 to keep the total at 50?
Answer. [Deleted.] The US would object through the Standard Consultative
Commission should the Soviets for any reason exceed their submarine ceiling.
With regard to specific actions that we would take, I believe that it serves no pur-
pose to speculate on this hypothetical question.
Question 2. Why do we need TRIDENT when the Soviets have a ceiling on
SLBMs and when there is no ASW threat for the foreseeable future?
Answer. The basic objective Of Our Strategic policy is to preserve the suf-
ficiency of our deterrent, to make nuclear attack unattractive. That sufficiency
is placed in Serious doubt by Soviet momentum in building up their already
powerful strategic forces, particularly their sea-based forces. We believe it is
imperative that this country have a credible and logical means of insuring that
the Soviets do not gain a position of clear nuclear superiority. The TRIDENT
program is part of that credible and logical means.
We accelerated the TRIDENT program initially as a step to preserve nuclear
sufficiency in the face of such a significant Soviet construction program for bal-
listic missile submarines. The On-going Soviet SSBN building program—without
an agreement—would have given them an even greater numerical Superiority ad-
vantage than they will have under the Agreement. At the expiration date of the
Interim Agreement the Soviets still will have an active production base for
these submarines. Unless We maintain the accelerated Schedule, we will be in
a distinctly unfavorable strategic situation should the Soviets decide not to
continue the Agreement. Alternatively, we would not have the negotiating lever-
age to help reduce the present imbalance.
The presence or absence of a ceiling On SOviet SLBMs does not affect the re-
quirement for Trident. We do not concur that there is no possibility of an ASW
threat for the foreseeable future. Although Our confidence in the pre-launch Sur-
vivability of the SSBN force is currently very high, our confidence in continued
high SSBN survivability decline with time simply because of Our uncertainty
about the future course and rate of progress in Soviet-ASW technology. Intelli-
gence lead times in this area are short compared to the time required to design,
develop, and deploy a new Submarine. Consequently, it is essential that we hedge
against unforeseen developments in the threat with an Orderly well-planned
Trident program which will be able to counter potential Open-Ocean ASW
techniques.
In addition to its decreased vulnerability to ASW developments, Trident can
be operated from U.S. ports, thereby reducing our dependency on foreign bases.
Question 3. An advantage that some see in the Offensive agreement is that it
allows the United States time to proceed with further development of our key
Srategic programs such as the Trident and B-1 bomber as well as improving our
already Superior technology. Doesn’t allowing for such, potential advances in .
tweapons technology and System quality just replace one area of instability with
another, in effect convert the arms race to an equally ea pensive technological race?
Answer. A more complete Statement Of the advantage of the Interim Offensive
Agreement is that it places some limits on the Soviet threat while allowing the
U.S. to proceed with those programs necessary to counter the remaining portions
Of the Soviet threat that are not foreclosed by the Agreement. We are also allowed
the right to maintain the technological lead necessary to Offset the numerical
advanage retained by the Soviets.
The increased confidence of both sides in the effectiveness of their strategic
retaliatory forces, as a result of the SAL agreements, should be a major brake
to the Offense-defense arms race.
Although the initial agreements did not prohibit technological improvements,
we believe that the numerical limitations will reduce arms. COsts to less than
they would have been if both quantitative increases and qualitative improve-
ments were unrestrained.
Question A. During the SALT talks was any consideration, given to dealing
with the problem of medium-range ballistic missiles, Such as those in Eastern
Europe, which have the range necessary to knock, Out Our forward-based Systems?
Why was no progress made in this area 2 Will they be on the agenda of SALT II?
131
Answer. [Deleted.] In the May 20, 1971, understanding we agreed to limit the
Offense agreement to ICBMs and SLBMs. [Deleted.]
Question, 5. If parity is important in ABMs where we Supposedly have a large
qualitative edge, why is it not important in Offensive missiles where we have a
qualitative edge but numerical inferiority? -
Answer. Numerical parity has importance in both ABMs and Offensive missiles.
Because the Safeguard program was being deployed, the U.S. was able to Obtain
numerical parity in the ABM Treaty in spite of the present Soviet lead in
numbers of deployed launchers and radars. By contrast, in the Offensive missiles
area, the Soviets had numerical Superiority as well as an active program to
construct additional launchers and the U.S. had no program in readiness to
construct additional launchers. Because we do not have numerical parity in
offensive launchers, it is important that we maintain our technological lead to
Offset the numerical imbalance. We believe that We Can COntinue to maintain an
acceptable strategic balance under the provisions Of the Interim Agreement by
keeping our technological capabilities updated and by pursuing the other pro-
grams we have recommended to the Congress.
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS
MONDAY, JUNE 26, 1972
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONs,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221,
New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman),
presiding.
Present: Senators Fulbright and Case.
OPENING STATEMENT
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. We are very
pleased to have this morning Dr. Robert C. Tucker, director of the
Russian Studies Program at Princeton University, Dr. Marshall Shul-
man, Director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University, and
Fºr Roman Kolkowicz, Department of Political Science at
UCLA. .
As you all know, this is the third open session in the hearings the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee is holding on the proposed treaty
on anti-ballistic missiles and the proposed agreement limiting offen-
sive weapons. Last week the committee heard Administration wit-
nesses in public and closed sessions. This week we will be hearing
witnesses dealing with various matters of concern to the committee
as it prepares to come to its judgments on the treaty and agreement.
Today, we will be paying particular attention to the Soviet Union.
The experts before us will address historic, political, military and
strategic aspects.
It is, of course, extremely important that we understand what the
proposed treaty and agreement might mean to the Soviet Union and its
leadership. A certain amount of trust is necessary on both sides if the
agreements are to be meaningful and productive in the long range.
That trust can best be based on knowledoe on both sides. It is quite
clear that we now understand the Soviet Union imperfectly. This is .
partially due to the fact that much of what happens in the Soviet
Union is closed to Western eyes, but also we sometimes fail ourselves
to take the time to understand what is available to us. It is in this
context that the genflemen before us here todav can be very useful.
The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Tucker, would you wish to begin?
STATEMENT OF PROF ROBERT C. TUCKER, DIRECTOR OF THE
RUSSIAN STUDIES PROGRAM AT PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
Dr. TUCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
(133)
134
The CHAIRMAN. We are very pleased you gentlemen could come here
this morning.
Dr. TUCKER. Thank you very much.
You have invited me to testify on the two strategic arms limitation
agreements concluded in Moscow. In responding, I must first mention
that I have no technical expertise in matters of arms control. In these
remarks I shall try to assess the broad political significance of the
SALT agreements in their context.
CONTEXT OF SALT AGREEMENTS
The context was a meeting of the heads of state on fundamental
problems of Soviet-American relations and the current international
situation. In addition to the two treaties requiring Senate approval,
the parties adopted a statement on “Basic Principles of Relations”
between the two states and concluded agreements on preventing inci-
dents at Sea, on exchanges in Science, technology, education and cul-
ture, and on cooperation in Science, space, health and on environmental
problems.
Taken together, these accords represent something of a landmark in
the development of Soviet-American relations. In this regard Presi-
dent Nixon has moved a considerable further distance down a path
that was taken, although with hesitations and interruptions, by Presi-
dents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson, on our side, and by Premier
Khrushchev on theirs. I believe it to be the right path. I would like to
see us go farther along it, however, than either of the two governments
has so far given indication of doing.
IMPORTANCE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ATTACHES TO AGREEMENTS
The large importance which the Soviet Government attaches to the
new agreements is perhaps best shown by the fact that it went through
with the summit meeting despite our government's decision, shortly
beforehand, to respond to an offensive in Vietnam with a greatly in-
tensified air war and blockade that challenge the Soviet Union's
capacity to supply its North Vietnamese ally. Further testimonial has
come in post-conference Soviet press commentaries. As they see it,
the new agreements mark the abandonment, in theory and practice,
of the one-time American claim to be a world-dominant power capable
of coercing even the Soviet Union in event of need. The commentaries
stress that according to the “Basic Principles” now adopted, each of
the two superpowers is to treat the other as an equal. Great stress is
placed on the word “equal,” with whom coexistence is necessary, whose
vital security interests must be respected, and whose positions on in-
ternational questions must be taken into account. The two arms limita-
tion agreements derive part of their significance, in the Soviet view,
from the very fact that they illustrate and embody this fundamental
principle.
The achievement of such politico-military parity with the United
States has been a long-range Soviet goal, necessitating a costly effort
in strategic weapons development. But that alone does not exhaust the
significance of the new accords from Russia's point of view. The plac-
ing of Soviet-American relations on a new plateau is part of a larger
135
trend in Soviet foreign policy which has gained momentum in the
early 1970's and was given authoritative sanction at the Twenty-
Fourth Party Congress in March of last year. It is a movement toward
stabilizing and improving Soviet relations with the West on the basis
of the European status quo. In this context the U.S.-Soviet agree-
ments take their place alongside the recently concluded Soviet and
Polish treaties with the German Federal Republic, the important new
four-power agreement on West Berlin, under which the access routes
are guaranteed and the Berlin situation normalized, the Soviet-French
talks and accord on “Principles of Cooperation” in October of last
year, and the Soviet Government's promotion of a European Security
Conference, with U.S. and Canadian participation, for the near future.
MOTIVATIONS BEHIND SoviFT POLICY
A number of motivations are discernible behind this policy of
détente and stabilization of relations with the West:
1. The Soviet desire to consolidate the present arrangements in
Eastern, and East-Central Europe, including the existence of two
ºnies by gaining formal Western recognition and acceptance of
them.
2. The Soviet concern to improve Russia’s position under conditions
of continuing deep tension and rivalry with China by reducing tensions
on the Western diplomatic front. This concern has doubtless been
accentuated by the recent developments in U.S.-Chinese relations,
which may have raised the specter of Soviet isolation from the other
main centers of power.
3. The desire of the Government of the Soviet Union to obtain sub-
stantially increased trade, credits and technological aid from the main
Western countries as means on overcoming its continuing internal
economic problems. At the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress, Mr.
Brezhnev proclaimed an ambitious new effort, somewhat reminiscent
of Premier Malenkov's 1953 “new course,” to raise Soviet living stand-
ards sharply and soon. Mr. Brezhnev's is, however, a conservative So-
viet regime which means to operate the economy, like the rest of the
Society, in essentially the long established way; and so far the advance
of the civilian economy has at best been slow. Expanded trade with
and technological assistance from the West are possible sources of im-
provement in the situation. Furthermore, depressed Soviet living
standards may more easily be raised if the SALT agreements and sub-
sequent Soviet-American progress in arms limitation should seriously
reduce the burden of investment and effort in Soviet strategic arms
development.
IMPLICATIONS OF LACK OF UNANIMOUs suPPORT FOR DáTENTE POLICY
We should take into account that Mr. Brezhnev's détente policy
does not enjoy unanimous support in his own country. -
There exists in Russia a heavy industry—defense lobby which bears
comparison with our own “military-industrial complex.” There are
there, as there are here, those who perceive more danger than promise
in the stabilization and improvement of Soviet-Western relations, and
who regard great and growing military might as the only really reli-
136
able means of promoting the state's vital interests. These facts have
serious implications as I see it for American policy. If the United
States now rushes pell-mell into an all-out new effort in the field of
strategic weapons systems, which is not ruled out by the new agree-
ments, we may be sure that this will intensify internal pressures on
the Soviet Government to do likewise. It is to be hoped that both
governments will take advantage of opportunities that the SALT
agreements provide to gain a certain respite in the strategic arms race
while they continue joint efforts for further agreements on limitation
and control.
FULL SIGNIFICANCE CANNOT YET BE MEASURED
Although the very fact of the Moscow summit meeting and its
accords is cause for satisfaction, the full significance of this event
cannot yet be measured. Very much depends upon the manner in
which the two governments act in the future. A Soviet-American
permanent standing commission has been created by the ABM Treaty,
and the SALT talks will go on. A Soviet-U.S. joint commercial com-
mission is to be set up as well as a Soviet-U.S. joint commission on
scientific and technical cooperation. The institutional machinery of
Soviet-American cooperation is being expanded now in an unprece-
dented manner. But how it operates, and with what results, will de-
pend very much upon the presence or absence of a will on both sides
to make it work and upon concrete policies that still remain to be
decided. Will there emerge, gradually, a Soviet-American “community
of fate” in face of the ecological crisis, the oncoming population
crisis, all the grave and increasing dangers to the survival and well
being of civilization on this planet% Will mutual understanding and
trust evolve along with habits of working jointly 7 And will the
planned Soviet-American docking in space in 1975 be accompanied by
a freer mingling of people and ideas down here?
U.S.-SOVIET WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL INFLUENCE
Among the reasons for being less than sure that the answers to
these questions will be affirmative, one deserves special mention. For
a long time now the United States and Soviet Russia have been en-
gaged in a world-wide competitive struggle for political influence, a
struggle that in the past two decades has increasingly centered in large
parts of Asia, the Middle East and Africa. As has often been noted,
this contest is costly in resources that could be used cooperatively to
better effect. Also, it periodically aggravates tensions between the
contestants and thereby makes it difficult for them to outgrow their
old posture of mutual antagonism. Recent events on the Indian sub-
continent provide one melancholy example. The Middle Eastern sit-
uation, with particular reference to Soviet policies there, provides
another. So, finally, does the recent history of Indochina, where events
have now come to the pass that the United States Government is wag-
ing an intense air war with a toll of civilian lives and destruction that
fills the hearts of many American citizens like myself with anguish,
Shame and dismay—a form of war that brings dishonor upon our
country and threatens to grow genocidal.
137
Some degree of competitiveness is probably inherent in Soviet-
American relations, given human nature and the division of cultures.
Nevertheless, cooperation, like peace itself, is in a certain Sense in-
divisible or must become so. We cannot stably collaborate in certain
selected spheres of mutual interest while placing no limits and curbs
upon our competition in others. So long as the United States and
Soviet Russia continue to view the Third World as an arena of politi-
cal competition for influence, their attempts to cooperate in arms con-
trol, trade, science and technology will be in perpetual jeopardy. The
whole structure of Soviet-American cooperation will remain fragile.
CONCENTRATION OF RESOURCES DEMANDED FOR INTERNAL PROBLEMS
In concluding, I should like to refer to a memorandum by the
eminent Soviet nuclear physicist, Andrei Sakharov. It was completed
in March 1971 and sent to Mr. Brezhnev, who did not reply. Some
days ago Academician Sakharov released it and excerpts have ap-
peared in our press. Unfortunately, they will not be printed in the
Soviet press. The memorandum estimates that military expenditures
take up to forty percent of the Soviet national income, and declares:
“Only a concentration of resources on internal problems will make it
possible to overcome difficulties in the areas of the economy and the
welfare of the population.”
It is a well known fact that our gross national product is larger
than Russia's, and the share taken by military expenditures is lower.
Still, our much wealthier society now faces a situation which is in
Some ways comparable to the one of which Academician Sakharov
speaks in reference to his own country. We are confronted with an
accumulation of increasingly urgent internal problems—of health,
education, care for the aged, crime control, prison reform, population,
ecology, urban redevelopment, rail transportation and the like. They,
too, demand a national concentration of resources, an effort of large
Scope over a period of time. In the final analysis, the treaty and the
interim agreement, as well as SALT agreements still to be reached,
may take on meaning in this context as well as that of our security.
They merit the Senate's strong support.
Thank you. -
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you Dr. Tucker. That is a very fine state-
ment, lucid and succinct. I congratulate you on it.
The next statement is by Dr. Marshall Shulman, Director of the
Russian Institute, Columbia University. •
Dr. Shulman. \
\, | - Y ^
STATEMENT OF DR. MARSHALL SHULMAN, DIRECTOR OF THE
RUSSIAN INSTITUTE AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
Dr. SHULMAN. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of my testimony is to
put before the Committee some considerations regarding the treaty
and interim agreement, against the background of the larger question
of how best to improve our security in our relations with the Soviet
Union. Pl
138
CURRENT UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS
The strategic arms limitation treaty and interim agreement, taken
together with the other arrangements discussed during the recent
Moscow summit meeting, raise the question whether the relations
between the United States and the Soviet Union may now be put onto
a less tense and dangerous footing than they have been over the past
twenty-five years. No one would argue that the Soviet system has
become more liberal or less interested in expanding its influence than
it has been. Nevertheless, we now have before us the possibility of
a more reasonable and more differentiated relationship: while the
political and ideological competition continues to run its course, Some
restraints in the conduct of that competition appear to be recognized
as mutually advantageous and even necessary, including some restraint
in the military competition. Also, the possibility of some cooperation
between the two countries in trade, technology, space, health and
environment may over time help to moderate the hostility with which
these two countries have regarded each other.
The move in this direction was not a simple matter for the Soviet
leadership. In the period prior to the XXIV Communist Party Con-
gress a little over a year ago, there were signs of a debate in the Soviet
Union whether to proceed toward a “normalization” of relations with
the U.S. and the SALT agreement. One of the questions raised in that
debate concerned the intentions of the U.S. Government and the pres-
ent Administration: was it seriously interested in a long-term im-
provement of relations, and did this represent a real option for Soviet
policy? In the end, despite the forebodings of the ideologues and the
pressures of military interests, the Soviet leadership committed its
prestige to the course of action which led to the summit. In doing so,
it gave controlling weight to the arguments that the modernization of
the Soviet economy, the consolidation of Soviet relations with China
and with Eastern Europe, and the advancement of the Soviet position
in the world could best be carried forward in a climate of reduced
tension.
The course of the discussions in Moscow with the President and
his entourage appeared to have reassured the Soviet leadership as to
the serious intentions of the Administration, despite some disappoint-
Iment that the negotiations on trade matters have not yet been pro-
ductive. -
In the month that has elapsed since that time, however, the sounds
that have been coming out of Washington have included the Admin-
istration's insistence that the treaty and interim agreement, while pre-
venting the Russians from building as many missiles and submarines
as they have been and might otherwise continue to build, did not pre-
vent the U.S. from doing anything it would wish to do, except for one
additional ABM site in Montana; further, Administration repre-
Sentatives have argued that the treaty and interim agreement not only
permit but require the commitment of an additional twenty-five billion
dollars for new generations of submarines, bombers, and other ad-
Vanced weapons systems. In Moscow, those who have been arguing
that the U.S. Administration’s purpose has been to use SALT as a
device to strengthen U.S. military-technological superiority rather
139
than to level off the arms race, can hardly have asked for more ex-
plicit confirmation of their predictions.
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO STRENGTHENING SECURITY
It is not surprising and not unreasonable that those who have mili-
tary responsibility should advocate a continuing increase in our mili-
tary capabilities. It is, however, the responsibility of the political au-
thorities, both in the executive and legislative branches of the govern-
ment, to make an overarching judgment as to how much is enough. In
making that determination, the political authorities are faced with a
choice between alternative approaches to the strengthening of our
Security.
One approach rests upon a commitment to a continuing effort to
achieve and maintain fechnological if not numerical strategic superior-
ity. This commitment has led us to force the pace of the strategic arms
race, and it ineScapably leads to an uncontrolled military competition
with the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet economic base is substan-
tially less than ours, its system of control enables the Soviet Union to
mount whatever level of effort is required to keep pace with us. The net
effect of an uncontrolled military competition produces no advantages
for either side and results in less rather than greater security, for it
increases tensions, risks and costs. -
The alternative approach seeks a stable military balance at moder-
ate deterrent levels, as a first step to security. It recognizes that the
quest for Superiority above these levels is an archaic carry over from
the pre-nuclear age; it confers no military or political advantage in
fact, and it serves no rational purpose other than to satisfy the pres-
Sures of the military interests on both sides.
Moreover, this approach recognizes that security involves other
dimensions of power than military. We can have, and have had, an
unprecedented capacity for destruction and still experience a decline
in our political influence in the world. In the competition with the
Soviet Union for political influence the effective resolution of our
critical domestic and foreign policy problems through the wise use of
our resources will be more decisive than a vain quest for military
Supremacy.
The chief difficulty in the way of getting public acceptance for a
policy of strengthening our security through a stable and moderate
deterrent balance is that in both the Soviet Union and the United
States fears are aroused by some who point with alarm, not to what
the other side has done, or is doing, but what it might do. This manip-
ulation of fear makes the meshing of a rational security policy of the
º countries as delicate an operation as the docking of two space
Snlps.
In the recent period, the political leadership of the Soviet Union,
against the demurrers of some of its military officers, has given increas.
ing emphasis to the strengthening of its economic base as the main
Priority and the main guarantee of its future power position. Having
overcºme a condition of strategic inferiority by concentrated effort
over the past seven years, the Soviet leadership has expressed a readi.
ness to seek security “on the basis of the principle of equality.” This
principle was a significant element in the Statement of Basic Principles
80–942 O—72—10
140
signed in Moscow on May 29 by President Nixon and Secretary
Brezhnev. The question we now face is whether this common accept-
ance of the principle of security on the basis of equality is to remain
empty rhetoric, or can be implemented in reality. If the U.S. now opts
for an accelerated effort to strength its technological superiority, the
internal debates in the Soviet Union cannot remain unaffected. The
Soviet political leadership cannot be expected to deny its military the
resources required in the continuing effort to catch up with our pro-
jected improved weapons systems, unless they prove to be more sensible
than we.
BARGAINING CHIP TACTIC
It is generally agreed that the present treaty and interim agreement
will be useful only to the extent that they prepare the way for more
Substantial arms limitation agreements in the near future. The ques-
tion is: which course of action by the U.S. is most likely to lead to
more substantial arms limitation agreements? The Administration
has argued that the bargaining chip tactic has been proven by the
Moscow agreements; had we not begun the Safeguard and the MIRV
deployments, it is argued, the Russians would not have had an incen-
tive to enter into the present agreements. Therefore we are urged to
press forward with advanced bomber and submarine systems, with
carriers and cruise missiles, new fighters and other programs in order
gºthen the U.S. negotiating hand at the forthcoming round of
LT.
The difficulty with the bargaining chip tactic is that it deflects at-
tention from the merits of the argument as to whether we genuinely
need the weapons systems advocated, and instead of intimidating the
Russians, requires them to follow our lead. Had we not begun to de-
ploy a Safeguard system, there would have been no need for the pres-
ent treaty, and the number of ABM launchers would have been con-
siderably less than the two hundred for each side provided under the
treaty. Had the Russians nevertheless persisted in modernizing their
Galosh system around Moscow, we could have decided what if any
action on our part this required; it is unlikely that we would have
been saddled with the kind of a system which the bargaining chip
logic has bequeathed us. Similarly, our MIRV deployment, rather
than encouraging a positive attitude toward arms limitation on the
Russian side, compels them to match our MIRV technology sooner or .
later. And when they do, we will both be worse off than if we had been
able to avert the MIRV competition.
What made the present agreements possible was not that the Rus-
sians were intimidated by our bargaining chips, but that they came
close enough to eliminating their previous strategic inferiority so that
they no longer needed to fear that a freeze would leave them at a per-
manent disadvantage. If now we continue to follow the logic of the
bargaining chip tactic and tried to widen our technological advan-
tage, we shall in fact be undermining the basis of present and future
SALT agreements. Bargaining chips is a game that two can play, and
two can lose. A
141
ENCOURAGING MOVEMENT TOWARD MORE SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENTS
The course of action most likely to encourage a movement toward
more substantial arms limitation agreements would be to hold steady
to our present strategic levels for a long enough period to give SALT
II a fair chance. This is not, and should not be caricatured as, uni-
lateral disarmament. By any reasonable definition of “sufficiency,” we
have several times more than is required to maintain an effective de-
terrent for the time required for a wholehearted effort in this direc-
tion. The incentive best calculated to encourage a positive Soviet re-
sponse to arms limitation is not intimidation, but a clear indication
that they can safely deflect resources from weapons to the industrial
and consumer sectors without danger or disadvantage.
The present treaty and interim agreement are not based upon trust
except in the sense that each side relies upon the other to recognize its
own enlightened self-interest in holding the strategic competition
within moderate bounds. If we set an example of modernization and
restraint, we cannot be certain that the Russians will follow that ex-
ample, but we can be certain that if we let our defense levels be deter-
mined by pressures from the military, no matter what the rationaliza-
tion, we will eviscerate the agreements that have been reached, and
lose whatever opportunity the present moment affords of bringing
the arms race under control.
There are no grounds for complacency in the present state of the
arms race. The nations of the world are spending more than $180 bil-
lion in weapons each year; new and more destructive weapons systems
are making their appearance, and the prospect of easy availability of
fissionable material brings nearer the day when more nations will have
nuclear weapons at their disposal. Although the United States and
the Soviet Union have shown increasing sobriety at the scale of destruc-
tiveness under which our peoples live in hostage, this gives little
assurance that war may not result from miscalculations or from the
possibility that military officers may substitute their judgment for
that of their civilian superiors.
By itself, the ratification of the treaty and the approval of the in-
terim agreement would be useful only if they reflect a decision on the
part of our political leadership to accept a commitment in all serious-
ness to an agenda of arms limitation. The first step on that agenda is
to seek a stable and moderate deterrent balance with the Soviet Union.
This means to work in SALT II toward reductions of present stock-
piles, to bring bombers and MIRVs under control, and to slow down
the technological race by a comprehensive test ban and a limit on flight
testing of missiles. Further steps on the agenda require efforts to bring
France and China into the system of agreements and to reduce con-
ventional weapons and the traffic in arms.
Finally, although a stable and moderate deterrent balance is perhaps
the best realistic hope for the immediate period, we cannot rest content
with a system which continues to hold the people of the world in
hostage to the risk of wholesale destruction. Only if we find a way to
go beyond deterrence to a system of international security not based
jº the threat of mass destruction can we begin to breathe more
easily.
142
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. It therefore follows that the ratification of the present treaty and
the approval of the interim agreement by themselves would be without
meaning unless this government is prepared to declare its commitment
to moderation and restraint in its military programs while it returns to
the effort to damp down and reduce the strategic competition with the
Soviet Union.
2. If, however, this commitment is not forthcoming from the Presi-
dent and the Congress, and if we give free rein to the military demands
for an acceleration of programs for more and more advanced weapons
systems, would it not be more honest to recognize that the treaty and
interim agreement are a hoax, a deceptive use of these negotiations to
cloak an intention to continue the drive for strategic superiority and
thereby to guarantee the continuation of the irrational and self-
defeating military competition? -
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. -
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Shulman. That is a very persuasive
Statement. - -
Our third witness is Professor Roman Kolkowicz, University of
California. *
STATEMENT OF PROF. ROMAN KOLKOWICZ, DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AT UCLA
Dr. Kolkowicz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am glad to have this opportunity today to discuss Soviet interests
and objectives in SALT. I shall address several problems relevant to
this broader issue: What is the nature of Soviet interests in SALT2
What kinds of Soviet objectives are served by SALT2 How is SALT
perceived by important Soviet elites?
SOVIET CONCERNS WITH NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE
It is a known historical fact that concerns with national security
and defense have invariably been among the very highest priorities
of Soviet leaders. Stalin launched radical social and economic reforms
of industrialization and collectivization in order to create a powerful,
modern defense establishment. Khrushchev came to power in the 1950’s
largely as a supporter of a strong and dominant defense establish-
ment. The current leadership of Brezhnev has continued this tradi-
tion of primacy of defense over other social and national concerns.
Moreover, any opponent of this primary objective has in the past
suffered the consequences of political demise. Thus, when Malenkov
opposed the military and the defense establishment in 1953–54, he
quickly found himself ousted from the top positions in the govern-
ment and party. Similarly, when Khrushchev began to oppose the
military and defense interests in the 1960’s, he was unceremoniously
ousted from power.
This Soviet preoccupation with defense and military interests can
be explained in several ways. Lenin had taught his disciples that
“everything is a phantom, except power”. Soon after the revolutionary
momentum abated in Europe after World War I, Soviet leaders found
143
themselves surrounded by a hostile international environment. More.
over, Soviet leaders succumbed to a kind of paranoia engendered by
hostile gestures and acts of the West. Several generations of Soviet
leaders grew up in an environment of “cordons sanitaire”, “capitalist
encirclements”, anti-communist pacts, etc. And since the end of World
War II, they were exposed to Western policies of containment, roll-
back, massive retaliation and Western strategic Superiority.
If Soviet leaders learned nothing else from their past experience,
they certainly learned that they must rely on their force of arms for
survival and political viability, and that nothing will assure their
security and political interests but the achievement of great power,
a power at least equal to that of the United States. -
REASONS FOR SOVIET INTERESTS IN SALT
The Soviet Union has now achieved this long-sought objective—
strategic parity with the United States. Having climbed this plateau,
the Soviet leaders began to pursue policies aimed at strategic arms
limitation talks, SALT. I submit, therefore, that an indispensable pre-
condition for SALT was the Soviet achievement of at least strategic
parity, so that they could enter into the negotiations from a position
of strength and political equality. s
Another reason for recent Soviet interests in SALT derives from
changes in Soviet foreign policy, changes in objectives, commitments
and constraints. For two decades since the end of World War II, So-
viet foreign and military policy focused largely on the West, that is
NATO and the United States. The Third World remained essentially
an area of marginal interest despite some ill-advised gambles by
Khrushchev; and the Far East and South East Asia similarly re-
mained an area of limited Soviet interest and concern. This Western-
focused foreign and military policy underwent a profound change in
the 1960's and a new policy seems to have emerged in the interval.
Briefly, the objectives of this policy is to: -
Hold, stabilize and normalize Soviet relations with the West, in or-
der to gain greater freedom to deal with their China problem in the
East, and to be able to explore the “soft” areas south of Russia for
policy opportunities.
A vital pre-requisite of this new policy line, for dealing with the
Chinese challenge and for the penetration and exploration of the
Middle East and Indian Ocean areas, is the normalization and stabil-
ization of relations with the West. Thus, several major recent Soviet
policy initiatives seem to support this assumption: Soviet interests in
European Security Conferences; Soviet interest in treaties and agree-
ments with West Germany; Soviet interest in SALT; recent Soviet
low-key reactions to militant American actions in Vietnam, etc. These
and others seem to support the assumption of a keen Soviet interest
in the stabilization and normalization of Soviet relations with the
West. Within this context, one may assume that SALT serves Soviet
leadership as an important tactical adjustment of their new policy
- ºn, rather than as a major shift in Soviet military and foreign
policy.
A further reason for Soviet interest in SALT derives from certain
domestic pressures on Soviet policy makers, pressures to allocate a
144
larger share of available resources to consumer and domestic interests.
Now, this is a favorite theory of many Western analysts and scholars.
They maintain that a stabilization of the arms race will enable Soviet
leaders to finally come to grips with their domestic problems, long
neglected, and that resources saved from the arms programs will find
their way to the consumer. I am afraid that I do not share this view
for the following reasons: Two previous leaders of the Soviet Union,
Malenkov and Khrushchev, had at different times proposed such a
consumer-oriented policy at the expense of defense interests. Both had
encountered stiff resistance from entrenched military-industrial-party
bureaucracies and found themselves ousted from power.
WIEHAT SALT WILL AND WILL NOT DO
More importantly, SALT does not really hold out the promise of
either halting the arms race, nor of enabling leaders to drastically cur-
tail defense expenditures in the interest of the consumer. We ought to
consider here what SALT promises to achieve and what it will likely
/fail to achieve: -
(1) What SALT will do: -
SALT will stabilize and formalize the rules of the game of the now
equal Superpowers, who have vested interests in maintaining a nu-
clear-strategic bipolarity.
SALT will stabilize the quantitative arms race, specifying the
numbers of tolerable ratios, launchers, sites, et cetera.
SALT may create a useful psychological-political climate for fur-
ther negotiations.
(2) What SALT will not do:
SALT is not disarmament, it does not promise, “peace in our time.”
SALT does not really stop the arms race, it merely moves it into a
different direction, into a qualitative arms race of a subterranean na-
ture, which may actually increase the numbers of deliverable war-
heads, warheads with a greater target-precision and greater devasta-
tion potential.
SALT will likely increase allocations in the Soviet Union and the
United States to the R. & D. sectors, in order to keep abreast with tech-
nological developments in military hardware and in order to remain
vigilant and capable of balancing or outdistancing the adversary
within the limitations of the treaty provisions.
SALT is not likely to change some important Soviet perceptions of
new policy opportunities in the 1970's. For the international arena
looks very promising indeed from Moscow; the Soviet Union is
stronger militarily than ever before; the Soviet Union has established
some sort of order in the bloc; the Soviet Union has extended its po-
litical and military influence into many parts of the world; the Soviet
Government has even raised the standard of living of its citizens and
introduced a modicum of relaxation in its international affairs.
At the time, the United States, which had dominated the inter-
national arena for the past two decades, is showing signs of fatigue
with its global role. This fatigue is in part the result of: waning Sup-
port of the American people for foreign interventions; the result of
urban disorders and demands for domestic priorities in policy deci-
sions; the result of the “no more Vietnam” syndrome.
145
These developments are carefully analyzed in Moscow and are in-
terpreted there as signs of American disenchantment with global roles
and responsibilities and as signs of waning American resolve to check
every kind of Soviet initiative or Communist aggression.
I suggest therefore, that before we succumb to the glittering prom-
ises of summitry, and before we fall victim to our illusions and wishful
thinking, that we ought to remain realistic about Soviet intentions,
perceptions and designs focusing on SALT. -
SALT AND THE SOVIET MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
The recent agreements in Moscow have not affected Soviet military
capabilities in any significant way. They merely formalized certain
Soviet and U.S. preferences and established numerical ceilings and
ratios for strategic forces which are higher than the presently existing
Soviet military capabilities. Yet, I would not be surprised to find out
that the Soviet military establishment found these largely symbolic
gestures objectionable. For the Soviet defense establishment is a
powerful institution in the scheme of Soviet politics, a veritable state
within a state, a description that usually evokes loud and angry Soviet
disavowals. What is the basis of the Soviet military’s power? /
The Soviet Union is a state without any provisions for the regular
and predictable transfer of state power. Thus, each succession to power
is a kind of crisis. Under Stalin, the several powerful institutions in
the state existed in a condition of balances, or divide-and-conquer,
with the Security organs, the military, the state bureaucraçies and the
Party apparatus balancing each other, while Stalin served as the
linchpin of the whole system.
Since the death of Stalin one of the vital balancers, the security
Organs, were removed from the political arena and the governmental
bureaucracies were reduced in their political group, while the military
remains as the main source of coercive power. The military has in
recent years grown in institutional strength and their voice in affairs
of the state has grown commensurably. We must ask therefore, what
does the military want? What are their preferences and objectives?
Like elsewhere, the Soviet military want large and growing budg-
etary allocations to their institution; the military demands the pri-
macy of defense and security interests over any other social objectives;
they prefer an international environment which is less than stable,
One which contains various levels of tension useful for the rationaliza-
tion of military demands, functions and interests; they have little
regard for their political leaders’ ability to properly manage the
strategic and Security affairs of the state. -
More concretely, the Soviet defense establishment continues to see
high political and military utility of great military power, and they
seem eager to project that power into targets of opportunity outside
Soviet borders. Soviet military spokesmen continue to view interna-
tional politics as a “Zero-sum-game” and they tend to plan on the
basis of the “worst possible case” approach. They argue therefore,
that the West must never be trusted; that a deterrence-only policy
may have fatal consequences; and that strategic-technological superi-
ority is a plausible and desirable Soviet objective.

146
It is possible that these Soviet military views are nothing more than
the usual Saber-rattling of generals who must persuade their political
masters of the military's viligence and toughness. It is also possible
that the Party leadership is able to exercise full control over their
marshals and generals. At the same time, it would be naive to dismiss
the Soviet defense establishment's militancy and internal political
influence as a Western exaggeration. For the Soviet military is in
many important ways different from others, including our own.
In any event, the Soviet defense establishment views SALT with
reservations; these reservations would become much more powerful if
and when SALT moves into more realistic and consequential negotia-
tions on the limitations of offensive strategic weapons. In such an
event, the defense establishment would likely offer strong resistance
to their political leaders.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It is argued here that Soviet interests in SALT are limited, in-
strumental and essentially political. They are limited to the extent
that SALT does not imply any reduction in Soviet military capabili-
ties or in their arms programs. SALT merely formalizes certain cur-
rent and future strategic ratios between the Soviet Union and the
United States. -
They are instrumental to the extent that SALT serves other im-
portant Soviet objectives as a peredishka, a necessary breathing pause,
in stabilizing one traditional area of confrontation, as the Soviet Union
assumes new responsibilities and commitments in the Far East, Asia
and south of Russia.
They are essentially political, to the extent that SALT formalizes
Superpower political equality and symbolically binds the United
States to the Soviet Union, while excluding China and others from
this compact.
Another argument made here is that SALT does not significantly
change the adversary relationship of the United States and the Soviet
Union. Any expectations of dramatic departures in Soviet foreign
policy are bound to be disappointed. If anything, one would expect
a heightened Soviet foreign policy activism in areas of presumed vul-
nerability, opportunity and low U.S. interest. Such policy activism is
likely to proceed at a slow, uneventful pace, in an unobstructive, ag-
gressive manner, in areas of strong Soviet interest. For example, the
Middle East would appear to be such a target of opportunity and is
likely to become an area of continuing Soviet penetration. -
A further argument advanced here is that while American globalism
and interventionism is waning, Soviet globalism and imperialism is
gaining momentum. The Soviet Union had been denied a global role
by Western policies of containment and by U.S. strategic superiority.
Having broken out of containment, and having finally achieved stra-
tegic parity, the Soviet military and political elites face an adversary
who is assumed to be “fatigued” and moving into a neoisolationist
position. Thus, Soviet elites find themselves in the possession of enor-
mous power, a power that is looking for a purpose. And that purpose
will be shaped by the resolve of their traditional adversary, by probes
147
into Vulnerable targets of opportunity and by the internal politics in
the Soviet Union.
Thank you.
(Biographic sketch of Dr. Kolkowicz follows:)
BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH OF ROMAN KOLKOWICZ
Born 1929, US citizen, married, three children.
Education: M.A. and Ph.D. degrees received at the University of Chicago.
Areas of Specialization: Comparative politics; International relations; Soviet
Foreign and Strategic Policy.
Professional Activities: Professor of Political Science, University of California
Los Angeles, 1970–. Senior Staff Member, Institute for Defense Analyses,
1966–70. Visiting Professor, George Washington University, 1968–69; University
of Virginia, 1967–68; and CUNY, 1966–67. Research Staff Member, The RAND
Corporation, 1961–66. - -
Related Activities: Delivered papers, lectures at international conferences at
Evian, France (1966); West Berlin (1967); Moscow (1968); Garmisch, Ger-
many (1969); Washington (1967); Tel Aviv (1971). Also at Harvard, Columbia,
War College, Berkeley, etc. Directed two research projects: Research Project
On the Warsaw Pact for the Department of Defense, (ISA), at the Institute for
Defense Analyses, 1967–69; and Research Project on Arms Control for the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, at IDA 1968–1969.
Languages: Proficient in Russian, German and Polish.
Publications: Books—“The Soviet Military and the Communist Party,” Prince-
ton University Press, 1967. “The Soviet Union and Arms Control,” (editor and
co-author), Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. “Interest Groups in Soviet Politics”
(contributor), Princeton University Press, 1970. “Armed Forces and Society”
(contributor) Mouton, The Hague, 1968. “The Soviet Union : A Half-Century of
Communism” (contributor) Johns Hopkins, 1968. “The Prospects for Arms
Control” (contributor), MacFadden, 1965.
Articles and Monographs: Numerous monographs completed at the RAND
Corporation and the Institute for Defense Analyses; also published in World
Politics, Journal of International Affairs, Orbis, Comparative Politics, Aussen-
politik, Osteuropa, Survey, Problems of Communism, Interplay, Estudios Inter-
nacionales, Military Review, etc.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Kolkowicz.
COMMENDATION OF WITNESSES
Those are very provocative statements, all three of them. I regret
that there are not more members of the committee here to hear these
very thoughtful statements. I can assure that all of the committee ex-
pressed a desire to hold these hearings, but when the hearings are held
for some reason or other they have other matters that seem to take
precedence. But I think that all of your statements are extremely well
thought out.
IS AGREEMENT A HOAX 2
Dr. Kolkowicz, do I gather from your statement that you feel, as I
believe Mr. Shulman put it, that this agreement is a hoax? Do you
think it should not be ratified ?
Dr. Kolkowicz. Not at all. I believe the agreement is not a hoax. I
am suggesting that we should be aware about what the agreement im-
plies in concrete political and military terms; at the same time, we
ought to be aware that the agreement is not likely to bring about
major changes in United States-Soviet relations.
The CHAIRMAN. I get the feeling that you don’t think it promises
anything.
148
Dr. KolrowICz. No; I was simply trying to introduce an element of
caution in terms of the expectation of regarding these treaties, and
how they might possibly affect Soviet Foreign policy. I am not per-
suaded there will be a substantial change in their foreign policy.
The CHAIRMAN. If it is used as an excuse for a vastly accelerated
arms race than it is a hoax; isn’t it?
Dr. KoDRowICZ. Well, not necessarily. I see SALT I as a sort of
first step of a long journey that might possibly lead to an improved
psychological political climate in which further negotiations, more
concrete negotiations, may take place. Thus, SALT I Seems to be large-
ly symbolic, an arrangement in which neither side gave away any-
thing they didn’t want to. It appears to be a formalization of their own
preferences at a superpower level.
ZERO-STUMI-GAME
The CHAIRMAN. What does the term “Zero-sum-game” mean? I have
never seen that used before.
Dr. Kolkowicz. Well, I am afraid this is sort of a hangover of my
past, I used to work for the Rand Corporation and at that time we
used to resort to these kind of things, rather than speak simple Eng-
lish.
Zero-sum-game merely suggests a conflict relationship in which one
i. can only gain if the other loses. The two sides cannot both gain or
OSe.
The CHAIRMAN. There is no such thing as a mutual advantageous
agreement then?
Dr. Kolkowicz. Yes. I was saying therefore that the Soviet military
seems to view international relations today in the zero-sum-game form,
from a zero-sum-game premise.
QUESTION OF AGREEMENT AS OPPOSED TO RECOGNITION OF FACTS
Senator CASE. You have made a very interesting point, Mr. Chair-
man. The question reflected is fundamental: can there be a useful agree-
ment as opposed to a useful recognition of status or of existing facts?
Forgive me for the interruption—
The CHAIRMAN. I will always welcome your interruptions.
Senator CASE. I have been intrigued by this for sometime. It seems to
me possible to state this in a way that doesn’t downgrade an agreement
entirely but rather looks at it as a recognition of existing facts. Nego-
tiations for an agreement therefore are useful chiefly for the explora-
tions that both sides are obliged to undertake into these facts and the
relative strengths of each side. I think this is an extremely important
consideration and one that the chairman has touched upon frequently.
It is especially vital in its bearing upon the question of what we do in
connection with the weapons now being requested and the arms race
generally.
The CHAIRMAN. I am so pleased to have a colleague. I will yield to
you now. You may proceed. I think it is very comforting to have at
least one member who is sufficiently interested to come to this meeting.
Senator CASE. In defense of the other members of the Committee,
149
and I Speak not for myself, it should be noted that other duties, in-
cluding those involving other committees, sometimes makes attendance
difficult.
The CHAIRMAN. I can assure you I didn’t set this meeting at my
convenience. It is customary to have them at 10 o’clock on week days.
It wasn’t for my convenience that it was set at 10 o’clock. It is the
Only time traditionally we have a meeting. Do you wish to proceed?
DIFFERENCE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AGREEMENTS
Senator CASE. In connection with the point I was making earlier it
does not seem to me that an agreement in international affairs is made
in the same fashion as one in the business world.
An agreement in international affairs differs in that it involves a
recognition of balances and existing conditions—and this, I believe,
downgrades the argument that “bargaining chips” are so necessary—
they aren’t, really. The only “bargaining chips” are those reflected in
the other sides recognition of your willingness to defend your national
integrity. If you are so willing, then the other side likely will agree
to a reasonable deal based upon existing relative strengths. If the pres-
ervation of these respective conditions is in the interests of both sides,
then a lasting deal will be made. If not, then one side is dissembling
in order to get some advantage and the deal will be worthless.
I don’t think these agreements are worthless. I think they are useful
as far as they go, although they are limited in nature.
Dr. SHULMAN. Could I respond to this point?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
ATTITUDE OF SOVIET MILITARY
Dr. SHULMAN. In the passage you refer to, what Mr. Kolkowicz
is doing is to characterize the attitude of the Soviet military, as he
understands it, and he is saying that from their point of view the
agreements represent a zero-sum-game in the sense that it is a situa-
tion in which one side wins and the other loses, but it is not possible
to have both sides win. I take it he is not saying that, this is his view
of the SALT agreements, and I hope there is no misunderstanding of
that point and I would want to underline that.
ISSUE TO SECURITY THEORY UNDERLYING PROGRAM
It seems to me this characteristic of our strategic military competi-
tion with the Soviet Union is in a somewhat different category than
the kind of political competition that he speaks of elsewhere. This is
one area where agreements to dampen down the competition can be
advantageous to both sides in which neither side necessarily loses by
the agreement. I feel strongly that the effort to play the numbers game
closely figuring the number of missiles is grossly misleading and in
fact that the effort to use these agreements for the purpose of getting
support for additional military programs has a certain “catch 22”
quality about it. That is to say, what is at issue here is what theory of
Security really underlies the program. Do we really accept the princi-
ple that by dampening down the strategic competition we are both
150
better off—without any illusions that the rest of our competition is
going to continue, but at least it may be safer and less costly? That is
the issue as I see it. Or are we simply using these negotiations for the
deceptive purpose of cloaking an effort to force the pace of the tech-
nological arms race? If that is so I think that then it would be a hoax.
Dr. TUCKER. May I respond? -
The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.
REGISTRATION OF FACTS AND INTENTIONS IN AGREEMENTS BETWEEN STATES
Dr. TUCKER. On the matter of agreements, it seems to me that agree-
ments between states do register facts but along with the facts they
also may register intentions, and I think both of them have to be in-
volved in any agreement, and because they do represent both facts
and intentions they may be significant landmarks in a change in a
relationship between two states involved in the agreements. But as I
think both Professor Shulman and I wanted to emphasize very
strongly, very much depends on how we both go from here, the Soviet
Union and the United States. On this point I do find myself in one
rather significant, I won’t say disagreement, but difference of empha-
sis with my colleague, Professor Kolkowicz, and that is over the role
of the Soviet military in the Soviet state.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SOVIET UNION
If I understand his position correctly, the Soviet government the
Soviet state at the present time is viewed almost as a state controlled
by its military establishment. He gave us a picture of Premier Malen-
kov having been ousted when he went against the military wishes and
later of Khrushchev being ousted when he went against the military
wishes, and of projection is that Brezhnev will go the same way if he
goes against the military.
I think I would consider this somewhat of an oversimplication of the
realities of civil-military relations in the Soviet Union. I think it would
be partly true of the Malenkov case, but I think in the case of the fall
of Khrushchev many other issues than the displeasure of the military
were involved. I also think we can’t project past incidents into the
future. In some ways the pressure from below upon the government to
improve the standard of living of the Soviet people is greater now than
it ever has been in the past and I believe that is one factor that might
counter-balance these military advisers.

WAYS IN WEHICH SOVIET MILITARY DIFFERS FROM OURS
The CHAIRMAN. Could I return to that passage, Mr. Kolkowicz,
after discussing the zero-sum-game you say, “For the Soviet military
is in many important ways different from others, including our own.”
What are some of the important ways in which it differs from our
OWI). -
Dr. Kolkowicz. Well, first, I would suggest that during the last
four or five decades of Soviet history the military has been treated
preferentially by the Party. Most of Soviet social and economic plan-
ning was built around the military’s interests; massive social and polit-
151
ical reforms were undertaken in the interest of the defense establish-
ment. *
The CHAIRMAN. How does that differ from the influence of th
American military establishment? -
Dr. Kolkowicz. One could explain it further. The Soviet military,
while it has been controlled by the civilian leaders all these years, is
perceived by the leadership as a constant source of potential challenge
to the Party. There is an enormous system of political controls in the
military; I don’t know of any other military establishment in the
world that is subject to such complex 4–5 layers of controls. All of this
is to make sure that the military remains at all times politically reliable
and pliable. gº -
The CHAIRMAN. And what?
Dr. Kolkowicz. Politically reliable and manageable, controlled. I
don’t know of any other military establishment that is in a similar
position.
Senator CASE. I wonder if we could illustrate—
The CHAIRMAN. One little question, please, and then I will yield.
You are intimating that the military in Russia is effectively con-
trolled by the political leadership. They do not have instances of a
General like General LaVelle and others going off the reservation fol-
lowing their own view. Is that what you are saying?
Dr. Kolkowicz. I am not saying that.
The CHAIRMAN. You are saying they control it?
Dr. KolºowICZ. Yes, sir. -
The CHAIRMAN. And that this is a difference between them and us.
Dr. Kolkowicz. Well, this is one of the differences. We don’t know
about the General LaVelles in the Soviet Union because they keep these
things secret; they don’t have a public press. But there are certain
reliable sources that give reliable information on instances of military
intervention and-
The CHAIRMAN. Don’t you think, outside of the LaVelle case and
others, we have civilian control of the military 2 I thought you used
this as a difference.
You said there are many important differences from ours and you
immediately say they are controlled by the political leadership, as if
this was a difference.
Dr. Kolokowicz. I am suggesting that there is an enormous control
apparatus which doesn’t exist any place else. At the very least it tells
us the sense of concern by Soviet political leaders with their military.
That control is not very effective, but it exists and it is very compli-
cated.
The CHAIRMAN. You don’t think we are concerned about our
military.
Dr. KolkowICZ. I am not saying that. -
The CHAIRMAN. I would like to get precisely what you are saying.
Dr. Kolkowicz. Our concerns with our military and the Soviet con-
cerns with their military seem to differ in intensity and concretely.
The Soviet military has been at the center of their political preoccu-
pation for many decades. The Soviet military is the most controlled
institution in the state. The military establishment is at the same time
the most preferentially treated institution in terms of social and eco-
nomic planning and budgetary allocation policies.
152
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET ATTENTION TO MILITARY AFFAIRS
The CHAIRMAN. But do you see any real distinction between the
relative devotion of our resources and attention to military affairs in
this country and in Russia. I would have thought looking at the last
ten years, at least, that the military operations and expenditures
Occupy even greater attention and resources in other countries than
they do in the Soviet Union.
Do you disagree with that? -
Dr. Kolkowicz. I agree that this was the case in the last decade or
So; I would certainly agree with that. But I am talking about the
whole span of Soviet history, from the late 1920's until the 1970's.
The CHAIRMAN. I think all countries that have been invaded as often
as they have, for example, by Germans twice, and exposed to in-
vasions, have all been more conscious of the military threat than we
have because we have been more isolated. We have not been invaded
or bombed; we have only bombed others during these past 25 years.
In that sense they are more conscious of their defense. Is that not so?
Isn't it true of France? Hasn’t she had the same feeling of exposure
and other countries that are surrounded by people who have invaded
them?
Dr. KolºowICZ. Yes, this is possibly true. .
The CHAIRMAN. It is not peculiar to the Soviets. There are good
reasons for them to be preoccupied about, for example, Germany;
aren’t there? .
Dr. Kolkowicz. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Concrete reasons?
Dr. Kolkowicz. Yes, sir. -
The CHAIRMAN. Then I am trying to get the significance of this and
how different it is.
Dr. KOLKowICZ. It may be a matter of emphasis or degree of em-
phasis. I would also stress the peculiar role of the military as a source
of constant potential instability within its system. This is an impor-
tant difference between our two political systems.
The CHAIRMAN. I may have misunderstood the thrust of your state-
ment, which is a very good statement. In a sense is this a rather futile
operation because no matter what you do the Russian military is so
strong they will do as they please and they will override the others and
the political leadership are so afraid of being ousted by them that if
they don’t give them everything they want there is not much hope in
any kind of restrictions upon the military in Russia? Is that true or
not?
Dr. Kolkowicz. No; that is not true.
The CHAIRMAN. I am just giving you an opportunity to make it
clear to the uninitiated. That is what these hearings are for.
Dr. KoDKowICZ. I am not suggesting that the Party leadership is
at all times scared or threatened by takeover; this is not the case. We
are talking about massive institutional pressure, of what we call the
military industrial complex, upon the party leadership, not in terms
of a military coup but in terms of affecting policy choices. This is
Something not unlike what has been taking place in other countries in
the West.
The CHAIRMAN. It is not unlike here, is my impression.
153
Dr. KolrowICZ. That is right. -
The CHAIRMAN. When you said it was very different, I immediately
thought how is it different. It seems to me it is very similar.
Dr. Kolkowicz. It is different. , , \
. The CHAIRMAN. The apparatus may be different. The final effect
is that the military gets anything they want out to the Congress; don’t
you agree? They have to now. I can’t think of an important issue
in which the military have been interested in the last ten years that
they didn't get what they wanted, almost to the nickel. Is that not
true? A.
Dr. Kol,KowICZ. That is true, Mr. Chairman. ~
The CHAIRMAN. How does it differ than other than merely a me-
chanical arrangement for the exercise of power?
f
PossIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENT BY RESTRICTING ACCELERATION
I am not trying to put words in your mouth. The final effect of
this is whether or not this agreement has significance. I agree with
other statements that have been made that unless we accept this in good
faith and unless we implement it by restricting this acceleration, it
is a hoax and it is a facade. But if we implement it by showing re-
straint, genuine restraint, it can be made the beginning of an effective
program of deescalation of the Soviet military affairs. That is all
I am trying to say. And I want to get your views.
Dr. Kolkowicz. I certainly agree with that. -
The CHAIRMAN. You left me with the impression you didn’t think
there was much hope of that.
Dr. KolrowICz. I am afraid I may have given the wrong im-
pression.
The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would clarify it. It isn’t easy to com-
municate with me, I suppose, because there are too many other things
that distract us. I am only trying to give you an opportunity to
clarify, not to argue with me.
Dr. KOLKOwſCZ. Shall I do it now?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.
Dr. Kolkowicz. Let me briefly repeat what I said. I said that SALT
I is essentially a symbolic gesture, in which both sides agreed to give
away very little. It is not disarmament; it doesn’t really change the
levels of their respective military capabilities.
The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that.
Dr. KOLKOWICZ. I further stated that the Soviet Union has in the
past 20 years been exposed to a variety of coercive western policies,
policies of containment, massive retaliation, strategic superiority, and
that only very recently have the Soviet military and political leaders
obtained this long sought advantage of political equality and strategic
parity. I am suggesting therefore, that it doesn’t seem very realistic
that the Soviet Union which has labored for 25 years to obtain that
dearly sought objective, would be willing to trade it away in such a
way, that it would bind them to agreements which may affect their
Security or their freedom of policy, their freedom to press for political
advantage based on military strength. Thus, I prefer to look at SALT
as a two-level problem. One aspect of SALT will lead to certain arms
control agreement, which have their own utility, depending on how

154
they are followed up. The other aspect of SALT, its implications to
Soviet foreign policy, is separate from the arms control agreement.
Thus, traditional Soviet foreign policy is very likely to remain very
active and possibly militant.
The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that. I think it will remain active. But
does that lessen the necessity of going forward with the arms control?
Dr. Kolkowicz. Not at all.
The CHAIRMAN. So you are in favor of that?
Dr. Kolkowicz. I certainly amin favor.
EFFECT OF AGREEMENTS AND ARMS REQUESTS
The CHAIRMAN. Would you be in favor also of our proceeding to
implement the requests of Secretary Laird? What effect would it have
upon the agreements if the Congress both agreed to the treaty and the
agreement and at the same time authorized these vast new techno-
logically superior systems? Do you think that we should or should not
do both 2 -
Dr. Kolkowicz. Well, I must agree here with my colleague, Pro-
fessor Shulman, or was it Professor Tucker, who suggested that argu-
ing from numbers is not always the best way to deal with this compli-
cated problem. If we insist on the need for some sort of bargaining
chips in order to persuade the Russians to give up some of their bar-
gaining chips then this is likely to set in motion a new action-reaction
momentum of a new arms race. We would have two parallel develop-
ments, one in which we negotiate a dampening of the arms race and
another which would lead to increased arms production programs on
both sides. I am not sure that this is the best way to go about arms
control.
- - SHOULD WE SHOW RESTRAINT 2
The CHAIRMAN. Can I conclude from that you feel we should show
restraint in going forward with these proposed weapons systems that
are very expensive?
Dr. Kolkowicz. Restraint in what sense?
The CHAIRMAN. By not proceeding with them at the present time,
giving at least a reasonable time to see what the intentions of the
people in the Russian government are. To put it another way, you
said the numbers are not very significant. I think you all agree with
that. What is significant is the underlying intention of the two
countries; whether they accept the principle of parity, whether they
accept the principle of restraint in further arms races or whether they
don’t. This is what I meant by the restraint.
If we proceed immediately with the vast escalation of highly sophis-
ticated weapons, it seems to me it does undermine. It shows something
about our intentions, which are simply to transfer from numbers to
quality, and that we can with our alleged superior technology—When
I look at what happened to the country in the last two weeks, I am
not so sure about this technology being very superior except in the
arms race and going to the moon. Other than that I don’t see that we
have such great technological superiority. Maybe there are good rea-
sons for that.
155
What are your feelings about the question how it bears upon the
intentions, really, of what do these people mean by this. Have we ar-
rived at the point where we are willing to accept parity or are we only
transferring the struggle into an area where we think we can gain
Superiority? The word superiority is used quite often and has been
used in these hearings.
STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY
Mr. Laird made no bones, I believe I am right, in his testimony. We
must have superiority in the technological field and maintain our
superiority is the way I think he put it in the hearing last week.
Dr. Kolkowicz. Mr. Chairman, I am not quite sure what superiority
means in the context of contemporary nuclear deterrence.
The CHAIRMAN. The way he was using it it means we can throw a
weapon from a Trident twice as far as they can throw one from their
existing Y-class submarine. That is what he means by it; isn’t it?
Dr. KoDKowICZ. I suppose, yes, but one wants to follow this up.
It seems to me that the notion of strategic superiority doesn’t have
much currency. What we see presently is the burden of past ideas on
both sides. Russian strategists are now thinking of strategy the way
we have been doing for the past 10–15 years. At that time we thought
in terms of strategic superiority, four to one or five to one, etc. But
in the present context of massive weapons, and MIRV’s etc. I fail to see
utility in concepts of superiority except as a numerical ratio which
has no significant military implications or consequences.
The CHAIRMAN. I don’t either. Senator Case.
Senator CASE. Go ahead, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. No; I yield to you. I am finished.
MAINTENANCE OF SOVIET CIVILIAN AUTHORITY OVER MILITARY
Senator CASE. Earlier you were talking about several ways in which
the Soviet civilians maintain authority over the military, I would like
to ask you to name two of the ways in which this is done—as an
illustration.
Dr. KoDKowICZ. Yes, sir. There is an organization called MPA, a
part of the Central Committee Secretariat. This is a very critical
control organ whose agents and operatives parallel every level of the
military hierarchy.
Senator CASE. At the highest level?
Dr. Kolkowicz. From the very top.
Senator CASE. These are members appointed by the Party ap-
paratus?
Dr. Kolkowicz. Yes, sir.
Senator CASE. And responsible only to the Party and having access
to all of the information.
Dr. KoDROWICZ. Yes, sir.
Senator CASE. What is the relationship between an MPA member
of the General Staff and a military member?
Dr. Kolkowicz. At the highest levels, they have military councils
rather than direct control organs. A military council typically consists
of a commander, a ranking military leader, his deputy, the representa-
tive of the Party unit there, and an MPA functionary. This is to
80–942 O—72—11
156
make sure that whatever takes place at the highest military levels
is open to constant scrutiny and control of the Party. The Party has
also always been concerned with military closure and has always
tried to open it up, to see what goes on in the military units, from the
very top to the bottom. The MPA represents only one layer of control
and it parallels the whole military structure. There are three—four
others, including the regular Party organization in each military unit
which reports upward to the Party Central Committee.
Senator CASE. How does that work in the case of a platoon, for
example?
Dr. Kolkowicz. Let's take a regiment or battalion—all the Com-
munist Party members of this particular unit belong to a Party com-
mittee or Party organization. In this particular Party unit all are
assumed to be equal, the colonel and the lieutenants are considered
to be equal by the Party.
Senator CASE. Does this cell consist only of commissioned officers?
Dr. KoDRowICZ. No, this applies to enlisted personnel, too, but I
was referring to the officers. They are also encouraged by the Party
to participate in a process which they call Criticism/Self-Criticism,
which is a unique sort of innovation where everybody is expected
to confess their sins against the Party; they are asked to point their
finger at anyone who has transgressed against the Party, and all of
this is taken down and recorded. This serves to open up the closure-
prone military units and keep the military less than secure.
Senator CASE. How is discipline maintained in such circumstances?
Dr. KolrowICz. During the regular military activities they have
traditional discipline. But I was talking about extra-military activi-
ties, like party meetings, MPA meetings, indoctrination, propaganda
activities. It is through these activities that the party asserts its own
prerogatives and authority.
During some periods of stress in the late 1950's and early 1960's,
this led to severe erosion of morale, but they have since dealt with it.

RUSSIAN MILITARY's voice, IN DETERMINING POLICY
Senator CASE. But then your point was that in spite of the various
ways in which civilians maintain control over the military, neverthe-
less the military in Russia has a strong voice in determining policy,
as they have here.
Dr. KolºowICz. I think I really should make something clear. I
do not want to imply that the Soviet military is constantly threatening
the regime— -
Senator CASE. But it does determine policy. *
Dr. Kolkowicz. By exerting a strong influence on policy, that is
right. - -
§ºnator CASE. In effect, what the situation is here.
Dr. Kolkowicz. Yes.
POSSIBILITY OF MAINTAINING STATUS QUO
Senator CASE. I wish you would address yourself, if you are inter-
ested, to the question of whether it is really possible to have agree-
ments between old and settled countries and those that are “on the
make.”
157
I think one of the great concerns of people who are concerned about
this country’s giving away too much, is not that those who wish to go
further are unpatriotic. Rather, they seem to fear that since we are
a “stand pat” country, we had better be as tough as we can in trying
to maintain the status quo-which happens at the moment to be satis-
factory with us. Is it ever possible to maintain a status quo?
Dr. SHULMAN. May I comment?
Senator CASE. Yes. This interests me very much and I believe it is
quite basic to the political side of the matter in the United States.
Dr. SHULMAN. I agree, Senator, I think this is a crucial question,
but the question to which it leads is what kind of power is important
in terms of our related political influence. - -
This is a period, as you suggest, in which the Soviet Union is de-
veloping as a nation, is increasing its role in international affairs, is
seeking to increase its influence in the world. • -
Now, I suppose that the question that is raised by the recent debates
is whether the superiority that we have had in the past is a vital
factor in projecting American influence in the world or not, or whether
other forms of power may not be more important.
As I suggested in my statement, we have had an extraordinary
capacity for destruction and yet in spite of that we have had a decline
of American influence. My own judgment is that that is not because the
world has reached a condition of parity in strategic competition be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United States, I think it has to do
with other forms of power with our political skill, with our use of
our economic resources, with the condition of our society at home,
the confidence of our allies in the United States, the confidence of our
people here in our own society.
These strike me as more relevant to the competition for political
influence than it would if we had, say, twice as many intercontinental
missiles as the Soviet Union.
Senator CASE. Does anyone else wish to comment?
RUSSIA Is OLD ESTABLISHED STATUS Power IN CERTAIN SENSE
Dr. TUCKER. Senator, I might say a word. I think it might be
added to what has just been said that the Soviet Union, too, in a certain
sense is an old established status power, to use your words. Sometimes
in the heat of discussions we tend to take it too much at its own, so
to speak, ideological face value as a country committed to revolutions.
We must remember that this revolution is 55 years old and that at 55
most revolutions are middle aged. And that is in many ways true of
the Russian revolution. It is a country which, while in certain re-
spects it is still actively involved in increasing its influence in the
world, and we have all talked about that, we are all very much aware
of that, but in certain other ways has a status quo to protect, particu-
larly the status quo in Europe. In certain ways it is a conservative state
and we have to learn to think in those terms. In certain ways the
major problems that the Soviet government faces today are due to
its conservatism, its unwillingness to liberalize its present laws, to
abolish the censorship, to democratize areas of society, and to re-
structure the long standing established single party system. Conse-
quently, I don't think the image of the old established static United
158
States confronted with activistic dynamic Soviet Union is a very
accurate reflection of the reality of our interrelationship.
Senator CASE. I think you are right. I recognize now that the way
in which I put the question made it sound as if it is a contest between
“aggressive” Russia versus “old established” United States. Although
the Russian government isn’t as old in the modern sense, one could
draw a parallel between Russia and Rome. Some have said that Rome
was trying to conquer the world because she was afraid of being de-
feated—and there is something in this, although in both cases I think
a certain degree of crusading spirit was involved. -
IMPORTANCE OF UNDERLYING ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL FORCES
What I am trying to say is that it is not so much agreements that
are important—rather it is the underlying economic and cultural
forces, certainly including nationalism. -
NO UNILATERAL REDUCTION OF U.S. MILITARY POSITION
I am trying to arrive at an orderly picture of this. What does it lead
to so far as the United States is concerned ? It isn’t in the mind of
any of you, I take it, that we should unilaterally and substantially
reduce our relative military position vis-a-vis Russia.
Dr. SHULMAN. No.
SLOWING DOWN U.S. BUILDUP
Senator CASE. I also take it that you think it possible that the United
States could take a chance on slowing down our military build-up a bit
and seeing whether a similar response was forthcoming from the
other side. Broadly, are you in agreement on these issues?
Dr. SHULMAN. Yes, sir. Could Irephrase it a bit, Senator.
Senator CASE. Yes.
Dr. SHULMAN. I take it the issue about the new defense programs
that are proposed is not one of the extremes, that is of unilateral dis-
armament on one side or preparations for a massive program on the
other, but that it comes down to a question of degree—how much is
needed and how soon. My own feeling, which I gather is shared by
my colleagues here, is that in the present context of the agreements and
our hope for follow on agreements, what seems to be suggested is a
steady program holding our defenses at something like the present
level. Our feeling is that we are not in a situation so far as we can judge
where our deterrent is jeopardized by developments that are likely to
take place in the next few years during which a SALT II may be
negotiated. Our feeling is that holding steady means not particularly
accelerating new programs of advanced systems in the present period.
It does not seem to me at least that the case for doing so is persuasive.
It seems to me the case against doing so is quite strong in that it would
tend to undermine the possibilities for further agreements, as I think
all three of us have said in one way or another. The basis of the present
SALT agreement and indeed the range of agreements reached at the
summit meeting is essentially that at this moment there has been
achieved a condition of something like parity, whatever parity means;
159
for all practical purposes it means the two countries have something
like an adequate defense which they feel comfortable with.
... I would argue that instead of trying to upset that condition, whether
in the name of a bargaining chip tactic or whatever rationalization,
our interests are better served by maintaining that condition and try-
ing to damp it down, than to move to higher levels. This would be the
argument.
What follows from this, I think, is not only the ratification of the
treaty and the approval of the interim agreement but attention to the
political context, attention to our intentions as expressed in our cur-
rent military programs.
Now, the arguments that have been made in this country have been
based largely on what the Soviet Union might do or what they could
do. Some of the military have argued that they are presenting a case
based not on Soviet intentions but on Soviet capabilities. But consider
what the reaction would be in this country if it were Marshal Grechko
who had been saying the things that have been said by the United
States military lately. Then there would be real alarm raised, but can
we not expect a comparable reaction on the Soviet side?
Dr. TUCKER. I would like to simply restate what my colleague has
just said in slightly different words because we are in complete agree-
ment.
What I think is so deeply concerning us is a sense of the kind of
predicament in which these two great powers each feel compelled,
under pressure of assumptions about what the other is going to do, to
act as though what the other is going to do in the next phase presents
it with the need to do the most itself. . .
We are concerned about the fact that certain pressures in both
Societies on the governments of the two societies seem to cooperate in
bringing about this constant spiral of competitive effort in the arma-
ment field, and in a sense the agreement could be a very very signifi-
cant first step toward a more rational way of relating, of Russia and
America relating to one another so that we don’t have to operate on
the worst-possible-case assumption. -
So in answer to our question, where does this leave us, or where
does it lead us, I think my feeling is it leaves us with an opportunity,
a possibility in the course of the coming months, maybe even over a
longer period, to take advantage of this agreement in order to get the
dynamic competitive arms development under control. I think it fol-
lows from the arguments that were being presented in these papers
that both the Soviet Union and the United States presently have an
enormous interest in some kind of control over the allocations of their
resources, this represents an opportunity to work in this direction.
QUESTION OF HOW TO PROCEED IN DAMPENING MILITARY COMPETITION
Senator CASE. I think no one could disagree with that as a general
proposition. But the question remains of how you then proceed, how
you get a handle on the course of action to follow. Absent a resolution
of this program, all that can be done is to consider each individual
weapon, for example, on its own individual merits. In this connection
we expect the military to be resourceful and ingenious and to keep
ahead, at least conceptually, of the potential of any possible aggres-
160
sor. We would be very uncomfortable if we didn’t think this was
being done. J - -
If you were Admiral Zumwalt, for example, you would have very
specific ideas about what is necessary in the Mediterranean.
Do you have any thoughts about this?
Dr. SHULMAN. Yes, I do, Senator.
If we have as an objective the dampening down of the military
competition I think we have to take it in a series of stages. The first
stage relates to the strategic balance and that is what we are dealing
with now in the present SALT agreements, the prospect for future
agreements. -
I do think, as you suggested, that we need to look beyond this in
several ways. Firstly, on the strategic side. We have to work not only
for a balance as we are doing now but to get to the point of reductions
and eventually to get out from under what is essentially the hideous
present reality which is that we see our security based upon a deter-
rent balance. Deterrence is just another way of saying two civilian
populations are held in hostage against the risk of destruction. That
is not a very satisfactory condition, though it maybe the best one we
can have at the moment. So I think our perspective in regard to stra-
tegic weapons is to work first toward a balance, secondly toward a re-
duction and bringing the new technology advances at least to a slower
pace, and then, thirdly, to work beyond that toward some strengthen-
ing of international institutions so we aren’t dependent upon the
hostage system. Then there are the other aspects of the arms race that
have to do with the conventional weapons. And it is true, as you sug-
gest, that perhaps the condition of parity in the strategic field may
raise more sharply the question of the balance of conventional weapons
of fleets, men under arms, mobility, fire power of the conventional
forces. In fact from the point of view of our defense budget, the high-
est proportion of our budget does go into general purpose forces, and
if we want to bring out resources into balance we have to pay atten-
tion to reductions in the general purpose forces as well as in the stra-
tegic side.
Moreover, it is the potentiality of sparks that may be struck by the
fleets or the mobile forces of the two sides in troubled spots in the
world, whether in the Middle East or South East Asia, that do contain
the risk of conflict in the world that could get out of control.
So I think it has to be on our agenda to move beyond this stage
of negotiations to an effort to dampen down the competitions in navies
and in conventional forces. -
Now there, too, some of the same problems that have bedeviled us
in the strategic field have also operated in the field of conventional
weapons. We have also had the sound of alarm about what the Rus-
sians have been doing. It is true that they have built up their Navy,
fairly substantially, although it is, I think, still by a substantial mar-
gin less powerful than our own. The alarm is raised not so much
about what the Russians have done but what they might do in the
future. This is essentially a subjunctive condition. It is based on
extrapolations from present rates of building vessels and submarines,
what their position may be generally and in particular parts of the
world, in the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and so on.
161
GEOGRAPHICAL ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
Senator CASE. —Taking into account the fact that we are an island
nation and Russia acts from a heart land large enough to support
itself. -
Dr. SHULMAN. That has advantages and disadvantages.
Senator CASE. I know, but it also bears on the question.
Dr. SHULMAN. There are serious disadvantages for the Soviet Union
in operating as a maritime power. Their access to the oceans of the
world is more difficult than ours and in a way, as the Administration
has said, one of the reasons for justifying the proposed submarine
balance is that the Soviet Union is operating at a geographical dis-
advantage. It needs to have a larger submarine fleet than ours in order
to maintain the same number of submarines on station. So the geo-
graphical factor is a complex one which confers some advantage on one
side and some on the other, but at any rate I do think it is necessary, as
you imply, for us to look beyond present agreements toward an effort
to stabilize and to damp down both the strategic and the conventional
competition. .
APPLICATION OF DETERRENT BALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FIELD SUGGESTED
As a matter of fact, it seems to me we might well apply in this con-
ventional field the same notion of a deterrent balance as we have done
in the strategic field. That is, the purpose of our conventional forces
of our fleets and of our men under arms is essentially a negative one,
to prevent the other side from using its forces in order to affect the
political outcome in conflicted areas of the world. That means that if
we can achieve that kind of a general balance it will not confer upon us
the capability of intervention, which I trust we do not wish, but we
hope it will dissuade others from intervention. Having stabilized the
military competition it may be possible to move toward some system of
international security. • .
Senator CASE. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
EDITORIAL ENTITLED : “THE ARMs RACE: what's THE HURRY 2’
Could I suggest this editorial might go into the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes indeed. Without objection the editorial from
the morning Post will be inserted into the record.
(Theinformation referred to follows:)
[From the Washington Post, Monday, June 26, 1972]
THE ARMS RACE : WHAT’S THE HURRY 2
Senator Fulbright is right to say that Defense Secretary Laird abuses the Spirit
and purpose of the SALT accords by threatening to withdraw his “support”
unless Congress moves ahead on new arms. The threat is meaningless in the Sense
that, even if implemented, it would not block Congressional approval of the
accords. Its danger is that it may scare some Congressmen into voting for ques-
tionable weapons programs that, On their merits, might fail.
The most questionable is the Trident missile-submarine project, justified by the
administration on grounds that its greater speed, size and quietness (over the
POlaris-Poseidon force) would extend its patrol area and its invulnerability to
enemy discovery and attack. Last year Mr. Nixon planned to deploy Trident in
162
the 1980s. This year the date was moved up to 1978, the year after expiration of
the interim agreement limiting offensive weapons. The speedup indicates that the
administration wants Trident chiefly as a “bargaining chip” in SALT TWO. It is
asking almost $1 billion, including large sums for the long-lead time nuclear
reactors that would allow actual boat COnStruction to begin next year.
But what’s the hurry 2 Not even the Pentagon claims the Polaris-Poseidon
fleet is wearing out or becoming easier for the Russians to find and destroy.
Pentagon estimates, which no reasonable man can credit, put the Trident fleet's
cost at $1.1 billion; the administration's speedup doubtless would push the figure
higher still. The boat as designed is so sophisticated in technology as to make
some experts question whether the extras are necessary and will work. One alter-
native would be to appropriate the money for the Trident missile, which could go
on the Poseidons (thus extending their patrol areas), and meanwhile to hold
back On the boat.
The $500 million the Pentagon seeks for the new B-1 bomber, for development
of a prototype, would not take that project so close to construction and therefore
is less objectionable. Nonetheless, the administration has yet to demonstrate that
the B–1 has any rationale more compelling than Air Force service pride. Would
a sensible man hard pinched for money buy a new third car when he already had
three good cars in the garage? Strategic bombers are the “third Car” Of the
American deterrent, after the land-and-Sea-based missiles. The B–1 WOuld. COSt,
again by Pentagon estimate, $1.1 billion. - - -
We are aware that On Thursday Mr. Nixon Confirmed that Mr. Brezhnev had
told him the Russians were “going ahead.” On arms programs not limited by
SALT One. Unless Congress approves his arms requests, the President went On,
American security will be “seriously jeopardized” and SALT Two will have “no
chance.” One could perhaps question the value of a SALT Two agreement that
would permit arms building on the scale Mr. Nixon seems to envisage. He should
know that the relevant issue now is not whether the Russians are “going ahead”
but on what projects and at what pace and to what particular ascertainable
effect on American security and credibility. The further relevant issue is the
extent to which Soviet programs are pushed Or slowed in response to American
programs. Crude assertions that the Kremlin is “going ahead” are no help.
What else could Mr. Brezhnev have Said?
President Nixon did say that the SALT agreements and the arms programs
should be weighed On their separate merits. We entirely agree. To ensure so, the
Senate should vote first and SOOn On the ABM treaty, and the Congress as a
whole on the Offensive-weapons agreement. There will be time enough later to
make decisions On new weapons. A delay past the conventions would be fine.
The expected nomination of Senator McGovern by the Democrats would give the
arms sceptics a strong champion, just as the administration’s contrary viewpoint
has such a champion in President Nixon : That is to say, the issue of the arms
race likely will extend beyond the SALT ratification process into the Presidential
campaign. And why not? The issue is no more complex than others that will be
debated, and no less urgent. We Surmise that neither Mr. Nixon nor Mr. Mc-
Govern, assuming he is the Democratic nominee, would shrink from it.
RUSSIAN PERCEPTION OF U.S. NOT BUYING NEW PROGRAMS
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Shulman, last week Admiral Moorer in justify-
ing the increased arms expenditure stated that unless we buy new
Submarines and bombers, among other things, and I quote, “The lead-
ership of the USSR would mark it up not to goodwill, but to a fail-
ure of will, not to our confidence but to our weakness.”
How would you comment on such a statement?
Dr. SHULMAN. Well, I am not sure where that kind of reasoning
can lead. It seems to me that no one is arguing that the United States
ought to abstain from acquiring what it feels it needs in the strategic
field out of goodwill, but what is at issue is whether we make a judg-
ment on the military procurements on the basis of what we think is
necessary or whether we do it on the basis of a bargaining chip logic.
163
As I suggested in my statement, I feel the bargaining chip logic is
fallacious; what it does is to saddle us with systems in the expectation
this is going to intimidate the Russians and then in the end we are
left with the systems whether we in fact needed them or not. I think
this is what happened in the ABM field. The judgment that we
make on whether we should build now the Trident, the submarine and
the two missiles that are contemplated under the Trident program, or
the B–1 or cruise missiles or the other programs advanced, should be
on the basis whether there is in fact a military need for these under
the present circumstances, and I would rather see the Admiral make
the argument on the basis of the need for these programs at the present
time rather than on the basis of the argument that this will intimidate
the Russians, this is necessary in order to strengthen our bargaining
hand. -
Dr. TUCKER. May I add something?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Dr. TUCKER. I don’t quite see the logic of the Admiral's reasoning.
It seems to me that if we proceed circumspectively, they would not
perceive that as weakness on our side. They know we are very well
capable of providing these weapons systems; the whole history of our
past development testifies to that. They couldn’t be in any doubt about
our capability. I don’t see the reasoning that this would be perceived
as weakness. It could be perceived as a willingness, a desire to keep
open the option of not making certain investments depending upon
what they do, and in a sense it seems to me the negotiating goes on all
the time between us even when our SALT delegations aren’t talking
because we are both in interrelations, we are talking in various ways,
the representatives of our governments are communicating to one
another and we both see what the other is doing, and that is a form
of talking and a form of negotiating. I believe Professor Shulman was
pointing out that none of us is really saying that the United States
should stop all activities in this field of strategic arms development
or unilaterally divest ourselves of these possibilities. We know that
planning will go on and a certain amount of work will go on in these
fields. We take this into account. It is a question of degree, of how
much and how fast.
TJ.S. SUPERIORITY IN NAVAL OPERATIONS
The CHAIRMAN. There have been some recent studies put out by the
Center for Defense Information, particularly with regard to the naval
forces. They point out that we have, I think, 14 or 15 aircraft carriers.
We have four or five times as many intercontinental bombers. We
have three, I believe, forward bases, as they call them, one in Scotland
and the others I forget.
Dr. SHULMAN. Guam, I think. ./ --
The CHAIRMAN. This points out the difference in size of many of our
destroyers, which are larger than the largest Soviet cruisers and so
on. There is a good deal of technical information. -
Admiral La Roque, who is just out of the Navy only a month ago,
I think, should be qualified to know what these relative strengths are.
It would seem to me that while in strategic weapons there is a parity,
in the field of naval operations we are vastly superior at the present
164
time. They have really no very large naval vessels other than their
submarines.
PossIBILITY OF U.S. DISADVANTAGE IN NEAR FUTURE QUESTIONED.
It didn’t seem to me there is any possibility in the near future of our
being at a great disadvantage. I don’t understand that that is the
thrust of it. That is going to be obviously the approach. I agree with
what you said about the effect upon the spirit with which these agree-
ments have been accepted, whether we really mean it or not.
With regard to the military balance, if it is a balance, or parity, in
many respects there is a superior capacity to deliver nuclear weapons
abroad on Russia than the Russians have in reserves, other than the
big missiles. Of course, our people in another context have often said
ours are more accurate and more efficient than theirs.
WHY DOES U.S. THINK SECURITY ALMOST WHOLLY MILITARY POWER 2 .
All three of you gentlemen are scholars, not only in this field. Why
do you think it is that our country seems to think of security almost
wholly as military power. That may have been appropriate a hundred
years ago or so, but the development of nuclear weapons, it seemed to
me, negatived to a great extent the concept of security as being com-
posed primarily of military power. Because we don’t really want to
use it, other activities which you suggested have become more sig-
nificant now in enhancing our prestige and influence abroad than the
military power. It isn’t nearly as important in this whole complex of
a country’s influence as it was before invention of nuclear power.
Would you agree with that? -
Dr. SHULMAN. Yes, Senator, I agree completely. I think that one of
the unfortunate aspects of the debates in recent weeks is that they
misdirect our attention to the numbers of strategic weapons and imply
that the security of the country and the political influence of the
country is dependent upon the relative strategic arsenals of the two
countries, whereas in fact it seems to me if we were to study those
instances in which the United States has been declining in influence
in the world, in Europe, and in Japan, and in Latin America and else-
where, I think the answer would be that it has not been because there
has been a change in the strategic balance but it would have to do
with other forms of power, the way in which we have managed our-
selves, say, in the Subcontinent, or in the way in which the people of
Western Europe look to us now, to the way in which we handle our
economic monetary relations with the Europeans, the way in which
we have shown a sensitivity to the interests of our allies, the extent to
which we have articulated values and purposes which attract the peo-
ple of other countries. -
It seems to me that even if we were to do everything that the military
is asking for and to pile on the new systems, the full something like
$25 billion - - .
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that is just the beginning.
Dr. SHULMAN. Yes. And surely our experience is that it would be
much more than that. I think the prospect is if we had all that this
would be a disadvantage in terms of the kinds of power that are likely
165
to affect the political competition with the Soviet Union. That it is
Somewhat the Neanderthal approach to security.
EFFECT OF WIETNAMI ACTIVITIES ON U.S. PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE
The CHAIRMAN. One of you mentioned, and I have forgotten
whether it was Dr. Tucker or Dr. Shulman, your reactions to our pres-
ent activities in Vietnam. I think you said you were ashamed of the un-
limited, unrestricted destruction of everything. -
How do you think that affects our influence and prestige around the
world?
Dr. TUCKER. I don’t think that there is a simple thing in the past
10 years, in the past 7 years particularly, since February, 1965, which
has so hurt the United States all over the world as our conduct of the
war in Vietnam. I am talking about Europe particularly, which we
like to think of as that sphere of the external world which is in many
ways most important to us. That is a sphere of the world in which
many of us have friends. We travel there; we talk to our colleagues,
other Scholars; we have a finger on the pulse of European thought.
I really believe that our war in Vietnam, our methods of conducting
the war from the air, our intransigence in the approach to the political
Settlement of the war has harmed us and depleted our influence more
than any other single thing in the minds of those people who are so
important to us.
I can’t speak with similar confidence of people in vast parts of the
world that I am not familiar with, but I am speaking particularly of
Europe.
POSSIBILITY OF U.S. DESTRUCTION MOTIVATING SoviFT DáTENTE
The CHAIRMAN. I sometimes wonder whether or not this unlimited,
unrestricted destruction has not, however, raised a question in the minds
of people like the Soviets and others that they are dealing with such a
dangerous country that they might better try to reach some détente
because it is a very dangerous power that can be let lose at any place;
can it not? -
Do you think it has any psychological effects upon the Russians
deciding that this is such a dangerous country they had better try to
seek a détente?
Dr. TUCKER. Senator, I don’t see the motivation behind the present
Soviet détente policy with the West as being substantially inspired by
that kind of a worry. After all, the worry would have been in the
Soviet mind at all times from February 1965 on, or at least at most
times, and yet the détente policy has been pursued in a vigorous and
effective way only in these last three or four years. And while I
wouldn’t discount the possibility that you speak of, I am not really
sure that that is a major factor in
The CHAIRMAN. I agree it is a very speculative question. It some-
times occurred to me that people capable of doing what we are doing
to a small defenseless country might be capable of nearly anything.
Dr. SHULMAN. Could I add a word on that, Senator?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. .
166
Dr. SHULMAN. My impression is there have been several stages in the
Soviet response to what we have done in Vietnam. In the first period,
immediately after the intensification of our involvement in late 1964
and early 1965, I think there was a period in which there was some
alarm in the Soviet Union about what this indicated about American
policy, whether it indicated a general increase in bellicosity and a
willingness to intervene. Then there followed, I think, toward the latter
part of 1965 a somewhat different emphasis, a realization that our
present policy in Vietnam was reducing American influence in the
world, as Professor Tucker suggests, and this was creating a new situa-
tion, new opportunities in the world.
So indirectly it may be so, but not for the reason you suggest. I think
it may be largely because this is a period in which from the Soviet
point of view there are opportunities for expansion of their influence,
not so much because of their own wisdom but because of the disad-
vantages on our side. They see a decline in American prestige and in-
fluence and this does create what they call an objective factor in the
world situation which is potentially advantageous.
EFFECT OF HISTORICAL BACEGROUND ON RUSSIAN ATTITUDES
The CHAIRMAN. I think so. I was reminded a moment ago, when
you were suggesting that Russia is a new country and we are an old and
Settled country, that their experience, even going back to Genghis
Khan and on up through the Russian invasion and may have contrib-
uted something to their national attitudes. That is, there is something
left in the traditions and the history of a country which influences its
attitudes. It never occurred to me they were a young and new country
without experience. I thought they were in many respects burdened
with old experiences that make it very difficult for them to have con-
fidence in anybody and especially neighbors. I would have thought so.
The last two world wars I would have thought contributed to an atti-
tude which makes it difficult to accept even new good faith on the
part of any neighboring country or any other country. Would you
not think so?
Dr. SHULMAN. Yes, sir; I do think so. One would have to take
account of a whole long historical background that goes back before
the revolution in judging some of the Soviet attitudes. This certainly
has to do with the tradition of secrecy for example, which is an ancient
one; it has to do also with the apprehensions of the Soviet Union about
China. These have deep historical roots and it would be a mistake, as
you * to think of the Soviet Union as only beginning its history
in 1917.
Dr. TUCKER. I would like to add to that, Senator. If you look to the
Russian history you will find that at certain periods that in the more
distant past, partly owing to the Mongolian conquest, back in the 12th
and the 13th centuries, Russia was really detached from Europe and
in certain ways felt itself more of an eastern country, but that in the
modern period, particularly from the late 17th and early 18th century
under Peter the First through the modernization, the building of
Petersburg and the whole cultural Europeanization that Russia un-
derwent, the country had come by the early 20th century to regard
167
itself, at least the elite Society, and to be regarded, as a European
power. It was part of the whole cultural and political world of
Europe.
In a Sense the early Soviet period saw a break in this modern line
of development and a reestablishment, a recreation of that old status
of isolation. One of the reasons why I think many of us who study
Russia feel that it is worthwhile to encourage a trend toward better
relations and stabilization with the West, such as we see, is that we
feel that it may foster a return in a way, or a completion of that earlier
process of rapprochement between Russia and European civilization,
which we think would be a desirable and a healthy thing. Many Rus-
sians of our generation like to think of themselves as belonging to
Europe and I think that needs to be encouraged.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brezhnev seems to have a weakness for Cad-
illacs and Rolls Royces. Maybe that is a sign of his attachment for the
West.
CONSTRAINT OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY BY SALT NOT LIKELY
Dr. KOLKowICZ. I wonder if I could move to the more contemporary
history of Russia and suggest Something that seems of interest here.
We are concerned here with strategic weapons and balances of stra-
tegic weapons. As we look at the past 20–25 years of U.S.-Soviet rela-
tions we note a very interesting development. Even when we had
nuclear monopoly or strategic superiority this did not prevent the
Russians from undertaking aggressive action, say, in Korea, Berlin,
or even Cuba. Thus, one might say that most instances of hostility,
tension, or war have taken place regardless of strategic equality or
parity, but during periods of Soviet strategic inferiority. Therefore, I
am suggesting that while SALT is desirable largely for the establish-
ment of the rules of the game between two super powers in the 1970's,
it is not likely to constrain Soviet freedom to pursue a foreign policy
which they have pursued for the past 25 years. -
SOVIET MOVEMENT TOWARD GLOBAL FOREIGN AND STRATEGIC POLICY
I would like to refer to another interesting recent Soviet historical
development. Soviet foreign policy has since World War II, been
closely related to their military capabilities. Stalin's foreign policy
had been essentially continental and regional; his military capabili-
ties were also continental and regional. As we move into the 1950's
and early 1960's, we see Soviet military capabilities under Khrushchev
becoming partially global and Soviet foreign policy also moves in a
global direction. In the 1970's Soviet capabilities became truly global
and Soviet foreign policy, assumes global scope and direction. This
is to suggest what I have mentioned before, that Soviet foreign policy
and strategic policy are now of global dimensions, and that any con-
straint created by SALT is not likely to influence Soviet foreign
policy. Nevertheless, the SALT agreements, which I support, will
likely balance two enormous arsenals of strategic weapons, whose
military utility is considered questionable by many knowledgable
people.
168
U.S. AND SOVIET MILITARY's Power OVER DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES
The CHAIRMAN. Since we are on that subject, I have a question. I
think you covered it. I was trying to rephrase it a bit. You empha-
sized the control of politburo, we will call it, the government of Mr.
Brezhnev over the military, keeping it very strong. Consider the power
of our military establishment now, political power, not military power,
in that such a large percentage of the major corporations in this coun-
try have an economic interest in the arms race business. Hundreds of
thousands of employees, as you know, all of whom vote, are employed
by the great corporations. This is the example of the Lockheed loan.
That wasn’t disassociated from the fact they have a great many em-
ployees in some very important States. This is, I think, primarily
politics. This is what they call the military-industrial complex. There
isn't anything more Sophisticated or esoteric than the fact that these
peoples’ livings depend upon their jobs and they are unusually good
jobs and there are hundreds of thousands of them. I mean a company
like Boeing, I suppose, had a hundred thousand employees. McDonald
Douglas has, I think, 50 or 60 thousand in the State of Missouri alone.
I don’t know how many Lockheed, A. T. & T. and General Electric
have, but all of the major companies are interested. You see in all of
the magazines what they call institutional advertising, demonstrating
our technological superiority, sometimes relating to a missile directly
and sometimes going to the moon. You put that together with their
capacity to get appropriations and I wonder if our military in the
final analysis on the question of the distribution of a country’s re-
sources is not more powerful here than it is in Russia. Would you
comment. On that? -
Dr. KOLKowicz. Well, Mr. Chairman, my so-called expertise is
largely in the Soviet Union.
The CHAIRMAN. You have observed what goes on here; haven’t
ou?
y Dr. KOLKowICZ. I think it would be probably fair, Mr. Chairman,
to put this particular question in a broader context.
The CHAIRMAN. In what?
Dr. Kolkowicz. In a historical context. During the 1940's and 1950's,
and possibly the early 1960's, it was generally assumed that while
this was an expensive proposition and drain on resources, it was never-
theless very necessary. As we became more sophisticated, and we got to
know our adversary much better, and realized that the Communist
Bloc is far from being a unified, dangerous, monolith—and after we
became involved in the miserable war in Vietnam, we began to recon-
sider the nature of the external threat and the utility of this vast ex-
pense and the terrible consequences of the military-industrial complex
to our society. I believe, however, that in the long run, the stability of
our institutions and of democracy will prevail and that the excesses of
the military industrial complex will be contained. I think that we
realize at last that big power doesn’t bring commensurate political in-
fluence, and that secondly, that we have much more important busi-
ness at hand, than creating more military hardware.
169
BRIEFING BY EPRESIDENT AND MIR. RISSINGER AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE's
STATEMENT
The CHAIRMAN. I am only trying to bring out the actual situation
here. The President briefed one hundred and twenty members of
Congress, as did Mr. Kissinger. Ithought he did an extremely effective
job of presenting the case. The President along with Mr. Kissinger;
who spent over two hours together in briefing them, emphasized that
this is an agreement in which neither party can be said to have an
advantage, that it shouldn’t be considered that way, that no one won
this at this summit, and that the agreement was in our mutual interest.
I was impressed by this. Then to have this spokesman for the military
in effect say that this is the reason why we must go forward with these
enormous new projects, which I agree with what has been said by Some
of you, undermines at least the spirit, the intentions, the sincerity of
our agreement. I would have thought it would be almost impossible
in the Soviet Union for Marshall Grechko, even if he thought so, to
make a public statement, in effect, I thought, undermining the very
agreement the President has just presented in a very appealing way.
I thought this was rather remarkable boldness on the part of the mili-
tary. I wondered if that told us anything about the control of the
civilian and government in Russia versus our own.
I was amazed really that the Secretary of Defense would make such
a statement, which seems to me to be contradictory to what the Pres-
ident and his spokesmen were saying. It is true the President says he
Supports these programs. The Secretary of Defense linked them to-
gether. He wouldn’t support the agreements unless he got the weapons.
Mr. Kissinger said that they are not linked together, that they
are separate and each must be judged upon its own merits separate
from the others. It is difficult for me to reconcile these. The point here
is the boldness of the military to take this position in which they do
link the two together, and if you can’t give us the weapons we can’t
Support SALT. I thought this was rather unusual. Do you see nothing
unusual?
Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Yes, I would say it is rather unusual. However
military professionals traditionally do see the somber aspect of inter-
national relations. -
The CHAIRMAN. And are willing to talk about it in public in opposi-
tion or in contradiction to the civilian leaders.
Dr. KOLKOWICZ. That remains to be seen.

WITNESS’ FAITH IN ULTIMATE CIVILIAN CONTROL
The CHAIRMAN. This is why when you mentioned your faith in this,
I raised the question. What is your faith, that ultimately the civilians
will control?
Dr. Kolkowicz. Yes, I may be naive. One might possibly speculate
even further, on the fact that civilian leaders of military establish-
ments can at times be more bellicose than so-called professional mili-
tary people.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that faith can be transmitted into
Votes on the floor of the Senate when we come to the proposals?
Dr. Kolkowicz. I wouldn’t presume to comment on that.
The CHAIRMAN. What do you think about it?
170
POLITICAL STRENGTH OF U.S. AND SOVIET MILITARY
Dr. TUCKER. Well, sir, in response to your question, I don’t know
which of the two military is the stronger. As to the political strength
of the Soviet military concerning which there may be some difference
of opinion here on the panel. As you know from our earlier remarks,
it is interesting that whereas our Secretary of Defense is a member
of the President's cabinet, and a very influential one it seems, the
Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal Grechko, is not a member of the
Politburo. There is no Soviet military officer in the highest policy-
making body, the Politburo. In the Central Committee, which is a
much larger policymaking body, there is a contingent of military
representatives, but it is a small contingent in terms of numbers. I
don’t know how much all this means but it is an interesting circum-
stance to take into consideration.
I think we also have to realize that probably there and probably
here too there is no monolithic military mind. I presume, though I
can’t speak from direct knowledge, that military men also may dis-
agree and differ as to the answers to some of these questions that we
have been discussing. But it seems to me, to return to your question,
that the strength of the military influence on politics in the Soviet
Union and in the United States is only partly to be measured in terms
of the internal situations in those two countries and their government
and the organization of civil-military relations. An essential margin
of the strength of the military in each of these two countries is what
the other country does.
That is to say, the military pressures on policy are very effective
in part because the other country is, or is presumed to be, doing or
planning to do something along the line of its security which neces-
Sarily implies for our security that we follow the recommendations
being made by our military. And exactly the same thing is happening
on the other side. So you could say that even without being aware
of it, the two military establishments are cooperating with each other.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. - -
Dr. TUCKER. And consequently the real question that arises is
whether the two civilian leaderships could learn to cooperate with
each other in curbing this other cooperation, and one of the ways of
doing that is through agreements of this kind.
JOB CONSTITUENCY FOR DEFENSE INDUSTRIES
The CHAIRMAN. I was suggesting that in our country, in our sys-
tem, very often votes in the Congress on proposals may not be pri-
marily inspired by the leadership in the White House. You have this
enormous constituency whose jobs and whose economic situation is
dependent upon it. The Lockheed loan was a fairly good example.
This was sold entirely on the ground of jobs. No one could defend
their performance on the C5A. It is a complete disaster. Here they
have spent five or six billion dollars on a white elephant. You have
seen the reports that they hardly dare even take it on trial flights for
fear the wings will fall off. It is a complete waste of money.
But to give people jobs, we give them a $250 million loan and
really most of the arguments centered around defense. You have seen
171
recently some of our candidates go to California and they feel they
have to modify their proposals because they are afraid they will ali-
enate the workers. I don’t know any Admiral or General who has
intervened on this. You have here a tremendous built-in political
influence. -
I have had members of the Congress say they can’t afford to vote
against something because there are 50–80 thousand of their people who
have jobs in that area and that they would have to bow out if they
should vote against that. This applies to space not quite the same, but
in a similar way to a lesser extent. So you get a rather initial influence.
Apparently operating directly on the Congress through constituents is
not so potent in the Soviet Union. No elected officials can ignore this.
They can’t survive very long if they ignore the personal economy
interests of their constituents. This is said as no reflection on the mem-
bers. They wouldn’t be here if they were not responsive to these in-
fluences. It grew up as you say because of the obsession with commu-
nists going back to Stalin's days. That is what you are confronted
with. I personally think the arguments you have made about this are
very persuasive, but I am not at all sure and I wouldn’t want to bet
today that when the showdown comes—are we or are we not going
to put up the money for the Trident, the B–1, the F-14, the cruise
missile—that you won’t end up about 53 or 54 votes for it and it will
be close, like the old ABM. It was 50–50 and if there ever was a case
of a ridiculous instrument that was authorized that was it. This is
what we face. Logic has very little to do with it really.
NECESSITY OF NATIONAL PLANNING FOR CONVERSION OF RESOURCES
Dr. SHULMAN. Senator, could I make two comments on what you
have said. The first is that it seems to me that the force of your
analysis, with which I agree, suggests that a necessary component of
our arms control effort is national planning for the conversion of
resources So that these jobs are not called into question, so that there
are other useful and profit activities to which these resources can be
directed. This requires, I think, planning on a national scale and it
has to be side by side with the steps that we propose to follow in the
arms limitations field.
PRICE OF JOS SUPPORT FOR SALT AGREEMENT
The Second comment I would make relates to your early suggestion
about the point of a difference between the position taken by the
President and by the Secretary of Defense. What seemed to me signifi-
cant there was not so much the nuances of difference in the President’s
presentation but that basically the agreement that had been reached
between the White House and the Joint Chiefs and Secretary of
Defense for the terms on which the Joint Chiefs would support the
SALT agreement, seemed to me to be too high a price. What was at
issue there was not the ambiguity of the remarks—whether they were
or were not linked—in fact what does link them, is the price that was
exacted for the Joint Chiefs support of the present agreement, and
it is this that seems to me to give this “catch 22” quality to the SALT
agreement. The price exacted was such that in fact it cuts the heart
Out of the agreement itself.
The CHAIRMAN. It almost negatives it, I would say.
80–942 O—72—12
172
DEBATE AMONG SOVIET LEADERSEIIP
A moment ago, Dr. Shulman, you referred to a debate among the
Soviet leadership. What did you have in mind? What is the debate?
Dr. SHULMAN. In the period before the Party Congress, from per-
haps 1969 on, there were a number of varying views expressed about
foreign policy about whether the Soviet Union should move toward
the treaties with Germany, and also whether it should move toward a
policy of easement of tension with the United States, whether it should
move toward substantial SALT agreement and so on. That discussion
came to an end rather sharply in about February 1971, just a month
or so before the Party Congress opened, and it was clear that the politi-
cal leadership made a decision about the direction in which the Party
Congress was going to go and the main line of foreign policy that was
to be established. This was related at that time to the decisions that
were being made about economic resources in the ninth 5-year plan
which was then being drawn up. So what I was referring to were the
ranges of differing views that were expressed during that period. It
included for example, disagreements about whether the treaties with
Germany were a good idea and those disagreements continued to be
expressed right up to the time of the signatures of the treaties and
even for a month or so after.
The CHAIRMAN. Was Pyotr Shelest connected with this? Was he a
ºnt On this policy? I have seen in the press some references to
that
Dr. SHULMAN. One can only guess at this, Senator. I want to make
it clear that this study of the Soviet Union we are engaged in is not
exactly a science but it is partly a matter of finger-type feel and
guesses. All the signs would indicate from what he had been saying
in public that his emphasis had been on the side of a rather more
militant policy and that he had been expressing reservations about
policy of easement of tension and also about the treaty with Germany.
So it is quite possible that the fact that he was relieved of his po-
sition as party secretary in the Ukraine may be significant.
Now, it is not yet known that he was relieved from his position in
the Politburo, so final judgment really waits to see whether that next
step is also taken.
BAHRAIN AGREEMENT's EFFECT ON RUSSIAN INDIAN OCEAN PRESENCE
The CHAIRMAN. One or two questions. It is getting late. I hate to
detain you too long, but you are here and you have all studied Russia.
We don’t have many people that are qualified to comment on these mat-
ters. I and others have made the point that on the Bahrain agreement
what we are doing there is simply inspiring the Russians to go much
further in their presence in the Indian Ocean and that area than
they have so far. Would any of you comment. I and some of my col-
leagues were objecting to taking this step formalizing a naval base in
Bahrain. Senator Case was instrumental, and I think he is the prin-
cipal One, in suggesting that these executive agreements be submitted
as treaties in order to at least submit them to a discussion. In the
course of that, which I approve of, of course, and a number of us
did, we thought that the Russians so far have not actually placed a
173
naval base there. They simply can send their ships where they like, of
course. If we put one in they will feel compelled to put one in. Would
you comment on that?
Dr. SHULMAN. I would not pass on the question of whether these
should be executive agreements or not, although it does seem to me it is
a good idea to have a discussion of the issues involved and that the
submission of these treaties to the Senate would serve a useful pur-
pose in airing the issues. The problem that the Bahrain agreement is
addressed to is that in that part of the world, in the Persian Gulf and
Indian Ocean, there is a long-term issue raised for our security and
also the security of our friends in Western Europe and in Japan in
that their dependence for their energy needs upon the oil of that area
is substantial. This is really going to create a difficult problem in the
future. The question is how best to insure that this remains gener-
ally accessible, does not become subject to Soviet control in view of the
contraction of British influence in the area.
Now, I can See a number of different ways in which we could move
in that direction. It obviously would be desirable from our point of
view if we did not get into a race in the area, if we did not get into
competition in which both we and the Soviet Union were trying
to establish bases and increase our military presence in the area. The
most desirable way in my judgment of insuring the security of access
to the oil resources of the area would be if there were an understand-
ing, albeit a tacit understanding, that we would both operate at very
moderate low levels.
The CHAIRMAN. That neither would have bases?
Dr. SHULMAN. Right.
The CHAIRMAN. That seems to me the argument we made. If we
put one in, they will feel compelled to put one in. If we stay out and
they stay out, it will not upset. -
Dr. SHULMAN. Precisely. I would hope that at least the exploration
of that possibility may have been on the agenda for the Moscow
conversation. I don’t know whether it was or not.
The CHAIRMAN. I get the impression our people don’t think that is
a matter for negotiation; we have already executed it in an execu-
tive agreement.
RUSSIAN REACTION TO U.S. NAVAL BASE
Do either of you have any feeling about that? How do you think
the Russians will react if we put an actual naval base there? Will
they feel that they should have one too or am I wrong?
Dr. TUCKER. I don’t know about that situation but every one of our
international acts is precedent creating and, therefore, if we have
taken a step that creates a somewhat new situation and it is possible
to duplicate or parallel this step, we obviously have to expect greater
pressure on the other side to do that.
The CHAIRMAN. Would you agree with that?
Dr. KOLKQWICZ. Well, I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that in the
spirit of parity and political quality that is now descending upon the
international arena I would not be surprised to see the Russians ac-
tually demand something of that sort.
174
The CHAIRMAN. Like building Tridents, it simply will inspire them
to imitate us. Many places where we have exerted this great presence
they seem to follow. They used to imitate us in the field of aid, even
though we had some disasterous experiences. So did they. They fol-
lowed along and went into Guinea and got much the same reaction
we got. The net result was both of us spent a lot of money rather
ºnly It seems to me that will be going on around all over the
WOI’ſ Ol.
MEANING OF SOVIETS PROVING TO BE MORE SENSIBLE THAN WE
You made one comment, I believe it was Dr. Shulman, which in-
trigued me. I wondered what you meant by it.
Soviet political leadership cannot be expected to deny its military
the resources required in the continuing effort to catch up with our
projected improved weapons steps, unless they prove to be more
sensible than we. .
What do you mean by unless they prove to be more sensible than we?
Dr. SHULMAN. Well, my point was this, Senator. It does not really
buy us any great political advantage to be pushing the strategic arms
race. It represents in my judgment a deflection of resources from other
forms of national power which are more important for our domestic
Society and our foreign policy and the question is whether in the Soviet
Union judgment, the final judgment will be made on the basis of the
relative pressures from the military or whether it will be based on some
sort of rational calculations of what kind of power is most effective
and most useful for them. In my judgment these programs do not con-
fer the political advantages that are advertised for them, neither for
the Russians nor ourselves. If they are sensible and if they have a sense
of proportion about the allocation of the resources, they will not fol-
low our lead. -
U.S. AND SOVIET WISDOM QUESTIONED
The CHAIRMAN. You remind me of an argument I used to make years
ago that the only thing that has really saved us has been the equal
stupidity of the Russian government to our own. If they had taken a
different turn and really made a much greater success of their economy
in dealing with the internal problems and set an example which the
so-called united Third World would admire more than our military
power, we would have been in much worse condition. I think Japan is a
Sort of example. Everybody admires Japan's great economic advances.
When you contrast the regard of the world for Japan now and what
it was 25 years ago, it is right remarkable. It also reminds me of a
comment that Mr. Kissinger made not too long ago in discussing the
Presidents trip to China. He said if you do open up communications
with China, this opens up an unknown area in which the challenge
from communications, that is becoming acquainted with the capacity
of the Chinese, might confront us with a much greater threat in the
so-called expansionism, or whatever it was, that inspired our going
into Vietnam. It gives us food for thought. Because they are extremely
able people and the contrast in the way they devote their resources,
the way they train their people to do various things, and certain ac-
complishments in the field of social activities, crime, pollution, clean-
175
liness in the city, even in the field of medicine, people have to recognize
we don’t know all of the answers to all of the problems. And the
discipline of their society. All of this raises very serious questions as
to our own wisdom; doesn’t it? *
Dr. SHULMAN. I would echo what Dr. Kolkowicz was saying awhile
ago; I do have faith that in the end we will show more common sense.
It is true that a lot of our problems come because these diverse views
do get expressed. It is possible in this country for our military leader-
ship to speak out, say what they have to say. We don’t know altogether
what the pressures are on the Soviet side. It may be that there are
views that are not expressed but that may nevertheless be important,
and it is the case also that although both in the Soviet case and
Chinese case there are some things that we may wish to emulate, on
the whole it seems to me no one would really want to trade even the
disadvantage of and the inefficiencies of a free Society for the kind of
discipline that you have spoken of. The cost of achieving unified social
purpose in that way is simply too great.
IMPORTANCE OF EXAMPLE ONE SETS
The CHAIRMAN. I am not suggesting that I or any of us prefer the
Soviet or Chinese system. I wasn’t talking about faith either. You
said a sensible reaction and one of the major things we have been talk-
ing about is our influence, the power, in one sense the military power.
I thought we had agreed that there is more to influencing other peo-
ples and in general the directions which the world as a whole moves.
To me the example one sets is more powerful than the military in the
long run except in the critical positions of taking a piece of real estate
or doing what we are doing in Vietnam. If we look upon this as a
period which we are approaching and in which we do compete peace-
fully rather than with military arms, then if they are more sensible
than we are, it could be more dangerous than if they followed our
example.
Dr. SHULMAN. I agree with you completely.
The CHAIRMAN. Isn’t this something for our people to consider?'
Dr. SHULMAN. I hope the effect of our hearing will be to call this to
public attention.
DIFFTCULTY OF COMMUNICATION
The CHAIRMAN. I am not very hopeful this hearing is going to be
effective, as interesting as I find it. You see how difficult it is to
communicate with our own country. We say it is free and open, but
how much communication do you expect this hearing to have with the
people of this country?
But if someone gets up and makes a speech that we are threatened
by military might of Russia, it will be on the front pages of every
paper in the world.
This is another difficulty I find simply of communicating your
statements. I think all three of your statements are extremely inter-
esting, but I don’t know how to get that beyond the chairman of this
committee and I am afraid he is already committed to your view; so
you haven’t made many converts this morning. You didn’t have to
convert me to the view that this arms race is a disaster, but I don’t
176
know who else you have converted. And I feel very sad about it. I think
it is a great problem with us. With two hundred million people, how
in the world do you expect them to think about what you gentlemen
have offered this morning as food for thought. I think you have done
extremely well. I can’t imagine how you could make more thoughtful
Statements than you have this morning. All of them are extremely
well thought out.
About the only thing that carries these hearings at all is the public
television and about the most sensible thing I have seen us do lately,
as far as the Senate is concerned, is to sustain the public broadcasting,
and that is about all. I dare say I saw no one from any of the other
networks this morning. So if there is any at all, it will be on public
broadcasting and I think all of it very worthwhile for the whole
public to know about. I regret very much that we do not have a
greater exposure of thoughtful people such as yourselves, but we are
a distracted nation all the way from floods to the war in Vietnam.
Do you have anything else you would like to add? I think it has
been extremely interesting. Would any of you like to make any further
comments?
Dr. SHULMAN. Thank you, no.
Dr. TUCKER. Thank you very much for the invitation.
The CHAIRMAN. You were very kind to give us your time for these
hearings.
The Committee is adjourned.
(Whereupon at 12:45 p.m., the Committee was adjourned subject to
the call of the Chair.)
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 1972
|UNITED STATES SENATE,
CoMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New
Senate Office Building, Senator John Sparkman, presiding.
Present: Senators Sparkman, Symington, Cooper, Javits and Percy.
Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order, please.
OPENING STATEMENT
I would like to welcome Mr. Paul Warnke, former Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Dr. Donald Bren-
nan, Senior Member of the Professional Staff of the Hudson Institute;
Dr. Stanley Hoffmann of the Department of Government at Harvard
University; Mr. Jerome Kahan, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Insti-
tution; and Dr. Edward Teller, Associate Director of the Lawrence
Radiation Laboratory.
I understand that Mr. Warnke, former Assistant Secretary Warnke,
has not arrived yet, but I assume he will bein.
This is the fifth of the committee sessions on the proposed treaty lim-
iting antiballistic missile systems and the proposed interim agreement
on offensive weaponry.
Today we will look into the strategic implications of the proposed
treaty and agreement and look ahead to future steps in arms control.
. that, our witnesses will explore possible directions in national
defense.
For many of us, the proposals offer a prospect that the arms race
that has continued for more than two decades may be on the verge of
a slowdown and, hopefully, a halt.
The subject at hand now is SALT I; but the Administration has
already indicated that it plans to proceed in the fall with SALT II.
There is also the prospect of further movement toward a comprehen-
sive test ban. Undoubtedly, before all the talks are done, limitations
discussions will move into the area of conventional armaments as well.
It has been argued that the proposed treaty and agreement should
not be accepted with euphoria. Similarly, however, the proposed un-
derstandings should not be viewed with fear, for they represent an
honest attempt on the part of many persons to arrive at some prelimi-
nary steps that will move this nation and the Soviet Union onto the
path of Sound arms control.
The agreements were achieved in an atmosphere of parity. Conse-
quently, we must ask ourselves not only whether they are good agree-
(177)
178
ments for the United States, but also whether we should strive for a
bargaining position other than relative parity in which each side has
what is known as sufficiency.
Is there a real military need for these programs or are they pri-
marily expensive bargaining chips? If we insist upon bargaining
from a position of strength, we must ask whether we can expect the
Soviet Union to do less. -
I think we must ask ourselves how we can justifiably seek to bar-
gain only from the position of advantage. How can the Soviet Union
accept the obvious choice, should that course be pursued, of either
accepting a position of weakness or of trying for its own position of
strength?
The whole issue of arms limitation is an extremely difficult one to
comprehend. Except for close students of the issues involved, many
do not have an opportunity to come to grips with the implications of
the move so far and future steps.
A major p pose of these hearings is the shedding of light upon
the issues so that more people can understand what the United States
and the Soviet Union are attempting now that the first round has been
concluded. -
Mr. Warnke has come in. We are very glad to have you, sir, and we
will be glad to hear from you at this time.
By the way, I say to all of you we have your prepared statements
and they will be printed in full in the record. You can present them as
you choose.
STATEMENT OF PAUL C. WARNKE, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
Mr. WARNKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you suggest, sir, I will
count on my statement being printed in the record and I will endeavor
now to highlight some of the points that I endeavored to make.
First of all, I would like to say that I think very highly of the agree-
ments that were reached with SALT. As a matter of fact, sometimes I
think that perhaps I think more highly of these than do the adminis-
tration spokesmen; but, in my opinion, the Moscow agreements can
constitute a very large step toward effective control over strategic
nuclear weapons. -
ABM TREATY IS PRINCIPAL ACCOMPLISHMENT
The principal accomplishment, in my view, is the ABM treaty. That,
to me, constitutes realistic recognition of the fact that no physical de-
fense on any known or foreseeable technology is available against a
nuclear attack of any significant size.
Accordingly, both sides have accepted the principle that safety
resides not in physical defense but in the certainty that the attacker
would be destroyed by the retaliatory strike that the other side would
be able to mount.
LOOPHOLES IN INTERIM. AGREEMENT
Now, in addition to the ABM treaty, the interim agreement does pro-
vide some control over offensive systems. I find the coverage at the
179
present time disappointingly small; and what troubles me, as I point
out in my statement, is the possibility that the loopholes that exist in
the interim agreement may make that agreement a brake on the offen-
sive arms race, but instead a spur to that race.
So construed, the interim agreement would be at least slightly worse
than no agreement at all.
But, entirely apart from the restriction on offensive systems, the
ABM Treaty is a major accomplishment; it should serve to put the end
to the inordinate expense and the very high risks of the nuclear
3,TIOS I’8,Cé.
LOGIC INFIERENT IN ABM LIMITATION
The question, however, is whether both sides will accept the logic
that I find to be inherent in the ABM limitation. In all logic the ABM
Treaty should eliminate any fear that the other side can achieve a first-
Strike capability. Because of the narrow limitations on the ABM sys-
tem that either side can deploy, each is, in fact, open to nuclear attack
even in a second strike. The surviving forces would be far more than
sufficient totally to devastate the attackers’ side.
NO PURPOSE IN ACHIEVING NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY
Under those circumstances, it seems to me, Mr. Chairman and Sen-
ator Cooper, that the continuation of the missile numbers game is in
fact a mindless exercise, that there is no purpose in either side's achiev-
ing a numerical superiority, which is not translatable into either any
sort of military capability or any sort of political potential. That is
why, in my opinion, the ceilings that are placed in the interim agree-
ment on both land-based and sea-based missiles should not be the cause
for any concern on our part. They do give the Soviets an apparently
large mathematical edge. They are permitted, as I read it, Some 2,350
missile launchers to our 1,710, but either figure is a flagrant example of
military redundancy. In the light of the abandonment of any forlorn
hope of an ABM defense, either number affords more missiles than
the other side affords in the way of targets.
So, accordingly, we should not be concerned about the existing
mathematical edge nor should we be concerned about any attempts that
the Soviet Union might make to add additional, useless numbers to
their already far more than adequate supply.
I suggest in my statement that were the Soviet Union to do this, we
might perhaps feel some relief that they have not expended their funds
for militarily more meaningful and potentially more mischievous
purposes.
INTERIM. AGREEMENT PROVIDES SOME CONTROL
Now, I believe that sensibly construed, the Interim Agreement does
provide some measure of control which is useful in assuring the Sur-
vivability of our land-based missile systems for the indefinite future.
It does limit, in a qualitative way, the numbers of large missiles that
the Soviet Union can construct. It confines them to some 313 instead
of the magic number of 500 which at times has been suggested as the
figure that would give the Soviets a counterforce capability against
our land-based missiles. -
180
With this limitation, it seems to me apparent that even with the
Minuteman part of our offensive triad alone, enough Minuteman mis-
siles would survive to inflict unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union.
But I believe that a sensible construction of the Interim Agreement
requires that we recognize that acceptance of the numerical imbalance
is possible because, in fact, numbers are totally irrelevant to our se-
curity in the strategic nuclear armsfield.
If missile numbers were a valid measure of national strength, then
the Interim Agreement would be improvident; but since they are with-
out significance, there is nothing for which we need compensate.
Accordingly, I feel that we should focus on the fact that arms con-
trol must not be allowed to become the new medium for fueling the
arms race and this, in my opinion, could be the result if the Congress
were to accept any one of three arguments which, as I read them, are
currently being presented as justification for new strategic weapon
systems.
LINEING APPROVAL TO FUNDING OF NEW STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS
The first and, I think, the most flagrant of these is the argument
that approval of the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty should
be linked to the funding of new strategic weapon systems. It has been
suggested by Secretary Laird that the price for Pentagon support of
the Moscow accords will be the agreement by Congress to fund the
new programs for a manned, strategic bomber and for an underwater-
launched missile system which includes a submarine which is more ex-
pensive than our nuclear carriers and approximately the same size as
the largest Soviet surface ship.
There has also been a suggestion that a submarine-borne cruise
missile should now be perfected because of the fact that this is not
forbidden by the Interim Agreement.
In my view, if the SALT agreements mean that we must now spend
more money to build more strategic weapon systems and continue the
offensive arms race, then the SALT agreements should not be approved
by the Congress. Instead, they should be sent back to the drawing
board with directions that the job be done again and that it be done
better this time. -
I was gratified to see that President Nixon has asserted that the
arms control agreements—the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agree-
ment—should be approved on their merits. He stated in his news con-
ference on June 22 that he would not have signed them unless he
believed that standing alone they were in the interest of the United
States; but, at the same time, and I feel somewhat inconsistently, he
has contended that failure to approve the new offensive weapon pro-
grams would seriously jeopardize the security of the United States and
jeopardize the cause of world peace.
As I understand his position, it appears to be based on two argu-
ments that differ somewhat from Secretary Laird's contention that
the agreements and the new funding for additional weapon systems
must be linked.

ACCUMULATION OF ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE WEAPONS BY SOVIET UNION
The first of these is an argument, which I believe is based more on
military cosmetics than it is on military capability. President Nixon
181
has emphasized the fact that the Soviet Union proposes to go ahead
with programs in areas from which they are not foreclosed under the
Interim Agreement. But since both countries are confined to what I
regard as token ABM defenses, these new offensive systems add noth-
ing to the Soviet ability to deter or in any way to utilize blackmail
against the United States.
In my view, the Soviets have always lagged behind the United
States in their appreciation of the realities of nuclear logic. Since I feel
that way and since they have now begun to move in a direction which
I regard as being the desirable direction, I don’t think that we should
substitute their judgment for our common sense when it comes to the
further accumulation of offensive nuclear weapons. -
We should accept, in fact, the reality that the ABM Treaty assures
our deterrent for the years to come. We should not yield to the tempta-
tion to get back into a numbers race and, as far as any political disad-
vantage is concerned stemming from the appearance of mathematical
superiority, this can be prevented by a sound, rational explanation of
our views to our own people, to our allies and to those who might be
disposed to be hostile to us.
Since the accumulation of additional offensive weapons by the Soviet
Union will give them nothing that they do not now have and will chal-
lenge nothing that is important to our national Security, it seems to
me that we should not, by apparently attributing some military sig-
nificance to any such gesture, put ourselves at a political disadvantage.
This will occur if, and only if, we bad mouth our own strength.
BARGAINING CHIP ARGUIMIENT
The third argument that has been presented is the so-called bar-
gaining chip argument and that to me poses perhaps the direst poten-
tial for continued arms escalation.
We were told for almost three years that we had to deploy an ABM
in order to assure success at the first SALT, but as I understand the
developments, the delay in reaching an ABM treaty stemmed less from
Soviet reluctance to enter into an agreement on defensive systems
than it did from our own insistence that a defensive treaty be linked
to some measure of control over offensive weapons.
President Nixon noted in his State of the World Message last Feb-
ruary that: The Soviet Union wished to work toward an initial agree-
ment limited solely to antiballistic missiles. We considered that so
narrow a solution would risk upsetting the strategic balance and might
put a premium on the further development of offensive weapons.
Now, if that was the risk then that is what the Interim Agreement
should prevent. The Interim Agreement is good if it diminishes that
risk. If, in fact, it spurs the arms race, then it is indefensible and it
will spur the arms race if we continue during arms control negotiations
to take the position that we must escalate the arms race in order to
accumulate further bargaining chips. -
I think the experience with the ABM Treaty documents justifies
this apprehension. Our decision to go ahead with the ABM deploy-
ment, while the impasse continued at Helsinki and Vienna, has just
meant more expense and less control. We have continued with deploy-
ment of an unneeded ICBM antiballistic missile defense centered in
182
North Dakota. The Soviet Union has gone ahead with its Galosh
System which could not possibly defend Moscow and now, in a curious
twist, both sides seem to be in a position in which they may end up
j. an additional ABM system that they never seemed to want
€TOI’e.
The treaty permits us to deploy a command and control ABM
around Washington and the Soviets are entitled to build east of the
Urals a defense of ICBM missiles. But whether or not they go ahead,
it seems to me, sir, that the Congres should reject any further ABM
expenditures. -
With the completion of the treaty it seems obvious that not even a
bargain-chip argument can be advanced as a reason for deploying a
system that can provide no effective defense.
In my view, the reason that the Soviet Union and the United States
have been able to negotiate and have been able to reach an agreement is
because each side has had to recognize the other side's technical poten-
tial. Each side must recognize that it is not capable of achieving any
Sort of meaningful advantage in the strategic weapons field unless
the other side is willing to concede that advantage, and nothing in
the history of the arms race indicates any such concession or any such
prospect of one dropping out of the competition if the competition
continues. Neither side need let the other one gain an appreciable
advantage and neither side will. -
So, if the bargaining-chip argument is valid, and if it is going to be
used, what it means is that the continuation of strategic arms limita-
tion talks will lead to agreements to arm rather than agreements on
arms control.
SALT AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ON THEIR own MERITs
As President Nixon has suggested, the SALT agreements should be
considered by Congress on their own considerable merits. I think that
decisions on new nuclear weapon systems that are not now forbidden
should be made entirely separate from the consideration of these agree-
ments and should be made with primary emphasis on their implica-
tions for effective arms control in the future. -
Any program that threatens the retaliatory capability of either side
should be rejected. I refer, of course, specially to such things as anti-
Submarine warfare programs or anything else that might have the same
impact as an antiballistic missile defense in appearing to challenge the
retaliatory capability of either side.
AGREEMENTS ASSURE TIME FOR SENSIBLE SELF-FESTRAINT
In my view, the major accomplishment of the agreements signed at
Moscow is to assure time for sensible self-restraint. No action that the
Soviet Union can take, at least for the duration of the Interim Agree-
ment, can threaten our deterrent or in any respect endanger our
Security. - -
Accordingly, I would recommend that we announce now that we
are withholding any further deployment of nuclear weapons pending
further negotiations. The ABM Treaty does not require that, just be-
cause it is permitted, we must go ahead and spend further billions on
183
a useless ABM site. What the ABM Treaty does provide is that we need
no more MIRVs, no new bombers, no larger submarines to enable us
to penetrate a nonexistent Soviet defense.
Instead of bargaining chips, I think our restraint can create the best
climate for further progress in arms limitations. Our example can be
well publicized and can, and I believe would put great pressure on the
Soviet Union to respond in kind. -
The agreements reached at Moscow can do much to move the world
toward nuclear sanity and I would suggest that any arguments that
diminish this bright promise should be taken with at least a grain of
salt. -
Thank you, sir.
(Mr. Warnke's prepared statement follows:)
PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL C. WARNKE, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE SALT AGREEMENTS AS ARMS CONTROL
On their Own merits, the MOSCOW agreements can COnstitute a giant Step to-
ward effective control Over Strategic nuclear weapons. The ABM treaty is
realistic recognition that no physical defense is possible against a nuclear attack
Of Significant size. By its terms, both Of the nuclear SuperpowerS accept the prop-
Osition that Security against nuclear devastation depends instead. On the Cer-
tainty that an attacker would himself be destroyed by a retaliatory second
Strike.
The accompanying Interim Agreement provides SOme measure of COntrol Over
Offensive missile Systems. Though disappointingly permissive, it nonetheless Can
be a useful beginning toward comprehensive restriction Of Offensive nuclear
weapons. But its utility in real arms control depends upon its explication and
acceptance as a means facilitating further restraint. If, instead, its support is
linked to Congressional adoption of crash programs in many Of the Offensive
weapons areas which it does not cover, this Interim Agreement could prove to
be slightly worse than no Offensive agreement at all.
Whether or not offensive weapons are restricted, the ABM treaty by itself
would constitute the single greatest major accomplishment in COntrolling the
nuclear arms race, with its in Ordinate expense and incalculabe risks, by its adop-
tion, each side will accept the policy that a strategic nuclear exchange, in light
Of the modern technology Of death, Spells Out Only the assured destruction of both.
Soviet Strategic planners, as quoted by advocates of an American nuclear War-
fighting capability, have in the past characterized the COncept of mutual assured
destruction by its acronym—a “MAD policy.” Now, however, the SALT ABM
treaty attests that, in the nightmare nuclear world, “though this be madness,
yet there is method in it.”
In all logic, the restriction. On ABM defenses Should eliminate any fear that
either side may acquire a first Strike Capability. Thus it should ensure sta-
bility and forestall the accumulation. Of additional Offensive weapons. Since
each has abandoned any real attempt to defend itself from nuclear attack, the
number Of Warheads that WOuld Survive even an all-Out first Strike WOuld be
sufficient totally to devastate the attacker’s Society. For example, if the Soviet
Union, by striking first, could destroy all of our ICBMs and all our bombers, and
even if the attack could catch and destroy most of our submarines in port, 10
Surviving Poseidon Submarines could aim 1,600 warheads at the Soviet Union.
They would run Out Of targets before they ran Out Of missiles. In thus assuring
retaliatory Capability, the ABM treaty makes COntinuation Of the missile num-
bers game a mindless exercise.
To the extent that the Interim Agreement actually leads toward the limitation
of Offensive weapons, it can be a desirable complement to the ABM treaty. But
to the extent that it is used as an argument for accelerated construction and de-
ployment of new offensive systems, it can only nullify the gains the treaty has
achieved and thus disserve the cause Of genuine arms limitation. It becomes an
agreement to arm—not arms COntrol.
The ceilings put on ICBMs and SLBMs give a mathematical edge to the
Soviets in both land-based and sea-based missiles. In aggregates, they are per-
184
mitted about 2,350 missile launchers that can reach United States territory while
we are restricted to some 1,710 that can be aimed at the Soviet Union from Our
ICBM silos and missile submarines. But this nuclear edge gives the Soviet Union
no practical military capability that we do not have, and that we would not have
With far fewer missiles entirely apart from our commanding lead in strategic
bombers and deliverable warheads. Elimination of any forlorn hope of ABM
defense of populations and facilities makes either ceiling figure a flagrant ex-
ample of military redundancy. And even if our potential adversary should elect
to pour additional resources into additional warheads, we need have no concern.
Instead, we might properly feel some gratification that he has not used these
funds for more meaningful and more mischievous purposes.
Sensibly construed, the Interim Agreement is of some value in assuring the
Survival Of Our land-based missile deterrent for the indefinite future. Limited to
no more than 313 large missiles of SS—9 size Or greater, and with no testing yet
of true MIRV technology, a Soviet counterforce strike would leave enough Min-
utemen to Obliterate the Soviet Union, even without resort to Our Submarine-
launched missiles and Our nuclear bombers. It thus lengthens the lead time during
which, if we are really serious about nuclear arms control, we can exercise re-
straint and look for reciprocal action from the Soviet Union. But pursuit of this
Sound policy requires an explanation of the Interim Agreement which focuses on
the fact that we can accept the numerical imbalance because it is in fact totally
irrelevant to our Security. To suggest instead that this missile Surplusage must
'be Offset by the expenditure of additional billions on strategic offensive systems
that are outside the parameters of the agreement is inconsistent and self-defeat-
ing. If missile numbers were a valid measure of national strength, the Interim
Agreement would be improvident. Since they are militarily meaningless, there is
nothing for which we need compensate.
We must not let arms control be converted into a new reason for escalating the
arms race. This will be the ironic and tragic result if the Congress accepts any
Of the three current arguments used to justify new strategic weapons programs.
The first of these fallacies is that approval of the treaty and Interim Agree-
ment must be linked with new funding Of Strategic weapons programs to preserve
our security. Secretary Laird has told this Committee that the price for Pentagon
support of the SALT accords is Congressional approval of proposed programs for
a new manned strategic bomber and a new underwater-launched missile system
Carried by a submarine about the size of the largest Soviet surface ship and more
expensive than our most modern attack carrier. Suggested also is a submarine-
bOrne Cruise missile. This has little more merit than a nuclear arrowhead Shot
from a cross-bow. If the SALT agreements mean that we must spend more
money and buy more weapons for Our Security, they should not be approved by
Congress. Instead they should be sent back to the drawing board with the re-
Quest that the job be done again and be dOne better.
President Nixon has now asserted, however, that the arms limitation agree-
ments should be approved on their merits. He assures us that he would not have
signed them unless he believed that “Standing alone, they were in the interest
Of the United States.” But at the same time, in his news conference of June 22nd,
he has contended that failure to approve the new Offensive Weapons programs
“would seriously jeopardize the security of the United States and jeopardize the
cause of world peace.” His position seems to rest on two further arguments that
differ somewhat from Secretary Laird's contention that the agreements and new
funding must be linked.
One of these arguments appears to be based on military cosmetics rather than
military capability. It is emphasized that the Soviet Union has indicated its in-
tention to go ahead with programs in areas not controlled by the Interim Agree-
ment.With both countries confined to token ABM Systems that can defend neither
populations nor industrial plants, the only mission for more warheads would be,
as Winston Churchill put it, to “make the rubble bounce.” The Soviets have al-
ways lagged behind us in strategic doctrine. We should not now substitute their
judgment for our own common sense. Rather we should accept the fact that the
ABM treaty assures Our retaliatory deterrent for years to COme and We should
See that this fact is appreciated by our own people, by Our friends, and by those
who might feel disposed to be unfriendly.
Strategic nuclear forces can serve no purpose except to deter an enemy from
using his. By this single sensible criterion we have more than enough and can-
not fall into an inferior position unless this deterrent is threatened. With the
ABM limitation, nothing that can threaten it is remotely in prospect. Whatever
185
else the Soviet Union may do in the offensive nuclear missile area is Without
military meaning. It can give them a political advantage if, and only if, We ap-
pear to concede it to them by depreciating Our Own Strength.
The “bargaining chips” argument is the third risk that arms control may
be converted into arms escalation. We were told for almost three years that
we had to deploy an ABM in order to assure success at SALT. But the delay
in reaching an ABM agreement seems to have stemmed less from Soviet re-
calcitrance than from our own insistence that an ABM limitation be accompanied
by limitations on offensive weapons. As noted in President Nixon's State of the
World message of February 9, 1972: “The Soviet Union wished to work toward
an initial agreement limited solely to antiballistic missiles. We considered that
so narrow a solution would risk upsetting the strategic balance, and might put
a premium on the further development of offensive weapons.” The Interim
Agreement can be defended only if in fact it diminishes that risk. If it spurs
the arms race, then it is indefensible. It will do so if new Offensive nuclear
weapons systems are supported as bargaining chips for further negotiations.
Our decision to deploy an ABM, while the impasse continued, has meant just
more expense and less control. Experience shows that nations hoard Obsolete
weapons just as some wealthy mean save string. We now seem condemned to
continue with our unneeded ABM defense Of Some Minuteman missiles in North
Dakota. The Soviets will probably retain their “Galosh” System that can’t defend
Moscow. Indeed, we may both end up with an additional mirror image ABM
we never Seemed to want before. The treaty permits us to deploy a “command and
control.” ABM around Washington. They are entitled to build, east of the Urals,
and away from Soviet populated areas, an ABM defense for some of their
missiles. Whether or not they engage in profligate futility, Congress should
reject any further ABM expenditures. Not even a “bargaing chip” argument
can be advanced now that an effective ABM limitation has been achieved.
What has led both nations to the bargaining table and what can lead to
lasting and comprehensive limitations on offensive weapons is each side's recog-
nition. Of the Other's technical potential. The agreements, presumably, were
designed to avoid the costs of converting that potential into weapons that would
then be countered and nullified. Neither need—and neither will—let the Other
achieve a position of appreciable bargaining advantage. To continue to build
additional nuclear weapons systems in order to bargain from strength will mean
Only that the final bargain will be the poorer. In the interim, the existence of
negotiations will have been used to spur the arms race. If the “bargaining chip”
argument is to prevail, it is questionable that we can continue to afford arms
Control negotiations. -
As President Nixon has suggested, the SALT agreements should be considered
by Congress on their own considerable merits. Decisions on new nuclear weapons
systems not now forbidden should be made separately and with primary emphasis
On their arms control implications. Those that may threaten the Soviet retaliatory
Capability Should be rejected as inconsistent with the SALT accords. Measures
that serve, like the ABM limitation, to protect the mutual deterrent should be
favorably considered. Among them are restrictions on further testing and on
developments in ASW. They should have top priority in the negotiations that
are to follow. -
The major accomplishment Of the agreements signed at MOSCOW is to assure
time for the sensible self-restraint that can bring an end to the nuclear arms
race. No action the Soviet Union can take at least for the duration of the
Interim Agreement can threaten our deterrent or endanger our security. We
therefore should announce now that we are wtihholding any further deployment
Of nuclear weapons pending further negotiations. The ABM treaty does not
mean that, because it is not forbidden, we must spend further billions on useless
ABM sites. The treaty does mean that we need no more MIRVs, no new bombers,
no larger Submarines to penetrate a non-existent Soviet defense.
Our restraint Can, moreover, create the best climate for further progress in
arms limitations. This example—which can and should be well publicized—
would put pressure on the Soviets to respond in kind and would turn the nego-
tiations themselves into a medium for arms control.
The agreements reached at MOSCOW can do much to move the World toward
nuclear Sanity. Any arguments that diminish their promise should be taken with
at least a grain. Of Salt.
Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Warnke.
186
I wonder if the members of the committee would feel that perhaps
the best way to proceed is to hear from each one of these people first
and then propound questions across the board; otherwise, I am afraid
we would never get through today.
Our next witness is Mr. Donald G. Brennan, senior member, profes-
sional staff, of the Hudson Institute.
Mr. Brennan, we will be very glad to hear from you, sir.
STATEMENT OF DONALD G. BRENNAN, SENIOR FELLOW, PROFES.
SIONAL STAFF, HUDSON INSTITUTE
Mr. BRENNAN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is
a pleasure and a privilege for me to appear before you once again.
As Some of you know, the subject of arms control and disarmament has
been a major field of my study for perhaps a dozen years and I am
grateful for your invitation to testify on the historic proposed agree-
ments now before you. -
BACKGROUND OF WITNESS
A detailed biographical sketch is attached at the end of my state-
ment. Let me mention here that I organized and edited the volume
“Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security,” often called the
bible of arms control, which was endorsed by Senator Fulbright,
among others, and I have collaborated with or consulted or testified
for many congressional groups and agencies of the executive branch
on matters concerning arms control, including at least four prior occa-
sions on which I have presented testimony to this committee. There
were the hearings on the establishment of ACDA, on the Partial Nu-
clear Test Ban, on ABM in the spring of 1969 and on the ratification
of the Geneva Protocol on Chemical and Biological Warfare in the
spring of last year. - -
I have supported, in one way or another, every arms control agree-
ment that has been established since World War II. I have also been
an active advocate for a dozen years or more of a suitable Soviet-
American agreement limiting strategic offensive weapons; such an
agreement was a particular focus of my work in the mid-1960s. It is
therefore a matter of particular disappointment to me that the pro-
posed agreements now before you are such that I cannot support them.
DIFFICULTIES WITH AGREEMENTS
The difficulties with the two agreements are quite different; the pro-
posed ABM Treaty does the wrong thing well and the Interim Agree-
ment does the right things badly.
To begin with the ABM Treaty: We and the Soviets have agreed
not to defend ourselves, not only against each other but, interestingly,
against anyone else, either. I believe that at least on the American side
this agreement stems purely from a sophomoric ideology and fashion.
Let me elaborate on this point. -
MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION POSTURE
The idea has taken hold in the United States that the best route to
nuclear peace and security resides in a strategic posture in which we
187
and the Soviets maintain a capability to destroy a large fraction, say,
one-quarter to one-half, of each other's population and cities and in
which no attempt is made by either side to interfere with the assured
destruction capability of the other. Such a posture is often called a
“mutual assured destruction posture.” It has the property that the
obvious acronym for it—MAD—provides at once the appropriate
description for it, that is, a “mutual assured destruction” posture as a
goal is almost literally mad.
If technology and international politics provided absolutely no
alternative, one might reluctantly accept a MAD posture. But to
think of it as desirable, for instance, as a clearly preferred goal of our
arms control negotiations, as the proposed ABM Treaty automatically
assumes, is bizarre. : -
As some of you probably know, I have often suggested a reduction-
to-absurdity proof of the madness of MAD. If a MAD posture were
genuinely desirable, we and the Soviets could have an arms control
agreement to mine each other's cities. The Soviets could plant large
thermonuclear explosives under, say, the first 100 American cities, and
we could do the same there. This arrangement would save most of
the present troubles and costs of ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers and so on
and, of course, would make any and all active defense systems, such
as ABM and air defense, completely irrelevant, at least as far as
Soviet-American confrontations were concerned. And yet despite the
obvious technical effectiveness of a mined-city posture for imple-
menting MAD, I suspect that few of you would care to sell such a
program to your constituents.
Your constituents would have the right reaction. Some would de-
scribe the reaction as naive or unsophisticated; however, it would in
fact represent the wisdom of rejecting a wholly unproved theory
when it leads to absurd consequences. -
The main theory involved is that a MAD posture is the best way
to protect against nuclear war altogether. This theory is reflected
in the preamble to the proposed ABM Treaty and in the Letter of
Submittal of June 10, 1972, from Secretary of State Rogers: “Effective
limits on antiballistic missile systems... will decrease the risk of out-
break of nuclear war...”
There is, of course, not the slightest shred of evidence in support
of this idea. Many nuclear strategists, including those who have
achieved the greatest prominence in the field, do not believe it is true.
The prevalent popularity of this theory can only be described as a
fashion. Yet the government is apparently prepared to gamble that
the theory is true and thereby commit us to a MAD posture indefinitely.
The treaty itself contains evidence that the theory is little more than
a fashion. If, as is usually argued in support of the theory, stability
resides in high hostage levels and the interposition of ABM on both
sides would be destabilizing because of reducing those levels, it should
be similarly destabilizing if the hostage levels were reduced by direct
cuts in offensive force levels. But the same treaty preamble which ex-
tols limits on ABM systems, without regard to their technical charac-
teristics, including effectiveness, also has the parties “Declaring their
intention . . . to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic
arms, nuclear disarmament . . .” This is something less than con-
sistency. -
80–942 O—72—13
188
It is possible to make a technical case—I personally do not believe
it—that it would be unwise to use currently available ABM tech-
nology in conjunction with cuts in offensive forces to begin to move
away from a MAD posture. However, there is no such technical argu-
ment to be made about all possible future systems of missile defense, of
whatever effectiveness and other characteristics, yet all future systems
are prohibited by the treaty.
In consequence of both my work with Hudson Institute and my
occasional consulting work for the government, I have been close
enough to the analyses of American positions for the SALT to know
what major alternatives and avenues have been considered and exam-
ined within the government. I should like to state flatly for the record
that no serious consideration has been given to possible alternatives to
a MAD posture.
INTERIM. AGREEMENT ALLows soviPTS GREATER CAPABILITY THAN U.S.
Passing now to the Interim Agreement, the basic intention of this is
to establish the beginning of a freeze on strategic offensive forces. The
trouble is simply that it is a bad beginning, not that the objective itself
is unwise. On many occasions in the past, both in published articles and
in lectures, I have urged a freeze of some kind for offensive forces.
However, I never supposed that the United States would formally
accept ceilings that, in every particular controlled by the agreement,
allowed the Soviets substantially greater capability than that per-
mitted the United States.
The Interim Agreement does exactly that. It may be that, in some
particulars not controlled by the agreement, such as numbers of war-
heads, the United States still retains some kind of lead; however,
under the terms of the agreement it is open to the Soviets to close the
leads that we have, and then some, while it is not open to us to close
the Soviet leads.
The payload capacity, or throw weight as it is ofted called, permit-
ted the Soviets in their ICBM and SLBM forces is perhaps four times
ours. The throw weight of a strategic force is unquestionably the most
important single parameter for characterizing the potential of that
force, even though other parameters—notably the number, yield and
accuracy of warheads that can be delivered—are of more immediate
importance. If the Soviets choose to do so, they can deploy as many
warheads per ton of throw weight as we can and since they are permit-
ted roughly four times as many tons, they can ultimately deploy
roughly four times as many warheads as we. They may not choose to do
so; they may choose some other way of using their payload, but the
important fact is we have signed an agreement that says, in effect, that
we have not only become but are willing to remain the second nuclear
power. •
The real Administration argument for the Interim Agreement is that
it will limit the extent to which the Soviets will achieve strategic-force
lead more reliably than any other approach in sight. But that Soviet
advantage, by any reasonable assessment, is already real, and may well
become greater as the Soviets deploy MIRVs and otherwise upgrade
their permitted force in the coming years. The political consequences
of this superiority, or more precisely of the general public recognition
of it, are several, and all bad. :
189
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF SOVIET SUPERIORITY
First, it will reinforce and confirm previously established Soviet
images and expectations of a declining American role in world affairs.
Within the past two years Soviet commentators on the American
scene have exhibited increasing contempt for the United States, its
power and its role in international affairs. For instance, Soviet ana-
lysts often made such remarks as “The United States must be adjust.
ing itself, in the manner of the United Kingdom at the end of World
War II, to its loss of power and influence in the world.” The Soviets,
correspondingly, think of themselves as very much as the ascendant.
These Soviet attitudes and expectations will be reflected in their peace-
time bargaining and will increase their aggressiveness in possible cri-
sis confrontations. -
Second, the Agreement and the Soviet lead it establishes will do
much to establish an image of American inferiority in American gov-
ernmental circles. The effects of this, of course, will be the obverse of
those to be expected from the attitudes in the Soviet bureaucracy,
though probably less marked in degree.
Third, the new imbalance of power will become established in the
minds of our allies, which will ultimately lead them to be more respon-
sive, perhaps unduly responsive, to Soviet diplomatic pressures and
initiatives. To use the current jargon, the Interim Agreement will
contribute to “Finlandizing” tendencies in the policies of our allies.
Fourth, enshrining this degree of Soviet superiority as a substan-
tially permanent thing will almost certainly have adverse consequences
in any serious crisis that may develop. For instance, we could not rea-
sonably expect as favorable an outcome in a replay of the Cuban mis-
sile crisis. I might remark parenthetically, the success of that outcome
did not reside so much in the immediate outcome in Cuba as that the
Soviets were deterred from counterescalating in Turkey or, especially,
in Berlin, a fact that apostles of parity find convenient to ignore.
It is in a certain sense true that different degrees of Superiority can
in the last analysis translated only into different degrees of victory
that would in any event be Pyrrhic. However, this often repeated ob-
servation conveniently ignores the fact that most political leaders
and many military leaders are not academic strategists; these leaders
not only count weapons, they tend to think in terms of who will come
out ahead and their perhaps simplistic attitudes about these matters
will influence their expectations, demands and flexibility in a crisis,
other things, such as the guts and the political support of the leaders
On the Scene, being equal. Therefore, a commitment to a position of
strategic disadvantage is, at least in some statistical sense, an invita-
tion to be pushed around in the next crisis. The Soviets understand this
very well.
In a press conference in Moscow on the occasion of the signing
of these agreements, Henry Kissinger repeatedly made the point that
the terms of the Interim Agreement were influenced by the fact that
the Soviets had ongoing ICBM and SLBM construction programs
while we did not. As he put it on one occasion, it was not the most
brilliant bargaining position he would recommend people to find
themselves in. He could not reasonably have made the point in that
Setting that if the American government found itself in that uncom-
190
fortable position, the responsibility must rest with the American
government; but I can, and do, make that point here: There has been
a collective failure.
REJECTION OF AGREEMENTS RECOMMENDED
This brings me to the final point of whether to recommend accept-
ance or rejection of these agreements.
The argument can reasonably be made that although both agree-
ments represent important failures, the best course of action in view
of current political realities is simply to accept them.
I am sympathetic to this argument. I also doubt very much whether
any recommendation of mine will alter the expected acceptance of
these agreements. But it seems appropriate that someone should say,
unambiguously and on the record, that both of these agreements are
wrong, that the United States ought not to be in the position these
agreements will leave us in, and that the country would ultimately
be best off by rejecting them both and then doing what is right. I
hereby take this position. -
I shall be pleased to answer any questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Brennan. We will
withhold questions until we have completed the direct statements.
(Biographical sketch of Dr. Donald G. Brennan follows:)
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF DONALD G. BRENNAN
DOnald G. Brennan is a mathematician and student of national security prob-
lems. His Special interests are in advanced military policy, alliance relationships
in Europe, and selected areas of arms control, such as policy issues relating to
ballistic missile defense.
Prior to joining Hudson Institute, of which he was President from July, 1962
until May, 1964 and where he now conducts research studies. Dr. Brennan worked
for nine years as a research mathematician and communication theorist at Lin-
Coln Laboratory Of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a research laboratory
engaged in technical Studies for the GOvernment. In addition to his technical
research there, he devoted Substantial time to studies of arms control and na-
tional Security problems.
Dr. Brennan's serious interest in arms control began in 1957, when he was
Organizer of a group that led to the 1958 Summer Study on Arms Control held
in Cambridge, Massachusetts, under the auspices of the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences. He was an Organizer and co-director of the 1960 Summer
Study on Arms Control, again held in Cambridge under American Academy aus-
pices. He was a member Of the Academy’s Committee on International Studies of
Arms Control in 1961–66, serving as its chairman in 1961–62, and has been a
frequent participant in international conferences relating to arms control.
Dr. Brennan has served as a consultant to the Department of State, the De-
partment Of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Executive
Office of the President, and to several research Organizations. He is editor of
the Well-known anthology, Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security
(New York, George Braziller, 1961), sponsored by the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences, and guest editor of its predecessor, the special (Fall 1960)
issue of Daedalus on “Arms Control.” He has edited Studies of future military
technology and Several publications On arms Control. He has Contributed articles
On arms COntrol to a number Of journals and books, and has lectured On national
security subjects at many universities, the U.S. National, Air, and Naval War
Colleges, The Canadian National Defense College, and defense study centers
in London, BOnn, Paris, and Oslo, among Others, and has given Seminars On arms
control in Moscow. He is a frequent witness at Congressional hearings concerned
with national Security affairs.
Born in 1926 in Waterbury, Connecticut, Dr. Brennan received the B.S. (1955)
and Ph.D. (1959) degrees in mathematics from Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
191
nology, where he was a Gerard Swope Fellow and received other graduate and
undergraduate prizes and awards. Prior to entering M.I.T., he was engaged in
radio engineering as a registered professional engineer in the State of Connecti-
cut. He is a Senior Member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engi-
neers and a member of Sigma Xi, the American Mathematical Society, The Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
He was a member of the President’s National Citizens’ Commission. On Interna-
tional Cooperation Year in 1965.
Senator SPARKMAN. Next, Dr. Stanley Hoffmann, Professor of Gov-
ernment at Harvard University. Mr. Hoffmann, we shall be very glad
to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF STANLEY HOFFMANN, PROFESSOR OF GOVERN-
MENT; CHAIRMAN, WEST EUROPEAN STUDIES; FACULTY MEM-
BER OF THE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD
UNIVERSITY
Mr. HoFFMANN. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I
am happy to be here and to be able to testify on this subject. -
For many years both national security and global peace have been
assured by what has been called the “balance of terror” between the
superpowers. This balance has depended and still depends on two
certainties: the certainty of not being able to destroy in a first strike
the enemy’s retaliatory force, and the certainty—which does not ap-
pear so mad to me—of being able to inflict intolerable destruction on
the enemy in a second strike if he chooses to unleash nuclear war.
SAL AGREEMENTS CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY OF DETERRENCE
Examined in and for themselves, the SAL agreements must be
hailed as an important contribution to the stability of deterrence.
The curbing of ABM systems insures that one's population will re-
main the enemy's hostage and removes any incentive to a first strike.
As for the limitation on offensive systems, a ceiling is placed on the
development and modernization of land-based missiles, that is, those
which are now most vulnerable to a first strike; and while the ceiling
on the total number of nuclear submarines and SLBM launchers ac-
knowledges the wastefulness of unlimited expansion, the fact that the
interim agreement on offensive arms does not affect bombers and al-
lows both for the modernization and replacement of existing subma-
rines and for the replacement of older ICBMs by SLBM launchers,
guarantees the survival of the retaliatory force.
To be sure, the Soviet Union, under those agreements, is entitled
to a higher number of launchers than the United States, but we must
take into account—and I am pretty sure that our allies are—first, our
current superiority in MIRV and bombers, unregulated by these ac-
cords and, secondly, the fact that at so high a level of overkill, and as
long as the survival of one's retaliatory force is assured, even a smaller
number of ICBM and SLBM launchers fully protects national secu-
rity and preserves the credibility of one's alliances.
FUTURE OF STRATEGIC BALANCE
We must, however, take a dynamic look at these agreements and
discuss not only their merits but also the future. It is here that the
192
Senate can and should have a considerable impact in orienting Amer-
ican policy.
There are two ways of looking at the future of the strategic balance:
One can envisage a stable balance achieved through a combination of
escalating arms races and joint superpower regulation limiting the
quantitative and qualitative expansion whenever a degree of suffi-
ciency or abundance is reached with respect to a given weapons system.
In this way, stability would be safeguarded and the most delirious ex-
cesses would be curbed. But the strategic arms race would, in effect,
go on; its costs would increase and the capacity to overkill would reach
even more ludicrous proportions. Deterring the unthinkable and ac-
cumulating the unusable would continue to be almost as senseless as
the holocaust itself.
The alternative is to try to stabilize deterrence in such a way as to
make unnecessary the breathless race that we have known for more
than a quarter of a century and which merely condemns the two racers
to keep running faster just in order to remain in place, with temporary
pauses when the strain becomes too high. It always leaves the two
runners at the end of each phase in the same mutual relation but on
a higher plateau of financial depletion and human absurdity. In ef-
fect, each side is a hostage of the other's calculations; both are driven
by their interacting fears and their competing programs. I would like
to see the alternative to such a mad momentum become the policy of
the United States. It raises two sets of questions:
SUBSTANCE OF LIMITATIONS
The first concerns the substance of limitations. Obviously, the main
objective should be a much more complete limitation of offensive sys-
tems. This means, on the one hand, quantitative curbs—on the numbers
and types of bombers, whose vulnerability to a first strike is real, and
whose effectiveness in a first strike is dubious; on the states’ right to
modernize and replace submarines; and one should also envisage a
gradual reduction and ultimate dismantling of fixed ICBM systems.
On the other hand, the qualitative arms race must be brought under
control. This means limiting the deployment of MIRV, which, as Mr.
Warnke has already pointed out, is much less necessary now that ABM
is being curbed, and also limiting the development of antisubmarine
warfare devices.
There are serious problems here. Concerning MIRV, we may
soon be so far head that a freeze would be unacceptable to the USSR;
whereas, if we wait until their technology has caught up with ours,
they may then achieve a superiority in overall deliverable warheads
that might be, politically if not strategically, intolerable to us; and
there is the vexed question of inspection. But these obstacles should
also be incentives. Limits on the number of missile test firings and a
comprehensive test ban treaty could be important steps.
As for defensive systems, a question can already be raised about
the need to build an ABM network to protect Washington; Moscow
may want to be defended against a Chinese attack, but we do not face
a comparable theat.
193
QUESTION OF TACTICS
The second question is one of tactics. It has been raised in different
terms but in the same spirit by Secretary Laird and by President
Nixon. Both have clearly chosen what I have called the first alter-
natives and have asked the Congress to approve new offensive Weapons
programs concerning bombers and submarines. They argue that
without these programs the USSR “will within a matter of a very
limited time be substantially ahead of the U.S. over all”, which assumes
that the Soviets will catch up with us in MIRV. They also argue that
without these programs the USSR will have no incentive to accept
desirable limitations, quantitative and qualitative, on offensive Weap-
ons. How impressive are these arguments?
In my opinion, they are highly debatable.
PREEMEPTIVE ESCALATION
The whole history of the postwar arms race is one of, so to speak,
preemptive escalation based on a worst-case hypothesis which assumes
the adversary’s capacity and will to go ahead full spead. This escala-
tion then turns into a self-fulfilling prophecy, for it serves as an in-
centive to the adversary's own escalation and provides him with the
pre-assumed will, which he may not have had at the start. e
Our massive nuclear expansion in ICBM and nuclear submarines,
following the myth of the missile gap, may have pushed Khrushchev
into the gamble of the Cuban missiles adventure. Both our drive and
his debacle led to the formidable Soviet effort which started in the
mid-60's and resulted in their exceeding our arsenal in numbers of
launchers and in payloads. This Soviet effort, in turn, was used as
an argument for the Safeguard system, while both the widely exag-
gerated development of Soviet ABMs to protect major cities and the
expansion of the Soviet ICBM force were used as arguments for our
proceeding full speed ahead with the deployment of MIRV.
Today, the Trident is described as a hedge against Soviet eventual
success in antisubmarine warfare, and the B–1 bomber, no longer pre-
sentable as a resource against an effective extensive Soviet ABM net-
work, is hailed as a hedge in case of enemy destruction of our ICBMs,
or of insufficient accuracy of our SLBMs. In the past, when it became
apparent that each new program only raised the balance of terror to
a higher plateau, it also became fashionable to describe the program as
a bargaining chip toward an agreement to stabilize the race. Today,
the first major agreement is, in effect, presented as an incentive to
climb higher, with the new climb hailed as a bargaining chip toward
a no doubt temporary halt at an even more dizzying altitude.

BARGAINING TACTICS
If we examine more closely the President's present arguments, we
find that the prospect of overall Soviet superiority is, to say the least
premature. While Russia’s determination to go ahead in the areas not
controlled by the SALT accords poses a problem, it does not impose
our own escalation as the only possible answer. The problem is precisely
how to curb the race which SALT merely channels, not how to continue
~~"
194
it. Thus, the decisive issue is that of bargaining tactics. Here, the Ad-
ministration's arguments are not persuasive.
An agreement on ABM was reached, less because we met Russia's
challenge and launched our own program, than because both sides
recognized that the costs were out of proportion with the value of
these systems.
The Interim Agreement on offensive weapons was reached even
though we had no on-going ICBM program, and the Soviets, who
resisted for a long time the inclusion of nuclear submarines and SLBM
into the agreement, gave in even though we have not launched Trident
yet. To be sure, incentives to agreements are necessary, but the threat
of launching a major program if no agreement is reached, coming
from a nation that is in so many respects still ahead in sophisticated
technology and qualitative performance, can be just as powerful, and
far more effective, in getting results at a lower level of absurdity than
actual escalation. Otherwise, we shall never break out of the vicious
circle which consists of launching a dubious program in order later
to be able to claim as a political breakthrough and as a victory of
common sense an agreement that merely restricts the further waste
of resources on such a program.
AREAS CURBED IN SALT
The President has correctly pointed out that the new offensive wea-
pon programs were recommended prior to SALT. This throws a
rather intriguing light on SALT. We have obtained from the Russians
curbs in areas, including the SS-9, where they, not we, have ongoing
programs and where had they refused limitations, we could not have
caught up with them during the next five years. But we have avoided
curbs in the areas where we wanted to expand anyhow, SO as to stay
ahead of them. This is quite a competitive achievement, but it sug-
gests not so much the triumph of the bargaining-chip theory—after
all, our biggest chip is the MIRV, which remains unregulated—as
the certainty that the Soviets will indeed feel that they have to catch
up with us in all the areas, including MIRV, that are left open in the
I’à, Ce.
ARMS RACE DECISIONS POLITICAL
The arms race raises, of course, purely military questions; but the
process of mutual reactions does not account for the entire story. The
decisions are also political in two senses: (1) they are based on an
overall political conception of the international system; and (2) they
correspond to specific political interests and objectives. &
The logic of the stratetgic arms race correponds to a view ac-
cording to which, in the realm of nuclear weapons as in foreign policy;
the best that can be hoped for between the superpowers is regulated
competition. Through regulation, explicit or tacit, direct confronta-
tions as well as strategic unilateral breakthroughs would be avoided.
but the contest for influence and the spirit of rivalry would go on. I
have no doubt that in the realm of diplomacy this is indeed correct.
3ut I do not think that we are doomed to this bleak future in the
strategic arms race, which has a life of its own. These weapons are not
usable for political purposes; they are deterrents, that is, they insure
195
that the rivalry in the field will both persist and be relatively safe for
global peace. This means on the one hand that unless one side achieves
So decisive a breakthrough as to destroy one or both of the bases of
stable deterrence described above, a relative overall superiority in num-
bers of launchers or warheads, or the inevitable asymmetries between
two different nuclear arsenals cannot, as the President claims, “be an
open invitation . . . for more potential aggression in the world.” A
margin of nuclear Superiority is not convertible into political gains at
lower, that is, nonnuclear, that is, daily, levels of conflict.
This means, on the other hand, that a separation between levels
could be firmly sought and established so that, at the nuclear level,
regulated contest could be turned into actual cooperation, channeled
escalation into gradual deescalation and the race toward qualitative
progress into a beginning of disarmament. Not an inch of additional
security is gained by pursuing the contest here, and enormous re-
Sources are wasted.
To be sure, it takes two to achieve such a change; but it seems to
me impossible to expect the Soviets to initiate it as long as we are ahead
in the race. It is the leading power's responsibility to make the shift
through its acts and in its planning. Thus, if we want to curb the
deployment of MIRV, we probably ought to slow down or suspend
ours so as to incite the Soviets to an agreement on terms acceptable to
them.
One may legitimately ask, what if the Soviets spurn such offers,
and use our good will as a springboard? My reply is that it is pre-
cisely our margin of superiority and our skills in research and develop-
ment which allow us to gamble in the way I have advocated. Should
the gamble get us nowhere, we will still be able to return to the
policy of competitive escalation without any loss in Security, and with
a better perspective from which to decide whether the new weapons
systems we need are those the President recommends today and which
assume that bigger is better.
PROBLEMIS WIFHICH SALT HAS BARELY AFFECTED
Insofar as specific political interests and goals in various parts of
the world are concerned, a look at the future shows a variety of prob-
lems which SALT has barely affected. -
One is that vexing perennial, nuclear proliferation. While it would
be wrong to argue that there is a direct connection between superpower
agreements curbing the strategic race and some lesser powers’ inclina-
tion to “go nuclear,” there is no doubt that the very stability of the
strategic balance between the U.S and the USSR, with or without
SALT, raises questions among America's allies about U.S. willingness
to suffer nuclear devastation for their protection. The nuclear stale-
mate may also serve as an excuse and incentive for other nations, in-
volved or uninvolved in the superpowers’ contest, to go nuclear in order
to gain prestige or to establish their regional preponderance; but this
problem can only be solved case by case, and in some instances, such as
Japan, the solution may lie in making profitable alternatives to re-
armament available to the country in question. In other instances, the
solution may lie in U.S.-Soviet cooperation, taking the form of joint
196
guarantees. Such cooperation, in turn, depends on the shift of policy
which I have suggested before. .
Another problem of particular interest to me is that of European Se-
curity. SALT, which excluded from its scope America's forward-based
system in Western Europe and Soviet MCBMs aimed at Western Eu-
rope, has not disturbed our European allies whom we have kept well
informed. But a SALT II that would deal with these two sets of
weapon systems above our allies' heads would be politically diastrous,
even if it left the overall strategic balance in Europe intact. Indeed,
these systems should be discussed in a different arena—the MBFR
negotiation that was called for by the Moscow summit communique.
A few points can be made, which are of general validity. What is
at stake here is not the capacity of the U.S. to deter a most improbable
Soviet attack in Europe, but its will to keep on playing a deterring role.
What matters ultimately in this respect is not the number of U.S.
troops but the maintenance of a more than token U.S. presence and the
conviction of our allies about our will and intentions. What is impor-
tant is not a perfect equilibrium of conventional and tactical nuclear
forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. What the West
Europeans fear is not Soviet military occupation but the political in-
fluence of the USSR based on Russia's military might.
What matters in this respect is that Western Europe, which is not
yet a coherent entity, should not feel left alone facing Moscow, and be
in no way deprived, at the coming European Security Conference and
in the MBFR forum, of the right to transform the EEC into a political
and military community in the future. In other words, political self-
confidence and economic strength are the best recipes against the so-
called Finlandization or Austrianization of Western Europe, and
these, in turn, depend on U.S. diplomatic skill and sense of purpose as
much as on wise military policies.
RELATION OF MILITARY POWER TO POLITICAL EFFECTIVENESS
A final remark of general importance:
Insofar as the major powers of the world are concerned, the po-
litical contest between them will be one for influence rather than of
arms. While weapons shall remain essential both as a deterrent and as
an ingredient of influence abroad, we are now in a world in which the
relation of military power to political effectiveness is far more com-
plex and twisted than ever before, and I have a feeling that political
leaders understand this even better than some strategic experts. It is
Western Europe's continuing identity crisis, its lack of a collective
political purpose, not military weakness, which limits its influence in
international affairs, despite huge economic strength. Japan’s rela-
tively small impact on world politics has resulted from a deliberate
political choice, not from military atrophy; indeed, Japan’s huge eco-
nomic impact was largely made possible by the limitation of defense
costs. Militarily, small powers can be highly effective if they have
the necessary will, cohesion and outside support, as Israel or North
Vietnam have shown. Almost unlimited might can fail to bring either
victory or compromise, as the U.S. is still demonstrating in Vietnam,
the area which requires the most drastic change in U.S. policy, along
with the strategic realm we have discussed here.
197.
Stable deterrence provides both the framework within which dis-
putes between nations will persist, and the reason why conflicts are
not only unlikely to lead to global war but also likely to result in ºn
increasing political fragmentation of the globe. This means, on the
one hand, that disputes will have to be dealt with on their merits, and
that great powers, acting together or balancing one another, do not
have any more the power to impose their solutions. •
But, on the other hand, the leading states still have a double capacity
to make matters worse and it is to that formidable power for evil that
we should address ourselves. One is the capacity to feed and escalate
local conflicts through competitive supplies of arms; the other is the
capacity to perpetuate an overall climate of competitive absurdity, in
full contradiction with any effort to bring about a moderate interna-
tional system through the strategic arms race. Thank you.
(Mr. Hoffmann's prepared statement follows:)
PREPARED STATEMENT OF STANLEY HoFFMANN, PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT,
CHAIRMAN OF WEST EUROPEAN STUDIES, AND FACULTY MEMBER OF THE
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
1. For many years, both national security and global peace have been assured
by what has been called either the “balance of terror” or, “stable deterrence”
between the two superpowers. This balance depends on two certainties: the Cer-
tainty of not being able to destroy, in a first strike, the enemy's retaliatory force;
the certainty of being able to inflict intolerable destruction on the enemy in a
Second Strike, if he chooses to unleash nuclear War.
In recent years, the stability of this balance appeared endangered, On the One
hand by the development of offensive missiles with greater accuracy and bigger
payloads, as well as by the deployment of the MIRV, on the other by the Con-
struction of ABM systems. The threat to the second certainty, due to the ABM,
was greater than the threat to the first, for even though MIRV and new missiles
may raise doubts about the capacity of land-based missiles to Survive a first
strike, they have not affected the capacity of the two other components of the
strategic nuclear force : Submarines and (to a lesser extent) bombers, to Survive
Gne. But the balance of terror requires both the absence of a first strike disarming
Capability, and the exposure Of populations to attack.
Examined in and for themselves, the SALT agreements must be hailed as an
important contribution to the stability of deterrence. The curbing of ABM sys-
tems insures that One's population will remain the enemy’s hostage and removes
any incentive to a first strike. As for the limitation on offensive systems, a ceiling
is placed on the development and modernization of land-based missiles, i.e., those
which are now most vulnerable to a first strike; and while the ceiling on the
total number of nuclear submarines and SLBM launchers acknowledges the
Wastefulness of unlimited expansion, the fact that the interim agreement on
Offensive arms does not affect bombers and allows both for the modernization
and replacement Of existing Submarines, and for the replacement of Older ICBM
by SLBM launchers, guarantees the survival of the retaliatory force.
To be sure, the Soviet Union, under those agreements, is entitled to a higher
number of launchers than the United States. But we must take into account, first
Our current Superiority in MIRV and bombers, unregulated by these accords, and,
Secondly, the fact that at so high a level of overkill, and as long as the survival
Of One's retaliatory force is assured, even a smaller number of ICBM and SLBM
launchers fully protects national security and preserves the credibility of one's
alliances.
2. We must, however, take a dynamic look at these agreements, and discuss
not Only their merits, but the future. It is here that the Senate can and should
have a considerable impact in orienting American policy.
There are two Ways of looking at the future of the strategic balance. One can
envisage a stable balance achieved through a combination of escalating arms
races, and joint Superpower regulation limiting the quantitative and Qualitative
eXpansion Whenever a degree of “sufficiency” or abundance is reached with
respect to a given Weapons System. In this way, stability, as defined above,
Would be safeguarded, and the most delirious excesses would be curbed. But the
198
strategic arms race would, in effect, go on, its costs would increase, and the
capacity to overkill would reach even more ludicrous proportions. Deterring the
unthinkable and accumulating the unusable would continue to be almost as sense-
less as the holocaust itself. The alternative is to try to stabilize deterrence in
Such a Way as to make unnecessary the breathless race that we have known for
more than a quarter of a century. It condemns the two racers to keep running
faster just in Order to remain in place, with temporary pauses when the strain
becomes too high. It always leaves the two runners, at the end of each phase, in
the same mutual relation, but On a higher plateau of financial depletion and
human absurdity. In effect, each side is a hostage of the other's calculations;
both are driven by their interacting fears and their competing programs. I would
like to see the alternative to such a “mad momentum” become the policy of the
United States. It raises two sets of questions.
(a) The first concerns the substance of limitations. Obviously, the main objec-
tive should be a much more complete limitation of offensive systems. This means,
On the One hand, quantitative curbs: On the numbers and types of bombers
(Whose Vulnerability Ot a first Strike is real, and whose effectiveness in a first
Strike is dubious), On the states’ right to modernize and replace submarines.
A gradual reduction and ultimate dismantling of fixed ICBM systems should also
be envisaged, given the growing Vulnerability Of these Systems. On the other
hand, the qualitative arms race must be brought under control. This means
limiting the deployment of MIRV and the development of antisubmarine war-
fare devices. Serious problems exist here: concerning MIRV, we may soon be
So far ahead that a freeze would be unacceptable to the U.S.S.R., whereas if
We Wait until their technology has Caught up with ours, they may then achieve
a superiority in overall deliverable warheads that might be-politically, if not
strategically—intolerable to us; and there is the vexed question of inspection.
Put these Obstacles are also incentives. Limits On the number of missile test
firings and a comprehensive test ban treaty could be important steps. As for
defensive systems, a question can already be raised about the need to build an
ABM network ot protect Washington; Moscow may want to be defended against
a Chinese attack, but we do not face a comparable threat.
(b) The second question is one of tactics. It has been raised, in different terms
but in the same spirit, by Secretary Laird and by President Nixon. Both have
clearly chosen what I have called the first alternative, and have asked the
Congress to approve new offensive weapons programs concerning bombers and
submarines. They argue that without these programs the U.S.S.R. “will within
a matter Of a Very limited time be Substantially ahead of the U.S. Overall”—
which assumes that the Soviets will catch up with us in MIRV. They also argue
that without these programs the U.S.S.R. will have no incentive to accept desir-
able limitations, quantitative and qualitative, On Offensive weapons. How im-
pressive are these arguments?
3. In my Opinion, they are highly debatable.
(a) The whole history of the postwar arms race is one of, so to speak, pre-
emptive escalation, based On a “worst case” hypothesis which assumes the ad-
Versary’s capacity and Will to go ahead full Speed. This escalation then turns
into a self-fulfilling prophecy, for it serves as an incentive to the adversary’s
own escalation and provides him with the pre-assumed will, which he may not
have had at the start. Our massive nuclear expansion in ICBM and nuclear Sub-
marines, following the myth Of the missile gap, may have pushed Khrushchev
into the gamble of the Cuban missiles adventure. Both our drive and his debacle
led to the formidable SOviet effort which started in the mid sixties and resulted
in their exceeding Our arsenal in numbers Of launchers and in payloads. This
Soviet effort in turn was used as an argument for the Safeguard system, while
both the (widely exaggerated) development of Soviet ABMs to protect major
cities and the expansion of the Soviet ICBM force were used as arguments for
our proceeding full speed ahead with the deployment of MIRV. Today, the
Trident—a reply to a Soviet submarine expansion that was a reaction to Ours—
is described as a “hedge” against SOviet eventual success in antisubmarine war-
fare, and the B1 bomber—no longer presentable as a recourse against an effec-
tive, extensive SOviet ABM network—is hailed as a hedge in case of enemy
destruction of our ICBMs, or of insufficient accuracy of our SIBMs. In the
past, when it became apparent that each new program Only raised the balance
of terror to a higher plateau, it also became fashionable to describe the program
as a “bargaining chip” toward an agreement to stabilize the race. Today, the
first major agreement is, in effect, presented as an incentive to climb higher,
199
With the new climb hailed as a “bargaining chip” toward a no doubt temporary
halt at an even more dizzying altitude. -
(b) If we examine more closely the President’s present arguments, we find
that the prospect of overall Soviet superiority is, to say the least, premature.
While Russia’s determination to go ahead in the areas not controlled by the
SALT accords poses a problem, it does not impose our own escalation as the
only possible answer. The problem is precisely how to curb the race which SALT
merely channels, not how to continue it. Thus, the decisive issue is that of
bargaining tactics. Here, the Administration’s arguments are not persuasive. An
agreement On ABM was reached, less because We met Russia’s challenge and
launched Our Own program, than because both sides recognized that the costs
Were Out Of proportion with the value of these Systems. The interim agreement
On Offensive weapons was reached even though we had no on-going ICBM pro-
gram ; and the Soviets, who resisted for a long time the inclusion of nuclear
Submarines and SLBM into the agreement, gave in even though we have not
launched Trident yet. To be sure, incentives to agreements are necessary, but the
threat Of launching a major program if no agreement is reached, coming from
a nation that is in SO many respects still ahead in Sophisticated technology and
qualitative performance, can be just as powerful, and far more effective in get-
ting results at a lower level of absurdity, than actual escalation. Otherwise, we
shall never break out of the vicious circle which consists of launching a program
of dubious utility, in Order later to be able to claim as a political breakthrough
and as a Victory Of Common sense an agreement that merely restricts the fur-
ther Waste of resources On Such a program. While we negotiate a limitation
of the “bargaining chips”, with all their formidable complexity, we fail to con-
centrate On all the Other a Spects Of the arms race that could be limited also.
(c) The President has correctly pointed out that the new offensive weapons
programs were recommended prior to SALT. This throws a rather intriguing
light on SALT. We have obtained from the Russians curbs in areas where they,
not we, have on-going programs (ICBMs, submarines)—and where, had they
refused limitations, we could not have caught up with them during the next
five years. But we have avoided curbs in the areas where we wanted to expand
anyhow so as to stay ahead of them (MIRV, bombers, Trident). This is quite a
competitive achievement ; but it suggests, not SO much the triumph of the “bar-
gaining chip” theory (after all, our biggest “chip” is the MIRV, which remains
unregulated), as the certainty that the Soviets will indeed feel that they have
to catch up with us in all the areas, including MIRV, that are left Open in the
I’à Ce.
4. The arms race raises, of course, purely military questions. As I have in-
dicated, each side's decisions on strategic programs have been largely shaped
by the acts, and by the (rightly or wrongly) anticipated acts or assumed inten-
tions Of the other side. But this process of mutual reactions does not account
for the entire story. The decisions are also political, in tWO senses : they are
based on an Overall political conception of the international System, and they
correspond to specific political interests and objectives.
The logic of the strategic arms race corresponds to a view according to which,
in the realm of nuclear Weapons as in foreign policy, the best that can be hoped
for between the Superpowers is regulated competition. Through regulation (ex-
plicit or tacit), direct confrontations as well as strategic unilateral breakthroughs
would be avoided, but the contest for influence and the spirit of rivalry would
go on. I have no doubt that in the realm of diplomacy this is indeed correct (see
my article, “Weighing the Balance of Power”, in Foreign Affairs, July 1972).
But I do not think that we are doomed to this bleak future in the Strategic arms
race, which has a life of its own. These weapons are not usable for political
purposes; they are deterrents, i.e., they insure that the rivalry in the field will
both persist and be relatively safe for global peace. This means, on the One
hand, that unless one side achieves so decisive a breakthrough as to destroy
One or both of the bases of stable deterrence described above, a relative “over-
all” superiority in numbers of launchers or warheads, or the inevitable asym-
metries between two different nuclear arsenals cannot, as the President claims,
“be an open invitation . . . for more potential aggression in the world”. A
margin of nuclear superiority is not convertible into political gains at lower,
i.e., non-nuclear, i.e., daily, levels of conflict. This means, on the Other hand,
that a separation between levels could be firmly sought and established SO that,
at the nuclear level, regulated contest could be turned into actual cooperation,
channeled escalation into gradual deescalation, and the race toward qualitative
200
“progress” into a beginning of disarmament. Not an inch of additional security
is gained by pursuing the contest here, and enormous resources are wasted.
To be Sure, it takes two to achieve such a change. But it seems to me im-
possible to expect the Soviets to initiate it, as long as we are ahead in
the race. It is the leading power's responsibility to make the shift, through
its acts and in its planning. (Thus, if we want to curb the deployment Of
MIRV, We probably ought to slow down or suspend ours so as to incite the
Soviets to an agreement on terms acceptable to them). One may legitimately
ask: What if the Soviets spurn such offers, and use our good will as a Spring-
board? My reply is that it is precisely our margin of superiority and our
Skills in research and development which allow us to gamble in the way I
have advocated. Should the gamble get us nowhere, we will still be able
to return to the policy of competitive escalation without any loss in security—
and With a better perspective from which to decide whether the new weap-
OnS System. We need are those the President recommends today, and which
a SSume that bigger is better.
5. InSOfar as Specific political interests and goals in various parts of the
WOrld are COncerned, a look at the future shows a variety of problems which
SALT has barely affected.
(a) One is the Vexing perennial, nuclear proliferation. While it would be
Wrong to argue that there is a direct connection between superpower agree-
ments Curbing the Strategic race, and some lesser powers' inclination to “go
nuclear”, there is no doubt that the very stability of the strategic balance
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (with or without SALT) raises questions
among America’s allies about U.S. willingness to suffer nuclear devastation
for their protection. The nuclear statement may also serve as an excuse and
incentive for other nations, involved or uninvolved in the Superpowers' con-
test, to go nuclear in Order to gain prestige or to establish their regional
preponderance. This problem will have to be Solved case by case. In some
instances (Such as Japan), the Solution may lie in making profitable alterna-
tives to rearmament available to the country in question. In other instances,
the solution may lie in U.S.-Soviet cooperation, taking the form of joint guar-
antees either to the States on the threshold of nuclear power or to the potential
victims of these states. Such cooperation in turn depends on the shift of policy
advocated above.
(b) Another problem, of particular interest to this witness, is that of Eu-
ropean Security. SALT, which excluded from its scope America’s forward-
based Systems in Western Europe and SOviet MCBMs aimed at Western Eu-
rope, has not disturbed Our European allies, whom we have kept well-informed.
But a “SALT II” that would deal with these two sets of weapons systems
above Our allies’ heads would be politically disastrous, even if it left the Over-
all Strategic balance in Europe intact. Indeed, these Systems should be dis-
cussed in a different arena : the MBFR negotiation that was called for by
the Moscow summit communiqué. This is not the time and place to discuss the
numerous problems of MBFR, but a few points can be made, which are of
general validity. What is at stake here is not the capacity of the U.S. to
deter a most improbable Soviet attack in Europe, but its will to keep On playing
a deterring role; What matters ultimately in this respect is not the number
Of U.S. troops, but the maintenance Of a more-than-token U.S. presence, and
the conviction of our allies about our will and intentions. What is important
is not a perfect equilibrium Of conventional and tactical nuclear forces be-
tween NATO and the Warsaw Pact. What the West Europeans fear is not
Soviet military occupation, but the political influence of the U.S.S.R., based
on Russia's military might. What matters in this respect is that Western Eu-
rope, which is not yet a coherent entity, should not feel left alone facing
Moscow, and be in no way deprived, at the coming European Security Con-
ference and in the MBFR forum, Of the right to transform the E.E.C. into
a political and military community in the future. In other words, political Self-
confidence and economic strength are the best recipes against the so-called
“finlandization” (or austrianization) of Western Europe, and these in turn
depend on U.S. diplomatic skill and sense of purpose as much as On Wise mil-
itary policies.
6. Insofar as the major powers of the world are concerned, the political COn-
test between them will be One for influence, rather than Of arms. While Weapons
shall remain essential both as a deterrent, and as an ingredient of influence
abroad, we are now in a world in which the relation of military power to politi-
201
Cal effectiveness is far more complex and twisted than ever before. It is Western
Europe’s continuing identity crisis, its lack of a collective political purposes, not
military weakness which limits its influence in international affairs, despite huge
economic strength. Japan’s relatively small impact on World politics has resulted
from a deliberate political choice, not from military atrophy: indeed, Japan’s
huge economic impact was largely made possible by the limitation. Of defense
costs. Militarily, Small powers can be highly effective, if they have the necessary
will, cohesion and Outside Supports, as Israel Or North Vietnam have shown.
Almost unlimited might can fail to bring either victory Or compromise, as the
U.S. is still demonstrating in Vietnam—the area which requires the most drastic
change in U.S. policy, along with the strategic realm discussed here. Stable de-
terrence provides both the framework within which disputes between nations
will persist, and the reason why conflicts are not only unlikely to lead to global
war, but likely to result in an increasing political fragmentation of the globe.
This means, On the One hand, that disputes will have to be dealt with On their
merits, and that great powers, acting together Or balancing One another, do not
have any more the power to impose their solutions. But On the other hand, the
leading states still have a double capacity to make matters worse, and it is to
that formidable power for evil that we should address Ourselves. One is the
capacity to feed and escalate local conflicts through competitive supplies of arms,
the other is the capacity to perpetuate an Overall climate Of COmpetitive ab-
surdity—in full contradiction with any effort to bring about a moderate inter-
national System—through the Strategic arms race.
Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much. -
Next we will have Mr. Jerome H. Kahan, Senior Fellow at the
Brookings Institution. s
Before you start, let me say there is coming up very shortly a vote
on the Interior Appropriations bill. When that vote comes, we can
either recess or, if one of you gentlemen would be willing to do it,
leave immediately and vote and come back and the others of us leave
on the Interior Appropriations bill. When that vote comes, we can
recess; whichever you desire.
All right, Mr. Kahan.
STATEMENT OF JEROME H. KAHAN, SENIOR FELLOW, BR00KINGS
INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. KAHAN. Senator Sparkman and Members of the Committee, I
am privileged to appear before you to testify on the subject of strategic
arms limitations.
In the interest of time, I will summarize the more important points
of my testimony and request that the full statement be entered in the
record.
Senator SPARKMAN. That will be done.
ARTICLE: “LIMITED AGREEMENTS AND LONG-TERM STABILITY”
Mr. KAHAN. Many of the ideas and analyses I will present are
based upon an article of mine entitled “Limited Agreements and Long-
term Stability,” appearing in the Spring, 1972 issue of the Stanford
Journal of International Studies. I request permission for this article
to appear in the appendix of the published record of these hearings.
Senator SPARKMAN. Very well, it will be included in the appendix.
(See appendix.) -
BACKGROUND OF WITNESS
Mr. KAHAN. For the information of the committee, before joining
the Foreign Policy Division at Brookings, I served on the staff of
202
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the International
Security Affairs Division of the Department of Defense. The views
I will express today, of course, are my own and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Brookings Institution or organizations sup-
porting its research.
SENATE SUPE’ORT OF TREATY AND INTERIM. AGREEMENT URGED
The signing of the Moscow strategic arms limitation accords repre-
Sents a major milestone in bringing the nuclear competition under
control. The agreements will enhance both sides' security primarily
by placing low limits on ABM systems and also by setting ceilings on
offensive missile forces. But apart from the specific details of the
accords, the mere fact that the United States and the Soviet Union
were able to negotiate agreements affecting weapon systems so central
to their Security is itself an unprecedented political event with posi-
tive significance for U.S.-Soviet relations and benefits for all nations.
For these reasons, I would urge Senate support of both the Treaty and
the Interim Agreement.
QUESTIONS ADDRESSED BY WITNESS
In outlining my views on the SALT accords, I will address three
related but relatively distinct questions:
First, why are the Moscow agreements in the net interest of the
United States. Second, how might both sides maintain long-term
stability through further negotiations and discussions? Third, what
guidelines should the United States follow in managing its strategic
policies under the initial SALT accords while working toward further
limitations?
ABM LIMITATION'S MOST IMPORTANT BENEFIT OF AGREEMENTS
Without doubt, the single most important benefit of the Moscow
agreements can be found in the ABM limitations. More than any other
strategic weapon, defensive systems capable of protecting populations
against missile attacks have the potential of stimulating an increase
in the level of offensive armaments and, beyond that, of creating
Serious instabilities.
With stringent limits placed on ABMs by the SALT Treaty, the
requirements for the United States and the Soviet Union to improve
or enlarge their offensive forces should diminish. The prospect of large
ABM deployments by the other side would no longer dominate each
nation's defense planning, and variations in offensive force levels and
uncertainties over qualitative improvements should have less signifi-
C8,1] C62.
In a remarkable doctrinal shift, the Soviet Union, in the context of
SALT, adopted the view that ABMs are, in fact, destabilizing and
should be limited to very low levels. The USSR's implicit acceptance
of the principle of deterrence through the threat of reprisal should
make U.S. leaders feel more certain that a secure nuclear relationship
with the Kremlin can be maintained.
203
REASONS FOR NEGOTIATING OFFENSIVE MISSILE LIMITATIONS
There are also important reasons for negotiating offensive missile
limitations. From the U.S. viewpoint, it would be useful to limit for
number of Soviet strategic missiles, even though MIRVs are not
banned under the Interim Agreement. Forestalling further deploy-
ment of large ICBMs of the SS—9 type could delay the date by which
the Soviet Union might develop a counterforce MIRV capacity, there-
by increasing the life expectancy of our Minuteman force. And
limiting the number of Soviet SLBMs could diminish the threat to
U.S. air bases and, over the long term, enable American planners to
take more effective countermeasures to preserve our bomber deterrent.
Moving beyond strict military calculations, however, the offensive
limitations negotiated at SALT can have considerable value.
Administration officials have justified acceptance of the USSR's 50
percent advantage in numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs under the In-
terim Agreement by pointing to our undisputed lead in long-range
bomber capabilities, numbers of warheads, and overall force quality.
This line of reasoning is valid.
Of crucial significance is our advantage in MIRV technology which
will enable us to retain an overwhelming superiority in deterrent power
through the 1970s. Even if the Soviets managed to deploy MIRVs on
their large ICBMs within the next five years they could not match our
lead in the far more important area of MIRVed sea-based missiles of
the Poseidon type. Indeed, from the perspective of a Soviet “conserva-
tive planner,” the Interim Agreement, which permits the U.S. to ex-
ploit its technological edge, does not limit U.S. long-range bomber
capabilities or forward-based nuclear systems, which could be as plac-
ing the USSR in an extremely disadvantageous strategic position,
On the other hand, if no constraints were placed on Soviet offensive
forces, the USSR might well continue to deploy ICBMs and SLBMs
at the current rate for the next five years. During this period, U.S.
leaders would undoubtedly feel increasingly uncomfortable if the So-
viets showed signs of building toward a level of perhaps 2,000 ICBMs
and over 1,200 SLBMs deployed on 80 modern nuclear-powered sub-
marines. U.S. officials in any Administration would feel the pressure
to build additional strategic offensive forces in order to counter the
Soviets’ overriding numerical missile advantage—even if such actions
were not necessitated by strict military calculations.
Faced with expanding Soviet programs, the U.S. would almost
Surely react by producing a substantial number of new generation of-
fensive systems and constructing ABM defenses. The Soviet Union,
in turn, would probably increase its offensive missile forces still further
and enlarge its ABM network. In this environment, U.S. planners
could not be certain of the ability of our strategic offensive forces to
inflict retaliatory damage on the Soviet Union.
DETERRENT WOULD REMAIN RELIABLE IN CONTEXT OF SALT
In the context of SALT, on the other hand, our deterrent would
remain highly reliable throughout the decade. The Interim Agreement
would not eliminate the potential danger to our landbased missiles but,
With Soviet ABMs Severely constrained U.S. sea-based missile forces
80–942 O—72—14
204
alone could be assured of inflicting at least 25 percent retaliatory
damage upon the Soviet Union's population. Soviet antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) threats are not imminent and a variety of counter-
measures could be taken by the U.S. to maintain a survivable sea-based
force in the future.
Without the SALT Treaty, the U.S. would, of course, be free to de-
ploy additional ABMs around its ICBM sites. But it is highly unlikely
that such hard-point defenses could guarantee the invulnerability of
Our Minuteman force against a Soviet MIRV threat. At best, any
increased retaliatory capacity which might be obtained through this
costly countermeasure could be offset by the attritive characteristics
of an enlarged Soviet ABM network.
Senator SPARKMAN. This is the five-minute signal. I must go. We
will stand in recess. I may not be able to come back myself because I am
managing the Foreign Assistance Act which I think will be called up
immediately, but someone else will take over.
Dr. Teller, I am sorry I didn’t get to hear you, but I will read care-
fully your statement and wish I might be here for the questioning.
The committee will stand in recess until further notice.
(Recess.)
Senator CoopFR (presiding). The committee will come to order. I
regret very much that Senator Sparkman is unable to come back. He
has an amendment pending on the floor.
I think we vote on it at 12:30.
I am very sorry that we are hearing you in the last few days of the
Senate before the recess. Many committees are in session and votes
are on the floor all the time. So it has not been possible to have all mem-
bers of the committee present. Having heard the testimony thus far
and having read the testimony of Dr. Kahan and Dr. Teller; I know
how important it is. I think this is the first time in this hearing we
have had before us experts who have worked in this field for so many,
many years that your testimony is of tremendous importance. Mr.
Kahan, will you proceed. -
STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP wiTH/WITHOUT AGREED LIMITATIONS
Mr. KAHAN. Thank you, Senator.
In political as well as military terms the SALT accords can be ex-
pected to improve our strategic position when constrasted with the
future situation which would be expected to arise in the absence of
mutual limitations—that is, on a “relative risk” basis.
Although the initial agreement would codify the Soviet Union's
position of nuclear parity, American deterrent forces should be suf-
ficient to dissuade the Soviet Union from attempting to exploit its
strategic power for purposes of blackmail or coercion. Nonetheless,
having overcome its past position of strategic inferiority, there is still
the possibility that the Soviet Union might see the changed nuclear
balance as enabling it to pursue an aggressive foreign policy.
However, the strategic relationship without agreed limitations
would probably be less desirable. Even with a major increase in ex-
penditures, the United States could not regain strategic superiority
and an uncontrolled arms race might work to our disadvantage.
205
It is possible, of course, that without any SALT controls the Soviet
Union might not build a strategic missile force larger than the levels
permitted under the Interim Agreement. And it is also possible that
the U.S., through congressional action or executive branch policy,
would not move forward with its major strategic programs. In theory,
both nations ought to exercise unilateral restraint and pursue purely
stabilizing strategic policies. But experience shows that neither na-
tion has taken such initiatives. In this sense, bilateral agreements, de-
fensive as well as offensive, have the unique effect of forcing both sides
to do together what they are not likely to do separately.

COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE MORE COMIPREHENSIVE MEASURES IN PHASE
TWO
The value of the SALT accords extends beyond the initial agree-
ments negotiated at Moscow, to the commitment on the part of both
nations to negotiate more comprehensive measures in phase-two. This
is an important goal, since an uncontrolled continuation of the arms
competition within the bounds of the agreement could make it difficult
for the United States and the Soviet Union substantially to ease ten-
sions. Over the long term, failure to minimize potential instabilities
could preclude renewal of the Interim Agreement and possibly jeo-
pardize the ABM Treaty.
At the outset, both sides should, of course, ensure that the initial
SALT agreements will operate effectively and enhance mutual con-
fidence. But the United States and the Soviet Union should immedi-
ately begin to explore ways of modifying the terms of the Interim
Agreement and expanding its scope.
The SALT experience to date demonstrates that the two nations are
capable of holding serious discussions of strategic arms control ques-
tions and striking a bargain acceptable to both sides. Equally sig-
nificant is the fact that the Moscow accords do not merely place nu-
merical ceiling on deployed forces but impose technical and qualitative
restrictions as well. Thus, the initial agreements contain many sub-
stantive as well as procedural precedents which make comprehensive
offensive controls seem feasible.
TWO OBJECTIVES PROPOSED FOR PHASE TWO
It might be useful to attempt to address the issue of future SALT
prospects by proposing two objectives which might be followed in
formulating additional agreements and identifying certain limitation
options which flow from each of these guidelines.
MAINTAINING FHIGH DEGREE OF STRATEGIC STABILITY
The first objective of phase-two should be to maintain a high degree
of strategic stability. - •-
Consistent with this objective, an obvious issue for further negotia-
tion concerns future ICBM vulnerability. As noted earlier, the initial
accords will not eliminate this problem, since MIRVs are permitted
and missile-site ABM deployments are severely limited. -
206
There are three possible arms control approaches to this problem:
(1) Modify the Interim Agreement to permit both sides to deploy
extensive missile site ABM defenses which would not appear as a first
step toward an area ABM. Although a theoretical possibility, this
approach would involve modifying the ABM Treaty and would raise
a host of technical and verification issues.
(2) Minimize the threat by imposing deployment or testing limita-
tions on MIRVs. At this stage, however, such measures would prob-
ably prove difficult to negotiate and verify.
(3) Diminish the danger by removing the targets threatened by
MIRVs, notably, fixed ICBM sites. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could
first agree to reduce their ICBM forces by 50 percent. At the same
time, the freedom-to-mix formula of the Interim Agreement could be
extended to provide both sides the option of replacing substantial
numbers of ICBMs with SLBMs, but perhaps on a less than 1-for-1
basis. This approach might prove to be the most feasible and desirable.
If initial progress is made, both sides might eventually move toward
exclusive reliance on sea-based missile systems and bombers—a stra-
tegic configuration which would eliminate the instabilities associated
with accurate MIRVs. - - * -
The survivability of sea-based deterrent forces, on the other hand,
seems relatively well assured. While there seems to be no immediate
prospect of ASW breakthroughs, however, negotiated restrictions
would reduce fears over the possibility that missile-firing submarine
systems might become increasingly vulnerable within the next decade.
Perhaps joint technical working group could be established within
the SALT framework to grapple with the complex, long-range prob-
lem of ASW limitations. r
CONTAINING ARMS COMPETITION IN WAYS REDUCING TENSIONS, COSTS
A second objective which should govern future negotiations stems
from the need to contain the arms competition in ways which could
reduce political tensions and the costs associated with strategic arms.
Measures flowing from this concern could include agreed limitations
on weapons not covered by the Interim Agreement, such as long-range
bombers and forward-based systems; restrictions on weapons which
could create uncertainties in estimating relative U.S.-Soviet nuclear
power, such as a formal ban on land mobile ICBMs; and developing
guidelines to restrict both nations from modernizing their strategic
arsenal when not justified on grounds of Security or efficiency.
In addition, constraints could be placed on active air-defense sys-
tems without detracting from warning or command and control capa-
bilities. With ABMs limited to low levels, it would make little Sense
for either side to retain large and costly air-defense establishments.
QUESTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS POLICIES UNDER SALT
At this point, I would like to turn to the question of strategic arms
policies under SALT—an issue which has become more important
than the agreements themselves during the current debate. -
There will remain considerable room for U.S. strategic weapons
decisions within the bounds of the Moscow SALT accords. But the
207
precise implications of SALT for our unilateral strategic weapons
decisions are neither obvious nor simple to assess.
To begin with, it should be recognized that the accords do not re-
move all the potential threats to our strategic forces which many
ongoing programs are designed to meet. For example, the lack of
ASW limitations makes it imperative that the U.S. ensure that its
sea-based deterrent remains highly Secure, and the prospect that Our
ICBM forces might become vulnerable makes more important the goal
of preserving reliable bomber as well as submarine systems.
The USSR will probably continue quantitative and qualitative stra-
tegic programs permitted by the SALT accords, not only in anticipa-
tion of our future efforts but as a means of further improving its
present position. Thus, until and unless Soviet restraint or follow-On
SALT agreements eliminate or significantly alleviate these dangers,
the U.S. must pursue programs needed to maintain an assured deter-
rent capability—keeping current forces effective and modernizing them
when necessary.
It would also be necessary for the U.S. to place greater emphasis
on national verification efforts needed to monitor Soviet compliance
with the accords. And it might be necessary to institute programs
which could provide additional hedges against uncertainties which
could arise in our verification capabilities as well as a standby capacity
to deploy systems in the event the agreements are abrogated for any
reason. Apart from their prudential value, these programs can help
the Administration and the Congress develop a sense of confidence
in the new environment of SALT, lower the likelihood that uncertain-
ties or false alarms might generate tension, and reduce to a minimum
the possibility that U.S. officials might consider withdrawing from
the accords. -
On the other hand, as a consequence of the Moscow accords, it is
clear that the U.S. can and should modify and possibly curtail many
of its strategic programs.
Important U.S. strategic deployment efforts, notably the Poseidon
and Minuteman ITI MIRV programs, were planned primarily as re-
sponses to anticipated Soviet ABM expansion. With ABMs limited
and MIRVs permitted, these programs will provide the U.S. with a
strategic posture under SALT far more adequate than originally con-
templated. Therefore, in developing new systems, such as TRIDENT
and the B–1, U.S. defense planners can be less conservative in calculat-
ing our future deterrent requirements.
The U.S. should also restructure its strategic programs to avoid
endangering the stability of the initial agreements or foreclosing future
SALT options. In particular, the U.S. should seek to minimize the
“action-reaction” cycle within the constraints of SALT by attempting
to maintain the viability of its deterrent without posing a threat to
the Soviets’ deterrent. Thus, programs designed to improve the coun-
terforce capabilities of MIRV’s on other offensive weapons should not
be pursued.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the U.S. should shape its
strategic programs to support its negotiating objectives and facilitate
meaningful progress in phase two of SALT.

208
BARGAINING TACTICS
To this end, there is a legitimate need to maintain momentum in
our strategic programs. In many bargaining circumstances, putting
this form of visible pressure on the other side to accept restrictions
on his activities can represent a Sound and Sensible negotiating
Strategy.
The Soviets bargained hard throughout the first phase of SALT.
In Phase-two, the USSR will almost surely propose measures which
the U.S. would find difficult to accept and oppose measures put forth
by Washington. Therefore, leverage should be available to strengthen
the hand of U.S. negotiators during the difficult discussions which lie
ahead. -
At the time, there are serious disadvantages in pressing the so-called
bargaining-chip argument too far. Negotiating from strength can re-
duce prospects for agreement by stimulating the nuclear competition
in uncontrolled areas as each side seeks to acquire more “chips” in re-
sponse to the other side's move. If weapon systems are deployed for
bargaining purposes, it becomes virtually impossible to reverse the
process. As a consequence, the effectiveness of agreements are often de-
graded and resources wasted on marginally useful systems. Alterna-
tive bargaining tactics which exploit the potential for deployment,
such as placing construction funds “in eScrow,” can be equally effective
in Supporting a strong negotiating posture without detracting from
the ultimate value of the agreements being sought.
RELATING FUTURE U.S. STRATEGIC WEAPON DECISIONS TO SALT
As a means of striking a realistic balance between deterrence re-
Quirements and negotiating needs, the U.S. might be guided by four
criteria in deciding how to relate its future strategic weapon decisions
to SALT:
First, prevent the bargaining-chip rationale from becoming the
major motive for programs which cannot be credibly justified as
necessary to support our deterrent objectives and which would other-
wise be halted or restricted for cost-effectiveness reasons.
Second, maintain momentum on developmental programs designed
to offset potential threats to our retaliatory capability, but seek to
avoid moving these systems into the full flight test or procurement
stages unless actions are judged essential for maintaining a con-
fident deterrent posture.
Third, pay particular attention to exercising restraint on programs
which might seriously threaten the stability of the initial SALT agree-
ments or foreclosure options for future agreements which could in-
crease our own longer-term security.
Finally, indicate to the USSR that continued restraint on our part
in a particular area would require some form of Soviet reciprocity—
not simply a symmetrical response, but a response which reduced the
threat our program was designed to meet.
Such broad policy considerations can be used as guidelines for eval-
uating specific aspects of the U.S. strategic forces program. However,
detailed analyses and legislative actions concerning our unilateral
strategic options should take place in the context of reviewing the
209
Administration’s proposed fiscal year '73 defense budget. During this
process, the implications of SALT for U.S. strategic forces and pol-
icies should be taken into account as one of the many factors to be
considered in assessing the U.S. defense program. It would be neither
appropriate nor advisable to delay or imperil implementation of the
SALT accords by making congressional support for the agreements
conditioned in any way on the outcome of the defense budget debate.
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING U.S. FY 1973 STRATEGIC PROGRAMS
My major recommendations regarding U.S. fiscal year '73 strategic
programs can be briefly summarized as follows: -
(1) Complete the Poseidon and Minuteman III MIRV programs
as scheduled as a means of maintaining a highly-reliable U.S. posture
under SALT and diminishing pressures for new systems.
(2) Continue the Trident program at a reduced funding level of
$350 million and retain the option to deploy this system as an eventual
fººt for Polaris/Poseidon or an alternative to land-based
ICBMs.
(3) Cut the B-1 program to $100 million but allocate $50 million to
develop a follow-on bomber for the 1980s which would be less costly
and more efficient in terms of satisfying a retaliatory deterrent mission.
(4) Reduce the AWACS program to approximately $150 million
in developmental efforts, with a view toward introducing this system
as a replacement for expensive and inefficient ground-based warning
and control systems, and refrain from modernizing our fighter-inter-
ceptor or SAM squadrons.
(5) Complete the one Safeguard site currently being deployed at
our ICBM installations in North Dakota, but do not construct the
Second ABM site around Washington, D.C., as permitted under the
Treaty.
These recommendations would reduce the fiscal year '73 strategic
forces’ budget by some $1.2 billion over the approximately $600 million
in direct savings tied to curtailment of those Safeguard sites banned
under the treaty. However, it should be recognized that the economic
savings from the initial SALT agreements would tend to flow from
future expenditures foregone, rather than from appreciable cuts in
current or near-term levels of spending. But this should not call the
accords into question, since the primary value of these agreements is
to increase strategic stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war. Over
the long term, through phase-two agreements and a movement away
from “worst-case” planning, more meaningful Savings might arise.
MAINTAINING SECURE NUCLEAR RELATION SHIP
In sum, the initial SALT agreements will contain the nuclear com-
petition, help both sides maintain credible deterrent forces and offer
the United States and the Soviet Union the continuing opportunity
of managing their strategic policies within a bilateral framework. But
the Moscow accords represent only the beginning of the search for sta-
bility. Sustained efforts will be needed to maintain a mutually secure
nuclear relationship during the coming decade, and both superpowers
must commit themselves to this task.
(Dr. Kahn's prepared statement follows:)
210
... -->
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JEROME H. KAHAN
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee : The signing Of the
Moscow strategic arms limitation accords represents a major milestone in bring-
ing the nuclear competition under control. In transmitting the agreements to
Congress, President Nixon stated that they “provide for a more stable strategic
balance in the next several years than would be possible if Strategic arms compe-
tition continued unchecked.” The agreements will enhance both sides’ Security
primarily by placing low limits On ABM Systems and also by Setting ceilings On
Offensive missile forces. But apart from the Specific details Of the accords, the
mere fact that the United States and the Soviet Union were able to negotiate
agreements affecting weapons systems SO central to their Security is itself an
unprecedented political event with positive significance for U.S.-Soviet relations
and benefits for all nations. For these reasons, I urge Senate Support of both the
Treaty and the Interim Agreement.
Yet domestic reactions to the Strategic arms limitation agreements have not
been uniformly favorable. SOme doubt that the measures will in fact Strengthen
U.S. Security and argue that acceptance of the accords could freeze the U.S. in a
potentially dangerous position Of inferiority. Others suggest that the Offensive
agreement is too limited to have any real utility and claim that both nations
will Simply channel their energies into the many areas Of the arms race left un-
controlled. Still others see considerable value in the agreements and praise the
President’s efforts but fear that SALT will be used to justify excessive expansion
Of U.S. Strategic programs.
In presenting my views on the SALT accords, I will address three related but
relatively distinct questions:
First, why are the MOSCOW agreements in the net interest Of the United States?
Second, how might both sides maintain long-term stability through further
negotiations and discussions?
Third, what guidelines should the United States follow in managing its stra-
tegic policies under the initial SALT accords while working toward further
limitations?
I. BENEFITS OF THE INITIAL SALT ACCORDS
Without doubt, the single most important benefit Of the Moscow agreements
can be found in the ABM limitations. The Treaty limits ABM deployments on
both sides to two separated Sites Of 100 launchers each, places constraints On
ABM radars, and imposes restrictions On ABM-related testing and development.
But Of perhaps greater Significance than the limitations themselves is the State-
ment of intent by both nations not to deploy nationwide ABM defenses Or pro-
Vide a base for Such a System.
MOre than any Other Strategic Weapon, defensive Systems capable of protecting
populations against missile attacks have the potential Of Stimulating an increase
in the level of Offensive armaments and beyond that Of Creating Serious instabili-
ties. One COuntry’s ABM poses a direct threat to the Other country’s retaliatory
missile forces. In contrast to Offensive counter-force threats which might en-
danger the Survivability of a nation’s land-based systems. The ABM threat is
far more Serious Since it can potentially negate both land- and Sea-based missiles.
Moreover, if ABMs were extensively deployed, the risk of nuclear war could rise.
In a time of tension, one side might come to believe that it had sufficient con-
fidence in its offensive forces to launch a first-strike while relying On its defensive
network to reduce damage from weapons launched in retaliation.
U.S. Strategic force decisions have been Substantially influenced by the fear
that Soviet ABM deployments would endanger Our “assured destruction” deter-
rent capability. Indeed, the mere prospect that the Soviets might deploy an
ABM tended to trigger anticipatory countermeasures. Until recently, the USSR
did not appear to share this U.S. attitude toward deterrence. However, in a
remarkable doctrinal shift, it now seems that the Soviets have reversed their
longstanding belief in the desirability of ABMs, and, in the context of SALT,
have adopted the view that ABMs are destabilizing and should be limited to
very low levels.
With stringent limits placed on ABMs by the SALT Treaty, the requirements
for the United States and the SOviet Union to improve or enlarge their Offen-
sive forces should diminish. The prospect of large ABM deployments by the
Other side would no longer dominate each nation’s defense planning, and
variations in Offensive force levels and uncertainties Over qualitative improve-
ments should have leSS Significance. Each nation should thus become more Con-
211
fident of its retaliatory force and both sides would benefit from a stable strategic
situation based upon mutual deterrence. The USSR’s implicit acceptance Of the
principle of deterrence through the threat of reprisal should make U.S. leaders
feel more certain that a Secure nuclear relationship with the Kremlin can be
maintained. #
The foregoing discussion seems to suggest that limits on ABMs alone might be
sufficient to dampen the Offensive nuclear arms competition and enhance Strategic
stability. However, there are practical military as well as political reasons for
negotiating Offensive missile limitations.
From the U.S. viewpoint, it would be useful to limit the number Of SOviet
ICBMs, even though MIRVs are not banned under the Interim Agreement. The
Soviet Union has tested Simple multiple Warheads, but has not yet demon-
strated a MIRV capability and could not acquire an advanced MIRV system
before the late 1970’s. A Soviet SS—9 force of approximately 500 missiles Out-
fitted with a MIRV package Of three multi-megaton warheads could pose a
threat to the survivability Of Our land-based Minuteman force. However, to
acquire a comparable capability with some 300 SS—9 ICBMs as limited by the
agreement, the Soviets would have to develop a more Sophisticated package Con-
taining five Or six single-megaton Warheads Of even greater accuracy. These
additional technological demands could delay the date by which the Soviet
Union might develop a counterforce MIRV capacity and increase the life
expectancy Of Our Minuteman force.
Strategic policy experts COnsider Sea-based missiles to be stabilizing, Since
these systems are highly Survivable and best Suited for retaliatory rather than
first-strike missions. Nonetheless, U.S. Officials have been concerned that the
growing Soviet Polaris-type submarine fleet will pOse an increased threat to
the survivability of Our bombers. Pentagon planners fear that Soviet SLBMs
launched from close range can reduce the warning time needed to permit Our
B-52 forces to become airborne before they are destroyed. On their bases. Limit-
ing the number of Soviet SLBM's could diminish this threat and, Over the long
term, enable American planners to take more effective countermeasures to pre-
Serve Our bomber deterrent. -
Admittedly, the value of the Interim Agreement may not be great on strict
military grounds. On a broader level, however, the Offensive limitations can
have considerable utility for the United States.
Administration officials have justified acceptance of the USSR's 50% advan-
tage in numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs under the Interim Agreement by pointing
to our undisputed lead in long-range bomber capabilities, numbers of war-
heads, and overall force quality. This line of reasoning is valid. Of crucial sig-
nificance is our advantage in MIRV technology which will enable us to retain an
Overwhelming superiority in deterrent power through the 1970's. Even if the
SOviets managed to deploy MIRVs On their large ICBMs within the next five
years, they could not match Our lead in the far more important area of MIRVed
seal based missiles Of the Poseidon type. Indeed, from the perspective Of a Soviet
“conservative planner,” the Interim Agreement—which permits the U.S. to
exploit its technological edge, does not reduce the American long-range bomber
force, and leaves U.S. forward-based nuclear Systems uncontrolled—could be
seen as placing the USSR in an extremely disadvantageous strategic position.
On the other hand, if no constraints were placed on Soviet Offensive forces,
the USSR might well continue to deploy ICBMs and SLBMs at the current rate
for the next five years. During this period, U.S. leaders would undoubtedly feel
increasingly uncomfortable if the Soviets showed signs of building toward a level
of perhaps 2,000 ICBMs and Over 1200 SLBMs deployed on 80 modern nuclear-
powered submarines. With the prospect of a Soviet missile force twice as large
as Ours, the U.S. might decide to procure additional Offensive Systems simply
to prevent the numerical balance from Shifting too dramatically against it—
even if Such actions were not necessitated by military calculations. While ac-
knowledging that Small changes in the strategic relationship are not significant
and that neither side could obtain a first-strike capability, President Nixon has
emphasized that the United States would respond to any substantial Soviet effort
to alter the balance. U.S. officials in any Administration would feel the pressure
to build additional strategic Offensive forces in Order to counter the Soviets’
Overriding numerical missile advantage.
In short, when evaluated by comparison against the future situation which
WOuld be expected to arise in the absence Of mutual limitations—that is, On a
“relative risk” basis—the SALT accords will improve Our strategic posture. With-
212
Out the agreements, it is likely that both nations would continue to enlarge and
improve their strategic forces. Faced with expanding Soviet programs, the U.S.
WOuld almOSt Surely react by producing a Substantial number of new-generation
Offensive Systems and constructing ABM defenses. The Soviet Union, in turn,
WOuld probably increase its Offensive missile forces still further and enlarge
its ABM network. In this environment, U.S. planners could not be certain of
the ability Of Our Strategic Offensive forces to inflict retaliatory damage On the
SOviet Union. - -
In the context of SALT, On the other hand, our deterrent would remain highly
reliable throughout the decade. The Interim Agreement would not eliminate the
potential danger to our land-based missiles, but, with Soviet ABMs severely con-
strained, U.S. Sea-based missile forces alone could be assured of inflicting at least
25 percent retaliatory damage upon the Soviet Union's population. Soviet anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) threats are not imminent, and signs of Soviet prog-
ress could be countered by qualitative improvements in the Polaris Submarine
fleet, extending the range Of the Poseidon SLBM, Or, if necessary, eventually
building Trident as a replacement for present sea-based forces. Bomber capa-
bilities, which would not be controlled, would provide diversity and thereby in-
crease confidence in our deterrent. Without the SALT Treaty, to be sure, the U.S.
would be free to deploy ABMs around its ICBM sites. But it is highly unlikely
that Such “hard-point” defenses could guarantee the invulnerability Of Our Min-
uteman forces against a Soviet MIRV threat. At best, any increased retaliatory
capacity which might be obtained through this costly countermeasure would be
Offset by the attritive characteristics Of an enlarged SOviet ABM System. Put
another way, a strategic Situation in which a reliable dual deterrent of American
SLBMs and bombers faced Only a token ABM capacity is to be preferred over a
situation in which the U.S. might be able to maintain a marginal “triad” deter-
rent—but at the price of permitting the Soviets to deploy large numbers of ABMs.
Although the initial agreement would codify the Soviet Union's position of
nuclear parity, American deterrent forces should be sufficient to dissuade the
Soviet Union from attemping to exploit its strategic power for purposes of black-
mail Or coercion. Not Only would Our Strategic forces retain the clear capacity to
inflict catastrophic damage, but, On an OVerall basis, Our Strategic posture Would
remain numerically comparable to that Of the Soviets. This makes it improbable
that Kremlin leaders would underestimate either the capabilities Of Our forces
or the willingness of the United States to protect its interests.
Nonetheless, having overcome its past position of strategic inferiority, there
is still the possibility that the Soviet Union might see the changed nuclear balance
as enabling it to pursue an aggressive foreign policy. However, the Strategic rela-
tionship in the absence of agreed limitations would not necessarily be more
desirable. Even with a major increase in expenditures, the United States could
not regain strategic Superiority, and an uncontrolled arms race might Work to
our disadvantage. At best, we would remain equal and be confronted with what-
ever problems parity may bring.
A SALT agreement would, of course, introduce a new uncertainty into the
strategic equation—the possibility that the Soviets might violate its terms or
abrogate the accord and mount a massive buildup in an attempt to gain advan-
tage. But these dangers must be put into perspective in evaluating relative
risks. The U.S. would be able to verify the agreed restrictions with a high
degree of confidence through national means. The Soviets could attempt to dis-
guise their deployment activities, but this would involve considerable technical
difficulties as well as a high risk of discovery with its attendant political COSts.
In addition, there would be little payoff for the Soviets in undertaking an evasion
program unless they could be reasonably certain of gaining a meaningful advan-
tage. This is a most unlikely prospect, for, even with a delay in our capacity to
detect, we could be certain of identifying Soviet violations before they became
significant enough to pose a threat to our deterrent or to dramatically alter the
numerical balance. With Our current strategic force levels and continued quali-
tative improvement, we would have a cushion against uncertainties and could
tolerate delay and ambiguity in detecting possible Soviet violations. Consequently,
the Soviets would not be able to rapidly deploy defensive Or Offensive Systems
after a sudden abrogation on such a scale that our security would be threatened
before we could take appropriate Counteractions.
It is possible, of course, that without any SALT controls, the Soviet Union might
not build a strategic missile force larger than the levels permitted under the
Interim Agreement. And it is also possible that the U.S., through Congressional
213
action Or Executive Branch policy, would not move forward with its major
Strategic programs. In theory, both nations Ought to exercise unilateral restraint
and pursue purely Stabilizing strategic policies. But experience shows that neither
nation has taken Such initiatives. In this Sense, bilateral agreements—defensive as
Well as Offensive—have the unique effect Of forcing both sides to do together what
they are not likely to do separately. The certainty gained through SALT may well
be its most important benefit.
In sum, the foregoing discussion leads to the conclusion that the SALT accords
are in the net Security interest Of the United States. Strategic Superiority is no
longer within Our grasp. Under the terms Of the agreements, the U.S. WOuld be
able to maintain a strong nuclear posture and WOuld not be placed in an inferior
position. Indeed, Our Strategic deterrent cOuld be preserved with greater Con-
fidence and at leSS COSt than WOuld. Otherwise be the Case.
II. POSSIBILITIES AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE AGREEMENT
The value of SALT extends beyond the initial agreements to the commitment
on the part of Washington and Moscow to negotiate more comprehensive meas-
ures. The Interim Agreement places Only limited COStraints On Offensive forces.
Although many new weapóns programs and improvements can be stabilizing—
for example, more secure sea-based systems and hardened ICBM silos—an un-
controlled COntinuation Of the arms COmpetition within the bounds Of the agree-
ment could make it difficult for the United States and the Soviet Union substan-
tially to ease tensions. MOre importantly, failure to minimze potential instabili-
ties could preclude renewal of the Interim Agreement and possibly jeOpardize the
ABM Treaty.
While negotiating additional agreements, both sides should ensure that the
initial SALT accords Will Operate effectively and enhance mutual confidence.
A significant step in this direction is the forrmal agreement between Washing-
ton and Moscow acknowledging the use of “national technical means” for veri-
fication, prohibiting interference with such systems, and precluding “deliberate
COncealment measures” Which COuld impede Verification. The Treaty also calls
for a Standing Commission to be formed for the purpose of monitoring and man-
aging the agreements. Through this mechanism, the parties would discuss the
precise interpretations of restrictions and clarify actions by either side Which
might otherwise generate false alarms regarding compliance. The Commission
would, in addition, be responsible for Overseeing the various replacement proce-
dures associated With the Interim Agreement.
Within the framework of the SALT Commission, Systematic attempts could
be made to minimize uncertainty and maximize stability as both nations continue
to pursue unilateral strategic weapons activities which are not prohibited by
the initial agreements. For example, One side could notify the Other in advance
of its future development programs and procurement plans. Perhaps mutually-
agreed guidelines could be established to assist both nations in making unilateral
strategic force decisions which would not be viewed by the Other side as threat-
enling.
But continuing discussions and attempts to arrange tacit rules of restraint
cannot, in themselves, be relied upon to COntain the future strategic competition.
Explicit agreements need to be reached in Order to achieve meaningful results.
Thus, the U.S. and the USSR should immediately begin to explore ways of modi-
fying the terms Of the Interim Agreement and expanding its SCOpe, With the goal
of securing a more permanent and stable Offensive agreement. Again, the SALT
Commission would be the most natural vehicle for such negotiations.
It is important to recognize that the MOSCOW accords provide a firm foundation
for U.S. and Soviet negotiators to work out additional limitations. Most funda-
mentally, the SALT experience demonstrates that the two nations are capable
of holding serious discussions of strategic arms control questions and striking
a bargain acceptable to both sides. In addition, the agreements do not merely
place numerical ceilings on deployed forces. There are detailed technical restric-
tions (e.g., power-limitations for ABM radars); limits on testing and develop-
ment (e.g., the Various ABM-related prohibitions) ; qualitative constraints On
Offensive weapons (e.g., Silo and missile size limitations) ; and procedures for
dismantling and replacing forces (e.g., “cashing-in” Older ICBMs for SLBMs).
Thus, the initial agreements Contain many substantive as well as procedural
precedents Which make COmprehensive Offensive COntrols seem feasible.
214
At this stage, it is difficult to predict the precise course of subsequent negotia-
tions. Nevertheless, it might be useful to attempt to address this issue of future
SALT prospects by proposing two objectives which might be followed in formula-
ing additional agreements and identifying certain limitation options which flow
from each of these guidelines.
The first Objective of phase-two should be to maintain a high degree of strategic
stability. This was emphasized in an official U.S. Unilateral Statement which de-
Clared that a goal Of the follow-On negotiations should be “to constrain and reduce
On a long-term basis threats to the survivability of Our respective retaliatory
forces.” The USSR did not subscribe to this particular statement, but expressed
Strong interest in “more Complete” limitations.
Consistent with the first Objective Of Stability, an obvious issue for further
negotiation concerns future ICBM Vulnerability. As noted earlier, the initial ac-
cords will not eliminate this problem, Since MIRVs are permitted and missile-
site ABM deployments are severely limited. By the end of the decade, therefore,
ICBMs on both sides could become endangered. Many analysts do not express
COncern Over this prospect as long as both sides retain Sea-based deterrents.
But Other strategic experts, as well as high American Officials, claim that the
existence of vulnerable ICBMs could create instabilities which might lead to
a breakdown of deterrence in a time Of tension. In any case, the Subject should
be discussed at SALT with a view toward acquiring a COmmon understanding
of the issue and finding mutually acceptable Solutions to potential problems.
There are three possible arms control approaches to the problem Of ICBM
vulnerability : -
(1) Design an agreement permitting both sides to deploy extensive missile-site
ABM defense which would not appear as a first Step towards an area ABM. HOW-
ever, this would involve modifying the ABM Treaty and would raise a host of
difficult technical and vertification issues. Moreover, it is unlikely that ABM de-
fenses could provide cost-effective protection against MIRVs. While the possi-
bility Of Such an arrangement should not be dismissed, Serious pursuit Of this
option would not appear to be fruitful at this time and such efforts could
jeopardize the stability of the initial SALT agreements.
(2) Minimize the threat by imposing mutual limitations On MIRVs. A ban on
MIRV deployments would involve intrusive On-site inspection, and, apart from
this Stumbling block, would probably be unacceptable to both sides On Strategic
policy grounds. It might be possible to alleviate the adverse implications Of
MIRVs by placing agreed restraints On missile testing to prevent each side from
developing highly-accurate warheads with a counterforce capability. But this
would probably prove difficult to formulate and negotiate. The U.S. would raise
verification concerns while the SOviets WOuld see the measure as freezing them
in an inferior position.
(3) Diminish the danger by removing the targets threatened by MIRVs—
notably, fixed ICBM sites. Under this approach, the U.S. and the USSR could
first agree to reduce their ICBM forces by 50%. At the same time, the “freedom-to-
mix” formula Of the Interim Agreement could be extended to provide both sides
the option of replacing substantial numbers of ICBMs, but perhaps on a less than
One-for-One basis. The U.S. would probably view this plan with considerably more
interest than the USSR, although it might be acceptable to the Soviets since they
could increase their sea-based Strength by shifting Substantial forces from land
to sea without seriously compromising their ICBM power. Such a reduction plan
could enhance mutual stability by leading both sides to rely more heavily on sea-
based missiles. Over the longer term, both sides might move towards exclusive
reliance On Sea-based missile Systems and bombers—a Strategic COnfiguration
which would eliminate the instabilities associated with accurate MIRVs.
Even if agreed solutions to the problem Of ICBM vulnerability cannot be found,
bilateral discussions Of this issue COuld be beneficial in reducing risks. The U.S.
would, Of course, always retain the Option of reducing its ICBM forces unilater-
ally if this action is judged to be necessary for the maintenance Of a stable deter-
rence posture. - -
The Survivability Of Sea-based deterrent forces, On the Other hand, Seems rela-
tively well assured. There seems to be no immediate cause for COncern. Over ASW
breakthroughs. Nevertheless, negotiated restrictions would reduce fears Over the
possibility that missile-firing submarine systems might become increasingly
Vulnerable within the next decade. FOr example, an agreement COuld be reached
whereby neither side's nuclear-powered attack Submarines are permitted to CrOSS
an agreed and monitored Sonar barrier. In principle, this measure would permit
215
both sides to maintain a reliable deterrent force with their Offensive ballistic
missile submarines while preventing attack submarines from Crossing into areas
behind the barrier. As a COmplementary measure, a limit could be placed. On the
number Of hunter-killer Submarines each Side might deploy. Perhaps a joint
technical working group could be established within the SALT framework to
grapple with the complex long-range problem. Of ASW limitations.
A second Objective which should govern future negotiations Stems from the
need to contain the arms competition in ways which would reduce political ten-
sions and the costs associated with strategic arms. Measures flowing from this
concern could include agreed limitations On weapons not covered by the Interim
Agreement, imposing restrictions on systems which could create uncertainties in
estimating relative U.S.-Soviet nuclear power, and eliminating expensive systems
which each nation might otherwise retain in order to match the other.
As an initial step, numerical limits could be placed On Strategic bombers. SOviet
inferiority in this area suggests that such a measure might not be negotiable.
However, the United States might be prepared to accept a bomber limit of 250–
the approximate number of B–1 aircraft which might eventually replace Our pres-
ent 500-unit heavy bomber force—in return for a Soviet agreement not to increase
their present force of 200 long-range bombers. Both sides Would remain free to
deploy air-to-Surface missiles On their bombers to improve penetration, but Such
actions would not be destabilizing.
In addition, constraints could be placed on active air-defense Systems, Without
detracting from warning or command and control capabilities. These could in-
clude prohibitions against modernizing bomber defense networks as Well as agreed
reductions of interceptor aircraft, Surface-to-air missiles, and associated radars.
With ABMs limited to low levels, it would make little Sense for either side to re-
tain large and costly air-defense establishments. Reducing Such defenses would
also contribute to stability by further alleviating concerns on each side that the
Other side might upgrade its air-defense System and acquire a clandestine ABM
capability in Violation Of the ABM Treaty. Moreover, lowering the level Of air-
defenses WOuld help insure the reliability Of both sides’ bomber deterrent forces—
an Objective which could become increasingly desirable as ICBMs become less
Survivable. -
An attempt could also be made to Set a ceiling On SOviet intermediate- and
medium-range missiles and medium-range bombers in return for the United
States accepting some limits on numbers of forward-based tactical aircraft (FBS)
reployed in Western Europe and On aircraft carriers. This issue is extremely com-
plicated because Of the Variety Of Weapons involved, the problem of dual-purpose
Systems, and the significance Of these systems for NATO defense. Moscow’s posi-
tion that all weapons capable of reaching the homeland of the U.S. and the USSR
Should be classified as “strategic” created a deadlock earlier in SALT. However,
after gaining the experience and confidence of a working SALT agreement, some
accommodation might be found. FBS limitation Options could also be discussed
in the context of European force reduction negotiations (MBFR).
As a Specific item in phase-two of SALT, the U.S. should seek to persuade the
USSR to accept a formal ban on land-mobile ICBMs. Deployments of these sys-
tems by either side would tend to create undesirable uncertainties, since it would
be difficult to estimate the other side's force level. For this reason, Sea-based
missiles are to be preferred Over land-mobile missiles as an alternative to fixed
ICBMs. The unilateral U.S. statement regarding land-mobile deployments as in-
consistent with SALT should be made more meaningful through mutual agree-
ment.
As a broader measure, it might be possible for the U.S. and the USSR to nego-
tiate arms control guidelines for strategic force modernization programs. Land-
based and Sea-based systems On both sides will eventually need replacement if
they are to continue to serve as reliable deterrents. Through SALT, the two sides
might reach an understanding to replace systems only when justified for reasons
Of cost Or efficiency and to work towards postures which contained fewer forces
Of greater Survivability designed primarily for retaliatory rather than “war-
fighting” purposes. Mutual force levels could be set and replacement systems and
Schedule COuld be made subject to agreement.
Finally, Success at SALT can provide impetus for negotiating a Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban. With progress made towards stabilizing the strategic relation-
Ship as a result of the initial accords and efforts under way to reach more com-
plete Offensive limitations, the U.S. and the USSR should find continued nuclear
Weapons testing less essential. At the same time, constraints on underground test-
216
ing—whether a total ban or a threshold arrangement—would reduce fears of pos-
Sible destabilizing Weapons developments and thus support the goals of SALT.
The CTB could be explored by the SALT Commission, but the multilateral nego-
tiations at Geneva would probably become the primary forum. .
III. STRATEGIC ARMS POLICIES UNDER SALT
Not Surprisingly, there Will remain considerable room for unilateral U.S. stra-
tegic weapons decisions within the bounds of the Moscow SALT accords. Indeed,
no one argued that the limited agreements likely to be negotiated as the first step
to Wards controlling the Strategic competition would remove the need for continu-
ing defense programs. Nevertheless, in the course of considering the SALT ac-
Cords, the question of U.S. strategic defense options has become a dominant domes-
tic issue, Often Overshadowing the agreements themselves.
The debate over the connection between SALT and U.S. strategic programs
ShoWS Signs of becoming polarized. It seems safe to observe, however, that the
Signing Of the SALT agreements does not automatically lead to the conclusion
that the U.S. Should halt all its new and ongoing strategic programs or to the
Conclusion that We Should Sustain and accelerate all our strategic efforts. But
between these extremes, the precise implications of SALT for our unilateral
Strategic posture decisions are neither Obvious nor simple to assess.
TO begin With, there are many reasons why the U.S. should continue certain
Strategic programs within the framework of the SALT agreements. The ac-
cords do not remove all the potential threats to our strategic forces which many
Ongoing programs are designed to meet. For example, the lack of ASW limita-
tions makes it imperative that the U.S. ensure that its sea-based deterrent re-
mains highly Secure, and the prospect that our ICBM forces might become vul-
nerable makes m0re important the goal of preserving reliable bomber as well
as submarine Systems. The USSR will probably continue quantitative and qualita-
tive strategic programs permitted by the SALT accords, not only in anticipation
Of Our future efforts but as a means of further improving its present position.
Thus, until and unless SOViet restraint Or follow-on SALT agreements elimi-
nate or significantly alleviate these dangers, the U.S. must pursue programs
needed to maintain an assured deterrent capability, keeping current forces
effective and modernizing them when necessary.
In addition, there are factors introduced by the SALT agreements which can
create new program requirements. It would be advisable for the U.S. to place
greater emphasis On national verification efforts needed to monitor Soviet Com-
pliance with the accords. Furthermore, it might be necessary to institute pro-
grams which could provide additional hedges against uncertainties which could
arise in Our verification capabilities and a Standby Capacity to deploy Systems
in the event the agreements are abrogated for any reason. Apart from their pru-
dential value, these programs can help the Administration and Congress develop
a sense Of confidence in the new environment of SALT, lower the likelihood that
uncertainties or “false alarms” might generate tension, and reduce to a mini-
mum the possibility that U.S. officials might consider withdrawing from the
accords.
On the Other hand, as a consequence Of the MOSCOW accords, it is clear that
the U.S. can and Should modify and possibly Curtail many of its Strategic pro-
grams. The single most important justification for moving in this direction are
the severe limitations placed on Soviet ABMs by the Treaty. Important Ongoing
U.S. strategic deployment efforts, notably the POSeidon and Minuteman III
MIRV programs, were planned primarily as responses to anticipated Soviet ABM
expansion. With ABMs limited and MIRVs permitted, these programs will pro-
vide the U.S. with a strategic posture under SALT far more adequate than
originally contemplated. Therefore, in developing new systems, such as Trident
and the B–1, U.S. defense planners can be less conservative in calculating Our
future deterrent requirements. Rather than using “worst case” analyses based
upon the so-called greater-than-expected threat, it would be safe and sufficient
to design our forces using less pessimistic assumptions which recognized that
SALT places constraints on the Soviet threat.
At the same time, the U.S. should restructure its strategic programs to avoid
endangering the stability of the initial agreements or foreclosing future SALT
options. Such an approach makes sense in strict defense terms, Since SALT has
already led to a negotiated situation which contributes to the achievement Of
our basic strategic objectives far more effectively than could have been achieved
217
--
*-
through unilateral policies alone. Accordingly, the U.S. should seek to minimize
the “action-reaction” cycle within the constraints of SALT by attempting to
maintain the Viability Of its deterrent without posing a threat to the Soviets’
deterrent. This would argue against programs designed to improve U.S. counter-
force capabilities. More generally, in planning Our future strategic posture,
the short-term gains of strengthening Our deterrent through rapid modernization
or qualitative improvements should be balanced against the possible long-term
adverse consequences of these actions for stability and arms control. If procure-
ment decisions on particular new systems are deferred because of SALT, we
might have to mount a costly crash program if further agreements do not materi-
alize. On the other hand, if such decisions lead to Successful phase-two SALT
arrangements, we may not find it necessary to procure Certain expensive Systems
at all.
The U.S. should also modify its Strategic programs to Support its negotiating
objectives and facilitate meaningful progress in phase-two of SALT. To this
end, there is a legitimate need to maintain momentum in Our strategic programs.
In many bargaining circumstances, putting this form of Visible pressure On the
other side to accept restrictions on his activities can represent a sound and Sensi-
ble negotiating strategy. Without accepting all the Administration's claims of
Success for its “bargaining chip” tactic, it is possible that a unilateral halt in the
Safeguard construction program might have reduced the USSR’s incentive to
accept limitations which serve U.S. security interests, such as the sub-ceiling On
SS—9 missiles. The Soviets bargained hard throughout the first-phase of SALT ;
in phase-two, the USSR will almost surely propose measures which the U.S.
would find difficult to accept (such as limitations on forward-based systems and
the elimination of OverSeas submarine bases), and tend to Oppose proposals
which the U.S. might favor (such as an agreed ban. On land-mobile missiles and
reductions in ICBM forces). Therefore, leverage Should be available to Strength-
en the hand of U.S. negotiators during the difficult discussions which lie ahead.
On the Other hand, there are serious disadvantages in pressing the bargaining
chip argument too far. Negotiating from Strength can reduce prospects for agree-
ment by Stimulating the nuclear COmpetition in uncontrolled areas as each Side
seeks to acquire more “chips” in response to the Other side's moves. If weapons
Systems are deployed for bargaining purposes, it becomes Virtually impossible
to reverse the process. As a consequence, the effectiveness of agreements are
Often degraded and resources wasted. On marginally useful weapons. Thus, if the
Administration had followed a restrained negotiating Strategy, it might have
been possible to reach a more COmprehensive set Of initial SALT limitations at
lower force levels. Alternative bargaining tactics which exploit the potential for
deployment, such as placing construction funds “in escrow”, can be equally
effective in Supporting a strong negotiating posture without detracting from
the ultimate value Of the agreements being sought.
In an attempt to Strike a realistic balance between deterrence requirements
and negotiating needs, the United States might be guided by four criteria in
deciding how to relate its future strategic weapons decisions to SALT :
Prevent the bargaining chip rationale from becoming the major motive for
programs which cannot be credibly justified as necessary to support our deter-
rent Objectives and which would otherwise be halted Or restricted for COst-
effectiveness reasons.
Maintain momentum On developmental programs designed to Offset potential
threats to Our retaliatory capability but seek to avoid moving these systems into
the full flight test Or procurement stages unless such actions are judged essential
for maintaining a confident deterrent posture.
Pay particular attention to exercising restraint on programs which might
Seriously threaten the Stability of the initial SALT agreements or foreclose
Options for future agreements which could increase our Own longer-term security.
Indicate to the Soviet Union that continued restraint on our part in a particu-
lar area. WOuld require SOme form of reciprocity—not simply a symmetrical
Soviet response, but a response which reduced the threat our program was
designed to meet.
The broad policy considerations outlined above can be used as guidelines for
evaluating specific aspects of the U.S. strategic forces program. However, de-
tailed analyses and legislative actions concerning our unilateral strategic options
should take place in the context of reviewing the Administration’s proposed FY
73 defense budget. During this process, the implications of SALT for U.S. strate-
gic forces and policies should be taken into account as one of the many factors to
218
be considered in assessing the U.S. defense program. It would be neither appro-
priate nor advisable to delay or imperil implementation of the SALT accords
by making Congressional support for the agreements conditioned in any Way On
the Outcome of the defense budget debate:
My major recommendations regarding U.S. FY73 strategic programs Can be
Summarized as follows:
1. Complete the Poseidon and Minuteman III MIRV programs as scheduled.
Deployment of these systems will ensure that the U.S. can retain a highly reliable
deterrent under the SALT accords and preserve our advantage in numbers of
Warheads. Military requirements and political pressures for new offensive SyS-
tems Would thus be diminished.
2. Continue the Trident program at a reduced funding level of $350 million
and retain the, option to deploy this system as an eventual replacement for
Polaris/Poseidon or an alternative to land-based ICBMs. Emphasize the ULMS-1
missile as a potential replacement for the Poseidon SLBM, but do not commit the
Trident Submarine to production until substantially more development efforts
have been Successfully completed. Redesign Trident to carry 16 rather than 24
missiles in Order to maintain the maximum number of nuclear submarines per-
mitted under the Interim SALT Agreement.
3. Cut the B-1 program to $100 million and allocate $50 million to develop a
follow-On bomber for the 1980's which is less costly and more efficient in terms
Of Satisfying a retaliatory deterrent mission. Deploy the SRAM and SCAD air-
to-Surface missiles to enhance the penetration capabilities of the present B-52
force. Pursue the base dispersal, warning, and rapid-alert programs designed to
improve the survivability of our bombers.
4. Refrain from modernizing our fighter-interceptor or SAM squadrons, and
reduce the AWACS program to approximately $150 million in development ef-
forts. With nationwide U.S. missile defense deployments banned by SALT, there
is little justification for modernizing active air-defense systems or maintaining
extensive bomber defense capabilities. However, a prudential level of defense
should be maintained with AWACS eventually introduced as a replacement for
expensive and inefficient ground-based warning and control systems.
5. Complete the Safeguard site deployed at our ICBM sites in North Dakota,
but do not construct the second ABM site around Washington, D.C. as permitted
under the SALT Treaty. There are no strong security requirements for such a
defense and there is no need to match the Moscow ABM. In any case, the possible
marginal benefits of a Washington ABM site are not worth the projected expendi-
tures of Over $3 billion. However, research efforts in the field of missile-site de-
fenses should be continued.
These recommendations would reduce the FY 73 strategic forces budget by
some $1.2 billion over the approximately $600 million in direct savings tied to
curtailment of those Safeguard sites banned under the Treaty. However, it should
be recognized that economic savings from the initial SALT agreements would
tend to flow from future expenditures foregone, rather than from appreciable cuts
in current or near-term levels of spending. By constraining the Soviet offensive
missile threat and by restricting ABMs on both sides, the agreements should
prevent a major increase in United States strategic expenditures over the coming
decade. On the other hand, continuation of programs not affected, replacements of
Obsolescent Systems, and greater emphasis on readiness and monitoring programs
make it unlikely that the United States could substantially reduce its annual
strategic arms budget. This should not call the SALT accords into question, since
the primary value of these agreements is to increase strategic stability and
reduce the risk of nuclear war. Over the long-term, through phase-two agree.
ments and a movement away from Worst-case planning, more meaningful savings
might arise.
M :}; :: :: $ ::: $:
The initial SALT agreements will contain the nuclear competition, help both
sides maintain credible deterrent forces, and Offer the United States and the
Soviet Union the continuing opportunity of managing their strategic policies
Within a bilateral framework. But the Moscow accords represent. Only the be-
ginning of the search for stability. Sustained efforts will be needed to maintain
a mutually Secure nuclear relationship during the coming decade, and both
Superpowers must commit themselves to this task. Whatever the specific evolu-
tion of SALT, there will continue to be a need for intelligent unilateral strategic
policies On both sides—policies which recognize the interlocking nature of Ameri-
219
can and Soviet Strategic postures and leave Open options for further enhancing
Security through negotiations.
Senator CoopFR. I thank you, Dr. Kahan.
I may say again that you who testified this morning have given the
committee insight and facts that we have not received from other
witnesses.
I believe that—I know that Dr. Teller has been one of those asso-
ciated with the development of nuclear systems and I know that I
wouldn’t expect Mr. Warnke to have been, although I know he is
experienced in other fields, but the others—the others who have testi-
fied—have you been—were you associated in any way with the devel-
opment of these systems?
Mr. BRENNAN. To a modest extent.
Senator COOPER. You have been.
DR. BRENNAN’s POSITION ON AGREEMENTS
From the testimony, I assume that all, with the possible exception
of Dr. Brennan, favor the ratification of the Antiballistic Missile
Treaty; am I correct on that?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir.
Senator CoopFR. I don’t think you are very clear on that, Dr. Bren-
nan. Do you favor the ratification of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty 2
Mr. BRENNAN. May I simply reread the final paragraph of my state-
ment, sir? I said: “But it seemed appropriate that someone should
Say, unambiguously and on the record, that both of these agreements
are wrong, that the U.S. ought not to be in the position these agree-
ments will leave usin, and that the country would ultimately be best
off by rejecting them both and then doing what is right. I hereby take
this position.”
Senator COOPER. The purpose of this hearing is to receive the testi-
mony of those who favor the ratification of the treaty, and their rea-
Sons for it, and also those who oppose it.
Now, you have said it is a bad treaty and a bad agreement, Would
you express specifically what your reasons are for saying that it is a
bad treaty, a bad agreement? First limit it to the ABM Treaty.
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir. Do you wish me to respond to that before
you hear Dr. Teller’s statement? -
Senator CoopFR. Excuse me. I am sorry, Dr. Teller
Mr. BRENNAN. Ishould be delighted to come back to that again.
Senator COOPER. Dr. Teller, please go ahead. I beg your pardon. I
º been waiting to hear your testimony so will you speak, Dr.
€lleI* *
Mr. TELLER. Thank you.
Senator COOPER. May I Say I welcome you here. We have heard you
many times before this committee.
STATEMENT OF DR. EDWARD TELLER, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR,
LAWRENCE RADIATION LABORATORY, LIVERMORE, CALIF.
Mr. TELLER. Mr. Chairman, Senator Percy, in direct answer to the
last question raised, I favor ratification of the treaty but—and I have
to ask you to listen to some of my qualifications of the statement—this
80–942 O—72—15
220
treaty freezes the United States in a position of decisive disadvantage.
It has been stated repeatedly that there is enough—there is more than
enough to kill and to overkill. This statement, precisely because it is
So widely accepted, must be discussed, and I will do so in a few words
(which will be insufficient).
U.S. LEAD IN NUCLEAR ExPLOSIVES IS ESTIMATE, NOT FACT
It is claimed we are ahead of the Russians today in an important
respect; we have more nuclear explosives, more warheads, by a ratio .
of 2 to 1.
First of all, please realize that this is not a fact; it is an estimate, an
estimate with which I agree though I am not sure of it. -
TREATY DOES NOT LIMIT NUMBER OF WARHEADS
Secondly, the treaty does not limit the number of warheads. Putting
many warheads on the same missile, using MIRV, is open and should
be open because it can’t be policed. There have been estimates how long
it will take the Russians to catch up with us. Itend to agree with that
of Secretary Laird, that the Russians will have the full capability of
putting many warheads on their missiles in two years. By that time
they also can acquire high accuracy; they can destroy our land-based
missiles; they can destroy most of our bombers before the bombers
take off.
U.S. LOSING TECHNOLOGICAL ARMS RACE
Our Security hangs by the single thread of the sea-based deterrents,
Let me mention here the main theme of what I have to say. We are not
in a quantitative arms race. The quantitative restrictions imposed by
the treaty, while significant, are not the most basic. What is most basic
is the qualitative development, the new ideas. -
We are in a scientific—we are in a technological arms race, in a race
of technology. -
In sharp contrast to one of the earlier speakers, I want to say (and I
want to return to this all important question) that this race we are los-
ing. This race, the race of ideas, cannot be regulated by any treaty. If
we lose this race, indeed we are lost. -
This is the most ominous part of the present situation and in the con-
clusions of my remarks I will come back to it. -
DANGER TO U.S. SEA-BASED DETERRENT
Now I only want to say that a single, big discovery in Oceanography,
in the detection of submarines, can wipe out our last deterrent, and we
don’t know whether and when it will happen. Secrecy (I am against
secrecy, which excludes the American people, which excludes even
the Senate from knowing the full facts about preparedness) will not
allow us even to know it when our danger has arrived. This secrecy
prevents me from discussing in detail what I would like to discuss,
how our sea-based deterrent might be endangered.
Senator CoopFR. Would you repeat that, Doctor? I am sure what?
Mr. TELLER. The Russians know the various ways of how submarines
can be detected. We here cannot openly discuss what I think can be and
should be common knowledge.
221
RUSSIAN ADVANTAGE IN AMOUNT OF EXPLOSIVES DELIVERED BY ROCKETS
Now, the treaty, by giving the Russians a 4 to 1 advantage in the
amount of explosives that they can deliver by rockets, is a great increase
in our danger. I am for ratifying this treaty because in doing so you
will not do more than to ratify a fact that is not going to change
whether you ratify or not.
“GOOD ExAMPLE” HAS NOT DETERRED RUSSIANS IN PAST
In many years in which we tried to give the Russians good example
by not deploying missiles, the Russians increased their rate of deploy-
ment. Our good example has not “deterred” them in the past. It is for
you to say whetherit will deter them in the future.
POTENTIAL GRAVE DANGER OF TREATY
Now, the treaty has a potential grave danger, that is, if people stand
up and say, “We can reduce our budget; now we can save dollars be-
cause we are safe.” Actually we have not been as unsafe ever. We are
now as unsafe as Britain was at the time of Munich; but this is not
Munich. Our government has not agreed to anything, has not given
away anything of real value. It has put down on paper for everyone
to see what the position is.
One of the greatest advantages of this treaty is that by spelling out
our danger we might at least do something about getting ourselves into
a position where we can defend ourselves and the free world.
I am for the treaty because it is realistic and because it raises a signal
of danger which signal will remain on the mast long after ratification.
ARTICLES ESTABLISHING COMMISSION ON VERIFICATION OF TREATY
Now, I want to say something very positive for the treaty and for the
agreement.
There is a novel, imaginative proposed article in both treaties, Ar-
ticle XIII in the ABM Treaty, and Article VI in the Agreement.
These articles establish a Commission on Verification of the Treaty.
This is done because verification cannot be accomplished by rigid and
agreed means; it can be done only by good will, by asking questions
and by volunteering not only answers but also additional information
as is foreseen in Article XIII.
One of the main points on which I think the Senate should insist is
that this Article XIII should receive careful scrutiny. The way how
it is implemented should be watched. The Commission should con-
tain men highly capable in a technical respect, imaginative men and
men who are properly worried about the safety of the United States
and of the free world.
If the Russians should volunteer the evidence that indeed the treaty
is adhereed to, then we face a better future. I hope this will be the case.
A number of questions have to be raised. For instance, relocatable
º are ruled out. This is very hard to check and very important to
CI)62CK.
Can parts of ABM equipment be stockpiled? Could the Russians re-
peat their performance of 1961 when they abrogated the test mora-
222
torium and went ahead with the most impressive test series that they
had prepared for a long period; this has put them ahead in nuclear
weapons, in megatonnage and in the study of the effects of nuclear wea-
pons in the atmosphere; it put them on the road toward constructing
a realistic missile defense. We were caught unprepared. Can they now,
stockpile ABM parts, put them together in a hurry :
This time, if we are unprepared there may be no future.
Can they convert their SAM missiles, SAM-5s, into ABMs? Can
they do it in a hurry?
The treaty says they should not do it. How can we be assured that
they won't! The commission, under Article XIII, should find as-
SUII’8,1] CeS.
Can they upgrade their missiles? What is the number of Russian
missiles? We talk about the ratio of numbers, 3 to 2; we talk on the
basis of knowledge of our missiles, but on the basis of guesses concern-
ing the Russians'. We talk about this on the basis of intelligence which
is imperfect. :
There are these questions and a lot more that under Article XIII
have to be clarified. If they are, then we are on the road to peace.
If they are not, then we have evidence on the basis of which we shall
have to act. º
This unique provision in the treaty is the one which distinguishes
it from every one of its predecessors and this new beginning should
be fully exploited.
But even apart from that, even if one adheres to the treaty, consider-
ing the coming Russian multiple warheads, considering Russian re-
Search, we face great danger. .
TJ.S. HAS TO WORK. CLOSELY WITH ALLIES
What can we do? We can do two things: One is not in my field and
I will mention it. The other is in my field and I will discuss it.
I believe that the United States cannot retain its leading position in
defense. I think actions in the past 12 years have made that unavoid-
able, and we are facing a very dangerous world. The united free world
still could be number one. We have to work closely with our allies,
and in this respect I completely agree with Professor Hoffman. How
this should be done is up to you, very specifically, up to this committee.
NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION
I raise only one little point that worries me. There is the question
of the so-called national means of verification which undoubtedly we
shall discuss with the Russians. These national means of verification
are secret. Reliance on the treaty depends on acts carried out in secrecy.
We shall discuss these secrets with the Russians. We are not going to
discuss them as it now appear with our allies, with the American people
or even with the Senate. This is highly improper. -
Since the national means of verification are the basis of reliance on
the treaty, these national means of verification should be opened up,
displayed, at least to our allies, at least to the Congress; I hope also
to the people of the United States.
223
TJNITY BETWEEN FREE DEMOCRACLES
Other than that, I don’t want to make detailed recommendations
except for Saying that the survival and the maintenance of freedom in
every advanced democracy is the same issue and it is only unity between
these free democracies that can save us. It is only such unity which
can persuade any reasonable person in Russia to sign meaningful
treaties. Because if we are not united they cannot talk with all of us at
the same time. For the sake of safety, for survival and also for the
possibility of a real structure for world peace, including the Russians,
we must first come to complete agreement with our allies.
FOLE OF RESEARCH
Now, let me come to the last point and that is the role of research.
It is research, it is technology, it is excellence in these fields which made
of the United States the strongest country in the world. Today re-
Search on defense subjects is considered a dirty word on our university
campuses. Research on any technical subject is looked down upon.
Even respect for pure science is declining in our institutions of higher
learning.
By contrast, the Russians have established a splendid institution, in
Siberia, in Novosibersk, Academegorodok, the academic city which has
been written up in Newsweek in the last issue. It is a place where
people of privilege live in Russia, and this privilege includes an
unheard of privilege, for Russians, some free speech. It is the greatest
research and educational institution in the world. But it is only one
of the tips of the Russian research iceberg whose mass is somewhere
between the outskirts of Moscow and the Altai mountains. Again it is
Secrecy, the keeping of Russian Secrets, which happens to be imposed
upon me by the United States Government, which prevents me from
describing to you this tremendous Russian research effort which out-
strips us and which is apt to insure Russian domination or at best a
“Russian peace” for the world.
I would like to become a little more specific about research because
unless I do so I do not think you will fully understand what I am talk.
ing about. At the same time, secrecy unfortunately prohibits me from
giving you real details.
One example is space exploration. That it is connected with knowl-
edge about what is going on everywhere in the world is not hard to
imagine. I welcome cooperation with the Russians in space as in every
other respect. I worry that our open space effort should be coupled with
the Russians' secret one, lest we acquire the disease of Secrecy even in
that field.
I also worry that the increasing Russian effort is not matched by us.
Rather we are cutting our space budget. This effort is needed to find out
what is going on everywhere, to detect hurricanes and save 50,000 lives
in Texas as happened two years ago, to know of other dangers that may
be impending. The space effort is important.
Then, instead of looking up we may look down into the ocean. Ocean-
ography, with its very many fruits for the civilian economy, with its
ultimate capability of detecting and destroying submarines, may be the
one field in which our safety, our survival; may be decided.
224
FIELD OF FUTURE : LASERS
Finally, I would like to mention a brand new field. It is ten years
old. I speak of lasers—exceedingly intensive, very sharply defined
beams of light. They can be used to measure the distance of the moon,
to an accuracy better than an inch. It has already been measured to
the accuracy of one foot, and I could give you reasons why this is
important.
It can be used to check whether pollution regulations are obeyed.
Lasers can also be used for defense.
The Nobel prize for the basic ideas has been given to three people:
one American, my good friend, Charlie Townes, who works in Berkeley
where I work, and two Russians, Basow and Prokoroff. -
Charlie Townes is no longer working on lasers. He is working on
astrophysics. His interest is many light years away. Baslow and Prok-
oroff have stuck to lasers and to all their applications. -
In this field, in the field of the future, there is no question but that
the Russians are ahead of us. I believe that this lag in research or
our unwillingness to apply research to better our every day life, and
the criticisms leveled against the research to be applied to the defense
of our country and of the free world—these are our real weaknesses.
RATIFICATION OF TREATY RECOMMENDED
If this treaty will deflect us from looking too closely on the quantity,
if it deflects us from paying too much attention to the size of our
weapons, if it directs our attention to finding new approaches, if it
stimulates us to work with our allies for the common defense of the
free world and for the ultimate establishment of a really peaceful
world, then I can be happy about the treaty. At any rate, at the
present moment we cannot do anything but ratify it because if we
wouldn’t do so this will not lead to the desperately needed improve-
mentS.
On this basis, and with deep worry about the safety of freedom
everywhere, Irecommend ratification of the treaty.
(The prepared statement of Mr. Teller follows:)
COMMENTS ON THE MOSCOW AGREEMENT
(By Edward Teller, University of California)
Though the SALT agreements signed in MOSCOW put us at a dangerous disad-
vantage, I recommend ratification by the Senate and general agreement by Con-
gress. It would take many billions of dollars in the next five years to close the
missile gap that becomes apparent in these agreements. In the absence Of trea-
ties, the Russian advantage would grow faster.
These agreements freeze Our present disadvantage, but leave the dOOr Open for
the Russians to catch up with us and Surpass us in any field where we are still
ahead. - . . . .
It is claimed that we have a two-to-one lead in numbers of nuclear explosive
missile warheads. This claim is probably correct but this advantage will not last.
Mr. Laird's specific estimate that the Russians can develop MIRVs in two years
is plausible. - -
The ABM Treaty has a valuable and novel provision ; Article XIII. It estab-
lishes a standing commission with the purpose to strengthen the credibility of
the treaty. It should be staffed by experts who possess vision and are dedicated
to the defense Of Our COuntry.
225
The greatest immediate danger Of the agreements is unjustified euphoria. The
great potential advantage is that the agreements Spell Out American inferiori-
ties in Vital fields; thus, needed preparation Of Our defenses may be Spurred.
One phase of Such preparation is research directed toward means of defense.
Today such an activity is unpopular. If this does not change, Our future is dark.
In the understandings which accompany the treaty, a most doubtful point is a
limitation placed under implementation of novel ABM ideas, should they develop
in the future. It is indeed a mistake to limit the use Of Systems which do not
exist as yet and may not even be imagined at present.
Another needed step Of preparation is to work more closely with Our allies for
the common defense of freedom. American advantage, if it still exists, is vanish-
ing. A united, free world could insure safety, peace and democracy. Nothing in
the treaty Or in its interpretation should stand in the way Of the effort to build
a better World based On the ideas Of human dignity and Safeguarded by proper
measures to defend the citizens Of a free SOciety.
Hence, I recommend a careful and detailed Scrutiny, resulting in a State-
ment Of understandings designed to Safeguard the beneficial aspectS Of the
agreements. Once this is done, I recommend wholeheartedly, the endorsements
Of the treaty and interim agreement, including particularly the planned COOpera-
tion in several fields which Our President has called “building blocks of peace.”
Senator CoopFR. I appreciate very much your statement, Dr. Teller.
You have made a great contribution and your testimony is very valu-
able.
TJ.S. ARMIS DEVELOPMENT IN 5–YEAR PERIOD
As I understand, you are for the agreements and this treaty—one,
because you think they lay our danger out before the world and the
people, and because otherwise there would be no restrictions upon
the continued arms race. You have said that you fear that we are
falling behind in research. Of course, there is nothing in these agree-
ments, either the treaty or the agreement, which prevents research, so
it is a question not so much dealing with the treaty or the agreement
but what the attitude of the Congress is, what the attitude of the Amer-
ican people may be toward research and technology. At some point the
others might want to comment on your statement that we are falling
So far behind in research. It is my judgment and, I think, the judgment
of the committee that the treaty will be approved with very few votes
against it and the agreement also. All of you have stated, as the Admin-
istration does, that numerically the Soviets will be superior under this
agreement in launchers, and in megatonnage. I assume that we are
superior in warheads.
One question which all of you have raised and which might be
the most useful for you to comment upon is, what we should do about
the development of arms during the next five-year period.
As you know, in both treaty and agreement, there is nothing to pre-
vent the modernization of the weapons which are the subject of the
agreement and the treaty.
I have noticed that all of you suggest—I don’t know what Dr. Bren-
nan’s views are—that we should show restraint in the development of
new weapons and the modernization of the existing systems. But Dr.
Hoffmann said, if I recall, on page 3 of his testimony, that the Soviet
Union could overtake us in MIRVing its offensive weapons, as we are
doing, and that if we wait until their technology has caught up with
ours, they may then achieve a numerical superiority in overall deliver-
able warheads that could be politically if not strategically intolerable
to us.
226
What is the judgment of the panel on this issue? If we show re-
straint, if we do not begin the development of additional strategic
weapons, if we do not undertake complete modernization, but the
Soviet Union does, what would be the position of the United States,
if the political question is a correct one as Dr. Hoffmann has pointed
Out
Would you comment, Dr. Hoffmann?
Mr. HoFFMANN. I think, Mr. Chairman, that the answer depends
very much on what kind of weapons one is talking about. What I was
trying to suggest in my testimony is that the new weapons programs
which have been submitted by the President do not seem to me to be
able to meet that particular problem. There is indeed a problem, which
Dr. Teller has very forcefully described, of the Soviet Union catching
up with us or doing better than we are doing in the qualitative realm;
but I am not at all convinced that the programs which have been sub-
mitted to Congress address themselves to this question or that their
adoption would do anything to fill the gap, if indeed it exists, which
Dr. Teller has been talking about and which concerns such things as
lasers, in particular, and general attitudes toward science and military
research.
What those programs do is essentially continue the quantitative race
in those areas which have not been restricted by SALT I, without, it
seems to me, any advantage for us. **
SUBIMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES
There is indeed one very serious question, on which I would like my-
Self to hear some opinions from our military experts: what one does
about the competitive deployment and testing of MIRV ; but that is a
very different problem from new submarine and new bomber programs.
Senator COOPER. Let's forego the bomber program. For myself, at
least, I don’t See any necessity of starting on that program. But what
about SLBM's? I thought I gathered from what all of you said that
Submarine-launched missiles are now our best deterrent; is that cor-
rect? Would you agree? -
Mr. TELLER. Excuse me. Let me answer this question explicitly.
Senator CoopFR. What would be the effect of our failure to improve
the SLBM and failure to commence Trident? Would that in any way
endanger the United States? I will ask each one of you to speak upon it,
and then I will yield to Senator Percy. -
Mr. TELLER. Mr. Chairman, I did not say, and I don’t want to be un-
derstood as Saying, that our submarines today are safe.
Senator CoopFR. You implied it.
Mr. TELLER. I implied it. I implied it; I hope so. I don’t know the op-
posite. A surprise is a surprise, and it has happened before. This safety
on which we count may have vanished already.
At this point I would like to make another reply to your remarks.
If you asked what will happen if the Russians get ahead of us in
MIRVing, in other improvements of this kind, my answer is not only
that the situation will be grave, but when it happens we may not even
know it. -
Senator COOPER. I understand.
227
Mr. TELLER. We may find it out only when the Russians feel that
they are sufficiently strong to put before us their non-negotiable de-
mands. We may be faced at that time with overwhelming irresistible
force. It is for this reason that I say we have to do what we can do
and we must fight the danger of euphoria which could follow from
this treaty.
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO GO AHEAD WITH TRIDENT
Senator CoopFR. I want to ask each one of the others because we
have now to consider after the agreements and treaty are agreed to,
what we will do about the modernization of the weapon systems. Do
you believe that the failure to go ahead with the accelerated Trident
program, for example, would in any way imperil the ultimate deter-
rent which I thought you all agreed on was the SLBM & What would
you say, Mr. Warnke? You were the first witness.
Mr. WARNKE. As I have stated, Senator Cooper, in my written
statement, I feel that going ahead with the Trident program at the
present time is not only unnecessary, I regard it as a calamitous waste
of funds. I think that the logic of the ABM Treaty is such that our
deterrent is unchallenged and unchallengable for the foreseeable fu-
ture, certainly for the period of the Interim Agreement. I think that
the context has been established in which we can exercise restraint and
look for reciprocal restraint on the part of the Soviet Union. -
I would disagree very respectfully with those who suggest that we
have tried that restraint before and have not ended up with any sort of
reciprocity. Neither side has tried restraint. We have frozen the num-
bers of missile launchers but we have proceeded with a program which
now give us 5,700 warheads to their 2,500. Now, that is not much
restraint. -
I am suggesting that the arms race has not been stopped by anything
that has been done up to the present time. It has not been stopped by
one side trying to scare the other side into submission. I think we ought
to try restraint and I think there is a good chance it will work.
Senator COOPER. Dr. Brennanº
Mr. BRENNAN. May I begin with a side question and ask if these
microphones that we keep wrestling with are of real or imaginary
importance; is there any importance—I see. All right. They are real.
TJ.S. STRATEGIC FORCE BUDGET.
If I may answer the question with a prefactory remark: We have for
the past several years operated with a strategic-force budget that is
apparently roughly half of the Soviet strategic-force budget. This has
left us in a posture from which, as Mr. Kissinger noted in his Moscow
press conference, we had a very poor bargaining position for attempt-
ing to persuade the Soviets to agree to equal limitations on their of
fensive forces and ours. . .
ATTEMPTING TO REDRESS IMBALANCE AND LIVE WITHIN
AGREEMENT's SPIRIT
I believe that ultimately an appropriate objective of offensive-force
limitations should be to establish some kind of symmetry in the forces
228
So that the United States is not in a position of declaring to the world
that we have accepted a secondary position in at least the forces con-
trolled by the agreement.
How we are to get to that position, if ever, is problematical. I believe
it will probably be of some importance that the United States not
Seem to be suffering from euphoria with regard to strategic matters.
I also believe that it is important not to violate the spirit of this Interim
Agreement if, as expected, it is approved and, therefore, I should be
reluctant to Say at this point that we should attempt to redress in the
span of a few years the strategic-force imbalance that has developed
between the Soviet Union and the United States.
These conflicting requirements, one, of attempting to redress an im-
balance that has developed and, two, of attempting to live within the
spirit of this agreement if we accept it, are going to present a difficult
and delicate problem of balance, to which I have no immediate and
ready answer.
PROCEEDING WITH TRIDENT APPROPRIATE
In regard to the particular question of ULMS or Trident, which-
ever you wish to call it, my immediate belief would be that it is highly
appropriate to proceed at least with the development of the Trident
system, although whether it will ultimately prove necessary to deploy
it in large numbers is a decision that can easily be deferred.
DANGER IF RESTRAINT IS SHOWN ?
Senator CoopFR. I must defer to my associates here. It has been Sug-
gested by some that the United States should show retraint for a year
or two at least, to determine whether or not the Soviets were proceeding
with a strategic arms buildup. I will defer to my associates but I hope
you will respond as to whether there would be any danger, in the mili-
tary or political fields, to which you have referred if we showed
restraint for a year or two. -
I yield now to Senator Javits.
Senator JAVITs. Mr. Chairman, I have not been here but I would
greatly appreciate it if, on my time, we simply continued down the
line. We have heard from two of the expert witnesses and we have
heard from Dr. Teller.
Could we have a word from you in answer to Senator Cooper's ques- .
tion, Professor Hoffmann? g
Mr. HoFFMANN. Yes, I would entirely support Mr. Warnke's posi-
tion, that to go ahead fullspeed now with the Trident program would
be at least a waste of opportunities for further limitations, especially
in the qualitative arms race for offensive weapons.
In the two areas which strike me as the most sensitive and the most
dangerous, and which are ASW and MIRV, I do think, for the rea-
sons that both Mr. Warnke and I have both indicated in Our testimony
earlier, that we can afford this restraint for a while.
U.S. IN POOR BARGAINING POSITION IN MOSCOW
I do believe that if we were indeed in a poor bargaining position
in Moscow, that then the results we have achieved are nothing short
229
of miraculous. After all, we have got the Soviets to accept limitations
in areas where we had no ongoing programs and where, if they had
wanted to hold out, they could have pushed ahead far beyond the 3
to 2 position which they have now; and, frankly—and I do some
reading about foreign relations—I see nowhere any indication that
our allies now believe that we have accepted a second-rate position in
defense. They may believe it if we tell them often enough, but so
far they do not.
Of course, there are the dangers that Dr. Teller has mentioned;
but I still do not believe that in the daily universe of politics the
scenario by which suddenly the Soviet Union would feel that it is
capable of knocking out pretty much all of the U.S. retaliatory force
in a first strike without suffering an unbearable and unacceptable
damage in return, is a very likely one. It may be a scientist's night-
mare, but I must say that it seems to me as imaginary as science
fiction. -
PLEA FOR MORE RESTRAINT
What I do know is that if after 25 years of this arms race we are
in a position in which we can be told that never has our security
been more threatened, never has the danger been greater, then there is
indeed something very grievously wrong with the logic of the mo-
mentum; even on that basis, I would plead for more restraint. And
I do not like the overuse of the Munich analogy. It is Munich which,
to a large extent, sent us into Vietnam and if there is disaffection in
universities toward research which seems connected with war, it is
very largely to that that we owe it.
Senator JAVITs. Thank you.
Professor Kahan 2
RESTRAINT
Mr. KAHAN. In answer to Senator Cooper's question, I believe that
as a practical matter it is simply too late to get an effective ban on
MIRVs. I begin with that premise, unfortunate as it may be. How-
ever, even though this would free the Soviet Union to build MIRVs,
the U.S. will not fall behind in the vital area of MTRW technology
for at least the next eight years. We are already deploying these sys-
tems in Poseidon and Minuteman III missiles. I suggest that we
should complete these programs simply because it will provide a lead
which will then take away the requirements for pursuing full speed
ahead with additional modern weapon systems, such as the Trident
and the B–1. By giving a little on MIRVs, perhaps we can exercise
greater restraint on expensive future.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SHOULD CONTINUE ON TRIDENT
Therefore, on the Trident program, I would disagree that there is a
need to begin to produce and prepare to deploy such a system. But I
share Dr. Brennan’s view that we should continue research and de-
velopment efforts in that area because of the importance of keeping
Our submarine systems viable.
230
SOVIET POINT OF VIEW
I might add that from the Soviet Union's point of view the agree-
ment, as I suggested in my testimony, can appear to be disadvanta-
geous: Imagine the Soviet analog of some of our “worst case” Pentagon
analysts looking at the emerging U.S. threat under the SALT agree-
ment: at least 10,000 U.S. warheads being deployed in our missiles and
on Our aircraft over the next five years; an advantage in U.S. quali-
tative technology across the board which can be exploited under the
agreement; from no controls of the U.S. long-range B-52 bombers
and no controls over U.S. forward-based systems in Europe and on
carriers which can hit the Soviet Union. Were I sitting in the Kremlin
examining the agreements I might indeed be nervous about
signing it.
Clearly, this is a distorted analysis. However, when you can con-
struct these arguments from the Soviet point of view, it begins to make
our deterrent look a lot better than a lot of people have suggested.
EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC BALANCE
Finally, whatever the evolution of the strategic balance might be
within the confines of SALT, I believe that we cannot do any better
in the absence of any agreement. If parity is here, it is here to stay.
We should cement it at the levels agreed to under the SALT accords
rather than continue to add new weapons at a rapid rate.
CHOICES UNDER SALT
But the choices under SALT are not complete restraint or full de-
ployment and procurement. The current debate has become polarized,
in my view, between these two alternatives which are really not prac-
tical. The realistic questions concern what R&D efforts we should pur-
Sue and at what pace, and what criteria should we use for moving those
programs into deployment and procurement as necessary improve-
ments or replacements for existing systems.
Senator JAVITs. Thank you very much, Professor.
Dr. Teller, would you wish to make any comment?
U.S. RETALIATORY FORCE
Mr. TELLER. It is extremely hard to argue against a point of view
that has been established by repetition and that is supported by the
enormous size of nuclear explosives. The idea that we have enough re-
taliatory force is indeed very generally accepted, according to the
simple facts of human psychology impossible to change this idea in a
few words. -
I have given some reasons how our retaliatory forces could be
knocked out. I have not completed my argument. I am now forced to
go a little farther in what has been called science fiction. I only can say
I wish it were mere fiction. I lived with these problems for very many
years and unfortunately it is not science fiction.
We have, for instance, a presumed superiority in bombers. The
Russians have an incredible air defense system, at least five times
stronger than ours. Not many of our bombers will get off in a surprise
attack. Those that get off probably will not reach their targets.
231
CIVIL DEFENSE
One further thought: We have no civil defense, practically none.
The Russians have an evacuation plan which they have published. The
last publication, a little more than a year old, has been distributed in
500,000 copies. The English translation is available. It has been esti-
mated what would happen if the Russians execute this evacuation
plan, and then give us an ultimatum, and if they attack us and we re-
taliate. If our retaliation is successful, if all my other worries are mis-
taken, then our retaliation against the Russians will give rise to a
casualty rate of 3 or 4 percent of the Russian population; while the
same exchange much more than 50 percent of our people will die.
The Russian cities may be in ruins but Russia will then have a way
to tell everybody what to do, and their recovery will be fast and their
domination of the world will be complete.
DANGERS SEEN IN FIELDS OF RESEARCH AND INTUCLEAR WEAPONS
I have been asked to respond so I tried to do so. The relations of this
to the treaty is simply connected with the proposal: we have now a
treaty; we are safe; let's cut the budget. I say let's ratify the treaty;
let’s put up a defense system around our capital and get more ex-
perience about ABM since the Russians already have more experience
than we do. Let us go ahead with every reasonable expenditure and
look at each of them carefully. I think that generally what is being
proposed by the Department of Defense is reasonable but I don’t
want to talk about objects like a Trident or the B–1, about which I
am not an expert. There seem to be nothing but experts here. I am
an expert in research. I am an expert in nuclear weapons. In those
two fields I see enormous dangers.
Senator JAVITs. Thank you, Dr. Teller.
Mr. Chairman, we have a vote on the floor. Thank you very much.
I am through so far as I am concerned.
Senator COOPER. I do not want to impose on you but Senator Percy
has not had a chance to ask a question. Do you mind waiting until he
returns?
Mr. TELLER. Of course not.
Senator JAVITs. It shouldn’t be more than five minutes.
NEW SYSTEMS OR MODERNIZATION OF PRESENT SYSTEMS Ž
Senator COOPER. Five minutes. I don’t want to over-simplify these
matters and, of course, it seems like oversimplification when I am
talking to a group of men who have great knowledge in this field, but
I think we know that both countries have the capability of destroying
each other over and over and over at present, and if the arms race
goes on, of course, that capacity will be increased in magnitude. What
I would like to know and I think what most of us would like to know,
in this situation—hoping that in Phase II of negotiations, there will
be further agreements on limitations or reductions of arms—are your
recommendations when we are now called upon to determine whether
We should support new systems or modernization of present systems.
Whºsenator Percy returns will you say what you recommend that
We CIO .
232
BARGAINING CHIPS
I ask one further question before I leave on the question of bar-
gaining chips: Isn’t it really a question that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
are both, not so much bargaining but both have recognized what the
other side in fact has? I will try to come back and Senator Percy
won’t keep you long. Thank you very much.
[Recess.] -
Senator PERCY (presiding). To conserve the time of our guests, and
we are Sorry for these interruptions, Senator Cooper suggested that I
go right ahead. *.
COMMENDATION OF WITNESSES
I would first like to say how very helpful the testimony has been
this morning, and I See that you have as much unanimity of opinion
as we have in the Senate on most issues.
IMPORTANCE OF PROPOSED SECOND (WASHINGTON) ABM SITE
First, I would like your judgment as to the importance of the pro-
posed second ABM site in terms of the stability of the SALT agree-
ments, the Security of the United States, and the need to present a
strong negotiating position for SALT II.
Mr. BRENNAN. By the Second site you mean the importance of the
Washington site?
Senator PERCY. Yes, sir.
Mr. BRENNAN. I believe that is more important than the Grand Forks
site for the protection of Minuteman, and in this I differ quite sharply
with both Mr. Warnke and Professor Hoffmann in their remarks on
that point.
I believe there is a very considerable substantive importance to the
Washington defense site. This does not have to do with protecting the
country as a whole against large-scale Soviet attacks but with a num-
ber of technical but important considerations for protecting the com-
mand and control capability of the country against possible light at-
tacks, which might be Soviet attacks or they might be from some other
Source. Let me mention only one possible consideratiton.
You might have a situation in a tense crisis between the United
States and the Soviet Union where some possible third country, the
favorite candidate of these scenarios is China but other possibilities
may occur in the future, in which this third country would like to
provoke a large-scale war between the Soviet Union and the United
States. An active defense system of Washington would be one of the
ways to assure that an attempt of that kind would be quite likely
to fail, and this reason alone would justify the Washington defense
even if there were no others. - -
I don’t think the Washington defense is of great importance for
bargaining-chip purposes but it is, in my judgment, of very great Stra-
tegic significance. . . . . . . . . . - . -
Senator PERCY. May I ask who agrees with that position of Dr.
Brennanº
Mr. TELLER. I agree with the position but I want to add that the Rus-
sians had much more experience with missile defense. Our experi-
ence has been limited and I think to acquire this experience in a second
233
missile site where we are not hampered by hardware already commit-
ted is an additional valuable asset.
Senator PERCY. Is there any further agreement with the position?
Those who disagree, then. Mr. Kahan 2
Mr. KAHAN. At the outset I might observe that the Russian experi-
ence with their ABM has probably been all bad and a waste of
money. The realization that ABMs do not have much value undoubt-
edly influenced the Soviets to take the initiative in advocating ABM
limitations at SALT.
Beyond that, I believe that there is no security requirement or
negotiating need to build the Washington ABM site at a cost of over
$3 billion. Unlike certain offensive programs which should sustain
Some momentum, I see no necessity for the site.
Senator PERCY. Professor Hoffmann?
Mr. HoFFMANN. I agree entirely and concur in that position.
Senator PERCY. Yes. Mr. Warnke?
Mr. WARNKE.. I agree with Mr. Kahan. I would say the national
capital ABM defense is of no importance whatsoever; it can’t defend
against a Soviet attack; it has only 100 intercepter missiles; it is not
needed against the attack of a third country because that which
deters the Soviet Union is certainly more than adequate to deter any
third country. If a third country were insane enough to want to
attack, a defense around Washington still leaves them with sufficient
targets to provoke the kind of crisis to which Dr. Brennan referred;
and, finally, as far as the bargaining-chip argument is concerned, we
have the ABM Treaty. We have played our bargaining chips. We
don’t need them anymore for a treaty; it has already been signed.
ACCOMPLISHIMENT OF OBJECTIVE AT KWAJALEIN
Senator PERCY. Dr. Teller, can I ask you why you can’t accomplish
your objective better at Kwajalein where you can really test?
Mr. TELLER. I would be glad to see the objective accomplished in
Kwajalein. The system is a very complex one and needs a pilot plant
type of operation which is more than we ever are likely to invest in
Kwajalein.
RUSSIAN EXPERIENCE WITH ABM
I also would like to make one point which I think is more im-
portant in a general sense than it is in a specific sense. I have stated,
and I think I can prove it, that the Russians have a much longer
experience with ABM than we have. It has been stated on the other
side that all the experience of the Russians was bad. Let me please
reply to that, that it may be correct, maybe not. The other witness did
not know; I don’t know. We are talking about the uncertain future
where research and development are very important, and to jump to
the conclusion that Russian experience was all bad, to settle such an
important question in such a manner, I think that is improper.
I happened to look into all the intelligence available and I can
tell you, without violating security but perhaps violating some feel-
ings in the CIA, as well as outside of the CIA, that everything we
know is inconclusive.
234
SOVIET RESPONSE IF NO SECOND ABM SITE
Senator PERCY. Dr. Brennan, I know you want to comment on this,
but would you also comment on what you think the Soviet position
might be if we did not go ahead with the second ABM site? What sort
of a response or reaction do you think that would elicit from them?
Mr. BRENNAN. To take the specific question you just put first, I have
not thought about it and have no immediate idea of what, if anything,
the Soviets might specifically do as a consequence of our not doing the
Washington defense site. -
CATALYTIC ATTACK
I did wish to comment on part of Mr. Warnke's remarks just pre-
ceding. I believe he misunderstood the role I had in mind for a third
power. His remark that what would deter the major power would also
deter the minor one suggests he must have been thinking of a situation
in which the minor power I was speaking of was identifiable. I was
Speaking about what is sometimes called a catalytic attack in which
Some secondary power attempts to provoke a Soviet-American war
by disguising its own attack to appear as a Soviet attack directed at us. .
If in a tense Soviet-American crisis Washington were suddenly to
disappear, along with a few other targets, from submarine-launched
missiles from some unidentified submarine which could not be dis-
criminated from a Soviet submarine, the likelihood of triggering an
all-out Soviet-American war would be much greater if Washington
were among the cities destroyed in such an attack, and it is insurance
against that kind of eventuality that makes me think that the Wash-
ington defense site would be valuable. There are other considerations
of like kind.
POSSIBILITY OF SOVIETS NOT GOING AHEAD WITH SECOND SITE
Senator PERCY. Would you respond to the possibility, however, that
the Soviets who—who did not have the protection of ICBMs in their
original ABM defensive plan anyway—might not go ahead with their
Second site if we did no go ahead with ours? They have not selected
the location yet.
Mr. BRENNAN. I should think the likelihood that they will go ahead
or not go ahead with their second site is likely to be substantially
independent of whether or not we build a Washington defense. They
may not have very great motivation to go ahead with their allowed
ICBM defense site, apart from the one Dr. Teller mentions of acquir-
ing experience with systems of this kind. I myself believe that our
motivation for the Grand Forks site is very much lower than our
motivation for the Washington defense site, given the nature of the
Interim Agreement and given the amount of protection that that
Grand Forks site will provide to the Minuteman force.
EFFECT OF NOT GOING AHEAD WITH SECOND SITES
Senator PERCY. Would you feel that we would be at a strategic
disadvantage if we did not go ahead with the Washington site and
they did not go ahead with their second site protecting ICBMs?
235
Mr. BRENNAN. I should judge that we would be at a strategic dis-
advantage from some important perspectives if we did not build the
Washington defense site whether or not they build their second site
allowed them. &
Senator PERCY. Mr. Warnke, did you want to comment on either
one of those points?
Mr. WARNKE.. I did want to comment, Senator Percy, on the reply
that Dr. Brennan made to me.
SCENARIO WHERE THIRD COUNTRY PRETENDS TO BE SOVIET UNION
My feeling with regard to the scenario where a third country pre-
tends to be the Soviet Union is again that it is science fiction in large
part. But assuming this horrendous thing would take place, I would
suggest that even the destruction of Chicago or possibly Winnetka
would be sufficient to increase the crisis atmosphere. There are a
plethora of targets that would be available. The defense of Wash-
ington does not contribute in any respect to decreasing the likelihood
of this highly implausible scenario.
Mr. BRENNAN. No, sir. If I may respond further to that point, the
decision makers of the U.S. are not in Winnetka, or in Chicago either.
It is a very important asymmetry.
Mr. WARNKE. If they disappeared, they could not make the mis-
take that the attack was from the Soviet Union instead of China.
Mr. BRENNAN. You might get a different set of decision makers
who might be less cautious.
Mr. TELLER. I want to associate myself with Don by stating that
our decision makers who are here are the best possible ones.
PROTECTION WASHINGTON ABM SITE WOULD AIFFORD NATIONAL
COMMAND AUTHORITY
Senator PERCY. Dr. Kahan, I wonder if you would comment as to
what protection a second ABM site around Washington would afford
the national command authority in real terms, especially if the threat
came from SLBMs or cruise missiles launched, let’s say, 300 to 1,000
miles offshore?
Mr. KAHAN. I think you have given part of my answer in your
question, Senator Percy. I think that because there are ways of getting
through a very thin 100-launcher ABM defense of Washington, if a
nation wished to do so
Mr. BRENNAN. If the Soviets wish to do so.
Mr. KAHAN. I would argue if any nation wished to do so. I am think-
ing five to eight years ahead—since we not even build the ABM site
for three or four years—and by the time it is constructed, technology
would be available to the Chinese which would make it possible for
them to exhaust, by-pass, or penetrate a 100-launcher system. Even if
the U.S. could “buy” Some time—under one of the scenarios conjured
up, where our 100 ABMs are launched against single missiles coming
at Washington—I question how much additional time we could actu-
ally buy and what our leaders might do with in those additional few
minutes that would require a defense.
80–942 O—72—16
236
U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA
Finally, I would say from the standpoint of U.S. policy toward
China—a dimension which has not been introduced—the ABM treaty
has significant benefits. It prevented the U.S. from deploying a nation-
wide ABM system against the Chinese which in my judgment, would
have harmed U.S.-Chinese relations.
If we build a Washington ABM site, however, Peking could be-
gin to believe that we really are worried about the so-called “irra-
tional Chinese ICBM threat.” We would then be moving in the direc-
tion of destabilizing U.S.-Chinese relations. Yet Henry Kissinger re-
turned from a recent visit in Peking and indicated that we can easily
give up an ABM defense against China because the Chinese are peace-
ful and we are establishing relations with them. I would therefore,
reject the Washington area site for reasons of improving relations
with China, in addition to the other reasons prevented.
SREPTICISM ABOUT ABM DEPLOYMENTS
Senator PERCY. My own skepticism about ABM deployments has
been expressed in televised discussions with Senator Jackson, and
We have come closer together as he has taken a position against the
proposed Washington site. Soviet officials have indicated that they
have no doubt about U.S. ability to penetrate the Moscow ABM de-
fense and about our inability to create an impenetrable U.S. ABM
defense. And a crew on one of our nuclear submarines told me they
would have no problem in penetrating the Moscow ABM defense.
Now, it is still a subject of debate and I think your comments today
have been helpful for the forthcoming debate on the floor of the
Senate.
B–1 BOMIBER
I would like to get some insight into your feeling on the B-1 bomber
and, Mr. Warnke, perhaps with your background you can comment
on that for us. -
Do we or do we not, in your judgment, need the B–1? Do you believe
the Soviets assume we are going to build it?
Mr. WARNKE. Senator Percy, I have never been able to guess what
the Soviets assume or what they don’t assume. I have difficulty enough
dealing with our own decision makers. As far as my view is concerned,
I think that the B-1 is not a needed improvement at the present time.
I am not sure that it is really an improvement. I think that it has been
made clear by the people in the Pentagon that the B-52 properly mod-
ernized can serve the purpose of the bomber part of our deterrent well
into the 1980s. I think that the B–1 gives you less in the way of pay-
load. I think that the B-52, particularly with SCAD and SRAM, gives
you the capability of mounting a very serious threat to Soviet targets
in a standoff capacity. All that the B–1 really does is to give you a low-
level, supersonic capability. That is very expensive and relatively use-
less in the light of the development of SRAM; therefore, I think that
the program is inordinately expensive and it probably gives us less for
more money than we would have by modernizing the B-52.
237
IMPROVEMENT OF POSEIDON As AGAINST NEW TRIDENT PROGRAM
Senator PERCY. Dr. Teller, on the Poseidon-class submarine and mis-
siles, why can’t the present class be improved as against the necessity
of going into a whole new $12 billion program for the Trident? Is there
room for improvement, and do we think that the Poseidon technology
will become obsolete in the next five years?
Mr. TELLER. Senator Percy, I have already disqualified myself from
making a detailed argument on any of these specific subjects. I want to
point out, however, that in the Trident program there is included a
missile modification that can be used on the Trident or on another sub-
marine which gives our submarines much more sea space, which even
allows us to keep them close to home, where countermeasures against
Trident or any other submarine will become more difficult because we
can do something about those countermeasures. This portion of the
program looks to me completely justified.
When you go beyond that I know that the program has been care-
fully considered. If you ask me to say yes or no to Trident, I will
Sayyes but I am not basing it on my own expert knowledge, and cannot
go further than this.
FRUITFUL AREAS FOR NEGOTIATING SALT II
Senator PERCY. I wonder if, Dr. Kahan, you could comment on what
you feel would be the most fruitful areas for negotiating in SALT II?
Mr. KAHAN. In my testimony I tried to introduce a logical framework
for considering a question such as this. However, I must admit that na-
tions often strike bargains which seem illogical. The ABM Treaty, in
particular, seems to reflect a compromise which did not represent both
sides’ optimum negotiating positions but which each side was prepared
to accept.
Nevertheless, the two of SALT II ought to be: first, maintaining
Stability in the strategic balance, and second, preventing the arms
race from continuing to increase tensions and wasting money—even
though those efforts may not directly threaten the stability of the bal-
. yiew it first as a military goal and the second as perhaps politi-
Cal goal.
Under the first objective, I believe that both sides ought to begin
working immediately on two stability problems: ASW limitations and
ICBM vulnerability. - -
I agree, in this sense, with Dr. Teller, that there is a need to ensure
that both sides’ submarine deterrent remain survivable. I view SALT
as providing a framework to discuss this problem bilaterally and to try
to work out arrangements, such as agreed Sonar barriers and other
Zonal arrangements, which can make each side feel secure that its
submarine forces cannot be threatened by possible antisubmarine prog-
ress on the other side. I do not suggest that the problem needs to be
Solved tomorrow. But I do think that a technical negotiating group at
SALT should begin to discuss this issue. Four or five years hence,
when the problem begins to be thought of as more serious, we might
have found some possible solutions.
Similarly, the problem of ICBM vulnerability will inevitably be
upon us, if not in five years in eight years, because SALT permits
238
MIRVs and accuracy improvement, but does not permit either side
to protect its ICBM sites with ICBMs. Solutions to this problem, such
as ICBM reductions, should be considered by the U.S. and Soviet nego.
tiators.
In terms of the Second objective, I would broaden the scope of the
agreement and try to put a lid on expenditures. I would suggest limits
on long-range bombers, forward-based systems and other strategic
weapons which have not been limited in phase I.
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN
Senator PERCY. Is it realistic for us to seek a comprehensive test ban
now and can we enforce such a ban with our present detection meth-
ods? Would any of you care to comment on that?
Mr. TELLER. Senator Percy, may I have permission to answer your
previous question as well as this one?
Senator PERCY. Of course.
Mr. TELLER. I think that in this particular treaty, in SALT I, there
is one innovation which I emphasized; I don’t remember whether you
were here or not when I did so. Article XIII
Senator PERCY. Yes, I was.
Mr. TELLER (continuing). Gives us a way to communicate?
Senator PERCY. Right.
PROPOSAL FOR SALT II: DECREASE SECRECY
Mr. TELLER. I have one proposal for SALT II, which I think has
overriding importance. Decrease secrecy on both sides. Unless we do
So, unless Secrecy disapears, these negotiations look to me like an honest
poker game with each side having several wild cards up its sleeve pro-
duced by research. Only we are beginning to run short of wild cards
and the Russians are not. Openness, to my mind, is the condition for any
agreement that can be controlled. Any step that will bring about more
than one sided openness will be highly welcome.
I would not bargain for openness by saying if you open up we do so
too. I argue that here we should proceed unilaterally, but then we
should exert every possible pressure, use every possible inducement So
that they will open up as well.
POLICING OF COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN NOT POSSIBLE
Now, as to the second point: No, the policing of a comprehensive
test ban is not possible. A great deal has been said about it. But nuclear
explosives can be decoupled, exploded in cavities. They can be ex-
ploded in earthquake-prone areas. It will be exceedingly hard to dis-
tinguish them from bona fide earthquakes.
Furthermore, by giving up a possibility of testing we are giving up
one very important active field of research where further improvements
can be made. For instance, we may produce nuclear explosives for very
specific purposes, small and accurate ones that can be used in the bat-
tlefield. We have to develop these. We cannot check whether the Rus-
sians will continue to do so. -
239
Furthermore, the comprehensive ban would close another door on
research. For that reason I am definitely opposed to it as well as for the
reason that it cannot be checked.
Senator PERCY. Does anyone else wish to comment on that particular
point?
Mr. WARNKE.. I find myself in great disagreement in that respect. I
think the seismological detection has been improved to the point where
you could have quite adequate certainty that the ban was not being
circumvented by the Soviet Union. I think our national means of ob-
servation would be sufficient also so that we could detect any attempts
to cheat on that.
BENEFITS OF CONTINUED TESTING
As far as the vaunted benefits of continuing testing are concerned,
I take quite a jaundiced view of it. I think for us to try to continue
testing for the purpose of developing small tactical nuclear weapons
for the battlefield would be self-defeating and eventually destructive
of the entire human race and I think if we ever did develop small
tactical nuclear weapons you would have to be sure the other side had
an equivalent supply, otherwise when you started with one of your
small clean ones they would come back and hit you with a great big
dirty one.
Senator PERCY. I appreciate your comment. I did not want to as-
sume then that by silence everyone concurred with Dr. Teller.
Mr. WARNKE. Yes, sir.
DR. TELLER's CONTACTS witH ACDA
Senator PERCY. Dr. Teller, have you kept up your contacts with the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and advised them of your
judgment in this, because a very crucial point is that we shouldn’t enter
into any agreement the integrity of which we can’t insure, and if this
next step is possible we want to be certain that it can be effectively
enforced.
Mr. TELLER. Sir, I have kept up carefully my contacts with the
detection capabilities. I did not intend to reply to Mr. Warnke be-
cause he is so wrong that there is no point in replying. However, as
far as ACDA is concerned, I shall be happy to discuss this with them
if and when they invite me to do so.
Senator PERCY. Fine.
TECHNOLOGICALLY FEASIBLE TO CONDUCT CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIONS
Mr. BRENNAN. It so happens that the subject of a comprehensive
nuclear test ban had been one of my main areas of study for the past
year and a little bit more, so I happen to be very familiar with most
of these issues.
Mr. Warnke in his remarks used an important qualifying word; I am
not sure exactly what it was, but I think he said it can be quite ade-
quately detected. Well, what is adequate may depend on your judg-
ment about some very complex issues and I wouldn’t attempt to dis-
cuss those issues here in any detail. I should say that as a matter of
technological feasibility it is probably technologically feasible to con-
240
duct a number of clandestine nuclear explosions, that the Soviets could
conduct a number of clandestine nuclear explosions about which we
Would have little knowledge or very uncertain knowledge at best.
. Whether or not those would be sufficiently significant in order to
justify the cost, the potential cost, to the Soviets of carrying out those
tests is a much more complex issue, and I believe Mr. Warnke's posi-
tion was reflecting a judgment about this evaluation which transcends
the simple technological question of whether or not there are means
available to the Soviets to conduct a number of covert tests.
It is possible to argue that the significance of further nuclear de-
velopments, if tests are otherwise mainly limited, is rather small in
terms of what can be done with a surreptitious test series. As I say,
this is a much more complex evaluation than the question of detection
and identification.
Senator PERCY. Professor Hoffmann and Dr. Kahan, would you
want to associate yourselves with either of the two positions?
DR. TELLER's LOGIC
Mr. HoFFMANN. I am slightly ovewhelmed, which has happened
before, by the contradictory evidence presented by experts. My own
reaction is essentially a political scientist's reaction. What worries me
about the logic of Dr. Teller's position is that it is the logic of an
absolutely unlimited continuation of the arms race because otherwise.
one takes risks which might be fatal in certain circumstances, which
I consider to be extreme and unlikely.
DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL, NUCLEAR WEAPONs
On the other hand, if there is a very grave risk that a very important
unilateral breakthrough can be made by undetected testing, then
obviously one has to be very cautious. But from the little I know on
the subject I would certainly prefer to associate myself with Mr.
Warnke's comment, in particular when it comes to the small, tactical
weapons. It seems to me that to a large extent the kind of world order
we have tried to establish has rested on a very sharp distinction between
nuclear weapons and all others, and I am not convinced that efforts
to erode that distinction by making nuclear weapons more like other
weapons is wise.
It seems to me what can be accomplished by the Small tactical wea-
pons can very well, if that is the word, be accomplished by conventional
weapons, and that in that way one would not run the risk which Mr.
Warnke mentioned, of somewhat inadvertently or unintentionally
starting the kind of nuclear escalation that we have so very carefully
avoided since 1945.
Mr. KAHAN. I would begin. Senator, by associating myself strongly
with that last point. I view it, as an advantage if a comprehensive
test ban would deny the U.S. the option of developing small nuclear
weapons which might then serve as alternatives for sustaining ade-
quate levels of conventional defense around the world. I fear that the
Ü.S. might conceivably find itself in a return to a form of a “massive
retaliation” defense policy if we are not selective in the way in which
we seek to reduce the defense budget. One of the specific fears I have is a
241
reduction in conventional defense leading willy-nilly to a return to
increased reliance on nuclear defense as battlefield weapons in Europe
and Asia. So we can bring the boys home. More “bang for the buck”
made little Sense 15 years ago and it certainly does not make any sense
under the present situation of nuclear parity. If a CTB can help
prevent such possible defense policies from emerging, I am for it.
VERIFICATION OF COMIPREHENSIVE TEST BAN
In terms of verification of the CTB, I tend to align myself with Mr.
Warnke's position, although I am not an expert in that particular area.
The key question is how much confidence you ask for under an arms
control agreement. One should not expect 100 percent certainty. We do
not have that in the absence of arms control. We could, of course,
always attempt to negotiate the so-called “threshold” test ban by
banning underground nuclear testing above the level at which we
are highly confident of detection but below the level which might have
sufficient uncertainty to bother some people. Such a two-step approach
to a CTB might be bureaucratically effective within the U.S. and the
Soviet Union in terms of satisfying those who argue that we must
continue testing and it could pave the way for a total test ban without
on-site inspection. -
NUCLEAR TESTS COULD BE DETECTED AS EARTHQUAKES
Senator PERCY. Dr. Teller, we would appreciate your comments on
this point, that if earthquakes can be detected as possible nuclear tests,
is the reverse likely, tests that can pass possibly as earthquakes on de-
tection equipment?
Mr. TELLER. I am sorry, sir, I have not understood the question.
Senator PERCY. The question is, if earthquakes can be detected as
possible nuclear tests, then is the reverse also true or likely, that is,
tests that can pass as possible earthquakes on detection equipment? If
you have a nuclear test could it show up as an earthquake?
Mr. TELLER. That was one of my main points, that a nuclear test
can be made to look like an earthquake. I also should say that I would
be very interested in hearing from Mr. Warnke, a quantitative state-
ment of how small nuclear explosions does he think can be safely de-
tected? What has gone on here, is a confusion of issues, and a confusion
of words. That to me is appalling. Respectfully, Professor Hoffmann
you said you were confused by the evidence. No evidence was shown
here, only words, and those words in toto made no sense.
OBLITERATING DISTINCTION BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS
Mr. BRENNAN. May I make one brief point? I would just not like
to leave the possible impression on the record I was sympathetic to
obliterating the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons,
in case any of our colleagues had the impression I supported that posi-
tion. Inever have and I do not now.
Senator PERCY. Thank you.
242
DEFENSE RELATED RESEARCH ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES
Dr. Teller, you made some very disturbing comments about research
and research attitudes on universities, and I can assure you that even
those of us who did hope that we would not go ahead with ABM
deployment always supported continued research in that area, and
we tried to overcome the feeling on campuses that defense-related
research should not be pursued. I am thankful that we are doing it at
campuses rather than just in Government laboratories, and that we
have the competence available on campuses.
DETECTION OF SUBIMARINES
I would sometime like very much to pursue with you in private or
in executive Session the subject you raised of detection of submarines.
It would be very crucial to us to know if our submarine fleet is in
danger of detection and if we are falling behind in that area of re-
Search, and certainly in the national means of verification. I just want
to clarify that I understood your point there; as I recall, you indicated
that we are making available information to the Soviet Union on
our national verification system that is not available to the public or
to Congress. I just wanted to be sure I understood what you meant
there because, as I understand it, we do not share intelligence data
with the Soviet Union. It is not made public, but Congress does have
access to such material.
Having spent many years in the photographic field, I have had a
deep interest in it and it is my impression we can detect railroad ties
at 100 miles and even count the railroad ties. A steady pattern of
photography over a given area, all four seasons of the year, enables
us to verify with considerable accuracy what is going on in that area
in the deployment of offensive or defensive systems. Were you saying
that we don’t have such detection information or that whatever we
have should be shared with the public more than it is, or implying
that we in Congress are not getting access to information that we
should have 2
Mr. TELLER. I meant the second and third.
COMMENDATION OF WITNESS
Senator PERCY. Thank you very much. I appreciate your brevity,
and I want to thank you very much again on behalf of the committee
for your patience. I am certain committee members will study your
testimony very carefully. Senator Cooper and Senator Javits wanted
me to express particularly their deep disappointment at not being able
to return because of their schedules. But your contribution today will
be shared with all committee members and is very valuable indeed.
We much appreciate it.
The hearings are recessed. &
(Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 1:30 p.m., the committee
to reconvene at 10 o'clock a.m., Thursday, June 29, 1972.)
(The following material was subsequently supplied:)
243
LAWRENCE LIVERMORE LABORATORY,
June 30, 1972.
Mr. BILL ASHWORTH,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. ASHWORTH : Please find enclosed a supplementary statement that I
hope you can add to the record of the testimony before the Committee on Foreign
Relations On June 28. I think this statement is quite important. It explains the
basis On which testimony was given concerning an exceedingly important question,
namely, the COmprehensive test ban.
A COpy Of the attached Statement is being Sent to Mr. Warnke in case he has
anything to say in the way of a refutation or comment.
Thanking you for your courtesy,
Sincerely,
EDWARD TELLER.
Attachment.
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT BY DR. EDWARD TELLER
Immediately following the question period conducted by Senator Charles H.
Percy Of Illinois, I (Edward Teller) addressed Mr. Paul Warnke in Order to
clarify an important question that came up in connection with a possible com-
prehensive test ban (CTB). I asked Mr. Warnke how small a nuclear explosion
needs to be in Order to escape detection. Mr. Warnke's answer was, “Small enough.”
I thereupon inquired just how small is “small enough?” Is it one ton? 10 tons?
100 tons? One kilton 2 10 kilotons?
Mr. Warnke gave an answer to the effect, “I do not care how Small it is.”
I thereupon asked Mr. Warnke, who is of course respected by the Committee
as a former head Of ISA, to make a statement to the same effect in Order to Clarify
the basis Of his testimony. Mr. Warnke refused. Then I told him that in that case
I felt that it is my duty to do SO myself. He answered that he does not care
Wheher Or not I do SO.
For the information of the Committee, I wish to add that to the best of my
knowledge a nuclear explosion will be effectively undetectable (even as a mere
seismic event) if it is smaller than one kiloton and is fired in a reasonably low
COupling medium such as dry alluvium. However, no Serious evader would consider
himself limited by this number. Such an evader would be concerned with the
Question of how large an explosion can be and still be unidentified (as a nuclear
explosion). The following chart was presented as testimony to hte JCAE.”
CHART 22–EVASION TECHNIQUES
Conservative
yield limit
to avoid
seismic
detection or
identification
Technique (kilotons) Constraints on tester
Tamped shot in low-coupling media----------- 1–2 Low yields; relatively few areas of low-coupling media;
most in undeveloped regions; evader should test in
seismic region.
Decoupling cavity--------------------------- 50 Large volume of rock or salt to hide; long time to pre-
pare; expensive.
Detonate following nearby earthquake- - - - - - - - - 50 Device may have to be emplaced for many months;
local earthquakes must be at least 1 seismic magni-
tude larger than explosion. 10 to 20 events per year
> mb 5.5 in U.S.S.R.
Detonate following large earthquake----------- 100 Most efficient way to conduct clandestine tests; evader
should probably test in seismic regions. 1 event every
1 to 2 years.
Multiple shot simulation of earthquake- - - - - - - - 100 Requires multiple emplacement holes; evader should
test in seismic regions.
* “Status of Current Technology to Identify Seismic Events as Natural or Man Made,”
Hearings of The Subcommittee on Research Development and Radiation of The Joint Com-
mittee on, Atomic Energy, October 27–28, 1971. Chart 22, page 53, testimony by Dr. Luka-
Sik, Director of Advanced Research Projects Agency.
244
This indicates that an evader can fire up to the order of 100 kilotons,
depending on the effort he is willing to exert. In view of the fact that
most important work on tactical weapons need be performed under one
kiloton and in further view of the fact that the greatest portion of our
important shots were fired under 100 kilotons, Mr. Warnke's state-
ment that undetectable explosions are “small enough” is completely
unjustified. On the basis of present information we have to accept the
fact that a CTB cannot be policed in an effective manner. It should
also be noticed that Dr. Lukasik's testimony on which the above chart
is based has been given less than a year ago. What this amounts to is
the fact that advances in capabilities of detection and identification
have been offset by advances in a better understanding of evasion.
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS
THURSDAY, JUNE 29, 1972
UNITED STATEs SENATE,
CoMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONs,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 4221,
New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (Chairman),
presiding.
Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Cooper and Percy.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
OPENING STATEMENT
This is the fifth open committee session on the proposed treaty limit-
ing antiballistic missile systems and the proposed Interim Agreement
on Offensive Weapons.
At this point I would like to specifically recognize members of the
media who have diligently covered these hearings and, in particular,
I would like to express my appreciation to the National Public Radio
Network which has broadcasted all of these sessions live, enabling
many interested in these issues to follow them closely.
This morning I would like to welcome Senator Kennedy as our first
witness. We will also be hearing from Senator Buckley, Senator Jo-
seph Clark of the Coalition on National Priorities and Military Pol-
icy; Mr. Roy Bennett of the Americans for Democratic Action; Dr.
George Rathjens of the Council for a Livable World; Dr. James
Dorman, Liberty Lobby; Mr. Sanford Gottlieb of SANE; Mrs. Phyl-
lis Schafly of the National Association of Pro America; and Mr. Cor-
dell Burch of the Northern Virginia Committee for Victory over
Communism.
Senator Kennedy, we are very pleased to have you this morning.
STATEMENT OF HON, EDWARD M. KENNEDY, U.S. SENATOR FROM
MASSACHUSETTS
Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appre-
ciate the opportunity to testify before this committee this morning
regarding the ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Agree-
ment presented to the Senate by the President.
I am pleased to be part of the continuing inquiries by this com-
mittee and by the other committees of the Senate, for I believe that
the tenor of much of the testimony from Administration witnesses
requires some response.
(245)
246
Stated as simply as possible, it seems clear that the Administration
is using an important and impressive treaty to limit arms in order to
whipsaw the Congress into stamping its approval on new, outra-
geously expensive and unnecessary weapon systems. -
The SALT agreements essential include a treaty limiting ABMs
and a five-year interim agreement which places numerical limits on
certain offensive weapons systems. But beyond those agreements there
is an equally impressive achievement, one which Dr. Kissinger cap-
tured in these words: “. . . the stakes were larger than the simple
technical issues; . . . what was at stake was a major step toward inter-
national stability, confidence among nations and a turn in the pattern
of postwar relationships.”
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT’s PURSUIT OF ADDITIONAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS
It would be tragic were the accomplishments of diplomacy to be
tossed away to satisfy those within the President’s constituency who
were so evidently uneasy with his Peking and Moscow visits. Yet
within a few days of the President's return the Secretary of Defense
was calling for a new cruise missile for our submarines, for a tenfold
increase in outlays this year for ULMS, for full speed ahead on the
B–1 bomber and for construction of a National Capital Area. ABM
system—a total package of at least $25 billion. -
Instead of the restraint called for by the President, the Defense
Department is engaged in a headlong pursuit after additional weapon
systems that are irrelevant to our strategic deterrence at this time and
irresponsible in their appetite for resources when our domestic needs
are being short changed.
It would be tragic if a treaty limiting the quantitative arms race were
to become the excuse for a new qualitative arms race. Yet Defense
Department witnesses appear determined to exact these new weapon
systems as their pound of flesh for SALT ratification. In so doing they
have painted a distorted picture of the relative strategic postures of
the United States and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the SALT
accord; and so as I testify today in favor of ratifying the Strategic
Arms Limitation Agreement, I believe it is vital to ask ourselves, first,
what is the principle underlying our strategic force structure, second,
how would SALT affect that structure and, finally, what should be
our policy after SALT I.
PRINCIPLE OF ASSURED DESTRUCTION
The policy that has guided recent administrations in their definition
of strategic force requirements has been one of deterrence, the ability
of our offensive strategic forces to not only survive an effectively
launched surprise attack but to do so in such condition that the United
States would have a credible ability to respond with such devastating
power as to rule out any rational decision by an opponent to attempt
that first strike. - -
This principle has been defined as assured destruction, the ability
to destroy a substantial portion of the Soviet Union in a retaliatory
blow. -
2.47
President Nixon went further in his foreign policy report to the
Congress, arguing that, “Our forces must also be capable of flexible
application.” He said, “A simple “assured destruction’ doctrine does
not meet our present requirements for a flexible range of strategic
options.”
CONCEPT OF FLEXIBLE OR LIMITED NUCLEAR RESPONSE
I would argue, Mr. Chairman, that even with the President's ex-
panded definition of what is the underlying rationale behind our stra-
tegic force structure, the SALT agreement enhances our deterrent, not
only for assured destruction but also for any so-called flexible re-
sponse. But I would also challenge the concept of a flexible or limited
nuclear response as being a contradiction in terms. There is no limited
nuclear response. It is irrational to talk of a flexible nuclear response
targeted only on the military potential of an opponent when that
attack will inevitable encompass the deaths of millions of civilians,
millions of Tanyas.
SALT AGREEMENT ENIHANCES DETERRENT
Even accepting the President's view of the parameters of deterrence,
I believe the SALT agreement enhances that deterrent and leaves us
not only with an unquestioned assured destruction capability today
but with improved confidence in that deterrence for the future.
ABM PROVISIONS
First, the ABM Treaty prohibits not only a nationwide antiballistic
missile system but also the upgrading of an air defense system to per-
form an ABM role.
Second, the treaty also prohibits the development, testing and de-
ployment of ABM systems or components which are sea based, air
based, space based and mobile land based.
The only exceptions are made for a National Capital Site and for the
protection of a single ICBM site. Total launchers for these two sites
are limited to 200 interceptors; the sites must be separated by at least
1,300 kilometers, and the deployment of ABM radars is strictly con-
trolled to avoid any dual use for an area wide purpose.
I have cited these ABM provisions because they comprise the strong-
est commitment yet made to stem the nuclear arms race—a commit-
ment that both the U.S. and USSR pledge not to defend their popula-
tions from attack.
This treaty which the President, Dr. Kissinger, Secretary Laird,
Admiral Moorer, Secretary Rogers and Ambassador Smith have stated
can be adequately verified through national means alone, removes any
threat to our capacity to penetrate Soviet defense in a second-strike
Situation.
In the debates over MIRVing our land-based ICBMs and our
Polaris submarines, the Pentagon argument was based almost en-
tirely on the possibility that the Soviet Union was developing an area-
wide ABM system. It was that threat that prompted many senators to
accept the $13 billion cost of placing multiple warheads on our mis-
siles, for a nationwide Soviet ABM system might have prompted their
248
military planners to question our second-strike capability. That pos-
sibility prompted the Congress to underwrite a long-term program to
place multiple warheads on 550 of our ICBMs and on the missiles
carried on 31 of our Polaris submarines.
Nor was there any hard evidence, despite the annual cries of “wolf”
by the Defense Department that such a system was within the near-
time competence of the Soviet Union. Now the issue is settled.
An area wide ABM has not been constructed. Under this treaty, it is
prohibited and, thus, barring abrogation of the treaty, the USSR is
stripped forever of a shield against the 2,760 warheads on our sub-
marines and against the 1,300 warheads on our land-based ICBMs;
and even were our ICBMs destroyed, the SLBMs still could lay waste
to the USSR. -
Without considering the additional nuclear bombs carried in our
strategic bomber force, we are assured a multiple level of overkill, a
level far beyond the needs of assured destruction; and the statements
of the defense spokesmen of a year ago must now be recalled.
Dr. John Foster, DOD head of research and development, testified
a year ago: “... if a ban were placed on the ABM in the sense of ban-
ning a capability to intercept a ballistic missile attack, then as I see it
at the moment there would be no need for the United States to deploy
a MIRV . . .”
It seems clear that the fear that a Soviet ABM could threaten the
penetration of our deterrent is laid to rest by the treaty; and if that
fear is gone, then why do we need to go forward today with the produc-
tion or development of a single new strategic weapon system?
CURRENT STRATEGIC FORCE STRUCTURE OF U.S.
Let us examine the current strategic force structure of the United
States, where we are today at the conclusion of a SALT agreement
prohibiting a Soviet ABM system: the ICBM and the bomber force
are each capable of destroying in a second strike at least 30 to 35 per-
cent of the Soviet Union's population. The Polaris-Poseidon is even
more potent. Our arsenal consists of 1,054 ICBMs, 656 ballistic missiles
carried on submarines and 457 heavy, long-range bombers. The com-
bined force packs a nuclear punch of some 5,700 warheads, the smallest
of which is three times the power of the 15 kiloton bomb that destroyed
Hiroshima and the largest of which contains the power of several mil-
lion tons of TNT, hundreds of times the Hiroshima bomb; and those
figures do not even take into account the 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons
based in Europe, a substantial number of which could be delivered on
targets in the Soviet Union. That power is not in the planning stage
or in the research and development stage: it exists at this instant on the
Strategic Air Command runways, in ICBM silos and beneath the seas
on Polaris submarines. Its capacity, without going forward with
MIRVing the remainder of the Minuteman III's, is beyond the limits
of assured destruction. - -
The long accepted level of assured destruction—25 percent of popu-
lation and 50 percent of industry—could be achieved by destroying 100
of the Soviet Union’s largest cities; and this could be accomplished by
two on-station Polaris-Poseidon submarines which would have 12 mis-
siles and 120 warheads left over.
249
The missiles from a single Poseidon submarine could destroy one-
quarter of the Soviet Union's industry, not to mention a substantial
percentage of the Soviet Union's population. w
Fifty Minuteman III missile could destroy nearly half of the Soviet
industry, and ten B-52 bombers, approximately 2 percent of our stra-
tegic bomber force, could destroy nearly 40 percent of Soviet industry.
These are the realities that a Soviet military planner would confront
in his consideration of a first-strike attempt after SALT. -
Our deterrent is awesome in its power and the surplus overkill ca-
pacity is ample evidence that political decisionmakers in this Nation
have failed miserably to find a way to answer the question how much
is enough. - . .
Under no circumstances which can even faintly be termed rational
can our deterrent be endangered now or in the near future and under
no circumstances can any nation, including the Soviet Union, estimate
that a first strike will succeed in destroying our ability to massively
destroy them in return.
CONDITIONS IN 5 YEARS UNDER PROVISIONS LIMITING OFFENSIVE
ARIMAMIENTS
That is the present situation. What will be the condition in five years
under the provisions of the executive agreement limiting offensive
armaments? First, we have a specific numerical limitation on subma-
rines and a freeze on additional construction of ICBMs by either side;
and we have the assurance from Mr. Kissinger at the White House on
June 15: “... we are confident that the national means of verification
are sufficient to give us the highest degree of confidence that this agree-
ment will be lived up to, or that we will know it almost immediately
if it is not lived up to.” ... . . .
Although the agreement did not limit qualitative changes, it had
the effect of halting the quantitative momentum of the Soviet Union
in the two categories in which they were embarked on major construc-
tion programs, no additional land-based ICBMs particularly the po-
tent SS-9s, and a ceiling on Y-class nuclear submarines. . . . . . . .
In examining the results of the agreement, the only relevant ques-
tion appears to be the one posed by Dr. Kissinger in Moscow on May
26: “... the question is to ask in assessing the freeze is not what situa-
tion it perpetuates but what situation it prevents. The question is,
where we would be without the freeze.” - -
Members of the defense analysis staff at the Brookings Institution
estimated that the USSR could have 1,900 land-based ICBMs by 1977,
against a U.S. total of 1,054. Under the Moscow agreement, they pro-
ject Soviet strength at 1,330 missiles—a drop of 600—against a U.S.
total of 1,000—a drop of 54. - -
They estimate that the Soviet Union would have had some 1,200 sea-
based missiles at the level they were previously building, compared to
barely half that total, 656 missiles, for the U.S. - - -
Under the treaty, the Soviet Union is limited to 950 sea-based mis-
. a decrease of 250, and the U.S. a total of 710 missiles, an increase
Of 54. - -
Also, where the U.S. has substantial leads in strategic bombers
and in the technology of the MIRV, the agreement was silent. The
250
result is that our MTRW program will produce a proliferation of
U.S. warheads from the present level of 5,700 to a level of 11,000.
Relative to the U.S., the Soviet Union will continue to have a frac-
tion of the number of our warheads since they have not yet tested a
single MIRV. On that basis alone, the executive agreement would
appear to be of substantial benefit to the U.S., but if the ABM treaty
and the executive treaty are ratified and approved, as I believe they
should be, what is to be our future policy?
COURSE CHOSEN BY ADMINISTRATION
The Administration has chosen one course, a course that I would
described as pockmarked with danger for the Nation; for it views the
SALT accords as a corporation views the tax laws—as a compendium
of loopholes. Instead of acting as if the SALT agreement were an
incentive for mutual restraint, this Administration is telling the na-
tion that wherever SALT permits an opening, it intends to drive a
new nuclear weapon system through the loophole.
The basic and compelling argument which should convince the
Congress to reject this approach is the argument I have stated
previously.
ADDITIONAL WEAPONS SYSTEMIS NOT NEEDED

Our policy is one of deterrence. With the ABM Treaty, we have
that deterrence, not only today but well into the future. We do not
need these additional weapon systems today.
TOTAMIS
With our Polaris-Poseidon invulnerable today, and with no one,
not the President, not Dr. Kissinger, not Secretary Laird able to tell
the Congress what the threat against those submarines will be five
years from now or ten years from now, it makes little sense to lock
ourselves into a program whose minimal costs are in the neighbor-
hood of $13.4 billion. r
If we do not know the threat, it is a foolish and ultimately a
dangerous practice to become committed to a larger submarine which
may not be the proper response to an as yet undefined ASW men-
ace. It makes far more sense to move forward only with the develop-
ment of the ULMS-I missile at this time. Nor is the modernization
argument compelling since none of the present submarines are antici-
pated to reach the end of their 25 to 30 year lives until the 1985–1990
timeframe.
Admiral Moorer, testifying last year before the Armed Services
Committee, stated: “. . . If the Soviets continue this momentum
. . . then we will have to go forward with these new programs such
as the ULMS . . . and accelerate the development of production of
these systems. If some progress could be made in SALT . . . then the
expansion and the augmentation of our current capabilities would
not be so vital. If we can succeed in reaching agreement which would
limit the overall capabilities on both sides and set an established
level, then we could afford to hold back on the weapon development
and production . . .”
251
Admiral Moorer's reasoning of a year ago should be adhered to.
SALT has been concluded. There is a limitation halting the Soviet
momentum. There is an ABM ban. Therefore, we should not go for-
ward with the accelerated ULMS schedule at this time.
B—i.
Admiral Moorer also referred specifically, to the B-1 in stating
that a SALT agreement would remove the incentive for deploying
new systems. The modern B-52 is not wearing out. Its current ef-
fectiveness against Soviet-type air-defense systems has been shown
in the Haiphong-Hanoi area.
There is no reason to go forward now with $11 billion B-1 pro-
gram. If there is rationale for maintaining a strategic bomber force
in a no ABM environment, we would be wiser to save our money and
invest it in further research and in consideration of ways to pre-
serve the life of the B-52s through the addition of standoff missiles.
NATIONAL CAPITAL AREA ABM
The National Capital Area proposal is an expensive and unneces-
sary example of converting the option contained in SALT into an
obligation. For any scenario that one can imagine, whether massive
attack, accidental launch, or limited attack, the NCA ABM would be
unjustified and of highly questionable value. In a massive attack, its
100 interceptors could be overwhelmed without difficulty. In a limited
attack by a third country, the NCA would be of little deterrent use
since the rest of the nation would be vulnerable and it would bear the
brunt of the attack; and it is a matter of extreme improbability for
an accidental launch to head for Washington.
CRUISE MISSILE
The proposal for $20 million this year alone for a cruise missile
to be placed on our submarines is best described as nonsense. We have
a treaty that prohibits an ABM; therefore, there is no challenge at all
to ballistic missiles on our submarines. Yet, instead, we see the proposal
to develop a cruise missile that must be fired at close range and a mis-
sile, which will be vulnerable to the air-defense system of the Soviet
Union. It makes little sense if our concern is deterrence and not the
satisfaction of devising an exotic new weapon system.
ADMINISTRATION's ARGUMENT: BARGAINING CHIPs
If these weapons systems cannot be justified on their own merits,
as I believe they cannot, then it leaves only the peripheral argument
that the Administration has used so successfully in the past to obtain
more arms: bargaining chips.
We are being told that failure to approve these weapon systems
constitutes unilateral disarmament. Despite our ability to destroy the
Soviet Union thousands of times over, we will be told that failure to
approve ULMS or B–1 constitutes unilateral disarmament. -
In similar terms, this argument says that any weapon system that
can be built must be built and that the failure to build constitutes
80–942 O—72—17
252
unilateral disarmament. I reject that logic. If Lewis Carroll were here
today, I suspect he would tell this committee that Alice in Wonder-
land is loose in the Pentagon.
I also reject the argument that failure to build the weapon systems
deprives us of a bargaining chip and therefore removes the incentive
of the Soviet Union to negotiate. Our past experience should not be
forgotten. The Administration argued that without moving forward
with an ABM, there would have been no SALT agreement. I question
that assertion. -
Two years ago, the Soviet Union was ready to accept a limitation to
a single national capital site; but because we were already going ahead
with the ABM, we rejected that proposal. Using ABM as a bargaining
chip has produced a treaty in which the Soviet Union can wind up
with a bigger ABM system than they had before the negotiations
started. . . ." -
With regard to MIRVs, the insistence on deploying them virtually
assured the failure of any serious negotiations on that subject at SALT.
Our defense planners wanted to go forward with the full deployment
of this bargaining chip and theirs refused to bargain from a position
of such blatant inferiority. The result is that the most potentially
destabilizing strategic offensive system is not covered in the agreement.
We have consistently failed to recognize that a bargaining chip is
good so long as it is not played. Once played, its only effect is to raise
the stakes, and that has been the effect of our use of nuclear bargaining
chips, each time the stakes have been raised and each time the security
of all nations have been endangered. - -
If there is any bargaining chip, it is our overall nuclear deterrent,
its size, its diversity, its clear dominance in the number of warheads;
and beyond these factors our bargaining chip is our technological
capacity, the capacity shown in the Apollo program, the capacity for
almost unlimited technological innovation.
Instead of raising the ante of nuclear stockpiling, I would urge the
Congress to put a check on this round of proposed military escalation.
POLICY OF COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE ARMS REDUCTION URGED
Instead of the course of nuclear escalation to bloat an already suffi-
cient deterrent or to construct a new bargaining chip, I would urge
that we adopt a policy of restraint, a policy of commitment to nego-
tiate arms reduction. - -
MORATORIUM on UNDERGROUND TESTING
First, I believe we must offer a new initiative by announcing a mora-
torium on underground testing to remain in effect so long as the Soviet
Union abstains. I introduced a resolution to that effect which also
called for prompt negotiations by the President. I think it is instruc-
tive to note the criticism today by the Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers,
of France's plans for a nuclear test. Yet most nations would see that
statement as hypocritical since we continue to test underground while
criticizing other nations which are unable to test underground, when
they test in the atmosphere. - -
I would hope that following SALT this committee would find itself
able to consider that resolution as a means of stimulating action toward
placing qualitative limits on the arms race.
253
LIMITING ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE DEVELOPMENT
Secondly, I would urge that SALT II consider limiting anti-sub-
marine warfare deployment. While there is no immediate threat to our
Polaris-Poseidon force, nor any which can be easily imagined, an im-
portant stabilizing influence in the strategic dialogue would result
from agreements in this area. I see no reason why there could not be
an effort to achieve ASW-free zones as a first step toward elimination
of this threat. This is a far more productive course of action for pre-
serving our deterrent than seeking to develop Trident.
MIRV LIMITATION
Third, I believe we must do more to obtain a MIRV limitation. We
no longer have adequate reasons to continue MIRV deployment, par-
ticularly on the Minuteman, since the ABM has vanished. At the very
least we should make every effort to achieve limitations on MIRV
testing.
MOVE FROM ARMIS LIMITATION TO ARMIS REDUCTION
Fourth, I believe it is time to move from arms limitations to arms
reduction. A proportional reduction in the number of land-based
ICBMs would seem to be a desirable and feasible goal.
These are among the kinds of efforts that we should make in the
post-SALT environment and they are far more in keeping with our
national interest and with the stability of our deterrent than the Ad-
ministration's strategy of escalating armaments.
COMMENDATION OF WITNESS
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kennedy. I think that is an
extremely well thought out and complete response to this problem of an
ongoing missile program.
SENATE RESOLUTION ON MIRV PASSED
You have raised many problems. The moratorium which you sug-
gest on underground testing has been raised, and I think a number
of the members of the committee are in favor of it. It reminds me
that the Senate as a whole passed a resolution recommending a mora-
torium on deployment of MIRV, as you will recall, but it did not in-
fluence the Administration. I think your colleague from Massachu-
setts introduced that resolution and a number of others, of course,
supported it. In fact, it was a very large vote in the Senate.
I find myself very much in agreement with your reasoning on both
counts, that is, the approval of the ABM and essentially restraint in
going forward with the further weapon systems.
Senator Sparkman, do you have any questions?
Senator SPARKMAN. I enjoyed the statement very much, too. How-
ever, I couldn’t help but have this thought, that we are dealing with
a treaty and with the two agreements. This committee will not be
the one to consider ABMs, MIRVs, and so forth. I know your posi-
tion, but I would like to get it very clear.
254
You do not tie your endorsement of the treaty and your endorse-
ment of the agreements to the other matters? In other words, you are
for them regardless of the other, aren’t you?
Senator KENNEDY. I am for the treaty and have been opposed to
the rationale and the justification that has been suggested by the Ad-
ministration for expanded weapons, strategic weapon systems; so I
am for the treaty but not for the new weapons systems.
Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, I understandit.
Senator KENNEDY. I don’t tie them together.
Senator SPARKMAN. You don’t tie them together?
Senator KENNEDY. The Administration does.
Senator SPARKMAN. This committee does not handle the other.
Senator KENNEDY. As I say, I support the treaty and I was trying
to address myself to the particular argument of the Secretary of De-
fense in justification for the treaty, only if there were new weapons.
I accept completely the observation that those issues and questions
should be decided in the authorizing—appropriating committees, but,
obviously, they are very much relevant to the considerations of this
committee. -
Senator SPARKMAN. Well, I am thinking—I have heard some say
that they could not support the treaty unless these other things were
done. I am trying to separate the two. I don’t think that we ought
to condition one upon the other.
Senator KENNEDY. I support that logic and that presentation.
Senator SPARKMAN. Very well; that is what I wanted. Thank you
very much.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper?
FURTHER MIRVING OF MINUTEMAN OPPOSED
Senator CoopFR. I think it is a very good statement, Senator Ken-
nedy. I would like to ask a question regarding the ongoing programs.
The Minuteman is being MIRVed and Poseidon is as well—do you
support the continued MIRVing or are you opposed?
Senator KENNEDY. No, I would oppose any further MIRVing of
the Minuteman weapon system. Obviously those submarines in the
process of conversion would have to be completed. As I tried to
suggest as a fundamental theme in the statement, the question at issue
is the deterrent capacity of the United States. I think that that deter-
rent capacity is preserved with the living up to this treaty by the So-
viet Union and by the United States, and so I see no further reasons
for such a program. I also would have very serious reservations as well
about the building of an ABM system around the capital or around the
single missile site in Grand Forks. I think they can both be easily
overcome and I think the argument of accidental launch is extremely
remote. I fail to feel that there is a necessity for those or for the other
weapon systems which I have outlined here.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Senator Cooper. I think the treaty itself is testimony to the fact
that both countries know they can easily overcome an ABM system.
As I understand it, ULMS or Trident could not be deployed until, I
255.
think, '78 if accelerated and not until 1982 on its regular schedule.
Would you favor research and development?
Senator KENNEDY. Research and development was well—
Senator COOPER. Research.
Senator KENNEDY.—on the Trident as well as on the missile. But
I think, first of all, accepting the statements that were made to the
Armed Services Committee by the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the
virtual invulnerability of the Poseidon last year; I think we can rely
effectively on them as a deterrent. I know there are those in the De-
fense Department who think that because of the development of
antisubmarine warfare by the Soviet Union we ought to move into
production of the Trident submarine; but we can’t tell exactly the
nature of the antisubmarine warfare mechanisms being developed by
the Soviet Union.
It is hoped by the Defense Department that because the Trident
might be faster, and might be quieter, that it would be able to over-
come any antisubmarine warfare, but we don’t know whether the anti-
submarine warfare might be more effective in identifying a larger
target and therefore be counterproductive. Perhaps we would be bet-
ter off in building the smaller submarines rather than the large ones
and I would like to defer action on the Trident now given the fact
that the Poseidon weapon submarine system will not be outdated
until the mid-1980s. I think we could afford to defer action on that.
And that at the particular time, and I would hope, while we were
deferring action, that we would consider the possibility of ASW-free
zones in order to protect the deterrent of the United States as well
as of the Soviet Union. I think that would make a great deal more
sense and I think our efforts ought to be in those directions before
moving on to a multibillion dollar new weapon system.
Senator CoopFR. That is all.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator, one or two points:
PRESIDENT DOES NOT LINK TREATY AND WEAPONs systEMS
It is my understanding that the President himself, and certainly
Dr. Kissinger in his briefing in the White House to members of the
Congress, does not link these two together. He does not make approval
of the ABM Treaty dependent upon an obligation to go forward with
all the weapon systems. It was Secretary Laird who asserted that.
Senator KENNEDY. Yes, that is correct. -
The CHAIRMAN. And Secretary Laird did assert it before this com-
mittee, as I understood it, and in the press; I am not sure about Secre-
tary Rogers. But I think the position of the President, at least, is that
each of these should be considered upon its merits; that is, independent
of the other. He proposes them, but he does not make them dependent
§: not insist on linkage, so in that regard you are in agreement
with him.
MILITARY POWER NOT ONLY SIGNIFICANT CONSTITUENT
TO NATION’s SECURITY
Qne, other thought that strikes me. We have become so fascinated
with these great technological weapon systems that the impression is
256
given in many of these hearings that the only significant constituent to
a nation's security is its military power. When you consider the diffi-
culties we are having with our economy, both internationally and do-
mestically, and with social problems, it strikes me that in balancing
the relative importance of more powerful weapon systems we are ne-
glecting or overlooking the fact that there are these other elements to
our security. If the two ventures of the President in China and Russia
are not to be taken as simply an exercise in futility, then we should con-
sider them vis-a-vis the other aspects of our internal stability as a
major element in our security. I think we see in the hearings every-
thing is centered around the military as if the military power was the
whole problem, the whole question of Security.
I think it is only a part of it, that much of our security depends on
what we do in other areas. Would you agree with that?
Senator KENNEDY. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that the Security
interests of the people of my city of Boston are more threatened by
violence in the streets of Boston than they are by 17 million peasants in
North Vietnam. -- -
The CHAIRMAN. But to get this perspective seems to be very difficult.
For some reason or other, the military aspects are so much more news-
worthy and attract the attention of everyone. There are so many things
we need to do here that relate to our security that I think we must re-
examine the relative importance of these programs, and the Only place
this could be expected to be done is in the Congress. -
I do not criticize the military for asking for everything they can
think of. That is their responsibility. What I try to emphasize is that
it is essentially and uniquely the responsibility of this body, the Senate
and the House, to make a decision as to what is most important in the
near future to our security.
Would you not agree? -
Senator KENNEDY. I would certainly agree with everything that you
have commented on and stated there.
The CHAIRMAN. There is a tendency to always put this responsibility
on the administration. When we seem to be criticizing a proposal by
the Joint Chiefs, it isn’t a criticism, really; I don’t think we are justi.
fied in Saying they shouldn’t ask for these things. The criticism is on
Congress for not going to the trouble to exercise its independent judg-
ment on which of these various things should be given emphasis.
Nobody is advocating unilateral disarmament or abandonment of
all arms. This is the position of those who criticize the point that the
Congress must make this decision.
Thank you very much.
Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
members of the committee. -
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Our next witness is the distinguished Senator Buckley of New York.
Senator Buckley?
STATEMENT OF HON, JAMES L. BUCKLEY, U.S. SENATOR FROM
NEW YORK
Senator BUCKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. -
I would say that I have a rather lengthy statement, but I will spare
you large chunks of it, if I may.
257
The CHAIRMAN. We can put it all in the record and you can read
what you want.
Senator BUCKLEY. Thank you very much. I appreciate the oppor-
tunity to appear before this committee to express my views on the
Strategic Arms Limitation. Accords. I suspect you will find the thrust
of my remarks somewhat at variance with those of Senator Kennedy.
I have followed these developments with intense interest and not
only because of their effect on our national security but also on our
role in international affairs as well.
AGREEMENTS COULD INCREASE ULTIMATE RISK OF WAR
Throughout the course of the negotiations it had been my hope that
agreements could be concluded that would fulfill the traditional objec-
tives of arms control—namely, to reduce the risk of war, or if war
should occur, to mitigate its consequences. Having had an opportunity
to study the agreements in some detail, I have reluctantly concluded
that unless appropriate measures are taken, they will achieve neither
goal; in fact, they could well increase the ultimate risk of war by
undermining our alliances while encouraging Soviet intransigence in
any future confrontations. If we have learned anything from the
great conflicts of this century, it should be that weakness invites attack
and that aggressor nations seem inevitably to overestimate the willing-
ness of free men to retreat. . .
We are dealing, of course, with two separate agreements: the Treaty
on the Limitations of Antiballistic Missile Systems and the Interim
Agreement placing limitations on certain categories of strategic
offensive arms. I will discuss, in brief, the risks which I believe to be
inherent in each before recommending to your committee certain Safe-
guards which can be adopted by the Congress in order to minimize
these risks. -
ABM TREATY OPPOSED
I will say at the outset that I will vote against ratification of the
ABM Treaty for the reason that I have strong misgivings as to both
the prudence and the ultimate morality of denying ourselves for all
time, or denying the Russians, for that matter, the right to protect
our civilian populations from nuclear devastation. I am not suggest-
ing that we have the technical means to do so at the present time, but I
challenge the morality of precluding the possibility of developing at
Some future date new approaches to antiballistic missile defenses
which could offer protection to substantial numbers of our people. I
question, in short, the basic doctrine which requires us to dismantle
our defenses before agreement is reached on dismantling the weapons
of mass destruction. -
The immediate effect of the treaty, of course, is to limit antiballistic
missile systems to nominal levels, where each side agrees to defend
its national capital and one strategic missile site with not more than
100 antiballistic missile interceptors per site. I would argue that this
agreement is inappropriate on its face.
For Some years American defense policy has been dominated by
theories such as “assured destruction” or a contemporary variant of
assured destruction known as “strategic sufficiency.” It has been a car-
258
dinal objective of these theories that U.S. security is best maintained
by establishing a system whereby active defense is severely constrained
on the theory that strategic stability will be assured by the mutual
pºlis of the citizens of both the United States and the Soviet
Ill OI). -
This is the doctrine that the ABM Treaty signed in Moscow seeks to
perpetuate. Thus the agreement goes so far as to prohibit the develop-
ment, test or deployment of Sea, air or space-based ballistic missile
defense systems. This clause, in Article V of the ABM Treaty, would
have the effect, for example of prohibiting the development and test-
ing of a laser-type system based in space which could at least in prin-
ciple provide an extremely reliable and effective system of defenses
against ballistic missiles. The technological possibility has been formal-
ly excluded by this agreement.
There is no law of nature that I know of that makes it impossible
to create defense systems that would make the prevailing theories
obsolete. Why, then, should we by treaty deny ourselves the kind of
development that could possibly create a reliable technique for the
defense of civilians against ballistic missile attack? Why should we
not at least be in a position to deploy such a system with the least
possible delay in the event that we should find it necessary to terminate
the agreement under the conditions allowed in Article XV or should
we fail to negotiate a satisfactory successor agreement to SALT I?
There are many other defects inherent in the treaty. For example, it
is technically possible for the Russians to net or tie in their Moscow
ABM defense system into the system which they are allowed for the
defense of a strategic missile site. For some unknown reason, the
Soviet Union is permitted to deploy its site for the protection of an
ICBM base as close as 800 miles from Moscow, while the United
States may not deploy one closer than 1,400 miles from Washington.
These relative proximities would enable the Soviet Union, with ap-
propriate radar and data-processing equipment, to have the more effec-
tive type of radar coverage for its two ABM systems which comes
from the capability to tie them together electronically. This disparity
in the effect of the ABM Treaty on the United States and Russia be-
comes even more significant when it is considered that the disposition
of the Moscow defense system would permit them to defend about
350 of their ICBMs or the equivalent of about two U.S. ICBM bases.
PROBLEMS REGARDING CAPABILITY OF U.S. SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM
There are also two problems which have to do with the capability
of our existing surveillance system to detect violations of the treaty by
the Soviet Union.
The treaty contains language which prohibits the deployment of a
“rapid reload capability” for ABM missiles. But the nature of the
Soviet ABM missile launcher makes it relatively simple for the Soviet
Union to covertly develop for later deployment a rapid reload capa-
bility. There must be a more realistic means of insuring compliance
with the rapid reload prohibition of the treaty than is possible with
satellite surveillance. Otherwise, it would be a rather simple matter to
develop the necessary mechanical devices and to store them in ware-
259
houses from which they could be deployed at launch sites in a matter
of days.
The other possibility relates to the upgrading of existing or new
antiaircraft systems to an ABM role. There are those who believe, for
example, that the existing SA-5 missiles, with their effective altitude
of 100,000 feet, could be given an ABM capability and connected with
the necessary radar installations without detection.
In the Interim Agreement, the United States has accepted a position
of significant quantitative inferiority in every area of offensive
strength which is subject to its control. -
Mr. Chairman, I won’t detail the facts supporting this proposition.
I know they are well familiar to you and they will be in my text. I
would only say that I agree—I substantially agree with the conclusion
expressed by Dr. Donald Brennan of the Hudson Institute who testi-
fied here yesterday. These conclusions also suggest that the Soviet
Union have the technical capability of developing a MTRW technology
for their ICBMs well in advance of the termination of the five-year
period of the Interim Agreement. -
Suffice it to say that there is nothing in the SALT Accords to prevent
the Soviet Union from obtaining significant quantitative advantage.
On the other hand, the SALT Accords will prevent the United States
from catching up to the Soviet Union in those areas where the Soviet
Union is guaranteed a substantial quantitative advantage.
There are additional hazards in the Interim Agreement which result
from ambiguities in its text or from the inadequacy of its provisions
for verification. For example, (1) the agreement places a ceiling on
intercontinental ballistic missiles based on the number of light and
heavy missile launchers in place or under construction as of July 1,
1972. Yet the United States has no definite information as to the size,
number and approximate location of land-based Soviet strategic mis-
sile forces.
At the present time the United States is relying entirely on its own
intelligence estimates. It should be noted that the general area in which
Soviet ICBMs are deployed is in North-Central Asia, where the
normal cloud cover is among the heaviest of any region in the Northern
Hemisphere. It is entirely possible that at some time subsequent to
July 1, 1972, scores of additional ICBMs could be discovered by our.
reconnaissance satellites. As the agreement only prohibits starts on
new construction after that date, we would face the practical difficulty
of not being able to establish whether or not newly discovered missile
sites had been constructed in violation of the agreement.
(2) It is not at all clear that the so-called “national technical
means of verification” available to the United States will suffice to
provide conclusive evidence as to whether or not Soviet medium and
intermediate range ballistic missiles—M/IRBM–Will be upgraded
to an intercontinental capability through the replacement of ob-
solescent SS—4 and SS-5 missiles with variable-range SS—11 missiles.
We do know that some replacement is now taking effect but we have
no evidence as to the capability of those new missiles.

RESERVATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS TO TREATY RECOMMENDED
Now, Mr. Chairman, I am quite prepared to accept the proposition
that given the rate at which the Soviet Union has been overtaking us
260
in its deployment of ICBMs and nuclear-powered submarines, the
risks which we are most assuredly assuming under the Interim Agree-
ment are nonetheless far smaller than those we would be assuming
if current trends were allowed to continue. I do feel, however, that it
is most important that the Congress recognize that we are, in fact,
assuming substantial risks so that we may take appropriate measures
to minimize them during the term of the agreement and to place our-
selves in an optimum position to negotiate a satisfactory SALT II
Agreement within the next five years; or should this fail, to move
swiftly to recapture a posture of nuclear parity. I believe that these
protections can be secured by attaching appropriate reservations to
the ABM treaty.
Specifically, I recommend that the Senate attach, the following
reservations and instructions to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-
ballistic Missile Systems:
(1) A reservation which will result in the automatic termination
of the Treaty at the expiration of the five-year term of the Interim
Agreement unless the parties shall have earlier concluded an agree-
ment for the limitation of offensive weapons which shall establish
approximate parity in the payload capacity of their respective strate-
gic offensive forces, such agreement to avoid the ambiguities contained
in the Interim Agreement and to provide a mechanism for the reliable
verification of compliance. -
(2) Instructions to the American representatives on the Standing
Consultative Commission providing for in Article XIII of the Treaty
requiring them to establish procedures at the earliest possible date
which will provide the United States with reliable evidence that (a)
the Moscow ABM system will not be tied into the other ABM system
permitted the Soviet Union under the Treaty; (b) existing or future
air-defense systems will not be upgraded to an ABM capability; and
(c) the Soviets will not develop a standby rapid-reload capability for
their ABMs. The instructions should stipulate that a failure to secure
such assurances will constitute an extraordinary event jeopardizing
the supreme interests of the United States within the meaning of
Article XV of the Treaty.
With respect to the Interim Agreement limiting certain strategic
offensive arms, I recommend that the Congress incorporate the follow-
ing provisos in its Joint Resolution approving the Agreement:
(1) An acknowledgment that the United States cannot prudently
enter into the Interim Agreement except with the understanding that
it must immediately intensify its investment in military research, de-
velopment and procurement so as to (a) preserve those areas of stra-
tegic Superiority which it currently enjoys, and (b) achieve the maxi-
mum qualitative improvement possible during the term of the Interim
Agreement in those weapons systems in which it will be frozen into a
position of quantitative inferiority.
(2) The issuance of instructions to the American representatives
on the Standing Consultative Commission to secure the earliest pos-
sible agreement as to the following: (a) verification by the Soviet
Union as to the exact number, size and approximate location of all land-
based Soviet strategic missile launchers in existence or under construc-
tion as of July 1, 1972; (b) a reliable mechanism for verifying that the
SS-11 variable-range missiles which replace the obsolescent SS—4
261.
and SS-5 medium and intermediate-range missiles do not have an in-
tercontinental capability; and (c) a definition as to what constitutes
a “heavy missile” within the meaning of the Interim Agreement.
These instructions should stipulate that a failure to Secure such
agreement shall constitute an extraordinary event jeopardizing the
supreme interests of the United States within the meaning of Para-
graph 3 of Article VIII of the Interim Agreement. -
WHY CONGRESS SHOULD CONDITION APPROVAL OF SALT ACCORDS
I believe that if the Senate and the Congress will condition their rati-
fication and approval of the Strategic Arms Limitation Accords in
such a manner, and if the Congress will give further evidence that it
understands these inherent risks by launching a serious and sustained
program to upgrade our strategic and military capabilities within the
limits imposed by the two agreements, then we will not only minimize
those risks as they affect our physical security but will also at the same
time avoid a critical dilution of our influence in world affairs.
If we do anything less, if it appears that we are willing to retreat to
a position of permanent strategic inferiority, then we will see subtle
but corrosive forces at work in the world arena which will have the
most serious implications for the United States and for the cause of
peace. - -
We can expect, for example, to see the Soviet leadership intensify
their diplomatic pressures around the globe; and in any future con-
frontations with the West, to assume more confident and intransigent
attitudes. By the same token, to the extent that the relative strategic
position of the United States declines, so will the options which are
available to an American President in any such future political crisis
with the inevitable erosion of his ability to support vital U.S. foreign
policy objectives. And it is not only our own diplomatic options which
would be affected by an understanding that the Soviet Union has
achieved a position of strategic supremacy.
As Dr. Brennan of the Hudson Institute pointed out to this com-
mittee in testimony yesterday, and I quote:
The new imbalance of power will become established in the minds of our
allies Which will ultimately lead them to be more responsive, perhaps unduly
responsive, to Soviet diplomatic pressures and initiatives. -
How can we expect the Japanese to accept with equanimity so
dramatic a change in the relative strength of the superpowers. Japan
will be left with little choice but to either seek an accommodation
with the Communist powers or, in the alternative, to develop an in-
dependent military and strategic capability which will guarantee
her own security. What I am suggesting, in short, is that unless we
couple the SALT Accords with a clear indication that we will settle
for nothing less than nuclear parity, unless we launch credible pro-
grams for the modernization of our strategic capabilities within the
limits set by these Accords, these agreements will prove not only
dangerous to the security of the United States but to the stability of
the world.
G. K. Chesterton once said: “I do not believe in fate that falls on
men however they act. I do believe in a fate that falls on men unless
they act.”
262
I believe that Chesterton's point is relevant to the facts of inter-
national life which we face today. I trust that we will not, for the
first time in our history, entrust our fate to others. Only We can
make sure that our own security and that of the free world is not
placed in jeopardy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
(Senator Buckley's prepared statement follows:)
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES L. BUCKLEY
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee
to express my views on the Strategic Arms Limitation Accords signed by Presi-
dent Nixon in Moscow on May 26th. I have followed these developments With
intense interest not only because of their effect on our national Security, but
On Our role in international affairs as Well.
Throughout the course of the negotiations, it had been my hope that agree-
ments could be concluded that would fulfill the traditional objectives of arms
control; namely, to reduce the risk of war, or if war should occur, to mitigate
its consequences. Having had an Opportunity to study the agreements in Some
detail, I have reluctantly concluded that unless appropriate measures are taken,
they will achieve neither goal. In fact, they could well increase the ultimate risk
of war by undermining our alliances while encouraging Soviet intransigence
in any future confrontations. If we have learned anything from the great con-
flicts of this century, it should be that weakness invites attack, and that ag-
gressor nations seem inevitably to overestimate the willingness of free men to
retreat.
We are dealing, of course, with two separate agreements: the Treaty on
the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Systems and the Interim Agreement placing
limitations on certain categories of strategic offensive arms. I will discuss, in
brief, the risks which I believe to be inherent in each before recommending to
your Committee certain safeguards which can be adopted by the Congress in
Order to minimize these risks.
I will say at the outset that I will vote against ratification of the ABM treaty
for the reason that I have strong misgivings as to both the prudence and the
ultimate morality of denying Ourselves for all time—or denying the Russians,
for that matter—the right to protect our civilian populations from nuclear
devastation. I am not suggesting that we have the technical means to do so at the
present time, but I challenge the morality of precluding the possibility of develop-
ing at some future date new approaches to anti-ballistic missile defenses which
could offer protection to substantial numbers of Our people. I question, in short,
the basic doctrine on which the SALT Accords have been constructed; a doctrine
which requires us to dismantle our defenses before agreement is reached on dis-
mantling the weapons Of mass destruction.
The immediate effect of the Treaty, of course, is to limit anti-ballistic missile
Systems to nominal levels, where each side agrees to defend its national capital
and One strategic missile site with not more than 100 anti-ballistic missile inter-
ceptors per Site. I WOuld argue that this agreement is inappropriate On its face.
For some years, American defense policy has been dominated by theories such
as “assured destruction” or a contemporary variant of assured destruction known
as “strategic Sufficiency”. It has been a cardinal objective Of these theories that
U.S. security is best maintained by establishing a system whereby active defense
is severely constrained. On the theory that Strategic Stability will be assured by
the mutual vulnerability of the citizens of both the United States and the Soviet
Union. - -
This is the doctrine that the ABM Treaty signed in Moscow seeks to perpetuate.
Thus the agreement goes so far as to prohibit the development, test or deployment
of sea, air or space base ballistic missile defense systems. This clause, in Article
V of the ABM Treaty, would have the effect, for example, of prohibiting the devel-
opment and testing of a laser type system based in space which could at least in
principle provide an extremely reliable and effective system of defenses against
ballistic missiles. The technological possibility has been formally excluded by
this agreement.
There is no law of nature that makes impossible the creation of defense sys-
tems that would make the prevailing theories obsolete. Why then should we by
263
treaty deny ourselves the kind of development that could possibly create a reliable
technique for the defense of civilians against ballistic missile attack? Why Should
we not at least be in a position to deploy such a system with the least p0SSible
delay in the event that we should find it necessary to terminate the agreement
under the conditions allowed in Article XV. •
There are other defects inherent in the Treaty. For example, it is technically
possible for the Russians to “net” or tie in their Moscow ABM defense system into
the system which they are allowed for the defense of a strategic missile site. For
some unknown reason, the Soviet Union may deploy its site for the protection of
an ICBM base as close as 800 miles from Moscow, while the United States may
not deploy one closer than 1400 miles from Washington. These relative proximities
would enable the Soviet Union, with appropriate radar and data processing equip-
ment, to have the more effective type of radar coverage for its two ABM Systems
which comes from the capability to tie them together electronically. This dis-
parity in the effect of the ABM Treaty on the United States and Russia becomes
even more significant when it is considered that the disposition of the Moscow
defense system would permit them to defend about 350 of their ICBMs or the
equivalent of about two U.S. ICBM bases.
There are also two problems which have to do with the capability of our existing
surveillance system to detect violations of the treaty by the Soviet Union.
The Treaty contains language which prohibits the deployment of a “rapid re-
load capability” for ABM missiles. But the nature of the Soviet ABM missile
launcher makes it relatively simple for the Soviet Union to covertly develop for
later deployment, a rapid reload capability. There must be a more realistic means
of insuring compliance with the rapid reload prohibition of the treaty than is
possible with satellite surveillance. Otherwise, it would be a rather simple mat-
ter to develop the necessary mechanical devices and to store them in Warehouses
from which they could be deployed at launch sites in a matter of days. -
The other possibility relates to the upgrading of existing or new anti-aircraft
systems to an ABM role. There are those who believe, for example, that the exist-
ing SA—5 missiles, with their effective altitude of 100,000 feet, could be given an
ABM capability and Connected with the necessary radar installations Without
detection. -
In the Interim Agreement, the United States has accepted a position of signifi-
cant quantitative inferiority in every area of Offensive strength which is Subject
'to its control. Depending on how the parties choose to exercise their options
under the agreement, the Soviet Union will be able to deploy, in round figures,
between 1400 and 1600 intercontinental ballistic missiles to our 1,000, and up to
1,000 Submarine launched ballistic missiles to Our 700. She will be able to expand
her fleet of modern “Y-Class” nuclear powered submarines to 62 while retaining
22 diesel-powered “G-Class” submarines, for a total force of 84 missile launching
submarines in comparison with the fleet of 44 which we will be allowed to
maintain. - .
Most significantly, because of the enormous size of Russia's heavy missiles, the
ceilings placed on intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles will
provide the Soviets with a more than four times advantage Over the United States
in the payload capacity or “throw-weight” of these weapons systems. This means
that the Russians will be guaranteed the capability, during the term of the agree-
ment, to deploy with these weapons more than four times as many warheads as
the United States should they achieve parity with us in warhead design.
Because such parity has not yet been achieved, it is argued that the United
States is likely to retain its existing two-to-One advantage in deliverable warheads
during the life of the agreement. This argument is based on U.S. Superiority in
manned heavy bombers, in multiple warhead technology, and in forward based
systems. I believe, however, that it is important to emphasize the fragile and
transitory character of this “advantage.” - -
First, with regard to the U.S. Superiority in manned bombers, this advan-
tage quickly disappears when one includes the medium bomber forces available to
both sides. While the United States has about 75 medium range F.B—111 bombers
in the Strategic Air Command which can operate from forward bases as part
of Our retaliatory force, the Soviets have approximately 550 TU–16 BADGERS
and approximately 150 TU-22 BLINDER medium bombers which are refuelable
and quite capable of reaching the United States and then landing in airfields in
Cuba. Or Mexico. - - -
Second, while a combination of skillful warhead miniaturization and relatively
accurate guidance systems provides the United States with a formidable present
264
advantage in multiple warhead technology, we have little reason to be complacent.
It should be noted that the United States developed its multiple warhead hard-
ware in approximately three years, from 1966 through 1969. Discussions of the
engineering characteristics of our multiple warhead missiles have been Widely
disseminated in trade journals and Congressional hearings. It would be im-
prudent, at best, to presume that the Soviets are so technologically retarded
that they would be incapable of developing and deploying significant numbers
of multiple warheads within the five year term of the Interim Agreement.
It has been argued that our intelligence estimates give the Soviet Union
only a limited capability to develop multiple warhead technology. I Would
point out that these intelligence analysis are the ones who have consistently
underestimated Soviet nuclear force objectives. It is these same intelligence
analysts who advised Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in the mid-
1960's that the Soviet Union had permanently accepted the status of strategic
inferiority.
It is with these same intelligence analysts who concluded in 1964 that the
Chinese Communists would detonate a primitive nuclear device made of plu-
tonium rather than the uranium device actually detonated which required a
huge gaseous diffusion plant for the manufacture of nuclear material.
With respect to these and other advantages which the United States may
currently possess in non-controlled strategic offensive weapons, it should be
noted that there is nothing in the SALT Accords to prevent the Soviet Union
from overtaking us in every category while these accords prohibit us from
overtaking the Soviet Union in those areas where they have been assured
Substantial margins Of Superiority.
There are additional hazards in the Interim Agreement which result from
ambiguities in its text or from the inadequacy of its provisions for Verification.
For example: -
1. The agreement places a ceiling on intercontinental ballistic missiles based
On the number of light and heavy missile launchers in place or under construc-
tion as of July 1, 1972. Yet the United States has no definitive information as to
the size, number and approximate location of land-based Soviet Strategic missile
forces. At the present time, the United States is relying entirely On its own intel-
ligence estimates. It should be noted that the general area in which Soviet ICBMs
are deployed is in North-Central Asia, where the normal cloud cover is among the
heaviest of any region in the northern hemisphere. It is entirely possible that at
some time subsequent to July 1, 1972, scores of additional ICBMs could be dis-
covered by our reconnaissance satellites. As the agreement only prohibits “starts”
on new construction after that date, we would face the practical difficulty of not
being able to establish whether or not newly discovered missile Sites had been
Constructed in violation of the agreement.
2. It is not at all clear that the So-called “national technical means Of Verifi-
cation” available to the United States will suffice to provide conclusive evidence
as to whether or not Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles
(M/IRBM) will be upgraded to an intercontinental capability through the re-
placement of obsolescent SS—4 and SS—5 missiles with “variable range” SS—11
missiles. It has already been noted in the press and elsewhere that the Soviet
Union has begun to place SS—11 missiles in her M/IRBM fields in the western
part of the Soviet Union. If the United States does not obtain ironclad proof
that an upgrading to an intercontinental capability is not taking place, the SO-
viet Union could add an additional 700 ICBMs to its arsenal without detection.
3. While it is agreed that missiles and launchers may be modernized and re-
placed SO long as the respective ceilings On light and heavy missiles are not
exceeded, nowhere is there an unambiguous definition of what is meant by a
“heavy missile”. The United States has issued a unilateral definition, but this
is somewhat less than satisfactory. If, for example, the Soviet Union were to
exchange its existing SS-9s for new missiles having twice their payload capac-
ity—and this may well be possible even within Our Own definition of what con-
Stitutes a heavy missile—the resulting threat to Our land based forces could be
so formidable as to allow us no prudent alternative but to develop and deploy a
mobile ICRM System. On an urgent basis.
I am quite prepared to accept the proposition that given the rate at which the
Soviet Union has been overtaking us in its deployment Of ICBMs and nuclear pow-
ered submarines, the risks which we are most assuredly assuming under the
Interim Agreement are nonetheless far smaller than those we would be assuming
if current trends were allowed to continue. I do feel, however, that it is most im-
265
portant that the Congress recognize that we are in fact assuming substantial
risks so that we may take appropriate measures to minimize them during the
term of the agreement and to place ourselves in an Optimum position to nego-
tiate a satisfactory SALT II Agreement within the next five years; Or should this
fail, to move swiftly to recapture a posture of nuclear parity. I believe that these
protections can be secured by attaching appropriate reservations to the ABM
treaty.
sºideally, I recommend that the Senate attach the following reservations
and instructions to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
SystemS : .
s: A reservation which will result in the automatic termination of the Treaty
at the expiration of the five-year term of the Interim Agreement unless the
parties shall have earlier concluded an agreement for the limitation of Offensive
weapons which shall establish approximate parity in the payload capacity of
their respective strategic offensive forces; such agreement to avoid the ambi-
guities contained in the Interim Agreement, and to provide a mechanism for the
fool-proof verification of compliance. -
2. Instructions to the American representatives on the Standing Consultive
Commission provided for in Article XIII of the Treaty requiring them to estab-
lish procedures at the earliest possible date which will provide the United
States with absolute, fool-proof assurances that— .
(a) The Moscow ABM system will not be tied into the other ABM system
permitted the Soviet Union under the Treaty; -
(b) Existing or future air defense systems will not be upgraded to an ABM
capability; and - , “ - *
(c) The Soviets will not develop a stand-by “rapid reload” capability for their
ABMS. • .
The instructions should stipulate that a failure to secure such assurances
will constitute an “extraordinary event” jeopardizing the “supreme interests” of
the United States within the meaning of Article XV of the Treaty.
With respect to the Interim Agreement limiting certain strategic Offensive
arms, I recommend that the Congress incorporate the following provisos in its
Joint Resolution approving the Agreement: .
1. An acknowledgement that the United States cannot prudently enter into
the Interim Agreement except with the understanding that it must immediately
intensify its investment in military research, development and procurement SO
as to : -
- (a) preserve those areas of strategic superiority which it currently en-
joys, and - . -
(b) achieve the maximum qualitative improvement possible during the
term of the Interim Agreement in those weapons systems in which it will
be frozen into a position of quantitative inferiority. .
2. The issuance Of instructions to the American representatives. On the Stand-
ing Consultive Commission to secure the earliest possible agreement as to the
following: . - • * * .
(a) Verification by the Soviet Union as to the exact number, size, and
approximate location of all land-based Soviet strategic missile launchers in
existence or under construction as of July 1, 1972. w
(b) A fool-proof mechanism for verifying that the SS—11 variable range
missiles which replace the obsolescent SS—4 and SS—5 medium and inter-
mediate range missiles do not have an intercontinental capability. -
(c) A definition as to what constitutes a “heavy missile” within the
meaning of the Interim Agreement. - -
These instructions should stipulate that a failure to secure such agreement
shall constitute an “extraordinary event” jeopardizing the “supreme interests” of
the United States within the meaning of Paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the
Interim Agreement. - - -
I believe that if the Senate and the Congress will condition their ratification
and approval of the Strategic Arms Limitation Accords in such a manner, and
if the Congress will give further evidence that it understands these inherent
risks by launching a serious and sustained program to upgrade our strategic
and military capabilities within the limits imposed by the two agreements, then
we will not only minimize those risks as they affect our physical security, but
will at the same time avoid a critical dilution of our influence in world affairs.
..If we do anything less, if it appears that we are willing to retreat to a position
of permanent strategic inferiority then we will see subtle but corrosive forces.
.*.*
266
at work in the world arena which will have the most serious implications for
the United States and for the CauSe Of peace.
We can expect, for example, to see the Soviet leadership intensify their diplo-
matic pressures around the globe ; and in any future COnfrontations with the
West, to assume more COnfident and intransigent attitudes. By the Same token,
to the extent that the relative strategic position of the United States declines, SO
will the Options which are available to an American President in any such future
political crisis with the inevitable erosion of his ability to support Vital U.S.
foreign policy objectives. And it is not only Our Own diplomatic Options which
Would be affected by an understanding that the Soviet Union has achieved a
position of Strategic Supremacy. In testifying before this Committee yesterday,
Dr. Donald G. Brennan, Of the Hudson Institute, pointed to the following adverse
political COnsequences:
“The new imbalance of power will become established in the minds of our
allies, which will ultimately lead them to be more responsive, perhaps un-
duly responsive, to Soviet diplomatic pressures and initiatives.”
Nor can we expect the Japanese to accept with equanimity so dramatic a
change in the relative strength of the super powers. Japan will be left little
choice but to either seek an accommodation with the Communist powers or, in
the alternative, to develop an independent military and strategic capability
which will guarantee her a degree of independence in matters affecting her own
Security.
What I am suggesting, in short, is that unless we couple the SALT Accords
with a clear indication that we will settle for nothing less than nuclear parity,
unless we launch credible programs for the modernization of our strategic
capabilities within the limits set by these Accords, these agreements will prove
not Only dangerous to the Security of the United States but to the stability of the
WOrld. -
G. K. Chesterton Once said: “I do not believe in fate that falls on men however
they act. I do believe in a fate that falls on men unless they act”. I believe that
Chesterton's point is relevant to the facts of international life which we face
today. I trust that we will not, for the first time in our history, entrust our
fate to others. Only we can make sure that our own security, and that of the
Free World, are not placed in jeopardy.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Buckley.
IS THERE APPROXIMATE NUCLEAR PARITY BETWEEN RUSSIA AND
* UNITED STATES 2
Do I understand your position is that there is or is not approxi-
mate strategic parity, nuclear parity, in nuclear power between Russia
and the United States today? - -
Senator BUCKLEY. Well, I believe, Mr. Chairman, that as of this
moment we have a Superiority of deliverable warheads; but the con-
Sequences of the Interim Agreement and the fact that we must antic-
ipate that the Soviet Union will strive to be able to exploit the
enormous throw weight advantage which it will be guaranteed by that
agreement in its ICBM and SLBM weapons will place us in the very
positive position of facing the world five years hence in a position
where we are not only—do not have parity but have something sub-
stantially less.
Is SOVIET UNION DETERMINED TO DESTROY UNITED STATES BY MILITARY
MEANS 2
The CHAIRMAN. Is it your position that the Soviet Union is deter-
mined to destroy the United States by military means?
Senator BUCKLEY. No; I believe that military power has an influence
on diplomatic events, on world politics, and that the possession of
267
power can enable the possessor of the power to force events to follow
his own wishes.
I hope and believe that neither the United States nor the Soviet
Union will ever launch a nuclear attack on the other; by the same token,
as I tried to point out at the close of my testimony, if the perceptions
of the parties involved in any confrontation is that one or the other
would be undertaking a substantially greater risk, then that perception
will inevitably influence the degree of determination of the parties
facing up to that confrontation.
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AS POSSIBLE OBJECTIVE
The CHAIRMAN. I assume the President's moves recently in this area
were based upon an assumption that—this phrase, and I suppose every-
one interprets it in a different way, but anyway it is overused—peace-
ful coexistence is a possible objective. Do you agree that it is a possible
objective?
Senator BUCKLEY. I am afraid I didn’t catch the earlier part of
your question.
The CHAIRMAN. We often have heard, you know, the phrase “peace-
ful coexistence.” I think Khrushchev used it and it has been used gen-
erally; it may be rather vague, but in any case, it means in my view
Some kind of normal relationships in which you have competition for
the respect and allegiance of other peoples, but not with military
means. It is the same type of relations that we have with many coun-
tries that are not allies, but at least our relations with them are rea-
Sonably normal. I assume the President based his move to both China
and Russia. On the assumption that such relations might be estab-
lished. Do you accept that premise?
Senator BUCKLEY. I believe this is possible, Mr. Chairman, but only
if we also follow the President's strongest recommendations that we
couple these agreements with a determination to, in effect, catch up in
certain critical areas so that during the negotiation of SALT II we
have an effective parity.
Now, I believe, if and when the Soviet Union is satisfied that we
have the spine and determination to match their extraordinary ex-
pansion in every aspect of their military might, that at such time
will they be most willing to do what makes sense for both of us and
that is, to start cutting back on the deployment of arms. I pray that
the time will come when we don’t set ceilings but start peeling back on
this enormous inventory of nuclear warheads. But as I indicated
earlier, I think that this is where we should be focusing our attention
and not in dismantling the military protection to protect ourselves
against the remote but nevertheless eventual possibility of a catas-
trophe.
The CHAIRMAN. I had thought these two agreements were a first
step, rather tentative, toward achieving that goal. That is the way I
interpreted the way the President and his spokesman, Dr. Kissinger,
explained it. While it couldn’t be expected to do all of this at once, this
was a step in that direction. You do not think this is a step in that
direction?
Senator BUCKLEY. We have—first of all, I have a fundamental dis-
agreement, of course, as to the ABM limitations on humanitarian
80–942 O—72—18
268
grounds, on moral grounds, but I think that both Dr. Kissinger and
the President have made it reasonably clear that, whereas, in fact, the
Interim Agreement will allow the Soviet Union to achieve a very sig-
nificant advantage, quantitative advantage, in the weapon systems it
controls, it is their feeling that this agreement is nevertheless necessary
because otherwise they would get even further ahead of us.
This is risk-taking in my judgment, and it is risk-taking which may
be necessary under the cold realities we face today, but it is risk-taking
which can be minimized if we will exploit such technological advan-
tages as we are capable of, within the ceiling that has been imposed
Oſ). UlS.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman?
Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Buckley, I think you make your posi-
tion clear. Now, as I understand it, you do not agree with the President
in his viewpoint on this, nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
PHILOSOPHY OF MUTUAL DETERRENCE
Senator BUCKLEY. I don't—let me put it this way: Where I am in
disagreement, where I have explicitly said I am in disagreement, is
the philosophy of a mutual deterrence; this is a philosophy that says
we will not protect ourselves. It seems to me the first duty of a nation
is to protect the lives of its civilians, if it has that capability. We have
allowed a doctrine to develop over the years, and this is not new; this
has been the doctrine for the last decade or so, a doctrine which main-
tains that we will deliberately be naked, hopefully in the expectation
that the Soviets will oblige us by undertaking to be naked themselves,
and that in this matter we have our best chances of avoiding a strike,
the mutual terror argument.
MORALITY OF PRECLUDING DEVELOPMENT OF NEW CONCEPTS QUESTIONED
Now, on the basis of existing technology, I can see the reasoning for
this, although there is question about the effectiveness of available
ABM technology; but I do question the morality of deciding now for
all time that we will preclude ourselves from developing new concepts
which at a later date could mean that the city of Washington or New
York or San Francisco or Detroit could not be meaningfully protected
either from attack by the Soviet Union or from an attack from some
other nation which has the capability of launching a weapon.
INTERIM. AGREEMENTS
Now, with respect to the Interim Agreement, I said that I am will-
ing to accept the fact that given the corner in which we found our-
selves with the Russians rapidly overtaking us in their land-based and
submarine-based missile capabilities, that perhaps this is the best we
could do, and then I specifically support the President and Secretary
Laird and Mr. Kissinger in saying that furthermore we will be totally
imprudent if we adopt these agreements, the Interim Agreements,
without at the same time making sure that we do not develop a
euphoria and sit on our hands to the end that most assuredly at the end
of 5 years we find ourselves in a position of decisive inferiority.
269
They are not recommending that; they are recommending that we
develop the ULMS, the B–1, that we increase the technical sophistica-
tion of our warhead guidance systems and so on and so forth.
Senator SPARKMAN. I was going to ask you if you would go along
with Secretary Laird who has indicated that his support of the treaty
would come only if we were allowed to proceed in the development
of these new systems, new weapons, new technology.
Senator BUCKLEY. This, of course, poses the dilemma that if the
Congress is not willing to go forward with even these programs, how
likely is it that the Congress will make that larger effort which will
be required to try to catch up with the Soviet capabilities in ICBM's
and submarine construction at the rate they are presently going. It
is a prudential judgment.
Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper?
COMMENDATION OF WITNESS
Senator CoopFR. I would like to say I think that Senator Buckley
has performed a useful service here today. You have raised practically
every question I think that might have been considered by the nego-
tiators. Your paper shows the very thorough knowledge you have of
the negotiations and of the systems. Your questions are very valuable
because the questions you raised, in their technical application at least
are COrrect.
Your paper points out as clearly as any I have seen and read that
these negotiations were very difficult. Agreement didn’t occur in the
last 24 hours in Moscow, and our negotiators were not just shadow-
boxing. These questions you have raised and others had to be worked
out over a period of years very carefully.
|NOT ALL ISSUES SETTLED
You are correct that not all the issues are settled. It is a fact that
the question of the heavy missile is not settled; the mobile ICBM's
are not settled. The question of whether we could check the launching,
the repeat loading of an ICBM raise—I don’t know whether it can be
detected or not. I don’t suppose anybody knows; the question of
whether you can detect with full certainty ICBM's in the mountainous
section of the Soviet Union which is under clouds most of the year—
you raise very important questions.
DANGER OF ABIM SYSTEM
I do want to question you on the ABM, though. You oppose it on
the ground of morality, whether or not we should be denied the au-
thority to protect our people. But as I have understood the reasoning
about the futility of an ABM system and also its danger throughout
these years of the debate over the ABM, the central factor is this that
if one country deployed an area wide ABM system and gave the im-
pression it was trying to protect its population and might be able to
do so, then it would cause such an instability that One nation might
launch a first strike in the belief that it could protect its population
270
º in fact, achieve the destruction of the other country, by a first
strike. .
How do you answer that?
Senator BUCKLEY. Well, I think the concept is fine so long as we can
be assured that both sides are playing by the same concepts, the same
rules; but I would suggest that the Soviet Union does not believe in
the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. They have long since
passed the point in the development of their capabilities which is suffi-
cient to satisfy that doctrine; whereas, we have deliberately avoided
achieving a counterforce capability, which is part and parcel of this
doctrine of assured mutual destruction; they have gone on to deploy
huge missiles which have the capability of zeroing in and destroying
our land-based deterrent forces. -
STATEMENTS OF EDITORS OF JANES MILITARY ANALYSES
Now, I am sure, Senator Cooper, that you have seen some scen-
arios—I know I have—and I know there is argument about them. But,
nevertheless, we find some foreign observers such as the editors of the
Janes Military Analyses who state that by 1975, if current trends are
allowed to continue, the Soviet Union will have achieved the capabil-
ity of destroying 90 to 95 percent of our ICBM's, half or more of our
B-52's, a third or more of our Polaris-Poseidon submarine forces,
which would then face the United States with this dilemma. Very few
people would be killed and when we are talking in the nuclear con-
test, with such a first strike to be aimed at the sites of weapons, not
cities, at that point deterence might very well work entirely against the
United States in that one can ask whether a President of the United
States would really press the button to destroy tens of millions of
Russians in an act of revenge when he would know that the immediate
response, because the Soviets would have sufficient weapons left
over, after their first strike, if the immediate response, would be to
destroy 40 or 50 or 60 percent of our population.
Now, as I suggested earlier, I don’t believe anyone is going to push
buttons, but if the two parties in a confrontation should sense that the
Soviet Union has this capacity, and could conceivably launch, and
that we would find ourselves in that position and this could very de-
finitely and dramatically influence diplomatic developments—very im-
º developments—which ultimately affect the security of the free
world.
SERIOUS PROBLEMIS EXIST : CONCERNING MIRV
Senator CoopF.R. You have raised a question which has been raised
by other witnesses, both those who think the agreements are good and
those who think they are bad. For example, we had witnesses yester-
day—Dr. Brennan, who wouldn’t quite say whether he approved or
disapproved these agreements, but he voiced doubts about them; we
also had a very fine witness, Dr. Stanley Hoffmann, who approves
them—both the ABM and the agreements, but who raised the question
which also you raised and I don’t think it ought to be glossed over . . .
He said this, about MIRV: -
Serious problems exist here : concerning MIRV, we may soon be so far ahead
that a freeze would be unacceptable to the U.S.S.R., whereas, if we wait until
271
their technology has caught up with ours, they may then achieve a superiority
in Overall deliverable warheads that might be—politically, if not strategically—
intolerable to us. -
EFFECTS OF ACTION OF SOVIET UNION IN PHASE II
My question is this: Would you think that phase II and the action
the Soviet Union may take in phase II and that we take may tell more
accurately the story of whether these agreements are a step toward
control of these weapons or their proliferation? -
Senator BUCKLEY. I think, Senator Cooper, it may depend entirely
or to a very significant extent on our relative postures toward the end
of the five-year period envisaged in the Interim Agreement. If we
have failed to move ahead, as the President has recommended, we
may find ourselves in a position of actual or almost immediate inferior-
ity from which we cannot catch up, at which time we might find the
Soviet Union very intransigent, the Soviet Union working not to
achieve what I believe is necessary in SALT II, namely, beginning with
assured parity on a payload capacity and then peeling back the weap-
ons, so we reduce, constantly reduce, this awful threat to humanity.
They might, in the alternative, use their existing strength and their
continuing capacity to tool up and start building still more submarines
and still deploying still added numbers of missiles to cause us to agree
to a position where they would have a permanent superiority as the
price for not—for both sides not continuing to spend still more money,
at which point the political implications would be most serious.
Senator CoopFR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
COMMENDATION OF WITNESS
I want to repeat again, I think your statement, while I don't agree
with your position on ABM, nevertheless I think it is a very intelligent,
thoughtful statement and one in which you raised, as I look back
through these years, practically every question of what must have
been considered in these negotiations.
Senator BUCKLEY. Thank you, Senator.
Senator CoopFR. And the questions that lie ahead.
Senator BUCKLEY. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Buckley. -
The next witness is our former colleague, Senator Joseph Clark.
We are very pleased to have you, Senator Clark.
STATEMENT OF HON, JOSEPH CLARK, FORMER U.S. SENATOR,
CHAIRMAN OF THE COALITION ON NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND
MILITARY POLICY
Mr. CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am grateful to you and
the members of the committee for giving the Coalition this opportu-
nity to testify and I believe I can save the committee some time if
my statement is placed in full in the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
272
Mr. CLARK. Then I will adlib from it. -
The CHAIRMAN. Put the entire statement in and you can emphasize
those points you wish to make. . -
Mr. CLARK. Thank you, sir.
APPROVAL OF ABM TREATY AND INTERIM. AGREEMENT RECOMMENDED
The Coalition believes both the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agree-
ment on Offensive Weapons should be approved by this committee
and we make this recommendation despite the belief that in many
ways both agreements are frauds on the American and Russian peo-
ple perpetrated by the military leaders of both countries.
ABM UNLIRELY TO WORK UNDER BATTLE CONDITIONS
The ABM Agreement is a fraud because the military leaders of
both countries know that the ABM will in all likelihood not work
under battle conditions. The billions the Russians have spent on their
ABM around Moscow have been wasted; so have the billions we have
spent in Montana and in North Dakota.
The basic inadequacy of the ABM was first called to the attention
of the American public in 1967 in a series of papers written by out-
standing scholars and scientists under the title “Debate to ABM’”
brought together by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. This was
followed by a volume which received even greater attention when pub-
lished in 1969, under the title, “ABM–an Evaluation of the Decision
to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System”, in which 17 knowledgeable
scientists, former Defense Department executives and public figures,
including Senator Edward Kennedy, who testified this morning, came
to the conclusion stated above: That is, the ABM would not work;
and more than that, it will not turn the arms race downward.
It is not too much to say that every prominent American scientist
not directly or indirectly in the pay of the Pentagon shares this view.
It is devoutly to be hoped that the Congress will not permit the
Defense Department to squander more billions in the building of a use-
less ABM ring around Washington. The fact of the matter is that the
ABM was obsolete before the first one was deployed.
INTERIM. AGREEMENT DOES NOT TURN ARMS RACE DOWNWARD
Similarly, the Interim Agreement respecting Strategic Offensive
Arms does not turn the arms race downward. In fact, if one is to
believe President Nixon and Secretary Laird, the Russians intend to
go full speed ahead with further massive research, development, test-
ing, and deployment of even more lethal nuclear weapons and delivery
systems. t
We are told that in the interests of national security we must follow
Suit, so under these agreements the arms race will accelerate, not cool
off.
SALT AGREEMENTS COULD USHER IN ERA OF GOOD FEELING
Why, then, you will naturally ask does the Coalition recommend
approval of these exceptionally ridiculous agreements?
273
The answer lies in our hope that the very real public relations
triumph which the President achieved in Moscow could conceivably
be turned into a solid start to a wide-ranging détente with the Soviet
Union; and on such a détente the peace of the world may well depend.
If we can only keep our Cold Warriors quiet in the Congress and the
Pentagon, the SALT agreements could usher in an era of good feeling
which could bring the arms race to an end within the foreseeable
future.
So the years of shadowboxing at SALT can be turned to good
advantage if this committee recommends the ratification of these two
agreements without exploring too deeply their essential unimportance
in and of themselves.
IMPACT OF RATIFICATION OF AGREEMENTS ON FY 1973 DOD BUDGET
Two main questions remain : First, what impact should ratification
of the agreements have on the 1973 fiscal year Department of Defense
budget; and, second, where should the United States go from here in
terms of further arms control and disarmament negotiations, not only
with the Russians but also with all other nations having significant
armed forces.
The answer to the first question, in our opinion, is easy: Under no
circumstances should Mr. Laird be permitted to use his requested
increases in the budget for new or improved nuclear weapon systems
or warheads as a “bargaining chip” in the congressional debate on
ratification of the SALT agreements. There is no legitimate excuse
for increased expenditures on nuclear weaponry; in fact, our strategic
nuclear arsenal should be cut, not expanded. -
In the debate on this treaty, one sees very little reference to the over-
kill that each side has. There is no reason to increase it. It would be
folly to do so. &
President Nixon says that Chairman Brezhnev told him the Rus-
sians are going full speed ahead with further nuclear research, dé-
velopment, testing, and deployment within the limits set by the treaty.
If this should turn out to be true, the answer should be, “Well, let
him.” If the Russians want to waste billions on this kind of folly,
that is their business. It is no reason for our following suit. As long as
we have at least 800 nuclear warheads on our invulnerable sub-
marines, we have no occasion to provide more. At present we have
5,700 warheads overall compared to their 2,500; that is many times
more than enough. If a nuclear strike were required, the 800 warheads
could destroy civilization in the Soviet Union many times over.
I call to the attention of the committee the June 30 issue of the
Defense Monitor published by the Center for Defense Information
of which Rear Adm. Gene La Rocque is the director. I would like
your permission to place it in the record. Parenthetically, the Center
for Defense Information clings wisely to its tax exemption as a re-
Search and educational group and, therefore, they can’t lobby by ap-
pearing before you. However, we are pleased to call your attention to
the excellent work being done by Admiral La Rocque and his staff of
defense experts.
(The information referred to follows:)
274
Volume One Number Three
June 30, 1972
SALT AND AFTERWARD
The SALT accords, signed May 26th in Moscow and now
before the US Congress for approval, were written in the
face of a rapidly moving nuclear arms race.
At the time of the signing the United States was installing
multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRV) on its
land and sea-based missiles. It was going forward with a
SALT ATA GLANCE
. ICBM LAUNCHERS
US USSR
Deployed 1550
Deployed 1054 Recent construction rate 250 per year
Recent construction rate None Possible 1977 projection 2000
Planned for 1977 without SALT 1054 without SALT
SALT ceiling 1000-1054* SALT ceiling 1408–1618”
SLBM LAUNCH TUBES
Present 580
Present 656 Recent construction rate 128 per year
Recent construction rate None Possible 1977 projection 1200
Planned for 1977 without SALT 656 without SALT
SALT ceiling 710°- SALT ceiling 950**
BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES
Deployed and 53 (approx.)
Deployed and 41 under construction
under conversion Recent construction rate 7-9 per year
Recent construction rate None Possible 1977 projection 80-100 . .
Planned for 1977 without SALT 41 without SALT - . . .
SALT ceiling 44** * -sm-m-T SALT ceiling 62** * smººt wºmes-
ABMs
SALT ceiling 2 sites SALT ceiling 2 sites
(100 missiles . (100 missiles
each) 2. each) 2.
NOT COVERED BY SALT AGREEMENTS
(CDI Estimates)
STRATEGIC BOMBERS
Present strategically targeted 321 >r Present strategically targeted 140
- * §: WARHEADs T...ſº $º 3
Present 5746 * &g Present 2491 -- *|S. S. |
Probable under SALT 10,557 M f Probable under SALT 3869 |
by 1977 -**! 2 by 1977 * & "
*Depending on whether old ICBMs are dismantled and replaced by SLBMs.
** To reach these levels US would have to dismantle 54 old Titan ICBMs; USSR would have to dismantle 210
Old SS 7 and SS 8 ICBMs.


275
^
program to greatly expand the destructive power of its
strategic bombers by equipping them with short range
attack missiles (SRAM). Together these steps would in-
crease the US strategic nuclear warhead and bomb total
from about 5700 in 1972 to more than 10,000 in 1976. On
top of this the United States was developing a new strategic
submarine called Trident, with new missiles to go with it,
and a new strategic bomber, the B-1.
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was building new intercon-
tinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers at a rate of 250
per year. These included silos for the huge SS9 missile,
capable of carrying 25 megatons (a US Minuteman II
carries about 1 to 2 megatons). The Soviets had dug 25 silos
possibly for a new missile even larger than the SS9. They
were building new nuclear-powered strategic ballistic mis-
sile submarines at a rate of 7 to 9 per year, and could at this
rate have twice as many such submarines as the United
States in five years. The Russians were, however, years
behind in MIRV. They were working on MIRV technology
but had yet to test what US technicians considered to be a
MIRV system.
Thus, the two superpowers were running their nuclear
race in different ways. The United States was concentrating
on MIRV, while holding its missile totals constant and
reducing megatons. The Soviet Union was increasing
numbers of missile launchers and deploying larger vehicles
to carry fewer warheads but with greater megatonnage.
Both sides were developing anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
systems.
For the question “Who’s ahead?” there were as many
answers as there were ways to measure the strategic arms
balance.
In numbers of ICBM launchers, the Soviet Union had
come from behind and passed the United States.
In numbers of submarine missile launch tubes the
Soviets were catching up, and would in a few years pass the
United States.
In numbers of heavy bombers the United States had a 3
to 1 lead. .
In numbers of separately targetable nuclear weapons,
the United States had a 2 to 1 lead, and because of this
country's head start in MIRV, this lead was rapidly
widening in favor of the United States.
In total megatons the Soviets had about a 2 or 3 to 1 lead.
When all these measures were considered together the
Soviet Union clearly had come from a position of nuclear
inferiority at the time of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis to a
position which many weapons experts saw as parity, and
which some viewed with alarm as indicating future Soviet
superiority unless the United States speeded up its weapons
programs.
THE ACCORDS
The SALT accords consist of a treaty limiting ABMs, a
five-year Interim Agreement which puts certain partial
limits on offensive weapons development pending further
arms talks, a protocol to this Interim Agreement, and a
number of statements of “interpretation” some agreed and . .
some unilateral. Based on all these documents, the followingº
is a summary of the main provisions of the accords:
ABM Treaty
Each country agrees not to build an ABM system for
defense of its entire territory or major region. This amounts
to a pledge that neither will try to upset the present deterrent
balance by deploying ABMs to protect its general popula-
tion and industry.
Each will limit ABM systems to two sites—one in defense
of its national capital, the other in defense of an ICBM field.
These must be at least 1300 kilometers (800 miles) apart,
which means the Soviet ICBM field to be protected must be
east of the Ural Mountains, away from the major western
USSR population centers.
No more than 100 ABM launchers and 100 intercepter
missiles may be deployed at each site.
Restrictions are set on numbers, types and placement of
ABM radars to foreclose a radar capability for nationwide
defense of either country.
In addition to these basic provisions, the two countries
agree to ban sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile
land-based ABMs; not to deploy ABM systems of new
kinds without prior discussion; not to convert air-defense or
other systems to an ABM role; not to build radars for early
warning of strategic ballistic missiles except along the edges
of the country facing out; not to transfer ABM systems to
other states or deploy them overseas.
There is no on-site inspection. Each side will use its own
technical means of verification and each pledges not to
interfere with these means or resort to deliberate conceal-
ment.
A Standing Consultative Commission will be established
to implement the treaty and consider questions involving it.
The ABM treaty is of unlimited duration but either side
can withdraw for supreme interest.
The treaty would require the United States to cut back its
12-site ABM program (of which four sites have been
approved by Congress) to a maximum of 2. The Ad-
ministration plans to complete the ABM site on which
construction is farthest ahead—at the ICBM field at Grand
Forks, N.D. It will halt work on three other sites at ICBM
fields and has asked Congress to approve an ABM site at
Washington, D.C. The treaty permits Russia to continue its
ABM site already under construction at Moscow and to
start a second site at an ICBM field.
: Interim Agreement and Protocol
These deal with offensive nuclear weapons. In general
they limit the numbers of ICBMs, ballistic missile sub-
276
marines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
to levels which each side agrees are presently deployed or
under construction. These limitations are for five years,
pending further SALT talks. With agreed “interpretations”
the limitations are as follows:
No additional fixed, land-based ICBM launchers may be
started during the freeze above the numbers deployed and
“under active construction” at the time of signing–1054 for
the United States, and about 1618 for the Soviet Union.
Launchers for so-called “light” ICBMs (the US
Minuteman and Soviet SS11 and 13) and “older” ICBMs
(the US Titan and Soviet SS7 and 8) may not be replaced by
“modern heavy ICBMs” (the Soviet SS9). The SS9 class
missiles may, however, be made heavier, Russia has 288
SS9s now and 25 apparently larger silos dug. It could
therefore end up with 313 “modern heavy” ICBMs of SS9
size or larger. The United States has no “modern heavy”
ICBMs and plans none. .
Within these restrictions, ICBMs may be replaced with
more modern ones—for example with MIRV. But in the
process of modernization, launchers may not be increased in
size more than 10-15%. -
The number of launchers for submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs) each side presently has deployed or under
construction was stipulated to be 656 US and 740 USSR.
These numbers can be increased subject to two provisions:
Additional SLBM launchers may become
operational only as replacements for an equal
number of “older” ICBM launchers (first
deployed prior to 1964) or for launchers on
older nuclear-powered submarines or for
modern SLBM launchers on any type of
submarines.
During the five year freeze the US is limited
to 44 modern ballistic missile submarines and
710 SLBM launchers. The Soviet Union is
limited to 62 modern ballistic missile sub-
marines and 950 SLBM launchers.
As in the case of ICBMs, submarine missile systems can
be modernized. Single-warhead missiles can be replaced by
MIRVed missiles. New submarines can be substituted for
old.
Destruction or dismantling of old ICBMs or submarine
a missiles must begin by the start of sea trials of a replace-
ment ballistic missile submarine.
Each side agrees not to significantly increase its number
of test and training launchers for ICBMs or SLBMs.
There were several unresolved points of disagreement in
the accords:
- The Soviet Union stated unilaterally that if
US allies in NATO should increase their
numbers of ballistic missile submarines
beyond those presently in operation or under
construction the Soviet Union would have the
right to make a corresponding increase in its
number of submarines.
The United States was unable to get agree-
ment on a common definition of “heavy”
ICBMs. The US considers it to be any missile
bigger than the largest existing “light” ICBM
which is the Soviet SS11.
The United States was unable to get agree-
ment to include mobile ICBMs in the freeze.
(Mobile ABMs are banned.) The United
States declared unilaterally that deployment
of mobile ICBMs during the freeze would be
considered “inconsistent with the objectives”
of the agreement.
WHAT THE ACCORDS MEAN
From an Arms Control View
The SALT accords can be examined from several view-
points. One of these is the viewpoint of international arms
control—that is, in terms of what effect the accords will
have on the arms race.
Among the achievements in this regard: -
The SALT accords represent the first—even though
partial—limitations by the United States and Soviet Union
dealing with the fundamentals of their arms race. Previous-
ly, the two countries had agreed to bar nuclear weapons
from the Antarctic, from outer space, and from the sea bed.
They had agreed not to test them in the atmosphere,
underwater or in space and not to give them to other
countries. But never had the two superpowers reached
agreement on the nuclear weapons targeted at each other.
The ABM treaty bans the kind of ABM system which
could be most de-stabilizing—a nation-wide or major
regional defense of population and industry. Such a system,
undertaken by either country, could threaten the other's
deterrent and cause it to respond with additional offensive
buildup. The complex restrictions on ABM sites should
convince each side the other is not developing an ABM for
defense of large areas. The treaty rules out a US ABM for
population defense against China, which this country once
planned but later abandoned. +
Freezing ICBMs, SLBMs, and ballistic missile sub-
marines at levels deployed and under construction is a first
step in limiting offensive nuclear weapons, a step on which
future SALT talks can build. Broadly speaking, the accords
accommodate themselves to the different kinds of offensive
weapons buildup which each side now has un-
derway—Soviet construction of more and bigger missiles
and US MIRV. They allow each side to substantially
complete the round it now has in progress. The new levels
become the starting point for attempting to freeze the arms
TaCC.
Among the debits from an arms control viewpoint:
Except for ABMs the accords do not stop any of the
major weapons programs now in progress. This is because
numerical limits are set high, qualitative improvements are
277
allowed, and many weapons systems—including bombers,
air-defense, anti-submarine warfare, air-breathing strategic
missiles and tactical nuclear weapons—are not covered.
Under SALT the United States can continue conversion of
Minuteman and Polaris to MIRV, development of Trident
submarines with new missiles, the B-1 bomber, research on
“site defense” for ICBMs, submarine launched cruise (air
breathing) missiles and new submarines in which to carry
them. The Soviet Union can continue, up to a point,
building additional land and sea-based missile launchers,
and could develop and deploy MIRV.
Because all these programs are allowed, and because
numerical limits are set so high, military planners on each
side will still point to future possibilities rather than exist-
ing or likely forces to justify their own building programs.
From a US Security View
The accords can also be looked at from a much narrower
view of US military security:
Advantages:
Since only the Soviet Union is presently building up its
numbers of offensive weapons launchers, it is to the
advantage of the United States to put ceilings on these
numbers. Within the totals the number of “heavy” ICBMs
Russia can have is limited to 313. Without SALT, the
Soviet Union could, at present rates of construction, exceed
the freeze ceiling. Instead of 62 modern ballistic missile
submarines it could have 80 or 90. The US has had no plans
to add to its numbers of ICBMs or build “heavy” ones. It
could, under the freeze, build 13 Trident submarines.
Defense Secretary Laird has said only ten are planned.
Actually the first Tridents would not become operational
until after the 5-year freeze, and are therefore more related
to future rounds of SALT than the first.
Freezing the number of ICBM launchers, especially
“heavy” ones will leave only one route for the Soviet Union
to develop increased “counterforce” capability to knock out
US ICBMs—qualitative improvements such as increased
accuracy, MIRVing, and throw weight.
The ABM limit plus the limits on ICBM numbers lessen
the chance that the Soviet Union could develop the capabili-
ty for a successful “first strike”—that is, the ability to
knock out enough US missiles to suffer no or substantially
less damage in return.
Criticisms:
A number of criticisms have been made against the treaty
on US security grounds:
The accords allow the Soviet Union to have
more ICBM launchers, SLBMs and ballistic
missile submarines than the United States.
Only the Soviet Union can have “modern
heavy” ICBMs, with capacity to carry more
megatons or more MIRVs than US missiles.
The Soviet Union will retain advantage in
total megatonnage and throw weight.
Though ICBM numbers are frozen at levels
deployed and under active construction, the
Russians did not specify exactly how many
they have under construction. The United
States considers the freeze level to be 1618 for
the Soviet Union.
In reply to these criticisms, Administration officials have
said that without the SALT ceilings, assuming recent Soviet
construction rates were to continue, the Russians could
have, in 1977, more than 2000 ICBMs instead of the 1618
permitted; 1200 SLBMs instead of the 950 permitted and 80
to 100 modern ballistic missile submarines instead of the 62
permitted. As to Russia's refusal to specify its ICBM total,
US officials said that if the Russians were to significantly
add to the number 1618, the United States would quickly
know about it and would have the right to withdraw from
the treaty.
An important factor in the security controversy is MIRV.
If the Soviet Union does not develop MIRV, it will still have
little more than 2500 warheads five years from now when
the United States will, under presently planned programs,
have more than 10,000.
If the Soviets do develop MIRV, two key questions will
be: How fast? And how much?
The Soviet Union appears to be years behind this country
in MIRV. The United States began MIRV tests in August,
1968. The first squadron of Minuteman III missiles became
operational Jan. 8, 1971; the first wing of 150, on Dec. 13,
1971. The Soviet Union has also been working on multiple
warhead technology since about August, 1968, but accor-
ding to U.S. officials it has yet to test a MIRV system as the
United States knows the term. The Russians tested a triple-
warhead system in which the warheads may or may not have
been independently targetable. (U.S. analysts differed on
this point.) But these tests stopped in late 1970, suggesting
that the Russians might have decided to start over on a new
tack.
Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird said June 5 that
Russia “could have a MIRV capability in 24 months.” But
he did not say how many they might have by then.
Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) has said that when the
Soviets achieve MIRV “...the combination of their vastly
superior payload and modern MIRV technology will give
them superiority in warheads.” There have been published
reports that Soviet missiles larger than SS9s could hold up
to 20 MIRVs each. (A US Minuteman holds up to 3; a
Poseidon, 10 to 14). But other defense analysts believe this
overstates what Russia could realistically achieve in MIRV
during the next five years.
Table V shows the Center for Defense Information's
calculation of what the Soviet Union probably could achieve
in MIRV during the five years of the Interim Agreement, if
it develops MIRV. At the end of five years it would have
278
)
some 3800 warheads compared to more than 10,000 for the
United States.
Assuming Russia could MIRV its missiles to the max-
imum figures indicated in public print, it could have more
than 14,000 warheads. It is doubtful Russia could achieve
this level in five years. The United States could also have
14,000 warheads by MIRVing all its Minutemen and
building the B-1 and Trident. This would be permitted by
the SALT Interim Agreement.
However, such calculations of marginal advantages for
the United States or Soviet Union—whether they be in
warheads, launchers or megatons—overlook one important
point: Both countries have the power to destroy each other
several times over, and this will remain the case during the
five years of the Interim Agreement.
Gerard Smith, director of the Arms Control and Disar-
mament Agency, when asked during hearings of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee June 19 whether Russia
would get ahead of the United States during the five year
agreement, replied: “Nothing the Soviets can do within the
five year agreement will offset the present strategic balance
between the US and USSR.”
COST
The immediate cost impact of the SALT accords on the
fiscal 1973 defense budget has been listed by the Defense
Department as follows:
Reducing ABM program $–711 million
to two sites
Increases in other
strategic programs:
Accelerate and complete + 60
development of Site Defense
Develop submarine-based + 20
cruise missile
Accelerate bomber rebasing + 45
Augment verification capabilities + 13
Develop improved reentry vehicles + 20
for ICBMs and SLBMs
Improved command, control and + 10
communications
Net change $–543 million
Secretary Laird has testified that the total ABM saving
through 1981 as a result of SALT would be $9.9 billion,
figured in 1968 prices. (The 1968 estimate for a 12-site
ABM was $18.4 billion, of which $13.4 billion remains to be
spent. The 1968 estimate for a two-site program was $8.5
billion, of which $3.5 billion remains to be spent. The SALT
saving is $13.4 billion minus $3.5 billion.)
Further savings could come from the first round of SALT
if the United States decided that, as a result of the recent
accords, it could safely stop or slow down some of its other
major nuclear weapons programs, such as Trident, the B-1,
or air defense. The Administration wants to go ahead with
these programs. The question of what this country's pace in
nuclear weapons building should be following the first round
of SALT has become a major issue.
POLICY FOLLOWING SALT
Secretary Laird told newsmen June 6: “I could not
support the (SALT) agreements if Congress fails to act on
the movement forward of the Trident system, on the B-1
bomber, and the other programs that we have outlined to
improve our strategic offensive systems during this five year
period.” Admiral Moorer said the Joint Chiefs were in
accord with the SALT agreements provided the other
programs went ahead: -
In a briefing for Senators and Congressmen June 15, Dr.
Henry Kissinger, assistant to the President for national
security, considerably moderated this stand. He said the
Administration wants Congressional approval of both
SALT and the new weapons programs but: “We are not
making them conditional. We are saying that the treaty is
justified on its merits, but we are also saying that the
requirements of national security impel us in the direction of
the strategic programs...”
Laird told the House Subcommittee on Defense Ap-
propriations June 5 that “Just as the Moscow agreements
were made possible by our successful action in such
programs as Safeguard, Poseidon and Minuteman III, these
future negotiations to which we are pledged can only
succeed if we are equally successful in implementing such
programs as the Trident system, the B-1 bomber, NCA
defense, Site Defense, SLCM, and accelerated satellite
basing of strategic bombers. We must also initiate certain
other measures in areas such as intelligence, verification,
and command, control, and communications.”
Transmitting the SALT agreements to Congress, Presi-
dent Nixon said: “Just as the maintenance of a strong
strategic posture was an essential element in the success of
these negotiations, it is now equally essential that we carry
forward a sound strategic modernization program to main-
tain our security and to ensure that more permanent and
comprehensive arms limitation agreements can be
reached.” -
The Administration's argument is that if the United
States had not been deploying MIRVs and going forward
with other programs it would have lacked the bargaining
power to obtain a ceiling on Soviet building of SS9s and
other systems.
Others have challenged this “bargaining chip” approach.
Sen. George McGovern told the Priorities Subcommittee of
279
the Joint Economic Committee June 16 that if the United
States had followed a policy of restraint in weapons
building, both American and Soviet MIRVs could have
been stopped. He said building weapons for bargaining
purposes “can only push up the terms of ultimate arms
control agreements.”
The Arms Control Association said: “The US should
review its unilateral weapons programs and pursue only
those that have a security need in light of the new strategic
situation.”
Thus, a fundamental issue has been raised—whether the
way to ultimately curb the nuclear arms race is to build
more weapons for “negotiating strength” or whether it is to
exercise more restraint in weapons building.
It is an issue which, no doubt, both the United States and
Russia face as they contemplate the next round of SALT in
October. -
Arms Control
The ABM treaty bans the kind of ABM systems which
would be most de-stabilizing and is therefore a significant
step in limiting the arms race.
The five-year agreement on offensive weapons allows the
United States and Soviet Union each to continue its present
round of nuclear buildup, and then establishes a partial,
quantitative freeze at the resulting new levels. This is a start
which can be followed up in future SALT negotiations.
US Security
The accords place ceilings on numbers of offensive
weapon launchers at a time when only the Soviet Union is
increasing these numbers. Without the accords, Soviet
construction could be greater. The offensive freeze plus the
ABM limitation lessen the chances of Russia ever becoming
able to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against this
country without being destroyed in return.
While Russia will continue to lead the United States in
numbers of launchers and total megatonnage under the
CONCLUSIONS
accords, the United States is expected to retain its lead in
numbers of warheads. These differences, however, are less
important than the fact that each country has the power to
destroy the other several times over.
Weapons Policy
The Administration should reconsider its present policy
which says that the way to limit nuclear weapons is to build
more of them. Both the United States and Russia appear to
have approached the recent round of SALT determined to
“negotiate through strength.” Each had nuclear buildups in
progress. But somehow these bargaining chips didn’t get
bargained. They are being built. The initial round of SALT
has made the US deterrent more secure. The United States
now does not need to build Trident submarines and B-1
bombers and submarine cruise missiles to convince the
Soviet Union that both countries have good reason to bring
their arms race under control and eventually reduce nuclear
arms. Each side already has more than sufficient nuclear
power to bargain toward this end.
280
1
2
3.
4.
5
6
7
8
TABLE I
Estimated Strategic Force Levels of the US At the Time of the SALT Agreement—May 1972
Missiles/Bombs Warheads per Deliverable
Launch per Missile/Bomb Missile/Bomb Warhead
Type Vehicle Number(X) Launch Vehicle (=) Total (X) (MRV/MIRV) (=) Total
ICBM
“Light” -
Minuteman | 320° 1 320 1 320
Minuteman || 500? 1 500 1 500
Minuteman || 180° 1 180 2.52 450
“Older-Heavy”
- Titan || 541 t 54 1 54
“Modern-Heavy”
None O O O
Sub-totals 1,054 1,054 1,324
SLBM Polaris (A-3) 211 16 336 2.52 840
Poseidon 101 16 160 123 1,920
Polaris under 101 16 160 123 1,920
Conversion to
Poseidon -
Sub-totals 411 - - 6561 2,760
(Not including those
Strategic under conversion.)
Bombers B-52G&H 2554 65 1,530 1 1,530
FB-111 666 2 132 } 1 132
Sub-totals 3217 1,662 1,662
TOTALS 1,416 - 3,372 5,746.”
DOD figures. May 22, 1972; Washington Post.
A total of three warheads per missile (MIRV) is possible. A multiple of 2.5 is used to take into account an
assumed percentage of less than 20% for decoys used in the overall system warhead loading.
This figure varies from 10 to 14. Twelve is used as an average.
255 is the Unit Equipped (UE) figure. The total number of B-52Gs and Hs is 282. The additional units are in
training and testing programs. -
This figure includes 2 Hound-Dog air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) and 4 nuclear gravity bombs.
66 is the UE figure. The total number of FB-111s is 72. The additional units are in training and testing
programs. - -
DOD gives 531 as a total for US long-range bombers. 321 represents only those UE bombers probably
strategically targeted. About 200 other B-52s are currently assigned to conventional bombing missions in
South East Asia (SEA).
DOD figures of May 27, 1972 give 5700 as the US warhead total.
281
TABLE ||
Estimated Composition of U.S. Strategic Forces by the Explmation of the SALT Agreement in 1977.
Table Shows Only Those Programs Approved by Congress and Does Not include the
Trident Submarine or the B-1 Bomber Programs.
Missiles/Bombs Warheads per Deliverable
Launch per Missile/Bomb Missile/Bomb Warhead
Type Vehicle Number(X) Launch Vehicle (=) Total (X) (MRV/MIRV) (=) Total
ICBM Minuteman || 450° 1 450 1 450
Minuteman III 550 1 550 2.5 1,375
Titan || 54% 1 54 1 54
Sub-total 1,054 1,054 1,879
SLBM Polaris (A-3) 10: 16 160 2.5 400
Poseidon 31 16 _496 12 5,952
Sub-total 41 656 6,352
Bombers B-52G&H 1633 6 978 f 978
(Hound-Dog
Missiles
and Bombs)
B-52G&H 924 20 1,840 .60% 1,104
(SRAM)
FB-111 66 6 369 .66% 244
Sub-total 321 3,187 2,326
TOTALS 1,416 4,897 10,5577
1
2
3.
4
5
DOD figures from Laird's Annual Defense Department Report for FY1973, page 67.
DOD figures from Admiral Moorer's US Military Posture for FY1973, page 10.
This figure represents those B-52Gs and Hs not currently scheduled for conversion to carry the Short Range
Attack Missile (SRAM). See Laird, op. cit., page 71.
Laird, op. cit., page 71.
This multiple assumes that out of the possible weapons load of 20 SRAMs per B-52, only about 12 (or 60%)
7
will be actual warheads while the remaining weapons will be decoys. See J. I. Coffey, “Strategic Power and
National Security,” University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971, page 13.
This multiple assumes that out of the possible weapons load of 6 SRAMs per FB-111, only about 4 (or 66%)
will be actual warheads while the remaining weapons will be decoys. See Coffey, Ibid., page 13.
Staff analysis by the members of the Brookings Institution projected this figure to about 11,000 in an article
which appeared in the Washington Post on June 11, 1972. A figure of 14,082 was used by the Center for
Defense Information in an earlier issue of the Defense Monitor entitled “ULMS: TOO MUCH TOO SOON.” The
present figure of 10,557 is a revised Center estimate adjusting for decoys and assuming only 92 bombers
equipped with SRAM instead of 255. -
282
TABLE III
Estimated U.S. Strateglc Force Levels Including
the Trident Submarine and the B-1 Bomber by Early to Mid 1980's
Missiles/Bombs Warheads per Deliverable
Launch per Missile/Bomb Missile/Bomb Warhead
Type Vehicle Number(X) Launch Vehicle (=) Total (X) (MRV/MIRV) (=) Total
ſCBM Minuteman || 1,000 1 1,000 2.5 2,500
Sub-total 1,000 1,000 2,500
SLBM Poseidon 31 16 496 12 5,952
Trident 132 163 208 12 2,496
New Strategic
Cruise Missile" 7 º 7
Sub-total 44 7045 8,448
Bombers FB-111 66 6 396 .66 261
(SRAM)
B-1 2416 247 5,784 .58% 3,355
(SRAM) *-*-*-w *E=- *-*
Sub-total 307 6,180 3,616
TOTALS 1,351 7,884 14,564
1
2
3
4.
5
6
7
This figure assumes the replacement of 54 Titan ll ICBMs by additional SLBMs, and converting the
Minuteman lls to Ills.
This figure is more than the ten Tridents discussed by Laird, but is the number needed to replace the ten
older Polaris submarines and add three additional ones to reach the allowed SALT total of 44. Keeping the 31
Poseidon SSBNs is assumed.
This figure is required in order to build the assumed thirteen Trident submarines and keep within the
maximum allowed number of SLBMs even though Laird has suggested that 24 would be the number of
missile launchers on the new Trident submarines.
The number of new strategic cruise missiles planned and new submarines required to launch them is
unknown.
A total of 710 is allowed by the SALT agreements.
Air Force Magazine, February 1972, page 64.
Air Force Magazine, February 1972, page 29.
This multiple assumes that out of the possible weapons load of 24 SRAMs per B-1, only about 14 (or 58%) will
be actual warheads while the remaining weapons will be decoys.
283
TABLE IV
Estimated Strateglc Force Levels of the Soviet Union at the Time of the SALT Agreement—May 1972
Type
ICBM
“Light”
“Older-Heavy”
“Modern-Heavy”
SLBM
Bombers
Launch
Vehicle
SS-13
SS-1 1
New ICBMs
(Silos under
construction)
SS-7 & 8
SS-9
New ICBMs
(Silos under
construction)
Sub-totals
Y-Class
YS and “Stretch"
Y-Class (under
construction)
H-Class
Sub-totals
TU-95 Bear
(Kangaroo ASM)
number
60°
97.02
663
2104
2885
THETET
255
184
104
538
669
349
Missiles/Bombs
per
(X) Launch Vehicle (=)
16
14(ave.)”
Missile and
Deliverable
Warhead Total
210
2886
1,528
400
252
30
6828
66
136
SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1971-72, page 5.
TU-95 Bear
(Bombs)
M-4 Bison
Sub-totals
TOTALS
4011
—149–
1,811
* Aviation Week and Space Technology, “The Growing Threat-2," October 11, 1971.
80
282
2,492”
• Washington Post, May 27, 1972. Only silo holes have been detected without missiles implaced. See Admiral
Moorer's Military Posture for FY 1973, page 6.
* Kissinger press conference in Moscow, May 26 and 27, 1972.
* DOD Figures, May 27, 1972; Washington Post.
* The actual total of SS-9 warheads is difficult to define. Four SS-9 missile modifications exist. A possible 3-
warhead MRV capability may have been tested and deployed for the SS-9 MOD 4. A MIRV capability has not
yet been demonstrated,
7 The new “Stretch" Y-Class has 12 missile launchers versus 16 for the Y Class and carries the longer-range
(3,400 nm) SS-N-8 SLBM. Since it is not publicly known how many of each type submarine is under
construction an average of 14 missiles per submarine is used in this chart. See Kissinger's Moscow press
conference, May 26 and 27, 1972.
* These figures do not include the 22 Soviet G-Class diesel-powered submarines or the 66 SLBMs carried by
them. The SALT agreements only mention “modern" submarines which means "nuclear-powered." The 66
G-Class SLBMs are the same as those carried by the nuclear-powered H-Class, but were considered similar
in nature to US forward deployed forces in Europe and the Mediterranean Sea. See Kissinger's Moscow
press conference, May 26 and 27, 1972.
* This number is taken from "The Military Balance 1970-71,” IISS, page 9, which estimates that about two-
thirds of the 100 TU-95 Bears carry a single Kangaroo air-to-surface missile (ASM). The remaining one-third
carry gravity bombs.
10 This is an estimated bomb load and is based on the Bear and Bison lift capacity as related to the US B-52.
” “The Military Balance 1971-72." About 90 M-4 Bisons exist of which 50 serve as tankers.
” DOD figures of May 27, 1972 give 2,500 as the Soviet warhead total.
80–942 O—72—19
284
TABLE V
Estimated Composition of Soviet Strategic Forces by the Explmation of the SALT Agreement in 1977.
Table Assumes Only a Limited MIRV Capability by That Time.
Missiles/Bombs Warheads per Deliverable
Launch per Missile/Bomb Missile/Bomb Warhead
Type Vehicle Number(X) Launch Vehicle (=) Total (X) (MRV/MIRV) (=) Total
ICBM SS-13 60 1 60 1 60
SS-1 1 970 1 970 1 970
New ICBMs 66 1 66 1 66
SS-9 and larger 313' 1 313 32 939
Mobile ICBMS3 7 2 Q
Sub-total 1,408° 1,408 2,035
SLBM Y-Class 345 16 544 1 544
“Stretch" Y-Class —*— 12 336 37 1,008
Sub-total 62 880° 1,552
Bombers TU-95 Bear 66 1 66 f 66
(Kangaroo ASM) º
TU-95 Bear 34 4 136 f 136
(Bombs)
M-4 Bison 40 2 80 1 80
Backfire? º Q 7
(under development)
Sub-total 140 282 282
TOTALS 1,610 2,570 3,86910
* This figure includes the current 25 “Modern-Heavy” ICBM silos under construction.
* This assumes at least a three-warhead (MRV/MIRV) capability deployed in all missiles.
* Mobile ICBMs are not covered by the present SALT agreements.
* This assumes that the “Older-Heavy" SS-7s and 8s will be replaced by additional SLBMs as provided for by
the SALT agreements. .
* This figure is obtained by assuming half (or 9) of the 18 missile submarines presently under construction are
Y-Class, and this is added to the 25 presently operational. -
* This figure is obtained by assuming that all the remaining allowed submarines, including the replacement of
the 10 H-Class submarines, will be of the newer “Stretch" Y-class presently under construction.
7 it is not publicly known if the new SS-N-8 SLBM has a multiple warhead capability. It is assumed here that it is
a logical possibility that they will develop a MRV/MIRV capability on this weapon if they have not already
done SO.
* This SLBM total could be increased by 66 more missiles if the Soviets convert those older missiles on the 22
diesel-powered G-class submarines to the newer and longer range SS-N-6 or SS-N-8 SLBM.
* This new bomber is under development but it is not known whether it is designed for use against the United
States homeland or for use in Europe and Asia.
" Accurate longer-range projections of Soviet warhead development are very difficult if not impossible to
achieve. Some analysts have assumed a Soviet MIRV capability greater than projected here. By allowing 20
warheads on each missile for the SS-9 force, 12 warheads on each missile of the new “Stretch" Y-class for
the SS-N-8 SLBM, and 3 warheads each for the other ICBMs and SLBMs, one can project a Soviet warhead
total of over 14,000 by some unknown future date.
285
Mr. CLARK. The New York Times expressed the points Imake in this
statement very well in an editorial last Sunday, June 25, entitled “Mr.
Laird's Nonsense.” I quote from that editorial in my testimony and
I will not read it again.
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE 2
But the second question is where do wo go from here?
The statements from Moscow in both the Declaration of Principles
and the Joint Communique relating to disarmament have been largely
ignored by a cynical press, which has not taken the subject seriously
since the assassination of President Kennedy. In fact, as far as I know,
the word “disarmament” has never passed the lips of either President
Johnson or President Nixon.
Article 6 of the Moscow declaration reads:
The USA and the USSR regard as the ultimate objective Of their efforts
the achievement of general and complete disarmament and the establishment
of an effective system of international Security in accordance With the purposes
and principles of the United Nations.
Or, as the communique stated under the heading, “Disarmament
Issues”:
The ultimate purpose is general and complete disarmament, including nu-
clear disarmament under strict international control. A world disarmament con-
ference could play a role in this process at an appropriate time.
I haven’t seen that mentioned anywhere in the press. I suspect, but
I do not know, that that was inserted at the insistence of the Russians,
possibly over the timid objection of some of our negotiators, but I
don’t think it should be ignored. I would hope that this committee in
its future deliberations will not ignore it.
The United States was committed to this principle by Secretary of
State Herter, a Republican, in 1960. President Kennedy, in coopera-
tion with then Chairman Khrushchev, caused separate treaties on GCD
to be prepared, filed and debated at the then 18 nation Disarmament
Conference in Geneva, where they still lie on the table gathering dust.
The Russians have been advocating GCD ever since the days of
Czar Nicholas at the turn of the century; but the goal has not been
mentioned by any American President since the assassination of Pres-
ident Kennedy in November 1963.
Since that date the Russians have freqeuntly advocated reviving the
Scheme either bilaterally or at a conference of the nuclear powers. In
November 1970 the People's Republic of China suggested the very
world disarmament conference now accepted in the joint communique.
IMPLEMENTING BILATERAL COMMITMENT TO GENERAL AND
COMPLETE DISARMAMENT
Let us now move from the splendid rhetoric issued from Moscow
to see what concrete steps can soon be taken to implement the bilateral
commitment to general and complete disarmament.
Assuming such disarmament is not just around the corner, there are
arms control measures which might turn the arms race downward.
One of them is a comprehensive test ban which by prohibiting all
286
nuclear weapons would crimp the plans of the research and develop-
ment boys in both the Pentagon and in the Kremlin. Mr. Chairman, I
point out that there are presently pending before this committee two
Senate resolutions S. Res. 230 and S. Res. 273 on which you held one
day of hearings. These resolutions indicate that the Senate believes
a comprehensive test ban without on-site inspection should be negoti-
ated. Senator Kennedy's resolution calls for a moratorium pending
the negotiations. I would hope the committee would find time to con-
sider and report out a resolution on this subject before you adjourn.
Another possibility would be to destroy all nuclear weapons and
build no more; and I call to your attention Principle No. 26 in the
Stockholm Conference on the Environment which calls for the elimi-
nation and destruction of all nuclear weapons.
This statement represented world opinion on a very wide Scale, and
I hope this committee will take it into consideration.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SALT II
Then, at SALT II, which we hope will come soon—the only reason
why we are supporting the SALT Accords is because we think they
may lead to SALT II—we recommend elimination of all nuclear
weapons and, until this can be agreed on, the destruction of all exist-
ing nuclear weapons over and above those necessary to create a credible
deterrent, say, 800 warheads on each side.
The second point, at SALT II, only civilians should be named as
members of the two delegations. They should be accompanied, of
course, by qualified military and naval advisers but without the power
to vote, only the power to advise. The military has a vested interest
opposed to arms control and even more so to disarmament. Consider
that, if a comprehensive test armament agreement could be negotiated,
we could tear down the Pentagon, and the admirals and the generals
would have to look elsewhere for useful employment. They have a
vested interest opposed to serious arms control and disarmament nego-
tiations, and, therefore, they should have no part as voting members
of the SALT II delegation.
Our third suggestion is that prompt steps should be taken at the
Geneva Disarmament Conference and at the talks between NATO and
the Warsaw Pact nations regarding mutual balanced force reduc-
tions this summer and fall to reduce drastically all conventional weap-
ons and manpower in Europe.
ACDA URGED TO START STUDY ON 19 62–63 PROPOSED TFEATIES
I would hope that this committee would call upon the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency to bring up to date the two proposed
treaties on general and complete disarmament filed by the United
States and the Soviet Union in 1962–63 with a view to promptly
starting negotiations looking to the achievement of that “ultimate
goal of general and complete disarmament under strict international
control and the establishment of an effective system of international
security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United
Nations” which the Declaration of Priniciples and the Joint Com-
munique issued in Moscow promised the people of the world.
287
We have urged the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to
start such a study. They wouldn’t do it. They don’t even want to discuss
the subject. We in the Coalition have arranged for private funding for
such a study which is going forward now. The financial support is
being provided by the Arms Control Association and the Carnegie
Endowment for Peace. We hope to have a good report on the options
confronting the United States and what can be done with those
treaties by the next President of the United States. I would hope that
this committee, which used to have a subcommittee on disarmament
chaired by Senator Humphrey, would take the initiative in urging
the ACDA, which, of course, has far more capability for funding
this kind of a study than do we in the private sector, to get after it.
SUGGESTED OBJECTIVES FOR SALT II
Now, Mr. Chairman, after this testimony was filed with you we came
to the conclusion there were two or three other items we should suggest
to you as objectives for SALT II. They are: (1) limit flight-testing of
missiles and warheads; (2) limit antisubmarine warfare measures to
preserve the invulnerability of sea-based strategic missiles; and (3)
conclude agreements to limit chemical weapons, particularly herbicides
and riot agents. The chairman will remember that his efforts in
connection with the Geneva Protocol of 1925 were unsuccessful in
terms of getting cooperation from the Administration which has in-
sisted on excluding tear gas and herbicides. I hope the committee
will not give up on that issue and will in due course bring that Geneva
Protocol before the Senate for ratification. Maybe you can’t do it
until next year after the new elections. At least we can be the leaders
and not the laggards in getting rid of these dreadful and lethal
methods of warfare.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your consideration.
(Mr. Clark's prepared statement follows:)
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH. S. CLARK, CHAIRMAN OF THE COALITION ON
NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND MILITARY POLICY
The Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy consists of 39 busi-
ness, labor, religious, educational, scientific and peace oriented activist civic
groups which have joined together to reverse the militarization of America’s
policies and resources, to support arms control and disarmament agreements
and to redirect resources to meet human needs at home and abroad.
We have organized a Task Force on Arms Control and Disarmament.
The Coalition believes both the ABM treaty and the interim agreement On Of-
fensive weapons should be approved by this committee and we make this rec-
ommendation despite the belief that in many ways both agreements are frauds
on the American and Russian people perpetrated by the military leaders of both
COuntries.
The ABM agreement is a fraud because the military leaders of both countries
Know that the ABM will in all likelihood not work under battle COnditions. The
billions the Russians have Spent on their ABM around MOSCOW have been wasted.
So have the billions we have Spent in Montana and North Dakota.
The basic inadequacy of the ABM was first called to the attention Of the Ameri-
can public in 1967 in a series of papers written by Outstanding scholars and
scientists under the title Debate to ABM brought together by the Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists. This was followed by a volume which received even
greater attention when published in 1969 under the title ABM-an Evaluation
of the Decision to Deploy an Anti-Ballistic Missile System in which seventeen
knowledgeable Scientists, former defense department executives and public
288
figures including Senator Edward Kennedy came to the conclusion stated above;
i.e. the ABM won’t work. And more than that it will not turn the arms race
Člown Ward.
It is not too much to Say that every prominent American Scientist not directly
or indirectly in the pay of the Pentagon shares this view.
It is devoutly to be hoped that the Congress will not permit the Defense De-
partment to Squander more billions in the building Of a useless ABM ring around
Washington. The fact of the matter is that the ABM was obsolete before the
first One was deployed.
Similarly the interim agreement respecting offensive nuclear armaments does
not turn the arms race dOWnward. In fact if One is to believe President Nixon
and Secretary Laird the Russians intend to go full speed ahead with further mas-
Sive research, development testing and deployment of even more lethal nuclear
Weapons and delivery Systems.
We are told that in the interests of national security we must follow suit. So the
arms race will accelerate not cool off as a result of the SALT agreements.
Why, then, you will naturally ask does the Coalition recommend approval Of
these essentially ridiculous agreements.
The answer lies in Our hope that the very real public relations triumph which
the President achieved in MOSCOW COuld conceivably be turned into a Solid Start
to a wide ranging detente with the Soviet Union. And On Such a detente the peace
of the world may well depend. If we can only keep our “cold warriors” quiet in
Congress and the Pentagon the SALT agreements could usher in an “era of good
feeling” which could bring the arms race to an end within the foreseeable future.
So the years of shadow-boxing at SALT can be turned to good advantage if this
committee recommends the ratification of these agreements without exploring
too deeply their essential unimportance in and of themselves.
Two main questions remain. First, what impact should ratification of the agree-
ments have on the 1973 fiscal year Department of Defense Budget; and second,
where should the United States go from here in terms of further arms control
and disarmament negotiations not Only with the Russians but with all other
nations having significant armed forces.
The answer to the first question is easy. Under no circumstances should Mr.
Laird be permitted to use his requested increases in the budget for new Or im-
proved nuclear weapons Systems Or war heads as a “bargaining chip” in the Con-
gressional debate on ratification of the SALT agreements. There is no legitimate
excuse for increased expenditures on nuclear weaponry. In fact Our strategic nu-
clear arsenal should be cut not expanded.
Both sides have presently so much Overkill that for either side to increase it is
folly. President Nixon says Chairman Breshnev told him the Russians are going
full speed ahead with further nuclear research, development, testing and deploy-
ment within the limits set by the treaty. If this should turn out to be true the
answer should be, “Well, let him.” If the Russians want to waste billions on this
kind Of folly that’s their business. It is no reason for Our following Suit. As long
as we have at least 800 nuclear war-heads on our invulnerable submarines we
have no occasion to provide more. At present we have 5700 war-heads Over all
compared to their 2500. That is many times more than enough. If a nuclear strike
were required, the 800 war-heads could destroy civilization in the Soviet Union
many times Over.
The New York Times put it well in its editorial Of last Sunday, June 25th en-
titled : “Mr. Laird's Nonsense”:
“The issue, however, is not whether the United States should have an Ongoing
program but what kind and at what pace. Ultimately, the Polaris-Poseidon will
have to be replaced, but replacement does not have to begin in 1978. It is much
too early to freeze on the Trident design and start on advance procurement as
this year's crash-program budget proposes. Research and development work on a
replacement could well continue with deployment planned for the late nineteen-
eighties. -
“A replacement for the B-52 strategic bomber may be needed sooner. But there
is plenty of time to study a better solution than the B–1, which will Only be
marginally better at penetrating Soviet airspace and will cost vastly more.
Many experts believe a low-cost stand-off bomber carrying large numbers of
air-ground missiles could provide a greater capability at a fraction of the
I’ICé.
D “Soviet development and deployment of MIRV multiple warheads in large
numbers, which is unlikely before 1980, will not endanger the American bomber
289
Or missile Submarine forces even if it ultimately does threaten much of the
Minuteman force. Panic action, therefore, is uncalled for.
“President Nixon argues that accelerated development of Trident and B–1
Would provide a ‘bargaining chip' for SALT II of such importance that, without
it, a Comprehensive limitation of offensive weapons could not be negotiated. The
United States already has more than twice as many separately targetable war-
heads as the Soviet Union. With Soviet antimissile deployment now to be limited,
that is far more than enough. American restraint-now might make it possible for
the SALT II negotiations to achieve ceiling at much lower levels than if the
armS race is pressed ahead.”
The Second question is where do we go from here? The Statements from MOSCOW
in both the Declaration of Principles and the Joint Communique relating to Dis-
armament have been largely ignored by a Cynical press, which has not taken
the subject seriously since the assassination of President Kennedy. Article Six
of the Declaration reads:
“The USA and the USSR regard as the ultimate objective of their efforts and
the achievement of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of
an effective System of international security in accordance with the purpose and
principles of the United Nations.” -
Or as the Communique stated under the heading “Disarmament Issues”:
“The ultimate purpose is general and complete disarmament, including nuclear
disarmament under strict international control. A world disarmament confer-
ence play a role in this process at an appropriate time.”
The United States was committed to the principle of general and COmplete
disarmament by Secretary of State Christian Herter in 1960. President Kennedy
in cooperation with then Chairman Khrushchev caused separate treaties Of GCD
to be prepared, filed and debated at the then 18 Nation Disarmament Conference
in Geneva. The Russians have been advocating GCD ever Since the days Of Czar
Nicholas at the turn of the century. But the goal has not been mentioned by any
American President since the assassination of President Kennedy in November
Of 1963.
Since that date the Russians have frequently advocated reviving the Scheme
either bilateraly or at a conference of the nuclear powers. In November of 1970
the People's Republic of China suggested the very world disarmament conference
now accepted in the Joint Communique
Let us now move from the splendid rhetoric issued from Moscow to see what
concrete Steps can SOOn be taken to implement the bilateral Commitment to GCD.
Assuming that GCD is not just around the corner, there are arms control
measures which might turn the arms race downward. One of them is a compre-
hensive test ban which by prohibiting all nuclear weapons would put a crimp
in the plans of the Research and Development boys. Another would be to destroy
all nuclear weapons and build no more. A third would be a drastic cut in military
manpower and various kinds Of conventional military, naval and air hardware.
But these matters appear not to have been seriously discussed either at MOSCOW
or SALT or at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. They should be raised at
SALT II. We recommend :
1. Prompt resumption of the SALT talks with the purpose of eliminating all
nuclear weapons and, until this can be agreed On, the destruction of all existing
nuclear weapons Over and above those necessary to create a Credible deterrent—
Say 800 On each Side.
2. Naming of civilians only to the two delegations, accompanied Of course by
qualified military and naval advisors. The military has a Wested interest Opposed
to arms control and even more so to disarmament. For a comprehensive dis-
armament agreement would enable us to tear down the Pentagon and force the
Generals and Admirals to seek other employment.
3. Prompt steps at the Geneva Disarmament Conference and at the talks
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Nations On Mutually Balanced Force
Reductions this summer and fall to drastically reduce all conventional weapons
and manpower.
4. The bringing up to date of the two treaties of General and Complete Dis-
armament filed by the USA and the USSR at Geneva in 1962–63 with a view to
promptly starting negotiations looking to “the achievement Of that ultimate
goal of General and Complete Disarmament under strict international control
and the establishment of an effective System of international Security in accord-
ance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations which the Declara-
tion of Principles and the Joint Communique promised the peoples of the World.
290
This committee can render an important public Service by dealing with these
matters in its report to the Senate on ratification of the SALT agreements.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Clark. º
They have just called a vote. Of course, all day we are going to be
confronted with having to recess for votes.
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
I am very glad that you called attention to the statement of prin-
ciples. It is true that, in the Moscow declaration, it is true they are
often overlooked; however, they were discussed rather fully at the
meeting at the White House. They have not been overlooked altogether,
but they are not as fascinating to the press as the military.
Mr. CLARK. I would suggest there was not too much zeal in support
of that declaration in the present executive branch. Again, I am
guessing. .
The CHAIRMAN. Of course, I don’t know. I am very pleased they
accepted them in any case.
PROCEDURAL ANNOUNCEMENT
For the information of some of the other witnesses, I am obviously
going to have to recess for a few minutes, but Senator Sparkman, who
preceded me, will come back and we will proceed as rapidly as we
can with the rest of the witnesses. It is very probable we cannot finish
all of them; and we will have to adjourn through lunch and come back
later this afternoon in order to complete our schedule. Those witnesses
who are on near the end may, if they wish to do so, be excused unless
they wish to stay, of course. I think it is fairly sure we could not get
to them until this afternoon because we have a vote now and I think
three are three votes. We have the debt limit and OEO extension and
one of them is controversial; well, they are both controversial; we
have some amendmetns on them. What we will have to do is just pro-
ceed as we can.
I think I will recess for approximately 7 or 8 minutes to give me time
to go vote and come back and proceed.
Mr. CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. The next witness will be Mr. Roy Bennett and we
will proceed up until about a quarter of one and get as far as we can.
I doubt that we can complete them all and we will probably have to
come back around 3:30 because there is a vote scheduled, final passage
of OEO, around 3:30.
(Recess.)
Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order, please. Sorry
that we had this little break, but we don’t control the rollcalls.
Let's see, Senator Clark has completed; next, Mr. Roy Bennett,
Americans for Democratic Action.
Mr. Bennett, we are very glad to have you here, sir.
Mr. BENNETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. -
Senator SPARKMAN (presiding). If you will identify the gentle-
man who accompanies you, we would appreciate it. -
291
STATEMENT OF ROY BENNETT, AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC
ACTION, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN ISAACS, LEGISLATIVE REPRE-
SENTATIVE
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. John Isaacs who is Legislative Representative of
Americans for Democratic Action.
Senator SPARKMAN. Very well.
May I say this for the benefit of all of you: We are going to have
a series of roll calls most certainly so if we move right along it will be
helpful. -
Mr. BENNETT.I will try.
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of Americans for Democratic Action I
wish to express my thanks for the opportunity to testify on behalf of
the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement and associated protocol
which your committee has under consideration.
I do not intend to scrutinize the details of the weapons balance
worked out by the specialists of the two countries. It seems to me that
the committee has already been saturated with complicated, compara-
tive weapons capabilities. Since both the Soviet Union and the United
States possess overkill nuclear capacity estimated at up to ten times
or 1,000 percent of presumed need, a discrepancy of 1, 2 or even 10
percent can have no discernible effect, regardless of which side is the
final beneficiary. I am more concerned with the historical background
of this treaty, its political meaning, and the consequences of it.
Mr. Chairman, I believe a serious examination of this treaty’s
impact requires that it be considered in the totality of all related
agreements and understandings. I mean by this that the treaty and
the agreements become even more significant when one considers them
together with the treaties recently concluded between the Soviet Union
and West Germany, the agreement on questions between West Ger-
many and Poland on borders, between Germany and the German
Democratic Republic on formalization of relations, and the very im-
portant treaty finalizing the status of West Berlin.
To these one must add the wide spectrum of additional Soviet-U.S.
accords reached in Moscow on science and technology, education and
culture, health and medicine, maritime matters, cooperation in space,
environmental cooperation, commercial and economic relations, along
with guidelines for future bilateral relations in Europe, India, China
and the Middle East.
ACCORDS CONSTRUCT BASIS FOR BROADER MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS
The significance of the signing, confirmation and implementation
of these accords resides in the fact that they construct a stable basis for
much broader multilateral settlements involving all of Western Eu-
rope, Eastern Europe, and the United States, a prospect which goes
beyond détente and the ending of the cold war. -
After 25 years of political conflict, it is no exaggeration to say that
in my judgment, the two superpowers have taken a first step toward a
legal codification of coexistence, the first attempt to institutionalize
a relationship between differing social systems, following reciprocal
acceptance of the concept that, as a political option, war between the
nuclear powers is eliminated.
292
WANING OF COLD WAR SUMMED UPIN 3 MAJOR CONTEXTS
I believe that the long waning of the Cold War might be summed
up in three major contexts:
(1) The intensity of conflict which once threatened world con:
flagration has mitigated as the bipolar nuclear powers have reached
a stable balance and, in consequence, nuclear victory no longer can be
a rational goal of either country.
(2) The superpowers found that the earlier, apparently profound
clashes of perceived vital interests have diminished in significance,
that a reciprocal reevaluation of interest has taken place, and that the
original perception of each other's aims has undergone change. All
this has removed or markedly altered the original basis of conflict.
(3) As a result of an initially tenuous collaboration between the
superpowers to contain and suppress violent conflict in many areas
around the world, there developed a growing awareness of a wider
mutuality of interest that, in most cases, was stronger than the orig-
inally perceived conflict of interest. Many serious issues originally
deemed unresolvable gave way to de facto resolution, a reluctant ac-
ceptance of an unchangeable status quo or, in Some cases, formal agree-
ment.
BACKGROUND
The roots of the current Moscow agreements go back a long way.
After the most acute stage of the Cold War, the period from 1947 to
1953, a cluster of agreements was reached, in part through Soviet
initiative. These were the Korean armistice of 1953, the first Indo-
china settlement in 1954, and the Austrian Neutrality Treaty in 1955,
all finally culminating in the Big Four summit meeting in Geneva
in 1955.
At that first meeting of heads of state since Potsdam, the agenda,
interestingly, was almost identical to that of the Moscow meeting 17
years later; and, most significantly, the unsolved problems of 1955
gave way to resolution in 1972. It took ten years, 1945 to 1955, to state
the issues and 17 years more to resolve them.
At the 1955 Geneva Conference the major subjects were disarma-
ment, the German question, European security and contacts between
East and West. Proposals such as President Eisenhower’s “open skies”
were on the agenda along with a Soviet proposal which was the
equivalent of a European security conference a proposal for a non-
aggression agreement to be concluded between NATO and the Warsaw
Pact member states.
While each step forward toward a lessening of tensions seemed to
be matched by a setback which followed it, the pattern which actually
emerged found the forces for detente stronger than the forces for
conflict. Each step forward was just enough stronger than the coun-
tervailing setback to achieve, over the long run, measurable progress.
One could list innumerable initiatives and setbacks through the long
period after 1955. The Soviet change in foreign policy at their 20th
Party Congress in 1956 ignited counteraction within their own bloc,
first in Poland and Hungary and later in China. This upheaval and
conflict, together with the eruption of the British, French, Israeli,
Egyptian crisis in the same year served to dim whatever positive
293
values seemed to emerge from de-Stalinization. In 1959, movement
forward was resumed on President Eisenhower's initiative which cul-
minated in the Camp David meeting with Premier Khrushchev. This
promising, informal rapprochement was scheduled to be followed by
a formal summit in 1960. Once again, an unscheduled event, the U-2
incident, torpedoed the meeting. - -
The 1963 breakthrough represented by the Test Ban Treaty, follow-
ing the Cuban, Congo, and Berlin crises, once again put the super-
powers on the détente road. But when in January, 1965, President
Johnson accepted a Moscow invitation for an early spring visit, he
found it canceled one month later when the war in Vietnam was
escalated by the United States.
Détente, battered and staggering, got its most serious test during the
years of the Vietnam war and the Middle East crisis. -
However, notwithstanding the divisive confrontation character of
these twin crises, the superpowers, forced into collaboration to pre-
vent both conflicts from spreading, achieved an interlocking balance
of power which prevented international war. -
The years of protracted stalemate did, however, see a number of
agreements, such as the nonproliferation, Outer space and sea-bed
treaties. Agreements were also achieved, as mentioned before, between
West Germany and Poland, and West Germany and the German
Democratic Republic, and a nonaggression pact was signed between
the Soviet Union and West Germany. Together with final ratifica-
tion of the Berlin Treaty, settling the status of West Berlin, the main
East-West conflict in Central Europe for over 25 years was resolved.
Simultaneously, long, arduous and patient meetings on arms nego-
tiations began to bear fruit. The most significant of these meetings was
on September 20, 1961. Valerian Zorin for the Soviet Union and
John J. McCloy for the United States reached an unusual agreement
which was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly. Called
a joint statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiation,
it said that “all measures of . . . disarmament should be balanced so
that at no stage of implementation ... . could any state or group of
states gain military advantage . . .” Today this does not seem as
important as it did then, but it did establish the principle of balance
of power for all future arms agreements.
The fundamental principle that balance of power shall be main-
tained in any arms reduction agreement, stated in 1961, guided and
shaped the carefully balanced Treaty and Interim Agreement which
this committee is considering today. Thus, to complete this very brief
history, the world did move slowly and with great difficulty in the 25
years of post-World War II struggles from Cold War to détente to
entente.
TJNDERSTANDING HISTORY GIVES US
We have set out some of the background better to understand two
facts about this historic understanding: (1) Its roots are deep in the
history of the Cold War. President Nixon is, in fact, the fortuitously
appointed historical agent for this great accomplishment and not the
mastermind some would have us believe. z
Secondly, it is true creators are those forces and groups who in the
ebb and flow of history—I have tried to explain—were the catalyst of
294
change, tirelessly fighting against the hysteria of the Cold War, the
arms race and, in the last few years, the war in Vietnam. Its true
creators are those forces and groups who, in the ebbard flow of history,
were the catalysts of change, tirelessly fighting against the hysteria
of the Cold War, the arms race, and, in the last years, the war in
Vietnam.
Without this understanding, which history gives to us, that there
was no straight line to detente, one would be at a loss to explain the
mystifying paradox we are witnessing today.
MILITARY BUDGET INCREASES REQUESTED BY ADMINISTRATION
The Secretary of Defense's and the President's request for huge in-
creases in the military budget, while simultaneously presenting an
arms agreement, raises some question whether it is arms limitation or
unlimited arms that they seek.
The extraordinary Joint Communique and the Declaration which
came out of Moscow makes the terms and the aims of the agreement
explicitly clear: “These agreements,” says the Declaration, “constitute
a major step forward, curbing and ultimately ending the arms race.
The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regard
as the ultimate objective of their effort the achievement of general and
complete disarmament.”
In light of this, the Administration’s request for a massive in-
crease in the arms budget is inexplicable. Taken at its best, it appears
that the extraordinary achievement in Moscow is to be used to increase
an already swollen arms appropriation. -
At its worst, one must conclude that the Secretary of Defense, at
least, in his attempt to hold the treaty and agreements as ransom to
his blackmail for larger defense appropriations, is engaged in the
same kind of political counterrevolution which I have described
dotted the road to ending of the Cold War and which has impeded us
on the road out of it. Further, there is every likelihood that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the military establishment extracted a promise
from the Administration that in return for their support of the treaty,
they would get the expensive and unnecessary hardware they desired.
This has been met by forces that set back, delayed or deterred move-
ment forward, and that is what I believe is happening today with these
proposals for huge arms escalations.
opposition To NEGOTIATIONS IN Soviet UNION
The United States is not alone in facing this problem. The So-
viet Union, in recent Pravda and New Times magazine articles, at-
tacked those forces inside the Soviet Union who opposed these agree-
ments. They charged there are individuals and groups who wish “to
warm their hands in the flames of the Cold War.” Indeed, on the
eve of the summit meeting itself, in a dramatic move, Pyotr Shelest,
reputed hardliner and spokesman for the Soviet Pentagon, was re-
moved from the highest ruling body—the Political Bureau of the
Communist Party—because of his opposition to the negotiations: New
York Times, June 9, 1972, page 4.
295
ASSAULT IN U.S. AGAINST PURPOSES OF TREATY EXPLAINED
In the United States the assault against the larger purposes of the
treaty can be explained in two ways (1) The President, in the face
of a military/conservative establishment attack, is fearful of the con-
sequences of his own handiwork. Under pressure he is permitting a
watering down of the spirit, if not the letter, of his own bilateral
understanding. (2) The Defense Secretary, leading the opposition
more directly, aims to gut the treaty itself. In effect, he calls for a
new arms race which, if conceded, is calculated to destroy the agree-
ment altogether.
The President’s contention that we must engage in such arms es-
calation as is not explicitly prohibited by the agreement, because we
anticipate the Soviet Union will, is a classical self-enforcing pre-
diction. Quite obviously, the Soviets will match whatever increase in
arms we approve, permitting us to charge them with the responsi-
bility for a new arms race.
The frank opposition of the Defense Secretary is not unusual.
What is unusual is the timidity of the President in dealing with it.
Despite the President, the Secretary of State and presidential ad-
viser Kissinger's attempt to draw a distinction between their views
and those of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary is still a member
of their own administration.
It is humiliating for an American to consider that the Soviet lead-
ership, faced with a parallel problem, without hesitation removed
the representative of their military-conservative establishment who
had attempted to sabotage the maioring view. Perhaps we should do
no less with the American Pyotr Shelest.
President Nixon, if he sincerely wishes to advance the purpose
of the agreement bearing his signature, must have a Secretary of De-
fense who both agrees in disarmament and is able to control the
military. . -
SUMMING UP CONCLUSIONS
Just briefly, Summing up our conclusions: (1) we believe the treaty
and the interim agreements are among the most significant achieve-
ments for peace and rapprochement in the 15 years of the Cold War.
We see it climaxing a slow decline of the costliest, most counterpro-
ductive and politically immoral period in the history of both coun-
tries. (2) Although these agreements are only a step on a larger road
to a fully codified multilateral form of coexistence, they define the
future with much more specificity than any previous agreements.
(3) The history of the Cold War demonstrates that there is no straight
line to detente. Past struggles were not only between the super powers
themselves, they were paralleled by a struggle within each of the
countries, between two main lines of approach—one which sought the
dismantling of the Cold War as inimical to the real interests of the
nation and the other which identified the existence of the nation with
a continued existence of the Cold War. This struggle continues and
will continue until the last residual vestiges of the Cold War are
buried. (4) This treaty and agreements, their human purposes, and
the promise they hold for the world will have to be defended by the
popular forces in both political parties. -
296
The massive turn in the U.S. policy which these agreements rep-
resent cannot rely on an Administration whose hesitancy is reflected
in the concessions it is prepared to make to the military-conservative
establishment. Without taking away any credit, to which President
Nixon is entitled, the destiny of this achievement must be accom-
plished by the majority of Americans who have rallied so strongly
behind the summit effort.
ADA STANDS FOR APPROVAL OF TREATY AND AGREEMENT
There is no ambiguity in ADA's policy. We stand for the approval
of the ABM Treaty, the Interim Agreement and the Associated Pro-
tocol. We consider them only a first step to a general and complete
disarmament and a foundation for a codified rule of co-existence.
Toward this end we urge the Senate to confirm this treaty and arms
limitation agreement.
The CHAIRMAN (presiding). Thank you very much, Mr. Bennett.
I am sorry Imissed the first part of your statement. &
Senator Sparkman, do you have some questions?
ARMS ESCALATION will, COME UP SEPARATELY, BEFORE OTHER COMMITTEES
Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, just this comment: I think Mr.
Bennett has given a very interesting review of the various steps lead-
ing up to the present detente. Again, Mr. Bennett, I will say this, as I
did to Senator Kennedy, that these matters of arms escalation will
come up separately and before other committees.
Mr. BENNETT, Yes, sir. - -
Senator SPARKMAN. Not this committee. I think we ought to make
the point very clear, and I believe you do, that you support the treaty
and the Interim Agreement regardless of what happens.
Mr. BENNETT. Without reservation.
Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper?
GIVING CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE
Senator CoopFR. I was not here when Mr. Bennett was making
his statement. I may say I have read it, and it is a good historical
record of what has happened since World War II. I don't agree with
you on your statements about the President; I must say that that I
have noted that, and I do not say this a partisan way because I am for
the ABM agreements and joined in initiating the fight against it
several years ago, but I have noted there is a grudging note in the
testimony of some witnesses—I think there is a partisan note, a grudg-
ing reluctance to say that the President has done what he has done.
Mr. BENNETT. That may be true but I think for ADA to say as much
as we have said that is favorable to the President is itself quite an
accomplishment. I don’t want to say this was not a good achievement
and he had nothing to do with it. I simply want to say there were
larger forces involved over a very long period to make this possible.
I think I said somewhere I don’t want to take credit away where it is
due and there is credit due. -
297
The CHAIRMAN. I could join in that feeling; I think there is credit
due. I think the President, in both his trips to Peking and to Moscow,
and in the negotiations of these agreements, does deserve credit. I
also would comment that the establishment of the almost overwhelm-
ing power of the military establishment isn’t solely the creation and
responsibility of this President; it has been growing for 25 years and
unfortunately the Congress has gone along with it and has declined
to take the responsibility in most cases for doing anything about it.
I am not sure they will here.
A curious thing about the Congress: It asserts in general terms that
it desires to participate in decisions involving foreign policy, but when
the actual decisions are put before it, it often declines to take action.
We don’t really like to take responsibility for this type of thing. Con-
gress prefers the responsibility for increasing Social Security, but
when it comes to anything as controversial as the military establish-
ment with all its power and its employees all across the country, it
doesn’t like to take the responsibility. I think the President shouldn’t
be held responsible for many of the difficulties. I am not sure he has the
power to discharge our Pyotr Shelests. -
Thank you very much, Mr. Bennett.
Mr. BENNETT. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. The next witness is Mr. George Rathjens.
Mr. Rathjens, we are very glad to have you. We welcome you
again. This is an old story with you, particularly on the ABM part.
STATEMENT OF GEORGE W. RATHJENS, COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE
WORLD
Mr. RATHJENs. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman.
I welcome the opportunity to appear before you again, this time
On the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks and Agreements and I do so
as a director of the Council for a Livable World this time.
MIXED VERDICT ON NEGOTIATIONS, AGREEMENTS REACHED, suBSEQUENT
ADMINISTRATION COMMENTS
Considering the conduct of the negotiations, the agreements reached,
and the subsequent comments by Administration spokesmen, a mixed
verdict is in order. The ABM Treaty, although not the best that could
have been negotiated, is a notable agreement of perhaps lasting
importance which should be supported without reservation.
The executive agreement relating to offensive systems is decidedly
less important; and the proposals for new strategic programs which
Secretary Laird has sought to link inextricably with the SAL agree-
ments, and which the President links, but less strongly, are clearly
undesirable. -
The ABM Treaty can be faulted in that it has been more delayed
than it need have been and because it permits too much. Almost cer-
tainly we could have had a simple ABM freeze over a year ago had
we not insisted on something like parity in ABM deployment and on
linking the ABM agreement with limitations on offensive systems. We
would have saved substantial sums. Valuing the agreement on offen-
sive weapons lightly, as I do, and heavily discounting the military
298
utility of the ABM deployments permitted by the treaty, I believe we
would have been better off. - -
But the delay and the wasted dollars pale into insignificance when
measured against the importance of the treaty. It should allay concerns
that either the Soviet Union or the United States may in the foresee-
able future find it advantageous to attack the other; it codifies the
legitimacy of verification by national means; and it can, and should,
be interpreted as weakening the case that is being made for develop-
ing and expanding strategic offensive forces. -
It should, for example, greatly diminish incentives for continuing
with MIRV deployment, an issue not addressed in the offensive forces
agreement but one of far greater moment than the issues with which
that agreement deals.
In fact, the executive agreement will accomplish little and I believe
is of marginal value. v
In the interest of conserving time, I will skip over the next four
or five paragraphs detailing my reasons.
The CHAIRMAN. The whole statement will be put in the record.
Mr. RATHJENs. Thank you.
I would like to go on then and comment on some of the issues sur-
rounding the agreements and particularly the requests for moneys for
continuing additional strategic weapon programs and the question of
our approach to further efforts at strategic arms limitation.
AGREEMENTS EXCUSE TO TURN DOWN ARMS RACE
I want to emphasize strongly that the SALT agreements, and partic-
ularly the ABM treaty, should be construed not as an excuse to ac-
celerate the arms race but as an opportunity to turn it down with less
concern than would otherwise have been possible.
With ABM deployment limited to militarily meaningless levels and
the primary rationale for MIRV deployment thereby eliminated, we
should bring the Minuteman III program to an immediate halt and
limit further work on Poseidon to modification to those submarines on
which conversion is already well underway.
The Congress should reject the Administration’s request for an
ABM defense of Washington. At the levels permitted by the treaty,
Such a defense could buy at most a few minutes' time for decisionmak-
ing by the President; it would not make much difference in the like-
lihood that he or anyone else in the area would survive attack; and
most significantly, it is almost unimaginable that the deployment
would make an attackless likely. If ever there was a case for unilateral
restraint, this is it. -
With the negotiation of the ABM Treaty behind us and with the
Washington defense Serving no meaningful purpose, not even the most
committed proponent of the bargaining-chip argument can claim it is
needed to strengthen our hand in future negotiations.
\
\ STRATEGIC ARMS QUESTIONS BEFORE CONGRESS
Probably the two strategic arms questions before the Congress that
are the most serious, in terms of cost if not otherwise, are the B–1
bomber and the Trident submarine, each of which program is likely
299
to cost in the range of $15 billion. There are strong arguments against
moving ahead rapidly with either. º º
With significant ABM defense proscribed, there can be little doubt
that the number of weapons that could be delivered by a very small
number, indeed a single one of our presently deployed submarines
would constitute an effective deterrent; and there is nothing on the
horizon to suggest that the Soviet Union could somehow destroy the
whole force simultaneously. To do so would require dramatic break-
throughs in antisubmarine warfare technology; and while one can-
not completely discount such possibilities, there is no reason to believe
that if such breakthroughs should occur, Trident will prove to have
been an effective response. Exploitation of any breakthroughs by the
Soviet Union would require the deployment of new systems based on
them on a worldwide scale and with vigilance and a reasonable re-
search program, we would have adequate warning time to react.
Thus, commitment to production of Trident at this time is grossly
premature. Somewhat similar arguments apply in the case of the B–1.
It will provide a marginal improvement over existing capabilities at
a time when marginal improvements are unnecessary in the absence of
breakthroughs and likely to be inadequate in the event they occur.
I would remark parenthetically that I am both appalled and de-
pressed whenever I hear claims that we must make decisions now to
buy strategic weapon systems that will see their major services in the
late ’80s, the '90s and even into the next century. Surely we must be
Optimistic enough to apply very high discount rates to such decisions,
putting them off as long as we prudently can in the hope that they
will never be needed.
Probably the most dubious of the new proposals is the submarine-
launched cruise missile program which, more than any other, a strate-
gic SLCM program epitomizes the worst possible construction to put
on the SALT outcome, that is, a determination to go ahead with work
in strategic areas not specifically proscribed even if the weapons are
neither required nor likely to be as effective as existing weapons.
Imagine our reaction should the Soviet Union now initiate a simi-
lar program, particularly if it were not obvious whether the new sub-
marines would carry cruise missiles as permitted by the executive
agreement; or ballistic missiles, in which case they would be pro-
Scribed; or whether they might be ostensibly designed to carry the
former but convertible to carry the latter.
PRESSURE TO GO AHEAD WITH PROGRAMIS IS DISTURBING
The pressure to go ahead with all of these programs in the light
of SALT is profoundly disturbing. There is the enormous waste of
resources; there is the likelihood that such moves will strengthen the
hands of those in the USSR who are disposed to use SALT as a basis
for greater weapon programs; there is the disillusioning effect on our
own people; and, finally, in such pressures there is evidence of a lack
of balance if not of something approaching morbidity in our view of
the role of strategic nuclear arms in world affairs. Since this view so
conditions our unilateral decisions regarding these weapons and what
we will do with respect to SALT II, I should like to elaborate briefly
using Dr. Kissinger's recent White House presentation to you and
other members of Congress as a vehicle.
80–942 O—72—20
300
POINTS MADE BY DR. RISSINGER IN WIHITE HOUSE PRESENTATION
Early in his remarks he referred to the strategic weapon systems
as those “which guarantee each side's security.” The º Wà.S 8.
parenthetical one to which I doubt he gave much thought. T single it
out, however, because I see in it a manifestation of the belief that the
major thing we have to fear is a deliberate attack based on rational
calculation by the Soviet leadership; and because I am personally
persuaded that initiation of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation
or irrational behavior in a crisis is a more realistic possibility.
Events of recent weeks suggest that failure of command and control
is another possibility that should not be lightly dismissed or discounted.
I would suggest that one would come closer to the mark if one observed
that strategic weapons guarantee not our security but rather our in-
Security for if they are retained in large numbers, in time one or more
of them is likely to be launched. To me, this means that the national
interest would be better served by less concern about bargaining and
about relative advantage, with more attention being given to diminish-
ing those risks of war that have their basis in numbers of weapons, their
design, nuclear proliferation, and communications and command and
control arrangements.
In this same vein, I find some of the other points made by Dr. Kis-
singer troublesome. He observed that “Devising an equitable agreement
on ABMs proved extremely difficult.” Perhaps so, but might not the
emphasis on equity have been misplaced? I have suggested earlier that
a nonequitable agreement would have saved us billions and could
have been achieved earlier, with little difficulty, and with our having
to be no more concerned than with the treaty we negotiated.
Later, in discussing possible deferral of construction of a second
ABM site by the U.S., Dr. Kissinger decried the possibility that the
Soviet Union might have had two sites to our one, as if it would make
a difference. He made the point that “if the agreement were being cir-
cumvented, obviously we would have to take compensatory steps in the
strategic field.”.
It is by no means obvious to me, although we might want to take
compensatory steps or we might want to denounce the agreement, de-
pending on the nature of the violations.
NEED TO WIEW STRATEGIC, WEAPONS DIFFERENTLY THAN CONVENTIONAL
- ARMS
What I am getting at is the need, really, to view strategic weapons
differently than conventional arms and to weigh each decision we make
with regard to them against a multiplicity of objectives, not just in
terms of the two concerns which seem to have dominated our approach
in recent years—the nightmare of a deliberate Soviet first strike and
the possibility that the numerical or qualitative balance might be
shifted in some way that can be exploited politically. There is here a
difficult task in education and reorientation of policy to which this
committee can make an important contribution. With the ABM treaty
Serving to help exercise the apparition of a first strike, the time is right.
301
NOT TOO EARLY TO LOOK AHEAD TO SALT II
Let me close by suggesting it is not too early to look ahead to SALT
II. We will be in for a difficult time of it if, as I fear, the negotiations
are carried out largely within the philosophical framework that has
characterized SALT I. To a large extent, the agenda will be dominated
by issues already surfaced in Vienna and Helsinki but which have
proved intractable—restraints on qualitative improvements, reduc-
tions and the problems of forward-based systems. Thus, unless there
is a change in approach, progress is likely to be slow.
I raise this particularly because of the Administration’s addition to
the bargaining-chip agreement. There would be nothing particularly
pernicious about such an approach if the negotiations could move
rapidly, but if they are protracted, the adverse effects of buying bar-
gaining chips during the negotiating process could well outweigh the
advantages inherent in any final agreement.
ABM TREATY SUPPORTED
In summary, I argue that the ABM Treaty should be supported
enthusiastically, that the executive agreement relating to offensive sys-
tems hardly matters one way or the other, that there are strong rea-
Sons for not going ahead with the major weapons programs Secreta
Ilaird demands, and that if those programs are the price for SALT II
negotiations, the negotiations probably are not worth entering into.
Thank you very much.
(Mr. Rathjens' statement follows:)
PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEORGE W. RATH.JENS
I Welcome the Opportunity to comment on the strategic arms limitation talks
and agreements as a director of the Council for a Livable World.
Considering the conduct of the negotiations, the agreements reached, and Subse-
Quent Comments by Administration spokesmen, a mixed verdict is in order. The
ABM treaty, although not the best that could have been negotiated, is a notable
agreement Of perhaps lasting importance which should be supported without
reservation. The executive agreement relating to Offensive systems is decidedly
less important ; and the proposals for new strategic programs which Secretary
Laird has sought to link inextricably with the SALT agreements, and which the
President links, but less strongly, are clearly undesirable.
The ABM treaty can be faulted in that it has been more delayed than it need
have been and because it permits too much. Almost certainly we could have had a
simple ABM freeze Over a year ago had we not insisted. On something like parity in
ABM deployment and on linking the ABM agreement with limitations on Offensive
systems. We would have saved substantial sums. Valuing the agreement On Offen-
sive weapons lightly, as I do, and heavily discounting the military utility Of the
ABM deployments permitted by the treaty, I believe we would have been better
Off.
But the delay and the wasted dollars pale into insignificance when measured
against the importance of the treaty. It should allay concerns that either the
Soviet Union or the United States may in the foreseeable future find it advan-
tageous to attack the other ; it codifies the legitimacy of Verification by national
means; and it can, and should, be interpreted as weakening the Case that is being
made for developing and expanding strategic Offensive forces.
It should, for example, greatly diminish incentives for continuing with MIRV
deployment, an issue not addressed in the Offensive forces agreement, but One
of far greater moment than the issues with which that agreement deals.
In fact, the executive agreement will accomplish little.
If Some draw comfort from the fact that five years hence Soviet force levels
might be lower with the agreement than without it, that must be counted a plus
302
but a small one considering that the military balance would not be shifted
decisively even if the Administration’s speculation about Soviet build-ups in the
absence of agreement were to be correct. Those speculations may of course be
Wrong. It would not be surprising if those in the Kremlin defend the agreement
On grounds almost identical to those used here, i.e. that it will not prevent their
dOing anything that would be dOne in its absence.
Should the interim agreement prove to be the basis for a lasting treaty the
effect could well be simply a continuation of the Strategic arms race with greater
emphasis On qualitative improvements—not necessarily a desirable direction in
terms Of either permitting the diversion of resources to Constructive purposes
nor in reducing the risks Of War.
Finally, it must be recognized that there are those who are disturbed by the
fact that the agreement permits the Soviet Union numerical superiority in
ICBMs and SLBMs; others who are concerned not about the immediate effect
but about the possible precedent in the figures; and still Others, myself included,
who are unconcerned about the military significance Of the disparity but who
Cannot discOunt COmpletely the political Significance Of Other’s Concerns. One
must, then, in evaluating the agreement, COunt the numerical disparity as SOme-
thing Of a negative factor.
On balance whether the agreement limiting offensive arms is worth having is
marginal.
Let me turn now to the iSSues Surrounding the agreements, particularly the
requests for monies for continuing and additional strategic weapons programs,
and the question Of Our approach to further efforts at Strategic arms limitation.
I want to emphasize strongly that the SALT agreements, and particularly
the ABM treaty, should be construed not as an excuse to accelerate the arms
race but as an opportunity to turn it down with less concern than would other-
wise have been possible. º
With ABM deployment limited to militarily meaningless levels and the primary
rationale for MIRV deployment thereby eliminated, we should bring the Min-
uteman III program to an immediate halt and limit further work On Poseidon
to modification to those submarines on which conversion is already well under-
Way. .
The Congress should reject the Administration’s request for an ABM defense
Of Washington. At the levels permitted by the treaty such a defense could buy
at most a few minutes time for decision-making by the President; it would not
make much difference in the likelihood that he or anyone else in the area would
Survive attack; and most significantly, it is almost unimaginable that the de-
ployment WOuld make an attack less likely. If ever there was a case for uni-
lateral restraint this is it. With the negotiation of the ABM treaty behind us
and with the Washington defense serving no meaningful purpose, not even the
most committed proponent of the “bargaining chip” argument can claim it is
needed to Strengthen Our hand in future negotiations.
Probably the two Strategic arms questions before the Congress that are the
most Serious, in terms Of cost if not otherwise, are the B–1 bomber and the
Trident submarine, each of which program is likely to cost in the range of $15
billion. There are strong arguments against moving ahead rapidly with either.
With significant ABM defense proscribed there can be little doubt that the num-
ber of Weapons that could be delivered by a very small number, indeed a single
One, Of Our presently deployed submarines would constitute an effective deter-
rent ; and there is nothing On the horizon to suggest that the Soviet Union could
Somehow destroy the whole force simultaneously. To do so would require dramatic
breakthroughs in anti-submarine warfare technology; and while one cannot com-
pletely discount Such possibilities, there is no reason to believe that if such break-
throughs should occur Trident will prove to have been an effective response. Ex-
ploitation of any breakthroughs by the Soviet Union would require the deploy-
ment of new systems based on them on a world-wide scale, and with vigilance
and a reasonable research program, we would have adequate warning time to
react. Thus, commitment to production Of Trident at this time is grossly prema-
ture.
Somewhat similar arguments apply in the case of the B–1. It will provide a
marginal improvement Over existing capabilities at a time when marginal im-
provements are unnecessary in the absence of breakthroughs, and likely to be
inadequate in the event they occur.
I would remark parenthetically that I am both appalled and depressed when-
ever I hear claims that We must make decisions now to buy Strategic weapons
303
systems that will see their major services in the late 80's, the 90's and even into
next century. Surely we must be optimistic enough to apply very high discount
rates to such decisions, putting them off as long as We prudently can in the hope
that they will never be needed.
Probably the most dubious of the new proposals is the Submarine-launched
cruise missile program, an approach we rejected years ago, which combines great-
er vulnerability than has the SLBM force to anti-Submarine warfare with the
vulnerability that bombers have to defenses, the latter vulnerability being greater
than that of ballistic missiles, particularly since Soviet air defenses will not SOOn
be restricted by treaty and are already large Compared to ABM defenses. More
than any other, a strategic SLCM program epitomizes the Worst possible Construc-
tion to put on the SALT outcome, i.e. a determination to go ahead With work in
strategic areas not specifically proscribed even if the weapons are neither re-
quired nor likely to be as effective as existing weapons. Imagine Our reaction
should the Soviet Union now initiate a similar program, particularly if it were
not obvious whether the new Submarines would carry Cruise missiles as permitted
by the executive agreement; or ballistic missiles in which case they would be pro-
scribed ; or whether they might be Ostensibly designed to Carry the former but
convertible to carry the latter.
The pressure to go ahead with all of these programs in the light Of SALT is pro-
foundly disturbing. There is the enormous waste Of resources; there is the likeli-
hood that such moves will strengthen the hands of those in the U.S.S.R. Who are
disposed to use SALT as a basis for greater weapons programs; there is the dis-
illusioning effect On Our Own people ; and finally, in Such pressures there is evi-
dence of a lack of balance if not of something approaching morbidity in our view
of the role of strategic nuclear arms in world affairs. Since this view SO condi-
tions Our unilateral decisions regarding these weapons and What We will do With
respect to SALT II, I should like to elaborate briefly, using Dr. Kissinger's recent
White House presentation to you and Other members Of Congress as a vehicle.
Early in his remarks he referred to the Strategic Weapons Systems as those
“which guarantee each side's security.” The phrase was a parenthetical One to
which I doubt he gave much thought. I single it out, however, because I see in it
a manifestation of the belief that the major thing we have to fear is a
deliberate attack based on rational calculation by the SOViet leadership ; and
because I am personally persuaded that initiation. Of nuclear War by accident,
miscalculation Or irrational behavior in a crisis is a more realistic possibility.
Events Of recent weeks suggest that failure Of COmmand and Control is another
possibility that should not be lightly discounted. I suggest that One would
COme closer to the mark if One Observed that strategic weapons guarantee not Our
Security but rather Our insecurity for, if they are retained in large numbers,
in time One Or more Of them is likely to be launched. TO me this means that
the national interest would be better served by less concern about bargaining
and about relative advantage, with more attention being given to diminishing
those risks of war that have their basis in numbers of weapons, their design,
nuclear proliferation, and Communications and command and control arrange-
mentS.
In this same vein I find some of the other points made by Dr. Kissinger
troubleSOme. He Observed that “Devising an equitable agreement on ABM's
proved extremely difficult.” Perhaps so, but might not the emphasis on equity
have been misplaced ? I have suggested earlier that a non-equitable agreement
Would have saved us billions and could have been achieved earlier, with little
difficulty, and With Our having to be no more concerned than with the treaty
We negotiated. Later, in discussing possible deferral of construction of a second
ABM site by the U.S., Dr. Kissinger decried the possibility that the Soviet
Union might have had two sites to our one—as if it would make a difference.
He made the point that “if the agreement were being circumvented, obviously
We Would have to take compensatory steps in the strategic field.” It is by no
means “obvious” to me, although we might want to take compensatory steps or
We might Want to denounce the agreement, depending on the nature of the
ViOlations.
What I am getting at is the need really to view strategic weapons differently
than Conventional arms and to weigh each decision we make with regard to
them against a multiplicity of objectives—not just in terms of the two concerns
Which seem to have dominated our approach in recent years—the nightmare
of a deliberate Soviet “first strike” and the possibility that the numerical or
Qualitative balance might be shifted in some way that can be exploited politically.
304
There is here a difficult task in education and reorientation of policy to which
this committee can make an important contribution. With the ABM treaty
Serving to help exercise the apparition of a “first strike,” the time is right.
Let me close by suggesting it is not too early to look ahead to SALT II.
We will be in for a difficult time of it if, as I fear, the negotiations are carried
out largely within the philosophical framework that has characterized SALT I.
To a large extent the agenda will be dominated by issues already Surfaced in
Vienna and Helsinki but which have proved intractable : restraints On quali-
tative improvements, reductions, and the problem of forward based System.
Thus, unless there is a change in approach, progress is likely to be slow.
I raise this particularly because of the Administration’s addiction to the
bargaining chip argument. There would be nothing particularly pernicious about
Such an approach if the negotiations could move rapidly, but if they are pro-
tracted, the adverse effects of buying bargaining chips during the negotiating
process could well OutWeigh the advantages inherent in any final agreement.
In Summary, I argue that the ABM treaty should be supported enthusiastically ;
that the executive agreement relating to Offensive systems hardly matters One
Way Or the Other; that there are strong reasons for not going head with the
major weapons programs Secretary Laird demands; and that if those programs
are the price for SALT II negotiations, the negotiations probably are not worth
entering into. -
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Rathjens.
There is a vote in process, but I was told it was noncontroversial and
there was no particular urgency for me to go, so I am going to skip
it in the interest of moving along. Perhaps I am not as sensitive to the
record of voting on every unanimous vote we have over there.
Your statement is a very good restatement, I think, of the posi-
tion of those who favor the SAL agreement, and with the reserva-
tions about the increased military program.
SINCERITY OF U.S. IN MARING AGREEMENTS
The first thought I had when I saw in Secretary Laird's statement
that his support was dependent upon authorization and appropria-
tion for the Trident, B–1 and so on, raised a very serious question as
to our sincerity in making these agreements.
Do we really mean it? Do we really mean it as a first step in the
slowdown or stopping of the arms race? If I were a Russian and read
that statement, and also if it were implemented, my reaction would
be that the Americans don’t mean it. The agreement is used as an
excuse to go forward with some very expensive weapons that they
* not otherwise be able to persuade the Congress to appropriate
OI".
What is your comment on that?
Mr. RATHJENs. Well, I feel exactly the same way. It seems to me we
have made this mistake before in the case of the test ban treaty, where
we agreed to go ahead with all sorts of muclear tests which, in retro-
spect, turned out to be wasteful and far more of them than we needed,
and doing such things, to me, I would think, would send a very bad
signal to people on the other side and I am concerned that it would sup-
port those in the Soviet Union who would make similar arguments.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that is right. I can imagine their military say-
ing, “Look, these people are not serious about this: we can’t trust them.
Look what they are getting ready to do, which is to vastly increase
their nuclear power and by qualitative means. They don’t really mean
that they are serious.”
305
CONGRESS DECIDES QUESTION OF PRIORITIES
I want to say further though in defense of the Administration, and
it is not my primary responsibility in life to do so, but in trying to
balance the play of forces within our country as brought to bear in the
Congress, I have a great sympathy with them. There is no doubt we
have had test after test in which real efforts were made. The classic
one to me was the ABM struggle in which you know this committee
played a big part. We had long hearings and got the best people we
could get, but when it came down to the vote and the great power of
the corporate interests in the country together with the ideological
obsession which has afflicted us for 25 years were brought to bear, they
prevailed. Any government of negotiation has to take that into ac-
count, and way I like to view it—and maybe this is being overly
optimistic and overly generous, I don’t know which—but now they
are saying, “Here it is; it's up to the Congress to make this stick.”
We had these forces bearing on us; we have it in the Administration;
we have to present a kind of a collective judgment. I am not saying
I would have presented the same one, but I do think this is essentially
a question that the Congress has to decide—this question of priorities,
of where you are going to put your money.
Are you going to put $30 billion you save into these things when we
have all these demands from every other source? So I am more inclined
to say that it is up to Congress. The SAL agreements have made a
start; however limited it may be, it is a start. It is a first start in a
direction which you approve, and I think the country approves, and
now it is up to Congress to make a decision: on the one hand, to accept
these agreements and, on the other, to give them validity by not pro-
ceeding with those other inconsistent programs. -
b º s the way it comes down to me. Do you feel too much offended
y that
Mr. RATHJENs. I would agree with everything you say and I think
it is a great opportunity for the Congress; the Congress has a great
responsibility to condition the environment in which the SAILT II
negotiations will take place
The CHAIRMAN. That's right.
Mr. RATHJENs. By doing exactly that, by approving these two
agreements and then by insisting on some restraints with respect to
all of these new programs.
SHOWING RESTRAINT WOULD BE STEP FORWARD
The CHAIRMAN. If we can show restraint even for two years to test
out what the attitude is and what happened, it would be a tremendous
step forward. If we immediately go the other way, I can easily see
where Marshal Grechko would say, “Well, there is nothing to this;
there is no point in taking it seriously.” I can’t see how by any stretch
of the imagination it would be any threat to us if we showed restraint
for two years to give SALT II an opportunity to be negotiated. Then
I think there might be real hope.
Thank you very much.
Do you have anything?
Senator SPARKMAN. No.
306
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Rathjens.
Mr. RATHJENs. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. The next witness is Dr. James Dornan of the Liberty
Lobby. Dr. Dornan? -
STATEMENT OF JAMES DORNAN, MEMBER, B0ARD OF POLICY,
LIBERTY LOBBY, AND ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICS, CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY; ACCOMPANIED BY L. A.
H00SER, LEGISLATIVE AIDE, LIBERTY LOBBY
Mr. Hooser. I am L. A. Hooser, Legislative Aide of Liberty Lobby,
Liberty Lobby is a political institution composed of 100,000 Amer-
ican citizens who have no special interest except our own conception
of national security to guide us in our expressions of policy. For 13
years this institution has expressed to the Senate and the House its
views on foreign policy as conceived from what we believe to be a pro-
American viewpoint.
BACKGROUND OF witness
Today I would like to present to the committee Dr. James Dornan,
who is a member of our board of policy and a special consultant and
who also is Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at
Catholic University and also an Assistant Professor at Johns Hopkins
University as well as a consultant for the Center for International
Business at Pepperdine University, Los Angeles. He has written ar-
ticles on American foreign policy and national security affairs for a
number of professional journals and at present is completing a book
called “Founding Fathers and World Politics,” to be published by
Johns Hopkins Press.
Dr. Dornanº
Mr. DoRNAN. It is a great privilege, Senator, for me to appear before
this committee this morning on this topic. No one will doubt that
the SALT Accords constitute one of the more important international
phenomena of our time. I would like to begin by noting that in my
view the accords themselves are not nearly as important as the situa-
tion which gave rise to them, which gave the accords their particular
form and shape; I am referring here to the ten year strategic buildup
of the USSR which has enabled the Soviet Union to equal or surpass
the U.S. in many categories of military power and to achieve overall
strategic parity with the United States.
It is in this context, I think, the context of rapidly expanding Soviet
power, that the recently negotiated SALT accords must be evaluated;
and the questions to be asked, I think, about them in this context are
many and difficult.
HOW AND WHY FUNDAMENTAL AITERATION IN STRATEGIC BALANCE
OCCURRED
First of all, it would seem to me to be immediately relevant for
the committee to ask how and why this fundamental alteration in the
strategic balance between the Superpowers occurred. In particular, it
307
would be useful to know both the operating assumptions of American
policymakers and their estimates of Soviet capabilities and intentions
during the five years of the Soviet weapons buildup. An assessment
of Soviet motives, it seems to me, would be particularly beneficial
because of its relevance for possible Soviet decisions on weapons acqui-
sitions in the post-SALT era. Some students of Soviet behavior have
asserted, for example, that the fundamental decisions leading to the
1967–1972 buildup were made well before the Cuban crisis of
1962, which may indicate that the buildup cannot be explained solely
as a defensive reaction to the Soviet retreat under fire during the
Khrushchev-Kennedy confrontation.
Recent Soviet diplomatic and military activities in the Middle East,
the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and the Caribbean, when analyzed
in conjunction with the weapons buildup, may indicate that Soviet
foreign policy has entered a new, dynamic phase which could pose
serious threats to the security of her neighbors and to U.S. Security
as well.
EFFECT OF U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF NIXON-BREZHNEW AGREEMENTS
The question is, then, whether American acceptance of the Nixon-
Brezhnev agreements would constitute an at least partially adequate
response to such international developments as these and whether,
more generally, the SALT accords would enhance or detract from
the capacity of the U.S. to protect her interests and her security in
the years ahead.
It seems to me, from this perspective, that the most immediate
problems arise from the Interim Agreement on certain measures with
respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The agree-
ment has been widely hailed as establishing a freeze on the acquisi-
tion of offensive weapons by the major powers; in fact, however, the
only power even partically frozen is the U.S. Both the U.S. and the
USSR are permitted to modernize and replace land-based and sea-
launched ballistic missiles as new technological developments warrant;
warhead capability and accuracy will thus become key areas of com-
petition in an altered arms race.
It seems to me that in this case Senator Buckley was correct this
morning when he said the agreement has transformed the arms race
from a quantitative to a qualitative one. I won’t burden you with
further specifics, since you know the details of weapon systems—
The CHAIRMAN. We will put the whole statement in the record, if
it is agreeable to you.
Mr. DoRNAN. I want to skip to a couple of points
The CHAIRMAN. You emphasize those.
Mr. DORNAN. Points not emphasized by other witnesses this morn-
i. So I will go now to page six, page four, I guess in the copy you
18,Vē.
SOVIET THROW WIFIGHT ADVANTAGE
The advantage which the Soviets have in weapons systems generally
and in delivery vehicles are supposedly counter balanced by the al-
legedly superior accuracy of U.S. weapons, and the flexibility afforded
by our overseas bases; but for a variety of reasons it seems to me the
308
significance of these U.S. advantages are exaggerated and here I refer
especially to the Soviet throw weight advantage. By throw weight, of
course, we simply mean the number of thousands of pounds of war-
heads which a missile can deliver.
This larger Soviet payload capacity is embodied principally in the
SS—9 missile system and the new, larger missile now apparently under
construction. I think the significance here derives not only from the
fact that the Soviet missiles carries larger warheads than our own,
but also the fact the weight advantage gives them the possibility of
developing a highly potent MIRV capability which may be the most
strategic significant fact of the coming five years. -
No one denies that within the very near future the Soviets will de-
velop an operational MIRV capability; when that capability is har-
nessed to the giant new missile, there arises the possibility of a Soviet
heavy missile force of 313 launchers, each carrying 20 warheads of 500
kilotons each or 40 warheads of 200 kilotons each. The totals are 6,260
and 12,520, respectively. In the first instance the heavy missiles alone
will carry more warheads than the entire present day American total;
in the second, a total as large as the most optimistic projections of
our own warhead total by 1977. And when one goes further and calcu-
lates the potential MIRV capability for up to 950 Soviet SLBMs and
1,100 SS—11 and SS-13 ICBMs of no greater potential than that pos-
session by U.S. Poseidon and Minuteman III missiles, this means a
maximum Soviet warhead total of more than 25,000. In turn, this
might well constitute a first strike capability for the USSR, depend-
ing on the nature of U.S. strategic forces in existence at the time.
SALT ACCORDS DON'T RESTRICT WARHEAD DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT
Now these figures represent, to be sure, the worst of all possible
worlds, and the likelihood that the Soviets would choose to deploy
warheads on such a scale will doubtless be questioned. Nevertheless,
the discussion at the very least serves to emphasize the fact that the
SALT accords place no restrictions on warhead development and de-
ployment, and there are thus absolutely no controls over one of the
most significance aspects of the arms race. Moreover, any realistic
American deterrence strategy for the future must take Soviet capa-
bilities as well as intentions into account now, in making the decisions
that will select our strategic posture a decade hence.
U.S. MISSILES’ SUPERIOR ACCURACY NOT DECISIVE FACTOR
Next, I would like to emphasize that I don’t think the superior ac-
curacy of American missiles is or will be as decisive a factor in the
strategic equation as often is assumed
I have already pointed out that warhead size can at least partially
compensate for missile inaccuracy; and the Soviets have already
achieved a substantial improvement in accuracy in the SS-9 series.
Ian Smart, assistant director of London's Institute of Strategic
Studies, believes that the SS-9 is accurate to within one-half to eight-
tenths of a mile. If that is correct, a five-megaton warhead such as
the SS-9 with a MRV configuration would have a 67-percent prob-
ability of destroying a Minuteman missile in its silo; and if they im-
309
prove that accuracy the kill probability will rise even further. So
I think it would be unwise in the extreme to allow American Se:
curity to rest on facile assumptions concerning Soviet technological
inferiority. Certainly there is nothing in the record of events of the
last 25 years to indicate that they will stay behind us in these key
areas for very long.
SENATOR BUCKLEY’s CONCERN ENDORSED
Now, there are a number of other difficulties with the Interim
Agreement and most of these were raised by Dr. Brennan yesterday
and Senator Buckley this morning—the difficulties involving heavy
versus light missiles and mobile systems and the rest.
I would like to say I simply endorse Senator Buckley's concern
on all of those issues; and I think the basic difficulty with the Interim
Agreement is that it freezes U.S. force levels in areas where the So-
viets have achieved superiority, and leaves the Soviets free to seek
parity or preponderance in areas where we possess superiority. .
One or two final points and these are addressed to comments raised
by the two previous witnesses.
TJ.S. SHOULD RETAIN SURE SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITY
It is argued often that concern with numbers of weapons or
warheads under contemporary conditions is misguided. Both sides,
so this argument runs, possess the power to destroy each other many
times over; this so-called overkill capability is not subject to destruc-
tion by a preemptive first strike. Soviet decisions to procure more
launchers or warheads, therefore, need not influence U.S. weapons
decisions except in the most extreme of eventualities. The fact is,
however, that whether our kill capability is “over” or “under” de-
pends on what our enemy could do to that capability in a preemptive
attack. That, in turn, clearly depends at least partially on the numbers
of missiles and warheads in his arsenal. Given a sufficiently large
numerical margin in his favor, the pressures upon him to strike
first could grow substantially. While it is sometimes argued that any
grOSS future enemy superiority in numbers of deliverable weapons
could be overcome by U.S. adoption of a rapid fire or launch-on-
warning strategic posture and contingency plan, most observers re-
ject this solution as highly dangerous and destabilizing, given the
unsolved problems in determining quickly enough precisely what con-
stitutes the kind of enemy attack requiring instantaneous launch, et
Cetera.
Such calculations are not made any easier by the growing sophis-
tication in the use of penetration aids, decoys, and the rest, so for
this reason most responsible observers, I think, believe we should
continue to retain a sure second-strike capability.
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF AGREEMENT
Finally, I think attention should be given to the political implica-
tions of the agreement. Even if it is conceded that the superiority in
numbers of land- and sea-based missiles which it guarantees to the
310
Soviet Union does not in itself adversely affect American Security, it
is worth inquiring about the possible impact of the fact upon our
image abroad, as perceived by both friend and foe, and its effect on
our political influence and power. Appearances are realities in interna-
tional politics, as John Kennedy once reminded us, and a nation’s
influence and effective power often exist in direct proportion to its
reputation for military preeminence. -
If other nations become persuaded that a new and permanent im-
balance of power in the Soviets’ favor is now a fact of international
life, the consequences could be profound indeed. This would be even
more true if the Soviets were to achieve parity or superiority in num-
bers of warheads, as distinguished from superiority in numbers of
launchers or in amount of megatonnage five years ahead.
Taken in conjunction with the new U.S. low profile and apparent
withdrawal from some areas of the globe, wise as that action may be in
Several cases, the apparent abandoning of a policy of parity may well
arouse fears among our allies, and perhaps hopes among our enemies,
of a reversion to isolationism on the part of the U.S. Once again,
prudence appears to dictate careful attention to this area in the post-
SALT era. . . . I think again in that connection that it is useful to
reflect upon the significance of the two arguments defending the
SALT accords, offered by the President and Mr. Kissinger.
PRESIDENT NIxON's ARGUMENT DEFENDING ACCORDS
The first argument, and I refer here now to Mr. Nixon's statement
transmitting the treaties to the Senate, the first argument defends the
accords on grounds that without the agreement the U.S. would five
years from now be in an even weaker position vis-a-vis the USSR than
is now the case. In noting that the U.S. has no ongoing program in
land- or sea-based missile systems, while the Soviets have been increas-
ing their totals by several hundred each year, and that this did not
constitute the best of all bargaining positions, Mr. Kissinger conceded
that the U.S. was negotiating from a position of weakness and essen-
tially took what it could get. One must ask what we might feel com-
pelled to accept should the Soviets have achieved numerical super-
iority in warheads by 1977.
It has often been suggested in testimony before this committee and
by the chairman himself in his various publications that should the
U.S. continue with present plans to improve its strategic position rela-
tive to that of the USSR, the Soviet military would have sufficient
excuse to demand further additions to the Soviet arsenal, and the
continuation of the arms spiral would thereby be ensured. Conversely,
if the U.S. forbears to add to its strategic power, the forces of modera-
tions in the USSR might be encouraged and the arms race fade away.
THESIS THAT ARMS RACES ARE SELF-GENERATING UNIPROVED
The debate over whether strength or goodwill is the proper founda-
tion for an effective foreign policy or an effective disarmament is as old
as international relations itself and certainly will not be solved here. It
is worth noting that even Mr. Nixon has, on occasion of late, flirted with
the goodwill position. It can only be suggested here that Soviet foreign
31.1
policy, like our own, is determined by a highly complex Series of inter-
acting factors, both domestic and international, and that the capacity of
the U.S. to influence decisively Soviet decision making by unilateral
initiatives does not appear to be great.
The thesis that arms races are self-generating phenomena remains in
any event unproved.
I might point out, finally, that the U.S. decision in the 1960s to halt
acquisition of new offensive system clearly did not inspire a compar-
able Soviet decision. Incidentally, I am not surprised to note that most
of the individuals who five years ago were insisting that the USSR
would be satisfied with strategic parity with the U.S. once parity had
been achieved, have not had their optimism dampened by their previous
errors in judgment and analysis.
Man’s capacity to draw the relevant lessons from history has always
appeared to be limited.
MORAL PROBLEM WITH ABM TREATY
I have a few remarks in my statement about the ABM Treaty and
again I would be repeating much of what Senator Buckley said. I sim-
ply endorse his remarks about the moral problem that he finds with that
treaty, particularly the implications that we will forbear in the future
to construct a defensive system should the technology become available
to protect the population of the U.S.
If I were in the Senate I doubt whether I would vote for that treaty
myself on those precise grounds.
DOUBTS ABOUT TREATY
Just to conclude now, Mr. Nixon, in his transmittal message expressed
the view that “besides enhancing our national Security, these agree-
ments open the opportunity for a new and more constructive U.S.-
Soviet relationship, characterized by negotiated settlement of differ-
ences, rather than by the hostility and confrontation of decades past.”
The above remarks indicate my doubts about the treaty On Several
grounds. I fear, on the contrary, that the agreements do little to slow
down the arms race or ensure global strategic stability, that they will
not have a substantial impact on Soviet-American relations, and that
they may create serious potential dangers for American security in the
future. If the accords do indeed represent the best possible solution to
the current strategic problem faced by the U.S., it is imperative that we
substantially improve our military posture without delay.
(Dr. Dornan's prepared statement follows:)
STATEMENT OF : DR. JAMES S. DORNAN, JR., SPECIAL CONSULTANT, LIBERTY LOBBY
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee : I am Dr. James E. Dornan, Jr.,
assistant professor in the Department of Politics, Catholic University, and also
assistant professor at Johns Hopkins University, as well a consultant to the
Center for International Business at Pepperdine University, LOS Angeles. I
have written articles On American foreign policy and national Security affairs
for a number of professional journals, and am COmpleting a bOOk, Founding
Fathers and World Politics, to be published by Johns Hopkins Press.
I am also a special consultant for LIBERTY LOBBY, and appreciate this
opportunity to present the views of LIBERTY LOBBY’s 20,000-member Board of
Policy, and also to appear on behalf of the 110,000 Other subscribers to its monthly
legislative report, Liberty Letter.
31.2
Historians of the future will almost certainly judge the massive development
Of the Soviet Strategic arsenal from 1967 to 1972 to be the most crucial fact Of
the present historical era. A few years ago—and during the preceding 15 years
as well—the U.S.S.R. was substantially inferior to the U.S. in virtually every
Category of strategic power : land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBM), sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), number and accuracy of war-
heads, total Weapons megatonnage, and long-range strategic aircraft, inter alia.
The U.S. thus possessed the maximum degree of Security possible in the nuclear
age—a security resting on the certain knowledge that any nation choosing to
attack the American homeland, even a nation utilizing its full Strategic potential,
could be utterly destroyed by an American retaliatory blow.
There is, Of Course, no Way Of measuring the precise impact of American
strategic preponderance upon Soviet and Chinese behavior in world affairs during
the first 20 years Of the Cold war, although few would deny the existence of a
direct relationship between Russian and Chinese prudence and American power
during that period. In any event, after 1967 the U.S. added no new missiles to
its strategic arsenal, and as a COnsequence in 1972 the strategic balance between
the two superpowers is vastly different, as the two charts below clearly indicate:
TABLE I.—GROWTH OF UNITED STATES AND SOVIET ICBM/SLBM STRENGTH, 1962–721
1962 1967 1972
U.S.S.R.:
ICBM-------------------------------------------------------- 75 460 1,510
SLBM--------------- '- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 130 520
United States: -
ICBM-------------------------------------------------------- 294 1,054 1,054
SLBM------------------------------------------------------- 144 656 656
1 Institute of Strategic Studies, “The Military Balance for 1971–72,” printed in Air Force Magazine, vol. 54, No. 12
(December 1971), p. 99; also Department of Defense information appearing in the Washington Post, May 27, 1972.
TABLE II.-COMPARATIVE STRATEGIC STRENGTH, UNITED STATES AND U.S.S.R.?
United States - Soviet Union
Category Type - Number Type Number
Land-based missiles:
Titan 2------------- 54 SS-7 Saddler------- } 220
Minuteman 1 ------- 900 §: Sasin---------
ICBM-------------------------------------- Minuteman 2------- SS-9 Scarp--------- 288
* Minuteman 3- - - - - - - 100 SS-11-------------- 950
SS-13 Savage------- 60
|RBM-------------------------------------------------------------------- SS-5 Skean--------- 100
MRBM------------------------------------------------------------------- SS-4 Scandal- - - - - - - 600
Cruise missiles----------------------------------------------------------- SSC-1 Shaddock---- 100
Sea-based missiles:
- Polaris A2---------- 160 SS-N-5 Serb – ----- 30
SLBM (nuclear submarines)------------------ Polaris A3------ "- - - - 432 SS-N-6------------- 400
Poseidon----------- 64
SLBM (diesel submarines)------------------------------------------------- §: §. --- #
Cruise missiles (submarines)----------------------------------------------- Shaddock----------- 310
Cruise missiles (surface vessels)-------------------------------------------- Shaddock----------- 48
Aircraft: • ‘(B-52 C-F 150 MW3–4 Bi 40
TJ4- VTI - - - - - - - - - - ya-4 BISOn--------
Long-range bombers------------------------- {# G/H----------- 210 Tu-20 Bear--------- 100
Medium-range bombers---------------------- FB-111------------- 70 Tu-16 Badger------- 500
2 Ibid.
The Soviet Union has now far Surpassed the U.S. in total Weapons metation-
nage and number of ICBM's, and will soon possess a numerical margin in SLBM's
as well. No responsible observer doubts that the Soviets possess the Scientific
and technological competence to eradicate, within the near future, remaining
U.S. margins of superiority in warhead design and accuracy.
It is in this context that the recently negotiated SALT accords must be eValu-
ated. First, it would seem immediately relevant for the Committee on Foreign
Relations to ask how and why this fundamental alteration in the strategic
balance between the superpowers occurred. In particular, it would be useful to
3.13
know both the operating assumptions of American policy-makers and their esti-
mates of Soviet capabilities and intentions during the five years of the Soviet
weapons build-up. It has been suggested, for example, that Secretaries McNamara
and Rusk and President Johnson were persuaded that the Soviet Union would
halt major acquisition of offensive weapons Systems Once Strategic parity With
the U.S. had been achieved. It would be useful to know whether the Johnson
administration's decisions on weapons systems were based on estimates of Soviet
intentions Or whether they simply represented the adoption Of a new deterrence
strategy for the U.S. In either case it is a fact that during the Johnson years the
U.S. made the strategic decision to terminate its building program in offensive
systems and to concentrate on qualitative improvements. So too with the Nixon
administration, during whose tenure in office—and while the SALT negotiations
were in process—the Soviets also registered striking gains in the strategic
weapons field.
An assessment of the motives for the Soviet weapons build-up in the past decade
would be particularly beneficial because of its relevance for possible Soviet deci-
Sions on weapons acquisitions in the post-SALT era. Some students of SOViet
behavior have asserted, for example, that the fundamental decisions leading to
the 1967–1972 build-up were made well before the Cuban crisis of 1962, which
may indicate that the build-up cannot be explained solely as a defensive reaction
to the Soviet retreat under fire during the Khrushchev-Kennedy confrontation.
Recent Soviet diplomatic and military activities in the Middle East, the Persian
Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and the Caribbean, when analyzed in conjunction with the
weapons build-up, may indicate that Soviet foreign policy has entered a new,
dynamic phase which could pose serious threats to the Security of her neighbors
and to U.S. Security as well.
The question is, then, whether American acceptance of the Nixon-Brezhnev
agreements would constitute an at least partially adequate response to Such
international developments as these, and whether, more generally, the SALT
accords would enhance or detract from the capacity Of the U.S. to protect her
interests and her security in the years ahead. I am hard-pressed to anSWer
affirmatively to either question ; and I believe that the agreements contain
Serious limitations, both as a contribution toward meaningful arms COntrol and
as an aid to American Security.
From this perspective, the most immediate problems arise from the Interim
Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms. The Agreement has been widely hailed as establishing a “freeze”
On the acquisition. Of Offensive weapons by the major powers; in fact, however,
the only power even partially “frozen” is the U.S. Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
are permitted to modernize and replace land-based and Sea-launched ballistic
missiles as new technological developments warrant; warhead capibility and
accuracy will thus become key areas of competition in an altered arms race. The
U.S., for example, will be able to replace approximately 10 Of the older A–3
Polaris-type submarines with the new Trident system vessels, and eventually
may also replace the Poseidon system with a more advanced ULMS. The Soviets,
On their part, have tested a 3,500-mile SLBM and are believed to be building a
new, larger class of ballistic missile submarine, probably to replace the Older
G. and H classes which have Only 3 and 4 missile launchers. In fact, in this Sense
the Agreement has merely transformed the arms race from a quantitative
Competition to a qualitative One. No controls whatever are placed on Such key ele-
ments of military power as strategic aircraft, naval forces beyond submarines,
Or forward land bases for the development of nuclear-armed tactical aircraft.
Thus, U.S. plans for a substantial B–1 bomber force and possible Russian acquisi-
tion of a new variable geometry bomber are not affected by the Agreement.
Indeed, since the fundamental conditions which led to the arms race originally—
the Conflicting ideologies and ambitions as well as clashes of interests which
have characterized relations between the two powers since at least the end of
World War II—have not been essentially altered, pressures on the powers to
escalate the arms race in areas not subject to restriction under the Agreement
are likely to prove Overwhelming. The need for power and the appearance of
power in a competitive world, as well as the mutual fears which are the in-
evitable accompaniment Of competition at the great-power level, remain, and
may even be exacerbated. Pressures to continue arms build-ups, as exemplified
by the recent statements emanating from Secretary Laird, will be at least as
great within the Soviet Union as in the U.S. And, rightly, neither nation feels
31.4
that it can afford to make strategic decisions on mutual protestations of sin-
Cerity and love for peace.
The Soviet Union, moreover, is permitted under the Agreement to proceed
With all land-based and sea-launched missiles now under construction. When
the On-going programs are completed, therefore, the Soviet arsenal will consist
Of Somewhere between 1400 and 1600 ICBM's and 740 to 950 SLBM's; the exact
total is contingent upon Soviet decisions concerning the “cashing in" of her
220 older SS-7 and SS-8 weapons and other replacement by more modern land-
based Or Sea-based launchers. The U.S. remains frozen at her 1967 level of
1,054 ICBM's and 656 SLBM's. Since strategic bombers are not controlled by
the Agreement the U.S. will most probably retain her margin here; while pub-
lished figures on the available number of U.S. bombers vary somewhat, we
p0SSess approximately 390 more strategic aircraft than the U.S.S.R. (see Table
II above) .” The Soviet Union will thus possess, within the lifetime of the agree-
ment, a 3 to 2 margin in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
The Soviet advantage is allegedly counterbalanced by the American pre-
ponderance in total numbers of warheads, the result of our earlier mastery of
MIRV technology, which is believed at present to constitute a 5,700 to 2,500
margin. Present plans call for the U.S. to MIRV 550 Minuteman missiles with
three 200 kiloton weapons, and 496 missiles of the Poseidon type with ten 50
kilotorſ Weapons. It is also allegedly counterbalanced by such factors as the
Superior accuracy of U.S. weapons and the flexibility afforded by our overseas
bases." For a variety of reasons, however, the significance of these U.S. advan-
tages Seems exaggerated. Since Soviet nuclear weapons are generally much
larger than Ours, the U.S.S.R. has a huge lead in total megatonnage, usually
estimated to be 4 to 1. Larger weapons, Of course, can Compensate for deficiencies
in accuracy; a 20-megaton weapon will have an 80% chance of destroying a
300 psi silo at an impact point 4000 feet from the target, while a 50-kiloton
weapon (the size warhead with which the U.S. Poseidon missile is armed) must
hit within 750 feet to achieve the same probability of destruction. Even more
significant is the greater “throw-weight” of Soviet missiles. “Throw-weight,”
Of course, is simply the number of thousands Of pounds of warhead which a mis-
sile can deliver. Soviet payload capacity has increased enormously since 1966,
and it has been Variously estimated that it now Stands at three Or four times
that of the American strategic forces.” This larger Soviet payload capacity is
embodied principally in the SS—9 missile, now designed to carry either one 25-
megaton weapon or three 5-megaton MRV warheads. The Soviets reportedly
have at least 288 SS—9 missiles either deployed or under construction."
In addition, the U.S.S.R. is building silos (at least 25) for an even larger
missile, with a diameter at least 30% larger than the SS—9, and thus with an
even more substantial throw-weight. Administration. SOUrces have reported that
the Russians have developed a method, through new launching techniques, Of
fitting these new missiles into SS-9 silos. Since the Interim Agreement forbids
Only the Substitution of heavy ICBM's for light missiles, there is nothing to
prevent the Soviet Union from eventually deploying the new heavy missile as a
replacement for all SS-9's ; this would apparently involve a total of 313 such
missiles." The significance of these figures is obvious. In five years—and perhaps
much sooner—the Soviets will Surely develop an Operational MIRV capability ;
when that capability is harnessed to the giant new missile, there arises the pos-
Sibility of a SOviet heavy-missile force Of 313 launchers, each Carrying 20 war-
heads of 500 kilotons each or 40 Warheads of 200 kilotons each. The totals are
8 U.S. News & World Report, June 12, 1972, described the U.S. bomber force as consisting
of 440 B-52's and 76, FB-111’s. In news dispatches printed in Washington Post of
June 15 and June 21, 1972, dealing with recent groundings of American aircraft for repair
and structural defects, the Associated Press, listed the totals as 67 FB-111’s and 455
B–52's. The Institute of Strategic Studies has reported that 90 B–52's are in “active
storage,” op. cit., p. 52. It should also be noted that the Soviets possess 200 TU–22
ºle. medium-range bombers which, with refueling, could reach North American targets,
Op. C4t., p. 59.
4 See, for example, New York Times, May 27, 1972. It is also argued that U.S. tactical
aircraft based in Europe, many of which are said to be armed with nuclear weapons, add
to the potency of the American deterrent. But the Soviets also possess large numbers of
Europe-based tactical aircraft, as well as IRBM's and MRBM's appropriately targeted, and
given the NATO role of the American forces in Europe, their net additive to U.S. deterrent
strength would appear to be small. -
* See, for example, the estimates of Donald G. Brennan of the Hudson Institute in
“When the SALT Hit the Fan,” National Review, June 23, 1972, p. 686.
* See, e.g., New York Times, May 25, 1972, and Los Angeles Times, May 11, 1972.
7 See New York Times, May 25, 1972.
31.5
6,260 and 12,520, respectively: in the first instance, the heavy missiles alone will
carry more warheads than the entire present-day American total; in the Second,
a total as large as the most optimistic projections of Our Own Warhead total by
1977. Calculating a potential MIRV capacity for up to 950 Soviet SLBM’s and
1100 SS—11 and SS—13 ICBM's Of no greater potential than that possessed by U.S.
Poseidon and Minuteman III missiles,” this means a maximum Soviet Warhead
total of more than 25,000. In turn, this might well constitute a first Strike Capabil-
ity for the U.S.S.R., depending on the nature of U.S. strategic forces in existence
at the time.
Now these figures represent, to be sure, the worst of all possible WOrlds, and
the likelihood that the Soviets would choose to deploy warheads On Such a Scale
will doubtless be questioned. Nevertheless, the discussion at the Very least Seems
to emphasize the fact that the SALT accords place no restrictions on warhead
development and deployment, and there are thus absolutely nO COntrols Over One
of the most significant aspects of the arms race. Moreover, any realistic Amer-
ican deterrence strategy must take Soviet capabilities as well as intentions into
account now, in making the decisions that will select Our Strategic posture a
decade hence. Since the time span between design and actual deployment of ad-
vanced weapons systems has reached a decade or more, and since the Agree-
ment prevents the U.S. from adding heavy land-based missiles to Our deterrent
force, hard choices on alternative weapons systems lie just ahead, if We are to
keep pace with Soviet warhead deployment.
Moreover, there is no reason to assume that the U.S.S.R. will be permanently
barred from acquiring overseas bases comparable to Our Own, perhaps in Latin
America and elsewhere, thus cancelling another existing American advantage.
Neither is it clear that the superior accuracy of American missiles is Or will
be as decisive a factor in the strategic equation as Often is assumed. I have
already pointed. Out that warhead size can at least partially COmpensate for
missile inaccuracy ; and the SOviets have already achieved a substantial im-
provement in accuracy in the SS—9 series. Ian Smart, assistant director of Lon-
don's Institute of Strategic Studies, believes that the SS-9 is accurate to within
One-half to eight-tenths of a mile. If that is correct, a five-megaton Warhead
such as the SS—9 with a MRV configuration would have a 67% probability Of
destroying a Minuteman missile in its silo. If the target accuracy Could be re-
duced to a quarter of a mile, the kill probability would rise to 99%.” In any
event, it would be unwise in the extreme to allow American Security to rest On
facile assumptions concerning Soviet technological inferiority.
Finally, serious questions must be asked about the future role of the B-52
strategic link in the U.S. deterrent force. References to the “aging B-52” have
already achieved the status of an Air Force cliche, a fact which is not surprising
in view Of the fact that the last models came Off the assembly line more than a
decade ago. B-52 repair crews fight a continuing struggle against Corrosion, and
maintenance problems continue to worsen ; evidence that major structural de-
fects exist in the D and F series, totaling 172 aircraft, was reported by the Air
FOrce to the HOOver Defense Appropriations Subcommittee as recently as last
March.” In addition, questions continue to arise concerning the reliability of the
F-111; the entire fleet of the tactical fighter version of this aircraft was once
again grounded on June 20, after another series of unexplained crashes.”
Moreover, although the B-52 was designed for high-altitude bombing, the proved
effectiveness of Soviet air defenses has forced the U.S. to adopt a strategy of low-
altitude penetration. Serious reservations exist about the ability of the B-52's to
take the pounding suffered on low-altitude bomb runs.” While the development
Of the Short Range Attack Missile could enhance the strategic value of the
B-52's during the next five years, their useful life is clearly nearing an end.”
* The Poseidon missiles each carry 10 MIRV’s in the 50-kiloton range, while the Minute-
man III's carry, 3 MIRV’s in the 200-kiloton range. The older Polaris A-3's are configured
for 3 MRV in the 200-kiloton range, or a single 1-megaton warhead. When the 31 newer
ballistic-missile submarines have been equipped to carry the Poseidon missile, the U.S.
submarine forge will carry 5,440 warheads capable of hitting 5,120, targets. See Herbert
Scoville, Jr., “Missile Submarines and National Security,” Scientific American, June, 1972,
printed in Congressional Record, June 21, 1972, p. S9845.
* See Los Angeles Times, May 11, 1972.
19 Washington Post, June 15, 1972.
11 Ibid., June 21, 1972.
* See, e.g., Los Angeles Times, May 11, 1972.
* The B-52 can be equipped to carry 24, SRAM missiles, which reportedly will have a
range of up to 85 miles. The planned B–1, will be able to carry 32 SRAM’s.
80–942 O—72—21
316
There are other difficulties with the Interim Agreement, most of which have
been raised by Senator Jackson in speeches on the Senate floor. For example,
Serious consideration ought to be given to possible Soviet motives in refusing to
agree to include in the Agreement a ban on the deployment of mobile land-based
missile Systems, in rejecting a precise definition of “light” and “heavy” ICBM's,
and in maintaining Official secrecy about the exact number of ICBM's currently
deployed and under construction in the U.S.S.R. As Senator Jackson has noted,
it is possible to conceal land-based missile emplacements, at least for a time;
intelligence Sources indicate that in the past whole ICBM fields not previously
known have suddenly been uncovered by our detection systems. We thus remain
to SOme degree uncertain of the exact number of missiles in the Soviet arsenal.
These could prove to be significant ambiguities, and the refusal of the Soviets
to resolve them could indicate an intention to seek further improvement in the
size of their strategic forces at Our expense.
Fundamentally, then, the difficulty with the Interim Agreement is that it
freezes U.S. force levels in areas where the Soviets have achieved superiority.
and leaves the Soviets free to seek parity or preponderance in areas where we
p08SeSS Superiority. Not Only does the Agreement not call a halt to the arms race,
therefore, but it also contains clear dangers to U.S. security for the future.
To be Sure, it is Often argued that concern with numbers of weapons Or war-
heads under COntemporary conditions is misguided. Both sides, so this argument
runs, possess the power to destroy each other many times Over; this “Overkill”
capability is not subject to destruction by a preemptive first strike. SOviet de-
cisions to procure more launchers Or warheads, therefore, need not influence U.S.
weapons decisions except in the most extreme of eventualities. The fact is, how-
ever, that whether our “kill” capability is “over” or “under” depends. On what
Our enemy could do to that capability in a preemptive attack. That, in turn,
Clearly depends at least partially On the numbers Of missiles and warheads in his
arsenal; given a sufficiently large numerical margin in his favor, the pressures
upon him to Strike first could grOW substantially. While it is Sometimes argued
that any groSS future enemy Superiority in numbers of deliverable weapons could
be overcome by U.S. adoption of a “rapid ſire” or “launch on warning” strategic
posture and contingency plan, mOSt Observers reject this solution as highly dan-
gerous and destabilizing, given the unsolved problems in determining quickly
enough precisely what constitutes the kind Of enemy attack requiring instan-
taneous launch, etc.; such calculations are not made any easier by the growing
sophistication in the use of penetration aids, decoys, and MIRVed missiles. The
moral pitfalls in making a quick decision based On available evidence in Such a
COnfusing situation have led many to argue that we have an Obligation to
ensure retention of an ensured second-strike Capability. The U.S. military has
traditionally argued that the best solution to these potential difficulties is the
maintenance of a “triad” of weapons systems in our deterrent force (i.e., ICBM's,
SLBM's, and strategic bombers) so as to complicate inordinately the problems Of
an attacker who seeks to destroy Our Second-strike capability ; if this argument
is sound, we should give top priority to the acquisition of the planned B-1 bomber
force of 227 aircraft. -
Finally, attention should be given to the political implications of the Agree-
ment. Even if it is conceded that the Superiority in numbers of land- and sea-
based missiles which it guarantees to the Soviet Union does not in itself adversely
affect American security, it is worth inquiring about the possible import of
that fact upon our image abroad, as perceived by both friends and foe, and its
effect on our political influence and power. Appearances are realities in inter-
national politics, as John Kennedy Once reminded us, and a nation’s influence
and effective power often exists in direct proportion to its reputation for military
preeminence. If Other nations become persuaded that a new and permanent
imbalance of power in the Soviets’ favor is now a fact of international life,
the consequence could be profound indeed. This would be even more true if the
Soviets were to achieve parity or Superiority in numbers of warheads (as dis-
tinguished from Superiority in numbers of launchers Or in amount Of mega-
tonnage). Taken in conjunction with the new U.S. “low profile” and apparent
withdrawal from Some areas Of the globe, wise as that action may be in several
cases, the apparent abandoning of a policy of parity may well arouse fears
among Our allies (and perhaps hopes among Our enemies) of a reversion to
isolationism. On the part Of the U.S. Once again, prudence appears to dictate
Careful attention to this area in the post-SALT era. -
317
With regard to this topic, it is useful to reflect upon the significance of the
two arguments defending the SALT accords, offered by the President and Mr.
Kissinger. On the one hand, they defend it on grounds that without the Agree-
ment the U.S. would five years from now be in an even weaker position Vis-a-vis
the U.S.S.R. than is now the case.” In noting that the U.S. has no on-going
program in land- or sea-based missile systems while the Soviets have been increas-
ing their totals by several hundred each year, and that this did not constitute
the best of all bargaining positions, Mr. Kissinger concluded that the U.S. was
negotiating from a position of weakness, and essentially took What it could get.
One must ask what we might feel compelled to accept should the Soviets have
achieved numerical Superiority in warheads by 1977. -
It has been suggested in testimony before this Committee that should the
U.S. continue with present plans to improve its strategic position relative to
that Of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet military would have sufficient excuse to demand
further additions to the SOViet arsenal, and the COntinuation Of the arms Spiral
would thereby be ensured; conversely, if the U.S. forbears to add to its strategic
power, the forces of moderation in the U.S.S.R. might be encouraged and the
arms race fade away. There is no Way to prove Or disprove that proposi-
tion. The debate Over whether strength or good-will is the proper foundation
for an effective foreign policy. Or an effective disarmament is as Old as
international relations itself, and will not be solved here; it is worth noting
that even Mr. Nixon has, On Occasion of late, flirted with the good-will position.
It can only be suggested here that Soviet foreign policy, like our own, is deter-
mined by a highly complex Series of interacting factors, both domestic and
international, and that the capacity of the U.S. to influence decisively Soviet
decision-making by unilateral initiatives does not appear to be great. The
thesis that arms races are self-generating phenomena remains in any event
unproved. Lastly, the U.S. decision in the 1960's to halt acquisition of a new
launching System clearly did not inspire a comparable Soviet decision. Inci-
dentally, I am not Surprised to note that most Of the individuals who five years
ago were insisting that the U.S.S.R. would be satisfied with strategic parity
have not had their Optimism dampened by previous errors in judgment, and
argue today in a similar fashion about likely Soviet progress in warhead acquisi-
tion. Man's capacity to draw the relevant lessons from history has always
appeared to be limited.
It remains Only to remark briefly on the Treaty On the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems. Most commentary on the Treaty has applauded it as
a long step toward acceptance by both sides of a deterrence strategy of mutually
assured destruction. If both powers eschew defensive systems, the argument
runs, they Will thereby decrease the likelihood that a second-strike attack could
be contained Sufficiently to avoid unacceptable destruction. A high degree of
Strategic equilibrium will thus have been achieved, and the danger of nuclear
war will correspondingly be reduced. I have already dealt with overly-facile as-
Sumptions about the maintenance of “plateaus” in strategic relationships during
my discussion of possible warhead developments under the Interim Agreement.
Here I Suggest Only that the whole theory of “mutual assured destruction” de-
Serves a careful reexamination : it appears to postulate an excessive degree of
rationality on the part of decision-makers and decision-making systems, an as-
Sumption for which there is little supporting evidence. In the words of Donald
Brennan, advocates Of mutual assured destruction seem to “have been bemused
by theoretical models of strategic interactions, models which seem sophisticated
and intellectually appealing but which are in fact much over-simplified descrip-
tions of reality.” “ There are moral questions involved as well: if deterrence
fails under Conditions of MAD, utter devastation of both countries is the inevi-
table result. While the technology to avoid such destruction may not yet be avail-
able, a treaty which points to permanent renunciation by the U.S. of the right to
defend its populace should not yet be ratified without a careful consideration of
its implications. -
In his message announced while transmitting the SALT accords to Congress,
Mr. Nixon expressed the view that “besides enhancing our national security,
4 & 14 “The Interim Agreement.” Mr. Kissinger told the Congressional leadership on June 15,
perpetuates nothing which did not already exist in fact and which could only have gotten
Worse without an agreement.” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 8
No. 25 (June 19, 1972), p. 1050.
* Brennan, loc. cit., p. 689.
y
3.18
these agreements open the opportunity for a new and more constructive U.S.-
Soviet relationship, characterized by negotiated settlement of differences, rather
than by the hostility and confrontation of decades past.” The above remarks in-
dicate my doubts about the treaty on several grounds. I fear, On the contrary,
that the agreements do little to slow down the arms race or ensure global strategic
stability, that they will not have a substantial impact on Soviet-American rela-
tions, and that they may create serious potential dangers for American Security
in the future. If the accords to indeed represent the best possible Solution to the
current strategic problem faced by the U.S., it is imperative that we substantially
improve our military posture without delay.
Thank you again for the opportunity to present our views today.
Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Dornan.
You have certainly raised some questions, answers to which we all
need.
OPPOSITION TO RATIFICATION OF TREATY
Tell me this, just as things are before us, do you oppose the ratifica-
tion of the treaty?
Mr. DoRNAN. The ABM Treaty troubles me for the reasons given.
Senator SPARKMAN. I know you bring that out but I never do find
any gº word as to whether or not you think we should refuse to
ratify.
Mr. DoRNAN. Let me put it this way: Certainly the technology for
an effective missile defense does not presently exist, so the kind of ob-
jections raised by Senator Buckley this morning are moot or contingent
on future developments. I would be opposed to the treaty, would vote
against it were I a U.S. Senator, unless it contained an escape hatch,
One much more clear than it presently contains, an escape hatch that
would enable us to withdraw from the treaty should at some future
point in time technology be available to protect our population.
SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF U.S. DEVELOPMENT OF EFFECTIVE ABM
CAPABILITY
I would like to address myself to a question Senator Cooper ad-
dressed somewhat earlier: If we developed an effective ABM defense,
wouldn’t that be destabilizing, possibly leading the Soviets to believe
we were perfecting a first-strike capability on our own?
I think there is a great deal of misunderstanding on this question,
not with you people but with the American people. The U.S. lacks a
first strike capability because it lacks appropriate weapons. It is not
only a case of our not possessing sufficient numbers of missiles. In fact,
we don’t have a first-strike capability because of the size of our war-
heads which are not apparently accurate enough to destroy Soviet
missiles in their silos in a preemptive strike, so I don’t think that de-
stabilizing factor exists.
I don’t think, therefore, that the Soviets could possibly interpret
U.S. development of an effective ABM capability as a prelude to an
effective preemptive first-strike capability of the U.S. So without that
escape hatch I would
ESCAPE HATCH RECOMMENDATION
Senator SPARKMAN. Let's get through with the treaty. The treaty
does not at the present time contain that escape hatch that you recom-
mend ?
319
Mr. DoRNA.N. Right.
Senator SPARKMAN. And, of course, the treaty comes before us as it
is. We can’t amend it.
Mr. DoRNAN. Well, the Senate can certainly attach reservations.
Senator SPARKMAN. We can have reservations, but a reservation does
not put something into the treaty that is not there already.
Mr. DoRNAN. Right. Well, I think then
Senator SPARKMAN. So I just wanted to get it definitely, as the treaty
stands now, you would be opposed to it?
Mr. DoRNAN. Yes, with the additional reservations I think it would
be acceptable given the technological problem I referred to earlier.
DANGERS IN WARHEAD DEVELOPMENT AND MIRV CAPABILITY
Senator SPARKMAN. But now go ahead with the agreement.
Mr. DoRNAN. Well, on the agreement, I think the President and Mr.
Kissinger both have raised a relevant point. In the absence of those
agreements, we are quite likely to be even worse off than we are at
the end of five years than would be the case under the treaty. So I
think Mr. Nixon is correct when he argues that the treaty can be
Separated or can be evaluated on its own merits and the agreement
can be approved on its own merits and probably should be for that
reason; but I certainly believe that there are dangers that exist in the
area of warhead development and MIRV capability and the rest,
dangers that the Soviets will surpass us in the one remaining area we
presently have preeminence; all of that implies it is imperative we go
full speed ahead in this area. -
The proposals of Senator Kennedy, Mr. Bennett and Dr. Rathjens,
that we abandon some of our existing MIRV capability, I find, I must
confess, truly incredible.
Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you.
Senator Cooper?
Senator CoopFR. I am sorry I was not here when you made your
statement. I was on the floor to vote but I will read it carefully.
I think I can get from what you just said some of the problems—
Mr. DoRNAN. Yes, quite similar to many raised by Senator Buckley
this morning and by Dr. Brennan yesterday.
Senator CoopFR. Thank you.
Senator SPARKMAN (presiding). Next we will hear from Mr. San-
ford Gottlieb, representing SANE, A Citizens’ Organization for a
Sane World.
Glad to have you.
STATEMENT OF SANFORD GOTTLIEB, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SANE,
CITIZENS’ ORGANIZATION FOR A SANE WORLD
Mr. GOTTLIEB. I am an executive director for SANE. I would like
to submit my full statement and just make a few points.
Senator SPARKMAN. That will be done.
Mr. GOTTLIEB. I hope these will be simple points in a discussion
which I think becomes unnecessarily complicated.
320
SECRETARY M’NAMARA's CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE
Number one, as Secretary of Defense McNamara said in 1967, the
number of nuclear warheads deliverable on target was the most mean-
ingful measure of nuclear capability. Secretary McNamara was talk-
ing about deterrence, and his concept was based on the notion that if
you had enough nuclear warheads each one of which could destroy a
city, you would deter the other side. He then went on to say that
between 200 and 400 megaton size warheads would be sufficient. Of
course, when he said that we already had far surpassed the number
that he was talking about.
We are now up to 5,700 warheads on the American side, and 2,500
on the Soviet side, which, by Mr. McNamara’s definition, can only be
considered overkill.
ACCORDS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS PERMITS ARMS RACE
CONTINUANCE
Secondly, the accords on the strategic offensive weapons permits the
continuation of the arms race; it really does not restrict it. One group,
the Center for Defense Information, has estimated that even under
these accords the United States could go up to 14,000 warheads by the
end of the five-year period. Until such time as the Soviet Union de-
velops MIRV technology, the best they can do is 3,000, so this agree-
ment, not the ABM agreement but the Strategic Offensive Arms Agree-
ment, does nothing to end the arms race.
DISCUSSION OF REALITY NEEDED
Third, there has been a great deal of unnecessary mystification that
has surrounded the public dialogue on this issue. Even the arms con-
trollers use the term qualitative improvements when they are talking
about MIRVs, the very weapon which continues to propel the United
States into an ever-increasing lead in the number of warheads over
the Soviet Union.
I think we should describe what is actually happening. MIRVs
mean thousands more nuclear warheads; each capable of annihilating
a city, will be deployed during the term of this Interim Agreement,
yet the Soviet Union has only 219 cities of 100,000 population and
IQOI’e.
We get concerned, and rightly concerned, when we see the effects of
the recent floods in this country on several American states. We see
hundreds of thousands of people who are now struggling to restore
the semblance of a natural life and perhaps this should bring us back
to some kind of discussion of reality of what we are talking about here
when we talk about one warhead that is capable in one instance of
annihilating several hundred thousand or perhaps millions of people.
EFFECTs of AGREEMENTS ON ARMs RACE
Number four: If I were in the Senate, I would vote for the ABM
Treaty as a modest, tiny step in the direction of general and complete
disarmament; but in terms of the Interim Agreement on strategic
321
weapons, we would have to express serious reservations about that
because it does very little if anything to end the arms race.
TJNFINISHED BUSINESS IN ARMIS FIELD
Finally, we believe it is much more important at this stage of history
to turn to the unfinished business in the arms field. We think that two
parallel courses of action are necessary; one is to refrain from develop-
ing and deploying additional weapon systems such as Trident and
the B–1 bomber which would further increase the overkill in the heavy
Asian-American arsenal, and the other is to seek much more vigorously
than in the past other agreements on arms control and disarmament
and disengagement.
Among these should be a comprehensive nuclear test ban, limitations
on strategic bombers and on antisubmarine warfare, a reduction in the
number of offensive missile launchers, mutual force reductions in
Central Europe which we believe can be encouraged by some unilateral
reductions and limitations on military aid to other nations.
It is not enough, Mr. Chairman, to take tiny steps which permit a
major part of the nuclear arms race to continue. This is the time to
end the arms race. The resources thus saved are urgently needed to
restore our society which has fallen into neglect as we concentrated
for an entire generation on building the ramparts against foreign
threats.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
(Mr. Gottlieb's prepared statement follows:)
PREPARED STATEMENT of SANFORD GoTTLIEB, ExECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF SANE,
A CITIZENS’ ORGANIZATION FOR A SANE WORLD
The best we can say about the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement. On
Strategic Offensive Arms is that the situation would be worse without them.
An unrestricted nuclear arms race has been replaced by a nuclear arms race
with a small measure of mutual restraint. However, the agreements announced
in Moscow represent Only the tiniest step toward ending the nuclear arms race.
Because they permit the continued deployment of thousands more warheads On
individual launchers, these agreements also reflect a lost Opportunity to Clamp
a lid. On Offensive Weapons.
TO assess the significance Of the accords it is necessary to recall former De-
fense Secretary Robert McNamara’s statement to the UPI Editors and Publish-
ers on September 18, 1967: “For the most meaningful and realistic measure of
nuclear capability is neither gross megatonnage, nor the numbers of available
missile launchers; but rather the number Of Separate Warheads that are Capable
Of being delivered with accuracy on individual high-priority targets with suf-
ficient power to destroy them.”
In February, 1968, Secretary McNamara testified that 200-400 megaton-size
nuclear weapons would constitute “an effective nuclear deterrent”.
In short, one megaton-size warhead can destroy a city. Since the Soviet Union
has 219 major cities, 200-400 warheads should suffice as a deterrent even if half
the warheads failed to reach their targets.
Yet, by 1968 the United States already possessed 4,200 strategic nuclear weap-
ons, against the Soviet Union's 1,200–vast Overkill on both sides. According
to the Defense Department’s latest “Posture Statement”, the balance at mid-
1972 will be 5,700 to 2,500, respectively. Thus, between the time former President
Johnson tried to begin the SALT negotiations and the accords announced in
Moscow on May 26, the United States deployed 1,500 additional warheads while
the U.S.S.R. deployed 1,300. In the past year alone the United States added 1,100
warheads, the Soviet Union, 500. The greater American momentum is a reflection
of its three- or four-year lead in deploying multiple warheads (MIRVs).
322
It is precisely in their failure to prevent the expansion of MIRV’s that the
Moscow accords lost a major opportunity to halt the nuclear arms race. If the
pOWer of destruction can be compared to the illumination of a house, these agree-
ments limited the total number of Sockets but did not prevent the residents from
Qusing multiple sockets to which many light bulbs can be attached.
Depending on which Options it chooses under the interim accord. On Offensive
weapons, the United States could double its strike force in warheads and perhaps
go as high as 14,000 during the next five years. Until the Soviet Union develops
MIRV's, it will be unable to deploy much more than 3,000 warheads under the
terms of the agreement. When it perfects multiple warheads, the U.S.S.R. will be
able to double its Strike force. Both nations are free under these agreements
to add Overkill to Overkill.
The concept Of a freeze On the number of launchers, which formed the basis
of the interim Soviet-American agreement, was first advanced by the U.S. Arms
COntrol and Disarmament Agency in 1964. The Johnson Administration as a
whole did not embrace the concept until 1968. When the Nixon Administration
came to Office in 1969, it took nine months to agree upon a negotiating position.
By that time the deployment of MIRV’s was beginning, and the Administration
did not want it stopped by negotiation.
Yet, a leading Pentagon planner is On record as admitting that there is no
rationale for MIRV’s if a limit is placed on ABM's. On April 19, 1971, Dr. John
FOster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, had this dialogue with
Senator Stuart Symington before the Senate Armed Services Committee :
Senator Symington : “Dr. Foster, in that One of the major arguments for
MIRV’s is the penetration of ABM defenses, what would be the requirement for
MIRV’s if a ban were placed on ABM's?”
Dr. FOSter: “Senator Symington, if a ban were placed on the ABM in the Sense
Of banning a capability to intercept a ballistic missile attack, then, as I see it at
the moment, there would be no need for the United Staates to deploy MIRV.”
Thus, the Moscow accords are more important for what they failed to do than
for what they did do:
1. They failed to halt the deployment Of MIRV's, the single most important
cause Of the expansion in Offensive weapons.
2. They failed to limit strategic bombers in any way.
3. They failed to limit anti-submarine warfare, a pursuit which creates in-
Security for those nations Seeking a seaborne deterrent.
4. They failed to Scrap any existing weapons.
On the other hand, the accords did : -
1. Place a limit on the expansion of anti-ballistic missiles (ABM’s) saving
badly-needed funds and removing one of the rationales for deploying MIRV’s.
(The limit on ABM's will permit both nations to increase the number of defensive
missiles above the current levels.)
2. Place at least a numerical limit On the launchers of both sides.
3. Establish the principle of inspection by each nation’s spy satellites rather
than the more politically sensitive System of On-site inspection.
There are two parallel courses Of action which can help Overcome the short-
COmings Of these agreements. One is to refrain from developing and deploying
additional Weapons Systems, Such as Trident and the B–1 bomber, which would
further increase the Overkill in the leviathan American arsenal. The Other is to
seek, much more vigorously than in the past, other agreements on arms control,
disarmament and disengagement.
Among these agreements should be a comprehensive nuclear test ban, limita-
tions On Strategic bombers and on anti-submarine warfare, a reduction in the
number of offensive missile-launchers, mutual force reductions in Central Europe
(Which we believe can be encouraged by some unilateral reductions), and limita-
tions On military aid to other nations.
It is not enough to take tiny steps which permit a major part of the nuclear
arms race to continue. This is the time to end the arms race. The resources thus
saved are urgently needed to restore Our Society, which has fallen into neglect
as We COncentrated for an entire generation. On building the ramparts against
“foreign threats”.
Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much.
Senator Cooper?
323
AGREEMENT REPRESENTS SOME PROGRESS
Senator CoopFR. You do concede, don’t you, that this agreement,
from your viewpoint, and the viewpoint of the people you speak for,
represents some progress? -
Mr. GOTTLIEB. I think the ABM Treaty represents some small ad-
vantage. It is not, I think, a weapon system that either side is particu-
larly interested in, except perhaps for negotiating purposes.
The real ballgame is in offensive missiles and the Interim Agreement
does very little to restrict the deployment of, as I say, as I said earlier,
thousands of additional warheads through MIRVing; so if we had
to -
Senator CoopFR. I don’t believe enough significance is given to the
fact that the Soviet Union and the United States could come into such
an agreement, that they could negotiate for three years
Mr. GoTTLIEB. We would have been a lot happier
Senator COOPER. In a rather dispassionate atmosphere without the
polemics that we associated with the Soviet Union in the past.
Mr. GOTTLIEB. On the one hand, Senator Cooper
Senator CoopFR. And we were able to reach an agreement.
Why do you think it is so easy % -
Mr. GOTTLIEB. Considering the history of the Cold War, one can
only celebrate any agreement that is reached. On the other hand, I
think we have to admit that the agreement comes very late in terms
of the development of the new technology which has brought the arms
race to a higher level of danger.
Senator CoopFR. What did you say about technology?
Mr. GOTTLIEB. I say that on the one hand we can only celebrate any
agreement that has been achieved between the two superpowers, but,
on the other, we have to admit this agreement comes very late because
of the development of a new technology—the MTRW technology.
Senator CoopFR. I don’t know how you could or should stop people
from thinking who are working in research and development of tech-
nology. I think one can disagree or agree with the treaty and with the
agreement; we have had witnesses who presented very good reasons on
both sides, but I think the idea that to reach any agreement is something
quite simple is absolutely incorrect. You know, just go in and sit down
and reach an agreement, I was not here when Senator Clark testified but
I read his statement, and I think he said they were engaged in shadow-
boxing. I had the opportunity to attend three of the meetings and
spaced over periods of, six months apart; and you could see the hard
work of negotiating the difficultissues that were settled. I think the idea
that it is easy to go over there and reach an agreement is very
superficial.
AGREEMENT SHOWS LITTLE RESTRAINT
Mr. GoTTLIEB. If I may say so, Senator, I am not trying to take
away from the hard work of the negotiators that they engaged in;
all I am saying, if at the end of a 5-year period you come out with
14,000 warheads on one side that started out with 5,700, and on the
other perhaps 3,000 or perhaps 6,000 warheads when the Soviet Union
started out with 2,500 at the beginning of that 5-year period, that
you have reached an agreement that shows very little restraint, very
324 -
little restraint. That is the point I am trying to make; therefore,
if I had to rate this agreement on the basis of three cheers, I could
perhaps muster one. ~~~
Senator CoopFR. That is all. #
Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much. We appreciate your
presentation. ~ .
Mr. GoTTLIEB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SPARKMAN. Next, Mrs. Phyllis Schlafly of the National
Association of Pro America. . . .
Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Mr. Chairman—
Senator SPARKMAN. I guess that means you represent all of us.
STATEMENT OF PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY, MEMBER, NATIONAL BOARD
OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRO AMERICA
|
... Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senators. I will try
to save the time of the committee by skipping paragraphs if you will
be kind enough to take the whole statement.
Senator SPARKMAN. The whole paper will be placed in the record.
Mrs. SoHLAFLY. Thank you.
My name is Phyllis Schlafly and I represent the National Associa-
tion of Pro America, a women's volunteer educational organization
dedicated to the protection of our American constitutional republic.
I am also the co-author of three books on nuclear strategy, written in
1964, 1965 and 1968, which accurately predicted that the Soviet Union
had a program to overtake and surpass the United States in nuclear
weapons. -
CONGRESS URGED TO REJECT AGREEMENTS
We urge the Congress to reject the SALT Treaty, the Interim
Agreement and the Protocol. This SAL pact is the most dangerous,
disadvantageous and devious document the United States has ever
signed. No more unequal, craven and degrading agreement has ever
been signed by any nation, except by a nation which was defeated in
war or about to be defeated in war.
The contradictor pro-SAL arguments: The national debate on the
SALT Pact is unique because U.S. officials urging ratification use
two entirely different and mutually-contradictory lines of argument,
one line to persuade the general public and a completely different line
to convince the well-informed. Such a dichotomy is possible only
because of widespread misinformation and misunderstanding on the
part of the general public about the power and purpose of nuclear
weapons.
LINE OF ARGUIMIENT USED FOR GENERAL PUBLIC
Here is the line of argument used for the general public: (1) The
strategic arms limitation pact is a great achievement because it stops
the spiraling arms race; (2) Don’t worry about SALT giving super-
iority to the Soviets in ICBMs, SS-9s, Polaris-type submarines, sub-
marine-launched missiles, et cetera, because this is balanced by U.S.
superiority in numbers of warheads: (3) Don’t worry about SALT
giving superiority to the Soviets because this is balanced by U.S.
3.25
superiority in MIRVs; and (4) Don't worry about SALT giving
superiority to the Soviets because, if the Soviets attack us, we have
enough nuclear weapons to strike back and destroy them. Our retalia-
tory power is variously described as “sufficiency,” “assured destruc-
tion” or “Overkill.” -
Let us examine these arguments: e - tº
(1) The strategic arms limitation pact does not stop the spiraling
arms race. This one-sided pact freezes the United States but gives the
Soviets written authorization to continue their nuclear building pro-
gram for the next five years. The SAL pact gives the Soviets the
go-ahead to complete the 90 to 100 giant new ICBMs on which they
have started construction, and there is no restriction on how much
megatonnage the Soviets can put in these missiles. We are forbidden
to build any ICBMs because we have none under construction.
The SAL pact authorizes the Soviets to continue building their
Polaris submarines until they reach 62, while we are frozen at 44. The
SAL pact does nothing to stop the Soviets from continuing to build
other strategic systems, including mobile ICBMs, reload capability,
bombers and space weapons. -
(2) To understand the joker in the argument that the U.S. has a
5,700 to 2,500 “warhead superiority” over the Soviets, consider this
scenario: You are discussing entering business with a potential part-
ner. He proposes that you each make an investment in the business
and share the profits equally. You ask, “What investment do you have
in mind?” He replies, “I’ll put up $50,000 and you invest $25 million.”
You demur, suggesting that this isn’t equal. He replies, “Both sides
are making an investment and an investment is an investment.”
If you allow yourself to be conned into that kind of unequal business
deal, you won’t stay in business very long. But the enormousinequality
concealed under the word “investment” in this scenario is exactly the
same ratio of inequality concealed under the word “warhead.”
Anyone who cites the figures of 5,700 warheads for the U.S. and
2,500 for the USSR is equating our one-twentieth of a megaton with
a Soviet 25-megaton warhead. This means asking the American peo-
ple to equate 50,000 tons of TNT explosive equivalent—in a MIRVed
U.S. Poseidon—with 25 million tons of TNT explosive equivalent in a
Soviet SS-9. In other words, one Soviet warhead has 24 million 950
ºnd tons of TNT explosive equivalent more than one U.S. war-
€8,Ol.
President Nixon's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel supplemental state-
ment released March 12, 1971, written largely by now Justice Lewis
Powell, severely criticized what it called the “numbers game . . .”
This Blue Ribbon statement specifically exposed the falsehood of a
warhead tabulation by which “a single bomb or one air-to-ground
missile on a B-52 was equated with a Soviet 25-megaton ICBM.”
The Blue Ribbon statement concluded: “This simplistic type of
comparison creates the illusion of abundant security, if not U.S. over-
kill capability. It would be difficult to conceive of a better way to mis-
lead the public than to present, without precides definition or analysis,
comparative figures of this kind. Those who present such distortions
contribute to the confusion rather than enlightenment of our people.”
(3) To understand the joke in the claim that U.S. superiority in
MIRVs compensates for USSR superiority in ICBMs, SS-9s, Polaris-

326
type submarines and SLBMs, consider this comparison: One suburban
developer has a plot for subdividing which has a total area of one
acre. A second developer has a plot for subdividing with a total area of
25 acres. Which one will get the larger number of useful lots out of
the subdivision?
The answer is obvious, and it ought to be just as obvious that the
Soviet ability to MIRV is 25 times greater than ours. We are MIRVing
our one-megaton Minuteman missiles; the Soviet SS-9s are 25 mega-
tons each.
The reason why we are MIRVing our Minuteman and Polaris
missiles is that the Soviets have 64 ABM launchers already deployed
around Moscow, and we adopted the MIRV program in extremis as
a countermeasure to preserve some credibility that some warheads
would get through the Soviets ABMs.
Since we have no deployed ABM, the Soviets have no need to run.
a MIRV race. They can just hit our undefended country with their un-
MIRVed weapons carrying the full megatonnage. But if the Soviets
choose to run a MIRV race, look how they can outpower us, by a factor
of 20 to 1.
EXAMINATION OF ARGUMENT USED FOR GENERAL PUBLIC
(4) The myth that the Soviets are deterred from attacking us by
the knowledge that our sufficiency or assured destruction or overkill
will destroy them is widely believed by the American public, but can-
not persuade anyone who understands the power and the use of nuclear
weapons. For example, in a speech on April 13, 1972, Dr. Edward
Teller, one of the greatest living nuclear scientists, was asked the
question, “If the Soviets launch a surprise nuclear attack against the
United States, what would be the result?”
Senator CoopFR. May I interrupt just a moment?
Mrs. SchLAFLY. Yes, Senator.
Senator CoopFR. I have an amendment and I must go to the floor.
I apologize to you because I know you have been waiting a long time.
Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Shall I continue?
Senator CoopFR. I just wanted to tell you why I was leaving, but I
shall read your statement. -
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Thank you, Senator.
Senator CoopFR. Is that all right?
Senator SPARKMAN. Fine; go right ahead.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. This is a quotation from Dr. Edward Teller:
The question is when. Right now they could do terrible damage. In a few
years, if present trends continue, it is practically certain that it will be the end
Of the United States. The United States will not exist, not as a state, not as a
#. not as an idea. I think that more than 50 percent of our people would be
killed.
I believe that the Soviets could so behave that there would be very few casual-
ties in Russia because we would not have forces enough left to retaliate. They
have excellent defenses—air defenses, missile defenses, civil defenses. It is
p0SSible that in a few years we shall be at the mercy of the Soviet Union unless
preSent trends change.
The real test of U.S. survival is not how many missiles we have in
a peacetime inventory but how many we will have left after a surprise
attack. Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research, told U.S.
327
News and World Report that the Soviets “would require a little over
400 SS-9s to knock out all but a small fraction of our Minuteman's
missiles.” The Soviets have 313 now.
The Mutually Assured Destruction myth has been aptly described
by its acronym as a MAD strategy. Who cares how many Russians we
can kill after the Soviets have killed more than half our population
and destroyed everything we know and love? Retaliation under such
circumstances is irrational.
As Nobel prizewinner Dr. Eugene P. Wigner stated on June 10,
1972, “It would have been better if each nation was assured that the
other could not destroy it.”
ARGUMENT USED TO INTELLECTUAL AUDIENCES
No way to catch up? These four arguments used on the general pub-
lic simply cannot be used on informed people who understand the
power and purpose of nuclear weapons; so an entirely different and
contradictory argument is used confidentially and off the record to
intellectual audiences. Here is the line spelled out in select briefings:
We are lucky to get the Strategic arms limitation pact, even though it guar-
antees the Soviets Superiority in all strategic nuclear weapons, because without
it in the next five years the Soviets would be able to go so much farther ahead
Of us, and there is no way we can possibly catch up because the Soviets have
On-going Weapon programs and We have none.
Let us examine this clever, Sophisticated tangle of truth and un-
truth: (1) It is true that the Soviets have nuclear weapons superiority
now and are increasing their lead rapidly. Note, however, that in this
line of argument to informed audiences that U.S. officials admit Soviet
Superiority while concealing it or sidestepping the point when address-
ing uninformed audiences. (2) It is true that the Soviets have an
ongoing weapon program and are determined to continue building
nuclear weapons. The Soviets have been building more than 150 giant
ICBMs per year. They have doubled the size of their shipyards to
build 8 to 10 Polaris-type submarines a year. On June 15 President
Nixon said, “Mr. Brezhnev and his colleagues made it absolutely clear
that they are going forward with defense programs in the offensive
areas which are not limited by these agreements.” (3) It is true that
the United States has no ongoing nuclear weapon production. We have
been in a strategic nuclear weapon freeze ordered by Robert McNamara
in 1967 and still in effect. We have not built a single ICBM, SLBM,
Polaris submarine, strategic bomber, or space weapon since that time.
(4) What is emphatically not true is the claim that the United States
is not capable of catching up with the Soviets. There is no logical or
factual basis for such defeatism and despair. America is the greatest
industrial power in the world and our gross national product is double
that of the Soviet Union. During World War II we proved that we
could produce armaments not only to equip the great American forces
on two sides of the world but also that we could arm and equip the
British and Russian forces at the same time.
PERCENT OF GNP SPENT ON DEFENSE
At the present time we are spending less than 8 percent of our gross
national product on defense, and only a tiny fraction of that on stra-
tegic weapons. -
32.8
During World War II we spent 35 percent of our gross national
product on defense, proving that we can do it if we want to. Mean-
while, the Soviets are spending 33 percent of their gross national prod-
uct on defense in their determination to achieve overwhelming nuclear
superiority and rule the world.
Any notion that we can’t afford the strategic weapons to stay ahead
of the Soviets is simply not true. We could have kept our former su-
periority for the price we have paid to put a man on the moon, or for
the price we have paid to keep troops in Europe so the West Euro-
peans don’t have to provide their own troops, or for the price we have
paid in foreign giveaways.
Those who say we can’t afford to spend money on nuclear weapons
to defend America are like people who claim they can’t afford to carry
fire insurance on their homes. The truth is, we can’t afford not to carry
this insurance. Most people are glad to pay fire insurance premiums
and never collect on them, knowing that they have this protection in
case a disaster strikes. That is what nuclear weapons are—protection
of our lives, families and property against the unexpected disaster of
attack. - .
SALT TREATY DANGEROUS, DISADVANTAGEOUS, DEVIOUS
Dangerous, disadvantageous and devious: (1) the Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaty is dangerous because it signs away our right to
defend 205 million Americans, except for the Washington politicians,
against nuclear attack. Why should we give up our right to protect our
lives, our families and our property against attack? Why are the
Washington politicians any more worthy of protection than the men,
women and children in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh,
Baltimore, Atlanta, Miami, Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis, New Orleans,
Pºlº, Houston, Denver, Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, et
Cetera,
The SALT pact is disadvantageous because it freezes the United
States as a poor second in the nuclear weapons which will control the
world. We will soon have to accept any ultimatum the Kremlin bosses
deliver because we will have no power to defend even our own vital
interests.
IDEA. THAT RELIANCE ON TREATY WILL PREVENT WAR
I think that the idea that reliance on a treaty will prevent war is not
new. In 1928 an American Secretary of State, Frank Kellogg, per-
suaded 62 nations to sign the Kellogg Pact which outlawed war as an
instrument of national policy. Neither Germany, nor Japan nor the
Soviet Union paid any attention to this treaty.
In the 1930's, a British Prime Minister adopted a policy similar to
that of the SALT agreements. Neville Chamberlain relied on weapons
restraint and a treaty he signed with Hitler at Munich in 1938 which
promised to bring “peace in our time.” The majority of the English
people supported him because disarmament meant more money for
social welfare.
Today, there are no monuments to Prime Minister Chamberlain, and
history books condemn his tragic mistake. The monuments are all
erected to Winston Churchill who warned that Britain must stay
ahead in weapons and rely on her own strength instead of on a treaty.
329
- HISTORY PROVES WEAKNESS INVITES AGGRESSION
History proves that weakness invites aggression. World War II is
only one of many lessons that tyrants strike when they think they can
win cheap, easy victories by surprise attacks against weak or poorly
prepared nations. The now officially proclaimed military inferiority of
the United States to the Soviet Union is a dire threat to the lives and
freedom of all Americans. We should head the Ominous warning of
Winston Churchill:
Sometimes in the past we have committed the folly of throwing away Our arms.
Under the mercy of Providence, and at great cost and sacrifice, we have been able
to recreate them when the need arose. But if we abandon Our nuclear deterrent,
there will be no second chance. To abandon it now would be to abandon it forever.
(Mrs. Schlafly's prepared statement follows:)
PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY
My name is Phyllis Schlafly and I represent the National Association of Pro
America, of which I am a member of the National Board of Directors. Pro Ameri-
ca is a woman’s volunteer educational organization dedicated to the protection
of Our American Constitutional Republic. Founded in 1933, the first two honor-
ary presidents were Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt and Mrs. Calvin Coolidge, and the
present president is Mrs. Williard Hendrick of Houston, Texas. I am the co-author
of three books on nuclear strategy, written in 1964, 1965 and 1968, which ac-
curately predicted that the SOviet Union had a program to Overtake and Surpass
the United States in nuclear weapons. These books also accurately warned of the
danger from the Robert McNamara policy of freezing U.S. production and per-
mitting this to happen.
We urge the Congress to reject the SALT Treaty, Interim Agreement, and
Protocol. This SALT Pact is the most dangerous, disadvantageous, and devious
document the United States has ever signed. No more unequal, Craven, and
degrading agreement has ever been signed by any nation—except by a nation
which was defeated in war, or about to be defeated in war.
TEIE CONTRADICTORY PRO-SALT ARGUIMENTS
The national debate on the SALT Pact is unique because U.S. officials urging
ratification use two entirely different and mutually-contradictory lines of argu-
ment : One line to persuade the general public, and a completely different line to
convince the well-informed. Such a dichotomy is possible only because of wide-
Spread misinformation and misunderstanding On the part Of the general public
about the power and purpose Of nuclear weapons.
Here is the line of argument used for the general public :
(1) The SALT Pact is a great achievement because it stops the spiraling arms
Iſa Ce.
(2) Don’t worry about SALT giving superiority to the Soviets in ICBMs, SS—9s,
Polaris-type submarines, submarine-launched missiles, etc., because this is bal-
anced by U.S. Superiority in numbers of warheads. -
(3) Don’t worry about SALT giving superiority to the Soviets because this is
balanced by U.S. superiority in MIRVs.
(4) Don’t worry about SALT giving superiority to the Soviets because, if the
Soviets atack us, we have enough nuclear weapons to strike back and destroy
them. Our retaliatory power is variously described as “sufficiency,” “assured de-
struction,” or “overkill.”
Let uS examine these arguments: .
(1) The SALT Pact does not stop the spiraling arms race. This one-sided Pact
freezes the United States, but gives the Soviets written authorization to continue
their nuclear building program for the next 5 years. The SALT Pact gives the
Soviets the go-ahead to complete the 90 to 100 giant new ICBMs on which they
have started construction—and there is no restriction. On how much megatonnage
the Soviets can put in these missiles. We are forbidden to build any ICBMs be-
CauSe We have none under construction. The SALT Pact authorizes the SOVietS
to continue building their Polaris-Submarines until they reach 62, While We are
330
frozen at 44. The SALT Pact does nothing to stop the Soviets from continuing to
build other strategic systems, including mobile ICBMs, reload capability, bomb-
erS, and Space Weapons. -
(2) To understand the joker in the argument that the U.S. has a 5,700 to 2,500
“warhead superiority” over the Soviets, consider this Scenario. You are discussing
entering business with a potential partner. He proposes that you each make an
investment in the business and share the profits equally. You ask, “What invest-
ment do you have in mind?” He replies, “I’ll put up $50,000 and you invest
$25,000,000.” You demur, suggesting that this isn’t equal. He replies, “Both sides
are making an investment—and an investment is an investment.” If you allow
yourself to be conned into that kind of unequal business deal, you won’t stay in
business very long. But the enormous inequality concealed under the Word “in-
vestment” in this Scenario is ea; actly the Same ratio Of inequality COncealed under
the WOrd “Warhead.”
Anyone who cites the figures of 5,700 warheads for the U.S. and 2,500 for the
U.S.S.R. is equating Our 1/20th of a megaton with a Soviet 25-megaton warhead.
This means asking the American people to equate 50 thousand tons Of TNT-
explosive-equivalent (in a MIRVed U.S. Poseidon) with 25 million tons of TNT-
explosive-equivalent (in a Soviet SS—9). In other words, one SOviet warhead
has 24 million 950 thousand tons Of TNT-explosive-equivalent more than One
U.S. warhead.
Would you really go into partnership with someone who started out by
deliberately attempting to deceive you this way? Would you trust a friend
who tried to persuade you to go along with such a lopsided agreement?
President Nixon's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Supplemental Statement released
March 12, 1971 (written largely by now-Justice Lewis Powell) severely criticized
what it called the “numbers game, namely, the mere counting of Warheads With-
out analysis of megatonnage” and other factors. This Blue Ribbon Statement
specifically exposed the falsehood of a warhead tabulation by which “a single
bomb or one air-to-ground missile on a B-52 was equated with a Soviet 25-
megaton ICBM.” The Blue Ribbon Statement concluded:
This simplistic type of comparison creates the illusion of abundant Security,
if not U.S. overkill capability. It would be difficult to conceive of a better way to
mislead the public than to present—without precise definition Or analysis—COm-
parative figures of this kind. Those who present such distortions contribute to
the confusion rather than enlightenment of Our people.”
(3) To understand the joker in the claim that U.S. Superiority in MIRVS
compensates for U.S.S.R. superiority in ICBMs, SS-9s, Polaris-type submarines,
and SLBMs, consider this comaprison. One suburban developer has a plot for
subdividing which has a total area of one acre. A second developer has a plot for
subdividing with a total area of 25 acres. Which one will get the larger number
of useful lots out of the subdivision? The answer is obvious. And it Ought to
be just as obvious that the Soviet ability to MIRV is 25 times greater than ours.
We are MIRVing our one-megaton Minuteman missiles. The Soviet SS-9s are
25 megatons each.
The reason why we are MIRWing our Minuteman and Polaris missiles is that
the Soviets have 64 ABM launchers already deployed around Moscow, and
we adopted the MIRV program in extremis as a counter measure, to preserve
some credibility that some warheads would get through the Soviet ABMs. Since
we have no deployed ABM, the Soviets have no need to run a MIRV raceS. They
can just hit our undefended country with their un-MIRVed weapons carrying
the full megationnage.
But if the Soviets chose to run a MIRV race, look how they can OutpoWer us.
Take our most powerful missile against their most powerful one (that we know
about). Our Poseidon could deliver a single 4-megaton warhead . but We are
splitting it into ten 50-kiloton warheads, making a total of 500 kilotons or *%
megaton for the Poseidon missile. The Soviet SS-9 with a single warhead of 25
megatons can be split into ten one-megaton warheads with a total of 10 megatons
per SS-9. Thus, in a MIRV race, the Soviets will have a Superiority of 20 times
the power of OurS. §
(4) The myth that the Soviets are deterred from attacking us by the knowl-
edge that our “sufficiency” or “assured destruction” or “Overkill” will destroy
them is widely believed by the American public, but cannot persuade anyone who
understands the power and use of nuclear weapons. For example, in a speech. On
April 13, 1972, Dr. Edward Teller, one of the greatest living nuclear scientists,
was asked the question: “If the Soviets launch a surprise nuclear attack against
the United States, what would be the result?” He replied:
331
“The question is when. Right now, they could do terrible damage. In a few years,
if present trends continue, it is practically certain that it will be the end of the
United States. The United States will not exist—not as a state, not as a power,
not as an idea. I think that more than 50 per cent Of Our people would be killed.
I believe that the Soviets Could SO behave that there would be very few Casualties
in Russia because We WOuld not have forces enough left to retaliate. They have
excellent defenses : air defenses, missile defenses, civil defenses. It is possible
that, in a few years, we shall be at the mercy Of the Soviet Union, unless present
trends change.”
The real test Of U.S. Survival is not how many missiles We have in a peacetime
inventory, but how many we will have left after a surprise attack. Dr. John
Foster, Director of Defense Research, told U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
that the Soviets “would require a little over 400 SS-9s to knock out all but a
Small fraction Of Our Minuteman” missiles. The SOviets have 313 now.
The Stark fact that we have no “assured destruction” or “Over-kill” or “Suffi-
Ciency” was confirmed by Dr. Donald Brennan, a COnsultant On Weapons to the
Departments of Defense and State. He recently wrote that in a nuclear War
we could kill only 6 perecnt of the Russian poeple, while “current Soviet forces
could probably destroy 60 percent of the American population.”
The “mutual assured destruction” myth has been aptly described by its
acronym as a MAD strategy. Who cares how many Russian we can kill after
the Soviets have killed more than half our population, and destroyed everything
We know and love? Retaliation under Such circumstances is irrational. As Nobel-
prize winner Dr. Eugene P. Wigner stated on June 10, 1972: “It would have
been better if each nation was assured that the other could not destroy it.”
NO WAY TO CATCH UP 2
These four arguments used On the general public simply cannot be used on in-
formed people who understand the power and purpose of nuclear weapons. So
an entirely different—and contradictory—argument is used confidentially and
Off-the-record to intellectual audiences. Here is the line spelled out in select
briefings:
We are lucky to get the SALT PACT (even though it guarantees the Soviet
Superiority in all strategic nuclear weapons) because, without it, in the next
five years the Soviets would be able to go so much farther ahead of us, and there
is no Way We can possibly catch up because the Soviets have “on-going” weapons
programs and We have none.
Let us examine this clever, sophisticated tangle of truth and untruth.
(1) It is true that the Soviets have nuclear weapons superiority now and are
increasing their lead rapidly. Note, however, that, in this line of argument to in-
formed audiences, U.S. officials admit Soviet superiority, while concealing it or
SideStepping the point when addressing uninformed audiences.
(2) It is true that the Soviets have an “on-going” weapons program, and are
determined to continue building nuclear weapons. The Soviets have been build-
ing more than 150 giant ICBMs per year. They have doubled the size of their
Shipyards to build 8 to 10 Polaris-type submarines a year. On June 15, President
Nixon Said, “Mr. Brezhnev and his colleagues made it absolutely clear that they
are going forward with defense programs in the offensive area which are not
limited by these agreements.” On June 22, PRAVIDA announced that the Soviets
plan to push ahead with offensive weapons development.
(3) It is true that the United States has no “on-going” nuclear Weapons pro-
duction. We have been in a strategic nuclear weapons freeze ordered by Robert
McNamara in 1967 and still in effect. We have not built a single ICBM, SLBM,
Polaris Submarine, strategic bomber, or space weapon since that time.
(4) What is emphatically not true is the claim that the United States is not
Capable of catching up with the Soviets. There is no logical or factual basis for
Such defeatism and despair. America is the greatest industrial power in the
World, and Our Gross National Product is double that of the Soviet Union.
During World War II, we proved that we could produce armaments not only
to equip the great American forces on two sides of the WOrld, but also that; we
could arm and equip the British and the Russian forces at the same time.
At the present time we are spending less than 8 perCent Of Our GroSS National
Product On defense—and only a tiny fraction of that on strategic Weapons.
During World War II, we spent 35 percent of our Gross National Product on
80–942 O—72—22
332
defense, proving that we can do it, if we want to. Meanwhile, the Soviets are
spending 33 percent of their Gross National Product on defense in their deter-
mination to achieve overwhelming nuclear superiority and rule the WOrld.
Any notion that we can’t afford the strategic weapons to stay ahead of the
Soviets is simply not true. We could have kept our former Superiority for the
price we have paid to put a man on the moon—or for the price We have paid to
keep troops in Europe so the West Europeans don’t have to provide their OWn
troops—or for the price we have paid in foreign giveaway.S.
Those who say we can’t afford to spend money on nuclear Weapons to defend
America are like people who claim they can’t afford to carry fire insurance. On
their homes. The truth is we can't afford not to carry this insurance. MOS't people
are glad to pay fire insurance premiums and never collect On them—knowing
that they have this protection in case a disaster strikes. That is what nuclear
weapons are—protection of our lives, families and property against the unex-
pected disaster Of attack.
DANGEROUS, DISADVANTAGEOUS AND DEVIOUS
(1) The Salt Treaty is dangerous because it signs away Our right to defend
205,000,000 Americans (except for the Washington politicians) against nuclear
attack. Why should we give up our right to protect Our lives, Our families and
our property against attack? Why are the Washington politicians any more:
worthy of protection than the men, women and children in New York, Boston,
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, Atlanta, Miami, Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis,
New Orleans, Dallas, Houston, Denver, Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles,
etc.? -
It is no answer to say that both sides are limited to the same number Of
ABMs. The Soviets have a long record of Sneak, surprise attacks on defenseless
countries, whereas the United States has never committed such an attack and
no rational person believes it is in the realm Of possibility. The SOviets do not
need any defense against U.S. attack; but We do need a defense SO we will not Suf-
fer the fate Of Poland and Finland in 1939, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in 1940,
Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968.
The ABM SALT Treaty is just as one-sided as though Tiffany’s made a pact
with the head of the jewel thief syndicate, agreeing that neither side would have
a burglar alarm system. Such an agreement is obviously for the benefit of the
Only side which engages in burglary. It would be highly dangerous for Tiffany’s.
Most important, the Soviets don’t need any ABMs to protect themselves
against a first strike because we have no first-strike weapons. We have only
retaliatory Weapons.
(2) The SALT Pact is disadvantageous because it freezes the United States
as a poor Second in the nuclear weapons which will control the World. We will
SOOn have to accept any ultimatum the Kremlin boSSes deliver because we will
have no power to defend even Our Own Vital interests.
The SALT Pact guarantees the Soviets a more than 3 to 2 superiority in inter-
continental ballistic missile launchers. We are frozen at 1,054, but the Soviets
are allowed at least 1,618, and it’s anybody’s guess how many more than that
because the Soviets refuse to say how many they have now, or have under
construction, or how many ICBMs they are limited to by the SALT Pact.
The SALT Pact guarantees the Soviets almost a 3 to 2 superiority in Polaris-
type submarines (62 to 44), and a similar superiority in submarine-launched
ballistic missile launchers (950 to 710). Up until a few months ago, we were
told that the Polaris submarine was Our last best hope for the defense of the
United States. Now we are told we are lucky to get the SALT Pact which per-
mits the Soviets “to go on turning out submarines like sausages” until they have
Overwhelming Superiority over us. In addition, having Cuba as a base is equiv-
alent to doubling the size of the Soviet submarine fleet.
(3) The SALT Pact is devious beeause its language and loopholes are cleverly
and deviously designed to help the Soviets and hurt the United States. Look at
a few examples: -
(a) The cutoff date for permitting new construction of ICBM launchers,
July 1, 1972, is a date which rewards the Soviets for having engaged in a
rapid missile-building program during the 2%-year period of the SALT Talks—
and punshes the U.S. for exercising restraint and remaining in a missile freeze.
Why wasn’t the date of the beginning of the SALT Talks, November 17, 1969,
selected? It was after that date that the Soviets achieved their decisive supe-
riority.
333
(b) The date “1964” specified in Article II of the Interim Agreement was ob-
viously designed specifically to guarantee the Soviets an overwhelming and in-
creasing lead in missile megatonnage. This section says: “The parties undertake
not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of Older types
deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types de-
ployed after that time.” -
This Article clearly prohibits the U.S. from increasing the megatonnage of our
ICBMs (because our Minutemen are “light” and our Titans are “older types
deployed prior to 1964”), while at the same time it does permit the Soviets to
increase the megatonnage of their SS—9s, and maybe Of Other models, too, be-
cause they were deployed after 1964. The Soviets already have a megatonnage
Superiority Over the U.S. of at least 5 to 1—and Article II permits them to in-
crease this lead as much as they want in Order to destroy Or blackmail us.
(c) Both the Interim Agreement and the Agreed Interpretations make clear
that the Soviets can go ahead full-speed with their huge mobile ICBM program.
They can keep their production line for the manufacture of missiles, their tech-
nology and their momentum, simply by making their new ICBMs mobile by put-
ting them on railroad cars or trucks. Our U.S. negotiators specifically “agreed to
defer the question of limitation of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers.”
But, while agreeing that the Soviets could go ahead in mobile ICBMs, our ne-
gotiators in effect bound the U.S. not to do likewise by stating that “the U.S.
would consider the deployment of Operational land-mobile ICBM launchers
during the period of the Interim Agreement as inconsistent with the Objectives
of that Agreement.” - -
(d) At least 140 Soviet ICBMs have on-site reload capability, and there is
nothing in the SALT Pact to prevent the Soviets from adding an on-site reload
capability to 1,000 more missile launchers, including their SS-11s and SS-13s.
This loophole allows the Soviets to tremendously increase their first-strike
capability against us. While theoretically we could also develop a reload capabil-
ity, in practice we cannot, because our reload missiles would be useless unless
they were “hardened” like Our Minutemen—because the Soviets have SS-9s to
knock them Out (whereas we have no comparable missiles to knock Out Soviet
missiles).
CURRENT SOVIET WAR PLANES
There is one question which Congress Owes it to the American people to get
the answer to before voting on the SALT Pact, and that is: Why are the Soviets
building all these nuclear weapons of mass destruction? The Soviet Union’s
hugely-expensive, decade-long buildup of weapons of war is without parallel in
all recorded history. Why are they building them? -
My Study has convinced me that the answer to this question is contained in a
Certain group of documents which are classified Top Secret by the Defense De-
partment and called the Oleg Penkovskiy “Special Collection.” Colonel Penkov-
Skiy was a high Soviet missile expert and intelligence officer who defected to the
West in 1961 and delivered into our hands thousands of secret Kremlin docu-
ments which set forth in detail the Soviet military doctrine. Penkovskiy sum-
marized this doctrine in his diaries published by Doubleday in 1965 in these
WOrdS :
“A future war will begin with a sudden nuclear strike against the enemy.
There will be no declaration of war. Quite to the contrary, an effort will be made
to avoid a declaration of war. When conditions are favorable for delivering the
first nuclear Strike, the Soviet Union will deliver this strike under the pretense
Of defending itself from an aggressor. . . . About 100 nuclear charges, exploded
in a brief period of time in a highly industrialized country . . . will suffice to
transform all Of its industrial areas and administrative-political centers into a
heap of ruins, and the territory into a lifeless desert. Contaminated with deadly
radioactive Substances. . . . This plan has been worked out in every detail and is
On file in the General Staff. . . . I know the extent of their preparations. I know
the poison of the new military doctrine, as outlined in the top-secret ‘Special
Collection’—the plan to strike first, at any costs. . . . Imagine the horror of a
50-megaton bomb. . . .”
The Penkovskiy documents came into possession of the Defense Department
in 1961 and 1962 and have been kept secret from the American public ever Since,
although they do not involve any American secrets at all. In refusing to make
them public, the Defense Department wrote on February 1, 1972: “The ‘Special
Collection’ contains material of the highest classification, much of which is still
eatremely relevant to current Soviet strategic doctrine and war plans.”
334
On March 8, 1972, a suit was filed in Federal Court (Case 72–40) against
Melvin Laird and the Defense Department under the Freedom Of Information
Act (Public Law 89–487) to force declassification of these 10-year old Soviet
documents. The date on these documents, 1961 and 1962, coincides perfectly with
the years that the Soviets must have adopted the “strategic doctrine and War
plans” for the decade-long weapons buildup and the nuclear hardware We know
they now possess.
Before voting on the SALT Pact, Congress has a right to know what are the
“Soviet war plans”—and how the Soviets plan to make use of the nuclear Weapons
they now possess. This is why Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act—
and there is no better time to make use Of it than now.
NO SECOND CHANCE
The idea that reliance on a treaty will prevent war is not new. In 1928, an
American Secretary of State, Frank Kellogg, persuaded 62 nations to sign
the Kellogg Pact which Outlawed war as an instrument of national policy. Neither
Germany, nor Japan, nor the Soviet Union paid any attention to this treaty.
In the 1930s, a British Prime Minister adopted a policy similar to that of the
SALT agreements. Neville Chamberlain relied on weapons restraint and a treaty
he signed with Hitler at Munich in 1938 which promised to bring “peace in our
time.” The majority of the English people Supported him because disarmament
meant more money for SOCial Welfare. -
Today, there are no monuments to Prime Minister Chamberlain, and history
books condemn his tragic mistake. The monuments are all erected to Winston
Churchill who warned that Britain must stay ahead in weapons and rely on her
Own Strength instead Of On a treaty.
History proves that weakness invites aggression. World War II is only one of
many lessons that tyrants strike when they think they can win cheap, easy
victories by surprise attacks against weak or poorly prepared nations. The now-
officially proclaimed military inferiority of the United States to the Soviet Union
is a dire threat to the lives and freedom Of all Americans. We should heed the
Ominous warning of Winston Church : “Sometimes in the past we have Committed
the folly of throwing away our arms. Under the mercy of Providence, and at great
cost and sacrifice, we have been able to recreate them when the need arose. But
if we abandon Our nuclear deterrent, there will be no Second chance. To
abandon it now would be to abandon it forever.”
Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Schlafly. It is a very interest-
ing presentation and you certainly make our position clear.
TJNITED STATES-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS
Would you—do you believe that anything can come from negotia-
tions between the United States and the Soviet Union looking toward
the limitation of armaments?
Mrs. SoHLAFLY. I believe that the last two and a half years of the
SALT negotiations going on in Helsinki and Vienna proved that the
Soviets used that period as a stall to build up their own weapons, while
we remained in a weapons freeze. In other words, they made use of
that time to achieve the superiority over us and when they got the
Superiority that they felt they needed, then they were willing to sign
some kind of an agreement which would preserve that superiority.
We operated in good faith in not building anything during that
period and I think one of the jokers in the SALT “pact” is the selec-
tion of the date July 1st, 1972, as the cut-off date. Now, that is a date
which rewards the Soviet for making use of the negotiating period to
build the weapons of mass destruction which can destroy us. Why
didn’t they pick the date of the beginning of the SALT, of November,
1969? Obviously because the Soviets used that period for their own
advantage.
3.35
Senator SPARKMAN. I recognize the force of the argument you make,
but I just ask the general question: Is it possible or is it going to be
possible for the two great powers to negotiate any worthwhile settle-
ment, in your opinion, or is it something that we should give up hope
for 2
Mrs. SoHLAFLY. I wish it were; I wish we felt that the Soviets were
negotiating with a feeling of fellowship and humanitarianism and a
desire to have peace; but I think it is important for the Senate to con-
sider the question before you vote as to why the Soviets have been
building these weapons of mass destruction. It is the most gigantic
arms buildup in the history of the world. There is no parallel for it.
Why have they been building it?
Now, I think that the answer to that question is contained in some
papers which are classified top secret over at the Defense Department
and which they will not release. These are the thousands of documents
which were given to this country in 1961 and 1962 by a very important
Soviet defector named Colonel Eleg Penkovsky. Colonel Penkovsky
sent these documents over and they have been classified top Secret ever
since. When a statement was made earlier this year to get the Defense
Department to declassify these papers and remember, they concern
only Soviet secrets not American secrets, the Pentagon replied saying,
“That these Pentkovsky papers contained material of the highest classi-
fication, much of which is still extremely relevant to current Soviet
strategic doctrine and war plans.” That is a direct quote.
Now, I think we are entitled to know the answer to the question
what are the Soviet war plans. The Pentkovsky papers which we know
because the diaries summarized the Soviet war plan as a strategy of
a surprise nuclear strike on the United States, and under the Freedom
of Information Act, which Congress passed a couple of years ago, I
would hope that the senators would take steps to bring about the
declassification of these documents; and the dates on those documents
are precisely the dates which, under which, the Soviets had to have
established for their master plan under which they have had the ten-
year buildup of weapons of mass destruction.
Senator SPARKMAN. Well, thank you very much. It has been an
interesting presentation and I think you make it very clear that we
have no easy job ahead of us.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Thank you, Senator.
Senator SPARKMAN. Next, Mr. Cordell Burch, Northern Virginia
Committee for Victory over Communism.
Mr. Burch, we are very glad to have you, sir.
STATEMENT OF CORDELL BURCH, NORTHERN VIRGINIA COMMIT.
TEE FOR WICTORY OVER COMMUNISM
Mr. BURCH. My name is Cordell Burch, Mr. Chairman, and I repre-
sent the Northern Virginia Committee for Victory over Communism,
and I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to testify.
SAL AGREEMENTS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT OPPOSED
The Northern Virginia Committee for Victory over Communism
opposes the strategic arms limitation agreements, including the treaty
336
limiting ABM sites, and the executive agreements limiting offensive
nuclear capability, because we are opposed to world government.
The Moscow agreements are part of a long-standing plan for world
government which was made the official policy of the United States
Government in 1961 and has been its policy ever since. This plan,
Department of State Publication 7277, envisages three stages: First,
the United States and Russia would limit their armaments; second, a
United Nations peace force would be established; third, the UN peace
force would be strengthened until it was more powerful than any
nation, including the United States. - .
Now, I quote from this plan as published by the Department of
State in September, 1961: Under Stage I, Part B is entitled, “To
Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments” and under Part B, para-
graph (b) states in part: “Levels of armaments of prescribed types
shall be reduced by equitable and balanced steps.”
Again under Stage I, Part D is entitled, “To Reduce Strategic
Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles” and under Part D, paragraph
(a) states in part: “Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in
specified categories and agreed types of weapons designed to counter
such vehicles shall be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and bal-
anced steps.”
The Moscow agreements are designed specifically to implement these
provisions of Stage I of this world government plan. -
I quote now from Stage II, Part E, paragraph (b): “The UN Peace
Force shall be established and progressively strengthened.”
And, finally, I quote from Stage III: “. . . progressively controlled
disarmament and continuously developing principles and procedures
of international law would proceed to a point where no state would
have the military power to challenge the progressively strengthened
UN Peace Force . . .” -
With the implementation of this stage, world government would be
a reality. I think that is quite obvious. -
I would like to emphasize that this is the official policy of the United
States Government, that is, to progressively transfer our military
armaments to the United Nations until the United Nations is stronger
than we are. . - .
You are aware, of course, that the UN official in charge of all United
Nations military forces, the Under Secretary General for Political
and Security Council Affairs, is always a Communist, under an
agreement made between the United States and Russia at the founding
of the UN. At present he is Leonid Kutakov of Russia.
The Northern Virginia Committee for Victory over Communism
unhesitatingly and, we think, with apparent justification, charac-
terizes the Moscow agreements as the first stage in the plan to abolish
the United States as we know it today and make us a part of a Com-
munist world government.
ROLE OF COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS IN U.S. GOVERNMENT
To learn how the United States got into this precarious position,
almost on the point of submitting to a world government, you must
look into the role of the Council on Foreign Relations in our govern-
ment. The Council on Foreign Relations—CFR-was founded in 1919
337 - - --- -->
by Colonel E. M. House, the Henry Kissinger of his day, and some
of his associates. It had become apparent to them by that time that the
United States would not join the League of Nations, which was to
have been their vehicle for establishing a world government, and that
they would have to lay a much stronger groundwork and basis for
getting the United States into a world government.
The CFR was set up to get the United States into a world govern-
ment. With strong support from the huge tax-exempt foundations,
the CFR grew in influence and during the 1920s and 1930s infiltrated
the executive branch of government until at the onset of World War
II it effectively controlled our State Department and has controlled
it ever since.
The CFR completely dominated the Committee on Postwar Prob-
lems, later changed to the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign
Policies, which is the group that designed the United Nations. -
The CFR did its job so well that when the UN Charter came before
the Senate for ratification, only two votes were cast against it.
Since that time the CFR has worked unceasingly to implement the
world government plan I have outlined. In 1961 the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency was established under CFR member Wil-
liam C. Foster and the State Department published the plan as official
government policy.
Today, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is headed by
CFR member Gerard Smith, the man who negotiated the SALT
agreements, and the CFR is about to see the United States enter into
the first stage of its world government plan.
The Northern Virginia Committee for Victory Over Communism
vigorously opposes United States participation in this plan and urges
the Senate to reject the treaty that is before it and to condemn all
the other executive agreements associated with it.
TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS OPPOSED
We view these treaties and agreements as exceedingly dangerous
to the security of the United States, not only in and of themselves,
as many witnesses have brought out before the committee today, but
also, more importantly, as a precedent, as a first step, in submerging
the United States in a world government. They lead inevitably to
more treaties and then more treaties until ultimately the whole scheme
for world government will be completed. We maintain and urge that
it must be stopped now before it ever gets started.
ALTERNATIVE COURSE OF ACTION FOR U.S. PROPOSED
In closing, we would like to propose an alternative course of action
for the United States to follow :
First, the United States must get out of the United Nations and get
the United Nations out of the United States. This is of the utmost
importance if we are not to find ourselves very soon in a Communist
United Nations world government. -
Second, the United States must completely stop all trade with and
aid to the entire Communist bloc of nations, who are the major pro-
moters of war in the world today. Within six months the whole Com-
munist empire would collapse without our support, we believe.
338
Professor Antony Sutton's three-volume study, Western Technology
and Soviet Economic Development, published by the Hoover Institu-
tion at Stanford University, which provides mountains of evidence
to show how the Soviet Union has been built up by the West, and
leads me to believe that the above prediction is no exaggeration.
Third, we must stop all trade and aid to any nation that will not
join us in the first two steps. This will ensure the rapid accomplishment
of the first two steps. This course of action would soon result in a
world of free, independent, peace-loving nations, whereas the course
on which our nation is now about to embark will result with absolute
certainty in a one-world, totalitarian government. -
We ask the Senate to reject this latter course by rejecting the
Moscow agreements and to adopt instead the course of action we have
outlined. - -
I would like to say in addition that I want to express my appreci-
ation to Senator Spong for arranging for our appearance before the
committee.
Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much.
I suppose you know Senator Spong had an amendment coming up
on the floor of the Senate which he was greatly interested in and there-
fore could not be here. He is a member of this committee and I am sure
he would have been here if he could have. -
We have all been working under considerable difficulty today, as
you know, but we appreciate your presentation.
TREATY ALLOWS SOVIETS TO BUILD ONLY 25 NEW SILOS
Mrs. Schlafly, there was just one think I wanted to call to your at-
tention. In your statement you referred to the Soviet Union building
without limit, apparently, additional ICBMs. I believe under the
treaty they are allowed to build only 25 new silos to hold heavy mis-
siles which would bring the number from the present 288 to 313.
Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Is this on
Senator SPARKMAN. Do you recall that?
Mrs. Sch.I.AFLY. Senator, the Soviets have never said how many they
have. The figures that have been used on Soviet ICBMs are strictly
U.S. intelligence figures on what we have seen but they have refused
to be bound to any figures as to the numbers they now have or have
under construction or feel they have to respect under the terms of the
treaty, so while I didn’t use the term “unlimited,” nobody knows
exactly how many they can still build. They can certainly continue
with the 90 to 100 holes that we have already spotted, and they can put
SS-9s in those and they can even put their 50-megaton weapon in it.
U.S. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM
Senator SPARKMAN. Don’t you believe that we have a pretty good
system of detection on these things?
Mrs. SoHLAFLY. No, I don’t believe we have a good system. Satellite
surveillance is good but it is no substitute for on-site inspection which
the Soviets have resisted very greatly. There is no way that satellite
reconnaissance can tell how many warheads they have. There are many
ways that they can conceal their weapons and, of course, Brezhnev has
339
made it perfectly clear and our negotiators made it clear that they can
go ahead full speed in mobile missiles which are practically impossible
to detect through satellite reconnaissance.
Senator SPARKMAN. You know, our people who handle those things
claim that our present detection system is superior to on-site
inspection?
Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Yes, these are the same people who didn’t find the
missiles that went into Cuba in 1962; these are the same people who
didn’t find a movement of 650,000 troops when they went into
Czechoslovakia in 1968; these are the same people who didn’t detect
the 6 months of preparation that the Soviets went into when they set
off their giant series of nuclear tests in 1961.
Our intelligence has had such abysmal failures in detecting what
the enemy is doing that I would suggest that it is very unsafe for us
to rely on that source.
Senator SPARKMAN. Would you include the CIA in that?
Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Well, we have many sources of intelligence sup-
posedly; but the net result is we have been surprised with every major
move on the part of the Soviet Union and that is why I pointed out
at the beginning of my statement that my books, beginning in 1964,
accurately forecast, the deployment of the SS-9 and the determina-
tion of the Soviet Union to pass parity and to go on to overwhelmin
Superiority, which they subsequently proceeded to do, while all the
people with access to all this giant information assured us solemnly
that the Soviets were going to stop when they got to parity.
Senator SPARKMAN. I agree with you that we have been severely
disappointed in the past on different occasions by the lack of proper
detection, but I am convinced that our methods of detection have been
vastly improved just within the last few years. -
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Well, they can’t detect the mobile ICBM's and they
can’t detect the numbers of warheads, and they can’t detect the sub-
marines through the satellite reconnaissance, and that is the only thing
we are limited to. Meanwhile, of course, you know the Soviets have
successfully tested Satellite interceptors and we do not have that ca-
pability. So they have the capability to blind us if they decide to move
and knock our spies in the sky out of existence.
Senator SPARKMAN. Of course, all those thing have to be taken into
consideration. That is one of the things that may be necessary for us
to delve into this just as thoroughly as we possibly can and that is
what we are trying to do. *:
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Well, I hope you do, and particularly on this ques-
tion of why are the Soviets building these weapons of mass destruc-
tion. They have poured such gigantic resources, at least twice, into
defense of what we have put into defense; they are determined to
acquire Superiority in every strategic weapon.
SOVIET ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR WEAPONS
Why are they doing it? Do you think they like spending money on
weapons instead of consumer goods to improve their standard of liv-
ing? They must have a reason. I don’t think these things just acci-
dently happen. There must have been some brain which decided, yes,
we are going to allocate this gigantic amount of resources into weapons
which only have one utility and that is to defeat the United States.
340
Senator SPARKMAN. Of course, we could discuss this all day back
and forth, banter back and forth. I have my ideas as to why they did
it. I think it all started at the time of the missile crisis in Cuba, and
I think it has been going on ever since.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. That's right. It has.
Senator SPARKMAN. And you and I both know that they have had
Some difficulty over there in the quarrel between sides as to whether
or not they were spending too much on armaments and not enough
for consumers. Of course they probably do not have the ease of ex-
pression that people in this country have; but we have been having
our own problems here on that, as you know.
Mrs. SOHLAFLY. Yes, but Mr. Brezhnev who is the space czar has
won out and they have spent the money on the weapons; and when you
point out that the decision was made about the time of the Cuban mis-
sile crisis 10 years ago, again
Senator SPARKMAN. I would say it started—
DECLASSIFICATION OF PENTAKovsRIY DOCUMENTS
Mrs. SCHLAFLY. It started then; then that ties in with the date of
these Pentakovskiy documents and I hope that in your position as Sen-
ator on the Foreign Relations Committee you will perhaps do what
you can to secure the declassification of these papers which reveal
the Soviet war doctrine and the Soviet strategic doctrine at that
time; and, personally, I see no reason why our Defense Department
should keep Soviet secrets away from the American people. The
Soviets already know about them; why can’t the American people
know what the Soviets are planning? So, under the Freedom of
Information Act, Senator, I hope you will request declassification
of those documents.
Senator SPARKMAN. I am sure you know we have been working on
the general subject of over-liberal classification of documents and
working in an effort to get declassification as early as it may be prac-
ticable. I am not speaking of these documents particularly, but in the
general field of classifying documents. You know this committee has
expressed itself rather strongly on that subject. t
Mrs. SoHLAFLY. Yes, and I agree with you and while some case can
be made or a good case can be made for keeping certain American
Secrets quiet and not available to the public, what argument can you
make for keeping Soviet secrets away from the American people?
Senator SPARKMAN. That is not our problem. That is something they
have to settle within their own country.
NON-INTERFERENCE WITH DETECTION SYSTEMIS PART OF AGREEMENT
By the way, in connection with this treaty, the Soviet Union did
promise us in turn, in fact, both sides promised that they would not
interfere with the detection systems of the other side. The question is
whether or not that will be faithfully observed, but that is a part of
the agreement itself.
Mrs. SoHLAFLY. Yes, that applies only, however, to the satellite re-
connaissance; we are not allowed any other type of surveillance.
Senator SPARKMAN. No, no; the on-site is not a part of it.
34:1
Mrs. SOHLAFLY. Is not a part of it.
Senator SPARKMAN. But any detection system that we may have,
they promised not to interfere with; of course, they know we have got
these spy satellites; I suppose the whole world knows it now.
Mrs. SoHLAFLY. But so far as the Soviets promising not to interfere,
I think we ought to remember back in 1968 when they made a treaty
with the Czechs for peace and friendship, 17 days before they marched
in with 650,000 troops.
Senator SPARKMAN. I have no argument with you on that basis. In
fact, I am not arguing at all. I am just trying to point out some things
that I think are essential for us to remember.
Anyhow, thank you very much, all of you.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Thank you.
Senator SPARKMAN. And the committee stands adjourned. -
(Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned subject to the
call of the Chair.) ..
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS
THURSDAY, JULY 20, 1972
UNITED STATES SENATE,
CoMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONs,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New
Senate Office Building, Senator John Sparkman presiding.
Present: Senators Sparkman, Symington, Spong, Case, Cooper and
Percy.
Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order, please.
OPENING STATEMENT
I would like to welcome Dr. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, Director of
the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center at Stanford University; Dr.
Marvin L. Goldberger, Chairman of the Department of Physics at
Princeton University; and Dr. Richard Garwin of the IBM Watson
Laboratory at Yorkton Heights, California.
This is the sixth and final public session of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee hearings on the proposed interim agreement limiting
strategic weapons and the proposed treaty limiting antiballistic mis-
sile deployments. To date we have heard Administration witnesses
presenting the arguments in favor of both the treaty and the agree-
ment and we have received testimony from experts in several fields
who have addressed points of concern as the committee and the Con-
gress prepare for consideration of these two extremely important
accords.
Today our distinguished panelists will address important issues
relating to the agreements who have before us and will look ahead to
SALT II and further discussions with the Soviet Union.
The testimony we will receive will be particularly important in
light of the various weapons proposals made by the Administration
and related by the Administration to the treaty and the agreement.
The committee must address itself to these very important related
issues of the weapons proposals and how they will influence both this
government and the government of the Soviet Union, now and in the
future, as it endeavors to reach conclusions on the two accords.
I am informed there is to be a roll call vote in the Senate at about
11:00 o'clock and there may be other interruptions, but we will move
along as well and as fast as we can. -
Senator Cooper, do you have any statement to make preliminarily?
(343)
344
COMMENDATION OF WITNESSES AND OTHER SCIENTISTS
Senator CoopFR. Thank you, Senator Sparkman. I would like to Say
I think the committee is fortunate to have the opportunity to hear
the witnesses we have before us—Dr. Garwin, Dr. Goldberger and
Dr. Panofsky. I am sure their testimony will be of the utmost
importance. tº
I would like to say also that I believe these witnesses and other Sci-
entists have contributed more to the effort toward arms control than
any other group. At the beginning of the debate on strategic arms
policy and arms control several years ago their testimony opened up
not only the debate on nuclear strategic systems but also it cleared
the way for informed debate on all arms. They have educated the com-
mittees and they have educated the country. We are all greatly in-
debted to them.
Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Percy?
Senator PERCY. Senator Sparkman, Mr. Chairman, I came up pri-
marily to say exactly the same thing. We are very indebted to our wit-
nesses this morning. It is in a way very unfortunate that on this final
day when they are the anchormen and important witnesses we do have
these roll call votes. I also must get down to the floor and speak on the
issue we are voting on at 11:00 o'clock, and also participate in an
executive meeting of the Government Operations Committee, of which
I am the ranking Republican, to mark up legislation we have been
working on for three years.
I find it very interesting that some of the chief proponents before
of the ABM system are now saying exactly the same things against
the extension of an ABM system around the control center here in
Washington. This certainly is a turn of events that sometime ought to
be completely written up. But it also seems to me an absolute and
total and complete vindication of the position that our three witnesses
took at a time when it almost looked like they were against the national
interest in so testifying. What they said at that time was so wise and
So right that I think it has been a great service to the country.
I want to express my deep appreciation to these three men who, I
think, are very, very unique in the role that, they have played through
the past several years and in the services they have contributed to
their country and to the United States Senate.
Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Senator Percy.
By the way, you mentioned having to go to an executive session.
It happens my committee is having an executive session and I am going
to have to slip out at least long enough to make a quorum up there, but
I hope to be right back.
Senator CoopBR. I will be here throughout the entire hearing.
COMMUNICATION OF SENATOR HART
I would like to say one more thing. Senator Philip Hart has been
asked to testify, but in view of his modesty said he probably would
submit a statement. I would like to say for the record that I believe
his work on arms control throughout the last three or four years has
been of the utmost importance and he deserves the immense credit of
345
the United States Senate in the work he has done toward the limita-
tion of nuclear systems.
Senator SPARKMAN. All right. Our first witness will be Mr.
Goldberger. - - -
Senator Spong, we are just getting started. We have had some pre-
liminary statements. Would you care to make one?
Senator SPONG. No, I have none. -
Senator SPARKMAN. Then, Mr. Goldberger, if you will come forward
we would appreciate it. You have a statement. I will say this to all
of you. Each one of you has a statement. Your statements will be
printed in full in the record and you may present them as you see
fit—either read it, summarize it, discuss it or however you want to
proceed. We are very glad to have you. -
STATEMENT OF MARWIN L. GOLDBERGER, CHAIRMAN, DEPART-
MENT OF PHYSICS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
Mr. GoLDBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a privilege to be
here today to discuss the strategic arms limitation treaty and the re-
lated interim agreement on offensive weapons. I have been concerned
for many years with arms control issues related to strategic weapons
and it is particularly gratifying to appear before you at a time when
an important step has been taken to limit the strategic arms race,
namely, the signing in Moscow of the SALT agreement. I strongly
support this treaty and urge speedy ratification of it by the Senate.
While supporting the treaty without reservation, I think it worth-
while to draw attention to certain issues that naturally arise in con-
nection with it, which might have bearing on future actions taken by
both sides and on the direction which future arms control agreements
might take. - *.
ABM SYSTEMS AND TREATY
In connection with the ABM treaty, it has long been clear that
ABM systems have been one of the most destabilizing elements in the
arms race; they can create unwarranted confidence in their effective-
ness for those who build such systems, which might promote reckless
foreign policies and at the same time cause the other side to react vio-
lently to produce offensive weapons in quantities more than Suf-
ficient to compensate for the conjectured effectiveness of the defense.
Although it would have been preferable in my opinion if the treaty had
banned ABMs completely or limited them to the existing single site
in each country, I feel that the two-site provision in the treaty is still
quite satisfactory since it clearly precludes the acquisition of a nation-
wide defense by either side. The treaty, together with the supple-
mentary understandings, contains sufficient technical details so that
not only are large ABMs banned but also bears that air defenses
could be upgraded to ABMs no longer can have any substance. The
negotiators have successfully attacked the problem of ABM radars,
the most critical element in an ABM system which must be controlled.
While upgrading was always of very questionable technical feasibility,
it was nevertheless used as an excuse by the U.S. for procuring addi-
º ºve weapons such as MIRVs. This red herring can now
e OurleOl. -
346
FUTURE U.S. ABM PROGRAMS IN LIGHT OF TREATY
Before leaving the subject of ABMs, I should like to express my
views on the future U.S. ABM program in light of this treaty. Should
we proceed to deploy the Washington ABM which is specifically al-
lowed ? My answer to this question is clearly no. Just because we have
this option is no justification for proceeding to exercise it. Admiral
Moorer stated on February 15, 1972, that the “Moscow (ABM) system
even with improved radars and more and better interceptors, could
still be saturated by a very small part of our total missile force.” Why,
then, should we proceed to deploy a Washington defense similar to such
an ineffective Moscow system?
Neither Secretary Laird nor Admiral Moorer in testimony before
this committee have satisfactorily justified the need to proceed. They
have argued that it might buy time for our command-and-control sys-
tem, but they have so far avoided being specific on this score, prob-
ably because the time bought is extremely short even under optimum
circumstances. Since the allowed system would permit only 100 de-
fensive missiles, even if it were 100 percent effective, it could be pene-
trated by 101 incoming warheads. What time is then bought by the
defensive system’ Our current command-and-control system has been
built to respond to the normal 30-minute warning of an ICBM launch
or the somewhat smaller period for the submarine-launched ballistic
missile. Any Small increment provided by a defense which could be
measured only in Seconds or at most minutes is clearly irrelevant.
Furthermore, the Washington ABM makes no sense for the second-
ary objectives originally put forth to justify the Safeguard system,
that is, defense against a Chinese attack or accidental launches. Since
by treaty the remaining population and industrial centers of the U.S.
outside of Washington must remain vulnerable, the Washington sys-
tem cannot have any practical value against even a limited Chinese
ICBM threat. Similarly, only a small proportion of the Soviet mis-
siles would be targeted against Washington so that the probability
that it could provide useful protection against an accidental Soviet
launch is very small. Thus the Washington ABM has virtually no
value against accidents, the Chinese threat, or a Soviet attack. I would
Submit that we are carrying the concept of parity too far if we seek
equality in Soviet mistakes.
The question of proceeding with the missile site defense at Grand
Forks is more debatable since it has been announced that the system
is already more than 80 percent completed. As I have stated previously
before this committee, I do not believe that the Safeguard ICBM de-
fense was either needed or effective since it could be overcome by a
very small increase in the offensive forces needed to destroy Minute-
man. This conclusion still holds good today; in fact, the requirement
for ICBM defenses has been significantly reduced by the ABM treaty
and by the ceiling on large ICBMs included in the interim agreement.
The ABM treaty would allow the construction of 18 additional radars
as a part of the missile site defense and this does remove the most
obvious Achilles heel in the Safeguard system, that is, the vulnerabil-
ity of the single missile site radar. However, with the limit of 100
interceptors, the system can still be easily overpowered. The addition

34.7
at great expense of 18 radars to the system at this time is probably un:
warranted. I recommend, however, that vigorous research be carried
out on the so-called hard-site system as a hedge in the event that the
treaty and the interim agreement are abrogated.
MORE LIMITED WALUE OF INTERIM AGREEMENT
I consider that the interim agreement on offensive weapons is of
more limited value than the ABM treaty since both nations already
have large numbers of strategic missiles and since it includes few re-
straints on qualitative improvements. Two years ago when SALT was
in its early stages, Dr. Herbert Scoville pointed out that a simple
numerical limitation on missiles with few if any restrictions on re-
placement of existing weapons by new and different models could be
a sham of arms control. Fortunately, the interim agreement does go
beyond a simple numerical ceiling although only to a limited extent.
It does prevent the replacement of small ICBMs by large ones and
significantly increasing the size—10 to 15 percent—of the land-based
launchers. Thus the Soviets are now frozen at 313 large SS—9 ICBMs,
significantly less than the 500 which Secretary Laird predicted the
Soviets would have by 1975 when justifying the Safeguard ABM and
MIRV deployments. The interim agreement, therefore, should reduce
fears on this score although in fact the Soviets had only started 25
new large ICBM launchers since August, 1969. If Secretary Laird's
original arguments were sound, then we should have reduced require-
ment for new strategic weapons now.
Apart from this restriction on large ICBMs, the numerical ceiling
is of marginal value and indeed by specifically endorsing the concept
of replacement of old models by new ones, it can provide an excuse
for accelerating the qualitative arms race. I am not concerned by the
fact that the Soviets are allowed a larger number of submarine-
launched ballistic missiles than the U.S. This disparity has no security
significance since the U.S. has a tremendous qualitative and geograph-
ical advantage. Dr. Kissinger has pointed out that the Russians would
require about 60 submarines to have the same capability as 40 U.S.
ones because of the much longer time that their ships would have to
take to reach operational stations. President Nixon pointed out in his
State of the World Message this year that both our SLBMs and our
Polaris submarines were superior to the Soviet systems. Secretary
Laird in testimony before this committee attempted to give the impres-
sion that the Soviet Y-class submarines together with the newly de-
veloped longer-range SLBM were already equivalent to our proposed
TRIDENT, but I know of no facts which would justify such a com-
parison. The Polaris-Poseidon system is, in my view, still superior to
anything that the Soviets are deploying today.
PROPOSED U.S. STRATEGIC ARMS PROGRAM
Since the interim agreement places so few restrictions on quali-
tative improvements, its true value and indeed that of the ABM
treaty as well will depend on the unilateral actions which the two
nations now take in light of the present guaranteed state of mutual
deterrence and on the vigor with which additional negotiations are
80–942 O—72—23
3.48
prosecuted to Secure restrictions on qualitative improvements and to
reduce existing weapons. Our proposed strategic arms program should
now be carefully reexamined in light of the new situation and only
those items which have a real security need should be carried for-
Ward. There is no reason for accelerating any offensive weapon pro-
grams at this time. Instead, if the agreements are to have any real
value, then many proposed programs should be cut back. There is no
Security requirement for rushing ahead with the Trident submarine;
in fact, prematurely freezing on the design of a large and hopefully
quieter vessel at this time could eventually lead to a reduction in our
Security when one is attempting to design to an unknown antisub-
marine technology and against a threat which has not yet developed.
Further deployment of MIRVs on either the Poseidon or the Min-
uteman TTT is no longer warranted since the requirement for over-
whelming a large Soviet ABM does not now exist and since the con-
tinuation of such programs can only make more difficult the achieve-
ment of a MIRV ban. The proposal to move ahead with a submarine-
launched strategic cruise missile at this time seems so absurd as to
almost not warrant comment since the ABM treaty has guaranteed
that our submarine-launched ballistic missiles can reach their target
within the USSR. I would recommend that the Congress look at these
and in fact at all other strategic weapon programs in light of the
Moscow agreements and fund only those which have a clearly justi-
fiable security need. -
BARGAINING CHIP ARGUMENT
The argument that weapons must be bought as bargaining chips
for arms control negotiations is not very convincing. It is difficult, if
not impossible, to assess the role played by Safeguard as a bargaining
chip in the SALT treaty.
Perhaps the Russians were influenced or at least mystified by our
insistence on deploying an ABM system with such obvious technical
deficiencies. At any rate, in practice the Safeguard ABM bargaining
chip only produced a treaty which allowed the Russians to enlarge
an ABM system which they were showing no signs of extending.
The MIRV bargaining chip has made more difficult the achieve-
ment of any limitation on MIRVs which in the long run can be a sig-
nificant security loss to the U.S. The Trident submarine program re-
quest designed to demonstrate to the Soviets our intention to match
their submarine construction program may have resulted in an agree-
ment which allowed the Soviets to build 50 percent more submarines
than they already had under construction. This is not an impressive
record for bargaining chips. We can no longer afford to let arms con-
trol negotiations be used as a cloak to procure unnecessary weapons.
VERIFICATION ASPECTS OF AGREEMENTS
Finally, I should like to make one further point relative to the veri-
fication aspects of the two agreements. I fully subscribe to the thesis
that national means of verification are satisfactory to verify that
significant violations of these two agreements are not occurring. The
clandestine deployment of an ABM systºm or upgrading of air de-
fenses to provide a significant ABM capability would have a very high
349
probability of being detected by our national means. In this connection,
the provisions of the treaty relative to radars are particularly helpful
Since these are the most easily detectable and longest lead-time items
in an ABM system. The precedent established by these agreements in
legalizing such national technical means of verification is excellent
and is useful not only in connection with the present agreements but
also for future ones as well. It is particularly satisfying to note the
provisions which make it illegal to interfere with such national tech-
nical means and to use deliberate concealment measures which impede
such verification. This is a major accomplishment in the field of arms
control.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, if the two governments act with restraint in their
unilateral programs and if they move forward rapidly to attempt to
reach agreement on qualitative restrictions, then the Moscow agree-
ments can be truly looked on as milestones toward the goal of limiting
nuclear arms. With good will and restraining on both sides, there will
be many opportunities for further restrictions, not all of which need
to be carried out in the context of bilateral SALT negotiations. A
comprehensive test ban which could be negotiated at the CCD in
Geneva would be a useful step in applying qualitative restraints and
in reducing the risks of further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Mutual force reductions negotiated by the NATO and Warsaw Pact
countries would be an important step in reducing the burdens of con-
ventional arms. There is little question that there will be widespread
support for efforts by the United States to ensure that the limitations
on strategic arms now undertaken are followed up in a manner which
ends the fruitless and expensive arms competition.
Thank you.
Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Goldberger.
In view of the fact that we are going to have a roll call a little
later, Senator Cooper has made a suggestion, which I think is very
good, that we have all three witnesses present their statements and leave
the questioning until later. If that is agreeable, we will hear from Mr.
Garwin next. -
Mr. Garwin, we are very glad to have you with us. You may proceed
with your statement as you see fit.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD L. GARWIN, IBM WATSON LABORATORY,
YORKTON HEIGHTS, CALIF.
Mr. GARwin. Thank you. I am honored by the committee’s request
for my testimony in regard to the strategic arms limitation agree-
ments now before the Senate, and I am pleased to have this opportu-
nity to comment. The committee surely recognizes that I can add very
little to the excellent factual presentations which have been made by
Ambassador Smith and others and to the highly informative White
House briefing by President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger on June 15, 1972.
Furthermore, it must be recognized that I speak for myself alone in
making these remarks. I hope that my views may be of some help to
WOUL.
350
BACKGROUND OF WITNESS
Since 1950 I have been involved extensively in technical contribu-
tions to offensive and defensive strategic arms. Since that year a sub-
stantial part of my time has been spent in helping to understand and
to provide the background for policy decisions in the national security
area. In particular, I have contributed extensively to the design of
nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, to the command and control of
such weapons, to the strategic air defense of the United States, to the
formulation of various possible systems for antiballistic missile de-
fense, to studies of arms control agreement such as the Limited Nuclear
Weapons Test Ban, and to agreements such as those which are now be-
fore the Congress. -
My recent involvement with the government has included member-
ship in the President's Science Advisory Committee from 1962 to 1965
and again from 1969 to the present time; membership in the Defense
Science Board—advisory to the Secretary of Defense—1966 to 1969;
membership and chairmanship of several military panels of the Presi-
dent’s Science Advisory Committee over these years; and the chairing
of panels for the Defense Department and for other agencies in the
national security area. In particular, it has been reported to the Con-
gress by responsible officials that I chaired the Military Aircraft Panel
and the Antisubmarine Warfare Panel of the President’s Science Ad-
visory Committee. Over the years I have had deep and intimate con-
tact with both strategic and tactical weapon programs, with the re-
sponsibility of assessing our technology in these specific areas in view
of the potential and the capabilities of our possible adversaries. An-
other aspect of my task at various times was to assess the current mili-
tary capability of certain of our forces I have recommended at times
that certain development or production programs be initiated or ex-
pedited and I have judged at times that certain programs should be
canceled or redirected.
AGREEMENTS BEFORE SENATE COMMENDED
The Senate has before it for its action the ABM treaty, the interim
agreement on offensive weapons and the associated protocol, signed
May 26, 1972. These were transmitted to the Senate June 13, together
with twelve agreed interpretations initiated by the heads of the dele-
gations on May 26, 1972, six common understandings and eight uni-
lateral statements. These supplementary statements amplify and in
most cases extend the coverage of the agreements. The formal docu-
ments are models of brevity. -
I regard these agreements as an historical achievement. They are
indeed a step toward more complete limitation of strategic arms, but
the limitations which they impose are of enormous significance in
themselves. I do not suggest that the agreements coincide in every re-
spect with those I would have advocated but I believe they result in
greater overall progress than I thought possible in arms limitation
by this date.
POSTURE OF MUTUAL DETERRENCE
For more than a decade the destruction of the U.S. by the Soviet
Union, or vice versa, has been prevented not by the traditional aspects
351
of defense—that is, a shield against the striking force, but by the cer-
tainty that each side possessed a thermonuclear force sufficiently nu-
merous and survivable that it could be used in return to destroy the
initiator of strategic warfare. During the decade, measures were taken
On both sides to render the offensive forces more survivable and more
controllable, so that this posture of mutual deterrence, apparently ac-
ceptable, even unavoidable, at any given time, could not be stolen or
destabilized by sudden unilateral action on the other side. The techni-
cal possibility most destabilizing would have been a deployed defense
against ballistic missiles—ABM–which it was felt by some could be
developed and proliferated to ward off and hence to negate the re-
entry vehicles and warheads of the land-based ICBM force and of
the submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Of course, deterrence would
still exist if the bombers could survive to take off and to penetrate to
their targets. Although costly and heavy air defenses were deployed
on both sides, it is clear that the present bombers on either side can
penetrate. Furthermore, any ABM system which has thus far been
proposed in detail has had no capability to prevent the overwhelming
penetration by the ballistic missile forces of the other side. Still the
uncertainty as to the future possibility of ABM of some unknown type
was an impetus for proliferation and improvement programs of the
offensive forces, such as multiple reentry vehicles—MRV, multiple
independently targeted reentry vehicles—MIRV, retention of bomber-
delivered weapons, et cetera. y
The other perceived threat to the stable deterrent was the possibility
of destruction before launch. The public and even official circles often
confused some eventual possibility of prelaunch vulnerability of the
land-based ICBM with an overall destruction before launch of the
offensive forces, although no combination of enemy ICBM warhead
yield and accuracy can threaten the survivability of the bombers or
of the submarine-launched missiles. The first are protected by their
ability to be launched on detection of ICBM firing, and the second by
the other side's ignorance of the specific location of the submarines.
This confusion was exploited by various individuals and groups for
their own reasons. *
Furthermore, many wished for a world in which the shield-like
defense could replace the deterrent and in which their own nation
could wield the threat of ultimate destruction of the adversary. In
fact, no proposal has ever been advanced which could seriously
promise to repeal the technical facts. Between the reality and grudged
acceptability of deterrence on the one hand, and the will-o-the-wisp
of the permanent defensive shield against all possible types of weap-
ons on the other, the responsibility national leaders have chosen the
reality of deterrence.
PROMISED PERMAN ENT ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE ABM CAPABILITY
Thus the ABM treaty promises the permanent absence of effective
ABM capability, either locally or nationwide. To enforce such an
important promise, it has provisions to limit systems which act like
ABMs or look like ABMs. Most importantly, it recognizes the use of
national technical means of verification, and it includes the under-
taking not to use deliberate concealment measures nor to interfere with
352
the national technical means of vertification of the other party. Finally,
it establishes a standing consultative commission to consider Various
questions, including details of compliance, et cetera. Furthermore, the
agreed interpretations further limit ABM systems and specify, among
other things, that specific limitations on ABM systems based on other
physical principles and on their components, would be subject to dis-
cussion and agreement. Among the articles of the treaty, Article V is
an undertaking “not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or com;
ponents which are sea based, air based, space based, or mobile land
based.” It is my judgment that this treaty and the auxiliary documents
provide a firm, safeguarded an verifiable elimination of the ABM as
a threat to the effectiveness of our ICBM and SLBM force.
INSURANCE AGAINST DESTRUCTION BY PREEMPTIVE STRIKE
The interim agreement on the limitation of offensive missiles, to-
gether with the protocol and the agreed interpretations, attempts to
do for a period of five years what the ABM treaty does for an un-
limited duration. They attack the other possible threat to stable deter-
rence, that is, the fear of destruction of the ICBM force before launch.
Remember that the SLBM force is not threatened by accuracy or num-
bers of the opposing offensive warheads, and the bombers can be based
and managed so that they can take off before being destroyed. Thus
the offensive limitations constitute a further insurance to the certainty
that our entire strategic offensive force cannot be destroyed in a pre-
emptive strike. As has been previously stated many times in these hear-
ings, the interim agreement and the protocol freeze the number of
ICBMs at the number presently operational or under construction, and
the number of SLBMs at the number presently operational or under
construction, the protocol spelling out the precise numbers. The U.S.
may trade 54 of its ICBMs for new construction SLBMs on not more
than three submarines, and the Soviet Union can destroy 210 ICBMs
and replace them with SLBMs. I can respond to questions regarding
the details of these numerical limits, but I don’t want to give them
undue significance.
DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NUMBERS OF MISSILES ALLOWED
Various individuals have made much of the discrepancy between the
number of missiles allowed the two sides:
United States U.S.S.R.
!9BM------------------------------------------------------------------ 1,054 (1,000) 1,618 (1,408)
SLBM----------------------------------------------------------------- 656 (710) 740 (950)
For each nation the numbers in parenthesis give the maximum per-
mitted number of SLBM launchers on nuclear-powered submarines
and modern SLBM launchers on any submarine. To reach this num-
ber, a nation must destroy ICBMs to the level indicated by the
parentheses. -
353
ARGUMENTS CONCERNING SOVIET STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE QUESTIONED
Critics have argued that the Soviet Union, by virtue of these greater
numbers, has some kind of strategic advantage. These arguments ig-
more the realities of deterrence, the fact that an ABM treaty effectively
increases the number of our missiles five or ten years hence by some
unknown but large factor in comparison with what we regarded as
satisfactory in the absence of such a treaty. It ignores the strategic
advantage contained in the unilateral “statement of the Soviet side”
submitted to you regarding the “strategic imbalance”—their words—
in the deployment of the nuclear-powered submarines of the U.S.S.R.
and the U.S. Finally, it ignores the enormous growth potential per-
mitted us under the terms of the agreements, which would allow us
to replace each Minuteman missile in its existing silo by a new missile
with at least three times as many warheads as the MTRVed Minuteman
III. Of course, there is no necessity to do any such thing; in the ab-
sence of an ABM agreement we felt no compulsion and had no pro-
gram to increase our ICBM offensive force at all, let alone by that
amount; but this offensive agreement, which in any case is limited to a
duration of five years, allows us this enormous growth. -
It is difficult to recollect that early in May 1972, we had no guarantee
that these SALT agreements would be signed. Admiral Moorer testi-
fied to this committee on June 21, 1972, that the Soviet Union was de-
ploying annually 250 ICBMs and 128 SLBMs. Considering the expira-
tion date of the interim agreement—1977, during this five-year period
the Soviet Union, without such an agreement, and without any accel-
eration in their programs, could have had 1,250 more ICBMs and 640
more SLBMs, all of the most modern types. Even if the interim offen-
sive agreement were not to be followed by further advances in arms
limitation, I would regard it as a very major benefit to the United
States to be facing a Soviet force in 1977 little different from that
which they have now, rather than one which could be far more than
twice as large. I must admit that there is one way in which the Soviet
|Union benefits from these agreements more than the U.S.—by having
agreed to the termination of the enormous on-going programs to which
Admiral Moorer alluded, they will save tens of billions of rubles.
We should be very clear that had the SALT agreements not been
reached, there was no program underway in the Defense Department
to provide a larger offensive force by 1977. The ABM agreement has
now quaranteed our ICBMs and SLBMs a free ride to their targets.
Compared with conservative projections of Soviet ABM capability,
our penetrating missile forces are enormously increased in capability
in the late 1970s. Furthermore, the ABM treaty, which eliminates
effective ABM, does not limit air defense. Thus, for the indefinite
future missiles are assured of penetration, whereas, our bombers face
an already heavy and potentially unlimited air defense. There is no
doubt that the SALT agreements make a major change in the relative
values and priorities of our existing strategic forces, in the needs for
development, and in the relative balance between strategic forces and
others. -
354
APPROVAL OF AGREEMENTS AND VOTE ON WEAPONS PROGRAMS
The benefits of the agreements will become a reality only when the
treaty has been ratified by the Senate and the Congress has approved
the executive agreements; therefore, I believe that it is urgent, as the
President stated on June 23:
First, the arms limitation agreements should be approved on their merits—
after the Congress moves—in approving the ABM Treaty and also the limited,
temporary, offensive limitations curb—all Congressmen and Senators—and this
Would, of Course, concern them all—who are concerned about the security of the
United States should then vote for those programs that will provide adequate
Offensive Weapons in the areas that have been recommended by the Secretary of
Defense and by the administration. -
FISCAL YEAR 1973 STRATEGIC PROGRAMS
I would like to give you my views on some of these fiscal year 1973
Strategic programs:
It is important to recognize that the fiscal year 1973 programs must
take into account the great impact of the ABM treaty and the offensive
limitations which the leaders of the United States and the Soviet
Union have signed and which the Congress will soon affirm. Proposed
programs, and on-going programs should then be evaluated in terms
of their contribution to our overall stable deterrent, their cost and hence
their impact on other military and nonmilitary needs, and their impact
On future arms limitations agreements.
TRIDENT AND TRIDENT I MISSILE PROGRAM
The largest and the least sensible innovation in strategic weapon
programs is ULMS or Trident. It must be clearly recognized that
Trident is an uneasy marriage of a useful, sensible program and a
premature, almost purposeless program. The Trident I missile, that
is, the Poseidon C–4 is a new development missile which fit into the
existing Polaris-Poseidon submarine and which, even if deployed in
small numbers, would allow these submarines to contribute to deter-
rence soon after they left home port. Furthermore, these new missiles
would greatly increase the submarine operating area from which
Polaris-Poseidon could strike deterrent targets in the Soviet Union. I
believe that the Trident I missile is a good program and should proceed
at a measured pace.
The Trident submarine, on the other hand, seemed to me unjustified
even in the absence of any SALT agreements. There is no threat known
or on the horizon which threatens the prelaunch survivability of our
submarine deterrent. In particular, a proper response to Some future
unexpected development in antisubmarine warfare could almost cer.
tainly be met at lower cost by new construction, slightly modified
Poseidon boats carrying the Poseidon C-4 missile. In the presence of
the ABM treaty and the interim offensive agreement, continuation and
even acceleration of the Trident submarine programs seems to me
to compound folly. The ABM treaty ensures the penetration of war-
heads launched from Polaris or Poseidon boats. There is no need to
expand our force. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the
ICBM's will in fact become vulnerable, since it would be illogical for
355
the Soviet Union to build an expensive capability to threaten Minute-
man when it has no way of effectively threatening Poseidon, and when
it will now have no ABM system to ward off those missiles which may
be launched.
In regard to the Trident submarine, you will remember that the
Secretary of Defense testified before the Armed Services Committee,
February 15, 1972, that:
The continuing Soviet Strategic Offensive force buildup, with its long-term
implications, convinced us that we need to undertake a major new strategic initia-
tive. This step must signal to the Soviets and our allies that we have the will and
the resources to maintain sufficient Strategic forces in the face Of a growing
Soviet threat. It would be diplomatically and politically unacceptable for the
U.S. to allow the Soviets to achieve a large numerical superiority in both land-
based and Sea-based Strategic missiles . . .
I am at a loss to understand how an ULMS or Trident program
which was needed in the face of a Soviet rate buildup of 250 ICBMs
and 128 SLBM's per year continue to be needed while this rate of
buildup has been reduced to zero. I believe that the Trident submarine
program ought to be redirected to be an exploratory submarine sur-
vivability program, at a level of about $50 million annually.
B—1 BOMBER AND SCAD PROGRAM
The B-1 bomber, in view of SALT, is considerably less valuable
relative to missiles than had been the case. The ABM treaty guaran-
tees penetration to their targets for both ICBMs and SLBMs. It does
nothing for the bomber. I believe that the B-1 must be justified, if at
all, for its tactical uses. For the strategic force, if one believes that
bombers are indeed a necessary component, and I remain unconvinced,
one could better use the SCAD—subsonic cruise armed decoy—now
planned for the B-52, launched from outside the borders of the Soviet
Union by cargo-type aircraft—for example, C-141, et cetera. There
is no hurry to replace the B-52 and the B–1 could well proceed, if at
all, at a slower pace. On the other hand, the SCAD program, in its
armed version—not solely a decoy—could provide additional deter-
rent capability from many available vehicles, and here I should add
that it could provide this capability at reduced cost.
CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAM
The Department of Defense has included in its strategic programs
the development of a new cruise missile to be launched from sub-
marines. It notes that the Soviet Union has cruise missiles which can
be launched from their submarines. I have long argued that such nu-
clear armed Soviet cruise missiles could, in fact, vitiate any coastal
ABM system, but I believe that the Soviet submarine-launched cruise
missile is generally regarded as an anti-shipping weapon. Surely the
Defense Department cannot seriously propose the substitution of
cruise missiles on a one-for-one basis for SLBM's, which later encoun-
ter no defenses, while the cruise missile will be subject to the general
air-defense system of the Soviet Union. If the Department of Defense
is proposing to build large numbers of cruise missiles, simply because
they are not limited by the precise text of the interim offensive agree-
356
ment, it could better consider the payload enhancement of the Minute-
man missile, too, on the order of 10 of the present type MIRVs, to
which I have referred before. This cruise missile program makes no
Se]]Se.
SAFEGUARD ABM SYSTEM
The Safeguard ABM system is strictly limited by the treaty to the
one ICBM defense site at Grand Forks and to a possible site at Wash-
ington, D.C.. I believe that the site at Washington, D.C., was never
worth the money and is far less desirable now. If the Soviet Union
wished to deny us the small additional decision time which one might
imagine to be provided by a 100-interceptor Safeguard site, it could
well do that by targeting on Washington a very small fraction of their
total stable of warheads. They could do it with far less expenditure by
the use of decoys. They could deny us all warning in the case of this
attack on the national capital—not in the case of an attack on the
strategic offensive force—by the use of other means. Simply because I
am permitted by law to shred or burn my money does not impel me to
do so. Similarly, although the U.S. is authorized under the ABM
treaty to deploy an ABM for Washington, D.C., there is no reason for
us to proceed with this system of 100 interceptors together with radars
. no more than 6 aim points unless we believe it is in our interest to
O SO.
ASSURANCES REQUESTED BY JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are quoted by their chairman in his testi-
mony of June 21, 1972, as requesting three assurances in connection
with their support of the arms limitation agreements. These are:
Assurance (1) “A broad range of intelligence capabilities and opera.
tions to verify Soviet compliance in a strategic arms limitation en-
vironment.” Assurance (2) “Aggressive improvements and moderni-
Zation programs.” Assurance (3) “Vigorous research and development
programs.”
I agree with his statement of Assurance 1. I believe that the JCS
statement of Assurance 2 is unrealistic and illogical—“maximize stra-
tegic capabilities within the constraints established by the ABM Treaty
and the interim offensive agreements.” This says to me that because
we have arms limitation agreements, the normal budetary controls no
longer apply. It means that strategic capabilities must be maxi-
mized independently of their impact on tactical programs, or for that
matter independent of their budgetary impact on Assurance 1 and
Assurance 3. Furthermore, the second part of Assurance 2, “plan for
rapid augmentation of strategic forces beyond the constraints of the
treaty and agreement . . . to be made in the event of abrogation, with-
drawal, or collapse of negotiations,” unless qualified, is a prescription
for an arms race, for the development and creation of production ca-
pacity for systems which are unneeded now and which would be un-
needed even in the event of collapse of negotiations.
Assurance 3, “continued testing to ensure the effectiveness of new and
existing nuclear weapons systems,” really begs the question as to
whether nuclear testing is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of ex-
isting nuclear weapons systems. This is a point which deserves a good
deal of discussion in its own right, rather than being stated as a con-
dition for support of the arms limitation agreements.
357
PRESIDENT's Two STEPs TowARD FOLLOW-ON AGREEMENT .
In his remarks at a briefing for five congressional committees June
15, 1972, President Nixon said:
It is for that reason, without getting into the specifics as to what the level
Of defense Spending should be, as to what the offensive programs should be, I
am Simply Saying that if we want a follow-on agreement, we have to have two
Steps: We need first, Of course, to approve these agreements; and second we
need a credible defensive position so that the Soviet Union will have an in-
Centive to negotiate a permanent Offensive freeze. That is what we all want.
That is what I want, too. The Congress should act favorably on these
agreements and should then look closely at what is required for a strong
and credible defense program. I do not believe that the program pro-
posed by the Department of Defense would lead to a credible and
strong defense. I have no objection to spending the money requested,
but I believe that far better uses for it can be found in the Defense
Department than in the development of the Trident submarine, in the
construction of the Washington, D.C., Safeguard site, or in the de-
velopment of the submarine-launched strategic cruise missile. I think
that the historic achievement represented by the strategic arms limita-
tion agreements, when endorsed by the Congress, should force a
thorough review of the detailed programs for improving and maintain-
ing our defense capabilities. I do not believe that hasty action on the
defense budget is in the best interests of our national security or of
our military capability.
Thank you.
Senator SYMINGTON. (presiding). Thank you, Dr. Garwin.
Senator SYMINGTON. Dr. Panofsky, do you have a statement?
Mr. PANOFSKY. Yes.
Senator SYMINGTON. Will you read it, please?
STATEMENT OF WOLFGANG. K. H. PANOFSKY, DIRECTOR, STAN-
FORD LINEAR ACCELERATOR CENTER, STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
CALIFORNIA
Mr. PANOFSKY. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have the opportunity
of testifying before this committee in support of ratification of the
treaty signed May 26, 1972, at Moscow on the limitation of antibal-
listic missile systems and in support of approval of the interim agree-
ment signed at the same time dealing with limitations of strategic
offensive arms.
I am testifying as a private citizen who in the past and at present
has served in various consultative capacities to branches of the U.S.
Government and who has a continuing interest in strategic matters in
general, and in arms control in particular.
The Moscow agreements can constitute the largest advance in the
control of arms which the world has as yet seen; it is essential that
actions subsequent to the treaty and its ratification shall make fullest
use of the unique opportunities these agreements could bring to re-
verse the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union.
This race is dangerous, is wasteful of our resources and, in my view,
is one of the real tragedies of the postwar era.
358
PRECEDENT-SETTING TERMIS IN MOSCOW AGREEMENTS
There are many terms in the Moscow agreements which are prece-
dent setting. Let me enumerate a few of these. Obviously time does
not permit here a complete analysis of the agreements.
(1) The treaty is equivalent to a joint declaration that mutual de-
terrance is the strategic policy of both the U.S. and the USSR and
implicitly denies the usefulness of a nuclear war-fighting strategy. It
is explicitly stated in Article I that the parties will not deploy an
ABM system for the “defense of the territory” of each country. This
means that both nations agree not to adopt a “damage-limiting”
strategy which would attempt to reduce the impact of nuclear war to
each country. Once a nuclear war-fighting strategy at various levels
of intensity is given up as realistic objective of national policy, there
should be no need for either side to develop and deploy any nuclear
strategic offensive weapons beyond those needed for deterring the
other side from a first-strike attack or from a preemptive strike in
case of crisis.
(2) The agreed prohibition of effective ABM defenses implies that
each offensive strategic missile in the U.S. arsenal has now a larger
deterrent value. The overall deterrent value of the U.S. arsenal is en-
hanced above that before signature of the Moscow treaty; therefore,
signature of the SALT treaty implies a reduction in the required level
of armaments relative to that justifiable before the SALT agreement
was signed.
(3) We have agreed with the Soviets not to interfere with legal
“national means of verification” presumably including data collection
from satellite platforms. This is an important agreement which at-
tests to the fact that technology in general and satellites in particular
have made this a more open world.
(4) The SAILT treaty enters into technical matters of considerable
detail. It would have been considered impossible until a relatively
short time ago to negotiate with our ideological opponents in as much
technical detail as has been possible at SALT. As a result, some of
the restraints agreed upon, such as limitations on the product of per-
mitted radiated power and aperture for a radar, are quite detailed.
(5) The Moscow treaty contains many important restraints on the
growth of military technology. The treaty not only forbids deploy-
ment of ABM systems in excess of the numbers of interceptors and the
numbers and sizes of radar specified, but it also precludes such items
as testing of air-defense systems in an ABM mode, and prevents de-
ployment of ABM systems using physical principles different from
those now employed. Thus the treaty begins to demonstrate to the
world man’s willingness to control the growth of technology in direc-
tions which are considered undesirable to the overriding interests of
humanity. -
Technical products evolve through a long chain starting from new
results in basic research—that is, research not motivated by applica-
tions but by man's fundamental curiosity about the functioning of
nature—and leading on through development, test and, finally, pro-
duction and deployment. I have here, Mr. Chairman, a table which is
also contained in your written presentation which indicates the chain
of technological evolution from basic research, research applied to
359
identified technologies, development, test, production, deployment and
then possible transfer of the technology worldwide. Now, the ABM
treaty has provided highly meaningful controls deep into the tech-
nological chain all the way through. For instance, it prohibits the
development of an ABM multiple-warhead and prohibits adaptation
of non-ABM systems to ABM use. These are similar provisions as to
testing and broader provisions as to deployment. The treaty also pro-
hibits transfer of ABM technology to other countries. You will note
however, from the table that the interim agreement on offensive mis-
siles lags notably in terms of any constraints on qualitative evolution
of military offensive strategic hardware; this is a defect which I hope
will be remedied in the negotiations to follow.
PROS AND CONS OF TREATY AND INTERIM. AGREEMENT
The previous paragraphs describe what I believe to be the most im-
portant policy precedents achieved by the Moscow agreements, quite
apart from their specific content. In place of a more complete analysis
of the agreements themselves, I have tried to summarize in Tables II
and III of the agreement the pros and cons of the treaty and interim
agreement. Now, I have divided the pros and cons in these charts into
three categories: (1) those items clearly enhancing the security of both
nations; (2) those items in which the Soviets apparently enjoy an
advantage; and (3) those items in which the U.S. apparently has
benefited.
It is clear from these tables that the items agreed to which enhance
the security of both countries and which should do so at lower cost to
each, greatly dominate this summary, and I have here Table II which
enumerates those items in that category, namely, the ABM limits in-
crease the deterrent value of each offensive missile on both sides, and
thus both nations can obtain more deterrence at less costs. This bene-
fits both sides.
Senator SYMINGTON. Excuse me, Doctor. Mr. Chairman, I have to
go vote and I would hope the hearings will continue. There are some
questions I would like to ask.
Senator SPARKMAN (presiding). Yes. I will wait here. Senator
Cooper went on over and he will come right back and I will continue
until he gets back.
USE OF AGREEMENTS TO ACCELERATE U.S. ARM’s PRODUCTION
Senator SYMINGTON. The purpose of the questions is to be sure that
Dr. Garwin, especially, and Dr. Panofsky understand that the SALT
agreements are obviously being used as a method of heavily accelerat-
ing our arms production. That to me is very disappointing. I had
hoped that the agreement would have something to do with reducing
our arms because of the financial situation in which the federal govern-
ernment now finds itself, as evidenced by stories in the paper this
morning. So I would like to ask you and your colleagues some ques-
tions along those lines when I return. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SPARKMAN. We deferred questioning until they could pre-
sent their papers. -
Senator SYMINGTON. I understood.
Senator SPARKMAN. Go ahead, Doctor.
360
ITEMS FAvoRING U.S., soviBT UNION AND BOTH
Mr. PANOFSKY. I believe, Mr. Chairman, much of this material re-
lates directly to the point just raised by Senator Symington. So here
are the items which enhance the security of both nations and I will not
go into them further. -
Then, the next chart, Table III, indicates those items which appar-
ently favor the Soviet Union and those which apparently favor the
United States.
It is clear from these tables that the items agreed to and which
enhance the Security of both countries and which should do so at lower
cost to each, greatly dominate this summary. This ‘is as it should be,
since an arms control agreement can only achieve a durable objective
if both parties believe they have gained in security. This observation
contrasts with much of the debate which has been carried out before
this committee and in the press, which has focused largely on the
question as to which side has gained from the Moscow agreements at
the expense of the other. The truth of the matter is that the Moscow
agreements have increased the security of both parties, and that a de-
bate which tries to represent an arms control accord as a tug-of-war
between opposing parties grossly misrepresents the situation. Table III
contains items which appear to favor, and may, indeed, favor either
the USA or the USSR, but these items are reasonably well balanced
against each other. A principal achievement of the SALT agreements
has been stabilization on a very broad front of the strategic balance
between the two countries; therefore, small shifts in favor of either
side should not obscure the basic truth of the strategic situation of the
U.S. vis-a-vis the USSR; neither side can have the least hope of de-
livering a first strike against the other that would be sufficiently de-
vastating to escape destruction of its own society in retaliation.
On the surface, the much publicized numbers which constitute the
interim freeze on the number of offensive missile launchers provided
for by the interim agreement appear to be in favor of the USSR.
However, it should be recognized that there are many items not cov-
ered by the interim agreement—in particular, the fact that the U.S. is
in a position of leadership in the number of deliverable warheads and
in numbers of strategic aircraft. Such leadership cannot reasonably be
erased during the period in which a follow-on agreement must be
negotiated under the treaty. In addition, the interim agreement on
offensive missiles has achieved one goal that strongly favors the USA:
The agreement halts those items of Soviet offensive deployment—
construction of land-based missile silos and of missile-carrying Sub-
marines—in which the Soviets currently have a very vigorous on-
going program, but it places no constraints on those programs with
which the United States is actively proceeding: deployment of MIRVs
and other upgrading measures of the U.S. strategic forces. Therefore,
within its limited scope the interim agreement is a well-balanced
IYYea.SULF'é.
EACH NATION VASTLY - OVERARMED TO DETER ATTACK BY OTHER
I consider the counting of missiles and warheads and the weighing
of megatonnage to be a very naive means of assessing strategic stand-
361
ing. There are many other important factors such as differences in
geography and qualitative performance and Sophistication of the
strategic forces which contribute to the overall balance. However, the
singlemost important fact is that in the absence of meaningful ABM
defenses of their territories, as is now guaranteed under the treaty,
each nation is now vastly overarmed for its primary mission of deter-
ring an attack by the other.
IN EXPERIENCED WITH TOSE OF WEAPONS
No precise figures can be given as to what the minimum level of
armament must be to deter the other side from a first-strike attack.
Deterrence, after all, is not a measurable physical condition but is a
state of mind based on many factors other than sheer level of arma-
ments. Many of those who talk about deterrence tend to lose sight of
the enormity of the forces now at the command of the two superpowers
and of the literally unimaginable destruction that these existing
weapons can wreak. Debates about sufficiency of nuclear armament
tend to become a political game of numbers rather than a considera-
tion of the physical violence that these tools of mass destruction imply.
Since, happily, nuclear weapons have not been used in anger since
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, few of the current decisionmakers of either
the United States or the Soviet Union have any first-hand experience
with the use of these weapons; it is just this inexperience which tends
to lend an unjustified abstractness to the debate. Let me remind this
committee again about the incredible lethality of the threat to the
future of civilization which the world’s nuclear arsenal implies.
Senator SPARKMAN. Doctor, that is the warning bell. I barely have
time to get there, so I will ask you to hold up. Senator Cooper ought
to be here within a couple of minutes. -
Mr. PANOFSKY. Very good. Thank you.
(Recess.)
Senator SYMINGTON. (presiding). The committee will come to order.
Dr. Panofsky, will you continue? -
Mr. PANOFSKY. Shall I continue? I can also in a few words briefly
summarize all these things if that is not necessary.
Senator SYMINGTON. How many pages have you?
Mr. PANOFSKY. I have altogether 11 pages.
Senator SYMINGTON. Inasmuch as the SALT agreement apparently
is being used as justification for a heavy increase in armament, I would
hope you would not skip anything in your statement that has to do
with the matters as, for example, the Trident submarine.
We were told by this Administration several years ago that the new
plan was fly before you buy. To the best of our knowledge the hun-
dreds of millions of dollars that are being asked for the production
of the UTMS submarine are being asked for the production of some-
thing for which there are not yet even complete blueprints.
Mr. PANOFSKY. All right, sir. The most relevant item which has
bearing on that is what I consider to be a salient result of the SALT
agreement. It increases the worth as a deterrent of every missile now
in the United States arsenal.
Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Case is with us and Senator Cooper.
Why don’t you go ahead and read your statement?
36.2
Mr. PANOFSKY. Very good. e
I said since happily nuclear weapons have not been used in anger
since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, few of the current decisionmakers of
either the United States or the Soviet Union have any firsthand ex-
perience with the use of these weapons; it is just this inexperience
which tends to lend an unjustified abstractness to the debate.
INCREDIBLE LETHALITY IMPLIED BY world’s NUCLEAR ARSENAL
Let me remind this committee again about the incredible lethality
of the threat to the future of civilization which the world's nuclear
arsenal implies.
I have here a picture posted here and also in the transcript, Mr.
Chairman, of the devastation brought to Nagasaki by a single weapon
of approximately 20 kiloton TNT equivalent explosive power. Today,
the captain of a single Poseidon submarine has at his command roughly
150 nuclear weapons, each independently targetable and each exceed-
ing in explosive power that of the bomb delivered to Nagasaki. Multi-
ply this by the number of submarines and add in the additional strik-
ing power available through land-based missiles and strategic bombers
and the result is a degree of devastation beyond any human
comprehension. -
It is all too easy for military strategists to ignore these horrors in
their preoccupation with the numbers of casualties and weapons needed
for deterrence. Moreover, all strategic calculations tend to estimate
casualties only through what is known as prompt effects, that is, the
death and injury caused by the blast of a nuclear weapon and its im-
mediate radiation effects; usually not even fallout is included in the
damage prediction. What is totally ignored is the aftermath of a nu-
clear exchange—fire, disease, lack of medical care, destruction or in-
accessibility of food supplies, disorganization, unbalance of ecological
chains, et cetera. Therefore chances are that eventual casualties result-
ing from nuclear war are very much higher than those generally used
by executive-branch decisionmakers or presented by strategic analysts
to legislative committees. I therefore tend to agree with the opinion
expressed by McGeorge Bundy in 1969, that any policy leading to the
delivery of only a single nuclear weapon would be considered to be a
catastrophe blunder and that the delivery of even a small number of
nuclear devices would be a disaster of the first magnitude in the history
of the world. In contrast, those who plead for additional nuclear arma-
ment demand potential deaths in the many tens of millions, calculated
naively as prompt fatalities, as a basis of sufficiency of our deterrent
forces. -
Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question for clarification?
Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Case?
Senator CASE. Dr. Panofsky, when you say a single nuclear weapon,
do you mean of any strategic sort or any
Mr. PANOFSKY. I mean any nuclear weapon of this yield or larger.
363
RELATIONSHIP OF ARMS CONTROL MEASURES TO MILITARY EXPENDITURES
LEVEL
. This brings me to the last part of my testimony which is the rela-
tionship of arms control measures in general, and the Moscow agree-
ment in particular, to the level of military expenditures in those areas
affected by the arms control agreement. Let me flag again three items
which represent the cardinal achievements of the Moscow agree-
ments:
(1) Each missile in the U.S. arsenal has a higher deterrent value
as a result of the Moscow agreements than it had before as a result
of the treaty constraints on ABM.
(2) The declaration in Article I of the Moscow treaty that each
nation will forego defense of its territory is equivalent to accepting
a policy of mutual deterrence as the primary mission for its strategic
forces; both the U.S. and the Soviet Union are now vastly overarmed
for that mission. -
(3) The balance of terror implied by the strategy of mutual de-
terrence is very insensitive to even considerable changes in the cur-
rent strategic armaments of both sides.
Considering these circumstances, it is contrary to all reason to use
the Moscow agreements as an argument for more and not less stra-
tegic weaponry. The conclusion that the SALT agreements have
decreased the need for offensive weaponry is clearly substantiated on
technical grounds. The only question that remains is whether one can
justify further escalation of strategic weapons expenditures on a
political basis, that is, by the so-called bargaining chip argument
applied to the forthcoming round of SALT.
It is indeed true that in spite of the far-reaching achievements of
the Moscow agreements of May 26 a great deal remains to be done.
Table IV lists some of the elements of the strategic arms race which
remain unconstrained by SALT I and which, unless controlled, might
well in time negate much of what has been accomplished.
ITEMS UNCONSTRAINED BY INTERIM. AGREEMENT
I am listing here, Mr. Chairman, on Table TV, those items which
are unconstrained by the interim agreement.
The first is strategic bombers. There are no constraints on quali-
tative improvements through one-for-one replacement by better mod-
els. There are no—there are hardly any constraints on strategic mili-
tary research and test, no constraints on MIRVs, no constraint on
nuclear weapon improvements, no constraint whatever on production
and stockpiling, which can lead to future deployment of hardware
for strategic military offensive systems and no constraints on anti-
submarine warfare. -
In particular, qualitative improvements of strategic missiles, be they
through further additions of MIRV, through improvements in accu-
80–942 O—72—24
364
racy or through other measures, could in time erode the significance
of the limitation on offensive arms imposed by the interim agreement.
However, I would like to point out that the limitations of the ABM
treaty will continue to stabilize the strategic balance and thus reduce
the requirements for offensive strategic armament, irrespective of the
success of a follow-on agreement. -
AGENDA FOR NEXT ROUND OF SALT
Control of some, if not all, of the items listed in Table IV consti-
tutes an ambitious agenda for the next round of SALT. Priority
should be given to converting the interim agreement to a comprehen-
sive limit on offensive strategic weapons, including both numerical and
qualitative constraints. Moreover, in view of the vast excess of present
armament, considering the openness of the population guaranteed by
SALT—I, both nations should be able to negotiate reductions of stra-
tegic arms and so demonstrate to the rest of the world their commit-
ment toward a saner policy.
ARMIS EXPENDITURES POLICY ALTERNATIVES
The argument has been put forth that in order to lend urgency to
these future negotiations the U.S. must accelerate its arms expendi-
tures. To put it bluntly, the existence of these follow-on negotiations
is being proclaimed by Department of Defense spokesmen as a justi-
fication for strategic arms expenditures which under the ordinary
budgetary process and congressional review could not be justified.
I believe that this kind of argument is a mockery of the basic pur-
pose of arms control, which is to achieve higher security for both
nations at lower cost. Whether arms control negotiations are in prog-
ress or not, each country has to make decisions on its military expendi-
tures taking into account both its internal priorities and its external
security problems. What are the alternatives? One possibility would
be for our nation to proceed with a policy of restraint, that is, by cut-
ting back military expenditures, taking into account the arms control
agreement reached in the past, and demonstrating faith that arms con-
trol discussion of the future will achieve further constraints on the
arms race. A second alternative might be to proceed on the basis of
business as usual, ignoring the possibility of future arms control by
making the prudent assumption that the discussions may fail. A third
alternative is the bargaining-chip or the negotiating-from-strength
approach which means to buy more military strength in order to be
able to give some of it away in the negotiations. Yet the result may be
the opposite; the negotiating opponent may not propose that the bar-
gaining chip be given up; rather, he may demand an equal augmenta-
365
tion in armament and thus the bargaining-chip argument in itself
contributes to an escalation of the arms race.
LESSONS OF HISTORY OF U.S. AND SOVIET ABM DEPLOYMENTS
Let me consider the lessons which can be learned from the history of
|United States and Soviet ABM deployments that culminated in the
Moscow treaty. The Soviets have deployed an ABM system around
Moscow containing 64 Galosh-type ABM interceptors. This system
was built after several false starts and it is now agreed that it offers
negligible resistance to the penetration of U.S. missiles targeted
against Moscow.
I believe a previous witness has quoted Admiral Moorer’s testimony
to that effect. -
The United States Administration proposed the multiple purpose
Safeguard ABM system for authorization to the Congress. This sys-
tem was designed both to support an area-defense mission and to pro-
vide for the defense of the Minuteman and strategic bomber deterrent
forces. After receiving severe technical criticism of the system, the
Congress denied authorization for the area-defense component of
Safeguard, which is now also prohibited by the Moscow treaty, but in
successive years it authorized deployment around three Minuteman
sites. When the technical critics testified pursuasively as to the ex-
ceedingly low effectiveness of the resulting Minuteman defense in
relation to its cost, the Administration used the bargaining-chip argu-
ment in support of authorization. I cannot conclusively testify as to
Soviet reaction to this deploying decision. Although they must have
been fully aware of the low effectiveness of the system, they may well
have been concerned about the future growth of Safeguard into a more
comprehensive system. At any rate, as a consequence of the Moscow
deployment and of the 80 percent completion of the Safeguard instal-
lation at Grand Forks, North Dakota, the SALT negotiations con-
verged on an agreement which, to reflect the strategic parity between
the two powers, permitted each side to copy the wasteful mistake made
by the other. The agreement permits the U.S. to match the admittedly
ineffective defense of Moscow as a defense of Washington, D.C., and
it also permits the Soviets to imitate the Grand Forks Safeguard in-
stallation by protecting an equivalent force of missile silos east of the
Ural Mountains. Thus our bargaining chip has resulted in an arms
control agreement permitting, but not requiring, some very ineffec-
- º but at the same time very expensive ABM installation on both
SIOleS.
OPPORTUNITY TO ExERCISE RESTRAINT IN MILITARY EXPENDITURES
The achievements of SALT-I have created an unparalleled oppor-
tunity to exercise some restraint in military expenditures and still
366
meet the needs of national security. Contrary to some public state-
ments, I am aware of no evidence that in response to the Moscow
agreements the Soviets are accelerating their strategic military activ-
ity in order to divert and intensify their preparations into those direc-
tions not as yet constrained by the agreements. SALT I gives us some
time to watch what the Soviets will in fact do subsequent to the agree-
ments and then to respond ourselves. Because of the very broad range
of strategic stability reached by the elimination of meaningful ABM
defenses, there is no necessity for as high a rate of expenditure in
anticipation of unseen threats as we sustained in the past. We must
not confuse the weapons permitted under the Moscow agreement with
a mandate to proceed toward their procurement and deployment.
This testimony deals primarily with the merits of the Moscow
Strategic agreements, not with a detailed analysis of the strategic
weapons authorization request of the Department of Defense. I would,
however, suggest that in view of the foregoing the Senate recognize
that technically the agreements must necessarily lead to lessened
strategic requirements and that the prospects for negotiation of a
follow-on agreement to replace the interim accords should not justify
military expenditures which are otherwise not needed. On the contrary,
the increased strategic stability achieved by the accords provides a
safe opportunity for restraint in strategic military spending. For all
these reasons I recommend that the Congress examine most critically
the technical justification for such items as the accelerated programs
for the Trident submarine and the B–1 strategic bomber, as well as the
need for the ABM defense of Washington. I hope that the Congress
will not support further escalation of the strategic arms race justified
by proposed negotiating tactics rather than by fully demonstrated
strategic need.
I consider the Moscow strategic accords to be a precedent-setting
event which enhances the security of both the United States and the
Soviet Union and thus of the world. At the same time it enhances the
opportunity for both countries to shift their priorities from oppres-
sive military expenditures to urgent civilian needs. I recommend that
the Senate speedily ratify the treaty and that the Congress approve
the interim agreement. I also hope that the Congress will be able to
use the strategic agreements as a basis for increased dedication to the
solution of the many pressing civilian problems at home and abroad.
(Tables and photograph follow :) -
§
TABLE 1.-CONSTRAINTS ON ABM TECHNOLOGY, DEPLOYMENT, AND TRANSFER IMPOSED BY THE MAY 26, 1972, TREATY AND IMPOSED ON OFFENSIVE MISSILES BY THE INTERIM AGREEMENT
Basic research
Research applied
to identified
technologies Test
Development
Produc-
tion
Deployment Transfer
ABM treaty----------
Interim agreement
No ABM multiple warheads. No
ABM reload or refiring. No adap-
tation of non-ABM systems to
ABM use.
No development of sea-based, air-
º space-based, or mobile
Agreed test ranges, limits on
launchers at test ranges.
No test of ABM multiple
warheads, or reload capable
launchers. No testing of the non-
ABM systems in an ABM role.
No test of sea-, air-, or space-
based ABM or mobile ABM
systems.
No transfer of ABM
systems or components
to other states.
ABM launchers limited in numbers
and locations. Radar Constraints.
No ABM capabilities to be given to
non-ABM systems.
No ABM reload-capable launchers.
No ABM multiple warheads.
ABM system based on new physical
principles not to be deployed.
No deployment of sea-, air-, or
space-based ABM or mobile
ABM system.
No new starts of specified categories
of land-based missiles and
numerical limits on sea-based
missile launchers. Limits on
certain physical dimensions.
368
TABLE II.-Sonſ E ITEMS IN THE AGREEMENTs of MAY 26, 1972 of SECURITY BENEFIT
To Both THE USA AND USSR.
(a) ABM limits increase deterrent value of each offensive missile. Thus both
nations can attain more deterrence at less cost. -
(b) Agreement on “no defense of the territory of each country” signals that
mutual deterrence of attack is an agreed strategic policy and that the populations
of both countries are “hostages for peace.” Under these conditions peaceful co-
existence is a necessity.
(c) The momentum of the offensive arms race is reduced (but not halted!);
an obligation is assumed to seek a halt and a reversal to the race through future
agreements.
(d) “New technology” ABM is prevented from deployment.
(e) The world is a more open place since surveillance of satellites (national
legal technical means of verification) is protected.
(f) Future reduction of offensive weapons can be undertaken without impair-
ing strategic stability.
(g) A consultative commission to monitor compliance is established.
TABLE III.-SoME ITEMS IN THE AGREEMENTs of MAY 26, 1972 WHICH MIGHT BE
CoNSIDERED To FAvor EITHER THE USA or THE USSR
IN FAVOR OF USA
Momentum of that program in which the USA is active (MIRV’s) is continu-
ing, while momentum of that program in which USSR is active (Missile and
Submarine Building) is arrested.
U.S. has technical superiority in many aspects of strategic submarines and has
better access to ocean areas.
U.S. has numerical Superiority in strategic bombers and numbers of warheads.
IN FAVOR OF USSR
Freeze occurs at a larger number and size of USSR ICBM's and greater total
megatonnage of all offensive systems combined.
Freeze occurs at a somewhat larger number of Soviet launch tubes on sub-
marines.

369
General panoramic view taken from the Nagasaki Medical School and HOS-
pital, looking southeast. In the foreground, at the foot of the hill on Which the
Medical School is located, the double-track street railway loop to the hospital
buildings will be noticed. There was practically no damage to the tracks them-
selves, but the trolley wires were knocked down and the tracks covered With
debris. The whole area shown in this picture was covered with industrial build-
ings and small residences almost as close together as it was possible to build
them. In the background, the skeleton remains of the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms
Works can be seen. Note that the reinforced concrete Office buildings still Stand
amid the wreckage of steel frame buildings. In the reinforced concrete School
buildings at the foot of the hills in the background, the doors, Windows, Ceiling,
and building contents were damaged by the blast.
TABLE IV.- ITEMS OF IMPORTANCE TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE NOT CONTROLLED
BY THE MOSCOW TREATY OR INTERIM. AGREEMENT OF MAY 26, 1972
(a) Strategic bombers. -
(b) Qualitative improvements through one-for-one replacement by better
models.
º*Almost all strategic military Research, Development and Test.
(d) MIRV.
(e) Nuclear weapons improvements. -
(f) Production (in contrast to deployment) of hardware for strategic mili-
tary Offensive Systems.
(g) Anti-submarine warfare.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Dr. Panofsky. -
There is a vote and we have to go to that vote. If it is all right with
you, we will go to that vote and come back and ask you some questions.
We will recess until that time.
(Recess.)
Senator SYMINGTON. Dr. Panofsky, are you ready?
Mr. PANOFSKY. Yes.
Senator SYMINGTON. And your colleagues, Dr. Garwin and Dr.
Goldberger?
SALT AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT RESULT IN ACCELERATED ARMIS RACE
You three gentlemen are unanimous in feeling quite strongly that
this SALT agreement should not result in acceleration of what could
be called the arms race. Is that correct?
Mr. Panofsky?
Mr. PANOFSKY. Yes, sir. I believe that would be a real contradiction
to the basic purpose of the agreement which, I believe, is to obtain
more Security for both countries at lesser cost to each.
Senator SYMINGTON. Dr. Garwin, would you comment?
Mr. GARWIN. Yes, I quite agree. I think that the programs which
were advocated by the administration before SALT in response to,
in many cases, exaggerated claims of the rate of Soviet progress, cer-
tainly are not required after SAILT, and what the precise post-SALT
program should be will require much more study, certainly will be
very much slower and less expensive than what has been proposed by
the administration.
Senator SYMINGTON. Dr. Goldberger?
Mr. GOLDBERGER. If it was in fact correct, as the President empha-
sized, that we had a posture of nuclear sufficiency before the SAILT,
with which I do agree, then it is even more true after the SALT agree-
ments. As Dr. Panofsky emphasized, the value of every single one of
370
our offensive systems and our missiles has been enhanced by this
agreement.
E’ROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
Senator SYMINGTON. Yesterday I put in the record an article by
Mr. Andrew Wilson of the London Observer, which was reprinted
over here, entitled, “Nuclear Capability Spreads.” The article states
that by the end of the 1970s about one-third of the countries in the
World will have significant programs for the production of nuclear
energy and hence the potential for making nuclear weapons. It does
not mention France and China who have signed no agreement, but it
does mention India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, Argentina, Bra-
zil, Japan, Australia, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, Switzer-
º and West Germany as potential developers. The last paragraph
I’ê8,OIS :
By 1980 about one-third of this plutonium will be owned by countries which
do not now possess nuclear weapons, an amount of plutonium that would in
theory make possible the production of 100 nuclear weapons of Hiroshima size
per week.
What are your thoughts about the proliferation and its relationship
to the SALT agreements? w
Mr. GARwiN. The preamble to the treaty has a sentence, “Mindful
of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on Nonprolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons.” That refers to our obligation as a nuclear
power to do something toward disarmament in order that the other
nations of the world should renounce nuclear weapons, and these
agreements are a start. But if they are used as the basis for an expan-
sion of the arms race, expansion of nuclear weapons programs, they
will not fulfill this purpose. They will have, in my opinion, a bad im-
pact on the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
I think that we must move; we must reduce the forces to slow pro-
liferation and we must take new initiatives in that area as well.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.
Dr. Goldberger?
Mr. GoLDBERGER. The possibility of very many nations acquiring
nuclear weapons has always been a nightmare and would clearly lead
the world into a seriously more unstable situation than we now find
ourselves with a relatively small number of nations having nuclear
Weapons.
It seems to me intuitively clear that if the United States and the
Soviet Union, as a start, deemphasize armaments in general and, in
particular, their strategic forces in agreements which we hope will
follow the current SALT treaty, this might serve as a spur, an incen-
tive, for other nations to become less concerned with a feeling that
they must themselves acquire nuclear weapons. It is surely no guaran-
tee that they won’t continue to strive for them, but since it is our policy
to pursue the nonproliferation treaty, I think this is again a good time
to take that up with great vigor.
Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Panofsky?
Mr. PANOFSKY. Yes, I agree with what was said. I might read here
from the preamble of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons which entered into force on March 5, 1970, after ratification
3.71
by the Senate. It says: “Declaring their intention to achieve at the
earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and to
undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarma-
ment,”—and then later on there is more. These obligations are spelled
out in greater detail in Article VIII. So it means, therefore, that the
U.S. Government has an obligation under the treaty to slow the arms
race. Therefore, using arms control to accelerate the arms race, which
is very much what the bargaining chip implies, would be against the
spirit if not the letter of the treaty and, therefore, would be an impedi-
ment, in my opinion, to adherence by the other nations to the Nonpro-
liferation Treaty.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.
Yesterday and the day before in the Armed Services Committee,
Senator Jackson asked some very constructive questions of the mem-
bers of the United States SALT delegation and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. In an effort to obtain the opinion of outside experts on these
same issues, and with his agreement that it would be in order, I would
go to a quarter of 1:00 and ask some of these questions and then yield
to my colleagues. I don’t want to take all of the time, but I thought
these questions were very pertinent.
sovſHT REFUSAL TO INCLUDE NUMBER “1618.” IN AGREEMENT
The first question was, why, in your view, did the Soviets refuse to
include the number 1618 in the agreement, thereby stating precisely
the number of fixed, land-based ICBMs they are permitted to deploy?
Mr. Panofsky?
Mr. PANOFSKY. I believe that the reason why the Soviets insisted on
phrasing the treaty in terms of general terminology relating to their
state of construction rather than specific numbers is that they did not
wish to get into a dialogue with us as to the precise validity of our
intelligence assessments. So it is fundamentally, I believe, a political
point, that they did not wish to acknowledge toward their own people
as to how precise our assessment of their capability really was; so,
therefore, they preferred to put it in terms of an operational rather
than a numerical description.
jutor SYMINGTON. Dr. Garwin, do you want to add anything to
that
Mr. GARWIN. Well, I generally agree. I think also there is some
degree of embarrassment in admitting that their society is really so
open to other nations and that these numbers are then embodied in an
agreement when they have been kept so secret from their Soviet citi-
zens and probably even from some high level officials.
Senator SYMINGTON. Dr. Goldberger?
Mr. GoLDBERGER. I have nothing to add.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.
LIMITATION OF NUMBER OF INTERCEPTORS AT GRAND FORKS
The next question: Why, in your view, did the Soviet Union insist
on limiting the number of interceptors in the U.S. ABM system at
Grand Forks to only 100%
37.2
. To that I would add, do you believe these 100 missiles provide suffi-
cient defense to warrant the expenditure of additional billions to com-
plete that site?
Mr. PANOFSKY. Let me answer the first question.
This number 100 arose from negotiations. It was not a unilateral
insistence by the Soviet Union which defined that particular number
and I believe the negotiating record indicates that several other num-
bers had been discussed. So I think the question as phrased does not
state quite the exact situation.
Clearly, in my view, it is in the United States’ interest to have that
number be as Small as possible because any number in that general
magnitude of 100 interceptors constitutes a very ineffective defense.
At the same time, the very fact that the Soviets have it gives an
incentive to our defense planners to escalate offensive weaponry;
therefore, I believe that the most important achievement of the SALT
from the point of view of the United States’ security and the United
States’ ability to lessen expenditures is to have that number low. I
would have preferred it even lower.
Now, to answer the second question. Is a number as low as 100 inter-
ceptors a sufficient number to constitute an ABM defense worth the
money, either for defense of the capital or for defense of the deter-
rent? I would answer no, but I might add that that number is not
significantly different from what it always had been in our proposed
ABM system.
Senator SYMINGTON. Dr. Garwin?
Mr. GARw1N. Well, our purpose at SALT was to keep the Soviets
from having a substantial ABM. We would have been unhappy with
a large number of interceptors around Moscow; we could therefore not
insist on a very large number of interceptors at our ICBM site. Given
the number 100, the answer is clearly no; we do not have an effective
defense of the ICBM site.
On the other hand, because of the offensive limitations and because
especially of the absence of ABM on the Soviet side, we don’t need
any defense of the ICBM sites. For these two reasons, there is no mili-
tary justification for continuing with the Grand Forks system. I think
that there is a good deal of political face invested in this system and
that it might be difficult to terminate it.
On the other hand, the very great investment to come in a defense
of Washington, D.C., has no military justification and no political face
invested, and I think it ought to be stopped now.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Doctor.
Senator Case?
Senator CASE. I think after Dr. Goldberger.
Senator SYMINGTON. I thought you had a question.
Mr. GoLDBERGER. I have nothing to add to the question of how the
number was arrived at in the agreements with the Soviet Union.
I agree with my colleagues that it is a very comfortably small number
and that from the general standpoint of our deterrence posture the
number is essentially negligible and the same observation applies, as
I referred to in my testimony, and on previous applies, as I referred
to in my testimony, and on previous occasions, to the Safeguard de-
fense of Minuteman, which was never adequate or reasonable or logi-
cally sensible. So that if pure logic were to prevail, we should stop
373
spending any money at all on it. But I agree with Dr. Garwin that
there may be a variety of political reasons that would make such a
totally cartesian course, untenable.
BUILDING OF SECOND ABM DEFENSE
Senator CASE. I don’t know whether this had better be left to later,
but I was going to ask about the question of the building of the
Second ABM, either in Washington here or the Russian one that is
permitted by the agreement. It is my understanding, for at least I
have been told that the Defense Department was the one, that insisted
we should have a defense of Washington instead of another defense
of Minuteman site and they chose that Washington be defended.
Have you any knowledge of this or understanding of the reason
for their thinking about it or any comment on it?
Mr. PANOFSKY. I could not testify as to the formulation of our
position in that respect, Senator Case.
I can give you my opinion on it, but I do not know through what
decisionmaking process this particular apparently symmetric arrange-
ment was arrived at.
Fundamentally, in my testimony I certified that this history of
events where we ended up permitting the Soviets to build what we
have built and where we are permitted to build what the Soviets have
built is, I believe, a very poor example of arms control because it is an
arrangement of arms control by adding the totality of deployment on
the one side which are in one case not identical, rather than determin-
ing equivalent. Therefore, I would have preferred an arrangement
where the number would have been lower rather than the sum of the
two. I believe this whole history demonstrates the real danger of the
bargaining-chip concept. Once you have established a bargaining chip
rather than negotiating your way in the negotiations, the negotiations
end up with the other side wanting it too. I believe, therefore, that the
fact that we deployed Safeguard gave an incentive to the Soviets to
take that same defense of their deterrent as a serious strategic objec-
tive. There has been no history before the SALT negotiations that
the Soviets ever had any interest whatsoever in active defense of their
deterrent. -
I have no knowledge whether as a result of these agreements the
Soviets will in fact deploy an active defense around the number of
silos permitted east of the Urals. They may simply decide to forego
this opportunity after evaluating the costs vis-a-vis the benefits.
Similarly, I would like to urge the Senate not to consider the fact
that it is permitted under the treaty to deploy an ABM around Wash-
ington as a mandate to do so because I believe that the military jus-
tification for doing so is exceedingly low. -
I agree with Dr. Garwin's testimony that the educational time in
terms of responding to an attack against Washington such a defense
would provide is negligible under any circumstances and that any-
way what delay time there would be would be under the control of
the attacker. If the attacker decides to attack with 101 missiles simul-
taneously, there is no delay time because you have 100 interceptors;
so it is at his discretion. So the only marginal military use of a de-
fense of Washington would be as a defense against a very sophisti-
374
cated kind of accident which happens to launch a missile against
Washington and against nowhere else in the U.S. and where then the
hot lines makes it possible to alert the National Command Authority
of the United States.
That very narrow and remote contingency is, I believe, the only
technically viable justification for an NCA defense and I consider
that particular contingency to be so remote that the very large in-
vestment which would be required for an NCA defense is clearly not
justified.
Senator CASE. You have already talked about this in a sense in your
statement. Again, Stu, I don’t want to break in and interrupt your
thinking.
Senator SYMINGTON. No.
Senator CASE. But there was a piece by Dr. Hoffman of Harvard, I
think, in Foreign Affairs discussing the whole general question of bal-
ance of power. He made several statements and I wanted to check
them with you.
FUTURE POSSIBILITY OF OTHER COUNTRY HAVING, EFFECTIVE DETERRENT
One of the points that he made was that it will be not within the
foreseeable future that any other country besides Russia and the
United States will have the capacity that they have in nuclear weapons.
That is to say, will not be able to have an effective deterrent. Is this,
in the judgment of any of you, a fairly sound hypothesis? That is,
France will have the capacity to do damage to us and to Russia, and
the Chinese the same, but no foreseeable nuclear power will have the
capacity to wipe us out. Is this correct? -
He goes on and uses this to knock down the idea that we will have
a five point power system, for instance.
Mr. GARwiN. Frankly speaking, other countries can have the capa-
city to do tremendous damage—nuclear weapons are extremely power-
ful—but they will not have the capacity to survive, to have their forces
survive a strike and then do this kind of damage. So other countries
in general will walk more cautiously for different reasons than will the
Soviet Union and the United States. -
They could do damage. It would be national suicide on their part.
They can be treated somewhat differently than we treat the Soviet
Union. We have other ways of urging them not to build large forces,
not to use those forces if they build them.
Senator CASE. What good does it do to build them if you don’t have
the capacity to survive? -
Mr. GARwLN. Well, it feeds some innate need of human nature, I
suppose, and it is better to have arms control agreements.
Senator CASE. I am serious. g tº
Mr. GoLDBERGER. I think that what Dr. Garwin is referring to is
perhaps reflected both in the development of a strategic nuclear force
by France and by China. I think there is definitely a prestige element
involved that can’t be ignored. . e
One, I suppose, can imagine circumstances where those countries
in desperation might feel that they had to inflict damage on the United
States, although it is very hard to construct such a scenario; Certainly
from a technical standpoint, as you put it, in the foreseeable future,
375
it is hard to imagine any country achieving a nuclear striking power
comparable to that of the United States or the Soviet Union.
Senator CoopFR. Can I ask a question?
Senator CASE. Thank you very much.
Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Cooper?
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Senator CoopBR. I have a list of questions which I don’t believe we
will have time to ask and have answered now. I would like to submit
them for the record so that the witnesses can comment on them.
Senator SYMINGTON. Will the Senator yield? I was told the debate
on the military procurement bill will start Monday and I have some
more questions, too. We have a meeting at 2:30. Could you gentlemen
work it out so that the questions and your answers could be part of
the hearing record? -
Mine are not long and as long as we are having these hearings we
ought to have all the facts we can.
Senator CoopFR. I have some comments. I think this testimony is
of the utmost value. I want to ask one question because Senator Case
referred to the testimony of Dr. Hoffmann. -
SITUATION IN WEHICH SOVIET UNION COULD EXERT POLITICAL PRESSURE
; ON UNITED STATES
Dr. Hoffmann argued, and so have other witnesses, that suppose the
Soviet Union does go ahead with qualitatively improving its offensive
weapons, and the United States does not. A situation could arise which
might be impossible for the United States in which the Soviet Union
could exert great political pressure at some critical point. He didn’t
expand the point. -
With your knowledge of these weapons, having participated in their
development, can you comment on that and describe, if you can, how
such a situation could arise? It is a theoretical question.
Senator CASE. I am very glad you asked that because that point is
also made in this article. -
Mr. GARWIN. I think Dr. Kissinger has pointed out
Senator COOPER. It is a point that will be made. It is a political issue.
Mr. GARWIN. I think Dr. Kissinger has pointed out the lack of
utility of these weapons once one has achieved a deterrent force, a
sufficiency.
Now, the political importance depends on the degree of under-
standing of the person who is influenced. When Admiral Moorer or
Somebody in his position says that we need these new programs solely
to provide positive evidence to our allies of our intentions to maintain
our strategic deterrent power so necessary to their security within the
strategic arms limitation environment, I don’t think he does justice
to the resources of the Defense Department and to the degree of un-
derstanding which we have in this country of the utility and lack of
utility of strategic forces.
Yes, people who are sufficiently ignorant can be impressed by num-
bers, true or not true, as to which country has more weapons, more
376
Warheads, more megatons or is just plain meaner than the other
country. - -
The facts though are different from the numbers which have been
Stated. For instance, I quoted Admiral Moorer as saying that the
Soviet Union has been deploying an average of 250 ICBM's per year.
and 128 SLBMs per year. In fact, there appear to have been no new
starts on ICBMs for almost the last year and the previous year only
80 or thereabouts. -
So if we insist through our leaders and the management of the De-
fense Department that the Soviet Union is making qualitative strides,
and they are important, surely we can persuade our allies of the fact
although some of them, like me, may remain skeptical. -
If, on the other hand, we point out there are many ways of spend-
ing money without any technical or political return, and I can point
to the Safeguard weapon system on our side, the Moscow system on the
other side, too many useless systems, then we can emphasize what I
think is absolutely correct, that investments, even achievement in
Qualitative improvements, are not politically useful.
We tend always to minimize what we have accomplished—the MIRV
programs, the number of deliverable warheads, the fact our subma-.
rines are not operational or under construction; they are operational
and they are at sea much more than the Soviet submarines—we tend
to minimize that in looking for new weapons programs, new author-
izations from the Congress, and thereby persuade our allies that we are
weaker than in fact we are. -
Senator COOPER. Senator Symington announced we won’t come back
because we will have other votes. You all have been here such a long
time and we will have to go, but we will submit some other questions
to you.
EFFECT IF U.S. FELT IN INFERIOR POSITION
But I wish all of you would apply yourselves to that question, that
first, if such a situation as Dr. Hoffman suggested should arise, and
you have been speaking of the way it might affect countries which
did not have knowledge of our resources—you said ignorant—but how
it would affect this country if it felt it was in a much inferior position.
Our scientists said to me it is much more subtle than that, if one
country, the USSR, thought it had such a superior position it might
feel that it would have to show that superiority. These are subtleties.
We have to go, but would you discuss those in your answers?
Senator CASE. Just answer all those questions.
DECLINE IN U.S. BASIC RESEARCH
Senator CoopFR. There is one other thing I would like to ask you. Dr.
Teller suggested that the United States is falling so far behind in
basic research at its universities and colleges, not just applied research
but basic research, that it was possible that we could find ourselves in
the position where we could be overwhelmed by new discoveries, new
applications, new weapons, a situation to which we would not be able
to respond. He spoke of the paucity, in basic research, and resources
for research, monev and people in this country today. He said it had
greatly declined. I don’t want to exaggerate what he said, but I think
that was the thrust.
377
Mr. GoLDBERGER. I would like to assert, Senator, that is unmitigated
In OI)SeIl Se.
Senator CoopFR. I must leave now. We just have about three minutes
to get there to vote.
COMMENDATION OF FITNESSES
Again I would like to express our great thanks to you. I think your
testimony is of the highest quality. It will be historical, too. So I wish,
if you have not done so, you would all submit a statement of your
background, education, scientific work, all of your scholarly work and
your work in connection with these systems. We thank you very much.
(Committee Staff Note: The remainder of the hearing was con-
ducted by Mr. George W. Ashworth of the Committee staff, using
Questions submitted by the Committee members. Each Senator's name
appears before his questions as it would have had he asked it himself.)
ABSENCE OF NUMBERS OF LAND-BASED ICBM's
Senator PERCY. Professor Panofsky, what is your reaction to the
absence both of specific figures as to the number of land-based ICBMs
covered by the interim offensive agreement or of a public declaration
by the Soviets as to the number of ICBMs they have deployed? Num-
bers were, after all, included in the protocol covering SLBMs.
Mr. PANOFSKY. The Soviets have maintained, historically, a posture
before their own population of maintaining high Security in privacy
of their country; therefore, admitting precisely to the numbers of
land-based ICBMs which they now possess would cause them some
embarrassment. For this reason since all uncertainty about the num-
ber of ICBMs they possess or which are under construction is in fact
very small, we agreed to adopt an operational definition rather than a
numerical definition. By doing this we do not lose any degree of pre-
cision while at the same time preserving the Soviets’ sensitivity on
this particular point.
The situation in regard to SLBMs is somewhat different because
there seems to be some substantial degree of numerical disagreement
and, therefore, it was found necessary in the auxiliary protocol to
document our understanding as to numbers.
However, even in that case in the interest of the Soviet sensitivity
on this point, the negotiators evidently decided not to press for having
these numbers included in the primary agreement.
TJ.S. BARGAINING POSITION FOR SALT II
Senator PERCY. Dr. Panofsky, how would you characterize our bar-
gaining position for the forthcoming SALT II talks? What are our
principal areas of strength and weakness?
Mr. PANOFSKY. Well, I would characterize our bargaining position
for SALT II that we are proceeding from a situation of approximate
numerical strategic parity and from a position of more advanced tech-
nological strength. I believe our main strength is that we have an
assured destruction capability which will surely be preserved for the
next decade without the addition of any major programs and both
37.8
sides are proceeding from a position of being vastly overarmed for the
maintenance of a deterrent capability.
I am sorry; what was the second part of the question?
Senator PERCY. What are our principal areas of weakness?
Mr. PANOFsky. I believe that a great deal of the SALT II negotia-
tions will depend on our ability of achieving qualitative constraints as
deep as possible in the technological chain. Our greatest weakness in
regard to verification of any agreement is the much larger effective-
ness of secrecy in the Soviet Union. For this reason, compliance with
prohibitions on production are much more difficult to verify than in
the United States and therefore to avoid suffering from this weakness
we should urge restraints further down the line in the area of develop-
ment and testing.
IMPORTANCE OF B-1 AND TRIDENT SYSTEMIS TO U.S. BARGAINING POSITION
Senator PERCY. How important are the B-1 and the Trident pro-
grams to a strong, effective bargaining position for SALT II? Dr.
Panofsky?
Mr. PANOFSKY. I do not consider that initiation of these programs
on a developmental basis, even an accelerated developmental basis, will
improve our bargaining position in SALT II. On the contrary, the
very existence of these programs, in particular, if they were acceler-
ated, would tend to force—I am sorry—would tend to persuade the
Soviets, to urge for higher levels of armaments themselves and, there-
fore, the constraints which can be imposed by SALT II would become
less severe and the arms control objectives would be weakened.
I believe that the momentum of our on-going programs, combined
with the high rate of expenditures which corresponding to those pro-
gram forces on the Soviet Union, are entirely adequate to lend a real
sense of urgency to the Soviet negotiators to proceed with SALT II.
I therefore conclude that the merit of these new strategic programs
should be judged on their own value and not in reference to alleged
negotiating positions on SALT II.
FOSSIBILITY AND IMPACT OF SOVIET MIRV DEPLOYMENT
Senator PERCY. Everyone is prepared to admit that the Soviets will
achieve a MIRV capability within the life of the interim agreement.
What, Dr. Panofsky, is your estimate on this question and on the
impact that Soviet deployment of MIRVs will have on maintaining
the balance achieved in SAILTI in Salt II?
Mr. PANOFSKY. I am not persuaded by the current state of Soviet
MIRV deployment that they will achieve an effective deployed MIRV
capability during the life of the Interim Agreement. By effective
MIRV capability I mean a MIRV which constitutes an effective coun-
terforce threat against U.S. landbased missiles. It is technically pos-
sible for them to achieve such a capability, but I am not persuaded by
the available intelligence information that they are certain to do so.
PROTECTION AFFORDED NCA BY WASHINGTON ABM SITE
Senator PERCY. Dr. Goldberger, what protection would a second
ABM site around Washington afford the National Command Author-
379
ity in real terms, especially if the threat came from SLBMs or cruise
missiles launched 300 to 1,000 miles off the coast?
Dr. GoLDBERGER. Upon the assumption that the radar arrangements
were such that these missiles would be picked up or that by tying into
the Washington ABM system information coming from other systems
giving information about launches of SLBMs, one could imagine that
a Washington ABM system could cope with a relatively light attack
from such missiles.
There is no assurance that any time for a command and control
would be bought by such an arrangement because the missiles could be
launched in such a way that they would arrive simultaneously so that
the total time for decision would simply be that of the basic warning
period.
AUTHORITY TO LAUNCH ABM's AND ICBM's
Senator PERCY. Dr. Goldberger, if it seems doubtful there will be
much time for a Washington ABM system to respond to an incom-
ing missile attack originating from anywhere other than the Soviet
Union proper. What does this imply for the workings of our com-
mand and control system; specifically how much authority to au-
thorize the launching of either the ABM missiles or our retaliatory
ICBMs would the President have to surrender to various military
commands? -
Mr. GoLDBERGER. If the Washington ABM system is to have any
utility whatsoever, it obviously has to have a response time that is con-
sistent with the warning that would be available from a submarine-
launched missile. It must have a rapid response. It is hard to imagine
an ABM system in which the authority to launch ABM missiles would
not, in general, lie with the military. I don’t know in detail what the
current arrangements are for responding to an attack in connection
with the ICBM complex defense, but it would be my assumption that
launching defensive missiles would be a military decision.
With regard to the question of the launching of retaliatory mis-
siles, that depends, for example, on whether you assume that the
President would be killed in an attack on Washington, in which case
there is aready a well laid down plan for the way the chain of com-
mand passes; and, secondly, if the President were assumed to survive,
he may or may not want to decide at that moment whether to launch
retaliatory missiles and there would be no obvious reason to couple
the attack on Washington with the launch of retaliatory missiles; so
the question of passing such responsibility over to the military seems
to me would not necessarily arise.
ROLE OF EXTREMELY LARGE PAYLOAD SS—9 MISSILE
Senator PERCY. Dr. Panofsky, what do you believe the role to be
of the extremely large payload SS—9 missile? Is it first strike, one
designed primarily to take out our Minuteman force?
Mr. PANOFSRY. I do not know the precise rationale which the Sov-
iets followed in designing the SS-9. Soviet technology in general had
a tradition of building things large and unsophisticated compared
with the miniaturization and compactness and more advanced pack-
aging in electronics which is prevalent in the Western world. To some
80–942 O—72—25
380
extent the dissimilarity in the design approach to the SS-9 vis-a-vis,
for instance, Minuteman follows this general pattern of Soviet tech-
nology, but one need not necessarily assume a specific motive as to
strategic missions.
Nevertheless, I suspect that the Soviet planners had several missions
in mind and were willing to let future evolution of United States
response and general strategic situation determine which of these
missions to give higher weight. Clearly, a general deterrent mission
by, as an example, using a high altitude, high yield detonation could
well be a significant mission. In order to engage in counterforce anti-
Minuteman mission, as we all know, the SS—9 force would either have
to be MIRVed with high accuracy missiles or would have had to be
proliferated to very large numbers.
Now, the Soviets have done neither up to this particular time; SO
therefore I have no way to tell whether the anti-Minuteman missio
was or was not a primary consideration. - -
ACCURACY OF SOVIET MISSILES
Senator PERCY. The SS-9's effectiveness as an anti-Minuteman wea-
pon would seem to depend a great deal on its accuracy and not on
its admittedly large payload. Just how accurate are Soviet missiles,
the SS-9 in particular : How much of a lead in this crucial tech-
nological area do we have and how long can we maintain it?
Mr. PANOFSKY. The effectiveness of the SS-9 as a silo-killer depends
both on accuracy and yield. The more yield you have, the less ac-
curacy you need to be an effective anti-Minuteman missile.
Now, at present it is indeed true that the Soviet accuracies which
have been demonstrated lag behind those of U.S. weapons and it is
also true, as has been stated in public testimony, that neither the Soviet
weapons nor the U.S. weapons have the combination of yield and
accuracy at present to make them very effective silo-killers.
I am not in a position in open hearing to give specific numbers on
Soviet accuracies which have been obtained and prospects for im-
provement.
SIGNIFICANCE OF CLOUD CovKR
Senator PERCY. Dr. Garwin, verification of adherence to the SALT
agreements appears to be largely dependent upon the use of spy satel-
lites. The role of cloud cover has recently entered the debate on verifi-
cation ability, especially in view of the claim that much of the Soviet
Union is under perpetual cloud cover. Would you discuss this question
for the committee and give your views as to whether or not cloud cover
is a significant obstacle to U.S. verification efforts?
Mr. GARWIN. Well, I think the best answer to that concern is that
the Joint Chiefs had their representative on the SALT delegation and
that the Joint Chiefs are assured that the verification capabilities built
into the treaty are adequate to the job.
I can go further and point out that the construction of an ICBM
silo is a long task which requires the moving of much earth. We are
familiar with the procedures which are involved and the elements
which are limited by the treaty and the agreement can be adequately
verified. - -
381
Furthermore, in the case of large radars, there are other means than
those which would be impeded by cloud cover and we are quite confi.
dent that we can continue to monitor radars which could be capable of
being used in ABM roles. So I don’t think that this is a serious concern.
ARE SOVIETS WORKING ON SYSTEM SIMILIAR TO TRIDENT 2
Senator PERCY. I have three ASW questions here, submarine
Questions. -
First, is there any indication that the Soviets are working on a sys-
tem similar or equivalent to the Trident program &
Mr. GARWIN. We don’t know much about their early research.
Certainly there is no submarine being deployed or under construction
Which has capabilities remotely comparable with those that are talked
about for Trident. In fact, none of their submarines or missiles have
a capability comparable with that of the Poseidon system.
The standard SSN-6 missile is more nearly comparable with the
Polaris than with the Poseidon. The SSN-8, which is apparently be-
ginning to be deployed on some of their boats, has a capability com-
parable with that of the Poseidon launcher, but has no MIRVs such
as we have in Poseidon.
EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. ASW PROGRAM AGAINST SOVIET SLBMS
Senator PERCY. How effective is our own antisubmarine warfare
program against the threat of Soviet SLPMs?
Mr. GARWIN. Well, this is a question to which I alluded in an article
I published in the July, 1972, Scientific American. Our Navy does not
have the mission to pursue and be ready to destroy Soviet SLBM boats;
it wouldn’t make any sense to use our Navy in this role while we have
no capability against the Soviet land-based ICBMs.
By the time we could develop a capability to destroy ICBMs, Soviet
ICBMs and an ABM system on our side, the Soviet SLBM force would
be large enough and Sophisticated enough to cause us a great deal of
difficulty if we were to try to pursue and to destroy it in connection
with a first strike.
Certainly under the agreements which we have undertaken to have
no ABM and to limit the offensive forces, it makes no sense at all to
ask that question since the capability of the Soviet Union to destroy
this country in a deterrent role is not dependent upon their subma-
rine force. .
ADVANTAGES OF POSEIDON OVER SOVIET SLBMS AND STUBMARINES
Senator PERCY. What advantages does our Poseidon system have
over the modern Soviet SLBM and submarines? What is the likeli-
hood that we can maintain this lead in SLBM system technology for
the next five years?
Mr. GARwrN. Well, we have any number of advantages, starting
with the fact that all 41 of our boats have been built and become oper-
ational, whereas, only about 25 of the Soviet SLBM boats are opera-
tional. Furthermore, we have a big advantage in geography; we have
easy access to the sea from home ports, warm water ports on both
382
coasts of the U.S.; we have forward bases at Holy Loch and Rota
and I believe one other. We do not have to go through narrow straits
to reach positions from which we could fire at the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, we have a great deal more experience in the operation
of our boats since each boat has two crews. Our submarine-launched
missiles are at sea some 60 percent of the time. The Soviet boats are
at Sea very substantially less than that; so in operating tempo and on-
station time we are far superior. Our boats are quieter than the Soviet
boats and, of course, we now have multiple warheads on ten Polaris
boats and MIRVs in the Poseidon on about eight, I believe, is the
number, Poseidon boats, with 31 of them to be converted during the
next couple of years.
We have a very substantial range advantage in the missiles over
the deployed Soviet boats as well.
Now, of course, some of these advantages will gradually go away
but not for several years as the Soviets develop more experience with
their boats and if they put the effort and the money into developing
and deploying MIRVs.
The whole idea of the strategic arms limitations agreements, though,
is that these minor changes, even major changes, really don’t matter in
the strategic balance, because the strategic balance consists of the
capability on one side to destroy the other and vice versa and not in a
comparison between the numbers or quality of the offensive force.
VULNERABILITY OF POSEIDON/POLARIS FORCES
Senator PERCY. Dr. Garwin, Dr. Teller, in recent testimony before
this committee, implied that our Poseidon/Polaris forces are not as
secure from Soviet ASW capabilities as we would care to think. What
are your views on their vulnerability? If there is a threat, where does
it come from ? -
Mr. GARwiN. Well, Dr. Teller is an old colleague of mine and a tre-
mendously creative and ingenious person. But I cannot imagine a
source of information about Soviet ASW capabilities against our
fleet to which Dr. Teller has access that I do not. Certainly there is no
existing Soviet system and no necessary behavior on the part of our
submarine fleet which would put our fleet into any jeopardy in its
deterrent role.
Now, it is clear that our boats could be struck by the Soviet Union
while they are in port. It is clear that they return to port every 60
days or so. It is clear that if they stood on the surface at all times
ready to launch a first strike, they could acquire some vulnerability
to Soviet ASW efforts. -
In the national policy which is endorsed by the arms limitations
agreemeents; namelv, that of deterrence, our boats need not surface,
need not communicate, need not be close to the Soviet shores and need
survive only for a period of minutes or hours in order to receive the
message to fire and to execute their missions.
In the deterrent role which is all that we are concerned with in con-
nection with these arms limitations agreements, there is no significant
vulnerability to Soviet ASW.
Now, a Polaris or Poseidon boat may die of old age, but that is 20
years or more away. It may suffer an accident or it might by chance
383
run into or be run into by a Soviet ship or submarine. In no way can
this be imagined to constitute a vulnerability of the SLBM fleet in its
deterrent role. -
EPOTENTIAL OF MOBILE ICBM FORCE
Senator PERCY. A great deal has been said over the potential of a
mobile ICBM force, a concept we discarded some time ago but which
the Soviets have shown some interest in. What is your view of the
possible effectiveness of such a system and your estimate of the proba-
bility that the Soviets will go ahead and develop it to the point of
deployment during the course of the SALT IInegotiations?
Mr. GARWIN. There is a reference to mobile ICBM in the second uni-
lateral statement submitted to the Senate with the treaty and the
agreement. This reference says that the U.S. delegation now with-
draws its proposal that the agreements explicitly prohibit the deploy-
ment of mobile land-based ICBM launchers. It goes on to say uni-
laterally that “the U.S. would consider the deployment of operational
land mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the interim agree-
ment as inconsistent with the objectives of that agreement.”
Now, the problem with mobile ICBMs is not that they are more
dangerous than fixed missiles but that they are not easy to count and if
we insist on a precise knowledge of the numbers of ICBMs on the
other side, we might make an error of Some magnitude if the other side
had a deployed mobile system.
On the other hand, we did not reject the concept ourselves very long
ago; it was last year that the Defense Department was considering a
garage-based Minuteman, which is a kind of mobile system. It encoun-
tered the same difficulty of demonstrating to the other side that we
had only one Minuteman for a garage complex rather than that all
garages were full.
It may be that follow-on SALT agreements may permit mobile
ICBMs and that would not necessarily be a bad thing. It would give
survivability to ICBMs which cannot be obtained by hardening or in
other ways. -
On the other hand, with limitations of the offensive forces and con-
sidering especially the ABM treaty which enhances the deterrent value
of any remaining number of ICBMs or SLBMs, there is less reason to
search for ways to protect the ICBM force.
So I believe this is a detail which can very well be settled over the
years and in the SALT II discussions.
PRESIDENT's OPTION IF U.S. LAND-BASED DETERRENT DESTROYED
Senator SYMINGTON. Should the President be left with the single
option of striking Soviet cities with submarine-launched missiles in
the event that the U.S. land-based deterrent is destroyed in a Soviet
first strike?
Mr. GOLDBERGER. Well, let me say one thing about that: We also have
a bomber force. -
Senator SYMINGTON. I am assuming Minuteman decimation and
bombers.
Mr. GoLDBERGER. All right.
384
Mr. GARwſN. The purpose of the deterrent is to prevent such an on-
slaught which would result in tens of millions of fatalities among
U.S. citizens. It makes very little sense to ask about the details of the
response to such a massive strike. The Soviet Union must recognize
that it will be destroyed in response and any other flexibility is a
bonus, not a substitute.
Mr. PANOFSKY. I would like to add to that: I believe that the Soviet
Union will not possess in the foreseeable future the means to destroy
both the bomber and the land-based missile components of the deter-
rent simultaneously, considering the means of warning available to
the United States. So, quite apart from the fact that the destruction
by the Sea-launched missile should be a formidable deterrent, I question
the validity of the basic assumption. -
I should also like to add that as a result of the SALT I agreement
even the survival of 10 or 20 sea-based missiles should constitute a
major deterrent factor, considering the multiplicity of their warheads.
SOVIET INCREASES IN ABSENCE OF SALT AGREEMENTS
Senator SYMINGTON. Administration spokesmen have maintained
that in the absence of a SALT agreement the Soviets would have pur-
sued a vigorous increase in their strategic forces. Do you agree with
this general view' That was agreed to a certain extent earlier.
Mr. GoLDBERGER. The evidence from the past few years of the Soviet
missile deployment and submarine construction gives very little sup-
port to this idea. -
The President is quoted as saying that in five years they would
have 1,000 additional ICBMs, 1,000 ABMs, and 90 submarines. In
particular, in connection with the submarines, if you take their cur-
rent rate of construction and the fact that they presently have 25
submarines, in five years it would come to a number no greater than
75. It is not technically impossible for them to build at the rate of
200 TCBMs per year, but in fact there have been no new starts on
ICBM launchers for about nine months, and in the preceding year
there were only 80 launchers constructed or begun. There is no evi-
dence for any widespread deployment of ABMs so that it is simply
impossible to project what numbers they might have in five years.
Mr. GARwiN. I would just like to say I know of no evidence avail-
able to the government which indicates that the Soviet Union has had
such a plan. -
Mr. PANOFSKY. No comment.
Senator SYMINGTON. What objectives would such a Soviet build-up
support? -
Mr. GARVIN. Since there is no evidence for such a build-up, I don’t
believe it is useful to ascribe motives to it.
Senator SYMINGTON. Does everybody agree?
Mr. GoLDBERGER. We agree.
PREVENTION OF SOVIET MOVEMENT TOWARD FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY
Senator SYMINGTON. Is there anything in the present agreements
that would prevent the Soviets from moving toward the development
of a first strike capability during the five-year period of their
application? º
385
Mr. GOLDBERGER. There is one very clear thing that would prevent
them from moving to a first-strike capability and that is the absence
of an ABM system of their own. Unless they want to commit national
suicide, and if they adhere to the provisions of the SALT ABM
treaty, there is no way that they could expect to escape destruction if
they were to attack us and wipe out our land-based forces, and we
have great confidence in the continued invulnerability of our Sea-
based forces. . *
Mr. PANOFSRY. I believe it is technically impossible with the frame-
work of the SALT I agreement for the Soviets to acquire a first-strike
capability, if by that you mean that all three arms of the U.S. re-
taliatory forces were destroyed with only a negligible retaliatory ca-
pability. I even believe that it is exceedingly unlikely, although not
totally impossible, that the land-based missiles might become endan-
gered during the five-year period.
Mr. GARVIN. I agree that it is quite impossible for the Soviet Union
to obtain a disarming capability against our offensive forces within
this period. Furthermore, the ICBMs could always be launched if they
were threatened by the Soviet strike.
TJSEFULNESS OF INTERIM. AGREEMENT AS PERMAN ENT AGREEMENT
Senator SYMINGTON. Would the present interim agreement be ac-
ceptable as a permanent agreement? In this connection, I would like
to ask if not acceptable, what specific items do you believe should be
considered for negotiation?
Mr. PANOFSKY. I believe the present interim agreement would not be
a useful arms control permanent accord. I believe at a minimum quali-
tative constraints should be added to the interim agreement and the
other offensive strategic systems and particularly bombers should be
covered by the agreement. I consider this to be the highest priority
objective of SALT II with the possibility of negotiated force reduc-
tions the second objective. - -
Mr. GARWIN. The interim agreement should take on some of the
aspects of the ABM treaty which limits systems which are not pre-
cisely described. If one were to abide only by the precise text of the
interim agreement, the future would hold so many loopholes that no
ceiling on offensive forces would, in fact, have been set.
On the other hand, if the interim agreement should become perma-
nent and all other offensive systems be limited severely, then I could
recognize that as some type of arms limitation.
Mr. PANOFSKY. This matter is dealt with in some further detail in
the text and in Table IV of my statement.
GENEROSITY OF SOVIETS IN SALT II
Senator SYMINGTON. Do you believe that the Soviets will be more
generous in SALT II than they were in SALT I?
Mr. GoLDBERGER. I am not competent to answer that because I do
not know how generous they were in SALT I.
Mr. PANOFSKY. I don’t know how to answer that.
Mr. GARwrN. I don’t look for generosity on the part of the Soviets.
386
Mr. PANOFSKY. I believe the Soviets will agree to those terms which
they believe enhance their security and since there will be a large num-
ber of items which enhance the security of both countries, it will be
those items which should properly dominate the SALT II agreements.
INTERIM. AGREEMENT's EFFECT ON SOVIET ICBM PROGRAM’s MOMENTUM.
Senator SYMINGTON. Do you agree with the claim that the interim
agreements halts the momentum of the Soviet ICBM program over the
next five years? .
Mr. PANOFSKY. I agree with the statement that under the interim
agreement the numerical momentum must be stopped. I, of course, do
not know how rapidly the Soviets would have increased their force in
the absence of an agreement. -
Mr. GARwLN. I think that the interim agreement sets a significant
ceiling on the Soviet ICBM force. On the other hand, the word “mo-
mentum” implies that they had a large ongoing program which hap-
pens not to have been the case for the last couple of years. g
Mr. GoLDBERGER. The interim agreement certainly puts constraints
on things that they might have had on the back burner prepared to
resume activities on, but certainly their program to significantly in-
crease their stock of large missiles is halted in an important way.
SOVIET REFUSAL TO BAN DEPLOYMENT OF LAND MOBILE ICBMS
Senator SYMINGTON. Why, in your view, did the Soviets refuse to
agree to a ban on the deployment of land mobile ICBMs?
Mr. PANOFSKY. I do not have any specific reply to that, other than
that they were unable to complete the internal staff work to re-
store differences among the various parts of their decision-making
apparatus.
Mr. GARwrN. I don’t have a good basis for judgment.
Mr. GOLDBERGER. I have no opinion.
RADAR DEPLOYMENT PERMITTED AT MOSCOW
Senator SYMINGTON. Is the radar deployment permitted at Moscow
an adequate base for the eventual development of a thick defense of
European Russia? Of the Moscow region? .
Mr. GARwin. The whole purpose of the limitation on radars is to
prevent the construction of an adequate base for an area defense.
Therefore we can be sure that all members of the delegation and their
parent bodies agree that the radars, which are permitted, cannot form
such a base. My own investigations persuaded me that the permitted
radars are either sufficiently vulnerable by reason of their limitation
to six sites or are insufficiently powerful to provide such a base.
Mr. PANOFSKY. In essence, the radar limitations provide six aim
points which would totally negate any ABM capability and I consider
it to be impossible for the Soviets to defend those six points adequately
in order to have that constitute a defense of European Russia.
Mr. GoLDBERGER. I concur.
DOES ICBM FREEZE PLACE U.S. IN INFERIOR POSITION ?
Senator CoopFR. A number of the critics of the SALT ABM treaty
and interim offensive weapons agreement have stated that the large
387
throw weight missiles possessed by the USSR place the United States
in a position of inferiority. Does the freeze on ICBMs contained in the
interim agreement place the United States in a position of inferiority
particularly when the Sovet large throw weight missiles like the SS-9
are taken into consideration?
Mr. PANOFSKY. I don’t believe that the meaning of inferiority and
superiority can be measured by a single index. The Soviets are ahead
in terms of throw weight and total number of ICBMs. We are ahead
in the total numbers of reentry vehicles and strategic bombers. There
is no question that neither side possesses or can reasonably be expected
to gain a first-strike capability and therefore strategic stability main-
tained in the foreseeable future. Therefore, I think this question of
Superiority is not one which should be measured through a single index.
Mr. GARWIN. We have as many missiles as we need and we have
under the interim offensive agreement the possibility of multiplying
by an additional three times the number of warheads deliverable by
Our Minuteman force. I would not call this inferiority.
Mr. GoLDBERGER. The argument about the disadvantage the U.S.
finds itself in because of the larger throw weight in individual missiles
possessed by the Soviet Union has always been a very inaccurate way
to view our strategic position. It is worth remembering that we made
a very deliberate decision not to go in that direction that was strongly
backed by the military, by the Department of Defense in all branches,
and by and large by the entire scientific community. We believe that
We º: the right strategic decision to maximize the effectiveness of
OUIP TOI’Ce.
ASSURING FULLY ADEQUATE DEFENSE UNDER AGREEMENTS
Senator CoopFR. Given the ABM treaty and interim agreement
and given the present deployments of weapons on both sides, what is
needed to assure a fully adequate defense? Could you describe how the
Senate can be confident that our R&D and deployment programs are
sufficient to our security needs?
Mr. PANOFSKY. Let me respond to one part of this question.
I am personally acquainted in very considerable detail with the
basic research program of the Soviet Union in many areas including
my own specialty, high energy physics and low temperature work
and solid state physics and several other areas, and there is no ques-
tion whatsoever that in terms of originality and creativity as well as
total number of results of basic significance, that the U.S. program
has done considerably better in the past than has the Soviet Union and
there is no evidence that the gap here is being narrowed. Similarly,
in the important area of data analysis and computer development
a similar statement applies. So I see no basis that provided U.S. Sup-
port of basic research continues or if possible is improved somewhat,
there is no question that this will not be a current problem.
Assur ING U.S. SECURITY IN EVENT OF SALT AGREEMENTS BREAKDOWN
Senator CoopFR. Dr. Teller in his testimony raised the question of
not placing ourselves in a position as a result of SALT where we would
be in danger should the SALT agreements break down. Would you
please outline for the committee a reasonable R&D and deployment
program that would assure U.S. security in the event of a breakdown
of SALT 2 In other words, what hedges are necessary?
388
Mr. PANOFSRY. The question of the stability of the strategic balance
in case of abrogation of the treaty was clearlv verv carefullv con-
sidered in formulating the U.S. position and it is believed—and I be-
lieve—that the range of stability is broad enough that even if the
Soviets should abrogate the treaty, after clandestine preparations, we
would have time to take the necessary measures to preserve strategic
stability.
Mr. GARwſ N. The question of the defense R&D program is a very
broad one which I covered in testimony on February 2, 1972, to the
Armed Services Committee. The question of breakdown of SALT nego-
tiations was an important consideration in the decision process on our
side. If one imagines that the Soviet Union does not abide by the
agreements at any time, then clearly One should not enter into such an
agreement. I believe that the program which we have with the modifi-
cations which I advocate in my testimony are completely adequate
so long as we keep our eyes Open to guard against any consequences of a
breakdown of negotiations or an abrogation of the treaty.
'Mr. GoLDBERGER. Our strategic forces were built up over the past few
years to cope with what was a projected massive Soviet ABM deploy-
ment. The number of warheads was so large as to be conjectured to
overpower anything that they might rationally be expected to develop.
For this reason there is a great deal of leeway in our security, and
there is no reason to believe that our own on-going R&D programs
together with the tremendous size of our offensive forces would enable
us to fall into a dangerous position even if the Soviets were to abrogate
the treaty.
CHANGE IN U.S. SECURITY NEEDS SINCE SALT
Senator CoopFR. How have our security needs changed since the
SALT agreements of May 26? Had SALT not been signed and had
the Soviets continued their deployments, what would the situation
have been?
Mr. GARWIN. I believe our needs were more than adequately covered
by the defense budget request of February, 1972; in fact, I would
emphasize in that sentence the word “more.” Certainly faced now with
the prospect of no ABM and of strong limits on Soviet offensive
forces over the next five years, our defense programs can be reoriented
and in many cases cut back as I have indicated in my testimony.
Mr. PANOFSKY. I believe the matter is dealt with in some detail in my
testimony in my prepared statement.
Mr. GOLDBERGER. We have alluded to this in our prepared statements.
SUGGESTED MORATORIUM ON FURTHER wVAPONs DEPLOYMENT
Senator CoopFR. There have been some suggestions that there should
be a moratorium on further weapons deployment for a reasonable pe-
riod so the Phase II negotiations would not be adversely affected by
deployments. (a) What is a reasonable period for a moratorium? (b)
What deployments could we defer during that moratorium?
Mr. PANoFSKY. I personally would not be in favor of an explicit
moratorium preparatory to Phase II. I would rather advocate a policy
of restraint based on a realistic examination of our true security needs
which have been lessened as a result of SALT I.
38.9
Mr. GARwiN. I think that the effort required to negotiate and to
agree to a moratorium is as much as to achieve a more permanent arms
control limitation, so I do not think a moratorium would be useful at
this time. I think a good guide at all time is not to build useless Systems
and not to spend more money than is necessary.
Mr. GoLDBERGER. There is no simple thing on which one could have a
moratorium because we are not, both of us, planning to deploy identical
objects. Therefore, you would get into the question of trying to decide
our moratorium on MIRVs would have to be equivalent to a Soviet
moratorium on something quite different and therefore I agree that it
is not a feasible thing to contemplate at this time.
WEAPONS SYSTEMS WHICH COULD BE CONTROLLED IN PHASE II
Senator CoopFR. Maybe a simple list would suffice here.
Specifically, what weapons systems do you think would be possible
to bring under effective controlin Phase II?
Mr. PANOFSKY. I believe my table IV in my prepared statement dealt
with this question in general terms, although, as Isaid in my statement,
that this constitutes a very ambitious agenda and it may not be possible
to have Phase II be as comprehensive as indicated in Table IV.
Mr. GoLDBERGER. I have no comment. -
Mr. GARWIN. I think we have—I think some options have been pre-
sented here, but what can be brought under control depends very much
on the views of the two sides as will be developed in the negotiations.
RAPIDITY WITH WHICH SOVIETS COULD ENDANGER MINUTEMAN WITH MIRV
Senator CoopFR. How rapidly could the Soviets achieve a sufficient
MIRV force consistent with the SALT I agreement which would
endanger the Minuteman force as a significant part of the U.S.
deterrent?
Mr. GOLDBERGER. Didn't you address that question before?
Mr. PANOFSKY. I gave some reply to that question.
Senator CoopFR. All right. You consider that one answered.
Mr. PANOFSKY. I consider that one answered, but I believe it would
be difficult to achieve such a capability in five years.
SUBIMARINE AGREEMENT
Senator CoopFR. Dr. Garwin, could you explain how it can be argued
that the submarine agreement which gives the Soviets a large number
of submarines than the United States but freezes them at those levels,
in fact, gives the U.S. an advantage? Could you describe the factors
that went into the identification of respective strength of submarine
forces?
Mr. GARwſN. I think I covered that in relation to an earlier question.
On the other hand, I don’t think that anybody claims that the sub-
marine agreement gives the U.S. a specific advantage over the Soviet
Union. We wanted to limit the Soviet submarine program. We accom-
plished our aim as to whether they contribute to the overall national
Security and I believe very strongly that the package is in the interest
of our national Security.
(Whereupon, at 2:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, subject to
the call of the Chair.)
APPENDIX
[From the office of the White House Press Secretary, June 15, 1972]
THE WHITE HOUSE—REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT AT A CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING
ON THE ARMS LIMITATION TREATY AND AGREEMENT, THE STATE DINING ROOM
Ladies and gentlemen, we are beginning a little late because I understand
traffic is quite heavy around the White House this morning due to the arrival of
the President of Mexico. We must go forward with the schedule, because there
is a Joint Session, as you know, today and we do want the members of the com-
mittees present here today to be able to attend that Session. We will have to
adjourn this meeting at approximately 12:00 o’clock, or at best, five mintues
after 12:00, to give you plenty of time for questions. -
A word about the format Of this meeting. I will make a statement, and then
I will have to depart in Order to prepare for the arrival of the President of
Mexico. Dr. Kissinger will then make a statement, and then it will be open to
Questions to members Of the committees who are present here.
In Order to facilitate recognition Of Members, someone who knows all Of the
Members who are here, Clark MacGregor, will moderate the question and answer
period, but we will try to be just as fair as possible among the members of the
committees and between the House and the Senate, and Clark will, of course,
be responsible in the event it isn’t fair.
In any event, let me come directly now to my own remarks, which will not be
too extended, because Dr. Kissinger today will be presenting the Presidential
Views. He will be telling you what the President’s participation has been in
these negotiations. The views he will express I have gone over with him in
great detail, and I will stand by them.
I noted in the press that it was suggested that I was calling down the mem-
bers Of these COmmittees for the purpose Of giving you a pep talk On these two
agreements. Let me lay that to rest right at the Outset. This is not a pep talk and
Dr. Kissinger is not going to make you a pep talk either.
When I came back from the Soviet Union, you will recall in the Joint Session
I said that I wanted a very searching inquiry Of these agreements. I want to
leave no doubt about my Own attitude.
I have Studied this situation of arms control Over the past 3% years. I am
totally COnvinced that both Of these agreements are in the interest Of the Security
Of the United States and in the interest of arms control and world peace.
I am convinced of that, based on my study. However, I want the members of
the House and the members Of the Senate also to be COnvinced Of that. I want
the Nation to be COnvinced Of that.
I think that the hearings that you will COmduct must be searching because
Only in that way will you be able to be convincing to yourselves and Only in that
Way will the Nation also be COnvinced.
In other words, this is not one of those cases where the President of the
United States is asking the Congress and the Nation to take On a blind faith
a decision that he has made and in which he deeply believes.
I believe in the decision, but your questions should be directed to Dr. Kissinger
and others in the Administration for the purpose of finding any weaknesses that
you think in the negotiations or in the final agreements that we have made.
As far as the procedures are concerned, as you know, you will be hearing the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the head of the CIA, and of course,
Ambassador Smith, in the sessions of your various committees.
I know that a number have suggested that Dr. Kissinger should appear before
the Committees as a witness. I have had to decline that particular invitation. On
his part, due to the fact that Executive privilege had to prevail.
(391)
392
On the other hand, since this is really an unprecedented situation, it seemed
to me that it was important that he appear before the members Of the Committee
in this format. This is On the record.
All of you will be given total transcripts of what he says. All Of you Will have
the opportunity to ask these questions and in the event that all of the questions
are not asked on this occasion, he, of course, will be available to anSWer Other
questions in his office from members of the committee as time goes On, during the
course Of the hearingS.
What we are asking for here, in other words, is cooperation and not just rubber-
stamping by the House and the Senate. That is essential because there must be
follow-through on this and the members of the House and Senate, it seems to me,
must be convinced that they played a role as they have up to this point, and Will
continue to play a role in this very, very important field of arms control.
Now, let me go to the agreements, themselves, and express briefly some of my
own views that I think are probably quite familiar to you, but which I think
need to be underlined.
I have noted a great deal of speculation about who won and who lost in these
nogetiations. I have said that neither side won and neither side lost. As a matter
of fact, if we were to really look at it very, very fairly, both sides won, and the
whole world won.
Let me tell you why I think that is important. Where negotiations between
great powers are involved, if one side wins, and the other loses clearly, then you
Have a built-in tendency or incentive for the side that loses to break the agree-
ment and to do everything that it can to regain the advantage.
This is an agreement which was very toughly negotiated On both sides. There
are advantages in it for both sides. For that reason, each side has a vested inter-
est we believe, in keeping the agreement rather than breaking it.
I would like you to examine Dr. Kissinger, and the other witnesses, before the
COmmittee On that point. I think you also will be convinced that this was One Of
those cases where it is to the mutual advantage Of each side, each looking to its
national Security. 3.
Another point that I would like to make is Presidential intervention in this par-
ticular matter, Presidential COOrdination, due to the fact that what we have
here is not One of those cases where One department could take a lead role.
This cut across the functions of the Department of State, the Department of .
Defense, it cut across, also, the AEC, and, of course, the Arms Control Agency.
|Under these circumstances, there is Only One place where it could be brought
together, and that was in the White House, in the National Security Council, in
which all of these various groups participated.
There is another reason, which has to do with the system of government in
the Soviet Union. We have found that in dealing with the system of govern-
ment in the Soviet Union, that where decisions are made, that affect the Vital
Security and in fact, the very Survival of a nation, decisions and discussions in
those cases are made Only at the highest level. Consequently, it is necessary for
us to have discussions and decisions at the highest level if we are going to have
the breakthroughs that we have had to make in Order to come to this point Of a
Successful negotiation.
The Other point that I would make has to do with what follows On. The agree-
ment that we have here, as you know, is in two sages: One, the treaty with
regard to ABM defensive weapons; and second, the Offensive limitation, the
Executive Agreement, which is indicated as being, as you know, not a permanent
agreement—it is for five years—and not total. It covers only certain categories
Of Weapons. -
Now we are hoping to go forward with the second round of negotiations. That
Second round will begin, we trust, in October. That means that we can begin in
October, provided action is taken. On the treaty and On the Offensive agreement
that we have before you at this time, SOmetime in the Summer months ; we would
trust before the 1st Of September. I don’t mean that it should take that long, but
I hope you can finish by the 1st Of September so we can go forward with the
negotiation in October.
The Other point that should be made with regard to the follow-On agreements
is not related to your approval Of these agreements. It is related to the actions
Of the Congress On defense. I know there is disagreement among various Mem-
393
bers of Congress with regard to what our defense levels ought to be. I think,
however, I Owe it to you and to the Nation to Say that Mr. Brezhnev and his
COlleagues made it absolutely clear that they are going forward with defense
programs in the Offensive area which are not limited by these agreements.
Under those circumstances, since they will be going forward with their pro-
grams, for the United States not to go forward with its programs—and I am not
suggesting which ones at this point; you can go into that later—but for the
United States not to go forward with its offensive programs, or worse, for the
United States unilaterally to reduce its Offensive programs would mean that
any incentive that the SOviets had to negotiate the follow-on agreement would
be removed. -
It is for that reason, without getting into the Specifics as to what the level of
defense Spending should be, as to what the Offensive programs should be, I am
simply saying that if we want the follow-on agreement, we have to take two
steps: First to approve these agreements; and second, we need a credible de-
fensive position SO that the SOviet Union will have an incentive to negotiate a
permanent Offensive freeze. That is what we all want.
These are just SOme random thoughts that I had on this matter. I will
Simply ClOSe by Saying that as One Stands in this room in this house, One al-
ways has a tendency to think of some of the tragedies of history of the past.
As many of you know. I have always been, and am, a great admirer of Wood-
row Wilson. As all of you know, the great tragedy of his life was that after
he came back with the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, due
to ineffective Consultation, the Senate rejected the treaty and rejected the
League.
We, Of course, do not want that to happen. We do not think that it will
happen. We have appreciated the consultation we have had up to this point,
and we are now going forward with this meeting at this time. -
I will Only say that in looking at what Wilson said during that debate
when he was traveling the Country, he made a very, it seemed to me, moving
and eloquent Statement. He Said : “My clients are the children. My Clients
are the future generation.” -
This is an election year, and I realize that in an election year it is diffi-
cult to move as Objectively as we Ordinarily would move on any issue, but
I would respectfully request the Members of the House and Senate, Republican
and Democratic, to approach this in the Spirit that Wilson explained in that
period when they were debating whether they should go forward with the
League of Nations, remembering that our clients are the next generation,
that approval of these agreements, the treaty limiting defensive weapons, the
agreement limiting offensive weapons in certain Categories, and also the COn-
tinuation of a credible defense posture, will mean that we will have dOne Our
duty by Our clients, which are the next generation.
Thank you.
[From the office of the White House Press Secretary, June 15, 1972]
THE WHITE HOUSE—CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING BY DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, AS-
SISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, THE STATE DINING
ROOM
DR. KISSINGER : Gentlemen, the President has asked me to present to you
the White House perspective on these agreements, and the general background,
with the technical information and SOme more Of the details to be Supplied by
the formal witnesses before your Various COmmittees.
I will read a Statement to you which we will distribute. It is still in the
process Of being typed.
In considering the two agreements before the Congress, the treaty On the lim-
itation of antiballistic missile systems and the interim agreement On the limi-
tation of Offensive arms, the Overriding questions are these : Do these agree-
ments permit the United States to maintain a defense posture that guarantees
our security and protects our vital interests? Second, will they lead to a more
onduring structure of peace?
In the course Of the formal hearings Over the coming days and Weeks, the
Administration will demonstrate conclusively that they serve both Of these ends.
I will begin that process this morning by offering some general remarks on the
agreement, after which I will be happy to take your questions.
394
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE 1970'S
The first part of my remarks will deal with U.S.-Soviet relations as they affect
these agreements. The agreement which was signed 46 minutes before midnight
in Moscow on the evening of May 26th by President Nixon and General Secretary
Brezhnev is without precedent in the nuclear age; indeed, in all relevant modern
history.
Never before have the world's two most powerful nations, divided by ideology,
history and conflicting interests, placed their central armaments under formally
agreed limitation and restraint. It is fair to ask: What new conditions now pre-
Vail to have made this Step COmmend itself to the Calculated Self-interests Of both
Of the so-called Superpowers, as it so clearly must have done for both willingly
to undertake it? -
Let me start, therefore, with a sketch of the broad design of what the Presi-
dent has been trying to achieve in this COuntry’s relations with the Soviet Union,
since at each important turning point in the SALT negotiations we were guided
not so much by the tactical solution that seemed most equitable or prudent,
important as it was, but by an underlying philosophy and a Specific perception
Of international reality.
The international situation has been undergoing a profound structural change
since at least the mid-1960s. The post-World War II pattern Of relations among
the great powers had been altered to the point that when this Administration
took office, a major reassessment was clearly in order.
The nations that had been prostrate in 1945 had regained their economic
strength and their political vitality. The Communist bloc was divided into
Contending factions, and nationalistic forces and SOcial and economic pressures
were reasserting themselves within the individual Communist states.
Perhaps most important for the United States, our undisputed strategic pre-
dominance was declining just at a time when there was rising domestic resist.
ance to military programs, and impatience for redistribution of resources from
national defense to SOCial demands.
Amidst all Of this profound Change, however, there Was One important cOn-
stant—the continuing dependence of most of the World’s hopes for stability and
peace upon the ability to reduce the tensions between the United States and the
Soviet Union.
The factors which perpetuated that rivalry remain real and deep.
We are ideological adversaries, and we will in all likelihood remain so for
the foreseeable future.
We are political and military COmpetitors, and neither can be indifferent
to advances by the Other in either Of these fields.
We each have allies whose association we Value and whose interests and
activities Of each impinge On those Of the Other at numerous points.
We each possess an awesome nuclear force created and designed to meet
the threat implicit in the Other's Strength and aims. -
Each of us has thus come into possession of power Singlehandedly capable Of
exterminating the human race. Paradoxically, this very fact, and the global in-
terests Of both sides, create a certain commonality Of Outlook, a sort Of inter-
dependence for survival between the two of us.
Although we compete, the conflict will not admit of resolution by Victory in the
classical Sense. We are compelled to COexist. We have an ineScapable Obligation
to build jointly a structure for peace. Recognition Of this reality is the beginning
Of Wisdom for a Sane and effective foreign policy today. -
President Nixon has made it the starting point of the United States policy
Since 1969. This Administration’s policy is Occasionally characterized as being
based. On the principles Of the classical balance Of power. To the extent that that
term implies a belief that security requires a measure of equilibrium, it has a
certain validity. No national leader has the right to mortgage the survival Of
his people to the good will Of an Other State. We must Seek firmer restraints On
the actions of potentially hostile states than a sanguine appeal to their good
nature. • .
But to the extent that balance of power means constant jockeying for marginal
advantages Over an Opponent, it no longer applies. The reason is that the deter-
mination of national power has changed fundamentally in the nuclear age.
Throughout history, the primary concern Of most national leaders has been to
accumulate geopolitical and military power. It would have seemed inconceivable
even a generation ago that such power once gained could not be translated directly
395
into advantage Over One's Opponent. But now both we and the Soviet Union have
begun to find that each increment of power does not necessarily represent an in-
Crement of usable political strength.
With modern weapons, a potentially decisive advantage requires a change of
Such magnitude that the mere effort to obtain it can produce disaster. The simple
tit-for-tat reaction to each other’s programs of a decade ago is in danger of being
Overtaken by a more or less simultaneous and continuous process of technological
advance, which Opens more and more temptations for seeking decisive advantage.
A premium is put On Striking first and On Creating a defense to blunt the
other side's retaliatory capability. In other words, marginal additions of power
cannot be decisive. Potentially decisive additions are extremely dangerous, and
the quest for them are destabilizing. The argument that arms races produce war
has often been exaggerated. The nuclear age is overshadowed by its peril.
|All Of this was in the President’s mind as he mapped the new directions Of
American policy at the outset of this Administration. There was reason to be-
lieve that the Soviet leadership might also be thinking along similar lines as the
repeated failure of their attempts to gain marginal advantage in local crises Or in
military competition underlined the limitation of old policy approaches.
The President, therefore, decided that the United States should work to create
a set of circumstances which would offer the Soviet leaders an Opportunity to
move away from confrontation through Carefully prepared negotiations. From
the first, we rejected the notion that what was lacking was a cordial climate for
conducting negotiations.
Past experience has amply shown that much heralded changes in atmospherics,
but not buttressed by concrete progreSS, will revert to previous patterns at the
first Subsequent clash of interests.
We have, instead, sought to move forward across a broad range of issues so
that progress in one area would add momentum to the progress of other areas.
We hoped that the Soviet Union would acquire a stake in a wide spectrum of
negotiations and that it would become convinced that its interests would be best
served if the entire process unfolded. We have SOught, in Short, to Create a vested
interest in mutual restraint.
|At the same time, we were acutely conscious of the contradictory tendencies
at work in Soviet policy. Some factors—such as the fear Of nuclear war; the
emerging consumer economy, and the increased pressures of a technological, ad-
ministrative society—have encouraged the Soviet leaders to seek a more stable
relationship with the United States. Other factors—such as ideology, bureau-
cratic inertia, and the catalytic effect of turmoil in peripheral areas—have.
prompted pressures for tactical gains.
The President has met each of these manifestations on its own terms, demon-
strating receptivity to constructive Soviet initiatives and firmness in the face of
provocations or adventurism. He has kept open a private channel through which
the two Sides could communicate candidly and Settle matter's rapidly. The Presi-
dent was convinced that agreements dealing with questions of armaments in
iSolation do not, in fact, produce lasting inhibitions On military COmpetition
because they contribute little to the kind of stability that makes Crises leSS likely.
In recent months, major progress was achieved in moving toward a broadly-
'based accommodation of interests with the USSR, in which an arms limitation
agreement could be a central element.
This approach was called linkage, not by the Administration, and became
the object of considerable debate in 1969. Now, three years later, the SALT
agreement does not Stand alone, isolated and incongruous in the relationship
Of hostility, vulnerable at any moment to the shock of some Sudden crisis. It
Stands, rather, linked Organically, to a chain of agreements and to a broad un-
derstanding about international conduct appropriate to the dangers of the
nuclear age.
The agreements On the limitation Of Strategic armS is, thus, not merely a
technical accomplishment, although it is that in part, but it must be seen as a
political event of Some magnitude. This is relevant to the question of whether
the agreements will be easily breached or circumvented. Given the past, no one
Can anSwer that question with certainty, but it can be said with Some a SSurance
that any COuntry which contemplates a rupture of the agreement Or a Circum-
vention of its letter and spirit must now face the fact that it will be placing
in jeopardy not only a limited arms control agreement, but a broad political
relationship.
80–942 O – 72 – 26
396
PREPARATIONS FOR THE ARMS TALKS
Let me turn now to the more Specific decisions we had to make about What
the agreement should do and how it could be achieved.
We knew that any negotiations On arms control, especially Ones involving
those Central weapons Systems which guarantee each Side’s Security, Were
found to be Sensitive and complicated, requiring frequent high-level decisions.
The possibility of a deadlock would be ever present, and the repercussions Of
a deadlock could not help but affect U.S.-Soviet relations across the board. We
had to begin, therefore, by assessing what the Situation was in terms Of arma-
ments in place and under COnStruction; What realistic alternatives We had at
the negotiating table; and how a tentative or partial agreement would compare
With no agreement at all.
For various reasons during the 1960s, the United States had, as you know,
made the strategic decision to terminate its building programs in major offen-
Sive systems and to rely instead on qualitative improvements. By 1969, therefore,
we had no active or planned programs for deploying additional ICBMs, Sub-
marine-launched ballistic missiles Or bombers. The Soviet Union, On the other
hand, had dynamic and accelerated deployment programs in both land-based and
Sea-based missiles. You know, too, that the interval between conception and
deployment of strategic weapons Systems is generally five to ten years.
At the Same time, both sides were in the initial stage of strategic defense
programs, each approaching the antimissile problem from a different stand-
point. The Soviets wanted to protect their capital. The United States’ program
concentrated on protecting Our retaliatory forces. Both sides also possessed weap-
ons which, although not central to the strategic balance, were nevertheless rele-
want to it. We have aircraft deployed at forward bases and on carriers. The Soviet
Union has a sizable arsenal Of intermediate-range missiles able to attack Our
forward bases and devastate the territory Of Our allies.
A further complication was that the COmposition Of forces. On the two Sides
was not symmetrical. The Soviet Union had given priority to systems controlled
within its own territory while the United States had turned increasingly to sea-
based SystemS.
The result was that they had a panoply of different ICBM’s while we essen-
tially had One general class of ICBM's, the Minuteman, together with a more
effective and modern Submarine force Operating from bases overseas and equipped
With longer-range missiles.
All Of this meant that even arriving at a basic definition of strategic equiva-
lency would be technically demanding and politically intricate.
Looking beyond to the desired limitations, it appeared that neither side was
going to make major unilateral concessions. When the national survival is at
stake, such a step could not contribute to stability. The final outcome would have
to be equitable and to offer a more reliable prospect for maintaining Security than
could be achieved without the agreements.
With these facts in view, the President, in the spring of 1969, established a
group Of Senior Officials responsible for preparing and COnducting the SALT
negotiations.
I acted as Chairman, and the Other members included the Under Secretary of
State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the
Arms COntrol and Disarmament Agency.
This group, Called the Verification Panel, has the task of analyzing the issues
and factors and Submitting for the President’s decisions those Options which
Commanded support in the various departments and agencies.
The Verification Panel analyzed each of the weapons systems which could
conceivably be involved in an agreement. It compared the effect of different
limitations On Our program and on the Soviet programs, and weighed the re-
Sulting balance. It analyzed the possibilities of verification, and the precise
risk Of evasion, seeking to determine at what point evasion could be detected and
What measures would be available for a response. This was done in Various
combinations so that if one piece Of the equation changed, say the ABM level,
the Government would be able to determine the effect of that change upon the
Other components of a particular negotiating package.
Our aim was to be in a position to give the negotiations a momentum. We
Wanted to be sure that when Stalemates developed, the point at issue would not
be largely tactical, and that the alternative Solutions would be analysed ahead
of time and ready for immediate decision by the President.
397
SUMIMARY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
In the first round of the talks, which began in November of 1969, the two
sides established a work program and reached some tentative understanding
of Strategic principles.
For example, both sides more or less agreed at the outset that a very heavy
ABM system could be a destabilizing factor, but that the precise level Of ABM
limitations would have to be set according to our success in agreeing On Offensive
limitations.
In the spring and summer of 1970, each country put forward more con-
crete proposals, translating some of the agreed principles into negotiating pack-
ages. During this period, we, on the American side, had hopes of reaching a
comprehensive limitation. However, the initial search for a comprehensive solu-
tion gradually broke down over the question of defining the scope of the forces
to be included.
The Soviets believed that strategic meant any weapons system capable of
reaching the Soviet Union or the United States. This would have included our
forward-based aircraft and carrier forces, but excluded Soviet intermediate
range rockets aimed at Europe and other areas. *
We opposed this approach, since it would have prejudiced our alliance Commit-
ments and raised a distinction between our own security and that Of Our
European allies.
We offered a verifiable ban on the deployment and testing of Multiple Inde-
pendent Reentry Vehicles. The Soviets countered by offering a totally unverifiable
production ban, while insisting on the freedom to test, thus placing the control
of MIRV’s effectively out of reach.
At this juncture, early in 1971, with the stalemate threatening, the President
took a major new initiative by opening direct contact with the Soviet leaders to
stimulate the SALT discussions and for that matter, the Berlin negotiations, and
providing progress could be achieved on these two issues, to explore the feasibil-
ity of a summit meeting.
The Soviet leaders’ first response was to insist that only the ABM's should be
limited, and that offensive systems should be left aside. But as far as we were
concerned, the still incipient ABM systems on both sides were far from the most
dynamic or dangerous factors in the strategic equation. It was the Soviet Offen-
sive programs, moving ahead at the average rate of over 200 land-based and 100
sea-based missiles a year, which we felt constituted the most urgent issue. TO
limit our option of developing the ABM system without at the same time check-
ing the growth of the Soviet offensive threat was unacceptable.
Exchanges between the President and the SOviet leaders embodying these
views produced the understanding of May 20, 1971. As any workable compromise
in the field must do, that understanding met each side’s essential concerns. Since
the offensive systems were complex and since agreement with respect to all of
them had proved impossible, it was agreed that the initial Offensive Settlement
would be an interim agreement and not a permanent treaty, and that it would
freeze Only selected Categories at agreed levels.
On the defensive side, the understanding called for negotiations towards a
permanent ABM solution with talks on both issues to proceed simultaneously to
a COmmon conclusion. *
This left two major issues for the negotiators, the precise level of the allowed
ABM's, and the scope of the interim agreement, Specifically What Weapons Would
be included in the freeze.
Pevising an equitable agreement on ABM's proved extremely difficult. The
United States had virtually completed its ABM site at Grand Forks, and we were
Working on the second site at Malmstrom. Hence, we proposed freezing deploy-
ments at levels Operational or under construction, that is to say, two ICBM sites
On Our Side, and the Moscow defense on the other.
The Soviets Objected this would deny them the right to have any protection for
their ICBM's, a new formula was then devised allowing each side to choose two
sites, One each for national capital and ICBM defense or both for ICBM defense.
The resolution of the ABM issue was completed after Our Chiefs of Staff, Sup-
ported by the Secretary of Defense, decided that a site in Washington to defend
the National Command Authority was to be preferred Over the Second ICBM-
protective site at Malmstrom. They reasoned that while a limited defense would
not assure the ultimate survival of the National Command Authority, it would
buy time against a major attack While the radars in both the NCA defense and
398
the defense of ICBM's would provide valuable warning. Moreover, an NCA de-
fense would protect the National Command Authority in the event of a Small
attack by SOme third country Or even an accidental Or unauthorized launch Of a
Weapon toward the United States. º,
The President accepted their recommendation.
What about the Offensive Weapons freeze? Early in the discussions about the
implementation Of this portion of the May 20 understanding between the Presi-
dent and the Soviet leaders, it was decided to exclude from the freeze bombers
and SO-called forward-based Systems. TO exclude, that is, the Weapons in which
this COUIntry holds an advantage.
We urged the COngreSS to keep this fact in mind, when a SSessing the numerical
ratios of weapons which are subject to the Offensive freeze.
There was also relatively rapid agreement following the May 20 breakthrough
that interCOntinental ballistic missiles WOuld be COvered. This left the issue Of the
inclusion. Of Submarines.
With respect to ICBM's in submarines, the situation was as follows: The
Soviet Union had been deploying at the average annual rate of 200 interconti-
mental ballistic missiles and 100 sea-based ballistic missiles a year. The U.S. had
completed deployments Of Minuteman and the 41 Polaris Submarines in 1967.
Of COurse, as you know, We are engaged in increasing the number Of Warheads
on both our ICBM's and submarine-launched missiles. We were, and are, develop-
ing a new submarine system, although it cannot be deployed until 1978 or until
after the end of the freeze. In other words, as a result of decisions made in the
1960's, and not reversible with the time-frame of the protected agreement, there
would be a numerical gap against us in the two Categories of land- and Sea-based
missile Systems whether Or not there was an agreement. Without an agreement.
the gap would steadily widen.
The agreement would not create the gap. It would prevent its enlargement to
Our disadvantage. In short, a freeze of ICBMs and sea-based systems would be
Overwhelmingly in the United States’ interest.
These basic considerations undoubtedly impelled the recommendation of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff that any freeze which was to command their support must
include the Submarine-based system. The Only possible alternative was a crash
program for building additional missile-launching submarines. The President
explored this idea with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operatitons. Their firm judgment was
that such a program was undesirable. It could not produce results before 1976–
that is, toward the very end of a projected freeze—and only by building a type
Of Submarine Similar to our current fleet, and without many of the features most
needed for the 1980s and beyond.
The President Once again used his direct channel to the Soviet leaders, this
time to urge the inclusion of missile-launching submarines in the offensive
agreement.
After a long period of hesitation, the Soviet leaders agreed in principle at the
end of April. Final details were worked out in Moscow between the President
and the SOviet leaders. .*
My purpose in dwelling at Such length upon the details of our internal delibera-
tions and negotiations has been to make One crucial point: Neither the freeze
of ICBMs nor the freeze of submarine-launched missiles was a Soviet idea, and
hence, it is not an American concession. On the contrary, in both cases it was
the Soviet Union which reluctantly acceded to American proposals after long
and painful deliberation.
PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT
I will not spend this group's time in further review of the frequently arduous
negotiations in Vienna, Helsinki, and during the summit in Moscow leading to
the final agreement. I do want to pay tribute on behalf of the President to
Ambassador Smith and his delegation, whose dedication, negotiating skill and
patience contributed decisively to the outcome.
Let me summarize the principal provisions of the documents as signed. The
ABM treaty allows each Side to have One ABM Site for the defense of its national
command authority and another site for defense of intercontinental ballistic
missiles. - --
The two, must be at least 1,300 kilometers, or 800 miles apart in order to
prevent the development of a territorial defense. Each ABM site can have 100
ABM interceptors.
399
The treaty contains additional provisions which effectively prohibit either
the establishment of a radar base for the defense of populated areas or the at-
tainment of capabilities to intercept ballistic missiles by conversion of air de-
fense missiles to anti-ballistic missiles.
It provides for withdrawal by either party on six months’ notice, if Supreme
national interests are judged to have been jeopardized by extraordinary events.
By Setting a limit to ABM defenses the treaty not Only eliminates One area of
potentially dangerous defensive competition, but it reduces the incentive for
COntinuing deployment Of Offensive Systems. -
As long as it lasts, offensive missile forces have, in effect, a free ride to their
targets. Beyond a certain level Of Sufficiency, differences in numbers are there-
fore not conclusive.
The interim agreement on offensive arms is to run for five years, unless re-
placed by a more comprehensive permanent agreement which will be the subject
Of further negotiations, or unless terminated by notification similar to that
for the treaty. -
In essenge this agreement will freeze the numbers of strategic offensive mis-
Siles On both sides at approximately the levels currently operational and under
construction. For ICBM's, this is 1054 for the United States and 1618 for the
Soviet Union. Within this overall limitation, the Soviet Union has accepted a
freeze of its heavy ICBM launchers, the weapons most threatening to our stra-
tegic forces. - -
There is also a prohibition on conversion of light ICBM's into heavy missiles.
These provisions are buttressed by verifiable provisions and criteria, specifically
the prohibition against any significant enlargement of missile silos.
The Submarine limitations are more complicated. In biref, the Soviets are
frozen to their claimed current level, operational and under construction, of
about 740 missiles, SOme of them. On an Older type nuclear submarine. They are
permitted to build to a ceiling of 62 boats and 950 missiles, but only if they
dismantle older ICBM's or submarine-based missile to offset the new construc-
tion. -
This would mean dismantling 210 ICBM's and some 30 missiles on some nine
Older nuclear Submarines. Bombers and other aircraft are not included in this
agreement.
In sum, the interim offensive agreement will keep the Overall number of
Strategic ballistic missile launchers both On land and at Sea within an agreed
ceiling which is essentially the current level, Operational or under construction.
It will not prohibit the United States from continuing current and planned
strategic Offensive programs, since neither the multiple-warhead conversion, nor
the B–1 is within the purview Of the freeze and since the ULMS Submarine System
is not, or never was planned for deployment until after 1977. The agreement will
stop the Soviet Union from increasing the existing numerical gap in missile
launchers. -
Finally, there are a number of interpretative statements which were provided
to the Congress along with the agreements. These interpretations are in several
forms: Agreed statements initiated by the delegations, agreed interpretations
Or common understandings which were not set down formally and initialed,
unilateral interpretations to make Our position clear in instances where we COuld
not get total agreement.
In any negotiations of this complexity, there will inevitably be details upon
which the parties cannot agree. We made Certain unilateral statements in Order
to insure that our positions on these details was included in the negotiating record
and understood by the other side. *-
The agreed interpretations and common understandings for the most part deal
with detailed technical aspects of limitations On ABM Systems and Offensive
weapons. For example, it was agreed that the size of missile silos could not be
significantly increased and that “significantly” meant not more than 10 to 15
percent.
In the more important unilateral declarations we made clear to the Soviets
that the introduction of land mobile ICBM's would be inconsistent with the
agreement. Since the publication of the various unilateral interpretative state-
ments, suggestions have been heard that the language of the treaty and agree-
ment in fact hide deep-seated disagreements. But it must be recognized that in
any limited agreements, which are between old time adversaries, there are bound
to be certain gaps. -
400
In this case the gaps relate not so much to the terms themselves, but rather
to what it was impossible to include. The interpretations do not vitiate these
agreements, but they expand and add to the agreements. -
WIEIAT DO THE AGREEMENTS MEAN ?
Taking the longer perspective, what can we say has been accomplished?
First, it is clear that the agreement will enhance the security of both sides. No
agreement which fails to do SO could have been signed in the first place Or Stood
any chance of lasting after it was signed. An attempt to gain a unilateral ad-
Vantage in the strategic field must be self-defeating. -
The President has given the most careful consideration to the final terms. He
has asked me to reiterate most emphatically this morning his conviction that the
agreements fully protect our national security and Our Vital interests.
Secondly, the President is determined that Our security and Vital interests shall
remain fully protected. If the Senate consents to ratification of the treaty and if
the Congress approves the interim agreement, the Administration Will, therefore,
pursue two parallel COurses.
On the One hand, we shall push the next phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks with the same energy and conviction that have produced these initial
agreementS.
On the other hand, until further Arms limits are negotiated, we shall push re-
search and development and the production capacity to remain in a fully pro-
tected Strategic posture should follow-on agreements prove unattainable and SO
as to avoid giving the Other side a temptation to break Out Of the agreement.
Third, the President believes that these agreements, embedded as they are in
the fabric Of an emerging new relationship, can hold tremendous political and
historical significance in the coming decades. For the first time, two great powers,
deeply divided by their divergent values, philosophies, and Social Systems, have
agreed to restrain the very armaments On which their national Survival depends.
No decision Of this magnitude COuld have been taken unless it had been part Of
a larger decision to place relations On a new foundation Of restraint, COOperation
and steadily evolving confidence. A spectrum of agreement.S on joint efforts with
regard to the environment, Space, health, and promising negotiations. On economic
relations provides a prospect for avoiding the failure of the Washington Naval
Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand pact Outlawing war which collapsed in part for
lack Of an adequate political foundation. -
The final verdict must wait On events, but there is at least reason to hope that
these accords represent a major break in the pattern Of Suspicion, hostility, and
confrontation which has dominated U.S.-Soviet relations for a generation. The
two great nuclear powers must not let this Opportunity slip away by jockeying
for marginal advantages.
Inevitably an agreement of Such consequence raises Serious questions on the
part of Concerned individuals of quite different persuasions. I cannot do justice
to all Of them here. Let me deal with SOme Of the most frequently asked since the
agreements were signed three Weeks ago. -
Who WOn 2
The President has already answered this question. He has stressed that it is
inappropriate to pose the question in terms. Of Victory Or defeat. In an agreement
Of this kind, either both sides win or both sides lose. This will either be a Serious
attempt to turn the world away from time-worn practices of jockeying for power,
Or there Will be endless, Wasteful and purposeless competition in the acquisition
Of armamentS. -
DOes the agreement perpetuate a U.S. strategic disadvantage?
We reject the premise of that question on two grounds. First, the present
situation is on balance advantageous to the United States. Second, the Interim
Agreement perpetuates nothing which did not already exist in fact and which
could only have gotten worse without an agreement.
Our present Strategic military situation is sound. Much of the criticism has
focused on the imbalance in number of missiles between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union. But, this only examines one aspect of the problem. To assess the
Overall balance it is necessary to consider those forces not in the agreement:
Our bomber force which is substantially larger and more effective than the
Soviet bomber force, and our forward base systems.
The quality Of the weapons must also be weighed. We are confident we have
a major advantage in nuclear weapons technology and in warhead accuracy.
401
Also, with our MIRV’s we have a two-to-one lead today in numbers of warheads
and this lead will be maintained during the period of the agreement, even if the
Soviets develop and deploy MIRV’s of their own.
Then there are such factors as deployment characteristics. For example, be-
cause of the difference in geography and basing, it has been estimated that the
Soviet Union requires three submarines for two of Ours to be able to keep an
equal number On station.
When the total picture is viewed, our strategic forces are seen to be completely
Sufficient.
The Soviets have more missile launchers, but when other relevant Systems
such as bombers are counted there are roughly the same number of launchers. On
each side. We have a big advantage on warheads. The Soviets have an advan-
tage On megatonnage.
What is disadvantageous to us, though, is the trend of new Wepons deploy.
ment by the Soviet Union and the projected imbalance five years hence based
on that trend. The relevant question to ask, therefore, is What the freeze pre-
vents; where would we be by 1977 without a freeze? Considering the current
momentum by the Soviet Union, in both ICBM's and submarine launched bal.
listic missiles, the ceiling set in the Interim Agreement can Only be interpreted
as a sound arrangement that makes a major contribution to Our national Security.
Does the agreement jeopardize our security in the future?
The current arms race compounds numbers by technology. The Soviet Union
has proved that it can best compete in sheer numbers. This is the area which is
limited by the agreement.
Thus the agreement confines the competition with the Soviets to the area of .
technology? And, heretofore, we have had a significant advantage. -
The follow-on negotiations will attempt to bring the technological race under
control. Until these negotiations succeed, we must take care not to anticipate
their outcome by unilateral decisions.
Can We trust the SovietS 2
The possibility always exists that the Soviets will treat the Moscow agree-
ments as they have sometimes treated earlier Ones, as just another tactical
opportunity in the protracted conflict. If this happens, the United States will
have to respond. This we shall plan to prepare to do psychologically and stra-
tegically and provided the Congress accepts the strategic programs On which the
acceptance of the agreements was predicated.
I have said enough to indicate we advocate these agreements not on the basis
of trust, but on the basis of the enlightened self-interests of both sides. This
Self-interest is reinforced by the carefully drafted Verification provisions in the
agreement. Beyond the legal Obligations, both sides have a Stake in all of the
agreements that have been signed, and a large Stake in the broad process of
improvement in relations that has begun. The Soviet leaders are serious men,
and we are confident that they will not lightly abandon the Course that has led
to the Summit meeting and to these initial agreements. For Our Own part, we
will not abandon this course without major provocation, because it is in the
interest Of this country and in the interest of mankind to pursue it.
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
At the conclusion of the Moscow summit, the President and General Secretary
Brezhnev signed a Declaration of Principles to govern the future relationship
between the United States and the Soviet Union. These principles state that
there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence in the nuclear ago. They commit
both sides to avoid direct armed confrontation, to use restraint in local conflicts,
to assert no special claims in derogation of the sovereign equality of all nations,
to stress COOperation and negotiation at all points Of Our relationship.
At this point, these principles reflect an aspiration and an attitude. This Ad-
ministration will spare no effort to translate the aspiration into reality. We
shall strive with determination to Overcome further the miasma. Of Suspicion and
self-confirming preemptive actions which have characterized the Cold War.
Of course the temptation is to continue along well worn paths. The status
Quo has the advantage of reality, but history is strewn with the wreckage of
nations which sought their future in their past. Catastrophe has resulted far less
Often from conscious decisions than from the fear of breaking loose from es-
tablished patterns through the inexorable march towards cataclysm because
nobody knew what else to do. The paralysis of policy which destroyed Europe in
402
1914 would surely destroy the world if we let it happen again in the nuclear age.
Thus the deepest question we ask is not whether we can trust the SOViets, but
whether we can trust ourselves. Some have expressed concern about the agree-
ments not because they object to their terms, but because they are afraid of the
euphoria that these agreements might produce.
But surely we cannot be asked to maintain unavoidable tension just to Carry
out programs which our national survival should dictate in any event. We must
not develop a national psychology by which we can act Only on the basis of
what we are against and not on what We are for.
Or challenges then are: Can we chart a new course with hope but Without
illusion, with large purposes but without sentimentality? Can We be both gen-
erous and strong? It is not often that a country has the Opportunity to anSWer
such questions meaningfully. We are now at such a juncture where peace and
progress depend on Our faith and Our fortitude.
It is in this spirit that the President has negotiated the agreements. It is in
this spirit that he asks the approval of the treaty and the Interim Agreement
and that I now stand ready to answer your questions.
[From the office of the White House Press Secretary, June 15, 1972.]
QUESTION AND ANswer SEssIon AFTER A BRIEFING BY DR. HENRY KISSINGER,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, IN THE STATE
DINING ROOM OF THE WHITE HOUSE
Mr. MACGREGOR. Gentleman, as the President indicated in his report to the
Joint Session of Congress two weeks ago tonight, he places the highest import-
ance on executive-legislative partnership in the further carrying forward Of the
constitutional process with respect to the treaty and the agreement.
This Session this morning is designed to further that commitment On the PreS-
ident’s part and to give to you and through you the American people, an Oppor-
tunity for the fullest possible debate and the fullest range of questions.
The President has asked me, and I would like to do so, to recognize the Chair-
man of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Fulbright.
Senator FULBRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. MacGregor. -
Dr. Kissinger, first, may I say I think that was an extraordinarily thorough
and enlightening statement. The only regret I have is that he didn’t make it
public so all the country could have heard it, because I think it is a very great
description, I think, of what these agreements mean.
I am thoroughly in accord with the Spirit with which you have given them
and the way the President has presented this agreement for Our country. I have
Only One serious question about it.
There does appear to me to be an inherent inconsistency in the attitude as
expressed by the Secretary of Defense the other day. For background, I will read
One sentence. This is a quote from his testimony before the Armed Services Com-
mittee: “I could not support the agreements if the Congress fails to act On move-
ment forward of the Trident System, the B–1 bombers Or Other programs that
we have Outlined to improve Our Strategic Offensive Systems during this five-year
period.” .
Now, the explanation that Mr. Kissinger has made about maintaining Our
Security during the five-year period I accept as a general statement, but in View
Of the fact that we know the Soviets have no aircraft carriers whatever, they
have a very Small and not very modern bomber force, they have no forward bases
Similar to Ours, unless you consider Cuba perhaps a forward base.
But so far, we have no evidence that it is being so prepared. They are not
planning a Trident system that I know of. Their system of submarines is tradi-
tional and similar to the Ones they already have.
In view of all this, it seems to me to couple the approval Of the ABM and the
interim agreement with Congressional approval of these vastly expensive pro-
grams raises a serious question about Our determination to accept this agreement
in the Spirit in which I think it was negotiated and the Spirit which you have .
Stated. That is a gradual relaxation. Of the tensions, and not to use these agree-
ments as an excuse for a greatly enlarged arms System Of Our OWn.
This is the Only thing that has bothered me about them. I, Of course, am per-
sonally extremely pleased with the Overall agreements with the sole exception,
do we mean it, as I have said, and you yourself so offer, put yourself in the place
of the Russians, if we proceed immediately to a very large expansion of our
403
weapons systems, would this not leave in the mind of General Grechko and his
colleagues a question about our sincerity in really moving toward a reduction in
the arms race.
This is the only question I have and it is the One which bothers me and I wish
you would enlarge upon the necessity of proceeding at Once and tying these
agreements with the approval of programs about which there were serious ques-
tions even before this agreement was made, there were very Serious questions
about the A–14 and B–1 before these negotiations were agreed On.
Now, we seem to be put in the position of being pressured into that in Order
to get an agreement with which I am thoroughly in accord.
Dr. KISSINGER. As the President pointed out, and as I also said in my State-
ment, Mr. Chairman, we intend to move On two tracks: One, we hope to Start
the Second round Of SALT negotiations as SOOn as the Senate ratifies the treaty
and the Congress approves the interim agreement.
If the Schedule that was tentatively Suggested to you by the President Were
met, that is to say, approval by the end of August, We would hope to have the
first session of the second round of SALT sometime during October and then to
begin the process again. We will pursue those negotiations with the attitude to-
wards bringing about a change in the international climate that I have described.
At the same time, the question arises Of what we should do in Our national
defense posture while we engage in these negotiations. It has been the judgment
Of this Administration that we must continue those programs which preserve Our
strategic position. I do not, in this setting, want to go into each individual
weapon system because I believe that the appropriate committees will examine
the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with
respect to them.
Our view, however, is that we must continue those strategic programs which
are permitted by the agreement and those research and development efforts in
areas that are covered by the agreement in case the follow-on agreement can-
not be negotiated.
Our experience has been that an on-going program is no obstacle to an agree-
ment and, On the COntrary may accelerate it. That was certainly the case with
respect to Safeguard. We are in the position with respect to various categories
Of weapons that the Soviet Union has an accelerated program, and we have none.
Therefore, Our position is that we are presenting both of these programs On their
merits. We are not making them conditional. We are saying that the treaty is
justified. On its merits, but we are also saying that the requirements of national
Security impel us in the direction of the strategic programs, and we hope that
the Congress will approve both Of these programs as it examines each of them
On its merits. -
Mr. MACGREGOR. I am sure if the President were here, he would like to have
recognized the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Chairman
Morgan.
Congressman MORGAN. Thank you, Clark, and I want to thank Dr. Kissinger
in inviting us to brief us On it.
When the President appeared here in the short appearance he made before
this group, he spelled Out the reason why this had to be done in Moscow at such
a high level, because it crossed Over so many agencies and because of the form
Of government Of the Soviet Union.
He also ended up by saying that you would not be available for testimony On
Capitol Hill, in which I agree. But I just wondered, with the five committees
‘Who are represented here today, who are going to consider Over in the Senate side
the Treaty of the ABM’s and over on the House side this, the limitation that
has been set by you and the President, of September 1, whether you would be
available by these committees for consultation as we go along.
Dr. KISSINGER. I would be delighted to meet with members of these com-
mittees in groups, on an individual basis, or in the kind of setting that we have
WOrked Out before, in which I will meet with the committees at the invitation of
the Chairman in some setting that maintains the position of Executive privilege.
But I will be fully available to answer any questions and we are prepared to go
as far as is humanly possible with respect to Executive privilege.
Certainly, to make available to the Congress any answers that we can.
Congressman MORGAN. I want to assure you that the Committee on Foreign
*::::: Will go to WOrk On this as soon as we get back from the Democratic Con-
Went IOI).
404
Mr. MACGREGOR. I am sure we would like to hear from the Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Armed Services, the Honorable John Stennis.
Senator STENNIS. Well, Mr. Chairman, and colleagues I certainly didn’t come
here to make a statement. I came to listen and to learn. I did respond When I
walked in, to a request that I would Say just a WOrd.
Gentlemen and ladies here in the Congress, I have been on the Armed Serv-
ices Committee since before we had ICBM's and I have thought many times the
growing realization I had of what these could mean and now what they do mean
in our hands and then this same weapon in the hands of Our adversaries.
So, I have been driven into a corner of wanting very much to have Some
kind of an agreement that would be the germ, perhaps, of Something that Would
relieve the tensions and assure Our Safety.
I do have one major reservation about this situation I am going to mention,
but I do believe if we can approve it, it is a start, maybe not much of a start, but
it is a start. That is the biggest thing I See about it. -
May I just respond one moment to the very major point that the Senator from
Arkansas made, about if we get these agreements, why go on With the ULM's.
I remember So well the ABM debate that we had in the Senate. The most Outstand-
ing point in my mind, I was convinced that the great probability was that by
putting in the ABM for whatever it was worth, it might increase the chances
of getting some kind of a start On agreements.
Not that I have any perception, but as I have understood, from the President
at other briefings. they thought that was a major point in getting this. r
This same reasoning applies, I think. I am going to Support the B-1 and the
ULM’s and frankly, I am going all of the way on ULM’s now, even though I had
in mind supporting it only for a limited amount this year, and not on an all-
Out program.
I have in mind now, the statement you made, Dr. Kissinger, but I am not
under its impact exactly, and I have said these things because they were Old
thoughts. But it is quite helpful.
By the way, is this an Open meeting, is the press here? Anyway, the reservation
I have is On this Surveillance, Our power to detect any cheating. That hadn’t
been gone into here and it hasn’t been gone into in other briefings that I have
been to, and I don’t insist on any question being answered On it, but I raise that
point. -
If you want to comment On it, you may. I want to make this Observation. I
think that we are more than doers out there in the Congress. We are not going
to say just Yes Or NO. We have to actively make up Our mind. On this, and take
a position for future generations.
I believe that will help us approach it. DO you want to COmment. On that
detection and Surveillance?
Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I am sure that when Mr. Helms testifies in executive
sessions, that he can go into more detail than I can. In fact, all I can do is
to make the Statement that we are confident that national means Of Verification
are sufficient to monitor the numerical limitations Of this agreement.
We studied this problem in great detail before we entered negotiations, and
determined for each category of weapon the margin of error that we thought
Our collection Systems had and what We could do to react Once we found Out
that there had been a violation.
In each of these cases, we found that the margin was well within tolerable
limits. In this case, however, where we are dealing with numbers, we are con-
fident that the national means of verification are sufficient to give us the highest
degree of confidence that this agreement will be lived up to, Or that we will
know it almost immediately if it is not lived up to. -
Mr. MACGREGOR. The President is aware that the members Of the Joint Com-
mittee On Atomic Energy have developed a tremendous expertise which applies
directly to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and to the interim agreement
and we are delighted to see the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, the Honorable John Pastore, from Rhode Island.
Senator Pastore, do you have a question?
Senator PASTORE. Not exactly a question for the moment because I have asked
it before and I think it has been answered. I think the One dominant question
here is whether or not in these agreements we have reserved to Ourselves the
military potential that will constitute a deterrent against an attack upon us,
405
and also whether or not in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff they
are all unanimous that this is a good agreement. -
Dr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, we would not have entered into this agreement
if we thought it impaired our capacity for deterrence. As was pointed Out in
my statement, we believe that it maintains the capacity of deterrence and at
the same time, enables the world to start toward turning away from the arms
race as well as improving the whole international climate.
Secondly, at every stage of this agreement we consulted in the greatest detail
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This has been pointed out, both in my Statement,
but it was done throughout the work of the Verification Panel in Which the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is represented and at every decision that
the President made, the International Security Council.
I do not know of any significant decision—I don’t know of any decision with
respect to this agreement that was made which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have
not unanimously Supported.
During the final stages of the negotiation in Moscow, we were in direct touch
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the various proposals unfolded, and, Of Course,
you will be calling Admiral Moorer yourself, but I am certain that he will
confirm the unanimous support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for this agreement.
Mr. MACGREGOR. Yes, CongreSSman.
Congressman NEDZI. Dr. Kissinger, on March 14, the President gave as
rationale for the broad safeguard system, part of his rationale, Was the defense
of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which the People's
Republic of China is likely to be able to mount within the decade.
Has anything happened to that threat, and in that COnnection, are you able
to tell us anything about your forthcoming visit to China?
Dr. KISSINGER. Our estimate of the Chinese nuclear Capability is still approxi-
mately what it was at the time that Safeguard was developed. Our estimate of .
the likelihood of Our being involved in any nuclear conflict with the People’s
Republic of China is considerably less than it was at the time that the Safeguard
program was submitted to the Congress, because of the political developments
that have happened since then, Specifically the Opening toward China.
Therefore, we accept now that in the Overall Context of the contribution that
this agreement cOuld make toward WOrld peace and toward improving general
relationships, and in the light, also, Of improvement of relations with the
People's Republic of China, that we could pay this price of foregoing the addi.
tional protection that the President requested in his original statement.
We could do this all the more SO because if Our estimates turn Out to be in-
correct, we have Such an Overwhelming retaliatory Capability vis-a-vis any other
country other than the Soviet Union, that the idea of a third nuclear country
attacking the United States is a rather remote possibility.
Congressman NEDZI. Didn’t we have it three months ago?
Dr. KISSINGER. I was talking about the justification which the President gave
when he started the Safeguard Program. I don’t know what March 14th State-
ment you are talking about. It must have been March 14, 1969.
Congressman NEDZI. My apologies.
Dr. KISSINGER. It was not March 14th of this year.
Congressman NEDZI. I stand corrected.
Dr. KISSINGER. That was 1969. Then with respect to my visit to the Peoples
Republic of China, it was foreseen in the Shanghai Communique. It was tenta-
tively agreed to at the time Of the President’s visit to Peking that Sometime
during the COurse Of the Summer we would send a Senior representative to the
Peoples Republic. We intend to review the whole range of international prob-
lems as they affect American-Chinese relationships.
Mr. MACGREGOR. When I recognized Congressman Nedzi, I was looking unsuc-
cessfully for the Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, Con-
gressman Hébert of Louisiana. I don’t see Eddie, but I do see the ranking majority
Member Of the Committee, and the Vice Chairman Of the Committee On Atomic
Energy. I would like to recognize Congressman Mel Price.
Congressman PRICE. Mr. MacGregor, Mr. Hebert has important business in
LOuisiana today and could not be here. But I would like to advise the group that
the committee will mark up the Procurement Bill and all the items in there are
going to be approved this afternOOn. -
Senator BENNETT. My question is partly a request for additional clarification,
Do I understand that Mr. Kissinger's statement will be available to us as well as
that Of the President? -
406
Dr. KISSINGER. That is correct. -
Congressman HANSON. Dr. Kissinger, as I understand the ABM Treaty, it
anticipates the construction of an ABM site at the capital of each of the two
COuntries, plus One other site. -
Dr. KISSINGER. That is correct.
Congressman HANSON. With respect to an ABM system to protect our Nation’s
Capital, is it the intention of the Administration to push forward for authoriza-
tion and construction of this system around Washington and how important it is
to the Credible defense to which reference was made that we do proceed to author-
ize and construct this protection for the Nation’s Capital? Will our position be
significantly weakened in terms of future negotiations if we fail to take this step?
Dr. KISSINGER. First of all, we will request this authorization. Secondly, it was
the judgment Of Our Senior military leaders that a second site in the Capital area
WOuld be more useful than a Second site in Malstrom. It would give additional
Warning time in case of major attack and it would give protection against an
attack by a third COuntry. It is for this reason that we are recommending to the
Congress and requesting the Congress to authorize its construction.
Senator JACKSON. Dr. Kissinger, first I want to compliment you on a very fine
Statement. I think we all want to see an end to the arms race, but I think we all
Should agree that if you are going to have an agreement it should be One that will
Stabilize and not destabilize. When you have a number of ambiguities such as We
have in the present arrangement, I think it is fraught with Some trouble.
For example, I just want to illustrate a couple: There are a lot of them. But we
do have, for example, a bilateral understanding on the number of advanced
strategic type submarines, the Y Class, Polaris. That is defined specifically. But
there is no specific limitation other than Our unilateral statement as to the num-
ber Of land-based missiles, intercontinental, that are permitted. t
Would you comment? The same is true of “What is a heavy missile?”
Dr. KISSINGER. With respect to the numbers of missiles actually being deployed,
the Soviet Union has been extremely reluctant to specify precise numbers, that is
true. We have operated with a number of 1618. There is absolutely no question
that if Our intelligence Should reveal that the Soviet numbers significantly exceed
that figure that the whole premise of the agreement will be in question. -
Now, what will maintain this agreement is not the fact that we can waive these
provisions and take it to COurt at any particular moment, but what will maintain
this agreement is the consequences the Other side will face if it turns out that it
has turned into a Scrap Of paper and that it is being circumvented.
If this agreement were being circumvented, obviously we would have to take
COmpensatory Steps in the Strategic field. But beyond that, as is pointed Out in
my statement, the two countries have a unique opportunity right now to move
into an entirely different relationship of building additional trust.
If it turns out that through legalistic interpretations of provisions of the
agreement Of through failing to Specify numbers about which we have left ab-
SOlutely nO doubt as to Our interpretation and where are hereby reaffirmed, if it
Should turn Out that those numbers are being challenged in any significant way
at all, then this would cast a doubt. It would not Only threaten disagreement,
but it WOuld threaten the Whole basis Of this new relationship which I have
described.
We are very confident that Our national means of detection give us the highest
degree of confidence that these numbers cannot be exceeded without our knowing
and that if they are exceeded that the consequences I described will follow.
NOW, with respect to the definition of heavy missiles, this was the subject of
extensive discussions at Vienna and Helsinki, and finally Moscow. NO doubt, one .
of the reasons for the Soviet reluctance to specify a precise characteristic is
because undoubtedly they are planning to modernize within the existing frame-
WOrk SOme Of the weapons they now possess. A •
The agreement specifically permits the modernization of weapons. There are,
however, a number of safeguards. First there is the Safeguard that no missile
larger than the heaviest light missile that now exists can be substituted.
Secondly, there is the provision that the silo configuration cannot be changed
in a significant way and then the agreed interpretive statement which we made,
which the other side stated reflected its views also, that this meant that it could
not be increased by more than 10 to 15 percent. .
We believe that these two statements, taken in conjunction, give us an ade-
quate safeguard against a substantial substitution of heavy missiles for light
missiles. So, we think we have adequate safeguards with respect to that issue.
407
It is, however, true, Senator Jackson, that within these limitations, improve-
ments, qualitative improvements, are possible which will increase the capabili-
ties Of each Of these missiles and this is One Of the reasons why We have ad-
VOcated qualitative improvements in Our Strategic forces. But as far as the break
between the light and the heavy missiles is concerned, We believe that we have
aSSurances through the two Safeguards that I have mentioned to you.
Congressman STRATTON. Dr. Kissinger, I have One question with regard to. One
Of the unilateral Statements that was published the Other day. Under the agree-
ment, as I understand it, we have 41 Polaris Submarines and we could go to 44
if we turned in Our Old Titans. But the Soviets say that they are considering the
British and the French Polaris submarines to be part of Our force and that if the
total goes Over 50 they will consider the agreement breached. The British have
four. The French have One and three Others in construction, which means that if
the French Ones are completed, then we could Only have 42 Without putting it
Over the total Of 50.
Could you comment. On how we can hold down the British and French as part
Of this agreement? - -
Dr. KISSINGER. First of all, the Soviet Union has not said that they would
consider the agreement breached. The SOviet Union has Said that they WOuld
then reserve the right to ask for additional compensation.
Secondly, we have emphatically rejected that interpretative recitation and
have written Our rejection Of that into the record. SO, we do not COnSider that
we have agreed to this Soviet interpretation. You have to remember the inter-
pretative statements are in a number of categories. There are those that are
agreed and initialled. There are those Orally agreed. There are those that are
unilateral and not challenged and then there are those that are unilateral and .
challenged.
- I would think that a unilateral Statement that was challenged at the time
it was made would not be the most determining feature in Our Own policy with
respect to this.
But, finally, the provisions that permit the trading in Of One type of missile
for another do not have to be implemented. We have the right, but we don’t
have the Obligation, to trade in the Titans for additional Submarines and given
Our Construction program at this moment, with no additional Submarines Of
the Polaris type being built, we may well decide not to exercise this option
and keep the Titans, in which case your question would be moot.
But in any event, we have not accepted this Soviet interpretation.
Congressman PIKE. Dr. Kissinger, if I understand the philosophy whereby
One of these agreements requires a treaty and the other is an executive agree-
ment, it has to do with the fact that the executive agreement is limited to a
term. Of years. As We look ahead to SALT II, I would like to ask this ques-
tion : FOr how long a period of years could an exeeutive agreement be made
which was not required to be a treaty? Could it be for 25 years, for example?
I would also like to ask a question in this regard : The tentative agreement
Was fairly well leaked Or publicized in some manner before the President
Went to MOSCOW. I would simply like to ask whether there were any substantive
Changes made at MOSCOW.
Dr. KISSINGER. The first question is an important Constitutional question :
At What point does an executive agreement achieve character of such per-
manence that it should really more properly be in the form of a treaty?
There were two reasons why the exectuive agreement was put into that
form. One Was because of its limited duration and secondly because of its
limited Scope. That is to say, here we had an agreement, the major categories
Of Which Were going to be included again in a more comprehensive negotiation
leading to a more permanent arrangement.
For example, the disparity which is involved for a limited period of time
might not prove acceptable for a more permanent arrangement.
For this reason, that is to say, the limited duration and the limited scope
it Was decided that an Executive Agreement which, however, is submitted to
the entire Congress, was more appropriate.
If you got to the point where you made a 25-year agreement, I don’t want
to prejudge that issue, but, as a political scientist and not as a presidential
mºnt it would look more like a treaty to me. But I don’t want to get into
8.T.
NOW, With respect to the Second question, the general outlines of the agreement
Were Shaped, really, in three Ways. One was by negotiations in Helsinki and
408
Vienna, which did most of the detail. But the policy decisions that were brought
about through direct contact between the President and the Soviet leaders which
led to the May 20, 1971 breakthrough and then, again, to the formula which led to
the inclusion of the submarines—when we were in Moscow there were four major
issues that had not been resolved in Helsinki, which were known as issues, but
the solution of which could not have been leaked because it hadn't been achieved.
Those were the subjects that were most intensively discussed between the Presi-
dent and the General Secretary, primarily the issue of how you calculate the Sub-
marine limits, and at what point the replacement of submarines has to start, and
which submarines had to be counted for replacement purposes, and questions Of
this type.
There were subsidiary issues having to do with the silos, I mentioned inter-
pretative statements, and matters of this kind, none of which had been Settled
in Helsinki, and had to be settled in very extensive conversations between the
President and the General Secretary and between members of Our delegation in
Moscow and their Soviet colleagues.
Mr. MACGREGOR. Senator Javits?
Senator JAVITs. I would like to revert to the question asked by Senator Ful-
bright and Senator Stennis, because they raise some, to my mind, Very Serious
points.
On the assumption that the treaty can be denounced in six months, but the
agreement cannot be denounced at all, if it is breached, either party can treat
it as an end. What do you advise us to do about the September 1 date the Presi-
dent names, if by then we have not determined that we wish to authorize any
additional weapons systems in view of the fact that the President has made it
clear that he made this agreement on the assumption that we, too, would press
forward with our weapons plans as the Russians are?
And the second part of that question is : Is this the total bill Or are there more
weapons Systems to come within the next five years that we are going to have
to authorize because we have made this deal?
Dr. KISSINGER. First, I think it is not correct to say that you have been asked
to authorize weapons because we have made this deal. All Of the Weapons that
you are being asked to authorize had been requested prior to the deal and were
judged to be necessary before the deal. The question is not whether the deal impels
them, but whether the deal makes them dispensable. -
This is the shape Of the debate.
Secondly, I am frankly not sure about the withdrawal provisions of the de-
fensive agreement. I thought it had the same withdrawal provisions.
It is my impression that the Offensive agreement has exactly the Same with-
drawal provisions Of the defensive treaty, SO that we are protected.
Thirdly, as I have said, we are requesting both of these programs On their own
merit, and, therefore, it is up to the COngress to decide how to deal with them.
Senator PERCY. Dr. Kissinger, I would like to first express that in dealing with
Our two major adversaries, you will always be as skillful and Successful as you
have in skirting around the Executive privilege question.
I think in the case Of the treaty and the agreements, you have been, and the
President has been, and Secretary Rogers.
My question pertains to the second allowable site that each party can have.
Neither One of us has even begun the preparation of those two sites. Neither One
Of us have either site in Our Original defense strategy plans. Is it possible that
We COuld reach an agreement that neither One of us go ahead with those two
sites and would we take the initiative in suggesting that might be a possibility?
Dr. KISSINGER. The question of the deferral of the second site had been con-
sidered and had been rejected by both sides. The Soviet Union had taken the
position that it could not agree to an ABM limitation that did not give it the
right as long as we were in a position to defend ICBM's in which they could not
also defend Some ICBM's Of their own.
SO, therefore, Our failure to go ahead with Our Second site WOuld, in effect,
give them two sites to our One. The only possibility for us would have been to
Scrap the site we had and build an entirely new One in Washington, and it
seemed to us not a good policy to begin a disarmament agreement by which we
had to scrap everything that we had done in Order to build something entirely
different from What We Started Out to do. -
Mr. MACGREGOR. If you have any complaint about this process, I am the one
to complain to, but I have not identified to date the following hands, and I
4.09
would like to recognize you in this order, if I may. Senator Ervin, Congressman
Gubser, Congressman Fascell, Congressman Leggett, and Congressman Freling-
huysen, and then we will go on from there.
Senator ERVIN. I would like to ask this question. I think we had the Wisest Of
all Americans in Benjamin Franklin, and he said, “Beware of being lulled into
dangerous security.” My question is this: Wouldn’t a ratification of the treaty
and the approval of the Limited Arms Agreement make it all the more im-
perative for us to go forward with the Trident and with the B-1 bomber, and
other programs, to keep from being lulled into a dangerous sense of security?
Dr. KISSINGER. That is the position of the Administration.
Congress GUBSER. I seem to get from your remarks that we do, under the
treaty, have the option of going ahead with Malmstrom instead of the protection
of the National Capital. Is that correct or was that possible at One time?
Dr. KISSINGER. This was considered at one time, and then when We reached a
point where we were talking about two sites, the Secretary of Defense and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that if there were to be two sites, they Would
rather have the second site around the National Command Authority than in
Malmstrom. Whether we could have obtained Soviet acquiscence in two ICBM
sites rather than having the second site in Washington, We cannot judge today,
because we accepted the recommendations of our military leaders that if there
were to be a second site, that second site should be in Washington.
Congressman FASCELL. Dr. Kissinger, what does the protocol address itself
to, and what were the circumstances which brought it about ; and, secondly, we
know what is excluded from the Interim Agreement and We know What We can
proceed with in terms of qualitative improvements because they won’t be de-
ployed until 1975. What is it that the Russians have excluded from the Interim
Agreement and what is it that the Russians can proceed with in terms of quali-
tative improvement that might not be deployed until after 1975?
Dr. KISSINGER. The protocol came about because the Submarine question could.
have been an extraordinarily complicated One, and the COmplications arose from
this fact. We do not have a program for building missile-carrying Submarines
until 1978 at the earliest. The Soviet Union had been producing Over the last
few years at the rate of eight missile-Carrying Submarines a year. It has built
additional facilities which would enable it nearly to double this production rate,
although up to now they have used it mostly for the Conversion of Older Subma-
rines into more modern types. But they do have a very Substantial production
Capability. .
Therefore, a freeze on submarine construction was bound to stop a very dy-
namic Soviet program, and it was not affecting any On-going American program.
Therefore, a formula had to be found which at One and the same time met Our
needs for some equivalent, and took account Of the reality that the Soviet Union
without this agreement could have produced at the rate at least Of eight to nine
a year, so that Over the period of the freeze, the Soviet Union could have built
up to eighty to ninety submarines, that is an additional 40 to 45 to something
like 43 to 44 they now have under construction.
This was the situation we faced. So we developed a formula which enabled the
Soviet Union, if it wished, to go beyond their present level up to 62, which is
well Short of their capacity, but Only at the price of trading in some of the Older
ICBMs and Some Of the Older missiles On earlier nuclear Submarines, SO that the
Soviet Union has to trade in 240 missiles in order to be able to build up to this
agreed level.
So the submarine agreement has the dual advantage of stopping the Soviet
program. On construction well short of its capacity ; and secondly, retiring for
the first time by international agreement a substantial number of Other missiles
that we, in Our annual statements, had been carrying as part of the Soviet mis-
Sile force.
SO we needed a protocol to determine those things.
Then there was the second question of at what level does the process of trad-
ing-in start? That is to say, at what point do you determine that the Soviet
Union must trade in these ICBMs and Older Submarine missiles for newer Ones.
The ambiguity here arose from the fact that while Our intelligence is adequate
to tell us when they are putting Submarines at Sea, and how many Submarines
are under Construction in the Sheds at any given moment, there is some diffi-
culty in defining the term “under construction.”
If you start the process of “under construction” when the hull sections are
being built, before they are moved into the sheds, you get a different figure than
410
if you get the figure in the Sheds. Therefore, this was a subject of some compli-
cated negotiation to determine the level at which the trade-in would start, which
is, as expressed in the Communique, at the level Of 740 ballistic missiles On Sub-
marines, which includes 30 older ones, which is to say, therefore, at the level of
704 to 710 Of the newer Submarines.
This is the explanation for this rather COmplex calculation of the protocol.
Now as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, their bombers are outside of this
system and theoretically they could start building up their bomber force without
being limited by this agreement.
Historically, the Soviet Union has not put the emphasis On its bomber force
that we have. Its Operating procedures and eXperience is far below the level of
Our Air Force. We do not consider it probable that they Will make a major effort
in that field, but this is one field in which they could make progress.
The field in which it is most likely that they will make progress is in the
modernization of the missiles that are permitted under the agreement. That
is, they will not violate the numbers Of the agreement, but they will improve
the quality, accuracy, number of warheads and this is What will represent a threat
to Our Strategic forces.
Congressman LEGGETT. Doctor, I want to commend you and the Administration
on the negotiation of what I think is an extremely remarkable agreement. I
have my reservations that perhaps the Department of Defense is stampeding in
the Opposite direction, though, Of the Spirit of the negotiations.
I am concerned that in the bill that we marked up yesterday in the Armed
Services Committee we increased the hard Site Sprint nuclear program clearly
Outlawed as far as deployment 100 percent.
We accepted the budget figures which had a 900 percent increase in the ULMS
Or Trident program. Of course, the answer you originally gave was that we
needed this as a bargaining chip perhaps for Phase 2 or 3, however, it seems to
me we have Successfully negotiated the limitation on the number of land-based
missiles without an accelerated program, limited the submarine tubes without
an accelerated program. -
We perhaps have wasted several million dollars in the ABM program in
making that a bargaining chip and aren’t we perhaps doing the same thing in
developing the big bargaining things which obviously will never be deployed
if you are successful in your negotiating program 2
Dr. KISSINGER. Let me say two things: One, it is not easy to prove the motiva-
tions Of the Other side in making an agreement. I would think it probable however
that We COuld not have negotiated the limitations On Offensive weapons if it
had not been linked to the limitations On defensive weapons and to their desire
Of Stopping the deployment Of the ABM System. -
SO, what drove these negotiations for the first year was their desire to limit
Our ABM deployment. And it was not until we insisted that we could not agree
to an ABM treaty without Offensive limitations that they reluctantly included
the Offensive limitations.
Secondly, I think we will deploy, even if we are successful in the negotiations
that it is very likely we will deploy ULMS and Trident and then retire a similar
number Of the Older submarines, use them for replacement purposes rather than
additions to the current Submarine fleet. -
So, I cannot fully accept the assumption that they will not be deployed. What
would almost certainly happen though if an agreement were successful is a sub-
Stantial replacement Of the Older POlaris boats.
Congressman LEGGETT. Of course, those older Polaris are a quarter billion
dollars a piece, zero defects and a third of a mile CPI. It is hard to conceive
that they are Obsolete Or will be. -
Dr. KISSINGER. I don’t want to go into the technical weapons characteristics. I
think you will get more competent witnesses than me On that subject.
Congressman FREYLINGHUYSEN. I am sure we all appreciate both your presenta-
tion and the question and answer period which you have given us. I would like
to congratulate you on a masterful presentation. I think Clark is to be congratu-
lated on the music that he has provided to supplement the high points.
My question gets back to this level of defense spending. The President and you
both said you hoped for an earlier resumption of the SALT talks. Assuming rati-
fication of the treaty, you didn’t really answer Senator Fulbright’s question as
to whether the Soviets might not consider defense spending an indication Of Our
sincerity or insincerity. I)o you think that there is any chance that there is not
411
an expectation. On the part of the Soviets with respect to defense spending that
might jeopardize successful talks following the ratification of the treaty 2
In other words, does the other side hook Our Spending and Our attitude towards
defense to further talks
Dr. KISSINGER. First of all, this last round of talks took nearly 2% years. So,
even if the talks start again this fall, they are likely to be prolonged. We would
expect that the first session will deal with general principles rather than With de-
tailed negotiating packages.
All the more so in the next round, we are getting into the more complicated
issues of how to control technological change where national means Of inspection
are not as reliable as they are with respect to Sheer numbers.
Now, there is no question that the Soviet Union will judge our intentions in
part by the level of our defense spending, for good or evil, and that We cannot
take the position that our defense spending is irrelevant to our general political
relationship.
The question is: If we spend too little on defense, if we create such a unilateral
weakness then we destroy their incentive to negotiate seriously. If We Spend too
much and give them the idea that we are gearing up simply for getting a tre-
mendous spurt to get ahead of them, then we create the Other problem.
So our problem is to get our defense expenditures at a level that does not
create a unilateral weakness and give them pressure for agreement but does not
get us into an area where it had the counter-productive tendency of generating
a new round. On their side.
We believe that we are navigating that course. But it is a serious question
and it is a serious problem and we have to be alert to both Of these dangers.
Mr. MACGREGOR. John Hunt wishes to make a statement in explanation for
the departure of a number of members of Congress.
Congressman HUNT. Let me thank you for the clear and concise explanation
of your mission this morning. On behalf of the Armed Services Committee, you
will notice Some of us are leaving. It is not because Of any discOurtesy to you,
'Sir, or because we are not interested.
The fact is We have a conflicting Schedule of Subcommittees that are getting
ready for an important mark-up of the legislation this afternoon in the absence
Of Mr. Hebert.
So, if you permit me for a moment to explain, that is the reason they are
leaving. -
Dr. KISSINGER. Thank you. I thought they were like my Harvard students.
[Laughter.]
Congressman HARRINGTON. At the risk of being repetitive, to follow On Con-
greSSman Freylinghusen’s question and Senator Fulbright’s question, I am
puzzled that this year and last year we saw a $6 billion increase in defense
spending requested and if the estimates given us by the Assistant Secretary of
Defense Moot are correct, we can expect a $5 billion increase in Southeast Asia.
I have seen before the tide was even out, before our committee, hundreds of
millions of dollars sought for additional spending in the procurement bill for the
betterment Of Systems that were not part of your agreement in Russia.
On three levels I am puzzled, One, SOund economic policy which appeared to
be both Centered in the White House as a concern prior to the present Occupancy
in the White House looking toward the era of 1964 and 1968, public confidence
that has been led to believe that SOmehow Out Of this whole business Will come
a reduction, not an increase, in the overall spending in the defense area and in
general, whether or not in going to these talks you didn’t have enough of an
Outline Of questions in coming before Congressional Committee and members Of
the Executive Branch did to be able to live this year with the procurement and
appropriations bill as they were without adding to them in the way and with
the timing I think has been chosen to do it.
I would like to have you address yourself to SOme of those considerations,
particularly as a constituent might say to me, “What do you mean it is going
to COSt more for defense? I thought you fellows were negotiating for reductions
in tensions and costs.” I think that is the problem most of us have. -
Dr. KISSINGER. It is Our intention and GOnviction that as these talks proceed
into Other areas that we will be able to bring about a substantial reduction in
defense expenditures as a result of these talks. .
There are, of course, certain Savings in the ABM program. What we are find-
ing Out is that the combination of certain trends has produced requirements
which are not themselves the Cause Of the agreement, but which have COme to
a head at about the same time by accident as the agreement.
80-942 O - 72 - 27
412
One of these problems is that for a number of years we had significantly slowed
down the modernization of our strategic programs so that our strategic weapons
now were essentially designed in the early 60s, while those of the Soviet Union
were designed in the late 60s and this has created a certain technological
requirement. -
This is the reason for this additional expenditure. This other figure for South-
east Asia that you mentioned is a projection forward of current rates and may
Or may not be necessary, depending on how long current rates are being sustained.
Congressman HARRINGTON. I am quoting Assistant Secretary MOOt.
Dr. KISSINGER. I know and he projected them forward Over a period of months
which may or may not be necessary because he was being proper with the Con-
gress by giving his best estimate, but he was projecting current expenditure rates.
If there were negotiations, for example, if the Offensive slows down, there are
many factors that could affect this. I am just trying to give you an idea.
Thirdly, the increase in the defense spending has been caused to a considerable
extent also by military pay increases which now consume about 54 percent of Our
defense budget. I have seen a chart—I think the Secretary of Defense can do it
much better than I–that shows what the present defense establishment would
cost if the pay scales were still those of eight or 10 years ago.
So, it is a combination of these factors that have produced the increase Of
defense costs while forces have actually be shrinking.
Senator COOPER. I would like to join with Others in thanking you and showing
appreciation for your very fine Statement.
The first question I will ask is not one that I suggest myself, but it was asked
the day the agreement was announced. I am sorry Senator Jackson is not here,
but he wouldn’t mind my saying he asked the question.
Are there any other understandings, secret understandings, which have not
been made public or will be made public? I think we will be asked, and it is
just as well to ask it now.
Dr. KISSINGER. There are no secret understandings. We have submitted to the
Congress the list Of all the significant agreements and interpretive statements,
and SO forth. What we have not done is to go through the record to see whether
Ambassador Smith might have said something that they interpreted in a certain
way, and this is why we put on the qualification “significant”, because otherwise
we would have to Submit the entire record.
According to the best of our judgment, there are no secret understandings, and
all the significant interpretive statements have been submitted to the Congress.
Senator COOPER. May I ask one more question? I notice in your explanation, it
is said that the United States asked for a prohibition on mobile land-based mis-
siles. You later withdrew that. But you did say that if the Soviet Union went
ahead with deployment, you would consider it serious enough to break the agree-
ment. Is the Soviet Union going ahead with mobile land-based missiles?
Dr. KISSINGER. Let me make One Other COmment with respect to the first thing
about Secret understandingS.
There are, of course, in the discussions, general statements of intentions. For
example, we have conveyed to the Soviets what I have also said here publicly On
the record : that the option of converting the Titans into submarines, given Our
present construction program, was not something We WOuld necessarily Carry Out.
But we do not consider that as a secret agreement, that sort Of thing. This was
simply a statement of general unilateral intentions.
Now, with respect to the land-based mobile missiles, we have made an inter-
pretive statement according to which the deployment of land-based mobile mis-
siles would be inconsistent with the purposes of the agreement. Then this raises
the question of whether our national means of verification are adequate to moni-
tor this.
The national means of verification are adequate to monitor Over a period of
time whether a land-based mobile missile is being deployed. The margin. Of error
with respect to total numbers would be great, if you have a margin of error of
five percent, and I am giving you a fictitious figure; it might be 15 percent with
respect to mobile missiles.
But the fact of the matter is, what we have to monitor is not total numbers Of
land mobile missiles ; what we have to monitor is the fact that they are deploying
any of them. We are quite confident that within a reasonable period of time after
the initial deployment, and maybe not in the first month, but Over a three- to
four-month period, and well before they can develop a substantial capability,
413
we will be able to tell whether they have deployed a land mobile missile and we
Can draw the appropriate Conclusions.
So as to the fact of deploying a land mobile missile, we are confident that We
will discover it well before they could deploy enough to have any effect.
Congressman MONAGAN. Dr. Kissinger, you have said that these agreements,
our confidence in them, is not based on trust, but enlightened self-interest, and
yet I think you would agree with any bilateral arrangements, with the credibility
of the other party to the contract, where that is very important, you have also
said that there is reason to believe that the area of distrust and Suspicion may
be at an end.
I just wonder, in view of that question of credibility, is there any specific
reason that you have for coming to this conclusion?
Dr. KISSINGER. We are not basing this agreement on trust, and we believe that
this agreement can be verified ; and secondly, that it has adequate Safeguards to
prevent its being violated. We also believe that we have started a process by
which we can move international relations into a new era, and we base this on
the fact that we agreed with the Soviet Union over the past two years on the
issue of Berlin, which has removed one of the primary causes of tension in the
world for the foreseeable future, and a whole spectrum of agreements on health,
space, environment, rules of navigation, that we are on the verge of making
progress with them in other fields such as commercial agreements, and finally,
we have signed a Declaration of Common Principles which it would have been
no point to sign unless we meant to move in a major effort in that direction.
So, for all of these reasons, we believe that there is a basis, that we have an
Opportunity both in the Soviet Union and in the United States, to move into a
new era. Whether both sides have the wisdom to do it, and even if they have the
wisdom they are not caught by events in areas in which they cannot control their
decision, this remains to be seen. But I think we have the Opportunity to turn
a significant page in history, and as far as this Administration is concerned,
We are going to make a major effort in that direction.
Senator PELL. It is an excellent presentation. I have three short questions.
First, if the Soviet expenditures for arms remains static, or should decline, or
ours go up, wouldn’t that have a reverse effect on their willingness to move into
SALT II? -
Secondly, are any of the provisions of the seabed disarmament treaty in Con-
flict with Our Own treaty which you have negotiated, in view of the fact that we
apparently still consider the possibility of weapons of mass destruction Stored
On the seabed floor, and they are prohibited by the Seabed disarmament treaty?
Third, why, in this set of negotiations, was the constitutionality normal course
of Congressional consultation, advise as well as consent, not engaged in?
Mr. MACGREGOR. When did you stop beating your wife?
Dr. KISSINGER. With respect to the seabed, I am not aware that we have any
intention of deploying weapons On the seabed, and we have no intention of
Violating the Seabed agreement, SO unless you know Of SOme weapon that I am
not aware of, I would have to say that this is not planned.
We believe that the defense expenditures will stay roughly in balance and
that the Soviet incentive to come to an agreement will not be reduced by Our
being stronger. On the contrary. So the judgment has been that Our Strength,
if anything, gives them an additional incentive to make a negotiatiton, if we do
not carry it to a point where they are convinced that this is just a subterfuge
for a massive effort to get ahead of them. If that should become their conviction;
then, in fact, We have a problem. -
I have to repeat: We have to navigate between that, on the one hand, weaken-
ing Ourselves unilaterally, and on the other hand between having them see these
negotiations simply as a stage by which we try to achieve Superiority. Either of
these things would be self-defeating.
As for the process of consultation with the Senate, as Senator Fulbright
knows, this is not my Specialty, but it has been my understanding that Mr. Smith
and the appropriate Secretaries have been in close consultation, and we have
tried from here to be On a personal basis in Contact with key Senators.
Mr. MACGREGOR. Might I add in that respect, Senator Pell, that at least since
have been here, that is, January 4, 1971 to date, it has been Ambassador Gerard
Smith’s intention, following the directions of the President, to make himself
readily available to the Members of the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives, here in Washington as well as in Helsinki and Vienna. I would be delighted
414
to talk to you further about that, but I had thought that was worked out to the
reasonable satisfaction of the Members of the COngreSS.
Congressman FRASER. Dr. Kissinger, let me say first that I have thought that
the consultations with Ambasador Smith have been good, both here in Wash-
ington and in Vienna.
I listened with some care to the answer you gave to Senator Percy's question
on the ABM sites. I can appreciate the Soviets would want to have a Symmetrical
arrangement with ours, but I was not quite clear from your answer Whether in
fact you have evidence that the Soviets intend to go ahead with their Option to
protect an offensive missile site.
The reasons I ask that is that since building the National Capital Defense is
not a bargaining chip clearly because we have now put a cap on ABM and Since
we have a two to three times lead over the Soviet Union building a Site Over
the Capital is not going to give us any significant benefit from the possibility
of attack. It will not even give us more time.
Unless we already know the Soviets are going to build a second ABM, Why
couldn’t we wait on ours and save the taxpayers several billions of dollars?
Dr. KISSINGER. It depends on how you define “how do we know.” We have no
evidence that they have started construction. We have the impression that
they have the firm intention of proceeding. I have no evidence whatever to the
contrary that they do not intend to proceed.
All the conversations the Presidential party had with them left the im-
pression that they have the firm intention of proceeding with their second Site.
As for the argument of how much time you gain, the effort to Overwhelm, in
itself, is apt to give some additional time but I would not insist that this will
add a huge span of time to the Warning. .
Congressman ZABLOCKI. Dr. Kissinger, the President and you have made it
Quite clear that it would be desirable to have the treaty ratified and the Execu-
tive Agreements approved by Congress in order that Phase II could begin in
October.
We fully understand the system of the Soviets and there is no ratification on
their part as we have it here, and I am sure the Soviets understand that this is
an election year and we have political conventions and there may be an Op-
portunity not to meet, that is a ratification and approval Of the Executive
Agreements.
Is it absolutely necessary that the treaty be ratified and Executive Agree-
ments approved by Congress before Phase II can begin, sometime in October?
Indeed, cannot Ambassador Smith meet with his counterparts, even though the
Senate and the Congress have not finished their work as far as the treaty and
Executive Agreement are concerned?
If I may ask just a second question, I think it is in the Support, but what
problems were there, or why didn’t we pursue with greater determination the
inclusion of MIRV’s in the Executive Agreement?
Dr. KISSINGER. With respect to the first question, actually, the Soviets do go
through a ratification procedure. They have their Supreme Soviet approve it but
with all respect, it is a little more tractable than our Congress.
The reason why, really, we can have some exploratory informal talks and we
probably will at Various levels, but the reason it would be difficult to start formal
sessions is because we have to know from what base we are operating. It is
rather an embarrassing position to have a senior negotiator Operate On the
basis of the assumption of a ratification. -.
Also, it would be somewhat presumptuous towards the Congress to assume a
ratification that has not in fact taken place. Yet, On the Other hand, unless you
make some assumptions, you really have not got a fixed base from which you
Can Operate.
Therefore, the beginning of the second phase of SALT really has to follow
congressional ratification. We understand the pressures of this year and this
is simply a fact.
Now, with respect to MIRV, MIRV is a complex issue for this reason : You
Can Count numbers with national means Of verification, but it is much more
difficult to determine how many warheads are confined in the master warhead.
Now, you have some indications but it is not very easy. Therefore, with
respect to the deployment Of MIRV, the inspection requirements have to be
a little bit more rigid than would be Otherwise the Case.
Now, we have made two proposals, two linked proposals, one is a ban on
the testing of MIRV, this we are prepared to monitor by national means of
415
inspection, and second, a ban on the deployment of MIRV for which we asked
for Spot-checks on On-site inspection. Now we considered the test ban absolutely
Crucial because we could have been somewhat more lenient on the frequency of
On-Site inspection if there had been a test ban on MIRV’s because without
testing, by definition, it is not easy to deploy them. It is, in fact, impossible
to deploy them. -
The Soviet Union, for not ununderstandable reasons, because they are be-
hind in MIRV technology, refused a test ban. They also refused a deployment
ban as Such. What they proposed was a production ban but without inspec-
tion. A ban On production is totally unverifiable in the Soviet Union while
they could verify ours through our budget and other methods through which
Our industrial production generally becomes known.
So, the Soviet counter-proposal for a production ban without a test ban was
generally unacceptable to us and when we reached that stalemate, we could
not proceed any further. This was the obstacle to proceeding on the MIRV’s.
Congressman ZABLOCKI. What encouragement do you see, or Optimism that
this may be an area that in Phase II we may find SOme Common ground
On 3
Dr. KISSINGER. Phase II, Mr. Congressman, will be very much more diffi-
cult than Phase I, because there, we will deal with technological problems
and there we will require even more ingenuity with respect to Phase II than
was shown in Phase I.
If One Can have Optimism with respect to it, it is because now the Soviet
technology has gone SOmewhat further probably so that they may be more
Willing to accept a test ban which will at least put a limit On further deploy-
ments, and Secondly, you will remember when we started these negotiations in
1969, we were going through a crisis in the Middle East and the Berlin Crisis.
We were emerging Out Of this whole miasma of suspicion and it was the first
time we engaged with the Soviets in any major negotiation, so the climate was
Clifferent. -
Now, we have established a pattern in which the Chief of State on Our
Side, the President and their political leaders, can be in Constant contact with
each Other and I believe we can perhaps move a little more creatively in the
early Stages Of SALT I. •
I must also say that the subject is more difficult. Certainly, we had conversa-
tions Of the breadth and precision in Moscow that would have been unimagin-
able three Or four years ago with respect to strategic questions, but this gives
us SOme hope that at least We Can talk about the gut issues.
Senator FULBRIGHT. Can I ask you to comment on One aspect, On the significance
Of ABM, SO much more has been said about the agreement.
How do you evaluate what appears to me to be a renunciation of the effort
to create a defense? What you have left in the ABM is Surely nothing more than
a token. Hasn’t each country, in effect, said, “We recognize, we have no defense
to almost total devastation in view of the capacities for destruction, Or within
the existing weapons,” and if that is true, isn’t this the experience, and I don’t
know why you would say it would be much more difficult.
If they live up to that and we give them no reason to believe We haven’t
accepted in good faith that Our population is hostile to their weapons, and Vice
versa, and it seems to me it Ought not to be more difficult if you believe in that.
Dr. KISSINGER. I believe, Mr. Chairman, this is a very good point. The limit on
ABM's or effective ABM's of both sides, really creates a situation, as I said in my
statement, in One sentence, in which the Offensive Weapons Of both sides really
have a free ride into the country Of the Other. -
So that therefore, the difference in numbers is somewhat less significant than
you would assess otherwise. There is still a danger that One side Will get Such
an enormous numerical advantage in warheads that it can completely obliterate
the force Of the Other.
IBut in the absence of significant defenses, even relatively small forces can do
an enormous amount of damage.
Therefore, too, if we can move into the second phase of SALT, into an explicit
recognition that both sides will try to stay away from counter-force strategies,
from the One danger that now exists, or the Overwhelming danger, that they Will
try to destroy each other, then perhaps the premium on MIRV’s will be reduced,
because, as you remember very well, Mr. Chairman, MIRV’s were developed at
first as a hedge against ABM.
416
So I think we will find, in perhaps unexcepted ways, that the new strategic
relationship that is created by this treaty will create realizations On both sides
as to the significance of usable strategic power that Over a period of the next
negotiations could have quite dramatic impacts.
I am Very glad that you asked that. - g
Mr. MACGREGOR. It is very close to 12 noon. We appreciate your participation
and your presence and your patience, and We thank you for launching what the
President has called an effective Legislative-Executive partnership.
[From the Stanford Journal of International Studies, Spring 1972]
LIMITED AGREEMENTS AND LONG-TERM STABILITY: A POSITIVE VIEW TOWARD SALT*
(By Jerome H. Kahani)
The United States-Soviet Union Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
have been under way for Over two years. Thus far, the two nations have reached
agreements to modernize the Washington-MOSCOW “hot line” and reduce the
danger of an accidental missile launch.” But the negotiations have not yet yielded
an agreement which limits the strategic forces deployed on each side. Indeed, the
pattern Of a COntinued arms buildup On both sides which has paralleled the talks
to date has not been reversed. -
However, there are grounds for Optimism. On May 20, 1971, President Nixon
announced that the deadlock at SALT had been broken and stated that the
|United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to “. . . . concentrate this year
On working Out an agreement for the limitation Of the deployment Of antiballistic
missile Systems (ABM's) '' and to seek “Certain measures” to control Strategic
offensive systems.” Recent reports suggest that an initial accord might be reached
in mid-1972—about the time of the President's planned visit to Moscow.” This
agreement would restrict ABM systems to low levels and probably limit the num-
ber of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM's) On each side. t
Admittedly, an agreement along these lines would leave substantial areas of
the arms race uncontrolled. In principle, a more effective agreement could be
reached—for example, a comprehensive measure which banned multiple inde-
pendently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV’s) or a quantitative arrangement
which limited submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM’s) or set forces at
lower levels. Nevertheless, the real choice at this point seems to be a limited
agreement, hopefully representing a first step toward more comprehensive meas-
ures, Or no agreement at all.
The preceding discussion raises three questions which will be explored in this
article :
(1) Why would the achievement of a limited SALT agreement be in the
net interest Of the United States?
(2) How might this initial agreement be managed and modified to main-
tain long-term stability?
(3) What guidelines should the United States follow in designing its
unilateral policies within the framework of a SALT agreement?
*This article is based on a study of United States strategic arms policy being conducted
by the author under the joint sponsorship of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace and the Brookings Institution. A fuller treatment of these and related issues is being
prepared for book-length publication. The interpretations and conclusions presented are
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, officers, or trustees
of the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment, or the Organizations that Support
their research. - - : .
#B.S., Queens College, 1960 ; M.S.E.E., Columbia University, 1961. Senior Fellow, The
Brookings Institution. Lecturer in International Relations, Georgetown University School
of Foreign Service. Member of Policy Planning and Arms Control Staff, Department of De-
fense, 1968–69 ; Physical Science Officer. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1964–68.
1 T. Smith, U.S. and Soviet Union Sign. Two Nuclear Controls Accords, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 1, 1971, at 1, Col. 6. . , - -
° N.Y. Times, May 21, 1971, at 2, col. 7. A simultaneous announcement was made in the
Soviet Union. - - . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . ". . . . . . . .
3 An initial SALT agreement will almost, Surely be reached before or during the Presi-.
dent’s visit to Moscow in May of 1972. See Getler, Packard Is Optimistic About SALT
Chances, Washington Post. Oct. 22, 1971, § A, at 1. Col. 4; Gwertzman, U.S. Aides Easpect
No 271 Arms Pact, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1971, at 7, col. 1; Marder, Arms Talks Recess,
Washington Post, Dec. 23. 1971, § A, at 8, col. 1. In his third Foreign Policy Message,
President Nixon listed on his proposed agenda for his visit to Moscow the consummation of
an accord on an initial strategic arms limitation agreement or, if the details of an agree-
ment had been worked out before that time, discussion of the issues to be addressed in a
second stage of the SALT negotiations. Gwertzman, Nia on Says Soviet and U.S. Define Pact
on Missiles, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1971, at 1, col. 1; Getler, Niazon Says Initial Limits Near,
Washington Post, Feb. 10, 1972, § A, at 12, col. 1,
417
II. UTILITY OF THE INITIAL AGREEMENT
The particular parameters of the agreement likely to be negotiated can be
estimated with reasonable certainty from available public evidence." On the
defensive side, the agreement would limit the Soviet Union to approximately
100 ABM launchers around Moscow and restrict the United States to 100–200
ABM launchers deployed at Minuteman sites in Montana and North Dakota. In
terms of land-based missiles, the agreement would “freeze” the United States at
its present level of 1,054 ICBM's and limit Soviet forces to 1,550–1,600 ICBM's,
possibly with a subceiling of 300 placed on the large SS—9 ICBM's. Since Soviet
negotiators have strongly opposed sea-based missile controls, it is unlikely that
SLBM limits would be part of the initial SALT package.”
Clearly, many details of the actual agreement cannot be predicted with Con-
fidence. For example, since the Soviet Union is in the midst of a missile buildup,
the exact figure for the Soviet ICBM level would be determined both by the
“cut off” date agreed upon and by whether Moscow will be permitted to com-
plete partially constructed systems. Perhaps SLBM limitations will be included
in the first-stage agreement. At any rate, the implications for American Security
and the United States-Soviet Union strategic balance would not be significantly
affected by these or other variations in the actual accord as long as its essential
features remained unchanged.
A. Potential Benefits
The main value of the agreement outlined above would flow from the Severe
limits placed on both sides’ ABM systems. More than any other strategic weapon,
defensive systems capable of protecting populations against missile attacks have
the potential of stimulating an increase in the level of Offensive armaments and
Greating Serious instabilities. The reason for this is that One Side's ABM poses
a direct threat to the Other side’s retaliatory missile forces which in turn rep-
resent the foundation. Of both the United States’ and the SOViet Uni'On’s deterrent
posture. In contrast to counterforce threats, which might endanger the Surviv-
ability Of One Side’s land-based systems, the ABM threat is far more Serious
Since it can potentially negate both land- and Sea-based missiles. With AIBM’s
extensively deployed, the risk Of nuclear war could rise—particularly in a time
of tension—if one side came to believe that the other had sufficient confidence
to contemplate a first-Strike with its Offensive weapons while relying On its defen-
Sive network to reduce damage from Surviving missiles and bombers launched
in retaliation.
Past United States Strategic force decisions have been Substantially influenced
by the fear that Soviet ABM deployments would endanger our “assured destruc-
tion” deterrent capability. Indeed, the mere prospect that the Soviets might
deploy an ABM has tended to trigger anticipatory countermeasures—witness
the premature United States MIRV response in the mid-1960's to the possibility
that the Soviets might deploy a large-scale ABM or convert the Tallinn air de-
fense system into an effective ABM." The United States is continuing to install
MIRV’s in its Offensive missiles primarily for prudential reasons out of concern
that the Soviets might enlarge their ABM network. During the 1960's, the
Soviet Union did not share this attitude toward deterrence and ABM's, but it now
appears that the Soviets have reversed their longstanding belief in the desir-
* The basic elements of a potential SALT agreement can be readily predicted from the
press reports of some highly credible newspaper correspondents. See, e.g., Beecher, U.S.
Urges Soviets to Join in a Missiles Moratorium, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1971, at 1, col. 6;
Roberts, A SALT Agreement Near at Hand #, Washington Post, Oct. 6, 1971, § A, at 1, col.
4; Marder, Supra note 3, at 8, col. 1. Estimates of Soviet land-based and sea-based missile
strength are reported in Beecher, Laird Warns of Soviet Missile Buildup Far Ea:ceeding His
Earlier Estimates, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1971, at 5, col. 3; Beecher, Satellites Spot a Soviet
Buildup for Atomic Arms, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1971, at 1, col. 8; Getler, Sub Goals of
Russia Puzzle U.S., Washington Post, Nov. 23, 1971, § A, at 2, col. 8.
... " The United States and the Soviet Union appear to have agreed to postpone placing
limitations on SLBM's at this time. Gwertzman, Niazon Says Soviet and U.S. Define Pact on
Missiles, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1972, at 1, col. 1. This negative position on submarine restric-
tions has undoubtedly been influenced by the Soviet Union's inferiority in sea-based deter-
rent capabilities. See T. Smith, Submarine Missile Impasse Said to Persist in Vienna, N.Y.
Times, Jan; 12, 1972, at 6, col. 5. The possibility of SLBM limits as a second step in SALT
1S discussed in the text accompanying notes 28–29 infra.
* A description of the factors leading to the American MIRV decision can be found in
% º,The NUCLEAR YEARS ; THE ARMs RACE AND ARMs Control, 1945–1970, at
4.18
ability Of ABM's, and, in the context of SALT, have adopted the view that
ABM's are destabilizing and should be limited to a low level."
In principle, it would be possible to design a SALT agreement which banned
large-scale ABM's but permitted each side to deploy thin ABM systems com-
parable to the United States Sentinel or full Safeguard configurations. Such
Systems would have nationwide coverage, contain perhaps 1,000 defensive launch-
ers, and involve a widespread network of ABM radars. In practice, however, the
presence Of Such negotiated ABM’s would undercut most of the benefits of a
SALT agreement. The uncertain effectiveness of the opponent's thin System,
Coupled With the fear that such a system could be rapidly expanded into a more
extensive ABM, would tend to stimulate offensive countermeasures on each side.
EVen with the most careful attempts to formulate equitable and vertifiable ABM
limits, the resultant relationship would be unstable because of each nation’s
desire to maintain a high degree of confidence in its relatiatory capability.
Primarily for these reasons, both the United States and the Soviet Union have
decided within the Scope of the SALT negotiations to work toward more stringent
ABM limits of the kind de Scribed above.
With nationwide ABM defenses prohibited, both sides will have to rely on
their Offensive forces to deter China. However, the case for anti-Chinese missile
defenses is highly questionable on both military and political grounds, and there
is little reason to doubt the reliability of applying a retaliatory deterrent policy
against China.” Both sides would retain sufficient weapons under the limited
SALT agreement to deter China without detracting from their capabilities to
deter each other, since the Chinese missile force will remain small and relatively
Vulnerable for the next decade. Thus, the United States and the Soviet Union
have little to lose and much to gain in permanently agreeing to forgo thin ABM's
in order to stabilize the bilateral balance.”
The COmmon interest in imposing Strict COntrols Over ABM's has been reflected
in both nations’ reluctance to permit deployment under a SALT agreement of
extensive ABM defenses around missile Sites. Even though Such defense Systems
may theoretically be designed to protect ICBM's and enhance stability, there
appears to be a COmmon concern that these deployments would nonetheless
provide population protection and could be seen as the first step toward a
nationwide ABM system. More specifically, the Soviets may fear that the United
States Safeguard System will afford population COverage because its components
were originally designed for city defense and the second phase of the President’s
original program called for nationwide expansion. The United States may be
concerned that the proximity of many Soviet ICBM sites to population centers
would create an appreciable “overlap” if the Soviets were to deploy ABM’s at
missile sites.
With stringent limits placed on ABM's, therefore, the requirements for the
United States and the Soviet Union to improve or enlarge their Offensive forces
would diminish. Limits on ABM's alone could thus dampen the competition as
each side gained assurance that the prospect of large ABM deployments On the
other side need no longer dominate unilateral strategic planning. At the Same
time, with ABM's limited through agreement, both sides would be more Willing
to consider moving toward mutual offensive limitations. With the premise that
7. The Soviet announcement of December, 1969, following the first phase of SALT in
Helsinki, was interpreted to mean that the Soviets had accepted the idea of mutual deter-
rence. Sée Roberts, U.S., Russia Agree on Full SALT Talks, Washington Post, Deç, 23, 1969,
§ A, at 1, col. 3. In December of 1970, the Soviets proposed that ABM's be limited to the
protection of Washington, and Moscow, only. See Roberts, Soviets Propose ABM Limit,
Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1971, § A, at 1, col. 2. In July of 1971, the Soviets demonstrated
not only that they were opposed to large-scale ABM deployments, but also that they appre:
ciated the validity of the action-reaction phenomenon, as it pertains to the ABM. See
Viktorov, Some Résults and Prospects—On the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Pravda,
July 7, 1971, at 4. This attitude was officially confirmed by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko in a policy statement before the United Nations General Assembly On Septem-
ber 28, 1971. See N.Y. Times, Sent. 29, 1971, at 2, col. 4.
8 Most China scholars share this view. See, e.g., A. BARNETT, A NEW U.S. POLICY TOWARD
CHINA ch. 7 (1971). & Ҽ & g * * * * *
9 Defense Secretary Laird has stated that “[t]he U.S. has indicated a willingness to
modify the long-range plans for full safeguard area defense . . . if an acceptable arms
control agreement with the Soviet Union can be reached.” Statement of Secretary of Defense
Melvin R. Laird on the Fiscal Year 1972–76 Defense Program, and the 1972 Defense Budget
Before the House Armed Services Committee, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 73 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as Statement of Secretary of Defense Laird]. This position is consistent not
only with recent United States proposals at SALT, but also with the original United States
proposal which included ABM limits of fewer than 100 launchers. See T. Smith, U.S. Offers
Soviet Package Accord to Curb Missiles, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1970, at 7, col. 2 [here-
inafter cited as Smith]. The Soviets, it might be noted, have never publicly advocated an
“anti-Chinese” ABM.
419
ABM's will in fact be restricted, let us now explore the significance of ICBM
limitations at SALT.
From the American viewpoint, it would be militarily useful to limit the number
Of Soviet ICBM's, even though MIRV’s were not banned. The Soviet Union has
tested multiple or “clustered” warheads, but has not yet demonstrated a MIRV
Capability and could not acquire an advanced MIR system before the late 1970’s.”
Estimates show that a Soviet SS—9 force of approximately 500 missiles outfitted
With a MIRV package of three multi-megaton warheads could pose a serious
threat to the survivability of our land-based Minuteman force.” However, to
acquire a comparable capability with some 300 SS—9 ICBM's as limited by agree-
ment, the Soviets would have to develop a more sophisticated package con-
taining five Or six single-megaton warheads of even greater accuracy. These addi-
tional technological demands could delay the date by which the Soviet Union
might develop a counterforce MIRV capacity and increase the life expectancy
of our Minuteman force.* This would give United States planners more time
to develop effective countermeasures to protect Our ICBM's Or, in the likely event
that such measures were not forthcoming, find ways of coping with this problem
within the framework of future SALT discussions—a point which will be treated
more fully below.
On broader political grounds, strategic offensive limitations can have consid-
erable utility. The President has already expressed concern Over the possible
adverse foreign policy consequences of nuclear parity.” Thus, United States lead-
ers would feel increasingly uncomfortable if the Soviets continued to deploy
ICBM's at the current rate and showed signs of building toward a level of per-
haps 2,000 ICBM's. In such a circumstance, the United States might be forced
into the procurement of additional offensive systems to prevent the “apparent
balance” from shifting too dramatically against it—even if such actions were
not necessitated by military calculations. While acknowledging that Small changes
in the strategic relationship are not significant and that neither side could easily
obtain a first-strike capability, President Nixon, it should be recalled, has em-
phasized that the United States would respond to any substantial Soviet effort
to alter the balance.* However, pressures for new United States Systems might
be contained if the Soviets agreed to halt their ICBM constructions as called for
10 Defense Secretary Laird estimated that the accuracy of the SS—9 multiple warhead
system “. . . could be substantially improved by 1975/76.” Statement of Secretary of
Defense Laird, Supra note 9, at 46. Technical studies sponsored by the Pentagon and the
CIA in the spring of 1971 reportedly concluded that “[i]t would take the Soviets two or
three more years to perfect and begin deployment of a more accurate MIRV . . . and
several more years to equip the entire force of SS-9s [with these systems].” Getler,
Russian Missile Faulted, Washington Post, June 17, 1971, § A, at 15, col. 1. More recently,
in early 1972 Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, testified
that the Soviets might not be able to deploy an effective MIRV system until 1980. See
Beecher, Soviet Missile Peril, N.Y. Times. Mar. 22, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
11 For example, Dr. Foster, in a UPI interview, estimated that such a Soviet force, if
launched against our Minuteman sites, would leave very few ICBM's surviving, probably
fewer than 100, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1969, at 15, col. 1. The more widely known figure of
420 Soviet ICBM's has also been presented by Dr. Foster and Defense Secretary Laird as
potentially endangering the survivability of our Minuteman force.
* It is difficult to be more precise in offering such a judgment. Indeed, as indicated by
Dr. Foster, there is substantial disagreement within the United States government over the
details of the future Soviet MIRV threat and its effect on Minuteman ICBM survivability.
See Beecher, Supra note 10. Nongovernmental experts question the Administration’s analy-
Ses, and Scientists differ among themselves. Survivability calculations are extremely
dependent upon assumptions regarding the reliability and accuracy of Soviet warheads,
the number of warheads permissible, and , the number of SS-9's available. Alternative
assumptions can lead to wide variations in calculating Minuteman survivability for a
given Soviet threat—anywhere from 50 to 300 ICBM's remaining, for example. Nonethe-
less, one cannot escape the conclusion that the USSR could acquire the capacity severely to
endanger, our Minuteman force before the end of the decade. For an informative report
Showing in detail how analyses of the MIRV threat can differ, see STAFF of SUEcoMM. on
NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATION OF THE SENATE Comm. on Govºr N.
MENT OPERATIONs, 91st CoNG., 1st SESs., PLANNING-PROGRAMMING-BUDGETING, DEFENSE
ANALYSIS : 2 EXAMPLES (Comm. Print 1969).
* In his second Foreign Policy Message, President Nixon acknowledged that the Soviet
Union had reached a Strategic position “comparable” to that of the United States and
expressed CQIncern, that this growth of power ". . . could tempt Soviet leaders into bolder
challenges. It could lead them to underestimate the risks of certain policies.” R. Nixon,
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, FOR THE 1970’s: BUILDING FOR PEACE, H.R. Doc. No. 53, 92d Cong.
1st, Sess. 159 (1971). [hereinafter cited as Nixon].
*In a press, conference on October 12, 1971, President Nixon observed that neither
the United States nor the Soviet Union would be able to get such a decisive advantage
over the other 8. Would enable it to launch a preemptive strike or engage in international
blackmail. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1971, at 18, col. 6. But in his second Foreign Policy address,
the President warned that the Soviet Union... . . should be under no iliision that we wi
not respond to major, quantitative and qualitative improvements which threaten to upset
the strategic balance.” NIxon, supra note 13, at 171.
420
under SALT. American officials could justify acceptance of a Soviet edge of 500–
600 ICBM's by pointing to our undisputed lead in long-range bombers, numbers
of warheads, and overall force quality. Of crucial signifiance is Our advantage
in MIRV technology which will enable us to retain an overwhelming Superiority
in sea-based missile deterrent power through the 1970's, even if the Soviets
gain a numerical lead in SLBM's.”
The Soviet Union would also derive benefits from ICBM limitations at SALT.
Although the United States is already installing MIRV’s on Poseidon and Min-
uteman missiles, the accuracy of these small-yield weapons would have to be
substantially improved to pose a counterforce threat to Soviet hardened ICBM's.
Moreover, the United States has officially cancelled its “hard-target kill” pro-
gram and forsworn efforts to develop such a capability.” But Soviet planners
would be understandably reluctant to rely on pledges and might nonetheless
assume that we will acquire a counterforce MIRV potential Within the next
five years. In particular, the Soviet Union might fear that the United States will
build additional, more powerful offensive missile systems in the 1970's designed
for counterforce purposes. Soviet leaders could thus conclude that placing nu-
merical limits on American land-based missiles would at least prevent the
United States from pursuing this course.
More importantly, on a policy level, Soviet leaders might find a freeze at 1972
ICBM levels an effective way of maximizing their nuclear position at minimum
cost without risking a massive United States counterresponse which could
negate ther strategic gains. Under such an agreement, the Soviet Union’s ICBM
advantage would remain, and, as a result of its rapid progress in Submarine
construction, the Soviets could be assured of attaining at least a level of parity
in SLBM's by the mid-1970's. This would provide Moscow with a sufficient mili-
tary deterrent, as well as a force signifying political power.”
B. Relative Risk:S
The preceding discussion underscores the fact that an initial SALT agreement
would not be without defects and difficulties. The agreement would leave large
areas Of the strategic Offensive arms Competition unconstrained. No Controls
would be placed Over research and development programs, and qualitative im-
provement of existing Systems would be permitted. Thus, both sides would be
free to install MIRV’s with improved accuracies. Moreover, the number of
strategic bombers would not be restricted, and, in all probability, new offensive
missile Systems would be deployed. On a one-for-One basis to replace existing
systems. Perhaps the most serious strategic defect Of the agreement is the fact
that, with MIRV’s permitted and defense of missile sites prohibited, fixed ICBM
forces on both sides will become increasingly vulnerable. More generally, codi-
fication of the strategic balance through SALT could pose potential problems to
the United States and the West if the Soviets mistakenly perceive this relation-
Ship as a foundation for taking greater diplomatic and military risks.
Despite its imperfections, however, the limited SALT agreement—indeed any
arms control agreement—should be evaluated by comparison against the fu-
ture situation which would be expected to arise in the absence of mutual limi-
tation measures. Such a “relative risk” analysis attempts to answer the ques-
tion of whether the United States strategic posture will, on balance, be im-
proved Or degraded as a result of the SALT agreement.
Let us consider the strategic environment which is likely to emerge in the late
1970's if SALT fails. Without mutual limits placed on ABM's, it is likely that
both the United States and the Soviet Union will, at a minimum, deploy thin
* The Soviets have difficulty maintaining a sea-based deterrent comparable to ours
because of their geographic position vis-à-vis the United States and the fact that they are
almost a generation behind us in missile-firing submarine technology. The Soviet Union's
“Y-class” submarine missile, it should be recalled, resembles the American Polaris A–1
missile of the early 1960's, while the United States is presently deploying, the MIRVed
Poseidon missile and developing ULMS-a new underwater long-range missile system.
The new Soviet SLBM under development has a range comparable to Poseidon but is not
MIRVed, reported William Beecher in Soviet May Have New Missile in '72, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 3, 1971, at 7, Col. 1. -
* In response to Congressional pressure, the Pentagon cancelled a $12 million program
#9 improve missile accuracies, and in a letter to Senator Brooke, President Nixon stated :
There is no current U.S. program to develop a hard-target MIRV capability.” Washington
Post. April 24, 1970. § A, at 1, col. 2.
* For a thoughtful and balanced discussion of Moscow’s motives in entering the SALT
negotiations and the possible effects of an agreement on Soviet behavior, see T. Wolfº
SoviPT Power AND EUROPE : 1945–1970 ch. 18 (1970).
421
nationwide defensive systems.” Faced with the likelihood of. expanded Soviet
ABM jº evidence Of Soviet movements in this direction, the United
States would almost surely take actions to increase the survivable power Of its
deterrent force by deploying new generation offensive systems, such as the under-
Water long-range missile system (ULMS), and protecting its ICBM's with “hard
point” ABM Systems. The level of United States strategic spending could rise
by as much as $3 to 5 billion annually.” The Soviet Union, in turn, would probably
increase its Offensive missile deployments well beyond the present levels and
emphasize advanced MIRV’s.
The presence of a nationwide Soviet ABM network of uncertain effectiveness,
and its potential for growth, would introduce uncertainties in estimates Of the
ability Of Our strategic offensive forces to inflict retaliatory damage on the Soviet
Union. It would be particularly difficult for United States planners to perform
reliable calculations which demonstrated that our forces could survive and im-
pose a Specified level. Of SOviet population fatalities, given a variety of assump-
tions regarding Soviet force levels, weapons performance, and attack strate-
gies. Perhaps most significantly the deployment of Soviet ABM's could cause
American leaders to fear that the Credibility Of Our Sea-based deterrent had been
Substantially weakened. The existence of a large Soviet Offensive force would
COmpound the problem. While free to take Countermeasures without arms con-
trol Constraints, the United States could not ensure that its ICBM force would
remain invulnerable through the decade ahead, for there may be no reliable,
COst-effective way of protecting American ICBM's against a Soviet MIRV
threat.” At best, any increased surviving ICBM capacity which might be ob-
tained through protective countermeasures would be offset by the attritive
characteristics of an enlarged Soviet nationwide ABM system.
In the context of SALT, on the other hand, our deterrent posture would remain
highly reliable throughout the decade. Although an initial agreement would not
elminate the threat to our ICBM's, with Soviet ABM's severely constrained,
United States Sea-based forces alone could be assured of inflicting at least 25 per-
cent retaliatory damage upon the Soviet Union’s population. Soviet antisub-
marine warfare (ASW) threats are not imminent, and signs of Soviet progress
could be countered by qualitative improvements in the Polaris submarine fleet,
extending the range of the Poseidon SLBM, Or, if necessary, building ULMS as
a replacement for present sea-based forces.” Bomber capabilities, which would
not be controlled, would provide diversity and thereby increase confidence in Our
deterrent. Put another way, a strategic situation in which a dual deterrent of
American SLBM’s and bombers faced Only a token Soviet ABM capacity is to be
preferred over a situation in which we might be able to maintain a marginal triple
deterrent—but at the price of permitting the Soviets to deploy large numbers of
ABM’S.
Economic Savings from the limited type of agreement we might expect to arise
out of SALT would tend to flow from future expenditures forgone, rather than
from appreciable cuts in current levels of spending. By constraining the Soviet
Offensive missile threat and by restricting ABM's On both SideS, an agreement
which placed quantitative limits on American and Soviet forces would prevent a
major increase in United States strategic expenditures. On the other hand, con-
18 Many factors would move both sides in this direction, including the perceived need
to counter Nth country missile threats and the desire to match or surpass the other side’s
defenses. Pressures for the ABM within the United States and the Soviet Union would be
difficult to counteract if the other side's strategic forces were unrestrained.
19 For a discussion of strategic weapons and budget issues and an analysis of possible
future United States strategic expenditures, see C. SCHULTZE, A. R.I.VLIN, E. FRIED, & N.
TEETERs, SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES : THE 1972 BUDGET chs. 3–4 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as SCHULTZE].
* Even Defense Secretary Laird, acknowledged that the planned Safeguard deployment
might not provide adequate protection for our ICBM's and indicated that the United States
is investigating alternative ways of preventing these missiles from becoming vulnerable—
including improved “hard site” ABM's, “super-hardening” of ICBM sites, and land-mobile
systems. See Statement of Secretary of Defense Laird, supra note 9, at 71. However, many
experts argue that none of these alternatives can provide effective protection for our
ICBM's. See, e.g., York, Military Technology and National Security, 221 SCIENTIFIC AMERI-
CAN 17 (Aug. 1969).
* In early 1971 Defense. Secretary Laird acknowledged that there was “no immediate
concern” over the survivability of our Polaris and Poseidon submarines, but observed that
the Soviets are working on new ASW techniques. Statement of Defense Secretary Laird,
supra note 9, at 68. Scientific opinion supports the view that “breakthroughs” in ASW are
extremely unlikely to occur during the next decade, given the complexity of the problem
and the availability of offensive countermeasures. For a summary of antisubmarine war-
fare, see INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIEs, STRATEGIC SURVEY : 1970, at 12–17 (1971).
422
tinuation of programs which were not affected by the agreement, permissible
replacements Of Obsolescent Systems, and increased emphasis on readiness and
monitoring programs would make it unlikely that the United States could sub-
Stantially reduce the annual strategic arms budget.
A SALT agreement would, of course, introduce a new uncertainty into the
Strategic equation—the possibility that the Soviets might violate its terms or
abrogate the accord and mount a massive buildup in an attempt to gain advantage.
But these dangers must be put into perspective in evaluating relative risks.
TO begin with, the United States would be able to verify the agreed restrictions
With a high degree Of confidence through national means. The number Of deployed
ICBM's, SLBM's, and ABM's can be estimated quite accurately, without Onsite
inspection ; indeed this is done as a matter Of course by the Department of De-
fense in planning our strategic forces. The Soviets could attempt to conceal their
deployment activities, but this would involve considerable technical difficulties
and cost as well as a high risk of discovery.” In addition, it is not clear why the
Soviets would necessarily be driven to attempt to conceal their missile deploy-
ments under an arms control agreement and not try to do so in the absence of
arms control constraints. On the contrary, a case can be made that the Soviets
would have less incentive to do SO in the COntext Of a mutual agreement Which
explicitly commits them to certain arrangements. And there would be little payoff
for the Soviets in undertaking an evasion program unless they could be reason-
ably certain of gaining a meaningful advantage—a most unlikely proSpect.
Even with a delay in Our capacity to detect, we could be certain of identifying
Soviet violations before they became Significant enough to pose a threat to Our
deterrent Or to dramatically alter the numerical balance. The most WOrrisome
prospect for Soviet cheating lies in the area of ABM's, since successful clandestine
efforts to upgrade missile defenses Could pose a Serious threat to Our retaliatory
deterrent capacity. With Stringent limitations placed on ABM’s and assóciated
radars, however, it is highly improbable that the Soviets could successfully con-
ceal deployments of substantial numbers of ABM launchers leading to a meaning-
ful defensive capacity or convert air defense Systems into substantial missile
defense functions without early detection by the United States. In general, with
Our MIRV’s fully deployed and continued qualitative improvement of all Systems,
We would have a cushion against uncertainties and could tolerate delay and
ambiguity in detecting possible Soviet violations. Consequently, the Soviets would
not be able to rapidly deploy defensive Or Offensive systems after a Sudden
abrogation on such a scale that our security would be threatened before we could
take appropriate Counteractions.
Finally, “relative risk” analyses can be performed On a political as well as mili-
tary level. Although the initial agreement would codify the Soviet Union's posi-
tion. Of nuclear parity, American deterrent forces should be sufficient to dissuade
the Soviet Union from attempting to exploit its strategic power for purposes of
blackmail or coercion. Not Only would Our strategic forces retain the clear capac-
ity to inflict catastrophic damage, but, On an Overall basis, Our strategic posture
WOuld remain numercially comparable to that Of the Soviets. This makes it im-
probable that Kremlin leaders would underestimate either the capabilities Of Our
forces Or the Willingness of the United States to protect its interests. Nonetheless,
having overcome its past position of strategic inferiority, there is still the possi-
bility that the Soviet Union might see the changed nuclear balance as enabling it
to pursue an aggressive foreign policy. However, the strategic relationship in the
absence of agreed limitations would not necessarily be more desirable from the
American viewpoint. Even with a major increase in expenditures, the United
States could not regain strategic superiority, and an uncontrolled arms race
might WOrk to Our disadvantage. At best, we would remain equal and be con-
fronted with whatever problems parity may bring.
In sum, measured against military and political criteria, a limited SALT agree-
ment appears to be in the net United States interest. Undoubtedly, the United
States would always be able to retain an adequate nuclear posture. But Our
strategic deterrent could be maintained under a SALT agreement with greater
confidence and at less cost than would otherwise be the case. This conclusion is
further strengthened by the realization that the initial agreement can be im-
* An excellent analysis of United States verification capabilities as applied to a SALT
agreement can be found in Scoville, Verification of Nuclear Arms Limitations, 26 BULL.
OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 6 (Oct. 1970). It might be noted that the relative difficulty of
Verifying a MIRV ban in contrast to launcher limitations is perhaps the major factor
responsible for the probable exclusion of MIRV’s from the initial SALT accord.
423
proved through further mutual United States-Soviet efforts—an issue treated in
the following Section.
III. IMPROVING THE AGREEMENT
The foregoing discussion highlighted the fact that only minimal constraints
would be placed on American and Soviet strategic offensive systems under the
terms Of the initial agreement. Although many new weapons programs and
improvements can be stabilizing—for example, more secure sea-based systems and
“hardening” of ICBM's—an uncontrolled continuation of the arms competition
Within the bounds of agreement could make it difficult for the United States and
the Soviet Union substantially to ease tensions, and, even more worrisome, could
Call into question the strategic value of the initial agreement. How can the bene-
fits of SALT be assured in light of these problems?
A. Basic Approaches
The modalities of the initial agreement can be designed to provide flexibility
and facilitate change. For example, the United States and the Soviet Union
might Set a limit of perhaps three years on the agreement, at which time this
“interim” arrangement would lapse unless renewed and possibly modified by
both parties. Moreover, the agreement itself could take a variety of forms, rang-
ing from an informal understanding to a formal accord. A combined arrange-
ment cOuld be reached, with ABM's limited by treaty and offensive weapons con-
Strained through a less formal measure, such as an exchange of letters, which
could be more easily modified.”
Whatever the form of the initial agreement—and whether it is structured in
One Or two parts—it will undoubtedly contain a clause enabling either side to
Withdraw from the arrangement at any time if its Supreme national interests
are jeopardized. The Overarching objective of both sides, however, should be to en-
Sure that neither side exercises the withdrawal option. This, in turn, requires
mutual efforts to maintain and modify the initial measure as necessary.
Once an initial agreement is effected, therefore, it would be advisable for
the United States and the Soviet Union immediately to organize a mechanism
for continuous meetings, perhaps forming a standing Joint Commission. Through
this mechanism, the parties could monitor the agreement by discussing the
precise interpretations of restrictions and clarifying actions by either side which
might otherwise generate false alarms regarding compliance.” Equally im-
portant, the Commission COuld be used as a basis for substantive discussions
Of future stability problems and an examination of specific way of improving the
agreement—much like the exploratory phase of SALT.”
Within the framework Of the SAIAT Commission, systematic attempts should
be made to minimize uncertainty and maximize stability as both sides con-
tinue to pursue strategic weapons activities which are not prohibited by the
basic agreement. For example, one side could notify the other in advance of de-
Velopmental testing programs and future force procurement plans as permitted
by the agreement. Perhaps mutually agreed guidelines could be established to
assist both sides in making unilateral strategic force decisions which would not
be viewed by the Other side as threatening. Both parties might also reach an
understanding not to replace existing Systems On a One-to-One basis, but to work
toward postures which contained fewer offensive forces of greater survivability.
Agreed procedures could be followed in implementing such a “mutual moderniza-
tion” program, with prior notification and approval of planned replacements.
Going beyond a strategic dialogue and tacit rules of restraint, specific weapons
control measures could be formally negotiated. It may, in fact, prove necessary
to reach explicit agreements in order to achieve results.” A variety of measures
COuld be COnsidered.
28 Reports now indicate that the first-stage SALT accord will probably take this form.
See Doder, U.S. Seeks Arms Pact Financing, Washington Post, Mar. 10, 1972, § A, at 1,
col. 8. For a comprehensive treatment of precedents for informal agreements, as well as an
analysis of the alternative forms a SALT agreement might take and the role Congress might
play, see Bunn, Missile Limitation: By Treaty or Otherwise, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1970).
24. It would be desirable for both sides to reach an “anti-jamming” understanding wherein
each would agree not to interfere with the unilateral verification capabilities of the other—
notably reconnaissance satellites and externally based radars.
25 It would be preferable to initiate these discussions on a working level immediately, and
not wait until the agreement is about to lapse or until one side threatens to abrogate.
Indeed, it would be advantageous if both sides could agree to establish such a commission in
the context of negotiating the initial agreement. This would more firmly commit the
parties to the agreement to the task of preserving the stability of SALT.
26 For a discussion of the inherent difficulties in holding a productive American-Soviet
strategic dialogue, the need for explicit agreement, and a description of an informal “recip-
rocal action” procedure, see Kahan, Strategies for SALT, 23 WORLD POLITICS 171 (1971).
424
To begin with, there could be an agreement simply to reduce obsolescent sys-
tems. Such a mutual “bonfire” could be more politically acceptable than uni-
lateral moves to phase Out Obsolete programs. Under such an arrangement, for
example, the United States could eliminate its 54 Titan ICBM’s while the Soviet
Union phased out a fraction of its force of 220 older-generation land-based
missiles.
Of more strategic significance, the United States and the Soviet Union could
agree to extend the limits of the initial SALT agreement to cover categories of
Offensive systems not Originally included. The first Order of business might be
the issue of placing limits on numbers of SLBM’s as well as ICBM's.
Strategic policy experts consider sea-based missiles to be stabilizing, since
these systems are highly Survivable and best Suited for retaliatory rather than
first-strike missions. From this perspective, the Soviet Union's SLBM buildup
should not alarm American defense analysts. Nonetheless, American Officials are
concerned that the growing Soviet Polaris-type Submarine fleet Will pOSe an
increased threat to the survivability Of Our bomber.S. Pentagon planners fear
that SOviet SLBM’s launched from close range can reduce the warning time
needed to permit Our B-52 forces to become airborne before they are destroyed
On their bases. Limiting the number of Soviet SLBM's would diminish this
threat and enable American planners to take more effective COUntermeasures to
preserve our bomber deterrent.”
On the all-important political level, if the Soviets acquired a Submarine force
substantially larger than ours, surpassing us in numbers of SLBM’s and ICBM's,
American leaders might not view Our advantage in warheads and bombers as
adequate offsetting factor. Indeed, the Secretary of Defense recently stated
that the United States would be placed at a “very great political disadvan-
tage” if the Soviet Union gained superiority in missile-firing submarines,”
he thus requested, for fiscal year 1973, funds of almost $1 billion to accelerate
the ULMS program, primarily as a means of forestalling such an imbalance.”
Thus, even if Soviet ICBM’s were limited, the United States might be motivated
to build additional Strategic Offensive forces in Order to counter the Soviets’
Overriding numerical missile advantage. For example, the United States might
move even more rapidly to deploy the ULMS sea-based system than military
reasons alone would dictate, introducing this weapon as a supplement to, rather
than a substitute for, the existing Polaris fleet. But, if the Soviet Submarine
deployments were constrained by a SALT agreement, United States policy con-
Cerns would be alleviated and the procurement of strategic systems for purely
political purposes would be less likely to arise.
Although opposed to initial limitations on sea-based missiles, Soviet negotiators
might accept an agreement at a later date which permitted them to complete
all units under construction and led to a numerically superior Soviet SLBM
force. Such a measure would seem to be in the Soviet Union’s interest for two
reasons. First, it would provide the SOviet Union with a sea-based deterrent Of
Sufficient size to Offset its geographic and technical inferiorities, and Soviet
leaders WOuld have the Option of eventually installing MIRVed missles in
their Submarines. Second, it would prevent the United States from adding to
its sea-based strength by introducing ULMS as a supplement to the present
fleet Of 41 Polaris Submarines. This would not only minimize the military
threat from the United States, but cement Soviet superiority in overall numbers
Of missiles. -
As a further step, numerical limits could then be placed on strategic bombers.
Soviet inferiority in this area suggests that such a measure would not be
negotiable, but the United States might be prepared to accept a bomber limit
of 250—the number of B–1 aircraft which might eventually replace our present
500-unit B-52 force—in return for a Soviet agreement not to increase their
present force Of 200 long-range bombers. An attempt could also be made to set
a ceiling On Soviet intermediate- and medium-range missiles and medium-range
* In his Fiscal Year 1972 Defense Report,...Secretary Laird outlined a number of meas-
ures to be taken to increase the survivability of our bombers, notably dispersal of bases,
introducing a rapid-start capability for the B-52's, and deploying a radar warning system
against Soviet SLBM's. See Statement of Secretary of Defense Laird, supra note 9, at
66, 70.
28 ºther, Laird Says Soviet Rushes Sub Fleet, Washington Post, Oct. 14, 1971, § A, at
13, Col. 1.
* Getler & Wilson, Laird to Press Rise in Spending, Washington Post, Feb. 16, 1972,
§ A, at 1, col. 1.
425
bombers in return for the United States accepting some limits on numbers of
forward-based tactical aircraft deployed in Western Europe and On aircraft
carriers. This issue created a deadlock earlier in SALT, but after gaining the
experience and confidence of a working agreement, some accommodation might
be found.
Specific constraints could also be placed on air-defense Systems, including
prohibitions against modernizing existing bomber defense networks, as Well as
agreed reductions of surface-to-air missiles (SAM’s) and associated radars.
Such measures would contribute to stability by alleviating concerns On each
side that the other side might “upgrade” its air-defense system and acquire a
clandestine ABM capability in violation of the basic agreement. MoreoVer, they
would help ensure the reliability of both sides' bomber deterrent forces—an
objective which could become increasingly desirable as ICBM's become less
Survivable.
Looking further ahead, although there seems to be no cause for concern OVer
ASW “breakthroughs,” selected restrictions might be added to the basic agree-
ment as a means of reducing mutual fears over the possibility that sea-based Sys-
tems might become increasingly vulnerable toward the end of the decade. For
example, an agreement could be reached whereby neither side's nuclear-powered
attack Submarines are permitted to cross an agreed and monitored SOmar barrier.
In principle, this measure would permit both sides to maintain a reliable deterrent
force with their offensive ballistic missile submarines while preventing attack
Submarines from crossing into areas behind the barrier and posing an immediate
threat to the other side's offense. As a complementary measure, a limit could
be placed on the number of hunter-killer submarines each side might deploy.
B. ICBM Vulnerability: A Specific Case
Perhaps the most obvious issue for bilateral attempts to improve the initial
SALT agreement concerns the problem of future ICBM vulnerability. American
Officials have raised the possibility that the existence of Vulnerable ICBM's
could create instabilities which might lead to a breakdown of deterrence in a
time Of tension. Even if Our Sea-based forces and bombers remained Secure and
Capable of inflicting high levels of damage, it is argued, there might be some
incentive for the Soviets to launch a first-strike against Our land-based missiles.
In a severe crisis, for example, Kremlin leaders, fearing that the United States
was about to fire its ICBM's, might decide on such an action in an attempt to
limit damage to their country. By withholding their sea-based Systems and
bombers as a direct threat to Our population, the SOviets might believe that we
woud be inhibited from mounting a retaliatory response. Furthermore, the
United States is apparently reluctant to adopt a “launch On warning” doctrine
as a Way Of preventing Our ICBM's from being destroyed in a Surprise attack,
Since this would tend to increase the risk Of inadvertent missile launchings. For
these reasons, the United States has adopted “crisis stability” as a criterion for
deterrence, and has already taken actions to enhance the survivability of its
ICBM's through silo hardening and ABM defenses.”
The initial SALT agreement, as pointed out earlier, would prohibit meaningful
Safeguard ABM protection of Our Minuteman force. Consistent with its “crisis
stability” objective, however, the United States might seek to modify the agree-
ment to permit additional protective measures for Minuteman, possibly including
deployment Of “hard point” defenses Specifically designed to defend missile Silos.
If faced with no other choice, rather than retain vulnerable systems, the United
States might decide to reduce and possibly eliminate its ICBM force, but might
hesitate to do SO unilaterally since this would leave the Soviets with a massive
mon Opoly in land-based missiles, thereby Shifting the numerical missile balance
against this nation. Moreover, because deterrence must Operate On a bilateral
* As stated by Defense Secretary Laird, one of the Administration's four official “criteria
for sufficiency” is to provide “. . . no incentive for the Soviet Union to strike the United
States first in a crisis.” Statement of Defense Secretary Laird, supra note 9, at 62. The
President and senior United States officials apparently interpret this objective to mean that
the United States must, not permit its ICBM force to become vulnerable and have specif-
ically rejected the possibility of a “launch-on-warning” doctrine as indicated by the Presi-
dent's Second Foreign Policy Message. Nixon, supra note 13, at 170–73. See also Beecher,
Niazon Questions Atomic Strategy, N.Y., Times, Oct. 20, 1970, at 6, col. 1. Nongovernmentai
experts have further questioned the logic of the “crisis stability” criterion, arguing that the
Administration's scenarios for Soviet attacks against our ICBM's are implausible, and
concluding...that, we need not protect, our ICBM's because our sea-based missile forces
º º: deterrence. A discussion of these issues can be found in Schul.TZE, supra
note 19, a -ºr ex .
426
basis, stability could be similarly endangered if the Soviet Union's ICBM force
became vulnerable. Thus, the United States would find it useful—if not eSSen-
tial—to obtain Soviet cooperation and reciprocity in Seeking Solutions to the
ICBM problem.
However, the Soviet Union may not share these American objectives Or COn-
cerns, and may be reluctant to accept American proposals for ICBM reductions
or protective arrangements. Kremlin leaders put far greater Stock in ICBM's than
do their counterparts in the United States, and this may help explain their deci-
sion to build a force of over 1,600 ICBM's—possibly at the expense Of Other mili-
tary systems. The Soviets apparently see ICBM's as a sign Of political power, and
may view their advantage in ICBM's as a counterweight to our advantage in Sea-
based SLBM effectiveness as well as our substantial edge in Strategic bomber
capabilities. Soviet planners may also be constructing a large land-based missile
capacity as a means of acquiring a counterforce capability against the American
Minuteman force—if not part of a first-strike doctrine, then simply Out Of the
prudential desire to be in a superior “warfighting” position. Furthermore, Soviet
planners may not fear our counterforce threat as much as we fear theirs, and, in
any event, may favor different countermeasures. For example, the Soviets seem
to consider land-mobile ICBM's a feasible alternative to fixed land-based missiles,
but the United States has tended to dismiss this Option for a variety of technical
and domestic political reasons. And the “superhardening” of Soviet ICBM's—
which may already be under way—could be quite effective against Small Ameri-
can missile warheads, while strengthening the hardness of American missile Silos
will not bring long-term protective benefits against a Soviet MIRVed force Of
high yield, accurate Warheads.
Even if both sides could agree on the problem and the solutions, practical tech-
nical and verification problems would arise in formulating mutual arrangements
for ICBM protection. Consider, for example, attempts to design an agreement per-
mitting both sides to deploy equivalent “hard-point” ABM systems to defend their
ICBM's which, at the same time, would not appear as a first step to an area ABM.
Among the ideas generated for satisfying these objectives are Schemes wherein the
United States would deploy a newly developed short-range defense System at a
designated number of Minuteman sites in the Midwest while the Soviets would
deploy their ABM system east of the Ural Mountains, removed from the highly
dense population centers of Western Russia. Such an arrangement might be negoti-
able in principle, but it would surely take substantial time and effort to consum-
mate compared to the simpler agreementS COntained in an initial SALT measure.
Because Of the many asymmetries in American and SOviet Strategic forces and
attitudes, it will undoubtedly be difficult to negotiate a formal Solution to the
problem Of ICBM vulnerability. However, it might be possible to apply the leSS
formal procedure Of influencing unilateral actions through SALT.
In addressing the ICBM issue, for example, both sides could attempt to identify
a set of mutually acceptable measures which were designed to improve the sur-
vivability of each side's land-based missiles but which would not be viewed by the
other side as endangering its deterrent. In conjunction with formulating rules for
protective measures, the United States could introduce “freedom to mix” provi-
Sions which would permit each side to vary its proportion. Of land- and sea-based
missiles within an agreed overall limit—a level no greater, and preferably lower,
than the sum total of each side's existing land- and sea-based forces. * We could
then reduce our ICBM force while retaining the option to construct additional
Sea-based missiles if needed to satisfy Our deterrent Objectives and maintain a
stable strategic relationship. This formula might be acceptable to the Soviets,
since they could increase their sea-based strength by shifting substantial forces
from land to sea without seriously compromising their ICBM power. If sucessful,
“freedom to mix” could enhance mutual stability by leading both sides to rely
more heavily On Sea-based missiles, thus making it at Once more feasible and less
imperative to protect the remaining land-based missile forces. Over the longer
term, both sides might move toward exclusive reliance On Sea-based systems, since
this Strategic COnfiguration would eliminate the instabilities associated with ac-
Curate MIRV’s.
As a consequence of implementing these arrangements for coping with the
ICBM problem, it may prove practicable to negotiate explicit measures. But, even
if this Outcome cannot be obtained, the informal approach can maintain and
enhance mutual stability through coordinated unilateral weapons decisions.
* The proposal at SALT put forth by the United States in July, 1970, contained such
a “freedom to mix” provision, but bombers as well as land- and sea-based missiles were
included in the overall quota. T. Smith, supra note 9, at 1, col. 8.
IV. UNILATERAL PLAINNING AND ARMS CONTROL
The foregoing sections have demonstrated how SALT can help the United
States achieve its strategic objectives through agreed limitations and Continuing
bilateral contacts. Nonetheless, there will be considerable room for unilateral
strategic force and policy decisions within the bounds of a SALT agreement, and
it is therefore important to consider the question of how our unilateral planning
Can maximize the benefits Of SALT.
The United States would undoubtedly abide by the agreed limitations. If Cer-
tain prohibitions have an unclear interpretation, the SALT Commission should
be used for clarification. If, at some future time, the agreement is judged to be
disadvantageous to American security and appropriate modifications cannot be
implemented, the withdrawal option can always be exercised.
In areas unaffected by the agreement, the United States should structure its
force decisions to create a political climate and weapons conditions conducive to
improving the basic measure. The guiding rule should be to maintain the Via-
bility of our deterrent without posing a threat to the Soviet deterrent, endanger-
ing the stability of the initial agreement, or foreclosing future SALT Options.
This would not only argue against programs which are specifically designed to
provide the United States with a first-strike capacity against the Soviets’ Stra-
tegic force, but would counsel against deploying systems which are ambiguous
in terms of their first or second strike potential. Furthermore, it would also
suggest that the United States be sensitive to the possibility that the Soviets
might react politically as well as militarily to our decisions. We should recognize
that the Soviets might be motivated to “match” our weapons systems to preserve
an Overall balance of forces even if such reactions made little sense in strategic
terms. -
Difficult as it might be to assess Soviet reactions or to apply arms control
criteria precisely, a deliberate effort should be made to apply these guidelines
not only to deployment decisions but to the research and development, flight test,
and procurement phases of weapons programs. Throughout this spectrum of
decisions, the type, timing, and scope of each American program Should be
evaluated in terms of its potential effect on Soviet reactions and prospects for
further limitations. Short-term gains for improving our deterrent through rapid
modernization Or qualitative improvements should be balanced against the pos-
sible long-term adverse consequences Of these actions for Stability and arms
COntrol. “Relative risk” calculations should be systematically included as part
Of the Pentagon’s force planning procedures.
Such a policy would require the United States to loosen somewhat the degree
Of COnservatism applied to strategic planning and to place Self-imposed COn-
straints On the amount of effort devoted to “readiness programs” which would
undoubtedly be instituted under a SALT agreement for Security reasons and to
facilitate Senate ratification of an agreement. Premature force decisions taken
to hedge against future Soviet threats Of low probability should be avoided, and,
in many instances, reliance On “high confidence” measures to ensure Surviv-
ability and penetrability might have to be forgone in favor of measures which
are less reliable but also less provocative. To be sure, if procurement decisions
On new systems are deferred because of SALT, we might have to mount a costly
Crash program if an agreement does not materialize. On the other hand, if
unilateral restraint leads to an appropriate phase-two SALT arrangement, we
may not find it necessary to procure certain expensive Systems at all. More
generally, as noted above, policies of unilateral restraint could bring the ulti-
mately greater benefits Of an improved SATT agreement.
As an example of American strategic planning under arms control, a major
new program such as ULMS should be held in the advanced development stage
until and unless clear signs of Soviet ABM or ASW improvements are seen. Such
restraint would be feasible under an agreement which limited ABM's, even if no
explicit restrictions were placed on ASW. As a hedge, against Soviet ASW prog-
ress, greater emphasis should be given to anti-ASW measures for Our existing
Polaris fleet, and, if necessary, Poseidon could be replaced with a longer-range
SLBM. In addition, more effective penetration aids should be placed on our mis-
Sile and bomber forces. These moves would increase Our deterrent without threat-
ening the Soviets—in contrast to decisions to increase the number of Offensive de-
livery vehicles or the number of MIRV’s on each American system. -
As another element of its unilateral policy under SALT, the United States
Would have to adopt an appropriate attitude toward the relationship between
80-942 O - 72 - 28
428
weapons decisions and SALT negotiations. On the one hand, SALT Seems to have
induced some restraint and inhibited the United States from taking destabilizing
actions—witness the reluctance to move ahead with large-scale ABM deploy-
ments and the rejection of counterforce MIRV capabilities. On the Other hand,
the United States has followed a strategy of “negotiating from strength,” under
which weapons programs tend to be thought of as bargaining chips to be used
at the SALT table. Our MIRV program would probably have continued if SALT
did not exist. But it can be credibly argued that SALT saved the Administration’s
ABM program from Congressional defeat, since the “bargaining-chip” argument
proved strong enough to override opposition to Safeguard on cost and effective-
ness grounds.” Although the Soviets’ continued ICBM buildup may well be
motivated by the same reasoning, MOSCOW’s tactics might, in part, be a response
to OurS.
In certain circumstances, putting pressure on the other side to accept restric-
tions On his activities can represent a SOund and Sensible negotiating Strategy.
Indeed, it is quite possible that unilateral American restraint in areas of interest
to the Soviet Union might reduce its incentive to accept limitations On important
programs. If a SALT agreement does emerge, perhaps the Administration’s tac-
tic could be considered a success. On the other hand, “negotiating from strength”
tends to Work directly against arms COntrol goals, as One Side SeekS to acquire
more “chips” in response to the Other side's moves. Thus, in all probability,
the Administration's Strategy degraded the effectiveness Of any resultant agree-
ment, since it might have been possible to reach a more COmprehensive agree-
ment at lower force levels if both SideS had exercised unilateral restraint earlier
in the SALT process and not entered into an additional arms competition for
negotiating purposes.
In an attempt to Strike a balance between negotiating needs and realistic re-
straint, the United States might be guided by four criteria in deciding how to
relate its future strategic Weapons decisions to SALT Once an initial agreement
has been reached.
First, the United States should maintain momentum on developmental pro-
grams designed to Offset potential threats to Our retaliatory Capability, but avoid
moving these Systems into the flight test and procurement Stage unless such ac-
tions are judged essential for maintaining a deterrent worthy of confidence.
Second, the United States should pay particular attention to exercising uni-
lateral restraint On programs which might Seriously threaten the Stability Of the
initial agreement or foreclose Options for future mutual agreements which could
increase Our OWn longer-term Security.
Third, the United States should not permit the need for bargaining chips to
become the major motive for Continuing programs which would Otherwise be
halted on grounds of security, cost, or effectiveness.
Finally, in pursuing a particular policy of weapons restraint, the United States
should indicate to the Soviet Union that continued restraint on our part would
require reciprocity—not simply a symmetrical Soviet response, but a response
which removed the threat our program was designed to meet.
It may not be possible to fully apply all these criteria simultaneously in every
Case, but they should all play a role in unilateral program decisions. At the same
time, the practical difficulties associated with unilateral restraint Should not be
underestimated. Therefore, while attempting to follow a stabilizing policy on its
own, the United States should not lose sight of SALT.
W. CONCLUSIONS
Nuclear parity will not automatically ensure strategic stability in the face of
Changing Weapons technology and the mutual misperceptions which characterize
* During the Spring and summer of 1970, the Nixon Administration argued that continu-
ation of the Safeguard ABM program provided the United States with leverage for achiev-
ing, agreement. For example, Henry Kissinger reportedly told senators that the Safeguard
System was vital in terms of providing a “bargaining chip”, with which to persuade the
Soviets that a ceiling should be placed on SS—9’s. Id. The Administration’s basic negotiating
strategy was confirmed and defended by other officials such as Deputy Defense Secretary
Packard. See Hearings on the Arms Control Implications of the Current Defense Budget
Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, International Law, and Organization of the Senate
Foreign Relations Comm., 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 169–70 (1971). This strategy was partly
responsible for the decision in early 1972 to accelerate sea-based missile programs as sug-
gested by R. Levine in New Pentagon Budget to Combine Needs with Politics, Calls for $1
Billion Spending Increase, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 18, 1972, at 30, col. 1. SALT may also
have had the dironic effect of inhibiting , the United States from phasing out obsolete
Weapons, such as Titan II or older model B-52's, in hopes of being able to ...negotiate a
Q?tid pro quo with the Soviets.
429
the nuclear competition. Yet unilateral policies have been Only marginally Suc-
cessful in achieving stability in the past, and sole reliance On this approach Will
become increasingly inadequate in the future. SALT, on the other hand, Offers
the United States and the Soviet Union the Opportunity to find Ways Of manag-
ing their strategic posture Within a bilateral framework.
The limited initial agreement likely to be negotiated at SALT would contain
the competition and help both sides maintain credible deterrent forces in the
1970's. However, such an arrangement would represent Only the beginning Of the
search for stability; sustained bilateral efforts will be needed to maintain a
mutually secure nuclear relationship during the coming decade, and both Super-
powers must commit themselves to this task. But whatever the evolution. Of
SALT, there will continue to be a need for intelligent unilateral strategic policies
On both Sides—policies which recognize the interlocking nature Of American and
Soviet strategic postures and leave Open options for further enhancing Stabilit
through negotiations. -
STATEMENT OF EDWARD F. SNYDER ON BEHALF OF FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON
NATIONAL LEGISLATION
As a Committee which is widely representative Of Friends’ groups in the United
States, but which does not attempt to speak for all Friends, we appreciate this
Opportunity to comment. On the ABM Treaty, the Interim Agreement and asso-
ciated Protocol signed in Moscow May 26, 1972.
The signing Of international agreements in general, and especially agreements
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., on complex and controversial subjects, should
be the cause of great rejoicing. We are therefore glad that nearly four years of
negotiations have borne fruit in the Treaty agreement and protocol now Sub-
mitted to the COngress.
We welcome this evidence that these two great powers recognize their mutual
interest. On matters Of national Security. But we also wish to make the following
brief comments which suggest the ambivalence we feel toward these agreements.
These are positive aspects, in Our Opinion : -
1. The COncept Of nuclear parity as an acceptable state Of affairs between
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is confirmed. Hopefully this may encourage an end
to the illusory search for Superiority in nuclear arms.
2. Each side recognizes there may be a point beyond which it does not gain
more Security with more weapons.
3. Each side recognizes its own vulnerability and the devastating futility
of nuclear War as an instrument of national policy.
4. Specifically, the limitation to two ABM sites in each country is a posi-
tive factor. The limitation. On the construction of additional fixed land-
based ICBM launchers and additional submarine-based ballistic missile
launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines except as replacements
is also COnStructive. -
These are important and significant, though small, steps and we applaud
them. If they stood alone, we would have no difficulty in supporting the agree-
ments wholeheartedly.
But there are Other aspects and implications from these agreements which
are not SO positive.
1. Secretary Of Defense Laird has indicated that the approval of the ABM
Treaty is linked to a huge increase in military spending. We ask the Foreign
Relations Committee to look at this proposition very, very carefully. If the Com-
mittee accepts this “bargaining chip” theory, it will be buying an expanding
military budget on into the indefinite future. -
[Press deadlines have made it impossible for the text of this article to be updated beyond
April 1, 1972. Newspaper reports since that date strongly suggest that (1) SLBM limita-
tions will be included in the first stage agreement; (2), ABM's will be limited to two
installations for each country, placed “symmetrically,” with the United States deploying
ABM's around Washington to match the Soviet installation protecting. Moscow, and the
Soviet Union deploying ABM's around one ICBM complex to match the United States ABM
installation protecting the Minuteman site at Grand Forks, N.D.; and (3) freedom-to-mix
provision will be included, applicable to missiles only but permitting shifting between land-
based, and sea-based missiles. Washington Post, May 3, 1972, § A, at 1, col. 4. See also
Washington Post, May 2, 1972, § A, at 1, col. 4; N.Y. Times, May 3, 1972, at 3, coi. 5; id.,
May 2, 1972, at 1, col. 4. Despite these changes in the expected contours of the final agree.
ment; the concepts presented and the evaluative criteria discussed in this article will
remain relevant to consideration of that agreement, if and when it appears. ED.]
430
For many years the very expensive national military program Was Sold to
Congress on the basis of a military threat to the United States from the U.S.S.R.
and China. Now, fortunately, that fear is fading under the impact of time and
events, and is confirmed by President Nixon's visits to Peking and Moscow this
year. -
How, then, can Congress be persuaded to spend even larger Sums annually for
military purposes? The Administration suggests a “Catch-22” Solution : by agree-
ing to arms control arrangements. Instead of arms control argreements reducing
military spending, it is necessary to spend m0re so we will have more bargaining
chips and more weapons to agree not to produce or deploy in the next round of
negotiations.
If the Congress accepts the ABM Treaty as a part of a package which includes
increased military spending, it will be increasingly difficult to cut the military
budget in the future, and much of the positive value of the SALT agreements will
be vitiated. New military spending will lead to increased research, development
and deployment to continue the spiralling arms race. Again next year and the
year after, Congress will be asked to spend more money to step up the arms race
in the hope there will be a later agreement to step it down. This is an expensive
and dangerOus road to take.
2. The agreements encourage more research on ABM systems and Secretary
Laird has promised that “we will vigorously pursue a comprehensive ABM
technology program.”
Even more military research and development will go for Offensive weapons.
The limitation on launchers puts a premium On development and refinement
of programs to build bigger and better submarines like Trident, to put more nu-
clear weapons on each launcher, and to make them more accurate.
3. The ABM Treaty authorizes the construction of up to 100 ABM launchers
and interceptor missiles around Washington, D.C. We Oppose construction of
such an ABM system because it would be a waste of funds which are badly
needed elsewhere, because it would be ineffective and unreliable, and because
it has already been rejected by CongreSS and is not wanted by the people Of the
8.I'é8.
4. The ABM Treaty by preventing construction of ABM sites around major
population centers makes clear beyond doubt that millions of Soviet and Ameri-
can citizens would die in a nuclear exchange. This confirms the fact that there
is no place to hide and no hope for Survival in ABM and civil defense Systems.
“Deterrence” is formally recognized as the keystone of national security. By
Some curious alchemy of the arms race, we are told we are more secure because
We are leSS Secure.
These agreements enshrine the balance of terror as national policy. The Con-
gress and the Administration must move quickly forward from this position. We
are glad to note that the preamble to the ABM Treaty states the parties’ “inten-
tion to achieve at the earliest possible date the Cessation of the nuclear arms race
and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear dis-
armament, and general and COmplete disarmament.”
The most effective way to assure that these will be more than mere words On:
paper is to cut the military budget, not increase it. Some progress toward world
disarmament can come by agreement, but, in Our Opinion, more rapid progress
will come by example, interlaced with occasional agreements on key points.
In Summary, we urge the Foreign Relations Committee and the Congress
to approve these agreements if it is understood such approval does not require
increased military spending and, in fact, permits significant reductions, and if
it is understood that an ABM System for Washington is not required and need
not be built. -
If the price for approving these agreements is a $6.3 billion increase in new
military funding as requested by the Administration and the Construction of
a multi-billion dollar ABM System around Washington, the cost is too high.
The precedents which would be set are too dangerous. In these circumstances, it
would be better to allow the agreements to remain as they are now, signed by
the two heads of state on the premise and with the hope that they represent what
each nation conceives to be in its own best interest in any event, and are thus
self-executing. Hopefully negotiations for SALT II would result in an arms con-
trol agreement which would reduce military spending rather than increase it.
Hopefully, also, the Congress and the public can have a larger role in future
negotiations. This would help avoid the current situation in which the Presi-
dent reaches an agreement in secret Sessions and then presents it to Congress
4:31,
and the public On a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The public has been greatly handi-
Capped during this entire negotiation by lack of information as to the precise
goals which are being sought.
We Suggest these goals for the next round of discussions which might occur
in more than one forum simultaneously :
(1) DiSmantle even those ABMs which are now being constructed or are
in place.
(2) Establish a permanent limitation on launchers, prevent construction
Of mobile land-based launchers, and commence a phased reduction of the total
number Of permitted launchers.
(3) Initiate a comprehensive ban on all nuclear weapons testing.
(4) Withdraw nuclear weapons from bases outside national boundaries
Of the nuclear powers. This action should be coupled with a non-first-use
agreement.
ROOSEVELT, N.Y., July 11, 1972.
Senator J. W. Ful.ERIGHT,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: In connection with the hearings conducted by your
Committee relative to the Moscow agreements on the control of strategic arms,
I am Submitting below my statement on this subject. I respectfully request
that this Statement and the accompanying copy of my letter addressed to the
Christian Science Monitor dated 6/14/72 be included as part of the record Of
those hearings.
STATEMENT ON TEIE MOSCOW AGREEMENTS
The testimony and views of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas H. Moorer with regard.
to the MOSCOW agreements on the control of Strategic weapons have brought to
the Surface One of the most portentous forces in contemporary America. Should
this powerful current continue unchecked, it will profoundly subvert Constitu-
tional authority and thereby deprive the American people of any meaningful
Voice in the shaping of basic policies affecting their very lives and fortunes.
That Ominous force Of Subversion is Militarism.
What is the essence of Militarism? Comte de Mirabeau defined it succinctly
in 1788 following a mission to Berlin : “La Prusse n'est pas un pays qui a une
armee, C'est une armee qui a un pays.” Mirabeau then noted : “La guerre est
I’industrie nationale de la Prusse.”
Across the Atlantic at that time where tyranny had been vanquished, Alexander
Hamilton pointedly warned Of the pitfalls leading to Militarism. He wrote that
the institutions “which have a tendency to destroy their (the peoples') civil
and political rights” were chiefly “standing armies and the correspondent ap-
pendages of military establishments.” Continual resort to military means, Ham-
ilton further admonished his countrymen, “enhances the importance of the sol-
dier, and proportionably degrades the condition Of the citizen. The military state
becomes elevated above the civil.” (The Federalist, No. 8.)
In his classic work Imperial Germany (1915), Thorstein Veblen analyzed the
impact Of Militarism, as it affected German SOciety under the Kaiser: “Chief of
the agencies that have kept the submissive allegiance of the German people to
the State intact is, of course, successful warfare, seconded by the disciplinary
effects Of Warlike preparation and indoctrination with warlike arrogance . . .
The experience of war induces a warlike frame of mind; and the pursuit of war,
being an exercise in the following Of One's leader and execution of arbitrary
Orders, induces an animus of enthusiastic subservience and unquestioning obe-
dience to authority.” Military organization, Weblen continued, “reaches its best
efficiency in either case, war or peace, Only when the habit of arbitrary authority
and unquestioning Obedience has been SO thoroughly ingrained that subservience
has become a passionate aspiration with the subject population, where the habit
of allegiance has attained that degree of automatism that the subject's ideal
of liberty has come to be permission to obey orders . . .” (pp. 81–2)
The conditioning process in imperial Germany yielded its fruit in terms of
political values. “The German ideal Of Statesmanship”, Veblen Observed, was
“to make all the resources of the nation converge On military strength . . .”
(p. 162)
4.32
The material and historical conditions surrounding the growth of the United
States militated against the emergence of rampant Militarism, and it became
a virtual article of faith that the German experience, which Was also present
in varying degrees in other major states, could not happen here. This estimate is
no longer valid precisely because conditions have changed, thus altering the rela-
tionship between the military and other sectors of American Society.
In his remarkably perceptive address on the dangers of the military-industrial
complex, the late President Dwight D. Eisenhower delineated the main hazards
to civilian authority described by Weblen in greater detail with respect to the
German Scene. President Eisenhower Said : “Now this conjunction. Of an im-
mense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American
experience. The total influence—economic, political, even Spiritual—is felt in
every city, every state house, every Office Of the Federal Government.” Continuing
in this vein, President Eisenhower declared that the American people must not
“fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are
all involved ; SO is the very structure Of Our SOciety.”
By the time President Eisenhower yielded his responsibilities as Chief Execu-
tive, the curve growth of Militarism in the United States had risen sharply. It
continues to move upwards at an accelerated rate. Discerning Observers, who
have had close contact with the military power, have publicly described its per-
Vasive influence.
For example, General David M. Shoup, former Commandant of the U.S. Marine
Corps asserted that America’s expanding role in world affairs subsequent to
World War II “hinged upon military power.” He then declared : “The voice and
views of the professional military people became increasingly prominent.”
Military leaders, according to General Shoup began to fill top government posts
and became “respected Opinion-makers.” -
Expanding On this theme, General Shoup wrote: “It was a time of international
readjustment; military minds offered the benefits of firm views and problem-
solving experience to the management of the nation’s affairs. Military pro-
cedures—including the general staff system, briefings, estimates of the situation,
and the Organizational and Operational techniques of the highly schooled, con-
fident military professionals—spread throughout American culture.” -
Commenting on the results of the steady increase in the influence of the military
power, General Shoup wrote: “The American people have also become more and
more accustomed to militarism, to uniforms, to the cult of the gun, and to the
Violence of combat. Whole generations have been brought up on war news and
Wartime propaganda. . . . Soldiering loses appeal for some of the relatively
few who experience the blood, terror and filth of battle; for many, however,
including far too many senior professional officers, war and combat are an
exciting adventure, a competitive game, and an escape from the dull routines of
peacetime. It is this influential nucleus of aggressive, ambitious professional
military leaders who are the root of America's evolving militarism.” (The
Atlantic Monthly, April 1969.) In the light of General Shoup's analysis, one must
Conclude that the forces of Militarism have spread like a contagion through the
entire fabric of American society.
The economic base of the military power has been bolstered by the inter-
penetration of key military and civilian personnel in the structure of the military-
industrial complex. According to Senator William Proxmire, the number of high-
ranking retired military officers employed by leading companies in 1959 was
721 (88 of 100 companies reporting). In 1969, Senator Proxmire declared, 95 out
Of the 100 largest defense contractors reported the employment of 2,072 officers,
Or an average of almost 22 per company. (Cong. Record, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
Mar. 24, 1969, Vol. 115, No. 50, pp. S3072—S3081). At the same time, it must be
borne in mind that many individuals with private corporate connections have
been employed in key posts in the Pentagon.
Consequently, therefore, a reciprocal relationship has been consolidated between
the military power and certain sectors of private industry. In turn, this relation-
Ship thrives on the enormous sums of the country's wealth which have been
mortgaged to the military power. It is this wealth, above all, which provides the
military power with economic and political leverage unprecedented in the annals
of American history. From 1946 to 1970–71, U.S. military expenditures amounted
to approximately $1,200,000,000,000. Over this same period, the aVerage per-
Centage devoted to military expenditures represented approximately 8–10% of
the Gross National Product. Needless to say, the statistics on “purely” military
expenditures cannot indicate all of the ramifications of Militarism in the
United States and the grip which it exercises on the lives of the people.
433
It is to be noted that the tremendous funds poured into the military establish-
ment have become secured through institutional arrangements. As early as Janu-
ary 1944, Charles E. Wilson of General Electric proposed a “permanent War
economy” based on a planned cooperative relationship between the military
power and Big Business. The administration of this enterprise would be the
responsibility of the President acting as Commander-in-Chief. As for the role of
Congress, Mr. Wilson suggested that its function be “limited to voting the needed
funds.”
Even if one were to assume that the raison d’etre for these vast Outlays for
the military was aimed at enhancing the security of the United States, it is
pertinent to ask whether that goal has been reached. A few years ago (February
1968), another top executive of General Electric, J. B. McKitterick Stated pub-
licly : “Yet armed to the teeth with weapons too terrible to use, We never have been
more insecure.” Nor has the situation appreciably improved today, if We ponder
the implications of the views of Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer. Is it not
true that the gist of their argument for more funds rests on the allegation that
American security requirements have not as yet been achieved?
Yet the real irony Of the continued “insecurity.” Of the country derives exactly
from the fact that the military power has become the determinant influence in
the shaping of foreign and domestic policy. On the domestic front, the military
power has become the final arbiter in terms of deciding what portion of the COun-
try’s resources shall be devoted to productive purposes. As early as September
1967, William McChesney Martin, then Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board,
informed Wilbur D. Mills, Chairman of the House Banking Committee that the
country could not have equally guns and butter. (N.Y. Times, 9/13/67) Mr. Mar-
tin reaffirmed this view in March 1968. (Christian Science Monitor, 3/25/68)
Martin’s assessment Of the economics Of War and peace has proven to be COr-
rect. President Nixon himself described the blight Of Militarism. On the domestic
economy when he said: “One of the cruelest legacies of the artificial prosperity
produced by War is inflation. Inflation robs every American, every One Of you.
The 20 million who are retired and living On fixed incomes—they are particu-
larly hard hit. Homemakers find it harder than ever to balance the family budget.
And 80 million American Wage earners have been On a treadmill. For example,
in the four war years between 1965 and 1969, your wage increases were Com-
pletely eaten up by price increases. Your paychecks were higher, but you were
no better off.” (N.Y. Times, 8/16/71)
In terms of foreign policy, the military power has been a decisive factor in the
development of policies and their implementation. The notion that military power
plays a prime role in diplomacy appears to have been accepted by top Govern-
ment leaders as a matter Of Course. Speaking to a meeting Of the Veterans Of For-
eign Wars last August, President Nixon stressed the point that the military
might Of the United Sates “is the Only foundation on which peace among nations
can ever be built.” (My underscore. UPI, 8/19/71) The next month, Admiral
Moorer told a correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor that diplomatic
Credibility in negotiations must be based on military power. “In other words”,
he said, “the way to have peace is to have strength.” (9/9/71) Secretary Laird
echoed this principle of the primacy of military power in foreign relations when
he told a House sub-Committee on Appropriations in early June 1972 that, “We
have COnsistently advocated negotiations from a position. Of strength. We must
not forget this principle in our deliberations on charting our future course.”
The steady erosion Of the Civilian authority as it is subjected to the mount-
ing demands Of the military power has been a fundamental factor in the deteriora-
tion of America’s world position. Our growing isolation does not stem from the
pressures of so-called isolationists, but rather from the spreading mistrust among
many important COuntries as to Our real intentions. Indeed, the anxieties Of these
Countries have been markedly aroused precisely because of the special influence
enjoyed by the military power in policy-making in Washington. Addressing a
meeting of the Natioal Industrial Conference Board prior to his election to the
Presidency, Mr. Nixon said: “Seldom has a nation been SO mistrusted in its
purposes or so frustrated in its efforts.” (N.Y. Times, 9/13/67).
During the very first days of the Truman administration, Mrs. Eleanor Roose-
velt threatened to resign from her post as a delegate to the U.N. because Of the
growing influence of the military power on foreign policy. (N.Y. Times 6/25/72).
In concrete terms the massive influence Of the military power On the conduct of
foreign affairs has resulted in consequences aptly described by Senator Mike
Mansfield : In the past, he noted, “We have not always been very prompt to recog-
434
nize national self-interest as a basis for a policy of peace.” Senator Mansfield
continued : “The pursuit of ideological struggle has not led us to any Victories.
Rather, it has projected us into a hOdgepodge of foreign aid, military alliances
and into Overseas propaganda and Other dubious manipulative Operations. The
Warm human COncern Of Americans for Other people has been distOrted by ideolog-
iCal Warfare and we have plunged, without warrant, into the internal political
and Social affairs Of Other nations everywhere in the world.” (N.Y. Times,
6/11/72). -
The gains made by Militarism in the United States have escaped widespread
detection because the elements fostering it have managed to contain it within
the general framework Of the Constitutional Structure. However, the hearings
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and its counterpart in the House
reveal with stark clarity that the military power will not tolerate any signifi-
cant diminution of its prior claims On the resources of the country. This un-
mitigated challenge to Constitutional authority does not bode well for American
democracy. In the last analysis, the positive remedy to this most dangerous situa-
tion depends upon an alert and active Citizenry determined to curb the excesses
of the military power by the reassertion of the Constitutional prerogatives of
Congress. . - -
JUNE 14, 1972.
LETTERS To THE EDITOR,
The Christian Science Monitor,
Boston, Mass.
DEAR SIR : Secretary of the Defense Melvin R. Laird and Admiral Moorer,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned Congress that they would not
Support President Nixon's agreements with Moscow On strategic arms unless
billions Of dollars were appropriated to enhance the quality Of American Weap-
Onry. That is to say, policies and pacts which are exclusively the constitutional
province Of the President and the CongreSS are subject to the Veto of the
Pentagon. The Pentagon has now Openly declared that the powers of governing
as stipulated in the U.S. Constitution are no longer definitive. There is now a
“higher authority” which possesses the ultimate Voice in policy-making without
benefit of the peoples’ will as expressed in the electOral process.
We are witnessing, in other words, a profound transformation in our political
system. The “logic” of this change in the nature of political governance points
to the emergence of some sort of authoritarian structure sanctioned by the
Pentagon and the forces it represents. In other countries, the establishment Of
military dictatorships is usually dramatized by a coup d’etat, but here, the
moves against constitutional authority have been more subtle and hence un-
discerning to the average American. Nevertheless, the drive goes on relentlessly
buttressed by a budget of tens of billions which supplies the Pentagon with
unprecedented economic and political leverage. -
It is indeed ironical that the enormous largess enjoyed by the Pentagon COmeS
from the Congress of the United States, the very institution whose constitutional
powers are being emasculated. While historical analogies can be tricky, One
cannot help but think of the period leading to Julius Caesar's rise to power in
Rome. That the power of the Pentagon has become pervasive in the crucial
areas of the government, may be seen by its predominant influence in the shaping
of foreign policy. This is reflected in Washington’s approach to Southeast Asia
which is viewed through the “spectacles” of the Pentagon's strategists.
Sincerely yours,
HERBERT KRIEDMAN,
Professor of History.
BOARD OF CHRISTIAN SOCIAL CONCERNS
OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH,
- Washington, D.C., June 21, 1972.
Hon. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Once again we wish to call to your attention actions
of The United Methodist Church in its continuing efforts for disarmament and
an end to the arms race. We do this at a time when the Foreign Relations
435
- Committee is reviewing the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms agreements brought back
by the President from Moscow and the requests of the Department of Defense
for a new missile-submarine project, a new bomber program, and a new ABM
ring around Washington. -
In 1968 the General Conference of The United Methodist Church adopted a
Statement on peace that still remains the Official position of the Church. In the
Section. On disarmament it includes these paragraphs :
The use or threat of use of weapons which by their very nature are indiscrimi-
nate and difficult to control cannot be morally justified. The nations Of the WOrld
should halt the immoral, futile, and Suicidal quest for military Supremacy.
Anti-ballistic missile Systems threaten to accelerate arm Spending and heighten
tensions dangerously without adding to the Security Of the nations. We emphasize
that there is no real Substitute for World-Wide Safeguarded disarmament under
agreements that provide for adequate Verification and enforcement.
In 1971 the Board of Christian Social Concerns, an official national agency of
The United Methodist Church, approved the following resolution as part of a
larger Statement. On peace :
If the human race is to move forward Out of this period of futility and con-
stant peril, the search for new weapons systems must be halted through compre-
hensive international agreements. International negotiations, such as SALT,
should include all nations with substantial armaments systems. The vast Stock-
piles of nuclear bombs and conventional Weapons must be progressively dis-
mantled, and the resources they represent must be diverted to programs designed
to enhance life rather than destroy it.
In 1972 the General Conference of The United Methodist Church adopted with
Overwhelming support the “Bishops’ Call for Peace and the Self-Development
of Peoples.” This document, now an official declaration of that delegated assem-
bly, further Supports strong moves to end the arms race. Quoted here is a portion
Of the action of that body :
“There must be eventual disarmament. We cannot be certain of the Causes
of a particular War. “Causes” may be simply pretexts. In the final analysis,
it is the presence Of military institutions in the nations Of the world that make
wars possible and arms races probable. The tide must be turned. Recognizng
the Strategic dangers Of unilateral disarmament, nations can begin processes
Of military disengagement and move toward bilateral and multilateral disarma-
ment agreements Within the framework of the United Nations. Our Suicidal
confidence in arms and military systems must give way to a radical reordering
of priorities and an awareness of overriding human values.”
We wish to assure you, as Chairman Of the Foreign Relations Committee of
the United States Senate, that The United Methodist Church with a member-
ship Of nearly eleven million stands in support of those policies that will lead to
peace through a complete and safeguarded disarmament through international
agreements. We commend you for questioning the need of new military programs
and budget at the Very time the United States and the Soviet Union have ini-
tiated SALT agreements.
Sincerely yours,
HERMAN WILL, Jr.,
Associate General Secretary.
P.S.—If it is possible to include this letter in the record of the hearings now
being held it would be greatly appreciated.
(Material submitted by Mr. Kilsoo Haan of Aptos, California, is
available in the committee files.)
O
{ .***
f .." 4. **
º 2.º z *…*
- * * * f.
j" A M.
** g &
PROTOCOL AMENDING THE SINGLE
CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
EXECUTIVE J, 92D CONGRESS, 2D SESSION
PROTOCOL AMENDING THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON
NARCOTIC DRUGS, 1961
JUNE 27, 1972
§
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
TJ.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
PEPQSITEI) -
irr,......' * * *lº Fº Y FH #
{INITED stars; OF AMFeſ--
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine CHARLEs H. PERCY, Illinois
WILLIAM B. SPONG, J.R., Virginia
CARL MARCY, Chief of Staff
ARTHUR M. KUHL, Chief Clerk
(II)
C O N T E N T S
atements by—
Bevans, Charles I., Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of State ;
accompanied by Donald E. Miller, Chief Counsel, Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs; and G. Jonathan Greenwald, Office of
the Legal Adviser, Department of State -
Ingersoll, John E. Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs,
U.S. Department of Justice; accompanied by Donald E. Miller, Chief
Counsel; and George Belk, Assistant Director for International
Affairs
Rossides, Eugene T., Assistant Secretary for Enforcement, Trade and
Operations, Department Of the Treasury
lsertions for the record :
Foreign region personnel, supplied by BNDD__
Foreign district offices, supplied by BNDD
Budget requests and appropriations for Bureau of Narcotics and Dan-
gerous Drugs, supplied by Department of Justice
Bureau of Customs increases in manpower, equipment, and so forth,
Supplied by the Department of the Treasury___ - -
Information GOncerning the granting Of diplomatic immunities to rep-
resentatives of foreign governments and their perSOnal baggage
upon arrival in the United States, Supplied by the Department
Of the Treasury -* - wº. -- •- - - -
“Free Fix for Addicts?”, article by John A. Hamilton, the New York
Times, June 5, 1972
Twelve states which abstained at the Geneva Conference in the vote
to adopt the protocol amending the single COnvention, Supplied by
the Department of the Treasury -
Statement in response to Senator Pearson’s request for additional
discussion of the implementation of the additional authority and
responsibility given the International Narcotics Control Board, sup-
plied by Department of State
Answer to question submitted by Senator Percy to Mr. Bevans
Answer to question submitted by Senator Percy to Mr. Bevans______
Letter to Mr. Charles I. Bevans from Senator William B. Spong, Jr.,
containing additional questions, June 29, 1972, and Mr. Bevans'
reply of July 14, 1972 - -
Letter to Mr. Eugene T. Rossides from Senator William B. Spong, Jr.,
Containing additional questions, June 29, 1972, and Mr. Rossides’
reply of July 28, 1972
Letter to Mr. John E. Ingersoll from Senator William B. Spong, Jr.,
Containing additional questions, June 29, 1972, and reply of Au-
gust 2, 1972, from Mr. Gene R. Haislip, Special Assistant to the
Director
Page
44
2
17
(III)
9
13
67
71
"Rotocol, AMENDING THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON
- NARCOTIC DRUGS .
TUESDAY, JUNE 27, 1972
. UNITED STATES SENATE,
CoMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONs, -
- Washington, D.C.
he committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room 4221,
New Senate Office Building, Senator William B. Spong, Jr., presiding.
Present: Senators Spong, Fulbright, Church, Javits, Pearson, and
*ercy. - - -
Senator SPONG. The hearing will come to order.
OPENING STATEMENT . .
The Committee on Foreign Relations this morning will hear testi-
mony relating to the protocol recently adopted by a United Nations
onference in Geneva to amend the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs, 1961. The Single Convention, to which the United States
jecame a party in 1967, is the basic multilateral treaty governing
nternational control of narcotic drugs, including opium, heroin, and
ocaine. Ninety nations have ratified the convention and additional
ountries are in the process of becoming parties.
The protocol to amend the Single Convention is designed to
}rovide for a threefold approach to the problem of preventing
licit traffic in narcotic drugs and the abuse of those drugs: (1) It
would strengthen the international control machinery to enable it more
ffectively to curb the excess and illicit cultivation of the opium poppy,
s well as the illicit production, manufacture and trafficking in narcotic
lrugs; (2) it would expand the provisions of existing bilateral extra-
ition treaties; and (3) it would establish guidelines for each nation’s
º to avoid drug abuse and for the treatment of individual drug
UISOI’S. -
I am pleased to welcome our witnesses this morning: Mr. John E.
ngersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
within the Department of Justice; Mr. Eugene T. Rossides, Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement and Operations; and Mr.
harles I. Bevans, Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs in the
State Department. - -
We all are, of course, intensely concerned with the rising problem of
rug abuse in this nation and with the international traffic in illicit
larcotics which, directly, and indirectly, brings harm and misery to
hundreds of thousands of our citizens. I hope that this morning, with
he help of our witnesses, we will be able to view this problem in a







(1)

2
broad context, to learn more about the expanded effort being made b
this Government to deal with this problem and, finally, and more spe
cifically, to gain an understanding of how the new protocol woul
contribute to that effort.
Our first witness will be Mr. Ingersoll. We are very pleased to hav
you with us this morning.
STATEMENT OF JOHN E. INGERSOLL, DIRECTOR, BUREAU 0.
NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS, U.S. DEPARTMENT 0.
JUSTICE: ACCOMPANIED BY DONALDE, MILLER, CHIEF COUNSEI
AND GEORGE BELK, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR INTERNATIONA.
AFFAIRS -
Mr. INGERSOLL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished mem
bers of the committee.
First of all, with the chair's permission, I will introduce my col
leagues who are at the table. On my right is Mr. George Belk, th
Assistant Director for International Affairs; and on my left, Mi
Donald Miller, the Chief Counsel of the Bureau.
I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before you toda
in connection with your inquiry into proposed amendments to th
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTIC DRUG TRAFFIC
I will first address myself to the nature of the international narcoti
drug traffic, as you have requested. This traffic is a production an
merchandising system based on the slavish demands of addicted in
dividuals. In the United States we estimate these at approximatel
half a million, which we believe represents a sharp increase over t
previous decade. The heroin market in this country presents an ide
circumstance for illicit traffic. The addicts are numerous, their deman
is constant, their actual wealth or purchasing power, whether earne
through wages or in crime, is considerable, and the product whic
they crave originates in countries where production labor costs ar
extremely low. From origin in the form of opium, the drug is con
verted into morphine base and ultimately refined into heroin. Th
entire movement is dependent upon clandestine activity.
The principal vulnerability of this commerce is in the length an
complexity of its line of supply. This makes it susceptible to attac
where police forces can be organized with knowledge and sincerity o
purpose. The mission of our Bureau is to do just that in the Unite
States and to provide technical expertise abroad so that foreig
governments may do the same. I believe strongly in the desirabilit
of combating this traffic at its source and for that reason have place
increasing emphasis on our Bureau's international mission. Attache
to my testimony are tables indicating the Scope of this increase i
terms of the location and number of our foreign offices and the ager
personnel which staff them.
Since fiscal year 1969, the number of our offices has increased by 26
percent and our agent personnel by 258 percent. In addition, I up
3
graded our commitment organizationally in the fall of 1971 by estab-
lishing the position of Assistant Director for International Affairs.
One of the missions of our foreign offices is to gather intelligence
concerning the nature and scope of the problem we face. In addition,
since the fall of 1971, the Central Intelligence Agency has been given
a mandate by the President to use its facilities also for obtaining drug
intelligence. These sources of knowledge have been further augmented
by the active commitment of the Departments of State, Defense, and
Treasury. .
On the basis of current assessments, we estimate the total worldwide
production of illicit opium at approximately 1,300 metric tons. Of
this, perhaps 700 tons are produced in Southeast Asia, mainly in the
triborder area of Thailand, Burma, and Taos, called the Golden Tri-
angle. Principal producers of the remainder are India, at approxi-
mately 250 tons; Afghanistan, at 100 tons; Pakistan, at 100 tons; and
until recent improvements in collection, Turkey, at 50 tons. An addi-
tional quantity of approximately 1,700 tons are produced for legiti-
mate medical purposes in the Middle East and Central Asia.
We believe that between 6.5 and 10 tons of heroin are consumed
annually in the United States which, on the basis of conversion ratios,
equates to approximately 65 to 100 tons of crude opium. It is, there-
fore, clear that total illicit production is far in excess of that required
to supply the United States and indeed most of the production of
Southeast Asia is, and always has been, consumed in that area. In our
programs and efforts to reform international law and control ma-
chinery, we are concerned with the whole of this illicit production
but our specific operational aim is that part of the traffic which par-
ticularly supplies the United States.
Throughout the decades of the 1950's and 1960's, the narcotics supply
line to the United States appeared to have achieved some degree of
stability. The bulk of the heroin was derived from Turkish opium
refined into morphine base in Turkey and then smuggled into southern
France where it was further refined into heroin. From France, the
heroin was usually smuggled in through the port of New York or
indirectly by way of Canada. A persistent but smaller scale and less
organized traffic in heroin originated in Mexico and affected the south-
western portion of the United States. Finally, a small trickle of
Asian heroin accounted for occasional important cases, though con-
stituting an insignificant portion of the whole.
EVENTS EXPECTED TO ALTER PATTERNS OF WORLD TRAFFIC
Three major events which have now been set in motion can be ex-
pected to radically alter the pattern of world traffic. These are
first, the prospective elimination of Turkey as the principal source
of narcotic drugs entering the United States; second, the launching
of a vigorous and unprecedented attack on the centers of the French
heroin underworld; and, third, the discovery by Asian traffickers of
lucrative drug markets, among Americans which they can be ex-
pected to attempt to exploit as they did previously with our troops in
South Vietnam. Since these three developments can be expected to
dominate the future shape of the narcotics traffic, I will turn next
to consider each of them separately in greater detail.
4
TUREISH GOVERNMEN T'S BAN ON GROWING OPIUM POPPY
The heroin entering the United States from Europe is largely the
product of predominantly French and Turkish criminal organizations.
For decades opium poppy crops have been raised by tens of thousands
of Turkish farmers in the Anatolian Plain. It is grown in small
plots in addition to other subsistence crops because of its cash value
and it is also put to a variety of nonnarcotic uses. In theory, the Turk-
ish Government has always maintained a monopoly on the purchase
of the harvested opium for legitimate medical markets although until
recently less than effective efforts were made to insure that this law
was strictly enforced. In this environment, farmers would sell some
part of their harvest to drug traffickers at the site of their local village
without knowledge or interest in its ultimate destination.
The opium is often reduced to morphine base with crude processing
materials at or near a village site. Turkish criminal elements have
organized the movement of the morphine base from the village to
assembly points in Turkey and finally to a point of ultimate delivery
to a laboratory pickup man in France or West Germany. Often the
morphine base will move by Sea on board Turkish vessels and be
thrown overboard at prearranged points in waterproof containers near
the harbor of Marseille. Overland shipments usually pass through the
Balkans into West Germany where some 700,000 Turks have settled
since the postwar period.
This course of dealings has developed quietly and without inter-
ruption for over 20 years into a well-defined pattern of criminal ac-
tivity. More recently, the policy of the U.S. Government has focused
increasingly on destroying the very base of this pyramid of activity.
That base is the illicit diversion of opium from areas of legal pro-
duction by farmers ignorant of its destination or the havoc which i
brings to the cities of our country.
After expressions of interest by the President, the Secretary of
State, and strenuous representations by myself personally and by our
Ambassador in Ankara, the gravity of the situation to the United
States as well as other countries has come to be realized.
In June of 1971, the Turkish Government announced that a total
ban on the growing of the opium poppy would be brought into effect,
following the harvesting of the last legitimate crop in 1972. In the
meantime, efforts to collect as much as is actually grown in the remain-
ing period have been sharply increased, and it is expected that far less
of the crop will be diverted to illicit purposes than was formerly the
C8,Se.
I should emphasize that in spite of the fact that the Government of
Turkey has changed its leadership twice since the declaration, there
has never been any suggestion or apprehension on our part that it
would not be carried through. Sometime in 1973, hopefully, whatever
illicit opium stockpiles exist in Turkey should be depleted, and the
base of narcotic trafficking activity for over two decades should vir-
tually cease to exist.
Where will the French and Turkish traffickers turn? Will they be
able to readjust and prove themselves versatile enough to establish
new sources of supply? Before addressing this question, let me first
examine the developments in France. .

5
FRENCEI HEROIN UNDERWORLD
The French heroin underworld is based principally in the Marseille
area where most of the heroin laboratories are believed to be located.
his has been reaffirmed by the seizure of two laboratories by French
nforcement authorities during the first 6 months of this year. Many
f these violators are of Corsican origin and are often men in their
50's who have been engaged in clandestine operations of one kind or
another since the French underground resistance of World War II. A
group will usually consist of a small number of principals with one or
ore contact men who deal with outlets in the United States. Others
pecialize in financial arrangements or in organizing couriers for
smuggling into the United States. Falsified documents are extensively
employed for this purpose, and Smuggling techniques may range from
ody concealment devices to concealment within oscilloscopes, false
ottom suitcases, boxes of frozen vegetables, ski poles, or automobiles.
The heroin traffic in southern France has grown like an abscess
while the French Government and people remain unaware. Addiction
was increasing in France itself, and it is currently estimated that ap-
proximately 20,000 heroin addicts are located principally in the Paris
and Marseille areas. As recently as July of 1970, there were only seven
full-time narcotics agents in Marseille assigned by the French Govern-
ment to deal with this problem.
One of my first acts upon becoming Director of BNDD in 1968 was
to visit our Ambassador in France to discuss the matter. This led to a
meeting with the French Chief of Police Judiciaire in Paris in May
of 1969. Thereafter, efforts to involve the French more actively cul-
minated in the signing of a special agreement on February 26, 1971,
by former Attorney General John Mitchell and the French Minister
of the Interior. -
President Nixon himself has discussed the matter personally with
President Pompidou.
Public and Government interest is now at a peak in France, and
the narcotics traffic is regarded as a No. 1 law enforcement priority.
As a result, French police manpower dedicated exclusively to this
effort has increased by 400 percent since 1969, to a present level of
145 officers, with 160 projected for the end of 1972. This escalation of
activity has not only resulted in elimination of the two heroin labora-
tories previously mentioned, but also in significant seizures of heroin,
including the largest single case on record in which nearly a thousand
pounds were seized on board a French fishing trawler in the Marseille
harbor destined for the Western Hemisphere, probably Florida.
Our own agent personnel in France has similarly increased from
four agents in fiscal year 1969, to 11 in fiscal year 1972. This does not
include a number of other agents working special assignments for
shorter periods of time. There are numerous examples of outstanding
police work which have resulted from these increases. Several months
ago, two French nationals sought to recruit an American national in
Paris for the purpose of smuggling a large quantity of heroin. There-
after, one of our agents posing as an Air Force Sergeant made contact
with them, ostensibly for this purpose. The agent represented that he
was assigned to a general's aircraft and could easily smuggle the con-
traband into the United States without detection.
81—235—72 2 .















6
In May of this year, the trafficker delivered 120 kilograms of heroin
worth approximately $52 million in the streets of New York, to ou
agent in Brussels for smuggling on board the general’s aircraft. Some
part of the heroin was actually flown to the United States where a
delivery under surveillance was made to drug violators in this country
awaiting the shipment in New York. Five individuals were arrested
at that time, including the alleged head of a trafficking system which
had brought large amounts of heroin and cocaine into the United
States for the past 7 years. Also among the five was a French citizer
who is believed to be in charge of making financial arrangements fol
sophisticated groups of international traffickers. Simultaneously, on
the other side of the Atlantic, the two French traffickers were arrested
in Belgium. -
The point I wish to emphasize here is that both the quality of inter-
national cooperation and the level of enforcement activity so much
surpasses anything in the past that it admits of no comparison. Fol
the first time in two decades, the French heroin underworld can no
longer operate without fear. They no longer can trust to the safety of
Marseille as their sanctuary.
It is our hope that the pressure will eventually cause them to break
and disintegrate. Specialized operations which would be beyond their
ability to appreciate, or even suspect, are underway.
The developments in France and Turkey represent an immediate
promise for the future. Let me turn, finally, to the third element I have
mentioned which, by contrast, confronts us with a new threat.
DRUG TRAFFIC IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The drug traffic in Southeast Asia has historical precedence stretch-
ing back to the days of the clipper ships and the opium wars of China.
It is both large and lucrative, and until recently has been aimed al-
most exclusively at markets in the immediate geographic area. With
the exception of Hong Kong most of the traffic has been in smoking
opium rather than in heroin. But the presence of U.S. military per-
Sonnel in South Vietnam immediately adjacent to a major production
area has changed the picture. -
In part because of the drug abuse epidemic sweeping the United
States and because of the ready availability of drugs in Southeast
Asia, many of our young soldiers proved vulnerable targets for the
traffic in heroin. Our first indications of the presence of heroin in
South Vietnam came in December of 1969. In 1970, the trickle turned
into a stream; and in 1971, the stream into a torrent of heroin pouring
out of the Golden Triangle. New heroin refineries were established in
Thailand and Laos specifically to serve this demand. Ethnic overseas
Chinese merchant-traffickers who have long controlled the drug mar-
kets suddenly became aware of the new business opportunities repre-
sented in the American drug epidemic.
Criminally inclined Americans located in Southeast Asia likewise
became aware of the profits to be reaped in serving as the link between
criminals in the United States and traffickers in Asia.
In other testimony before the Congress earlier this year, I have deali
with the special enforcement units which we have created both ir




7
hailand and Laos. These efforts are already producing results. On
une 10, our agents and Thai police officers seized 1,600 kilograms of
pium together with an array of processing chemicals. The accom-
anying arrests led to the discovery and elimination of an illicit lab-
ratory 2 days later. I have also previously dealt with the high-level
ases involving ex-Servicemen in Bangkok and drug traffickers in the
United States.
As a result of accumulating intelligence, we have reason to believe
hat certain ethnic Chinese criminal elements in America have geared
p an operation to take advantage of the heroin availability in South-
east Asia. Common language, culture, and in some cases perhaps fam-
ily ties, make for a natural and easy connection with Asian traffickers
ho are also of ethnic Chinese origin. Chinese seamen serve aboard
ost of the world’s merchant fleets, and we find that many of these
are picking up quantities of heroin in either Bangkok, Hong Kong, or
Singapore and jumping ship with it in a variety of North American
ports. Here, prearranged contact is established with Chinese-Ameri-
can violators.
In essence, the evidence points to the establishment of a new pattern
which affects places never previously of any significance to the drug
traffic. Either as the result of actual seizures or our intelligence, we
sº these shipments have come through such diverse seaports as
Norfolk, Charleston, Miami, New Orleans, Los Angeles, Seattle, Van-
couver, New York, and the Great Lakes’ port of Chicago.
Our attack on this particular trafficking situation is engaging the
efforts of our Asian and domestic regional offices in close coordination
with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Bureau of
Customs, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. This effort has
already produced significant arrests and seizures of several kilograms
of heroin, particularly in New York and Miami.
In view of the abundant production of opium in Southeast Asia and
he obvious efforts which are being made to market a portion of it in
the United States, it is clear that this area could potentially replace
urkey as the source of heroin in our country. At the present time, the
Asian traffic still remains relatively unorganized and contributes only
a small, but nevertheless growing, percentage of the heroin marketed
here. -
| TWO QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED IN FUTURE
º questions, therefore, remain to be answered in the future,
y hich are: (1) Can our enforcement and diplomatic efforts succeed
n containing the Asian heroin traffic directed at the United States
while still in its infancy, and (2) will the traditional drug traffickers
n Europe and the Western Hemisphere be able to reestablish sources
f supply in the heart of an alien culture? Neither of these questions
'an be answered with certainty at this time. We have and are continu-
ng to make notable progress in containing Asian traffic. The accom-
2lishments which I have mentioned today in the recent elimination of
* heroin laboratory in Thailand, and the attack on ethnic Chinese
rafficking systems in the United States, are examples of this.
The second question is more problematic. Thus far, there is no indi-
ºtion of any large-scale attempt by French. Turkish, or Western
Hemisphere traffickers to establish organized sources of heroin in




8
Asia. However, we have to keep in mind that there still exist man
French influences in the Indochina area. Hopefully, the pressure O
both sides of the Atlantic may lead to the disintegration of these ke
elements altogether. We have, however, one clear example of the versa
tility of heroin traffickers in organizing criminal activity across cul
tural lines. One of the new variations on the European trafficking pat
tern has been the recent influx of Latin American violators.
According to our study of major seizures, their importance, though
still second to the French, has grown steadily since 1968. They have
been able to engraft the South American contrabandista system di
rectly on to European sources of heroin. This proof of versatility re.
emphasizes the need to keep a sharp watch on Southeast Asia an
other potential sources of supply.
COMPLEXITY OF PROBLEM AND SCOPE OF NEW INITIATIVES
In the foregoing analysis of the international drug traffic, I have
attempted to convey something of both the complexity of the proble
which confronts us and the great scope of the new initiatives whic
are only now getting underway. Cause for optimism may be found i
the fact that, whereas the problems have existed with equal complex
ity for many years, the breadth of our current effort far exceeds any
thing attempted in the past. In essence, our country has finally real
ized, and other key nations have finally realized, that the problem is
a cancer and not a headache; and it must be treated with surgery and
not with aspirin. -
PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The spirit of this realization is also found in the progress in inter
national law. In February 1971, an international treaty called the
Convention on Psychotropic Substances was successfully negotiated
in Vienna between 71 nations. This treaty will provide some minimu
of controls over the international commerce in categories of drugs
of abuse, which have previously been subject to no such restrictions
It is now before the Senate for advice and consent.
Similarly, our Government has proposed and sponsored amend
ments to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, designe
to strengthen the power of international bodies to enforce the re
strictions on narcotics. On May 25 of this year, 71 countries attending
the Geneva conference voted for adoption of these amendments, an
47 countries have already signed them subject to final ratification
Many opium-producing countries have complained that the Single
Convention amendments force them to adopt restrictions on opiu
production while industrial nations are reluctant to accede to the
Convention of Psychotropic Substances which affects the drugs they
manufacture. Our Government, as one of the latter manufacturing
nations, has sought to dispel these doubts by assuring all countries
of our sincere support for the international control of all categories
of drugs of abuse.
I have no reservations at all in recommending these major im
provements in international law to the Senate and to the people o
this Nation.
9
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will be happy to attempt to re-
spond to any questions you have. - -
(Attachments to Mr. Ingersoll's prepared statement follow:)
EOREIGN REGION PERSONNEL
- - Support -
Fiscal year Agents personnel Total
ind of 1969----- - ---------------------------- 26 - . 4 30
nd of 1970------------------------------------------------------ - 27 9 - 36
nd of 1971------------------------------------------------------ 49 24 73
resent onboard as of June 19, 1972---------------------------- * - - - - - 93 60 153
nd of 1972 (planned)--------------------------------------------- 11 71 186
nd of 1973-------------- - - - - (1) : (1) - (1)
1 No projected changes.
: - ‘. . - FOREIGN DISTRICT OFFICES
End of fiscal year 1969 . . –––––––––––––––––––––– 13
47
Present -
Location of BNDD FOREIGN DISTRICT OFFICES
FISCAL YEAR 1969
Mexico City, Lima, Rome, Paris, Beirut, Istanbul, Bangkok, Seoul, Singapore,
Hong Kong, Montreal, Saigon, and Ankara.
- FISCAI, YEAR TO DATE
Vietna??], .
Saigon.
Meanico & Central America :
Mexico City, Guadalajara, Hermosillo, and Monterrey.
a/nama & SOwth America :
Panama City, Panama; Caracas, Venezuela; Asuncion, Paraguay; Buenos
ires, Argentina; Lima, Peru; Quito, Ecuador; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Bogota,
olumbia ; Brazilia, Brazil; and La Paz, Bolivia.
ear East:
Ankara, Turkey; Istanbul, Turkey; Izmir, Turkey; Beirut, Lebanon; Kabul,
fghanistan ; Tel Aviv, Israel; Tehran, Iran; and Islamabad, Pakistan. - -
Outheast Asia : - -
Bangkok, Thailand; Chiang Mai, Thailand; Vientiane, Laos; Kuala Lumpar,
Malaysia ; Singapore; Phnom Penh, Cambodia ; and New Delhi, India,
ar East: - ...
Tokyo, Japan ; Hong Kong; Manila, P.I. ; Seoul, Korea; and Okinawa.
wrope: - - - + -
London, England; Paris, France; Marseilles, France; Madrid, Spain; Bar-
elona, Spain; Rabat, Morroco; Bonn, Germany; Frankfurt, Germany; Munich,
ermany; Milan, Italy; Rome, Italy; and Brussels, Belgium. -
Senator SPONG. Thank you very much, Mr. Ingersoll. It is very com-
rehensive testimony and most helpful.
ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY
In an article entitled “The World Opium Situation,” which was pre-
ared by BNDD (Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs) and
rinted in the June 1971 Congressional Record, it was noted that one
Problem with the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was a
ack of enforcement authority on the part of the International Nar-

10
cotics Control Board. Do you believe the protocol, in any way, helps
to overcome this problem since it does not provide for any enforce
ment authority? e •
Mr. iNgºnsoli. Mr. Chairman, it will help. It will certainly not
solve the problem. First of all, the International Narcotics Control
Board will be able to modify opium producing estimates in countries
where it seems that surpluses led to diversion of legal stocks; and, Sec.
ond, the Board, under the terms of the amendment, may reduce :
country's production by an amount equal to the amount that went int
the illicit traffic in that country in a previous year.
In addition the Board may request, not force, but may request a Coun-
try to admit an inspection team to examine the situation. The country
can still reject help from the Board but at least it must do a study and
submit proposed remedial measures to the Board. &
Of course, one of the limitations of international treaties when deal-
ing with criminal activity is that each government is sovereign in
legislating and enforcing criminal law, and much will rest, on world
opinion as to the effectiveness of its performance. So it will help. It
certainly by no means pretends to solve this particular problem.
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS IN TERMS OF TREATMENT
Senator SPONG. You have touched on this next question in your
testimony, particularly with regard to recent efforts in France, but in
the article I referred to in the previous question it is noted that—and
I quote: -
Given the present scale of opium-based drug abuse, it is unlikely to be lastingly
suppressed without greater international cooperation in treatment and enforce
ment programs as well as in attempts to control production directly.
Would you evaluate international efforts in terms of (1) treatment
(2) enforcement programs; and (3) control of production?
Mr. INGERSOLL. In the area of treatment, I would say that only
handful of countries are performing effectively. In those cases, I think
§: drug problem is rather small, with the exception of the United
tates.
The World Health Organization provides materials and references
on treatment programs that are available or in use in the world in
various nations; and each country that has had a severe drug problem
and that has mounted a treatment program has seemed to do this ir
direct relationship to its own culture and standards. For example, the
United Kingdom treats its addicts in a manner that is far differen
from the way Japan approached the problem, Japan required manda
tory treatment programs and a drug-free treatment environmen
whereas in the United Kindom, on the other hand, treatment is no
institutionalized completely and heavy use is made of drug mainte
nance programs. -
In the United States we are taking a middle road, I think, betwee
these two extremes.
The country of Iran has a very serious addiction problem and i
this case both the World Health Organization and the United State
have offered assistance. Article 15 of the Protocol embodies languag
which implies the desirability of parties having treatment programs
This is a matter of local decisionmaking and one which each govern
ment has to undertake itself.

11
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS IN TERMS OF ENEORCEMENT PROGRAMS
In the area of enforcement, the situation again is improving. I think
he reason we have had so much difficulty in persuading governments
ºf other countries to step up their enforcement programs is because
Irug problems have not been of high priority in enlisting their action
ind for many years the common retort was, “That is an American
}roblem.”
Now, more and more of these countries are finding a spread of the
lrug problem within their own territories and so they are taking in-
reasing action and paying more attention to it.
At a World Conference I attended last October, for example, the
lelegates repeatedly referred to this as a worldwide scourge and I
hink that best typifies the reaction of many governments at this time.
The example of Turkey, while it will not put a complete stop to
larcotic trafficking and will indeed not stop drug addiction in the
Jnited States itself, does show what can be done by a government
which is concerned that it was unable to control diversion of what
ſtarted out to be a perfectly legitimate production for use in medicine.
And because it could not control diversion into illicit trafficking, it
łecided to cease opium production altogether.
INCREASED CONTROLS
The same kind of approach would not be successful in many of the
ther countries I have mentioned because they simply don't have the
same degree of control over the territory in which opium is produced
hat Turkey has. Nevertheless, in these other countries we have seen
ncreased controls. For example, Laos, until last fall, did not have a
aw that made the production and movement of opium illegal. It
passed a law, and since that law has been in effect they have been very
iſſective in enforcing it.
In many countries in Southeast Asia–Thailand is another ex-
imple—there was no law against Opium production until the late
950s and it apparently takes a great deal of time to overcome the
nertia that an absence of law has created.
I might also add to this that many nations are moving toward the
stablishment of central narcotic bureaus for law enforcement and
egulatory purposes—places such as Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand,
Laos, the Philippines, and perhaps generally.
ARRIVING AT NUMBER OF U.S. ADDICTS
Senator SPONG. In your statement you used the figure of a half
million for the number of those in the United States that you estimate
i. pºſsently addicted to hard drugs. How did you arrive at that
OUII'ê
"Mr. INgrºsol. This is a statistical extrapolation of some known
º which mainly is based on addicts who have been identified either
y virtue of having come to the attention of local police agencies or
o medical authorities throughout the United States. From this sample,
ising a well-verified statistical technique that is used in other processes
estimating populations, the figure of about 565,000 has been obtained.
12
Before that technique was used, estimates that were reported on the
bases of just the sample figure which was derived from the reporting of
about 40 communities around the country.
ESTIMATE REVISED UPWARD
Senator SPONG. How much of an upward revision does thi
represent?
Mr. INGERSOLL. That is very hard to say, Mr. Chairman, becaus
until the last 2 or 3 years no effort was made to estimate the tota
population. I think that it is fair to say, however, that it represents a
substantial increase over what existed 10 or 15 years ago. By that, I
mean very substantial.
COORDINATION PROBLEMS
Senator SPONG. There have been reports that the activities of the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the U.S. Customs have
sometimes been hindered by coordination problems. Would you care
to comment on that?
Mr. INGERSOLL. I think that such reports, and particularly what ap-
pears in the popular press from time to time, are gross exaggerations.
I think it has to be expected that where two organizations are operat-
ing in the same area from time to time that there will be conflicts, and
I am not going to deny that operational conflicts have occurred. How-
ever, I do not think that these have impeded the Government’s pro-
gram against drug trafficking and I think that a look at the record of
both the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Bureau of
Customs during the last couple of years show the great improvement
that both agencies have demonstrated. This supports my contention
that whatever minor operational conflicts may have occurred in th
field from time to time certainly have not impeded overall progress in
controlling the traffic; and, I might Say, that at this time the relation
between the Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
and the Commissioner of Customs have never been better. We are in
constant communication and we direct our forces explicitly and per-
Sonally from time to time when we have a mutual operation going.
IS CIA INVOLVED IN OPIUM PRODUCTION IN INDOCHINA 2
Senator SPONG. There have been reports of CIA involvement i
opium production in the Golden Triangle area of Indochina. Do you
care to comment on those charges?
Mr. INGERSOLL. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, there i
absolutely no basis to those charges.
Senator SPONG. Senator Pearson?
Senator PEARSON. Just two or three questions came to mind as
followed your very excellent statement.
GOVERNMENT EFFORTS RELATING TO ADDICTION INCREASES
I would be interested if you would put in the record, although i.
deals with our domestic effort, what the effort of our Government has



















13
been in relation to the increase of addiction in the last decade that you
sited, and I would like, if you would, to put the figures as to your
budget requests and budget authorizations and appropriations and
manpower figures in. :
I must say that while there is a limit to the number of people who
might serve our Government in overseas capacities, the recitation of
the number from four to 11 in Marseilles seems like a relatively
insignificant increase at the very heart of what some of this problem is.
Mr. INGERSOLL. Senator, I will be very happy to comply with your
request but may I point out also that our agents have no enforcement
authority. -
Senator PEARSON. I understand that.
Mr. INGERSOLL. They are present there for advisory purposes—
Senator PEARSON. I understand.
Mr. INGERSOLL (continuing). And to provide assistance. I think
what we should examine is the increase in resources that other govern-
ments have put into this campaign.
Senator PEARSON. And they are substantial, are they?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes, sir.
(The information referred to follows:)
BUDGET REQUESTs AND APPROPRIATIONS FOR BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND
DANGEROUS DRUGS
(Supplied by the Department of Justice)
Attached is a tabulation of the budget requests and appropriations for BNDD
ind its predecessor agencies during the previous ten years. One of these agencies,
he Bureau of Drug Abuse Control, did not exist for this entire period of time.
These figures do not represent total GOVernment expenditures on drug law
inforcement activities inasmuch as Other agencies, particularly U.S. Customs,
have been involved in this effort to SOme degree throughout the period in question.
COMPARISON OF BUDGET REQUESTS AND APPROPRIATIONS ENACTED
{In thousands]
Approved Approved
Year Requested by Congress Year Requested by Congress
962: Total----------- 5,657 5,657
(a) FBN-------------- $4,462 $4,462
(b) BDAC------------- NA NA 5, 1966: -
(a) FBN------------- 6,050 6,050
Total------------ 4, 462 4,462 (b) BDAC------------ 2, 199 2, 199
2. 1963: Total----------- 8, 249 8, 249
(a) FBN------------- 4,777 4,767
(b) BDAC------------ NA NA 6, 1967:
(a) FBN------------- 6, 275 6,275
Total----------- 4,777 4,767 - (b) BDAC------------ 5, 107 5, 107
3. 1964: Total----------- 11, 382 11, 382
(a) FBN------------- 4, 450 5,350
(b) BDAC------------ NA NA 7. 1968: BNDD-------------- 14,374 14,374
8. 1969: BNDD-- - - - - - - - - - - - - 20, 455 18, 533
Total----------- 5,450 5,350 | 9. 1970: BNDD-------------- 27,772 27,772
- 10. 1971: BNDD-------------- 44, 201 43,592
65: 11. 1972: BNDD-------------- 66,639 65,039
(a) FBN------------- 5,657 5, 657 12. 1973; BNDD-- - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 73,053 174,053
(b) BDAC------------ NA NA s"
1 Approved by House and Senate Subcommittees. Transfer to GSA for space not reflected.
(See p. 73 for additional material.)
81—235—72—3
14
RECORD OF WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT
Senator PEARSON. You made particular reference to France and, O
course, I understand that, but you also indicated that some of th
processing was being done in West Germany. What is the record of th
West German Government? -
Mr. INGERSOLL. I didn't mean to imply that we know of any heroin
processing that is occurring in West Germany; however, West Ger
many is used as a trans-shipment country from Turkey and from th
Middle East into France. It may be possible that violators will b
moving, or may have already moved to Germany because of the pres
sure in France. We are particularly concerned about cities such as
Hamburg, but we have dialog and communications with a variety o
people in the West German Government, members of the Bundestag
members of the Government itself and the police. The West German
at this time are moving toward the establishment of central coordina-
tion of narcotics control which at the present is mainly in the hands
of the several provinces. As you know, West Germany is a federated
government of the almost pure variety and enforcement responsibilit
basically lies at the province level.
A meeting, for example, was called by Minister Emke who is the
Chief of Ministries of the German Government, of all of the provin
cial prime ministers—and they have all agreed to coordinate and co
operate with the national government in this effort.
BNDD has offices in three cities in Germany—Bonn, Frankfurt,
and Munich, and the German police and German customs service have
made several large seizures of morphine base. They are setting up an
intelligence unit at this time. This will be a computerized intelligence
system with some 2,000 terminals to feed narcotics intelligence int
a central unit; so we think they are doing quite well.
USE OF DRUGS BY U.S. THOOPS IN WIESTERN EUROPE
Senator PEARSON. Has there been a significant increase in the use
of drugs and drug addiction among our troops in Western Europe
especially in Germany ? -
Mr. INGERSOLL. There is some increase; however, most of this is in
the use of hashish. There is sporadic availability of heroin but no
continuing availability of heroin to our troops in West Germany
Of course, we were very concerned that the same type of situation
that occurred in South Vietnam does not occur there; and the U.S
Army in Europe is very active in enforcement and education and othe
preventive efforts.
ENFORCEMENT OF ABSOLUTE BAN BY TURRISH GOVERNMENT
Senator PEARSON. Let me ask you this last question and that is
You have expressed considerable confidence that the Turkish Gov
ernment with the changes of administration and the passage of th
law would be able to enforce its absolute ban at the end of the 197
crop. Given the failure to enforce its prior reputation of having a
monopoly on the purchase of that opium that was produced, do you
See a greater capacity or greater resolution on the part of the Turkis
Government or is it easier to control an absolute ban than it is th
absolute, total purchase of the production?





















15
Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes, sir.
Senator PEARSON. What is the source of this confidence you have in
the implementation of the Turkish Government in its very consid-
erable and very laudatory act?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Well, it is easier to enforce an absolute ban pro-
vided that the proper inspection of the terrain is carried out; and
we have reason to believe that they will do that. I think also an under-
standing of the Turkish mind underlines some of the confidence that
I have. The peasant class in Turkey understands either a complete ban
or complete permissiveness in these kinds of matters and they have
difficulty in understanding the gray area in between, particularly
since there is no significant addiction problem in Turkey. The peasant
farmer on the Anatolian Plain looks at the opium plant as a useful
plant, not only because of the cash that it provides but also because
it serves as fuel, as fodder; the oil is useful in cooking; the seeds
are useful as condiments on bakery goods—he cannot understand the
problems and the difficulty that the white powder derived from opium
causes on the streets of New York and elsewhere in the United States.
But he can understand when his government says no more produc-
ion; and the government officials in Turkey involved in this program
are optimistic that the farmer will comply, particularly since the
urkish Government will be compensating the farmer for the cash
OSS that he will incur during the first several years while changes in
conomic development are being made.
Senator PEARSON. I thank you very much, Mr. Ingersoll.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SPONG. Thank you, Senator Pearson.
POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED ITILICIT TRADE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
I would like to pursue for a moment, Mr. Ingersoll, the possibility
f increased illicit trade in Southeast Asia.
It has been suggested that the Florida based Trafficante family has
become involved in Southeast Asia. Also, in 1971, after certain suit-
cases containing heroin were seized at Orly Airport in France, sources
in Vietnam and Laos suggested that the French connection was ar-
ranged by a man named Theodas, who is a member of the French-
Corsican underworld and manager of a hotel in Vientiane, Laos.
Could this be considered evidence of a move of the illicit traffic
:oward Southeast Asia?
Mr. INGERSOLL. I think that the probability that French traffickers
will move to Southeast Asia is quite good and I think they probably
have been making arrangements ever since the ban on Turkish opium
production was announced. There is probably still a considerable
amount of opium that originated in Turkey in the pipelines that will
satisfy their requirements for an undetermined period. However, as
..hey move to Southeast Asia their logistical lines of supply will be
2xtended. I think this will make them more vulnerable to effective
police intercession. -
As I mentioned in my statement, there is still a heavy French in-
luence in Indochina and I am not naive enough to believe that all con-
nections between French and Asian criminals have been broken merely
jecause of the absence of the French Government in that area.
16
CountRIES NOT PARTY TO SINGLE CONVENTION
Senator SPONG. Are there countries which are not parties to the
Single Convention which could in your judgment, become major pro-
ducers as our efforts in Turkey and elsewhere take effect?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Yes, Mr. Chairman, there are some producing coun:
tries at this time that are not parties to the Single Convention. Iran is
one although it does participate in United Nations activities in drug
control. Iran is taking steps to ratify the Single Convention and, I be:
lieve, Laos is as well.
Senator SPONg. How about in the Western Hemisphere?
Mr. INGERSOLL. Mr. Chairman, I don’t think I can answer that ques.
tion, but I will be very happy to supply an answer for the record, if
you wish. -- -
Senator SPONG. Thank you. . f
(See p. 65 for State Department answer with which Mr. Ingersoll
concurs.) - t - -
CURBING PRODUCTION AND STUPPLY OF OPIUM
Senator SPONG. In comparison with the amount of opium needed to
supply addicts, the production is quite large. Do you believe produc
tion and supply can be curbed ? …”
Mr. INGERSOLL. In terms of the requirements in the United States
it is true that production is very large; however, until this year, to
the best of our knowledge, most of the opium production was used
throughout the world and the demand in various parts of the world
is still quite high. -
As far as the United States is concerned, I think that we cannot just
focus our efforts on the control of Supply. It seems to me this is ar
emergency type of effort that we have to maintain until we reduce
the demand in this country; and the demand can be reduced by first
providing adequate treatment for those who are addicted at this time
then, hopefully, we can change the attitudes of Americans toward
drugs and drug abuse over a longer period of time so that the demand
will disappear. - -
But I regard law enforcement and control efforts as really a firs
aid treatment, if you will; an emergency activity pending a long
range solution to the overall problem.
BASIS FOR PRODUCTION FIGURES
Senator SPONG. I am going to ask you to provide the following fo
the record, if you will: I would like a country by country estimate o
illicit opium production in the current year, and a comparison with th
estimated production in those countries 5, 10, and 20 years ago. In addi
tion, I would like to know what basis you have used for your estimate
I know this is not easy but we would like for you to do as well as yo
can with this, Mr. Ingersoll. (See p. 72.)
SUCCESS OF EUROPEAN EFFORTS TO STEM DRUG PROBLEM
Senator SPONG. I would like to ask you to summarize on one point
Do you believe that the drug problem in Europe is now being success
fully stemmed, or would you say that present European efforts are 5
percent or 75 percent successful—or would you use some other figure






17
Mr. INGERSOLL. I don’t know that I can quantify that, Mr. Chair-
man, because I think Europe is just getting started and they are where
we were maybe 5 or 10 years ago, both in respect to the extent of the
drug problem and their reaction to it. I think most Europeans will
agree with that assessment; they are at least 5 years behind us in all
respects. -
Senator SPONG. And certainly a part of their increased interest in
enforcement has been the fact that the problem is growing within their
own countries? -
Mr. INGERSOLL. There is no question about that. It seems to be human
nature to wait until a problem becomes a crisis before action is taken
against it or before it is given priority attention. I think that occurred
in the United States as well. -
PARTICIPATION IN PROTOCOL
Senator SPONG. There is a disparity between the number of parties
o the Single Convention—I believe there were over 90—and the num-
er of countries which have thus far signed the protocol, 47, expanding
he powers of the International Control Board.
Do you attach any significance to this and do you expect full par-
ticipation in the protocol!
Mr. INGERSOLL. I think the representative of the State Department
can answer that better than I can, Mr. Chairman; however, I do know
that these amendments were very controversial among the parties to
the Single Convention and also those who participated in the Geneva
Convention, and I thought 41 signing subject to ratification was a
good record in view of the handicap we started with. But I would
prefer to defer to the State Department representative on that
question.
Senator SPONG. We will be hearing from him.
Thank you very much.
Senator Pearson, do you have any further questions?
Senator PEARSON. No. -
Senator SPONG. We would appreciate the information we requested
for the record. - - w
Mr. INGERSOLL. We would be very happy to provide it.
Senator SPONG. Thank you for your testimony; and Mr. Belk and
Mr. Miller, thank you. - " .. 2
Senator SPONG. Mr. Rossides?
STATEMENT OF HON, EUGENE T. RossIDES, ASSISTANT SECRE.
TARY FOR ENFORCEMENT, TRADE AND OPERATIONS, DEPART-
MIENT OF THE TREASURY -
Mr. ROSSIDEs. Mr. Chairman, good morning. -
Senator SPONG. We are pleased to have you with us. Do we have
}opies of your statement? - -
Mr. RossIDEs. Mr. Chairman, I did not bring a prepared statement.
I thought I would give a general statement and answer any questions.
[ apologize but I have lived with this problem and I can easily lay out
o the committee and submit whatever additional information or put
my opening remarks into a more formal presentation. - h


18
Senator SPONG. It is not at all necessary. Are there some prefator
remarks you would like to make? -
Mr. RossIDEs. I would very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SPONG. All right. - -
Mr. RossIDEs. Let me say, first of all, that it is a great pleasure to b
invited by this committee to discuss what I consider, and I think yo
consider, one of the crucial problems facing our Nation, namely, th
problem of drug abuse. I think this distinguished committee can play
an additional role in this matter.
BIPARTISAN EFFORT IN AREA OF DRUG ABUSE
I think what we have seen in the last three and a half years is
tremendous bipartisan effort and accomplishments in the area of dru
abuse. -- -
Frankly, prior to January 1969, very little was done in this area o
a coordinated basis either by the executive or the legislative branches
of Government; and since that time under the leadership of Presiden
Nixon, with the full bipartisan support of the Congress, in my judg
ment, we have made substantial progress. ,
I happen to take an optimistic view that for the first time we ar
succeeding; we are turning the tide in a multidimensional approac
and attack on this problem.
PROBLEM ELEVATED TO FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE
I think the President's multifaceted program has led the way, and
if I could quickly mention them and the first and most importan
point, frankly, is what concerns this committee particularly: For th
first time we elevated this problem to a foreign policy issue. Instead
of the nonsense of the past of dealing with foreign governments b
agents, as dedicated as they may be, that is not their function, for th
first time we elevated it to a foreign policy issue and the Presiden
took a direct, personal interest, solicited the cooperation of foreign
governments such as Mexico, Turkey, and France, through the De
partment of State; directed Secretary of State Rogers to make thi
a high priority item. - -
The Department of State has done an enormous job in this area in
the last 31/3 years. It has been an unheralded job and
would like to lay out some of the things that I think they hav
accomplished. - - - -
First of all, the Ambassador now is informed this is a foreig
policy issue. In the past, whoever held the idea that the enforcemen
problem was a foreign policy issue? Mr. Chairman, I submit that 5
years from now, the role of the President and the Congress in alertin
not just our Nation but the world community to this problem, wil
go down in history far more than what we are doing in Vietnam an
elsewhere in many ways. -
We have had a U.N. International Narcotics Control Board fo
many, many years, and it did literally nothing. Governments talke
about this and gave an annual comment, a few of them; but once th
President raised this in his U.N. speech on the 25th anniversar
again it alerted the world. That does not mean we don’t have a lo























19
more to do, because I am not that optimistic in that sense. We have to
pressure ourselves: we have done a tremendous job in 3% years;
we have to do a lot more. Many of our friends and allies around the
world have done a fine job, but they have got to do a lot more; and I
am not so sanguine that without continuing attention by our Govern-
ment, and particularly the Congress, it is apparent our officials can-
not speak out as easily as the Congress, to keep the viewpoint that
this is an urgent world problem. Let's take France, Mr. Chairman, as
an example
Mr. PEARSON. Pardon me. What do you mean when you say, “our
officials cannot speak out”?
Mr. RossIDEs. Well, Senator, what I mean is, you cannot—I can-
not criticize another Government, because it is misinterpreted. I can
congratulate other Governments and say “we can do more, and they
have been doing a good job”; that is what I meant.
Senator PEARSON. I see.
MEXICO
Mr. RossIDEs. Mexico has done a fine job, but she has to do more.
France has done an outstanding job, which I will indicate, but more
should be done; but just like our own Government, more should be
done in this matter.
FRANCE
But France, who had not been as aware of this matter before,
through the diplomatic efforts in raising this to a diplomatic level
where the President himself became involved, the Department of
State became involved, and the extraordinary job done by Ambassador
Watson—I guess of all of our Ambassadors around the world—I
would have to single out Ambassador Watson's performance in work-
ing quietly and effectively with the French Government to obtain
their cooperation and pointing out that it is their problem as well. The
French Government realizes they have a great number of addicts in
France, and that is a world matter and a humanitarian matter; and,
I think, as Mr. Ingersoll pointed out in response to a question from
Senator Pearson, it is not so much the number of our agents there,
it is how much of an increase of agents by the French Government,
and they have done an extraordinary job in the last year. Their
seizures by their French customs service on March 2 of 935 pounds
stems directly from the initiatives taken to make this into a world
problem, to make it realized that it affects everybody.
TURREY
Now, in Turkey, they have done a fine job, and it was a courageous
act by the Turkish Government to legally ban the opium production
as of this weekend. The enforcement of that we have to pay a great
deal of attention to and keep working cooperatively with them to in-
sure proper compliance.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
So I say that in this area of foreign affairs—take Southeast Asia,
which is another great problem area—the whole history of the people
20
is smuggling as a way of life. We have made a lot of advances there
in hopes of preventing the percentage of opium and heroin coming
from Southeast Asia, to keep that percentage from increasing. For the
first time we are a little bit ahead of the game through the initiatives
we have taken under the leadership of the Department of State in
working with these various Governments in Setting up teams.
SOUTH AMERICA
Through our efforts in the customs service, we uncovered the major
ring in South America, the now famous, or infamous, Räcord case:
and somehow not only the French Corsicans came not only across the
South Atlantic but also through South America and in the United
States. Through the contrabandista system, goods are smuggled into
the Southern Hemisphere; and with an empty airplane at destination
why not put something in it and bring it here; and we stopped that
LEADERSHIP OF STATE DEPARTMENT
The first thing was to raise the drug problem to the diplomatic level
and the leadership of the State Department in this area has been, in
my judgment, tremendous in projecting the interests of the United
States and the world community, and, frankly, this is an issue of
which all Governments can agree upon, and it can help bring the world
community together, which it has done in this example more than it
has done in other issues which are divisive. -
CUSTOMS-TO-CUSTOM'S COOPERATION
As an example, one of the programs we started in the Treasury in
the spring of 1969 was customs-to-customs cooperation. This was the
first line of defense, Mr. Chairman, for in our country and in most
countries, there are efforts to prevent the smuggling. We were able to
Successfully have in the past the Customs Cooperation Council to pass
Smuggling laws. We are very proud of our sister customs service offi
cers in France.
Mr. Chairman, we actually had meetings with the Communist
countries behind the Iron Curtain, customs to customs, and I also had
the pleasure of hosting the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Directors of Cus
toms, as an example, during their recent visits to the United States,
Let me go quickly to the other points of the administration’s multi
faceted program and then stress Treasury’s specific role and then
answer any questions.
ROLES STRESSED ON FEDERAL LEVEL
You cannot just talk about this as an enforcement problem, ob
viously. As the President stressed, for the first time on a Federal level
the crucial roles of research, education, and rehabilitation, enormous
increases in budget, and, I think, significant and successful attempt
for better coordination of the many diverse agencies working in this
area of the Federal Government.




















21
DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN CRIMINAL STRUCTURE IN LEGISLATION
Third, we differentiated between the criminal structure in the legis-
ation that passed the Congress as between heroin and marihuana, so
the one which is the more serious remains a felony, of course, but on
he marihuana, the gradation and also flexible penalties for handling
youthful offenders, so with a first offender that slate can be wiped
lean whether it is a soft or a hard drug.
INCREASE IN BUDGETARY SUPPORT FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
Fourth, substantial increase in budgetary support for Federal law
enforcement in the two main agencies, the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, and our own Bureau of Customs. Additionally, in
this area last year, the President initiated the Treasury-IRS drug traf-
fic program where we do tough tax investigations of the middle- and
upper-echelon drug dealers, extremely successful programs which I
will comment on further.
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT
Fifth, you cannot beat this unless you get the community involved
n this problem; and I have said this in public many times, it is a two-
way street. Unless the community cooperates with the law enforce-
ment agencies, it will not beat the heroin problem. Blacks are breeding
blacks in this country, and Spanish are breeding Spanish speaking—
and whites are breeding whites; the drug traffic in Bedford-Stuy-
vesant, my home borough in Harlem, St. Albans, Watts—are run by
blacks, drug traffickers elsewhere by Spanish speaking, and by whites
elsewhere.
CENTRAL ROLE OF STATES
Now, sixth and last is, of course, the central role of the States. Now,
before this administration, frankly, a number of States—California
and New York—which had the main problem were doing the best
ork, but a lot of it going down the drain because you did not have
he total picture: a total program, diplomatic as well as Federal en-
forcement and rehabilitation.
We must understand that there are over 350,000 State and local law
enforcement officials, and that is crucial; and I cite you the example
of Japan, Mr. Chairman, the closest to the source with the largest
supply, the largest supply of opium in the world, had a serious heroin
problem after World War II. She has beaten that problem by tough
enforcement, by her customs service and her internal police, and by
her educational programs and total community action.
TREASURY’s ROLE THREEFOLD
Very quickly, Treasury’s role is threefold: Our primary responsi-
bility is to stop smuggling; and before January 1969, Customs was
literally out of that business, and this administration brought it back
nto it with enormous accomplishments with the support of the Con-
gress on Appropriations Committees and the full Congress.
81–235—72—4
22
Statistics on Seizures I can supply; just as an example, last year
Over 1,000 pounds, 1,109 pounds of almost pure heroin, an extraordi-
nary accomplishment, Mr. Chairman; in addition, the number of ar-
rests and seizures of all drugs have increased dramatically. No one
knows how much is getting in. That is a statistics game, but we cer-
tainly know from the amount that we have seized, the amount that for-
eign governments have seized, that in my judgment the supply of
heroin has peaked. It does not mean the number of addicts has peaked,
but I think for the first time we are finally giving the smugglers and
drug peddlers a run for their money. -
A Second area, an extraordinarily successful one, and I am going
to have our 12-month report shortly, is our IRS drug program. -
We have, in a short 11 months, 718 middle- and upper-echelon drug
dealers in the United States under tax investigation, 412 agents
throughout this country. We have had tremendous cooperation with
our sister Federal enforcement agencies and local and State police—
there is an example of a key organization in southern California with
narcotics agents that we have been trying to get for years and could
not get the actual narcotics evidence. We have them under a solid tax
investigation, and with the cooperation of our sister agencies with
California and Federal, we are going to break that organization and
take the profit out of it.
The third area of Treasury involvement, we have from the very be-
ginning of this administration at Treasury, taken the position in
dealing with any country on this problem of lining up the various
items of American interests in that country, so when we talk about
economic aid, economic assistance, that certainly had to be a factor
in relation to whether or not that country was properly enforcing its
drug laws and cooperating with us. Now, of course, there has been the
bill that has passed the Congress, and upon the President’s deter-
mination that a country is or is not cooperating, it is up to the Secre-
tary of the Treasury -
Senator SPONG. That legislation originated in this committee.
Mr. RossIDEs. Right. This is a most important position, just like
our position on expropriation. What a country does on drugs should
concern not just the United States, but all the international lending
institutions. It is silly to be pouring money into a country and have
it go down the drain because that country really is not doing its job
on drugs.
Mr. Chairman, that is a quick overview. Let me mention specifically
some of the things we did.
For instance, in Virginia, we have increased our number of people
there. We don’t have many people there, but as an example one of
the substantial cases that we had which affects Virginia and the Dis-
trict of Columbia. It started out as a mail case which Customs had un-
covered—William Herman Jackson—and he had a smuggling ap-
paratus stemming from Southeast Asia here, and stemming from
that lead and tip and involving cooperation with other agencies, we
were able to convict three members of that group just last month, and
they are awaiting sentencing today. But it is a tough problem. I think
we are making substantial progress; a lot more has to be done.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SPONG. Thank you, very much.
23
PROBLEMs of coorDINATION BETwPEN BUREAUs
You mentioned increased coordination and cooperation between the
various governmental agencies. I asked Mr. Ingersoll to comment
upon any problems of coordination between the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs, and the Customs Bureau. I wonder if you have
anything to say with regard to that? - -
Mr. RossIDEs. Well, I would echo Director Ingersoll's comments,
Mr. Chairman. Certainly there is bumping as there are in many
aspects of governmental operations where two agencies in part of
their duties overlap. I am not trying to belittle that, but I think it is a
normal amount of bumping. In the beginning, it might have been more
than that. We have it under control, and I think the two organizations
are working much better today. . -
But let me say this, that that is like a pimple compared to the suc-
cess of the beefing up of both of these organizations and the coopera-
tion that has occurred between them. There is a problem, a Small One,
and I am not too concerned about it. We are working it out within the
executive, and with the coordination of our committees. -
METHOD OF TH,F,F,GAL ENTRY
Senator SPONG. What method of illegal entry represents the most
difficult problem for the enforcement efforts that you are connected
with ? - .
Mr. RossIDEs. The most difficult method of entry of any enforcement
effort, not just our own, at this point involves the light aircraft com-
ing across the southern border, and Small craft landing along the
coast. Last year, Treasury proposed and the Appropriations Commit-
tee and the Congress approved—ſ forget the amount; I think it was
approximately $15 million—for equipment for this antiair intrusion
program along the Southern border. We are working in close coordi-
nation with the Navy on the development of proper radar and sensor
devices which are semioperational now and will be operational within
the next—fully operational say, within the next month—to help close
part of that gap along the southern border. When I say part of it, we
can’t patrol the whole border, but there are certain key spots which
radar today cannot handle and that is what we are going after, and we
are making it tougher on the air intrusion by the light aircraft. This
is simply the contrabandista system, and it ties in with other aspects
of the problem. - -
And here is what we are trying to say to our colleagues and friends
in South America, and this is being projected by our Ambassadors:
the contrabandista system of Smuggling goods is too dangerous when
it involves drugs. One is that it may seep into their own societies in
South America, but allowing the Smuggling to go on by light aircraft
into South America helps destroy their economies, reduces the amount
of duties that they collect by customs, unfair competition to the honest
usinessman trying to sell in a particular country. But that is the big-
'est problem we have today, the method whereby we think most of the
heroin and marihuana is coming, via light aircraft.





















24
CBS DOCUMENTARY
Senator SPONG. Did you see the CBS documentary Sunday night?
Mr. RossIDEs. I did, Mr. Chairman. .
Senator SPONG. Would you care to comment on it? .
Mr. RossIDEs. Well, they never did contact us. I think they were
a little bit in error regarding the question of the air intrusion, because
we have a program and it is working, not working perfectly; it is
improving and it is making it tougher. In my judgment, we are cut-
ting the supply; and the fact that one department didn't apparently
want to answer their question—as an example, we are the ones re-
sponsible, and they never came to us because we have a program which
is off the ground on the antiair intrusion. However, I will say it was a
remarkable performance in working and developing the actual meth-
ods of the aircraft. I congratulate them on that. As I say, there were
just one or two points that I would have nitpicked with them on, but
I thought it was a remarkable show as to our problem. We are doing
more than indicated, but that is a different question.
DRUG TRAFFIC THROUGH HAMPTON ROADS, VIRGINIA, AND DULLES
AIRPORT
Senator SPONG. You made some mention of my own State of Vir-
ginia. Our State crime commission filed a comprehensive report a few
months ago and mentioned the traffic coming through the port of
Hampton Roads. Would you comment on the extent of the drug traffic
through Hampton Roads; the success or lack of success of efforts to
curb it; and the extent of drug traffic through Dulles airport?
Mr. RossIDEs. Right. We don’t know the extent; no one knows the
exact figures and that is one of the great problems in this area. In our
tax program we can give exact figures—how many people, how much
seizure—but in smuggling we don’t know. To use the word substantial
would be overstating it for Virginia as an entry point. Hampton Roads
is not a basic entry point although there is some.
The same at Dulles. Dulles is not a main entry point from overseas.
The key entry points are Miami, the whole southern border, where
light aircraft are used; of course, there is entry through New York,
Lake Champlain and Rouses Point. We have increased our manpower
at Dulles, for instance, couriers come in, and transit elsewhere, Say, at
Houston where there is not extreme foreign entry and Customs might
not conduct extensive searches. So I would say there has been Some
increase through Dulles. So we have increased manpower and are work-
ing closely with Virginia authorities to handle the matter.
I think of more interest is the fact that in our IRS drug trafficker
program as of this week, we had 19 targets in Virginia. This morning
I was informed that five more have been added this month so there are
24 middle- and upper-echelon drug traffickers, smugglers, financiers,
dealers who are under tax investigation in Virginia. -
Senator SPONG. Senator Pearson?
JAPAN's SUCCESS IN PREVENTING DRUG SMUGGLING
Senator PEARSON. I was intrigued by your comment in relation to
the Japanese and I think if I remember your statement, you said that
25
through tough enforcement and educational programs they had beaten
the problem. I am intrigued that any nation or group of people who
have a problem of this severity can beat the problem.
Would you expand on that? -
Mr. RossIDEs. Yes, Senator Pearson, and they have, and we should
use that as an example, and particularly since they are closest to the
largest supply of heroin. As a matter of fact, one of the positions that
this administration has taken was that in the multidimensional attack
you just simply cannot talk about trying to stop the growing of opium
as a source around the world; you have to attack that but if you are
depending on that, forget it. I think the figures presented this morning
show what a small percentage of the total opium production in the
world can supply all the heroin needed in the United States.
What the Japanese found after World War II was a very serious
heroin addiction problem and they went at it, yes, by their very great
social control of their community, I guess, but what they—the Japa-
nese authorities—diplomatic and enforcement—have stressed to us was
the tough enforcement by their customs Service primarily to prevent
the smuggling into Japan of drugs.
Every internal policeman—and take the Japanese police force in
Tokyo; it is not a question of a special squad of 100 or 300 or 500 men;
every one of the 40,000 policemen in Japan, in Tokyo, is a drug expert
in the sense that he has had the requirement to go through a drug
course and is looking for drugs. Sure, they have a special squad, but
every one of them, and they feel that they get more concern, they get as
concerned about a marihuana Seizure today as we do about a heroin
seizure. And it is there; it is a question of probably they don’t have
the question of corruption, rooting out corruption in this problem.
I first became aware of it through the Washington Post—I had not
been as aware of Japan’s enormous success in this until the Washing-
ton Post, a few years ago, wrote a long article, very detailed, a full
page on the inside as well as the front page, an article about their
efforts.
U.S. CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT COMPARED TO JAPANESE CUSTOMS
Senator PEARSON. Would you say your customs enforcement is as
good today as the Japanese were at the time? Where are we deficient?
Mr. RossIDEs. Well, let me say, as good as the Japanese are today.
Senator PEARSON. At the time they were “beating the problem”?
Mr. RossIDEs. I would say they have a tighter control but I don’t
have enough of the details. Let's put it this way, Senator: When we
ame—when this administration came on board we had 9,000 person-
el in the Bureau of Customs. The Bureau of Customs had been the
poor sister at the Treasury then and before, when I was there in the
1950's, in the Eisenhower administration. All the attention was on the
evenue side and they did not have the support they should have had
rom the Office of the Secretary, frankly.
President Nixon in 1969 proposed a major supplemental on July 14,
1969, and pointed out that customs—directed them to initiate a major
antismuggling program. So from that point we increased to approxi-
mately 13,000. We have come a long way.
In comparing us today to the Japanese customs, I think it would be

























26
unfair to say we are weaker or stronger. I would have to get a closer
comparison. I would have to Say we have such an enormous increase
that we are proud of it and these men in customs and IRS have made
the Seizures; manpower is one of the differences. We need a heck of a
lot more manpower. We have a lot of mileage to cover and need addi-
tional equipment for the Southern border. But we have been given
just about as much in the past as we were able to digest at that time
and we have no fault to say to our Appropriations Committee at this
time.
I would say that we have had other problems. Take the fact we had
to Supply the sky marshals. It was a program that had to be developed
where they would be up in the air and on the ground and doing pre-
departure controls, so we had an additional thousand we had to train
there. It was like bringing customs out of the dark ages in 1969.
On enforcement, on tariff and trade affairs, they had simply been
neglected and they are well on their way to being the premier customs
agency in the world; but I would say—I don’t want to say the Japa-
nese are ahead of us—but we can profit from their experience.
Senator PEARSON. I thank you very much and I thank the chairman.
Senator SPONG. Senator Fulbright?
LACK OF CORRUPTION IN JAPANESE FORCES
The CHAIRMAN. This Japanese experience interests me as it did
Senator Pearson. Why don’t they have corruption in their forces?
Mr. RossIDEs. Well, I cannot say, Senator, that they don’t, and I
threw that out without enough thought, possibly; but in our discus-
sions with our Japanese colleagues and customs Service, it is clear that
drugs—that no quarter is given when it comes to drugs, anyone who
accepts bribes and so on, it has developed that you just don’t do it or
else, in this area. -
The CHAIRMAN. I am just trying to get at what is behind it. I
mean
Mr. ROSSIDEs. The fear.
The CHAIRMAN. Obviously there is a lot of money in Japan, just as
there is here. When you say they don’t have corruption, the reverse, I
assume you mean we do have it. How do they treat their people when
they do catch them; what do they do with them? Do they convict them
or do they allow them to go on bail? Is it 4 or 5 years before they come
to trial? -
Mr. RossIDEs. I am not qualified
The CHAIRMAN. I am just trying to make a case.
Mr. RossIDEs. I don’t know all the facts whether there is or is not
corruption, and, really, I don’t want to get off on that too much; I can
discuss it a little bit. I think it is that the way we understand it, that
there is such a fear of drugs in the Japanese Society that when they
attack this problem I think anyone who might have wanted to try to
corrupt an official found that he was not successful but I would have
to—
The CHAIRMAN. How did they create such an attitude? Is this an
educational project? -
Mr. RossIDEs. Oh, yes, in good part, part of the ºlºmº
approach is educational and they stressed the educational—in thei
27
journals, in their literature regarding the problems of drugs and what
it does; in other words, to them drugs pollute the mind and body; it
is as simple as that. - - -
The CHAIRMAN. They have educated. We ought to know that, but
how did they educate them? We ought to be able to learn from the
experience of Some of these people who solved this problem.
Mr. ROSSIDEs. I think for the first time we in the last 31% years have
done an enormous job in education. - - -
The CHAIRMAN. Have the Japanese done the best of any country you
are aware of ? -
Mr. RossIDEs. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
CHINESE ExPERIENCE
The CHAIRMAN. What about the Chinese? After all, we first read
about the Chinese in the opium wars; they had their experience with
it, too. Is it a problem there? -
Mr. RossIDEs. We understand no, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. It used to be a very great problem?
Mr. RossIDEs. Very much so; in fact, I recall when the President re-
turned from his historic trip to the People's Republic he pointed out
in his conversation, one of the comments, the feeling he got was that
the Chinese were very annoyed at the white race because it was the
white race that had introduced opium into China. . . . . . . . ."
The CHAIRMAN. How did they control it?
Mr. RossIDEs. Well, the Chinese Communists have ways of control-
ling their people a lot more than we have in controlling our people and
I don’t think we want to use those methods, but we understand that the
2eople's Republic made a set program of eliminating perhaps not
ully, but eliminating the use of opium in Red China and quite success-
fully. Now, our main problems are the other Chinese, the overseas
hinese, who, our intelligence indicates, are the primary group in
3ontrol of the opium traffic in Southeast Asia. - .
The CHAIRMAN. They do it to make money. They don’t use it? . .
Mr. RossIDEs. Yes, Mr. Chairman. -
The CHAIRMAN. That is all.
Senator SPONG. Senator Javits? .
Senator JAVITs. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
TREATY RECOMMENDED
Mr. Rossides, you are making an enviable record as Assistant Sec-
etary in this area. Do you recommend this treaty to us?
Mr. RossIDEs. Very much so, Senator Javits.
Senator JAVITs. Now, will you tell us -
Mr. RossIDEs. For the first time this protocol puts a little more teeth
nto the United Nation’s efforts. A lot more can be done by the United
ations, and this protocol will help substantially. - .
CHINESE COOPERATION IN DAMMING UP THE FLOW OF DRUGS
Senator JAVITs. Now, will you tell us to what extent, if any, the
hinese are now cooperating in damming up the flow of drugs, espe-
ially heroin or cocaine or those derivatives? . . . . . . .












28
Mr. ROSSIDEs. Well, when you say the Chinese, Senator, are you
talking about—
Senator JAVITs. Mainland Chinese.
Mr. RossIDEs. The People's Republic?
Senator JAVITs. Right. -
Mr. RossIDEs. We have had no—I don’t want to say no problems—
no problems that we know about of any effort by the People's Republic
to be in control of the drug trade either to our troops or to the United
States. Now, charges had been made, as you know, in the past and
frankly, I have read practically every one of the intelligence reports
because we made special efforts to try to find out whether or not any
evidence could be traced back to the People's Republic, and every one
of the agencies had to come up with a negative.
ANTIMARIFIUANA AND ANTIHEROIN CAMPAIGNS
Senator JAVITs. Now, there was a television program on the othe
night which indicated that we are spending a good deal of money to
control the growth of marihuana or to spot its importation from
Mexico. Can you give us some idea as to what funds and resources we
are throwing into the antimarihuana campaign as contrasted with
what we are doing about hard drugs?
Mr. RossIDEs. Yes, Senator Javits. We do not distinguish betwee
antimarihuana and antiheroin campaigns. Unfortunately, when w
initiated Operation Intercept in 1969, and I was cochairman of th
committee that started it in February of 1969 in finding out what is th
scope of the problem and what do we recommend to the President.
I was cochairman along with the now Attorney General, and that wa
a task force on heroin, marihuana, and dangerous drugs; it covere
everything. But when we submitted—when the Attorney General an
the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary Kennedy, submitted a repor
to the President in June and then a decision was to move ahead and
have a massive effort at the border, it was unfortunate that everybody
took it as if we were just going after marihuana because 15 percent
we estimated, of the heroin used in this country comes from opiu
grown and cultivated and refined in Mexico.
INCREASES OF MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT
We increased efforts along the borders particularly, Senator, as
earlier pointed out; we had very few personnel in customs and w
increased by 1,000 through the special supplemental appropriatio
that was submitted in September of 1969 and passed by the Congres
in the fall of 1969. In addition in 1971, in the regular appropriation
Customs has increased manpower in this area at least 2,000 durin
the last 31/2 years.
So for the first time we are getting the equipment—in last year’
appropriation bill approximately $15 million for aircraft, radar, and
sensoring devices to take care of the main problem, namely, the intru
sion by light aircraft, as well as Small craft.
For the first time we are contending with smugglers. In my judg
ment, we have actually made them take a step backward because o
the antismuggling program, the efforts of the Bureau of Narcotic






















29
and Dangerous Drugs and most recently the tremendous efforts of the
Internal Revenue Service on tax investigation.
The actual figures I will be happy to supply for the record of the
increases of manpower and equipment, but there has been a substantial
budgetary increase on enforcement, as well as the education and
research.
Senator JAVITs. Would you supply that? I ask unanimous consent
that it be included at this point in the record. i
(The information referred to follows:)
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS INCREASES IN MANPOWER, EQUIPMENT, AND SO FORTH
(Supplied by the Department of the Treasury)
1968 1972 increase
Manpower----- 8, 103 11, 120 3,017
Cost of Operation wº -- $89,911,000 1 $193,340,000 $103,429,000
Aircraft--------- l 26 25
Automobiles 313 903 590
Boats------------------ 0 22 22
Sector intelligence units-------------------------------------------- 0 5 5
CADPIN (customs automatic data processing intelligence network)------ 2 1 2 1
$160 3 160
1 Estimated.
2 Computer.
8 On-line terminals.
REPORT OF FEDERAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND HARD DRUG ABUSE
Senator JAVITs. Now, are you familiar with the report of the Na-
tional Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, headed by Gov-
ernor Raymond Shafer, of which I am a member and which found
that marihuana should not be classified with the dangerous drugs, SO
called, like heroin, and that it is a diversion of our effort and resources
to put them on a parity in terms of enforcement?
Mr. RossIDEs. Well, let me say this, Senator: I have read—I am
familiar with—the report; I have not read it all. The HEW Special
Action Office would be more responsible on the medical aspects of
the problem but I do agree with the administration’s position regard-
ing marihuana, that it should not be legalized; and I would point out,
though, that I agree with the Commission's position to the extent that
you must differentiate between heroin and marihuana, and this ad-
ministration early in September of 1969, as part of the drug abuse
bill that was before the Congress at that time, recommended a differ-
entiation and penalties as between heroin and marihuana, which was
most important; but it has not gotten the credit for that; and we also
put in the provision, first offender provision, so that any youth on a
first offense, whether it was marihuana, heroin, or anything, the slate
could be wiped clean.
STOPPING SMUGGILING
But, Senator, I have seen too many cases of heroin where the per-
Son started on marihuana; and when we are going after smugglers,
the smuggler does not say, “I am just a heroin smuggler”; he may
have started out as a diamond Smuggler, gold smuggler, or watch
Smuggler, So what we are trying to do is to stop smuggling and I am
sure the Commission, which I am sure they did want was to stop
the Smuggling of items coming in-you can’t say, “Now at San Ysidro
81–235—72—5
30
we will just look for heroin”; we are looking for and stopping smug-
gling, so you will stop both. Our main emphasis is heroin.
NO PHYSIOLOGICAL PROGRESSION FROM MARIHUANA TO HEROIN
Senator JAVITs. If you will forgive me—it is kind of a mixed bag;
it is one thing for a smuggler to be smuggling heroin and marihuana
and I can agree with you on that, and the Commission did not come
out in any way to denigrate our effort to stop smuggling; but it is
quite another thing for you to extrapolate that those who use mari-
huana go to heroin. The Commission, after spending several million
dollars, found exactly to the contrary, that they don’t. There is no
causal, relationship. It surprised me, too, but after all, that is why
objective, rational people were appointed to look at research results
rather than extrapolating from one case or whatever we might know.
As a matter of fact, I don’t know of any such cases and I have had
a lot of experience in this field. -
Mr. ROSSIDES. Senator, I didn't mean to—I qualify it; absolutely,
there is no physiological progression from marihuana to heroin and I
was not suggesting that. I did not mean to suggest that, because I
think that we have properly downgraded the marihuana in compari-
Son to heroin; and our efforts are heroin oriented, no question about
it. You take our IRS drug trafficker program, that is, after the heroin
rings, there are of the 178 targets that we have around the country,
there are several, say, that are large scale marihuana smugglers or
dealers but this is heroin oriented. .
TREATY's EMPHASIS ON HARD DRUGs
Senator JAVITs. So we have a right to expect that in the implementa-
tion of this treaty, this convention, the emphasis will be the same on
hard drugs? - -
Mr. RossIDEs. Yes, sir.
DIFFICULTY OF GETTING PROBLEM AT PRODUCTION END
Senator JAVITs. Now, isn’t it a fact, and I don’t want to detain you
any further—other members are waiting to question you—isn’t it a
fact that the whole poppy production which is necessary to supply all
the demand in the United States can be confined to such a small area
that it is extremely difficult to get at this problem at that end? I am
not saying that we shouldn’t try but to get at the dreadful addiction
problem which we have in the United States, especially in my home
area where an estimated half of the addicts are and where the figure
has risen within a decade from an estimated 100,000 to an estimated
350,000, isn’t it a fact that this cannot be our main reliance in dealing
with this scourge? -
Mr. RossIDEs. Absolutely, Senator, and that thinking in the past is
what has helped cause the problem today. This administration re-
versed that and it has put that down in the order of priority and has
pointed out that less than—I think it is—1 or 2 percent of the land-
mass that is commonly being used to supply poppies can supply the
U.S. market. That does not mean, though, the tremendous achievement
with the treaty with Turkey has not been as significant as we hoped
31
because they were the symbol, because some 80 percent of the heroin
stemmed from poppies grown there.
But the first order of priority is to keep the stuff out, education,
research, and rehabilitation. We turned that around. Before we had
the idiocy of thinking, “Oh, well, we will just stop it at the source and
that will take care of it,” instead of the combined attack through edu-
cation, through research, rehabilitation, enforcement, working with
the foreign governments to enforce, stop it from being Smuggled in
and working at it internally. . .
Senator JAVITs. I am satisfied with your answer; I get its implica-
tions, but I think what you said might be translated to mean that first
priority should be this effort to eliminate growth and so on; you
don’t mean that? .
Mr. RossIDEs. No; I meant the opposite.
Senator JAVITs. I understand you now, what you meant, but you said
it differently. -
NUMBER OF HARD DRUG ADDICTS IN NEW YORK
Senator SPONG. Senator Javits, just for your own information, Mr.
Ingersoll testified earlier that his most current figure on the number
of hard drug addicts in the United States is a half million; based on
your New York figure, you would have more than half.
Senator JAVITs. I wouldn’t say that. I hope and pray we don’t have
half, but our figures are a little bit higher. There is a difference in
figures, but the order of magnitude is the same. If they have doubled,
more than doubled in 10 years or tripled in 10 years, I think the im-
pact on the country is the same. I don’t challenge Mr. Ingersoll's
figures at all. - -
Senator SPONG. Senator Percy?
EMPHASIS SIHOULD BE IN THARD DRUGS
Senator PERCY. Mr. Secretary, I would reemphasize what Senator
Javits has said on the question of priority. We handled that legisla-
tion in the Government Operations Committee and affirmed that vir-
tually the entire emphasis of this should be in hard drugs. The last
figure I had—560,000—a tremendous figure now, far higher than the
quarter of a million we were talking about a relatively few months ago.
JOB DONE BY AMIBASSADOR ARTETUR WATSON
I understand you mentioned in your testimony that Ambassador
Watson has done an outstanding job in France, and I did insert a
newspaper article in the Record some time ago that commented on the
job that he has done. What can we learn from his experience—how he
went about it, what he did that could be usefully employed as tech-
niques and approaches and procedures in other countries where we need
similar cooperation? - -
Mr. RossIDEs. I would say that he took seriously the President’s and
§ºry of State's statement that this was the highest priority item,
O. 1. -
The Ambassador, and I have talked to him personally about these
matters, told me he spent 75 percent of his time on this drug matter
32
because he understood it. He came back and I remember talking to him
about it when he visited. He took a walking trip through Harlem and
the South Bronx in New York City, my home area; but what the
Ambassador did, and here is a businessman who came in as an
ambassador, his was the quiet technique, the effective technique, of
getting a job done.
He was not trying to be bombastic and make loud speeches of attack
and so on; he worked quietly day in and day out with French officials
on the highest levels, explaining and asking how to cooperate, and
very important, two things, to point out they had their own drug prob-
lem, and this is one of the major breakthroughs, that you cannot be a
major transit production place without having it seep off into your own
society, into your own culture.
Second, and very important, is that this is the kind of traffic that
everyone could be against and he capitalized on that point, the crim-
inal elements were reaping huge profits out of this and that this
affected other nations and other allies and here he was able to work
quietly day in and day out, but the intensity of his concern and if
this—and it is, I say—I am One to extol the virtues and accomplish-
ments of the State Department in this area—it has been unheralded.
You know everyone tries, wants to talk about Vietnam or SALT and
so on, but as I said earlier, this problem, if it is as serious as we think
it is, and I have suggested to Some of the people in the media to stop
the nonsense of sending someone for a 1-day visit to some of these
places. “If you want to do a job, if you are concerned about the drug
problem in New York City, and I don’t know how many men you have
in Saigon but send a team to Turkey, to France, to Mexico, not for a
1-day visit, keep them there, and report day in and day out what
that country is doing.” I, as a Government official, cannot be asking
every day what is France doing, what is Turkey doing, what is Laos
doing, but the newspapers can report it factually, report what is hap-
pening, what is being done, and not enough of that is being done.
But Ambassador Watson, in typical methods of diplomacy in his
own quiet, effective way, has transmitted to his own staff and to the
French officials the intensity of the problem and that has helped.
Senator PERCY. Well, having worked with him over a period of years
on a number of international problems and seeing him deal with the
International Chamber of Commerce's problems, I know he zeros in
on a problem, makes his mind up as to a Solution and if he can be part
of it, and he is effective, and I imagine what you are saying then is
that all of our embassies have to recognize that the President has
assigned priority No. 1 to this particular problem, and that it must
be implemented in the effort that we put in abroad.
WILL IRAN REPLACE TURE EY AS MAJOR SOURCE OF OPIUM 2
Can you tell me a little about Iran? Is there any likelihood that
Iran will replace Turkey as a major source of opium after Turkey
imposes its total ban after this year?
Mr. RossIDEs. Probably not; probably not, because they have better
enforcement of production there. They had legal production; they
had gone out of legal production in the 1950’s but then when Turkey
and Afghanistan continued the illegal production, they found out that
33
drugs were being smuggled from those countries into Iran which has
a very large addict population. So the Iranian Government reinsti-
tuted the legal production for the addicts in Iran. For the older ones,
there are very strict procedures as to who gets the drugs, and they are
trying to curtail it that way. They have stated publicly and the offi-
cials have stated to me, and stated it publicly to the Shah, if Turkey
and all her neighbors go out of legal production, she will.
Now, Turkey has, as of the end of this week, banned production.
Our greater problem would be India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
Senator SPONG. Iran has been tough, if not tougher, than the Japa-
nese as far as penalties are concerned.
Mr. RossIDEs. Correct, Mr. Chairman. I forget the figure, but it is
a death penalty, and I forget whether 40 were executed last year.
Senator SPONG. More than a hundred have been executed, I believe,
since they enacted the stiff penalties. Excuse me, Senator Percy.
SENATOR SPONG's TRIP DURING RECESS
Senator PERCY. It is all right. I subscribe to the Spong report and
I noticed with great interest the latest edition which shows the routing
of the trip you intend to take during our recess.
Senator SPONG. I will be glad to take you with us.
Senator PERCY. I can’t go but I am delighted you are probing these
8, I'ê8,S.
DISCUSSION BETWEEN SHAH OF IRAN AND PRESIDENT NIXON
Certainly the Shah has been most cooperative, and I am wondering
if there is anything you could say as to whether this was a subject
of discussion between His Majesty and the President when the Presi-
dent was there?
Mr. ROSSIDEs. Not really; it was—I understand it was on the agenda;
we recommended it; and I know the State Department did; but I
don’t know what—if it was discussed. I am sure it was discussed but
I don’t know what the substance of the discussion was.
Senator PERCY. But we really feel in Iran now adequate procedures
have been adopted to prevent Iran from becoming
Mr. ROSSIDEs. The transit point.
Senator PERCY (continuing). A source of supply?
Mr. ROSSIDES. I believe so. On top of that, Senator, we are much
more concerned with our cooperative and other programs with the
Surrounding countries. - -
DIPLOMATIC IIMMUNITY
Senator PERCY. Do you have an estimate of how many diplomats
have diplomatic immunity, how many employees of embassies come
into this country with diplomatic immunity?
Mr. RossIDEs. I do not. I think the State Department representative
may want to comment on it. I don’t know the figures, but let me men-
tion this, and we have been working with the State Department
about it in this area. There is abuse of the diplomatic immunity by
various individuals but it is a tricky and complex area; obviously, the
ambassador coming into a particular country and he is the ambassador
34
to that country, has diplomatic immunity. What the degree is for the
people down the line is another question. One of the major cases that
we in customs succeeded in uncovering was when a customs inspector
at JFK uncovered 170 pounds of pure heroin, and the person had
the diplomatic passport but he was not accredited to the United
States; it was the son of the Panamanian Ambassador to Taiwan,
a case you may recall. He had five suitcases and there was a technique
of having it in transit. When the inspector wanted to open it up he
said, “I am in transit,” and we said, “Sorry,” and he took the chance
because he was not a technical expert on diplomatic immunity. We
said, “No,” and he had no diplomatic immunity despite the fact that
he may have had a diplomatic passport. -
We work with the State Department, and the State Department
has-my understanding is—talked with the various embassies quietly
and with various governments, to make sure that they will be as tight
and tough as they can about diplomatic passports. . .
Now, certain countries, and I didn’t want to get into the names of
the countries, are very lax about this, and we are tightening up and
we give a much tougher examination to a diplomat coming, or alleged
diplomats or persons who are alleging diplomatic immunity from those
countries, primarily a few in South America.
Senator PERCY. I would like to have a figure from the State Depart-
ment as to how many people we are talking about that we have to be
concerned about if they have diplomatic immunity.
Are there known techniques? Can you tell me what we can do? In
other words, if a dog is sensitive by odor to the presence of the drug,
is it possible then for any procedure to be worked out without invading
diplomatic courtesy to then impound and hold in escrow a suitcase,
whatever it may be, until such time as proper authority is brought
from that country to open it and inspect to see if their employee is in
effect using diplomatic immunity to smuggle? - -
Mr. RossIDEs. Let me submit for the record a memorandum in con-
junction with the State Department. We obviously have sensing de-
vices. If we have a sensing device, and there is something in a pouch
or bag, then the question is whether or not the diplomatic immunity
prevents our opening it. But we have a suggestion there that maybe
We can work out a procedure for those persons even if they have dip-
lomatic immunity so it is put on the side and not opened unless an
appropriate person from that country is present. It is a tough one;
historically every so often a major case stems from the use by diplo-
mats of that diplomatic immunity. -
(The information referred to follows:)
INFORMATION CONCERNING THE GRANTING OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES TO REPRE-
SENTATIVES OF FOREIGN GovKRNMENTS AND THEIR PERSONAL BAGGAGE UPON
ARRIVAL IN THE UNITED STATES -
(Supplied by the Department of the Treasury)
Under the provisions of items 820.10 through 820.60, Tariff Schedules of the
United States, free entry is accorded, upon the request of the Department of
State, to the baggage and effects of representatives and employees of foreign
80Vernments and of certain public international Organizations such as the
United Nations, their immediate families, suites and Servants, whether accredited
to the United States or en route to or from other countries to which aCCredited.
--N
35
Free entry is also accorded under similar circumstances to baggage and effects
of diplomatic couriers, designated high Officials of foreign governments and
distinguished foreign visitors and their immediate families, and perSons desig-
nated pursuant to statute or treaties ratified by the United States Senate.
The privilege of free entry of baggage and effects does not necessarily entail
freedom from inspection. Sections 10.29(c) and (f) Of the Customs Regulations
as presently in effect limit the granting Of inviolability to the perSOnS and bag-
gage of the foreign representatives listed below:
1. Ambassadors.
2. MinisterS.
3. Charges d'affaires.
4. Secretaries, counselors, and attaches of foreign embassies and legations.
Ordinarily no distinction is made between those foreign representatives Who
are accredited to the United States and those Who are in transit to Or from
Other Countries to which they are accredited. - -
The baggage of foreign representatives of classes other than those listed
above is subject to inspection. In the case of routine arrivals of persons carrying
diplomatic passports, however, there is little likelihood that any baggage ex-
amination will be made. The usual procedure in connection with Such an arrival
consists of the prior submission by the Department of State to the Bureau of
Customs Of a request for free entry and other privileged treatment for the ar-
riving foreign representative. The Bureau then Screens the request and, if it
appears to be in Order, approves it and so advises Customs Officers at the port
Of intended arrival. Unless Customs Officers at the port have a valid reason to
believe that the baggage of the arriving foreign representative contains Contra-
band merchandise, no search will be made. Further, the baggage of the foreign
representatives listed in sections 10.29(c) and (f) of the Customs Regulations
is presently inviolable as previously stated. Diplomatic pouches are exempt from
examination, Of COurse. .
On the other hand, when a foreign representative arrives in the United States
unannounced, Customs officers at the port of entry examine his credentials (in-
cluding his passport and visa) and determine at that time whether he is entitled
to diplomatic immunity and exemption from baggage examination.
Personal baggage accompanying consular Officers and their families is exempt
from examination pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
unless Customs Officers have Serious reason to believe that it contains articles
other than for official or personal use, or articles which are prohibited importa-
tion or exportation under the laws or regulations of the United States. That
Convention has been ratified by the United States Senate. -
At the present time, a task force within the Bureau of Customs is rewriting
and clarifying the Customs Regulations pertaining to the inspection of diplo-
matic baggage. - - -
The following figures, provided by the Department of State, give the approxi-
mate number of foreign nationals resident in Washington who have diplomatic
immunity: -
Attached to Embassies:
Diplomats - + 1, 700
Employees - 3, 200
Attached to diplomatic missions to OAS:
Diplomats - - 100
Dependents of diplomats 85
TOtal - 5,085
1. Excludes family members, for whom accurate statistics are not available.
SMUGGLING ON MILITARY TRANSPORT
Senator PERCY. How about our own 7 I wouldn’t want to imply we
are just concerned about people from abroad coming to this country;
how about stopping it on military transport? How closely are we
watching this? And I must say, I have observed at Air Force bases the
laxity of import customs procedures, and we know, revealed in the
36
Government Operations Committee, in those hearings on the Southeast
Asian problem, that American personnel were using General Abrams'
plane to smuggle liquor in caselots. a ~ * tº
Now, if they can bring in a hundred cases of liquor and get by with
it, certainly using military transport with the number of planes we
have got going back and forth must be a tremendous temptation, par-
ticularly with the thousands of American forces that are dealing with
or are users of drugs, and the high incentive to bring it back in, not
only for sale but for their own personal use if they are on it.
MILITARY AND DRUGS
Mr. RossIDEs. This is one of our major concerns and one of the major
reasons why we moved in as quickly as we did regarding the military
and drugs a year and a half ago.
Two aspects: One, I frankly would like to say a word and congratu-
late the Department of Defense on its drug—antidrug abuse efforts.
When we came in, the administration—the best pamphlet on drug
abuse, frankly, was in the Department of Defense. They were alert;
they were trying to get out information to the troops and so on.
Now, when it hit in December of 1969, the first really sizable evidence
of No. 4 heroin going to our troops in Vietnam, I am frankly surprised
the enemy had not tried to do that earlier, and then in 1970 a lot more,
in the summer of 1970 much more. The Department of Defense moved
quickly on a number of fronts, but the one front we were involved in,
we immediately moved into a close customs-military working relation-
ship to develop the manpower; the military did a lot of the customs
work because we simply did not have the manpower, but DOD with
its amnesty program tied into a tough predeparture inspection of
troops coming back and their effects helped, in my judgment, to re-
duce a great deal of the drugs coming in.
I think the efforts of Dr. Jaffe, and the military personnel helped to
reduce the percentage; but the key problem currently and for the fu-
ture is the fact when you have over half a million Americans near
the closest source of supply of opium that obviously a certain percent-
age of the fellows are going to develop contacts, techniques, proce-
dures, routes, and personal contacts, that could develop a source of
a Smuggling route. This is why I said earlier that I felt that for the
first time we were a little ahead of the game. We estimate up to 10
percent, 5 to 10 percent of the heroin in this country comes from opium
produced in the Golden Triangle. The President and the Departments
of State, Treasury, Defense, and Justice, moved quickly and we now
have country plans and our Ambassadors are working actively with
these various countries. We have a long way to go, Senator, but for
the first time at least it is out in the open and we are moving.
Senator PERCY. Ihave no further questions.
SURVEY TAKEN IN ILLINOIS ON GOVERNMENT SPENDING
I would like just to comment on a survey that I took among my own
constituents in Illinois, asking them two questions: “Where do you
think Government should cut its spending?” The space program was
very high, and the military. -
Second, “Where would you like to see Government increase its
spending?” Way ahead of anything else was drug abuse control.
37
I think one of the most popular bills we ever passed was the $800
million to combat drug abuse, and certainly everyone in the country
is recognizing that the high cost of crime, running in the tens of bil-
lions of dollars, is so directly related now to the fear they may have
in their own homes. Heroin use in the Chicago area is spreading to the
Suburbs at a rate three times as fast as heroin use in our city areas, and
crime is following right with it.
I really feel that an outstanding job is being done but probably all
we can Say is whatever we are doing is not enough. .
Mr. ROSSIDEs. Yes, sir.
Senator PERCY. I think we will certainly support all of your efforts
in this area.
Mr. ROSSIDEs. Thank you.
Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SPONG. Senator Church, do you have any questions?
Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
TESTIMONY LAST YEAR OF PATRICK MURPHY, NEW YORK CITY POLICE
COMMISSIONER
Last year, this committee had a hearing on international traffic in
narcotics. We considered a number of bilis that were then pending
before the Senate, one of which in modified form was enacted into law
dealing with the sources of heroin in foreign lands and what this Gov-
ernment could do to discourage the production of illegal poppy and
the illegal traffic of heroin and derivatives. At that time, we had as
one of our chief witnesses the police commissioner of the city of New
York, Patrick Murphy, and I remember rather vividly his testimony.
He said:
I call for greater Federal efforts directed at the sources of illegal narcotics
abroad because law enforcement at Our borders, as intensive, Well financed, and
ingeniously equipped as it has been and promises to be, has not succeeded and
probably cannot succeed in substantially reducing the flow of illegal drugs into
this country. It is simply a physical impossibility to close our borders to the nar-
Cotics traffic as long as Opium and heroin are available abroad to the hordes of
parasites who consider the possibility of detection an acceptable risk to take in
light of the fantastic profits they can make. Often enough unfortunately they
Succeed.
It has thus become obvious that no amount of money spent by local govern-
Iments for narCOtic enforcement Can produce any Substantial results while the
sources of heroin remain unmolested. -
In developing that point, he described the United States as though it
were a sieve, the holes of which could not be plugged no matter how
much money we spent even if we finally put the Armed Forces of the
United States to constructive use such as trying to plug those holes.
Even our Army, he testified, would be insufficient. We talked about the
myriad of ways which heroin can be smuggled into this country no
matter how elaborate the efforts is to prevent it from happening.
Would you agree with that?
Mr. RossIDEs. No, Senator, if you want me to elaborate I will be
happy to. I don't want to get into a dispute with our distinguished
commissioner in New York city. He is wrong; Japan has proven he is
wrong about the question whether you can stop smuggling. You can
stop it; you have to have a total war and it includes not just
smuggling. If all you did was to depend on trying to stop smuggling,
81—235—72 6
38
forget it; you are not going to do it. If you allow a foreign government
and foreign countries to produce it at will, to refine it at will, and
have a massive amount coming in
Senator PERCY. But you see that was his point.
Mr. RossIDEs. No; wait a minute; if I may finish. -
Senator PERCY. His point, as I understood it, was you have to reach
the sources.
Mr. RossIDEs. He is wrong there, too. That was what I wanted to
get into.
Senator PERCY. You don’t have to reach the sources?
MULTIDIMIENSIONAL SUPPORT
Mr. RossIDEs. You have to have multidimensional support which I
believe the President—and with the full support of Congress embarked
on earlier—and in my judgment, for the first time we are contending
with the smugglers; for the first time we are getting them to take a step
backward and it is—very quickly—on the enforcement end it is a sev-
eral pointed program. Crucial is the need to stop the Smuggling but
also crucial is to get the various countries to do their job. It is idiocy
to talk about the United States doing in this area what we have tried
to do, say, in the military; it is not up to us to police the world on
heroin enforcement but it is up to us, and the State Department has
been doing this, to get France to contribute more people in its own in-
terest to enforce it. which they are doing.
So if France is having tough enforcement internally and at its
borders by customs, if Turkey is doing the same, if Mexico is doing
the same and we are doing the same at our borders and internally, we
can make the we can put them out of business.
PROGRAM OF TOUGH TAX INVESTIGATION
Additionally, internally we have this program which I mentioned
earlier of tough tax investigation; we have over 718 under investiga-
tion now to take the profit out, but it has now been determined, and I
agree with you thoroughly, that the source, stopping the source, the
idea of putting in the amount of money that would be required for
crop substitution, is ludicrous. It was a misguided thought in the past
and has led us to most of the problems we have today because less
than 2 percent of the total production of opium would easily supply
all the U.S. markets. So what are we going to do, hop from one country
to another and another? But the effort and the agreement with Turkey
was historic and of substantial importance because Turkey was the
symbol and because she supplied about 80 percent of the opium that
came in as heroin for this country. -
My point is that
UNITED STATES PAYS TURREY
Senator Percy. But we pay Turkey, do we not? . . .
Mr. RossIDEs. We have a program of crop substitution and effort
which, in my judgment, is a sound one; but that is it. In other
words
Senator PERCY. But we pay Turkey, do we not?
39
Mr. ROSSIDEs. We have an agreement to assist them in a cooperative
effort.
Senator PERCY. Doesn’t that involve money?
Mr. ROSSIDEs. Yes.
Senator PERCY. Can’t you answer my question?
Mr. ROSSIDEs. Yes.
PROBLEM WITH OTHER COUNTRIES
Senator PERCY. All right. Now, having paid Turkey for doing it,
what kind of problem does this present with other countries? Should
they ask equal treatment?
Mr. ROSSIDEs. Yes, Senator, but my point is, that is why I stressed
the point that it was worth it in Turkey because they were the symbol
and they supplied most of the heroin. We are not—we have now told
these other countries we are not—“doing the same with you; it is your
job to police your own area,” because here, Senator, in this area we
now have the opportunity; they are members of the U.N., with this
protocol they will have to do more and if we beef up properly our own
external and internal enforcement at the borders and internally we
may not have to rely on whether or not a particular country is not
cooperating because the rest of the world community will cooperate,
and with the force of public opinion we can do it.
Senator PERCY. But you just said that 2 percent is enough. So sup-
pose you get less than one or just one or two or three countries that
don’t cooperate, then don’t we still have the problem?
TMr. Ross IDEs. Yes, but then it would be easier to have the enforce-
ment against them. Say a particular country X, and there are one or
two that I don’t feel are cooperating adequately, Senator, are transit
points, say; well, you can concentrate your enforcement capability there
so if any traffic is coming from those countries they are going to get a
very special review. The development of intelligence—you are going
to work in that particular area, so what I am trying to say is that for
the first time we are turning the tide but we are so far down and we
have a long way to go to get back up to where we were—I am basically
optimistic; I think we have turned that tide.
PRESIDENT HAS DISCRETION TO WITH HOLED AID
This committee can help not just in this protocol but in the amend-
ment passed last year about economic aid, for instance. My Own feeling
is you just don’t deal with a country on isolated points, but we now
have the statute which Treasury has been in favor of and Treasury
has felt this before, that if a country is not cooperating, what is the
sense of pouring millions into that country of any kind, whether it is
a grant or loan.
Senator PERCY. And the law now permits the President discretion
to withhold aid
Mr. RossIDEs. Correct, but we need the spotlight put on these coun-
tries by the Congress and media more and more.
TAKING PEOFIT OUT OF DRUGS
Senator PERCY. Why wouldn’t it be a great help to take the profit
out of drugs? -
40
Mr. ROSSIDEs. It would be. -
Senator PERCY. Isn’t that the tremendous magnet that makes the
whole system operate and makes it function through the underworld?
Mr. RossIDEs. Correct, Senator, and this is one of the programs that
we at the Treasury are most proud of. The President initiated last
June of 1971, and we now have as of 11 months, June 1, 718 middle-
and upper-echelon drug traffickers in 38 States, 51 metropolitan com-
munities, under tough tax investigation and as of June 1 we collected
more cash than was appropriated. .
Senator PERCY. But to take the profit out of it—that way you have
got to catch them, don’t you?
Mr. RossIDEs. No, no; that is my point. You say catch them. We don’t
have to catch them. The beauty of this is you don’t have to catch them
with the drugs. What we do is we have a target selection committee
chaired by my office, composed of BNDD and the Bureau of Customs
and the IRS. We have target Screening to get at their targets; working
with the State and local police we get additional targets, and one case
I mentioned, in southern California, a major ring, the major ring in
southern California, for years the narcotics agents, Federal and State,
had been after them and we couldn’t get the goods on them because
they can insulate themselves from the goods at the street level. When
we started this tax program we suddenly found out a lot of income
had not been reported and we indicted one of that group and are going
to be indicting several more. I say this is one of the most effective ways
to do this.
Senator PERCY. What I wanted to suggest was something much more
sweeping than this, a general availability to addicts through super-
vised clinics of free drug substitutes that would satisfy their craving
so they wouldn't be forced to turn to robbery to get the money to buy
drugs from the underworld. It seems to me that would be the most
direct and effective method of taking the profit out for the criminal
element and the pressure off of the addict.
Mr. RossIDEs. Well, this is another part of the administration’s pro-
gram, the multidimensional approach on the research and rehabilita-
tion and treatment, more money for the first time; before January
1969 it was zero—well, not zero but practically zero—the only two
States really doing anything were New York State and California
and for the first time I think it is $300 or $400 million appropriated in
the special action passed by the Congress and the methadone program
is one the administration has been pushing. If you are talking about
methadone as the substitute, fine; I don’t profess to be a doctor but I
rely on my former boss, Senator Javits, when I was with him in the
Attorney General's office–T relied on Senator Javits and Governor
Rockefeller to say methadone is the way and the doctors I have talked
to, fine, that does not mean methadone for everybody. -
Senator PERCY. I understand. -
Mr. RossIDEs. That is part of it but in the District of Columbia, in
Washington, D.C.; earlier this year you may recall, Senator, the Wash-
ington Post, which has not been notoriously friendly to this adminis-
tration, had an article pointing out that for the first time heroin Sup-
ply was down, the availability, but it said that for the first time the
treatment at clinics couldn’t take the number that were coming but
they did a little bit later. - - “…a
41
Senator PERCY. Yes, but this is what makes me think that there is
great promise in this clinic approach as a pressure valve
Mr. RossIDEs. Oh, yes.
Senator PERCY (continuing). To give addicts an alternative to hav-
ing to deal with the criminal element, the underworld, and pay the
price, the profit that the underworld now realizes from victimizing the
heroin addict.
BRITISH SYSTEM
Senator SPONG. I was under the impression that Senator Church's
question was much more probing than just methadone. Consequently,
without reviewing what the administration has done, and what it
hasn’t done, would you comment on the British system?
Mr. RossIDEs. Right. Well, he said substitute, sir.
Senator SPONG. He did?
Mr. ROSSIDEs. Heroin maintenance is a myth. The British system is
moving away from it. The Vera Institute program, in my judgment,
is erroneous and counterproductive. There was a recent article in the
New York Times by one of the members of the editorial board—I can’t
remember his name, and I would like to submit it for the record—who
had a detailed article pointing out those few who were advocating
heroin maintenance and had failed to reveal all the facts, and the
British were moving away from it; it would be a disaster to the blacks,
and it, would be—I am not going to get into the medical aspects, but
I would like to submit one article because it is a very interesting one.
Senator SPONG. We would be pleased to receive it.
(The information referred to follows:)
[From the New York Times, June 5, 1972]
FREE FIx FOR ADDICTS 2
(By John A. Hamilton)
A. free fix for junkies? An experimental program that gives heroin to heroin
addicts under the label of “research”?
Community leaders in New York City, where a scaled-down proposal along
this line is receiving renewed interest from the Lindsay administration, have
denounced the idea as “a cruel hoax” and as “colonialist-type thinking.” The
nation's leading drug experts are also strongly opposed to the whole concept.
Dr. Vincent Dole of Rockefeller University, who developed the use of metha-
done in the treatment of heroin addiction, calls the thought of dispensing heroin
itself “insanity.” Dr. Jerome Jaffe, head of President Nixon's Special Action
Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, notes the need to supply addicts with as many
as five shots of heroin daily and concludes that any heroin-dispensing program
Would prove “a logistical nightmare.”
One of the founders of the British system for treating narcotics addicts, Dr.
Richard Phillipson, shares these views. The British system rests on the treatment
of addiction as an illness rather than as a crime and, for a while, this treatment
consisted mostly of dispensing heroin to heroin addicts. Dr. Phillipson, who is
now with the National Institute of Mental Health in Washington, warns against
this nation's trying slavishly to follow his original model. He points out that
While some heroin is still dispensed in Britain, the British system recently has been
moving toward an increased use of methadone.
Nonetheless, despite all this, there are those who persist in advocating a heroin-
dispensing program for New York City. The Vera Institute of Justice has pre-
sented a formal proposal to Mayor Lindsay's Narcotics Control Council and
some members of this council are urging its implementation, linking the drug
problem with the crime problem and arguing that if addicts received free heroin
they would no longer rob to maintain their habits.
42
Such an argument may now have special appeal to Mayor Lindsay. Out flat
emotionally after his futile Presidential foray, badly bruised in budgetary
Scuffles with both the City Council and the Board of Estimate, the Mayor is re-
ported interested in launching new programs in problem areas that would at
least give the appearance of innovation and activity. -º
But the fear of Crime, as real as it is, and the need for a mayoral initiative are
hardly persuasive reasons for launching a heroin program in the face of commu-
nity and medical Opposition. The proposal has serious flaws. It is said that
heroin is essential to “lure” Street addicts into treatment programs, but the truth
Of the situation in New York City is more the reverse. There are long waiting
lists Of addicts unable to gain entrance into existing treatment programs, es-
pecially the more successful methadone programs. There is less a need for a
“lure” than for expansion of these programs. At Rikers Island and at the Tombs,
the Manhattan House of Detention, men behind bars plead with medical visitors.
“Hey, man,” One said to Dr. Dole recently, “I’m in here now. I’ve been in here
before. I’ll be in here again. I need to get into a drug program.”
Dr. Dole told him that most programs were now full. - -
The methadone programs that Dr. DOle runs require funds. Any experimental
heroin program would drain away funds. Where methadone can be administered
once a day and addicts can be stabilized to hold jobs, heroin would have to be ad-
ministered more often and addicts would continue to suffer the “highs” and
“lows” that go with such addiction. The staffing of a heroin program would have
to be double or triple or more that of a methadone program. Again, a drain. On
scarce funds. -
Dr. Phillipson’s “grave reservations” about giving addicts a free heroin fix find
Support in the most recent figures made available by the British Home Office. As
Of the end of 1970, these figures show that Britain had Only 1,430 narcotics ad-
dicts, compared to the estimated 150,000 now in New York City. Of these addicts,
the Home Office figures show that Only 183 were being maintained On heroin.
Another 254 were receiving a combination of heroin and methadone, while the
bulk, Some 738, were receiving methadone alone. A remaining group of 255 were
listed as “therapeutic” addicts, having acquired their addictions from drugs
taken during illnesses or Operations; these were receiving a variety of other
drugs.
Thus, the free fix that the British now give addicts is not usually a free heroin
fix, as some advocates of a heroin program here seem to imply ; On the contrary,
the British are moving away from the use of heroin and toward the use of meth-
adone. The Vera Institute's proposal for a heroin experiment has a Section de-
voted to a discussion of the British system, but it somehow neglects to mention
either Dr. Phillipson or the figures from the Home Office. :
Senator SPONG. Mr. Ingersoll did not touch on this subject today,
but he made a speech earlier this month in California in which he
said substantially what you have just said, so I assume you concur in
his views? - -
Mr. ROSSIDES. I have not read his speech, but I have discussed this
with Dr. Jaffe, the medical adviser, and I concur definitely in that,
what you are referring to—Mr. Ingersoll's remarks and Dr. Jaffe's
position on this.
THRUST OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC EFFORT
Senator SPONG. I want to clarify several points in your replies to
Senator Javits and Senator Church. I think the Turkish experience
Was a noble gesture on their part and a good thing on our part. But,
do you advocate giving any priority to this method of curtailing abuse
throughout the world? - ... • -
... Mr. RossIDEs. Definitely not; that is correct, Mr. Chairman. I think
it was well worth it regarding Turkey because she supplied so much
of it here, but we are not about to be giving that kind of money to other
countries just because they raise opium. The thrust of our diplomatic
effort is to get each nation to meet its responsibilities to the interna-
43
tional community, to protocols and conventions that they are part of,
and to their own people.
HEROIN MAINTENANCE
Senator JAVITs. Mr. Chairman, would you yield just one minute?
I would like to say that heroin maintenance is a big problem for us in
New York and I have thought it over very carefully and I have been
active in this field since 1955, when I was Attorney General of New
York, and I think in the totality our experience in this country, con-
sidering the black community and the poor community, I would now
be against it, especially with methadone as a very feasible alternative.
DEGREE OF SURVEILLANCE AND ENFORCEMENT BETWEEN MARIEIUANA AND
- HEROIN -
Senator SPONG. Thank you.
Now, one other question. I am not sure that I understood your answer
to Senator Javits regarding the degree of surveillance and enforce-
ment between marihuana and heroin. Would you discuss that in more
detail? - -
Mr. RossIDEs. What I meant is this, Mr. Chairman: We are concen-
trating on heroin so that if we had one man available and we have a
tip on marihuana and heroin it is not a close question. If we had 10
tips on marihuana and three on heroin, those three would be on heroin;
that is the thrust of it. - • te
Along the border when a group is dealing with smuggling, as you
saw from the film the other night, it can be heroin and marihuana so
if we are tracking a plane we don’t know whether it is heroin or mari-
huana, or an individual in a truck; that is my point. We seized 170,000
pounds of marihuana last year. These were major seizures along the
border, and in cars and trucks, 300-pound lots, 500-pound lots, but
We don’t have the problem—I think the Senator is thinking more
about the internal part when the local police—you are not going to
be—you don’t have the manpower to be worried about some kid that
has possession of Some marihuana; you are going after heroin but at
the borders, we are stopping and investigating a smuggler.
Senator SPONG. You may have covered this in response to Senator
Percy, but I want the record to reflect it fully.
DO ALL DIPLOMATS HAVE COURTESY OF PORT 2
Do all diplomats have courtesy of the port, i.e., do they enter with-
out the customary inspection by customs officials?
Mr. ROSSIDEs. No, sir; we will submit the differentiation as to who
does. Obviously, an Ambassador and obviously key officials and it
does not mean an ambassador traveling through the Country; he has
to be accredited to that country. We will lay out those rules and it may
be a fruitful area which we are pursuing with the State Department,
maybe a fruitful area for further discussion with this committee.
(See p. 34.)
Senator SPONG. Thank you very much for your testimony this
morning. -
44
Mr. RossIDEs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SPONG. Mr. Bevans? -
Mr. Bevans, we thank you for being here. And, I thank you for
your patience. Because Mr. Ingersoll had to catch an airplane, we
allowed him to testify earlier, but I think the more logical proceeding
would have been to have heard from you first. -
STATEMENT OF CHARLES I. BEVANS, ASSISTANT LEGAL ADVISER,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY DONALD E. MILLER,
CHIEF COUNSEL, BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS
DRUGS; AND G. JONATHAN GREENWALD, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL
ADVISER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. BEVANs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and other members of this
distinguished committee. It is a pleasure to appear before you. I think
the discussions this morning and statements made were most interest-
ing. I am very glad to have with me this morning Mr. Donald E.
Miller, Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs. Mr. Miller was Alternate Representative of the United States
to the United Nations Conference at Geneva this year to amend the
Single Convention. Mr. Miller is at my right.
I also have at my left Mr. G. Jonathan Greenwald of the Legal
Adviser’s Office of the Department of State who also was a member of
the U.S. delegation to the Geneva Conference in March of this year.
The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to present
its views on the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Nar-
cotic Drugs.
AMENDMENTS RESULT OF INCREASED DRUG TRAFFIC, EXPERIENCE UNDER
SINGLE CONVENTION
The amendments embodied in the protocol, which was submitted
to the Senate by the President with his message of May 4, 1972, are the
result of the terrifying increase in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and
nearly 8 years of experience under the Single Convention. The devel-
opment of the amendments and their adoption are a part of President
Nixon's all-out effort to combat the scourge of drug abuse.
U.s. DELEGATION To U.N. ConFERENCE IN GENEVA
At the United Nations Conference held in Geneva March 6 to 24,
1972, which adopted the Protocol, the U.S. delegation was headed
by Ambassador Nelson G. Gross of the Department of State and, in
addition to other members of the Department, the delegation included
representatives of the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare, the Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, the
Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention and two congrès-
sional advisers, the Honorable Ancher Nelsen and the Honorable
Charles B. Rangel. o
The composition of this delegation reflects the representation of
both the legislative and executive branches of the Government in the
formulation of the amendments. The broad international interest in
the amendments and acceptance of their provisions is reflected in the
45
sending by 97 States of representatives to the conference and by five
other States of observers.
ADOPTION OF PROTOCOL
In adopting the protocol, 71 States voted in favor of it, none against,
and 12 abstained. Up to June 23, 47 States had signed the protocol.
ADMENDMENTS WILL BE OF SUBSTANTIAL VALUE
We believe that the amendments will be of substantial value in
Stemming the flood of illicit traffic by strengthening the international
drug control machinery, assuring expert assistance to countries that
need it in controlling drugs, facilitating the prosecution of narcotics
º offenders, and providing for national measures against the abuse
OI drugs.
Along with these benefits, we believe the many consultations, dis-
cussions throughout the world and the debates in the conference that
led to the formulation and adoption of the amendments have sharp-
ened a worldwide awareness of the dangers of drug abuse, and have
impressed upon all nations the need for more effective international
cooperation, better national controls and more active efforts to prevent
the abuse of drugs.
AMENDMENTS STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD
Most of the amendments have for their purpose the strengthening
of the International Narcotics Control Board. Those amendments will:
(1) Increase the Board's present membership from 11 to 13; (2)
assure better continuity by increasing the term of office from 3 years
to 5 years, with a provision for staggered terms; (3) strengthen the
independence of its administrative staff; (4) assign the Board ex-
plicit responsibility for preventing illicit cultivation of the opium
poppy and the illicit production, manufacture and traffic in narcotic
drugs, and for limiting the legal cultivation, production, manufacture,
and use of drugs to the amount required for medical and Scientific
purposes; and (5) expand the types of information governments
are to provide the Board; also expand sources of information beyond
that supplied by governments and organs of the United Nations to
include information supplied by the specialized agencies of the United
Nations—including WHO, among others—and by other intergovern:
mental or international nongovernmental organizations with special
competence in the drug field.
AUTHORIZATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS IN NEW AMENDMENTS
The new amendments will authorize the Board (1) to take action
not only where it has reason to believe that the aims of the convention
are being seriously endangered by the failure of any country to apply
the convention but also in cases where there exists evidence that a
country may become an important center of illicit activities regarding
narcotic drugs; (2) to take the initiative in proposing that a study
designed to develop remedial measures be conducted in a drug troubled
area by the government concerned in cooperation with the Board; and
46
(3) to recommend to competent United Nations organs or to special-
ized agencies that technical and financial assistance be provided a gov-
ernment to carry out its obligations under the convention.
The Board is not only authorized but is also required, where there
is a serious situation that needs cooperative action at the international
level, to call the matter to the attention of the Economic and Social
Council and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs with appropriate
recommendations. The Council in turn may then draw the attention
of the General Assembly to the matter.
MEASUREs ExPECTED TO INCREASE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY
OF BOARD -
One of the amendments creates a direct link by which, for the first
time, States will be able to pass timely information to the Board on
international illicit traffic and the Board will be authorized to take
remedial action.
The Board is also authorized to require a State to reduce its legal
production of opium when the Board considers that there is a link
between production of opium in that country and the international
illicit traffic. -
These are the principal measures that are expected to substantially
increase the authority and responsibility of the Board to curb excess
production and manufacture of narcotic drugs and illicit drug
activities. -
PROVISIONS ON EXTRADITION EXPANDED
The provisions on extradition in the Single Convention will be ex-
panded to include the substance of provisions embodied in the 1970
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
(hijacking) to deny drug offenders a haven anywhere from prosecu-
tion. The amendments in this connection will rectify at one stroke the
gap in those of our bilateral extradition treaties which do not presently
cover narcotics offenses.
MEASURES REQUIRED OF PARTIES
The amendments requiring the parties to take measures for the
prevention and abuse of drugs by education, treatment, aftercare, and
rehabilitation of individuals as is provided in the 1971 Convention on
Psychotropic Substances, and to consider, where appropriate, the
establishment of regional drug centers for scientific research and
other cooperation are considered to be of substantial importance.
EFFECTS OF RATTFYING PROTOCOL
The Department of State is convinced that the amendments in the
protocol will constitute an important improvement in international co-
operation and controls regarding narcotic drugs.
The Department of State is also convinced that ratification of the
protocol by the United States will encourage many other states to
ratify and bring into force at an early date the many improvements
that will be effected by entry into force of the protocol.
47
The protocol came into being within a relatively brief period as the
result of the initiative taken by the United States; other countries
will be expecting us to take the lead in ratifying it. Also, our ratifi-
cation of the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, now pend-
ing in the Senate, would encourage approval not only of that con-
vention but also approval of the present protocol by other countries.
The Department of State hopes the Senate will soon give its advice
and consent to ratification of that convention and the Congress will
enact the implementing legislation required for its application.
ADVICE AND CONSENT RECOMMENDED
For over 60 years the United States has been in a position of leader-
ship in the development and continually strengthening international
controls over drugs subject to abuse. We believe that leadership is
especially important at the present time.
The Department of State joins with the President in strongly re-
commending that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification
of the protocol. -
Senator SPONG. Thank you very much, Mr. Bevans.
PROSPECTS FOR WIDESPREAD RATIFICATION OF PROTOCOL
What are the prospects for widespread ratification of the protocol?
Mr. BEVANs. Mr. Chairman, we consider those prospects to be good.
We had a total of 97 countries participating in the conference directly,
with five others having observed there; 47 of them had signed at
the time we received the latest report, June 23, 71 voted to adopt it;
no one voted against the convention; 12 countries present abstained.
ABSTENTION OF 12 STATES
Senator SPONG. Why did 12 states abstain and can you tell me or fur-
nish for the record a list of the States that did?
Mr. BEVANs. We will be glad to.
Senator SPONG. Fine.
(The information referred to follows:)
TWELVE STATES WHICH ABSTAINED AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE IN THE WOTE TO
ADOPT THE PROTOCOL AMENDING THE SINGLE Convention
(Supplied by the Department of the Treasury)
. The twelve states which abstained at the Geneva Conference in the Vote to
adopt the Protocol Amending the Single Convention were Algeria, Bulgaria,
Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Mongolia, Panama, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics. Some of the states that abstained explained their
reasons for doing SO. -
Burma explained that it was in general agreement with the broad principles
underlying the amendments but abstained because it considered some would be
difficult to implement in the sensitive circumstances prevalent in Burma.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics explained that it abstained from voting
On the Protocol as a Whole because it contained a number of provisions unac-
ceptable to it. It considered it inappropriate that the Protocol’s provisions ex-
tended to States which were not parties to the Convention, paricularly since
Article 40 of the Convention prevented a number of States from becoming parties.
48
The USSR was also opposed to the granting of extensive powers to the Board
and objected to the Board’s determining the drug requirements of States. It Wel-
comed, however, the spirit of understanding and compromise which had led to
the adoption of an article on reservations which would enable reservations in
respect of a number of articles, in particular those which were not acceptable
to the USSR.
Bulgaria explained that it abstained for the reasons stated by the USSR.
Poland explained that it abstained because it could not understand the in-
sistence upon amending the provisions of the Convention with respect to the
powers of the Board regarding annual estimates of drugs; that it opposed the
inclusion of an amendment giving the Board authority with respect to the amount
of opium that may be produced. It also stated that the fact that several COun-
tries had been prevented from attending the Conference was contrary to the
universal approach necessary for a successful fight against drug abuse.
Mr. BEVANs. In many instances, the state that did not sign at the
Conference just had not made up its mind at that time. It wanted to
study the protocol further. &
(The following information was subsequently supplied by the
witness:)
In other instances the Delegation was not provided with full powers by its
government which wished to reserve the option until it had studied the protocol.
Then, again, there are a few States which have not signed or adhered to the Con-
vention and they may not sign the protoCO1 until they take that step.
Senator SPONG. New York kept doing that during the ratification of
the Constitution or something; they abstained forever. We would, for
the record, however, like to have a list of those which abstained. (See
p. 47.)
SANCTIONS AGAINST NATIONS REFUSING COMPLIANCE WITH BOARD's
s RECOMIMIENDATIONS
Are there any effective sanctions against those nations which refuse
to ºpply with International Narcotics Control Board recommenda-
tions?
Mr. BEVANs. Mr. Chairman, we have considerably strengthened
those Sanctions. We continue to have the recommendatory embargo.
We did not succeed in getting the mandatory embargo. We don’t feel
that was a great loss because even though we have had the recom-
mendatory embargo provision in conventions for some 30 years, they
have never recommended an embargo against any state. They have
considered it at times but they didn’t find it necessary. They got action.
We do believe that by the formulation and negotiation of this
protocol we have aroused a worldwide interest, and we have taken the
leadership which will be followed in faithfully applying the protocol;
but just having the protocol itself, we do not think, is going to be
enough. Like any treaty, you have to have the public officials and the
public back you up to have it enforced and we believe that that will
continue to exist.
PARTICIPATION IN PROTOCOL
Senator SPONG. I asked this question of Mr. Ingersoll and he re-
ferred it to you, so I will repeat it:
There is a significant disparity between the number of parties to
the Single Convention and the number of countries which have thus
far signed the protocol expanding the powers of the International
49
Narcotics Control Board. Do you attach any significance to this and do
you expect full participation in the protocol as well?
Mr. BEVANs. Yes, sir; I do expect full participation in the protocol.
We must remember it was just in March that this protocol was
adopted and it was a hardfought conference. We didn’t get every-
thing we asked for but we accomplished a great deal and I am fully
confident that all the states party to the Single Convention will even-
tually become parties to this protocol.
Now, of course, the first 40, the required number to bring it into
force, are the hardest ones to obtain but once an international instru-
ment like this is brought into force, the momentum increases for ap-
proving it by ratification or coming in Separately by accession.
Senator SPONG. So your answer is that you do not attach any
significance to the present disparity and you anticipate full
participation? -
Mr. BEVANs. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator SPONG. All right, sir.
HANDLING TURE EY UNDER PROTOCOL PROCEDURES
In the case of Turkey, considerable expense is anticipated in adjust-
ing their economy from its reliance on opium production. How would
Turkey have been handled under the procedures provided by the
protocol had there been no other assistance and no other agreement?
Mr. BEVANs. We—Mr. Chairman—I do believe that we would have
had some progress in having Turkey improve her control of the drugs
there; but I don’t think we would have been able to do it in time to
accomplish the objective which we believe we are accomplishing by
Turkey’s having reached the decision to discontinue altogether the
production of opium. It is one of those matters, I think, very much of
time and I do not anticipate that this protocol is going to cure every
evil of the drug traffic and drug abuse. It is only one of many measures
but we consider it a very important one of the measures required.
EFFECT OF PROTOCOL ON NEED FOR BILATERAL DRUG AGREEMENTS
Senator SPONG. The United States presently has bilateral drug
agreements with several countries, including France and Mexico. Does
the protocol either increase or diminish the need for such additional
agreements?
Mr. BEVANs. I would say in the course of time it would decrease the
need but I would say that it would not replace it altogether and I think
we are going to still continue to need such agreements at least until
the protocol enters into force and even after that I believe we will
need some, but I believe it will decrease that need, but I can’t say it will
replace it. -
WILL COUNTRIES RESTRICTING POPPY PRODUCTION REQUIRE AID 2
Senator SPONG. The United States is scheduled to provide $35 mil-
lion to Turkey over several years for crop substitution and other ac-
tivities to curb poppy growth. Does the State Department believe
similar aid will be required for other countries which we hope to
induce to restrict production?
50
Mr. BEVANs. Mr. Chairman, I think that depends very much on the
circumstances, upon the urgency of the particular case and whether
some other measures might be effective. The Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs is conducting a very intensive course of training
and supplying equipment and other materials like that to help coun-
tries to do better law enforcement in order to have better controls and
the like. So it is difficult to say ahead of time just what would have to
be done in a particular case.
The Turkish case, I think, was one of the most urgent cases and
required the action that was taken in the supplying of the funds.
REACTION OF TURKISH PEOPLE
Senator SPONG. Does the State Department have any reports on the
reaction of the Turkish people to the agreement banning poppy
production?
Mr. BEVANs. Well, the reports that I have seen have indicated that
they are going along with what their government requires of them. Of
course, whether they are Turks or whether any other people, farmers
are among the most conservative people in the world and when you
have generation after generation accustomed to growing a particular
crop it takes a good bit of doing to get them to change, but we are
optimistic about the program succeeding. - -
CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS
Senator SPONG. Is the United States currently negotiating drug
agreements with any other countries believed to be sources of illicit
drugs?
Mr. BEVANs. Well, when you ask if we are negotiating drug agree-
ments it would depend upon what particular kinds. We are negotiating
agreements to give technical assistance training for better policing and
better finding and locating of illegal cultivation of the opium poppy,
better customs inspection and the like. I am not aware of any other
country right now in which we are giving aid on a scale comparable
to that in the case of Turkey. - - -
Senator SPONG. Are you including within the activities of technical
assistance, encouragement for growing crops that are alternative to
the opium poppy? -
Mr. BEVANs. Yes, sir. That would be very much along that line and
would bring our Department of Agriculture into the picture in assist-
ing with those matters. - -
Senator SPONG. Senator Pearson?
Senator PEARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
AREAS OF DISAPPOINTMENT
Mr. Bevans, I want to compliment you and those who negotiated
this agreement for getting what you did. Of course, we never achieve
all of the goals in international conferences that we seek, but what
were some of the points of agreement that were considered to be of
major importance that were not subject to agreement? Where, may I
ask you, were your areas of disappointment? - -
51
Mr. BEVANs. Well, actually, we started out by seeking more than
we proposed during the conference. We had a team headed by Am-
bassador Popper, our Ambassador to Cyprus, and Ambassador Jova,
our Ambassador to the Organization of American States, who con-
Sulted with many governments to ascertain just what measure of agree-
ment might be reached at the Conference. As a result of those con-
Sultations, our proposals were shaken down pretty close to what we
obtained in the Conference. We were asking for a mandatory embargo,
for example, and that was given up; we were asking for a particular
right of local inquiry which was transformed into a provision for on-
the-spot study. I don’t think we lost much in these changes.
IMPLEMENTATION OF AMENDMENTS
Senator PEARSON. You indicate that the amendments will strengthen
the International Narcotics Control Board and that the amendments
would further authorize the board to, for example, prevent the illicit
cultivation of the opium poppy and take action where there is reason
to believe that the aims of the conventions are not being seriously
carried forward. How are you going to do that? What is the im-
plementation?
Mr. BEVANs. Well, we look at the system, how it works; each country
is required to give an annual estimate of the amount of drugs that it
is going to require for consumption, the amount it is going to need to
manufacture other drugs and the like.
The country is also required to submit annually statistics on the
amounts of drugs it actually produced, imported and exported, con-
sumed, utilized in manufacturing other drugs and drugs seized. The
Board examines any disparity between the estimates and the statistics
and where it finds there is an excess of amounts in the statistics they
look into that and try to find out why it exists. If the statistics exceed
the estimates for the year the country concerned will be asked to cut
back that much in the next year unless it can show a good reason for the
increase. With respect to the production of opium, we have been able to
obtain in this Protocol a requirement of reporting on the amount of
opium that is going to be planted, on the amount that is expected to be
produced, so that the Board can look ahead and estimate better what
the world Supply of opium is going to be for medical purposes.
Senator PEARSON. I wish you would put it in the record. That bell
is a vote.
(The information referred to follows:)
STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO SENATOR PEARSON'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DISCUS-
SION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY AND RESPONSI-
BILITY GIVEN THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD
(Supplied by Department of State)
Article 2 of the Protocol amends Article 9 of the Single Convention by adding
to that article an additional paragraph reading as follows: - -
“4. The Board, in co-operation with Governments, and subject to the
terms of this Convention, shall endeavour to limit the cultivation, produc-
tion, manufacture and use of drugs to an adequate amount required for
medical and Scientific purposes, to ensure their availability for such purposes
and to prevent illicit cultivation, production and manufacture of, and illicit
trafficking in and use of drugs.”
52
In its application of the provisions of the above-quoted new paragraph 4 of
Article 9, the Board may exercise the additional authority granted it in Other
amendments to the Single Convention. For example, under Article 6 of the Proto-
col the Board may take action not only on the basis of information Submitted to
it by Governments under the Single Convention or of information communicated
by United Nations Organs but also on the basis of information communicated to it
by Specialized agencies of the United Nations Or by Other governmental Organiza-
tions Or international non-governmental Organizations which have direct Com-
petence in the matter. This substantially broadens the Board's sources of infor-
mation for asking explanations from governments, making recommendations to
governments, or taking other action under the Convention. If the Board has
reason to believe that the aims of the Convention are being seriously endan-
gered by the reason of the failure of any country or territory to carry out the
terms of the Convention, the Board may propose to the government concerned
the Opening Of Consultations Or request it to furnish explanations. Even if there
is no failure on the part of a Country in applying the Convention, but it has be-
come, or there exists serious evidence that it may become, an important center
of illicit cultivation, production or manufacture of, or traffic in or consumption of
drugs, the Board may propose to the government concerned the opening of con-
Sultations. These new provisions permit much earlier and broader action by the
Board in the taking Of measures to COrrect a dangerous situation before it becomes
to O Serious and to 100k into situations that it could not consider under the Con-
vention in the absence Of the Protocol.
After taking such action the Board may, if it is satisfied that it is necessary
to do SO, call upon the government concerned to adopt remedial measures as
WOuld seem under the circumstances to be necessary for the execution of the
provisions of the Convention.
The Board may also under the amendments, if it thinks such action necessary,
propose to the government concerned that a study be carried out on its territory.
The Board may, at the request Of the government concerned, make available the
expertise of one or more persons to assist the government in the study. If the
Board finds that the government concerned has failed to give satisfactory ex-
planations, or has failed to adopt any remedial measures which it has called
for, or if there is a serious situation that needs cooperative action at the inter-
national level with a view to remedying it, it may call the attention of the parties,
the Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to the
matter. It is required to do this in especially serious situations. The Council
may in turn draw the attention of the General Assembly to the matter. These
amendments will give the Board a considerable increase in authority to obtain
full information regarding a dangerous situation, supply expert assistance to a
country when needed, encourage a COuntry to take necessary measures to curb
drug traffic, and provide, for the first time, consideration by the most representa-
tive United Nations political Organ When a particularly grave situation warrants
activity at that high level.
The Board may, when taking the above-mentioned measures, recommend that
the parties stop the import of drugs, the export of drugs, or both, from Or to a
country concerned, either for a designated period or until the Board is satisfied
as to the situation in the territory. Although never used, the authority to recom-
mend an embargo is considered to be an important residual power for use, or
potential use, in certain circumstances.
The Board may, with the agreement Of the government cOncerned, recommend
to the competent United Nations Organs and to the Specialized agencies that
technical Or financial assistance, Or both, be provided to a government to Carry
out its obligations under the Convention. This is an important recognition—for
the first time in a drug control treaty—that simple police measures may not
always be enough and that in some instances a state that wishes to do a better
job may have a complex social and economic problem that the appropriate inter-
national bodies will have to assist it With.
If under Article 11 Of the Protocol the BOard finds that a Country has not lim-
ited the Opium produced within its borders to licit purposes in accordance with
relevant estimates and that a significant amount of such Opium produced, whether
licitly or illicitly, has been introduced into the illicit traffic, the Board may de-
cide to deduct all or a portion of such amount from its estimated production for
the next year in which such a deduction can be technically accomplished. If the
situation is not satisfactorily resolved the Board may take the measures men-
tioned above. This amendment gives the Board a clear mandate to take measures
53
necessary to Curb the production of Opium where a clear link to the illicit traf-
fic has been established.
Under Article 5 of the Protocol the Board may, with the consent of a govern-
ment concerned, amend the annual estimates submitted by that government and,
in case of disagreement between the government and the Board, the latter may
establish, communicate and publish its own estimates for the information of
states dealing with that government. This provision, which is in addition to the
Special power with respect to the estimate for production of Opium, Will have a
salutary effect in keeping estimates closer to actual needs for drugs.
The foregoing are the most important Of the additional measures that may be
taken by the Board. With specific authority and responsibility for limiting the
cultivation, production, manufacture and use of drugs to an amount adequate
for medical and Scientific purposes and a mandate to prevent illicit cultivation,
production and manufacture of, and illicit trafficking in and use of drugs, the
Board will be able to function far more effectively after the Protocol is brought
into force. The new powers are far-reaching and emphasize the need for gov-
ernments to be cooperative and activist in drug control. They rely to a COnsider-
able extent on high visibility public disclosure and discussion of serious prob-
lem situations. No State wishes to be considered soft On drug control and We do
not think any government will regard these powers lightly. We think, therefore,
that these powers and this Protocol will substantially increase the possibility of
meaningful action to implement the high aims of the Convention.
Senator SPONG. We will recess for 10 minutes while we go vote,
and we will then come back.
Senator Percy, would you like to ask questions now? -
Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, did the bell just ring' I wonder if
it would be all right if I asked the three or four questions that I have?
Senator SPONG. You proceed and I will go vote and then come back.
Senator PERCY. Very fine. Thank you.
ExTRADITION PROVISIONS OF PROTOCOL
The questions I have, Mr. Bevans, deal, first, with the extradition
process.
Mr. BEVANs. Yes, sir.
Senator PERCY. I know this is a difficult one to negotiate in view of
the differing systems of justice that various countries have. Is there
any likelihood that the extradition provisions of the protocol would
be controversial enough to retard the pace of ratification?
Mr. BEVANs. I doubt it, Senator Percy, because the protocol provides
that the provisions therein on extradition are subject to the constitu-
tional limitations of a party, its legal system and domestic law. This
gives a country considerable leeway in deciding whether it can apply
those provisions. We feel that it supplies a workable framework which
would be available to any country that really wants to make a serious
effort to extradite and we believe the world interest is aroused to the
point where they are going to deny any haven to offenders of the nar-
cotics laws.
(The following information was subsequently supplied by the
witness:) -
Furthermore, the language of the Protocol under which narcotics offenses are
to be deemed to be included in bilateral extradition treaties is taken from the 1970
Hijacking Conventions, which has already been signed by 81 countries and has
been ratified or acceded to by 36 countries and is presently in force.
Senator PERCY. From our standpoint, with what countries will this
provision prove the most useful?
54
Mr. BEVANs. It would be the countries from which opium is flowing
into the United States or from which operations are conducted but
where our present bilateral extradition treaties do not cover narcotics
offenses. We would close this gap immediately once this Protocol is in
force and, although we are pursuing as fast as we can the amendment
of our existing bilateral extradition treaties, that will require consid-
erable time and we don’t know when we shall have all those treaties
amended. -
PROCEDURES TO GET BOARD TO ORDER oPIUM PRODUCTION REDUCTION
Senator PERCY. What procedures would a state have to take to get
the Board to order a reduction in production of opium ? In other words,
could an approach by the United States alone bring about a reduction
order?
Mr. BEVANs. If the United States found that there was evidence
of some other states piling up opium which might have a tendency
to seep into the illicit market, we could report that to the Board
and ask that something be done about it. The Board would be en-
titled to look into the situation and take appropriate action including
a reduction of opium production where circumstances warrant.
WOULD TREATY PRECLUDE DOMESTIC REFORM IN MARIHUANIA LAWS 2
Senator PERCY. Now, my last areas may have been covered by previ-
ous witnesses before I was able to come in, but I think because of
your own responsibility, duplication here may be desirable, certainly
in view of Senator Javits' concern also.
As I understand the treaty, it requires all parties to maintain do-
mestic criminal penalties against the use, possession, or trafficking
in marihuana. Now, as we know, we have had many commissions
which have taken positions on this. The President's Commission on
Marihuana and Drug Abuse recently recommended the elimination of
all criminal penalties for private use of marihuana. This approach
has been supported by the Le Dain Commission in Canada, two com-
mittees of the American Bar Association, the Committee on Crime
headed by John Finletter, former deputy director of the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and others.
My specific question is, would the treaty if ratified preclude this
domestic reform in the marihuana laws? -
Mr. BEVANs. The provisions in the single Convention applicable
to marihuana must be considered in the light of the definitions at
the beginning of that Convention. Marihuana is a member of the
Cannabis family of plants. Cannabis is defined in article 1 of the con-
vention as meaning the flowering or fruiting tops of the Cannabis
plant (excluding the seeds and the leaves when not accompanied by
the tops), from which the resin has not been extracted and by what-
ever name they may be designated. -
Then Cannabis resin is defined as meaning the separated resin,
whether crude or purified, obtained from the Cannabis plant; and
then we have the Cannabis plant defined as any plant of the genus
Cannabis. - - . . . . . .
55
But in examining through those provisions, one will find the state-
ments regarding Cannabis are general; for example, article 28, para-
graph 3 of the Single Convention provides that the parties shall adopt
such measures as may be necessary to prevent the misuse of and illicit
traffic in the leaves of the Cannabis plant. -
Now, it seems to me that the misuse of the leaves is essentially in
this particular case a matter for national legislation but you would
be obliged to prevent illicit traffic in the leaves of this plant
Senator PERCY. Well, just the usage, because I think this could really
be a hangup in our ratification of this treaty, if we could not remove
the use of marihuana from the criminal category.
Mr. BEVANs. May I ask my colleague, Mr. Miller'
Mr. MILLER. Senator, there is a paper that was prepared by a dis-
tinguished lawyer in Boston, William Chayet, for the National Com-
mission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse. He conducted a survey of the
requirements of the Single Convention and he came to the conclusion
that the United States is not obligated under the provisions of article
36 to maintain imprisonment penalties
Senator PERCY. I am very sorry I am going to have to leave; other-
wise, I will miss this vote.
(The following information was subsequently supplied:)
ANSWER TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PERCY TO MR. BEVANS
Question: Would the protocol, if ratified, preclude domestic reform in the
marihwana, laws? Despite the mounting evidence that mere users of marihuana
should not be defined as criminal, would the Congress be barred by international
law from enacting the recommendations of the Marihuana Commission ?
Answer : The Protocol is compatible with the liberalizing trenčis in United
States drug legislation which reduce penalties on users as well as with the
further liberalizing trends with respect to marihuana recommended by the groups
yOu have mentioned.
The Single Convention, to which of course the United States is already a party,
requires the United States to adopt such measures as will ensure that production,
manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of Can-
nabis or marihuana, as any other drug controlled by the Convention, will be lim-
ited exclusively to medical and scientific purposes. It does not specify the precise
measures a party should take but it requires that activity in Cannabis Or mari-
huana contrary to the Convention “shall be punishable offenses when Committed
intentionally, and that serious Offenses shall be liable to adequate punishment
particularly by imprisonment Or other penalties of deprivation of liberty.”
The Protocol introduces significant additional flexibility into these provisions
by providing that “when abusers of drugs have Committed such Offenses, the
Parties may provide, either as an alternative to Conviction or punishment Or in
addition to conviction or punishment, that such abusers shall undergo measures
of treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and Social reintegration . . .”
This provision would leave it to the discretion of the United States whether it
wished to provide criminal penalties for use of marihuana, perhaps including
imprisonment, or whether it wished to discourage misuse of the drug through
Other means Such as education. Ratification Of the Protocol would thus increase
the range Of Options Open to us.
Senator PERCY. I will submit my question for the record because I
think it should be answered. I have one other question.
Mr. BEVANs. May I give you a reply in writing?
Senator PERCY. Thank you very much indeed.
(Short recess.) *
Senator SPONG. I apologize for that interruption, Mr. Bevans.
56
Senator Percy did not complete his questioning. He will submit his
question to you for the record, which will be held open.
Mr. BEVANs. Thank you, sir.
(The information referred to follows:)
ANswer. To QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PERCY To MR. BEVANs
Question: The decisions as to which drugs should be controlled by the Psycho-
tropic Convention, and on which schedule they should be placed, would be made
by the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, which is not a health or
scientific body. Cam recommendations of the World Health Organization be
ignored by the Commission in favor of “economic, social, legal, administrative
or other factors”? -
Answer: Recommendations Communicated by the World Health Organization
to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs regarding controls Over a substance under
the Convention on Psychotropic Substances can not simply be ignored by the
Commission. Although the Commission is empowered to make the final deter-
mination whether a particular substance with respect to which the Organization
communicates a recommendation shall be controlled Or the existing controls
Over a substance shall be changed, the Commission is required to take into
account, “the communication from the World Health Organization, whose assess-
ments shall be determinative as to medical and Scientific matters.”
Article 2 of the Convention, which provides in paragraph 4 for the making
by the Organization of assessments Of Substances and for the communication of
those assessments with recommendations regarding controls, provides in par-
agraphs 5 and 6 as follows:
“5. The Commission, taking into account the communication from the
World Health Organization, whose assessments shall be determinative as to
medical and scientific matters, and bearing in mind the economic, social,
legal, administrative and other factors it may consider relevant, may add
the substance to Schedule I, II, III or IV. The Commission may seek further
information from the World Health Organization or from other appropriate
SOUII*CéS.
“6. If a notification under paragraph 1 relates to a substance already
listed in One of the Schedules, the World Health Organization shall communi-
cate to the Commission its new findings, any new assessment of the substance
it may make in accordance with paragraph 4 and any new recommendations
on control measures it may find appropriate in the light of that assessment.
The Commission, taking into account the communication from the World
Health Organization as under paragraph 5 and bearing in mind the factors
referred to in that paragraph, may decide to transfer the substance from one
Schedule to another or to delete it from the ScheduleS.”
The above-quoted provisions were formulated and adopted on the basis of
many years of experience by representatives of governments in dealing with the
placing of drugs under international controls. The Commission on Narcotic
Drugs is composed of dedicated and conscientious individuals and their Views
are based upon the advice of health authorities and other authorities of their
respective governments. Their views are very strongly health-oriented as is in-
dicated by the composition of the delegations participating in the twenty-fourth
session of the Commission. Thirteen of the twenty-four member states of the
Commission were represented by authorities of health agencies. Sixteen alternate
representatives and advisers were from health agencies. Twenty-five of the in:
dividuals participating had the title of doctor. It would seem unthinkable that
such individuals would not be sincere in taking into account the assessments
and recommendations of the World Health Organization and be equally assidu-
ous in seeking to solve public health and Social problems resulting from the
abuse of drugs. The decisions taken by the Commission with respect to controls
over psychotropic substances and over preparations containing those Substances
are required by the Convention to be taken by a two-thirds majority of the mem-
bers of the Commission.
U.S. FOREIGN AID WHICH HAS GONE INTO DRUG PROGRAMS
Senator Spong. I would like, for the record, to ask you to provide
a country-by-country breakdown of the amount of U.S. foreign assist-
- }*
57
ance which has gone into drug programs in the past 5 years. (See
p. 61.) -
PARTICIPATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN INTERNATHONAL ORUG
EFFORTS
I would also like to ask you if there are other nations participating
in international drug efforts outside their borders. For example, are
other nations contributing adequately to the U.N. Special Fund for
Drug Abuse Control? Have other nations sent personnel into still
other nations to work on drug control?
Mr. BEVANs. Yes, sir.
Senator SPONG. Could you respond to the last question?
Mr. BEVANs. About whether they are adequately contributing to
the U.N. fund 8
Senator SPONG. I asked: (1) if there are other nations participating
in international drug efforts outside their own borders; and (2) if
other nations are contributing adequately to the United Nations spe-
cial fund for drug abuse control; and (3) if other nations have sent
personnel into other countries to work on drug control.
Mr. BEVANs. We have some figures here, Senator. I could read them
to you, if you wish me to do so with respect to the U.N. fund that you
mentioned.
Taking our own contributions first, of $2 million, Canada, $150,000;
France, $100,000; the Federal Republic of Germany, $310,482; the
Holy See, $1,000; Morocco, $2,000; Saudi Arabia, $2,000; Sweden,
$20,790; Turkey, $5,000; Vietnam, $1,000; and then we have a non-
governmental figure, $6,830, which brings those contributions to
$2,099,102.
Senator SPONG. Of which how much is ours?
Mr. BEVANs. Ours is $2 million of that. Now, we have some pledges;
º I mention those? The pledges now made and existing are Canada,
250,000 - -
Senator SPONG. In addition to the amount they have already con-
tributed 3 -
Mr. BEVANs. Yes, sir. I understand that is additional. They have
given $150,000 and they have pledged an additional $250,000; Cyprus
$2,550; Greece, $2,000; Iran, $5,000; Italy, $101,350; Norway, for the
fiscal year 1973, $41,580; the United Kingdom, $125,000; which is a
total of existing pledges of $602,106.
Unspecified pledges of contributions have been made by Argentina
and Switzerland. India has offered to contribute expertise, training,
and educational facilities. -
Senator SPONG. In addition to the moneys subscribed or pledged,
are there any nations participating in drug efforts outside their own
borders?
Mr. BEVANs. May I ask Mr. Miller if he will answer that?
Senator SPONG. Yes.
Mr. MILLER. I can try to address myself to that, Mr. Chairman.
There have been officers from France in the United States; in fact,
in the agreement that was worked out with France between the At-
torney General of the United States and the Minister of Interior of
France it was in the agreement for a French officer to be stationed in
the United States. -
58
Additionally, Mexican officers, frequently, from time to time, and
working in cooperation with U.S. officers in border areas come across
to assist in investigation. Likewise, the Mounties from Canada fre-
quently come into the United States helping us in a case; but insofar
as the concept of stationing officers in other countries is concerned,
this really is entirely a U.S. effort. Other countries have not engaged
in that type of program yet. We are now concentrating on having
Schools in foreign countries training foreign officers on how to con-
duct drug investigations. Hopefully, the concept will spread.
Senator SPONG. Is Germany doing anything beyond its borders?
Mr. MILLER. I have heard that Germany is working to some extent
in Afghanistan to help their police set up better law enforcement
measures generally, and included in that would be drug control efforts.
Senator SPONG. Mr. Ingersoll earlier this morning mentioned the
difficulties in Germany proper because of the federal structure of its
government. Do you share his view that there will be a national effort
in Germany in the near future?
Mr. MILLER. Oh, indeed, I think it is well on its way.
Senator SPONG. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Senator Percy will submit his questions and I will look forward to
anything documented that you want to give in response to a question
I put to you.
The hearing is adjourned.
(Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, the commit-
tee to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.)
A P P E N DIY
- JUNE 29, 1972.
Mr. CHARLES I. BEVANS,
Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. BEVANS: Pursuant to the hearing On June 27 before the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee on the Protocol amending the Single Convention. On
Narcotic Drugs, 1961, I would appreciate it if you, On behalf of the Department
of State, would supply the following information for the hearing record :
1. A list Of the COuntries With which the U.S. has bilateral agreements relating
to drug COntrol.
2. A country-by-country breakdown of the amount of U.S. foreign assistance
which has gone into drug programs in the past five years, together With an indica-
tion of the specific purpose for which the funds have been used.
3. A listing Of contributions by the U.S. and other nations throughout the
world to the United Nations Special Fund for Drug Abuse Control.
4. A Summary. Of activities undertaken by other nations to curb the drug trade
Outside their borders. (There is no need to include participation in the Single
Convention, since we already have a list Of those nations.)
5. A summary of activities undertaken by the Department of State to restrict
the international flow of illegal drugS.
6. A list of the 12 nations which abstained from signing the Protocol.
7. A list of nations which are considered potential Sources of illegal drugs but
which have not signed the Convention.
8. A country-by-country breakdown of the number of State Department per-
sonnel abroad engaged in drug control work with an indication of the exact
activities in which they are involved.
How do these personnel figures compare with similar figures for 5, 10 and
20 years ago?
9. In which countries have personnel in the Department of State been most
active in efforts to control drugs? Has this pattern changed Over the past five
years, and do you expect it to change in the next several years?
10. Which diplomats have “Courtesy Of the port,” i.e., which Ones can enter
without the customary inspection by Customs Officials?
What evidence is there that diplomatic immunity is being abused with respect
to drugs? Are diplomats from One part of the world believed to be abusing diplo-
matic immunity more than those from Other parts?
Thank you for your assistance on these matters.
Sincerely,
WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR.
DEPARTMENT of STATE,
Washington, D.C., July 14, 1972.
Hon. WILLIAM B. SPONG, Jr.,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR SPONG: I thank you for your letter of June 29, 1972 requesting,
pursuant to the hearing On June 27 before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee on the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961,
that I Supply On behalf of the Department of State certain information for the
hearing record.
(59)
60
The Department of State appreciates this opportunity to supply in the en-
closures to this letter information on the following items Set forth in your
letter : -
1. A list of the countries with which the U.S. has bilateral agreements relating
to drug control. (Tab 1) e
2. A country-by-country breakdown of the amount of U.S. foreign assistance
which has gone into drug programs in the past five years, together With an
indication of the specific purpose for which the funds have been used. (Tab 2)
3. A listing of contributions by the U.S. and other nations throughout the
world to the United Nations Special Fund for Drug Abuse Control. (Tab 3)
4. A summary of activities undertaken by other nations to curb the drug trade
outside their borders. (There is no need to include participation in the Single
Convention, since we already have a list of those nations.) (Tab 4)
5. A summary of activities undertaken by the Department of State to restrict
the international flow of illegal drugs. (Tab 5)
6. A list of the 12 nations which abstained from signing the Protocol. (Tab 6)
7. A list of nations which are considered potential sources of illegal drugs but
which have not signed the Convention. (Tab 7)
8. A country-by-country breakdown of the number of State Department per-
sonnel abroad engaged in drug control work with an indication of the exact
activities in which they are involved.
How do these personnel figures compare With Similar figures for 5, 10 and 20
years ago? (Tab 8)
9. In which countries have personnel in the Department of State been most
active in efforts to control drugs? Has this pattern changed over the past five
years, and do you expect it to change in the next several years? (Tab 9)
10. Which diplomats have “courtesy of the port,” i.e., which ones can enter
without the customary inspection by customs officials? (Tab 10)
What evidence is there that diplomatic immunity is being abused with respect
to drugs? Are diplomats from One part of the world believed to be abusing
diplomatic immunity more than those from other parts?
I hope that the enclosed information will be useful to you. If I can be of any
further assistance, please let me know.
Sincerely yours, -
CHARLES I. BEVANs,
A88istant Legal Adviser.
[H]nclosures : Tabs 1–10.]
1. COUNTRIES WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BII, ATERAI, AGREEMENTS
RELATING TO DRUG CONTROL
Austria Italy
Belgium Japan
BOlivia La OS
Cambodia Mexico
Canada Netherlands
China, Republic of Poland
Cuba Portugal
Czechoslovakia ROmania
Denmark - Spain
Ecuador Switzerland
Egypt Thailand
France Turkey
Germany, Federal Republic |United Kingdom
Greece Viet-Nam
India
Yugoslavia
61
2. CountRY-BY-Country BREAKDown of AMOUNT OF U.S. FoEEIGN ASSISTANCE
WHICH HAS GONE INTO DRUG PROGRAMS DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS
AID assistance in marcotics control
Thousands
Fiscal year 1967: Turkey, agricultural development and control loan---- $3,000
Fiscal year 1970:
Mexico, Enforcement equipment (grant) 1, 000
Fiscal year 1972 : - -
Vietnam - 500
Public safety * = * * 450
Customs advisers - . 50
Thailand 1,046
Customs Survey 16
Drug abuse research 30
BNDD program * 1,000
LaOS - 1, 100
Public Safety advisers and equipment 107
Customs advisers and equipment-- 514
Treatment and rehabilitation 111
Special narcotics investigation group (equipment) ––––––––––––– 66
Program support including project manager, Air America Inspec-
tion Service, Air Support, Communications--- 302
Turkey -- - - - - - 15, 700
Foreign exchange compensation 5,000
TMO—Collection final Crop- 300
Agriculture Development including Agricultural Advisers______ 10, 400
Philippines: Public Safety including advisers, equipment and participants 230
Bolivia : Bolivia narcotics brigade budget support - 19
Argentina : Customs training in United States - - 12
International organization : U.N. Special Fund for Drug Abuse Control” 2, 000
Interregional COStS_-_ -- 25
Total . ------- 20, 632
1 Training in narcotics control has been a regular feature of the Office of Public Safety
Police Academy in Washington since 1962. Additionally, as part of AID's regular public
fºram. narcotics advisory assistance had been provided to Vietnam prior to fiscal
**ś transferred to another U.S. agency for implementation. -
NOTE.-Additionally the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)
regularly conducts training programs for foreign officers. Since 1968 BNDD has
given intensive drug enforcement training to approximately 2,000 law enforce-
ment officers from 56 foreign countries, including the areas of Africa, East
Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Latin America, the Near East and South Asia.
º, stimates the total expenditure for this 5-year program to be nearly
$3UU, UUU.
62
3. contRIBUTIONS BY THE U.S. AND OTHER NATIONS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD TO THE
- UNITED NATION S SPECIAL FUND FOR DRUG CONTROL
COmtribution & Paid
United States— $2,000, 000
Canada 150, 000
France ––– 100,000
Germany, Federal Republic_____ -e ºs-- 310, 482
Holy See - *-- 1, 000
MOrocCO - - 2, 000
Saudi Arabia_-_ - * - -- 2,000
Sweden --- 20, 790
Turkey -> 5,000
Vietnam ––– 1, 000
NOngovernmental 6,830
2, 599, 102
Pledges
Canada ––– __ $250, 000
Cyprus ––– * * * * * * 2, 550
Greece * * - 2, 000
Iran ––– - --- 5, 000
Italy ––– 101, 350
NOTWay --- - - - 74, 626
Sweden (Fiscal Year 1973) - - - 41, 580
United Kingdom--------------------------------------------------- 125,000
602, 106
NOTE.-In addition, India has offered to contribute expertise, training, and
educational facilities.
4. SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES UNDERTAIKEN BY OTHER NATIONS TO CURB THE DRUG
TRADE OUTSIDE THEIR BORDERS
Outstanding example of drug control cooperation with the United States by
other nations—Canada, France, Mexico, Thailand, Turkey, and others—are set
forth in “United States Foreign Policy 1971, A Report by the Secretary of
State” (see Tab 5, paragraphs 8–16).
Thirteen other nations sent top-ranking police officials to a two-week seminar
sponsored in Washington in September 1971 by BNDD together with the narcotic
COntrol agencies Of France and Canada. The participants discussed all aspects of
the international drug traffic and the means of combatting it.
The meeting in Canberra, Australia, in November 1971 of regional enforce-
ment officers was a first step toward increased regional cooperation on efforts to
cope with the growth, production and trafficking in illicit drugs in Southeast
Asia. Australia, Cambodia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, New
Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet-Nam partici-
pated in that meeting. The U.S.A., the United Nations and INTERPOL were rep-
resented by Observers.
The contributions and pledges to the United Nations Special Fund for Drug
Abuse Control by 16 other countries in addition to the U.S. and the offer by
India to contribute expertise, training, and educational facilities (see Tab 3) are
further examples of activities that should assist in curbing the illicit drug trade
Outside their borders.
In 1971 President Pompidou of France submitted to the United Kingdom and
Other European Community Governments a proposal to promote greater co-
Operation on drug abuse and illegal drug traffic among those governments, which
is being acted upon by the Community.
The Federal Republic of Germany has assigned men to Afghanistan and
Turkey to assist in police training, including drug control.
63
5. SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO RESTRICT
THE INTERNATIONAL FLOW OF ILLEGAL DRUGS -
(The following, with minor modifications, is taken from “United States
Foreign Policy 1971, A Report of the Secretary of State”)
The Department of State is the primary agency for coordinating international
controls over drugs. Its activities to restrict the international flow of illicit drugs
are being conducted on many fronts.
Assigning the drug problem high priority among foreign policy issues, the
Department last August appointed at the Assistant Secretary level a Senior
Adviser to the Secretary and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters,
Nelson G. Gross.
Drug Control Coordinators have been designated for the Department's re-
gional and functional bureaus, and in July the regional bureaus began setting
up Interagency Narcotics Control Committees with representation from State,
A.I.D., Justice, Treasury, Defense, CIA, and USIA. Drug control officers have
also been designated at most of our missions to coordinate the Country Team
efforts abroad.
In August, the President further strengthened the Department's role in dealing
with the foreign supply and international trafficking in drugs and narcotics by
establishing the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control under
the chairmanship of the Secretary of State. Other members of the Committee
are the Attorney General; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Treas-
ury; Ambassador George Bush, U.S. Representative to the United Nations;
Richard Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; and Secretary of
Agriculture Earl L. Butz.
Specifically, the Cabinet Committee will : (1) develop comprehensive plans and
programs for drug control; (2) assure the coordination of all activities of inter-
national scope; (3) evaluate all such activities and their implementation ; (4)
make recommendations to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
concerning funding of activities; and (5) make periodic reports On the progress
of its operations to the President. The Cabinet Committee is supported by a
Working Group composed Of high-level personnel from each of the member agen-
Cies plus the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention. After three in-
formal meetings, the first formal meeting of the Cabinet Committee was held on
September 28 and the second On December 16. The subgroups have met dozens
Of times. -
A major project initiated by the Cabinet Committee is the preparation Of
narcotics control action plans for more than 50 countries considered to have a
current or potential involvement in the production, processing, consumption, or
transiting of illicit hard drugs. The focus is On world supplies, trafficking, and
smuggling of heroin and cocaine destined for the U.S. market or U.S. personnel
abroad. The action plans include a description Of the drug situation, a Statement
of goals, the strategy to achieve such goals, estimated costs, priorities, and a
general timetable for implementation. These plans are being forwarded to For-
eign Service posts to serve as a basis for Opening discussions with host govern-
ments for the negotiation of bilateral narcotics control action programs.
One Of the principal international goals of the United States is an end to
Opium production and the growing Of poppies. The development of effective sub-
Stitutes for the Opium derivatives, particularly Codeine, which is now used for
medical purposes, would eliminate any valid reason for opium production. In
the interim, because there are still indispensable medical uses for Opium, and
because production of the Opium needed for medical purposes is a legitimate
Source of income in some countries, we are pressing ahead with programs (1) to
develop synthetic substitutes for opium derivatives, (2) to assist countries in
their efforts to end illicit drug processing and trafficking and illegal opium pro-
duction, and (3) to make national and international control more effective.
A major effort is being mounted in the law enforcement field. Intelligence
gathering on international narcotics trafficking has been strengthened, and all
appropriate law enforcement arms of the U.S. Government—the Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), Bureau of Customs, and Public Safety
64
Division of A.I.D.—are stepping up their activities abroad. These efforts have
already begun to yield results. Information furnished by French authorities in
Cooperation with American agencies led to the seizure of the equivalent of over
tW0 tons of heroin in 1971. Hong Kong police, in cooperation with our BNDD,
Seized over 12,000 pounds of opium in 1971 compared with 95 pounds in 1970.
On a day-to-day basis, the U.S. Government is proceeding both bilaterally and
multilaterally against the illicit drug traffic and the supplies that feed it. Bi-
lateral cooperation has been closest with Canada, Mexico, France, Turkey, and
other countries which have a special relationship with us or to the problem of
drug control as it affects us. Collaboration with Canada and with Mexico is espe-
Cially important because Of Our Common frontiers.
A Franco-American Intergovernmental Committee on Drug Control has been
meeting periodically to review the cooperative arrangements and to discuss how
to improve them. At the invitation of the Americans and French, Canadian rep-
resentatives from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have also participated in
the work of the Committee since November 1970. The primary objective of this
trilateral cooperative effort is the discovery and closing of heroin conversion
laboratories in France and the interception of the illicit heroin traffic to North
America. An agreement signed with France in February 1971 provided for
French agents to operate in the United States and for U.S. agents to operate in
France. The success of this COOperative effort has been demonstrated by substan-
tial heroin seizures made by French and American police.
The Governments of the United States and Mexico have been collaborating in
narcotics trafficking programs since 1969 when a Joint Working Group was es-
tablished. Our cooperative effort has resulted in the seizure and destruction on
Mexican soil of large quantities of narcotics and psychotropic Substances aimed
at the illicit market.
On June 30, the Prime Minister of Turkey announced that the production of
opium would be banned in that country. A decree specified that production will
be restricted to four provinces for the fall 1971 planting, and that complete
abolition of opium production will go into effect when the crop is harvested in
June of 1972. Since that announcement, two additional Steps have been taken
by the Government of Turkey. The first was the passage in August of a strict
opium licensing and control law. Secondly, the Turkish Opium monopoly has
completed purchases of opium gum from the 1971 harvest. The collection of 149
tons, which was more than double the previous year's 61 tons, was larger than
any annual collection in the past eight years and represents a significant re-
duction of leakage into illicit channels.
In response to the Turkish decision to ban Opium production, the U.S. Govern-
ment Sent a high-level mission headed by the Secretary of Agriculture to Turkey
to provide technical advice on agricultural and agro-industrial development in
the area where poppy growing will be eliminated. We have assured Turkey of
Our readiness to provide financial assistance to help prevent foreign exchange
losses from legitimate exports of opium gum and poppy products and to help
establish development activities in the affected areas.
The agreement with Turkey was particularly significant since it will remove
the major source of opium for heroin marketed in the United States. We are
interested in similar cooperative arrangements with governments of other coun-
tries along the illegal trade route which runs from the Middle East through
Europe to North America, and increasingly through South America.
We are also seeking cooperative plans with the governments Of countries
in Southeast Asia where there is substantial illegal or uncontrolled production
of opium. That is the area to which the illegal traffickers will turn increasingly
as existing sources of supply in the Middle East are closed to them. Two major
accomplishments can already be cited. On September 28, 1971 the United States
and Thailand signed a Memorandum of Understanding by which the two coun-
tries pledged mutual action against the supply and trafficking of illicit nar-
cotics and dangerous drugs. Of equal significance, on November 15 the Lao
Government implemented a narcotics law which for the first time in Laotian
history prohibits the growing, processing, trading, and use of opium and the
Opiates. These actions will form the basis for cooperative efforts between the
two countries and the United States to combat the drug problem in Southeast
Asia and reduce the flow of heroin. -
In Vietnam the United States is fully supporting the Vietnamese Government's
anti-smuggling and narcotics campaign to prevent drug abuse by Vietnamese and
65
Americans alike and eliminate Vietnam as a transshipment point for narcotics
to the United States. Among our forces, U.S. Imilitary authorities in Vietnam
are also applying vigorous control measures to the same end.
In the international field we have been working multilaterally, within the
United Nations and other international organizations, and within the framework
Of the international drug Control System established and Operating under treaties.
International efforts to bring opium and other narcotics under effective control
have a long history and have in fact been successful in Controlling the legal
manufacture of narcotic drugs for medical use. Although world requirements for
morphine have increased more than five times since the 1930's, there is no evi-
dence of any Substantial leakage to the illicit traffic from the licensed factories.
NOW the challenge to the international control system is to bring the illegal and
uncontrolled production of narcotic raw materials under equally effective con-
trol and Similarly to extend control over psychotropic or so-called mind-bending
Substances. --
The United States, which produces a large percentage of the psychotropic
Substances entering the illicit drug traffic, joined with 22 other nations on Feb-
ruary 21, 1971, to sign in Vienna a Convention on Psychotropic Substances. This
is the first international instrument for the control of such substances as the
hallucinogens (including LSD), amphetamines, barbiturates, and tranquilizers.
On June 29 the President submitted the Convention to the Senate for its early
advice and consent to ratification.
In March 1972 the United States Delegation, headed by Mr. Nelson G. Gross,
the Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for International
Narcotics Matters, and Mr. William I. Cargo, Director of Planning and Coordi-
nation, and including other members of the Department of State, together with
representatives of the Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare, took a leading part in the adoption of the Protocol Amend-
ing the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, which is now pending before
the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. -
6. NATIONS WHICH ABSTAINED FROM SIGNING THE PROTOCOL AMENDING THE SINGLE
CONVENTION ON NARCOTLC DRUGS
Twelve of the nations which participated in the Geneva Conference at which
the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was adopted in
March 1972 not only abstained from signing the Protocol at the Conference but
also abstained on the vote to adopt the Protocol. Those twelve nations Were Al-
eria, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Panama, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Repub-
ic, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. However, Panama subsequently
signed the Protocol in New York. Colombia, Finland, and Israel, which also par-
ticipated in the Conference, have subsequently signed the Protocol in New York.
Other nations which participated in the Conference and have not yet signed
the Protocol are Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Burundi, Canada, Ceylon,
ahomey, El Salvador, Gambia, India, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya,
Korea, Kuwait, Laos, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger,
igeria, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabi, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singa-
pore, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, and Uruguay.
It should be noted that signature of such an international agreement has
essentially Symbolic significance. States which sign do SO Subject to ratification.
Those which do not sign may nonetheless accede to the agreement. In many cases
a State prefers not to sign but to study the agreement in its capital and then
make the decision whether to become a party to the agreement in the Course of its
ratification procedure. Signature of an international agreement, on the other
hand, is a pledge to submit that agreement to a State’s ratification procedure
but does not prejudge the decision that may be reached therein. We know that a
number of states which have not yet signed the Protocol feel favorably about it
and, in Some instances, cosponsored the amendments with the United States.
7. NATIONS WHICH ARE CONSIDERED POTENTIAL SOURCES OF ILLEGAL DRUGS BUT
WIHICH HAVE NOT SIGNED THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS
The following nations are potential sources of illegal drugs, either as producers
91 as stations on the illicit traffic route. Depending upon illicit traffic develop-








66
ments, other nations may become sources as well: Bolivia ; Colombia ; Laos;
Nepal ; and Singapore.
8. COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY BREAKDOWN OF NUMBER OF STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL
ABROAD ENGAGED IN DRUG CONTROL AND INDICATION OF EXACT ACTIVITIES IN WHICH
TFIEY ARE INVOLVED
Each U.S. diplomatic mission has designated a Drug Control Coordinator.
In the countries named in the attached list, for which Narcotic Control Action
Plans have been or are being developed, the Coordinator will be devoting all or
a major part of his time to drug control efforts.
In the following countries where drug control is critical for U.S. policy ob-
jectives, several officers are actively involved in and give substantial portions of
their time to drug control matters including the Chief of Mission, the Deputy
Chief of Mission and the Chief of Political or Economic Section, as well as at
least One Other mission Officer : Paraguay, Panama, Mexico, Turkey, Afghanistan,
Thailand, Laos, Viet-Nam, Burma, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy
and Canada.
This engagement of State Department personnel abroad in drug control work
has taken place during the past year and reflects both the extent of the drug abuse
problem in the United States and the U.S. Government decision to make drug
control internationally a high priority foreign policy objective.
NARCOTICS CONTROL ACTION PLANS
Africa.-Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya. •
Near East and South Asia.—Afghanistan, India, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan,
Turkey, Nepal, Ceylon, Israel, Greece, Egypt.
Latin America.-Mexico, Panama, Colombia, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru,
Jamaica, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay, Venezuela, Guyana, Barbardos,
Bahamas, Netherlands Antilles.
Europe.—France, Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Austria,
Spain, England, Denmark, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Switzerland, Bel-
gium, Canada.
East Africa and Pacific.—Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Philippines, Thailand, In-
donesia, Viet Nam, Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, Malaysia.
9. COUNTRIES IN W HICH PERSONNEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAVE BEEN MOST
ACTIVE IN EFFORTS TO CONTROL DRUGS
State Department personnel abroad have been most active in cooperative efforts
for drug control in the following countries:
Turkey - Laos
France Paraguay
Mexico Panama
Federal Republic of Germany Burma
Italy Viet-Nam.
Thailand
This pattern has been established during the past year. In June 1971 the
President made drug control a high priority foreign policy objective of the United
States. In August 1971 the President established the Cabinet Committee for Inter-
national Narcotics Control. Since that date narcotics control action plans have
been developed for about 60 countries (see list under Tab 8).
It is expected that this pattern will continue during the next several years.
Subject to budgetary and personnel resources made available, the Department
of State is prepared to maintain and, if required, to intensify these efforts.
10. DIPLOMATs which HAVE THE “COURTESY OF THE PORT’’, E.G., THOSE WHICH CAN
ENTER WITHOUT THE CUSTOMARY INSPECTION BY CUSTOMS OFFICIALS
All diplomats accredited to the United States, those accredited to other coun-
tries transiting the United States, and those accredited to the United Nations are,
under the present United States Customs Regulations, permitted entry without
examination of personal effects. Those regulations are, however, presently being
redrafted with a view to conforming them with the tenets of the Vienna Con-
vention on Diplomatic Relations which permits the inspection of personal bag-

67
gage of a diplomat if there are serious grounds for presuming that it contains
other than articles for official use of the mission or for his personal use or mem-
bers of his family or articles whose import or export is prohibited by law.
There is evidence that diplomatic immunity has been abused by SOme holders
of diplomatic passports, especially by Ones other than those referred to above.
There have been a few actual instances Of abuse by diplomatic agents but it
would be difficult to conclude that those from any One part Of the WOrld are
abusing diplomatic immunity more than those from Other parts.
JUNE 29, 1972.
Hon. EUGENE. T. ROSSIDES,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. ROSSIDES : Pursuant to the June 27 hearing On the international
drug situation before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I would appreciate
having the following questions answered for inclusion in the hearing record:
1. How many official points of entry into the U.S. are there and how do you
determine how to allocate your resources among these points?
2. Through which points of entry do you believe the major portion of the
heroin comes? Where have your largest Seizures taken place? -
3. Has the entrance pattern been consistent throughout the last 5 to 10 years,
i.e., are most of the drugs coming in through One Section and has this been
true over a period of time, or has there been a change in the pattern ?
4. Please provide, for the record, a breakdown of the location of your agents
dealing with drug control and seizures. Please compare this with the 10cation
of such agents for drug-related purposes 5, 10, and 20 years ago.
Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely,
WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR.
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
Washington, D.C., July 28, 1972.
IDEAR SENATOR SPONG : In reply to your letter of June 29, 1972, I am submitting
the answers to the four questions you posed, plus some additional information
which may be Of assistance to you.
For your information and guidance in evaluating the following answers, you
Shoukd be aware of the distinction between the various types of Customs officers.
Customs Inspector.—Uniformed Officer stationed at all normal points of entry
to examine passengers, baggage, cargo, and vehicles entering the United States.
(3348 current strength)
Customs Patrol Officer.—Uniformed or plainclothes officer who patrols the .
Waterfronts and airports to detect those who might attempt to circumvent nor-
mal inspection channels. (606 current strength)
Special Agent.—Plainclothes Officer who conducts the investigative work in an
effort to be prepared to apprehend the Smuggler when he arrives, or identify
and arrest those who have penetrated the customs barrier. (1012 current
Strength) -
| Question 1.-How many official points of entry into the United States are there
and how do you determine how to allocate your resources among these points? .
Answer.—At the present time there are 297 official ports of entry into the
United States as well as 74 official stations, making a total of 371 official points
of entry. Within the larger ports are numerous administratively-determined loca-
tions at which Customs Inspectors are located to clear passengers and/or
merchandise into the country. In large ports this could be a bridge, highway, or
tunnel, an airport, a rail station, a ferry dock, a marine terminal, or any com-
bination of these facilities. The number of Customs personnel that are assigned
to various ports and stations depends upon the quantity of merchandise, number
of Carriers, number of passengers, hours of service required, and distance to the
next Customs port or station along the land border or coastline. Such complex
Considerations make determination of manning level dependent upon individual
consideration of each port's particular traffic patterns and location.
Question 2–Through which points of entry do you believe the major portion
of the heroin comes? Where have your largest seizures taken place?
Answer.—We believe that the major entrance points for heroin are New York
City and Miami, Florida. Our intelligence reports that large amounts of heroin
68
are also being smuggled into the United States in vehicles crossing our Southern
borders from Mexico and in Cargo shipments from VeSSels Coming in at Our large
SeaportS. -
We have made two fairly large heroin Seizures from vehicles Crossing Our
Southern border in the past two years and have made three large heroin Seizures
from Cargo shipments in the past five years.
Our largest Seizures Over the past two years have been from
(a) Contrabandista aircraft flying the South America/Miami route;
(b) Trapped automobiles from many European ports to Canada, Mexico,
and eastern seaboard cities, mostly New York and New Jersey; and
(c) The SOn Of a foreign diplomat who used his status to clear heroin-
loaded suitcases at Miami and New York.
Question, 3.−Has the entrance pattern been consistent throughout the last 5 to
10 years, i.e., are most Of the drugs COining in through One section and has this
been true over a period of time, or has there been a change in the pattern ?
Answer.—During the past 5 to 10 years, patterns have changed from the tradi-
tional “mule or courier” body Carrying Or using false-bOttom Suitcases arriving
in the United States from Europe direct to the eastern Seaboard or through
Canada or Mexico. Today large Organizations ship 50 to 100 kilograms at a time,
are well-financed, always have COntrollers On the Scene, and when they are ar-
rested are much more inclined to COOperate than the Couriers of the past.
Most of the large heroin Seizures in the past were made in New York City or
its environs. This is still true today, but Miami personnel have made some very
large seizures during the past two years. -
Enclosed are records of major heroin seizures over the past two years. You will
note that most of the seizures Originating in Europe or South America are large
seizures, the small ones are from Southeast Asia or from Europe to Canada in
false-bottom Suitcases. §
Question -Please provide, for the record, a breakdown of the location of your
agents dealing with drug control and Seizures. Please compare this with the loca-
tion of such agents for drug-related purposes 5, 10, and 20 years ago.
Answer.—We believe you are most interested in our Special Agent positions in
question four, but we have also added Our present disposition of CPO’s. Since
over the period of years offices have been added and deleted, we have grouped the
figures by major geographical area.S.
1972
1952 1962 1967 1972 CPO's
Northeast (New York, Boston, Baltimore, Rouses Point, etc.)----- 52 86 94 231 317
Southeast (Atlanta, Miami, New Orleans, San Juan, Virgin -
Islands, etc.)------------------------------------------- 16 30 38 146 160
Southwest (Houston, San Antonio, El Paso, New Orleans, San -
Ysidro, etc.)-------------------------------------------- 57 41 55 324 33
West coast (Los Angeles, San Francisco, Honolulu, Anchorage,
Seattle, etc.)-------------------------------------------- 24 62 32 178 78
Midwest (Chicago, Detroit, Buffalo, etc.)---------------------- 20 17 69 98 18
Foreign-------------------------------------------------- 12 23 15 36 ----------
Total---------------------------------------------- 181 259, 303 1,012 606
[The present complement of CPO’s is a marked reduction in the numbers we previously had. The chart depicts the
smuggling potential today by comparing entries and arrivals to the number of CP0's
1947 1960 1971
Vessel arrivals---------------------------------------------------- 59,000. 53,000 51,000
Aircraft arrivals------------- * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 68,000 167,000 308,000
Passenger arrivals------------------------------------------------ 3,900,000 4,731,000 13,698,000
Formal entries---------------------------------------------------- 1,086,000 1,476,000 2,773,000
Number of patrol officers------------------------------------------ 1,650 550 606
We believe that the effect of the patrol Officer is to either force the smuggler
to go through normal channels where he is Vulnerable to the Customs inspector,
or to lay more detailed plans which are time-consuming, costly, and make him
more SuSceptible to discovery through investigation by the special agents.
69
I sincerely hope that the above information is adequate for your needs. Should
any further questions arise, please let me know.
Sincerely yours, - -
- EUGENE T. ROSSIDES.
[EnclosureS.] - -
SIGNIFICANT HEROIN SEIZURES IN UNITED STATES AND CANADA JULY 1970 TO
- PRESENT
. Bulk shipments of heroin moved from South America to U.S. via Contra-
bandista Aircraft. -
. Bulk shipments direct from France to the New York area in Automobiles.
Bulk shipments from France and Spain to San Juan, Mexico, and Canada in
Automobiles later driven across the borders. -
. Bulk shipments from South America and Europe in Suitcases carried by
DiplomatS. - - - -
. Bulk shipments on cruise ships to the Caribbean and on to South Florida and
other U.S. ports. - -
Small shipments from Southeast Asia via APO, MAC, and Body Carries.
s
F.
Quantity - -
Port of entry Date (pounds) Smuggling method employed Country of departure
Miami, Fla----------------- July 29, 1970 4 Courier/Suitcase----------------- Curacao.
D0-------------------- Oct. 20, 1970 94 Private air---------------------- Paraguay.
Toronto, Canada.------------ Nov. 28, 1970 22 Suitcase------------------------ Frankfurt.
Montreal, Canada---------------- do------- 18 ----- do------------------------- Paris.
Miami, Fla----------------- Dec. 12, 1970 40 Unknown----------------------- Unknown.
D0--------------------- ----do------- 210 Cargo air----------------------- Paraguay.
San Juan, P.R.-------------- Jan. 18, 1971 58 ----- do------------------------- Dominican Republic.
Forth Monmouth, N.J.-------- Apr. 5, 1971 17 Official mail--------------------- Bangkok, Thailand.
New Jersey---------------------- do------- 97 Automobile--------------------- Le Havre, France.
Honolulu, Hawaii------------ May 16, 1971 4 Thermos jugs, suitcase----------- Hong Kong.
Miami, Fla----------------- May 22, 1971 155 Cargo air----------------- ------ Buenos Aires.
San Juan, P.R-------------- May 29, 1971 246 Automobile--------------------- Bilbao, Spain.
Montreal, Canada_ _ _ ________ June 22, 1971 110 ----- do------------------------- Le Harve, France.
J. F. K. Airport, N.Y--------- July 8, 1971 156 Suitcase, diplomat.--------------- Panama.
Toronto, Canada------------ July 15, 1971 4 Suitcase------------------------ Italy.
Laredo, TeX---------------- Aug. 26, 1971 24 Automobile tires---------------- Mexico City.
New York------------------ Sept. 14, 1971 206 Automobile--------------------- France/via England.
P0-------------------- Sept. 22, 1971 186 - - - - - do------------------------- Genoa, Italy.
D0-------------------- Sept. 29, 1971 69 Suitcase, Braniff baggage switch--- Chile/Argentina,
- - Paraguay.
P0-------------------- Oct. 6, 1971 39 Cargo, oil paintings-------------- Argentina.
Sacrament0---------------- Nov. 11, 1971 3. Mail, AP0---------------------- Thailand.
Travis AFB----------------- Dec. 30, 1971 17 Cargo, military airlift------------- D0.
Miami, Fla----------------- Jan. 3, 1972 238 Laundry bags, cruise ship-------- France.
P0-------------------- Jan. 10, 1972 147 ----- do------------------------- Do.
Honolulu, Hawaii------------ Jan. 26, 1972 18 Courier, body------------------- Singapore.
New York------------------ Jan. 27, 1972 86 Uº. possibly Champagne France.
- OX6S. .
Miami, Fla----------------- Apr. 5, 1972 22 Seaman courier----------------- Hong Kong.
New York------------------ Apr. 26, 1972 18 Teakwood chests---------------- |D0. -
Detroit, Mich--------------- May 10, 1972 5 Housesearch-------------------- Unknown.
New York------- ----------- May 11, 1972 2.2 lº rºle. imported Le Havre, France.
: Uly 1, +- .
D0-------------------- May 16, 1972 264 Military footlockers-------------- France via Belgium.
Seattle--------------------- May 24, 1972 10 Molded oriental plaques---------- Damascus, Syria.
Douglas, Ariz--------------- May 26, 1972 6.8 Vehicle door panels-------- ------ Mexico.
Blaine, Wash--------------- June 12, 1972 18 Stereo speakers----------------- Hºſons via Vancouver,
New Yºrk: - - - - - - - - - - - June 27, 1972 4 Housesearch-------------------- Hong Kong.
O -
* * * * * * - - - - - - * * * * * * * - July 4, 1972 6.5 Suitcases----------------------- Bangkok.
COCAINE SEIZURES AUGUST 1970 TO DATE
A. Bulk shipments of cocaine moved from South America to U.S. via contra-
bandista aircraft and in household effects. , ,
B. Couriers traveling from South America to U.S. via commercial air and vehicl
make probes at numerous Ports of Entry. -
C. Seaman couriers on Chilean and Columbian vessels continue activity.
Port of entry
Quantity -
Date (pounds) Smuggling method employed
J. F. K. Airport, N.Y--------- Aug. 8, 1970
P0-------------------- Aug. 20, 1970
Miami, Fla----------------- Sept. 2, 1970
Dulles Airport-------------- Oct. 5, 1970
D0-------------------- Oct. 7, 1970
Hoboken, N.J.--------------- Oct. 12, 1970
Miami, Fla----------------- Oct. 14, 1970
Norfolk, Va.----------------- Oct. 22, 1970
J. F. K. Airport, N.Y--------- Nov. 11, 1970
Miami, Fla----------------- Nov. 14, 1970
J. F. K. Airport, N.Y--------- Nov. 18, 1970
0-------------------- Nov. 21, 1970
Miami, Fla----------------- Dec. 4, 1970
Tampa, Fla----------------- Dec. 7, 1970
J. F. K. Airport, N.Y--------- Dec. 10, 1970
Honolulu, Hawaii------------ Dec. 11, 1970
Miami, Fla----------------- Jan. 20, 1971
Laredo, Tex---------------- Feb. 14, 1971
Mexico City Airport---------- Feb. 16, 1971
D0-------------------- Feb. 19, 1971
D0-------------------- Feb. 21, 1971
D0-------------------- Feb. 22, 1971
D0------------------------- do-------
Miami, Fla----------------- Feb. 24, 1971
St. Thomas, V.I.------------- Mar. 14, 1971
New Orleans, La------------ Mar. 23, 1971
Baltimore Airport----------- Apr. 20, 1971
Los Angeles Airport--------- Apr. 27, 1971
Philadelphia Piers----------- May 5, 1971
Miami Airport------------- - May 17, 1971
New York piers------------- May 18, 1971
San Antonio Airport--------- May 23, 1971
Miami Airport-------------- May 30, 1971
0-------------------- June 5, 1971
Los Angeles Airport--------- June 9, 1971
0---------, - - - - - - - - - - - June 10, 1971
9-------------------- June 22, 1971
Miami Airport-------------- June 26, 1971
New Orleans, La----------------- do-------
Miami Airport-------------- June 28, 1971
San Ysidro, Calif------------ July 3, 1971
UCSOſ -------------------- July 29, 1971
Nogales------------------- - Sept. 7, 1971
Miami Airport-------------- Sept. 11, 1971
Wew York------------------ Oct. 6, 1971
Los Angeles Airport--------- Oct. 15, 1971
J.F.K. Airport-...------------- Nov. 11, 1971
Los Angeles Airport--------- Nov. 21, 1971
J.F.K. Airport, N.Y----------- Dec. 4, 1971
San Ysidro, Calif------------ Dec. 8, 1971
Los Angeles Airport-------------- do-------
San Juan Airport------------ Dec. 11, 1971
J.F.K. Airport, N.Y----------- Dec. 23, 1971
San Juan Airport------------ Jan. 9, 1972
Miami Airport-------------- Jan. 13, 1972
San Juan Airport------------ Jan. 23, 1972
J.F.K. Airport, N.Y----------- Jan. 27, 1972
San Ysidro, Calif------------ Jan. 28, 1972
Los Angeles Airport--------- Feb. 1, 1972
J.F.K. Airport, N.Y----------- Feb. 2, 1972
Miami Airport-------------- Feb. 4, 1972
0-------------------- Feb. 10, 1972
J.F.K. Airport, N.Y---------------- do-------
D0-------------------- Feb. 17, 1972
Miami Airport-------------- Feb. 25, 1972
San Juan Airport----------------- do-------
Port Newark, N.J.----------- Mar. 6, 1972
J.F.K. Airport, N.Y---------------- do-------
Morehead City, N.C.-- - - - - - - - Mar. 8, 1972
Niagara Falls, N.Y----------- Mar. 10, 1972
J.F.K. Airport, N.Y----------- Mar. 12, 1972
Miami, Fia---------------------- do-------
D0-------------------- Mar. 29, 1972
D0-------------------- Apr. 5, 1972
Houston, Tex--------------- Apr. 12, 1972
Country of departure
2% Body carry--------------------- Argentina.
4% Suitcase------------------------ Chiie/Mexico.
4 ----- do------------------------- Colombia.
26 Comm. Air, Sec----------------- D0.
2----- do------------------------- D0.
6% Wessel------------------------- Chile.
34 Diplomat Suitcase--------------- D0.
4 ----- do------------------------- Do.
1% Smuggler's west----------------- Do.
12 uitcase------------------------ Peru.
8 ----- do------------------------- Peru, Colombia.
5 Crew Comm./Air----------------- Colombia.
88 Cargo air----------------------- Peru.
34 Vessel------------------------- Chile
11 Suitcase------------------------ Bolivia.
8 ----- do------------------------- Colombia/Mexico,
Sidney.
16 Suitcase------------------------ Chile.
12 Rental vehicle.------------------- Unknown Via Mexico.
17 Suitcase------------------------ Chile.
4 ----- do------------------------- B0.
9 ----- do------------------------- D0.
18 ----- do------------------------- DC.
4 ----- do------------------------- DO.
10 in-transit baggage switch--------- Unknown via Panama
9 Suitcase------------------------ Peru via Trinidad.
9 Tables via air cargo-------------- Chile.
7% Girdle, precleared--------------- Ecuador via Nassau.
2% B00y carry--------------------- Colombia.
2% Body carry and crew quarters----- Chile.
2 Body carry--------------------- Colombia
5% Body carry and crew quarters----- Peru.
2 Body carry--------------------- D0.
2 ----- do------------------------- Colombia.
2 Coffee cans--------------------- D0.
7 Suitcase------------------------ Mexico.
% -----00------------------------- D0.
1 Body carry--------------------- Colombia
5 Suitcase------------------------ Costa Rica.
4% ----- do------------------------- Nicaragua,
3 ----- do------------------------- Peru.
2% Body carry--------------------- Mexico.
3 Car, under front seat.------------- D0.
% Car---------------------------- D0.
2% Body carry--------------------- Ecuador.
19% Cargo, picture frames------------ Argentina
4% Body carry, purse--------------- Peru.
5% Body carry--------------------- Chile.
1 W006en statues in suitcase------- Bolivia.
10 Suitcase------------------------ Spain.
4% Car/Spare tire------------------- Mexico.
3 Body carry--------------------- Colombia.
1 Body carry, shoes in suitcase - - - - - Do.
4% B00y carry--------------------- Chile.
3 ----- do------------------------- Colombia
54 Household effects/air freight------ Chile.
1 Uſse-------------------------- Colombia
6% Suitcase------------------------ Ecuador
2% B00y carry--------------------- Mexico
11 Body carry, Suitcase------------- Peru.
10 Suitcase------------------------ Colombia.
23 Aircraft spare parts-------------- Do.
4 Body carry--------------------- D0.
4 Courier Overcoat----------------- Panama
6 B00y carry--------------------- Colombia
6%----- do------------------------- Ecuador
! ----- do------------------------- Colombia
1 Body carry, Seaman-------------- D0.
4% 11 pairs of shoes---------------- D0.
4% Seaman's quarters--------------- D0.
2% Floorboard auto, teddy bear -- - - - - Canada.
2 Trousers pockets in suitcase------ Ecuador
. 3 Envelope in hand---------------- Do.
4.6 L00Seleaf binders-- - - - - - -------- Colombia,
6.6 Sides, false-bottom suitcase- - - - - - D0.
2.5 False sides, suitcase and men's Do.
shoes.
Quantity
Port of entry Date (pounds) Smuggling method employed Country of departure
J.F.K. Airport--------------- May 4, 1972 7 Girdle, body carry--------------- Panama.
D0-------------------- May 7, 1972 2.5 Hollowed-out book covers-- - - - - - - Colombia.
90------------------------- do------- 2.5 -----do------------------------- D0.
Miami, Fla---------------------- do------- ? ----- do------------------------- D0.
New Orleans Airport------------- do------- 9 False-bottom suitcases and D0.
hollowed-out b00k covers.
Miami Airport------------------- 0------- 1.5 Religious pictures--------------- D0.
0-------------------- May 9, 1972 . 5 Hollowed-out packet- - - - - - - - - - - - - D0.
Detroit--------------------- May 10, 1972 4 HouseSearch-------------------- Unknown.
Miami Airport-------------- May 12, 1972 13 Private aircraft------------------ Colombia.
Los Angeles/San Ysidro------ May 16, 1972 8 Vehicle doors------------------- Mexico.
LOS Angeles Mailroom --- - - - - May 17, 1972 2. 2 Hollowed-out book.-- - - - - - - - - - - - - Colombia.
New York Pier 2- - - - - - - - - - - - May 18, 1972 17 Bags on rear of hi-boy - - - - - - - - - - - Unknown.
Miami Airport-------------- May 19, 1972 9. 4 Suitcase at airport-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - {}.
P0-------------------- May 25, 1972 1 Shoes-------------------------- Colombia.
90------------------------- do------- 1.5 ----- do------------------------- Đo.
90------------------------- do------- 2. 6 B00y carry--------------------- D0.
P0------------------------- do------- 2. 2 ----- do------------------------- D0.
J.F.K. Airport, N.Y---------- May 26, 1972 1.0 Manila envelope--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Đ0.
Miami Airport-------------- May 28, 1972 4. 6 Body carry--------------------- D0.
Miami, Fla----------------- May 30, 1972 6.6 B00y carry (2)------------------ 00. . . .
Detroit, Mich--------------- May 31, 1972 10.3 Convoy, search in house---------- Coiombia Via Miami.
New York. ----------------- July 4, 1972 5.5 Body carry--------------------- Coiombia.
j UNE 29, 1972.
Hon. JOHN E. INGERSOLL,
Pirector, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MIR. INGERSOLL : Thank you very much for taking the time from y Our
busy schedule to testify before the Foreign Relations Committee on June 27.
As I indicated at that time, I have several questions which I would like to have
answered and included in the hearing record :
1. In testimony about a year ago before the Senate Appropriations Committee,
you noted that 50 to 60 tons of Opium could satisfy the addict population of
the U.S. You also noted, however, that Pakistan illicitly produced an estimated
175 to 200 tons annually, that Afghanistan may produce 100 to 125 tons and
that the Golden Triangle area of Burma, Thailand and Laos may provide as
much as 1,000 illicit tons. In your testimony today you indicated that 6.5 to 10
tons of heroin are consumed annually in the U.S. Are the figures of last year
and this year comparable after conversion has taken place? What a mount of
Space is required to grow this amount Of Opium ?
2. FOr the record, COuld you provide us with a country-by-country estimate of
illicit Opium production in the current year and compare this with estimated
production in these countries 5, 10 and 20 years ago? Also, for the record, COuld
you provide the basis for the estimate?
3. For the record, could you provide us with a country-by-country breakdown
Of where narcotics control agents are currently stationed and where such agents
(from predecessor agencies) were stationed 5, 10 and 20 years ago?
4. Do you have a current estimate of the total amount of heroin entering this
country Where does most of it originate? What is the basis for this information ?
5. How much heroin which was destined for U.S. consumption has been seized
in 1971 and 1972? Where did the major seizures take place? Is it possible to
determine where this heroin originated ?
6. What kind of Shifts in this geographical pattern of heroin trafficking can
We expect in response to Our expanded enforcement effort?
7. What is the going street price of heroin today ? Who profits from the heroin
trade? - -
8. The international drug traffic has developed largely since World War II.
Could you give us a brief history of such development, touching on major
traffickers, routes, successes and failures of efforts to curtail the trade?
Again, thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely,
WILLIAM B. SPONG, Jr.
72
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS,
Washington, D.C., August 2, 1972.
CAROLYN FULLER,
Legislative Assistant, Office of Hon. William B. Spong, Jr., U.S. Senate, Wash:
ſington, D.C.
DEAR CAROLYN : This is in response to Senator Spong’s request for additional
information for the record of the recent hearing on June 27 in connection. With
the proposed amendments to the Single Convention.
I apologize for the tardy response, but the breadth of the material and the press
of other duties has occasioned some delay.
In his letter the Senator lists eight specific areas on which he wished to receive
responses. Some of these questions are unanswerable because of the paucity of
data. For example, with reference to Question #2, until the last several years
there was no effort to estimate the amount of illicit opium production worldwide.
and no reliable figures can be given for an earlier period. Again, With reference
to Questions #1 and #4. a systematic means of estimating the amount of heroin
entering the United States has never been devised ; and so figures with consider-
able latitudes are customarily cited. Nevertheless, we have attempted to respond
to each question to the extent Of Our knowledge. Each Of these responses is COn-
tained in Separate attachments to this letter.
In addition to the matters contained in the letter of June 27, the Senator also
requested that We identify potential Opium producing countries which are not
currently members Of the Single Convention. These are Greece, Iran, Laos.
Cambodia, The People's Republic of China, and Columbia. China, of course, has
traditionally been excluded from agreements to which the United States was
a party. Evidence concerning Columbian opium production is scanty but at least
SOme potential is believed to exist.
Sincerely yours,
GENE R. HAISLIP,
Special Assistant to the Director.
[Enclosures.]
Question 1—Are the figures of last year and this year comparable after C07,
wersion has taken place?
Answer—This year’s figure represents an increase from 50—60 tons of Opium
to 6.5–100 tons Of Opium.
What a mount of Space is required to grow this a mount of Opium ?
Answer—Opium yield per unit of land is a function of climatic factors and
input of labor and plant nutrients. Yields vary from year-to-year and from
area-to-area. The average yield per hectare of land (2.7 acres) in Turkey is aboul
10 kilograms (22 pounds). These factors applied to the estimate of 65–100 tons
equal 175,000–270,000 acres.
Question 2—For the record could you provide us with a country-by-country
Gstimate on illicit opium, production in the Current year and compare this with
estimated production in these countries 5, 10 and 20 years ago? Also for the rec
Ord, could you provide the basis for the estimate?
Answer—Until the U.S. Government began in 1969 to direct world attentiol
toward control of illicit drugs at the source, no comprehensive effort had eve
been made to define the total World drug problem. Most Of the data availabl
On opium production, for example, concerns legal or controlled production, BNDI
began in 1970 with the cooperation of other U.S. Agencies to gather availabl
data with a view toward estimating illicit opium production. The basis for Ou
estimates include historical data, analysis of user markets, seizures of contra
band drugs, and intelligence information from a variety of sources.
Attached is the estimates of illicit opium production worldwide.
73
ESTIMATES OF ILLICIT OPIUM PRODUCTION WORLDWIDE
- Toºls
A. Illicit production of Opium in Southeast Asia, principally the tri-border
Countries Of Thailand, Burma and La OS 750
Consumed locally in the rural areas before distribution 450
Distributed to wholesalers in Bangkok, Vientiane, Hong Kong–––––––– 300
- 750
B. Breakdown Of the 300 tons distributed by wholesalers :
TO Supply traditional Chinese markets Outside Of the producing
COUIntries :
Hong Kong––––– / 120
Malaysia, Singapore - - 30
Philippines *- 10
Macao –– - 10
Cambodia º- - * 1.
Vietnam 29
200
Retained in Bangkok, Vientiane and Hong Kong to Supply urban de-
mand (in Bangkok and Vientiane) and to convert to heroin to Supply
U.S. servicemen in South Vietnam, Okinawa, Thailand, Philippines
and the growing market in the United States ___ 100
300
D. Estimates of licit and illicit production in other areas of the world :
Licit (tons) illicit
Ountry:
Turkey---------------------------------------------------------- 150 35 to 50 tons.
India------------------------------------------------------------ 1, 200 250.
Afghanistan------------------------------------------------------ 100 to 150.
Pakistan--------------------------------------------------------- 175 to 200.
Iran------------------------------------------------------------- 150 (?).
Mexico.----------------------------------------------------------- 0 5 to 15.
U.S.S.R---------------------------------------------------------- 115 (?).
R0 (China)------------------------------------------------------ 100 (?).
Yugoslavia------------------------------------------------------- 1.7.
Japan------------------------------------------------------------ 5 (?). -
Total.---------------------------------------------------------- 1, 720.830 566.7 to 666.7 tons.
Verseas by the predecessor Federal Bureau Of Narcotics.
ntly a SSigned OVerSeaS in the locations indicated.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF NARCOTICS
Total estimates worldwide illicit production : 1265 to 1365 metric tons.
Question 3—For the record, could you provide us with a country-by-C0tlºvtry
}reakdown of where narcotics control agents are currently stationed and where
Much agents (from predecessor agencies) were stationed 5, 10 and 20 years ago?
Answer—Attachment 1 reflects the locations and the number of agents assigned
Attachment 2 reflects the current plan and the actual number of agents pres-
Year and location Agents Year and location Agents
É. Rome, Italy------------------------- 3 1967:
62: Rome, Italy-------------------------- 3
Rome, Italy-------------------------- 3 Paris, France------------------------- 2
Beirut, Lebanon ---------------------- 1 Marseilles, France-------------------- 2
Paris, France------------------------- l Beirut, Lebanon---------------------- 2
Marseilles, France-------------------- 1 Istanbul, Turkey---------------------- 2
Istanbul, Turkey---------------------- 1 Mexico City, Mexico.------------------- 3
Bangkok, Thailand-------------------- 2 Lima, Peru--------------------------- 1
Hong Kong--------------------------- 1 Bangkok, Thailand-------------------- 2
Singapore---------------------------- 1 Hong Kong--------------------------- 1.
Mexico City, Mexico.------------------- 2 Singapore---------------------------- 1
Monterrey, Mexico.-------------------- 1 Seoul, Korea------------------------- 1
Total------------------------------ 14 Total------------------------------ 20
74
BUREAU OF NARCOT ICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS
Author- Author-
ized ized
agents On board - agents On boar
Mexico and Central America: Singapore-------------------- 2
Mexico City------------------ 8 7 Saigon, Vietnam-------------- 3
Guadalajara.------------------ 3 3 -
Hermosillo------------------- 2 2 Total---------------------- 21 1
Monterrey - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 2 ---
--------- Far East:
Total---------------------- 15 14 Tokyo, Japan----------------- 4
F----- Hong Kong * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3
Panama and South Aſſerica: Manila, Philippine Islands----- 2
Panama City, Panama--------- 2 0 kinawa--------------------- 1
Caracas, Venezuela----------- 2 2 ---------
Asunción, Paraguay----------- 2 2 Total---------------------- 10
Buenos Aires, Argentina------- 6 5
Lima, Peru------------------- 2 1 | Europe:
Quito, Ecuador--------------- 2 2 London, England-------------- 1
Brazilia, Brazil--------------- 1 1 Paris, France----------------- 7
Bogota, Colombia------------- 2 1 Marseilles, France------------ 4
La Paz, BGłivia--------------- 1 0 Madrid, Spain---------------- 2
-------------- Barcelona, Spain-------------- 2
Total---------------------- 20 14 Rabat, MoroCC0--------------- 1
—--~~ Bonn, Germany--------------- 1
Near East: Frankfurt, Germany----------- 2
Ankara, Turkey--------------- A. 4 Munich, Germany------------- 2
lstanbul, Türkey-------------- 2 2 Milan, Italy------------------ 2
İzmir, Turkey---------------- 2 2 Rome, Italy------------------ 3
Beirut, Lebanon -------------- 3 2 Brussels, Belgium------------ 1
Kabul, Afghanistan------------ 2 1 ------------------
Tehran, Iran.----------------- 2 2 Total---------------------- 28 2
Islamabad, Pakistan---------- 1 0
New Delhi, india------------- 1 0 | Canada:
-------- *" Montreal--------------------- 2
Total---------------------- 17 13 Toronto---------------------- 1
—— Vancouver - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Southeast Asia: ------
Bangkok, Thaiiand------------ 10 9 Total---------------------- 4
Chiang Wiai, Thailand---------- 2 1
Vientiané, Laos--------------- 2 2 Grand total----------------- 115 9
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia------- 2 2
Question 4—Do you have a Current estimate of the total amount of heroir
entering this country? Where does most of it originate? What is the basis fo
this information,” -
Answer—The current estimate of heroin entering this country is 6.5 to 10 ton
annually. This figure represents the amount of heroin thought to be needed t
Support the habits of approximately 530,000 U.S. heroin users. About 60
Originates from Near East countries' illicit opium. The remaining 40% originate
from Southeast Asia and from Mexico. These estimates are derived from seizure
Of COntraband which can be traced to the source through identification o
traffickers.
Question 5—Hoºp much heroin which was destined for U.S. consumption has
been seized in 1971 and 1972? Where did the major seizures take place? Is i
possible to determine where this heroin, originated ?
Answer—Since January 1971, significant amounts of heroin destined for the
U.S. have been taken Out Of the heroin Supply lines. BNDHD domestic Offices and
the Bureau of Customs have together removed Over a ton Of heroin Since the
beginning Of iast year.
A breakdown of the heroin removed by agency is as follows :
HEROIN REMOVED FROM THE DOMIESTIC MARKET
[Amounts in pounds]
1972 (throug
1971 May
BNDD--------------------------------------------------------------------- 432 59





75
Since most of this heroin was either seized at a U.S. border or removed within
the United States, it can safely be said that this heroin was destined for sale on
the Street in the United States.
However, since heroin is processed from Opium, and this comes into this COun-
try indirectly from the Opium producing countries of Turkey, Mexico, Laos,
Burma, and Thailand, it has been necessary for the U.S. effort to extend itself
beyond its Own boundaries.
With this in mind it is significant to note that BNDD coordinated with foreign
governments in stopping heroin before it could reach U.S. borders. This effort
has led to Seizures, not Only Of heroin, but also Of large quantities Of Opium and
morphine base from which heroin is processed.
The BNDD/Foreign cooperative seizure totals are provided below:
BNDD/FOREIGN SEIZURES
[Amounts in pounds]
1972 (through
1971 May)
Heroin--------------------------------------------------------------------- 937 1,730
Morphine base-------------------------------------------------------------- 2,271 874
Opium---------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1,440 843
Since One pound of morphine base chemically converts into approximately one
pound of heroin, BNDD COnsiders the 3,145 lbs. Of morphine base seized in the
17 month period as 3,145 lbs. of heroin equivalent. Opium converts to morphine
base on a 10:1 basis. BNDD therefore considers the 2,283 lbs. of opium seized to
be 228 lbs. of heroin equivalent.
Thus, the foreign cooperative seizures might also be presented as follows:
Heroin, or heroin, equivalent
#3 NDD/foreign seizures: Pottº ds
1971 3, 352
1972 (through May) 2, 688
For the most part individuals arrested in BNDD/Foreign cooperative seizures
have previously been identified by BNDD intelligence as those persons responsible
for maintaining the illicit drug pipeline to the U.S. Or to U.S. Servicemen abroad.
Therefore, the heroin removed can be said to have been designed for consumption
in the U.S. -
Although the Bureau does not have complete statistics for foreign seizures
made without BNPD assistance, numerous significant seizures by foreign govern-
ments (some of which are listed in the enclosure) indicate that foreign efforts
are also intercepting a portion of the heroin on the way to the U.S.
The sum total Of all the hard data available indicates that from January 1,
1971 through May of this year, BNDD, Customs, and BNDD forces in cooperation
with foreign governments have removed at least 8,282 lbs. Of heroin or heroin
equivalent destined for consumption in the United States.
One point, however, should be made with regard to these seizures. It is im-
possible to estimate the degree to which the drug traffickers are able to resupply
the heroin which is removed from their pipelines. Thus, it is impossible to know
how much Or the degree to which these seizures have caused a reduction in the
supply of heroin to addicts in the U.S.
In answer to the second portion of Question 5, there have been numerous
major seizures worldwide in the past 18 months. The majority of these cases
involved extremely large seizures of either heroin or morphine base, and most
that we have knowledge of took place in Europe and serve as evidence that
Europe is heavily used as both a conversion point of morphine base to heroin
and as a transhipment point of heroin to the U.S. Major seizures have been
made in boats off the shore of Marseilles, in Spain, France, Germany, and Italy
and in Vietnam, Hong Kong, Laos, and Thailand.
Major domestic seizures were made mostly in port cities or cities near sea
coasts. Frequently these seizures were made in cooperation with Customs.
A representative list of major seizures made since January 1971 is attached as
an enclosure. To the degree that it is possible, the probable source and intended
route of the intercepted drug is also enclosed.
3.
SIGNIFICANT SEIZURES
Amount g Probable opium s
Date Place Substance (pounds) Countries/agencies involved SOUTCé Intended route or destination
NDD/foreign cooperative: - & -
March 1971--_______ Marseilles, France--- Heroin------------- 37 French authorities, United States, BNDD-------- Turkey------------- Marseilles, France to Italy to New York City.
August 1971-------- Vietnam----------------- do------------- 97 Thailand Narcotic Bureau, Vietnamese National Southeast Asia- - - - - - Undetermined.
Police, United States, BNDD.
October 1971-------- Paris, France------------ do------------- 233 French CN0, United States, BNDD------------- Turkey------------- Through Paris to New York City.
April 1972---------- Rapallo, Italy ------ Morphine base------ 112 Italian authorities, United States, BNDD------------- do------------- Tºgº. Italy, probable destination to United
tates. -
Foreign only: -
December 1971------ Germany---------------- do------------- 506 German Customs--------------------------------- do------------- Undetermined.
March 1972--------- France------------------ do------------- 321 French Customs---------------------------------- do------------- 0.
D0------------ Marseilles, France Heroin------------- 900 - - - - - do------------------------------------------ do------------- To Guadelupe, Mexico, to Miami, Fla.
(in a Marseilles
port). -
April 1972---------- Hong Kong-------------- do------------- 80 Hong Kong Narcotics------------------------ Southeast Asia------ Undetermined.
NDD (domestic): -
January 1972------- Miami, Fla--------------- do------------- 372 BNDD-------------------------------------- Turkey------------- France to Miami to New York.
D0------------ New York City----------- do------------- 78 ----- do------------------------------------------ 0------------- France to New York City.
NDD/customs: .
May 1971 - - -------- San Juan, P.R.------------ do------------- 246 BNDD, U.S. Customs - - - - ------------------------ do------------- France to Spain to Mexico to United States.
September 1971----- New York City----------- do------------- 200 ----- do------------------------------------------ do------------- France to New York City.
77
Question 6—What kind of shifts in this geographical pattern of heroin traf-
fic/cing can we easpect in response to Our earpanded €77 forcement effort?
Answer—Immediate shifts for which there is already some indication involve
greater exploitation of Southeast Asia and Mexican Sources. Beyond this, Af-
ghanistan, Pakistan and India must be considered potential Sources.
Question 7–What is the going Street price of heroin today? Who profits from
the heroiſm, trade?
Answer—The going street price of heroin varies from City to city depending On
the demand for heroin in relation to its availability. Thus, a national “average”
price must be interpreted as a general guideline since the price is Subject to fluctu-
ation in any given area, and certainly from city to City.
With this in mind the daily cost of heroin to an addict is about $30 a day with
the average dose costing about $6; this price may vary from $2 to $12 a dose de-
pending On the city.
Aimost all persons who are involved in heroin production and distribution
profit from it. This includes the poppy growers, whose profits are Smallest, the
chemists who convert morphine into heroin, those who arrange and finance
heroin Smuggling into the U.S., the smugglers themselves, the high and mid-level
wholesalers, and street level pushers.
Within the United States, heroin dealers, regardless of their level of involve-
ment, usually realize 100% profit on whatever they invest in their “business”.
Question 8—The International drug traffic has developed largely since World
War II. Could you give us a brief history of Such development, touching On major
traffickers, routes, successes and failures of efforts to curtail the trade.
Answer—Traffic in contraband narcotics from Europe to the U.S. was com-
pletely disrupted during World War II. In the aftermath of the war the traffic
was fairly rapidly reestablished with Opium from the Near East to heroin labora-
tories in Italy and France. Heroin imports from Europe to the United States
became a major interest for organized crime which resulted in new Federal leg-
islation in 1956 required mandatory sentencing for narcotic traffickers. U.S.
addict populations appeared to stabilize at less than 100,000 during the 1950’s
and early 1960's. During this period the illicit traffic can be characterized as
highly organized with very limited amateur participation because of the high
risk Created by mandatory sentencing.
During the early and mid-sixties drug experimentation with marihuana and
the hallucinogens developed along with the youth culture and has been associ-
ated With numerous Social phenomena current during the past decade. Since
1969 rising heroin abuse has been documented and is associated with a variety
Of SOcial factors.
From a law enforcement standpoint the drug problem has simply grown faster
than Our Criminal justice Systems’ ability to handle it. Increased demand for
drugs along with increased availability are apparent factors reflected in current
problem definition. - -
Since the sources for illicit narcotic drugs are external to the U.S., the national
policy has been to cooperate with other nations in strengthening international
controls over drugs. Since 1969 extraordinary emphasis has been placed on con-
trol of illicit drugs at the Source. In line with this emphasis all feasible means
are being Considered for development of programs to bring about more effective
international Control of drugs. The drug control programs with Mexico, France,
Turkey, Thailand and Laos are being followed up with appropriate programs in
Other areas as Opportunity permits.
Attachments: Examples of significant cases. Papers detailing trafficking routes.
O
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT AMENDMENTS
HEARING i"! ! :- " - tº
BEFORE THE
(OMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 3726
TO EXTEND AND AMEND THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION
ACT OF 1969 TO AFFORD MORE EQUAL EXPORT OPPOR-
TUNITY, TO ESTABLISH A COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC POLICY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
JULY 19, 1972
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
81–190 O WASHINGTON : 1972
A.
. BY TH, -
peeoº. ... Arrerº
-YES
usted º
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois
WILLIAM B. SPONG, J.R., Virginia
CARL MARCY, Chief of Staff
ARTHUR M. KUHL, Chief Clerk
(II)
C O N T E N T S
Statement by:
Carlucci, Frank C., Deputy Director, Office of Management and
Budget-----------------------------------------------------
Insertions for the record:
Text of S. 3726, 92d Congress, 2d Session-------------------------
Prepared statement of Frank C. Carlucci, Deputy Director, Office of
Management and Budget-------------------------------------
Letter to Hon. Caspar W. Weinberger, Director, Office of Management
and Budget, from Senator J. W. Fulbright, June 28, 1972._________
Letter enclosing statement by the National Association of Secondary
Material Industries, Inc., on S. 3726, to Senator J. W. Fulbright
from David J. Muchow, July 14, 1972--------------------------
Summary of organization and functions of Council on International
Economic Policy, supplied by OMB----------------------------
(III)
Page
10
11
ExPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT AMENDMENTs
WEDNESDAY, JULY 19, 1972
|UNITED STATES SENATE,
CoMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONs,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room S-116,
the Capitol Building, Senator John Sparkman presiding.
Present: Senators Sparkman, McGee, Aiken, Case, Scott, and Percy.
Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order, please.
We expect other Senators in but, as all of you know, the Senate is in
session and I don’t know what kind of interruptions we may have. So
Ithink we had better get started. ..
OPENING STATEMENT
The committee is holding a public hearing this morning to receive
testimony on S. 3726, a bill extending the Export Administration Act
of 1969 and one which provides statutory authority for the President’s
Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP).
The first title of the bill relates to the extension and amendment of
the Export Administration Act, while title II of the bill is concerned
entirely with the Council on International Economic Policy.
(Text of S. 3726 follows:)
[S. 3726, 92d Cong. Second SeSS, I
A BILL To extend and amend the Export Administration Act of 1969 to afford more equal
export opportunity, to establish a Council on International Economic Policy, and for
Other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled,
TITLE: I AMENDMENTS TO THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT
OF 1969
SEC. 101. This title may be cited as the “Equal Export Opportunity Act”.
SEC. 102. Section 2(3) of the Export Administration Act of 1969 is amended
by inserting before the period at the end thereof a COmma and the following:
“particularly when export restrictions applied by the United States are more ex-
tensive than export restrictions imposed by countries with which the United
States has defense treaty Commitments”.
SEC. 103. Section 3 of the Export Administration Act of 1969 is amended by
adding at the end thereof the following:
“(6) It is the policy of the United States that the desirability of subjecting,
or continuing to subject, particular articles, materials, or supplies, including
technical data or other information, to United States export controls should be
determined after review by and consultation with representatives Of appropriate
United States Government agencies and qualified experts from private industry.”
(1)
2.
SEC. 104. Section 4(b) of the Export Administration Act of 1969 is amended—
(1) by inserting “(1)” after “(b)”; and
(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraphs:
“(2) The Secretary of Commerce, in cooperation with appropriate United
States Government departments and agencies and the appropriate technical ad-
visory committees established under section 5(c), shall undertake an investi-
gation to determine which articles, materials, and supplies, including technical
data and other information, should no longer be subject to export controls be-
cause of their significance to the national security of the United States. Not-
withstanding the provisions of paragraph (1), the Secretary of Commerce Shall
remove unilateral export controls on the export from the United States Of arti-
cles, materials, or supplies, including technical data or other information, Which
he determines are available without restriction from sources outside the United
States in significant quantities and comparable in quality to those produced in
the United States, except that any such control may remain in effect if the
Secretary of Commerce determines that adequate evidence has been presented to
him demonstrating that the absence of such a control would constitute a threat
to the national security of the United States. The nature of Such evidence Shall
be included in the special report required by paragraph (4).
“(3) In conducting the investigation referred to in paragraph (2) and in
taking the action required under such paragraph, the Secretary of Commerce
shall give priority to those controls which apply to articles, materials, and Sup-
plies, including technical data and other information, for which there are sig-
nificant potential export marketS.
, “(4) Not later than six months after the date of enactment of the Equal Export
Opportunity Act, the Secretary of Commerce shall submit to the President and
to the Congress a special report of actions taken under paragraphs (2) and (3).
Such report shall contain—
“(A) a list of any articles, materials, and supplies, including technica)
data and other information, which are subject under this Act to export COn
trols greater than those imposed by nations with which the United States
Has defense treaty commitments, and the reaSOns for such greater COntrols;
and -
“(B) a list of any procedures applicable to export licensing in the Unite
States which are more burdensOme than similar procedures utilized in na-
tions with which the United States has defense treaty Commitments, and th
reasons for retaining such procedures in their present form.”. -
SEC. 105. Section 5 of the Export Administration Act of 1969 is amended by
adding at the end thereof the following:
“(c) (1) The Secretary of Commerce shall appoint a technical advisory com-
mittee for each group Of articles, materials, and Supplies, including technical
data and Other information, Which—
“(A) is or may be made subject to export controls because of its signifi-
Cance to the national Security of the United States ; and
“(B) is difficult to evaluate for technical or strategic reasons.
Each such committee shall consist of representatives of United States industry
and government who may be appointed for terms of not more than two years.
NO person serving On any such committee who is representative of industry shall
Serve On Such committee for more than two consecutive years. {
“(2) It shall be the duty and function of the technical advisory committee
established under paragraph (1) to advise and assist the Secretary of Com-
merce and any other department, agency, or official of the Government of the
United States to which the President has delegated power, authority, and dis-
Cretion under section 4(d) with respect to actions designed to carry out the
policy set forth in section 3 Of this Act. Such committees shall be consulted with
respect to the level of United States export controls applicable to all articles, ma-
terials, Or Supplies, including technical data or other information, including those
Whose export is Subject to multilateral COntrols undertaken in COOperation with
nations with which the United States has defense treaty commitments. Such
committees shall also be consulted and kept fully informed of progress with re-
spect to the investigation required by section 4(b) (2) of this Act. Nothing in this
Subsection shall prevent the Secretary from consulting, at any time, with any
person representing industry Or the general public regardless of whether such
person is a member of a technical advisory committee. Members of the public
shall be given a reasonable Opportunity, pursuant to regulations prescribed by the
Secretary Of Commerce, to present evidence to such Committees.
3
“(3) Any member of any such committee who is not an Officer or employee of
the United States shall be entitled to receive compensation at not to exceed the
daily rate prescribed for GS-18 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of
title 5, United States Code, during such time as he is engaged in the performance
of his duties as a member. Each member may be reimbursed for travel, Sub-
sistence, and Other necessary expenses incurred in Connection with his duties as
a member. - -
“(4) Each such committee shall elect a chairman, and shall meet at the call
Of the Chairman but not less often than four times each year.”
SEC. 106. Section 14 of the Export Administration Act of 1969 is amended by
striking out “August 1, 1972” and inserting in lieu thereof “June 30, 1974”.
SEC. 107. Nothing in this title shall be construed to require the release or pub-
lication of information which is classified pursuant to Executive Order or to affect
the confidentiality safeguards provided in section 7 (c) of the Export Adminis-
tration Act Of 1969. .
TITLE II—COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
SHORT TITLE -
SEC. 201. This title may be cited as the “International Economic Policy Act of
1972”.
STATEMENT OF PURPOSES
SEC. 202. It is the purpose of this title to provide for closer Federal interagency
COOrdination in the development Of a more rational and Orderly international
economic policy for the United States.
FINDINGS AND POLICY
SEC. 203. The Congress finds that there are many activities undertaken by
various departments, agencies, and instrumentalities Of the Federal Government
which, in the aggregate, constitute the domestic and international economic policy
of the United States. The Congress further finds that the objectives of the United
States with respect to a sound and purposeful international economic policy can
be better accomplished through the closer COOrdination of (1) domestic and
foreign economic activity, and (2) in particular, that economic behavior which,
taken together, constitutes United States international economic policy. There-
fore this Act establishes a Council on International Economic Policy which will
provide for—
(A) a clear top level focus for the full range of international economic
issues; deal with international economic policies including trade, investment,
balance of payments, and finance as a coherent whole;
(B) consistency between domestic and foreign economic policy; and
(C) close coordination with basic foreign policy objectives. .
The Congress intends that the Council shall be provided with the opportunity to
(i) investigate problems with respect to the coordination, implementation, and
long-range development of international economic policy, and (ii) make appro-
priate findings and recommendations for the purpose of assisting in the develop-
§. Of a rational and Orderly international economic policy for the United
tates. -
CREATION OF COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
SEC. 204. There is created in the Executive Office of the President a Council on
International Economic Policy (hereinafter referred to in this title as the
“Council”). -
IMEMBERSHIP
SEC. 205. The Council shall be composed of the following members and such
additional members as the President may designate :
(1) The President.
(2) The Secretary of State.
(3) The Secretary of the Treasury.
(4) The Secretary of Defense.
(5) The Secretary of Agriculture.
(6) The Secretary Of Commerce.
4
(7) The Secretary of Labor. -
(8) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
(9) The Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.
(10) The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.
The President shall be the Chairman of the Council and shall preside over the
meetings Of the Council; in his absence he may designate a member of the
COuncil to preside in his place.
DUTIES OF THE COUNCIL
SEC. 206. Subject to the direction of the President, and in addition to perform-
ing such other functions as he may direct, it shall be the duty of the Council
to— -
(1) assist and advise the President in the preparation of the International
Economic Report required under section 207;
(2) review the activities and the policies of the United States Government
which indirectly or directly relate to international economics and, for the
purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection there-
With, consider with some degree of specificity the substance and scope of
the international economic policy of the United States, which consideration
Shall include examination of the economic activities of (A) the various
agencies, departments, and instrumentalities of the Federal Government,
(B) the Several States, and (C) private industry;
(3) collect, analyze, and evaluate authoritative information, current and
prospective, concerning international economic matters;
(4) consider policies and programs for COOrdinating the activities of all
the departments and agencies Of the United States with One another for the
purpose of accomplishing a more consistent international economic policy,
and make recommendations to the President in COnnection thereWith ;
(5) continually assess the progress and effectiveness of Federal efforts to
carry out a consistent international economic policy ; and
(6) make recommendations to the President for domestic and foreign pro-
grams which will promote a more COnsistent international economic policy
on the part of the United States and private industry. Recommendations
under this paragraph shall include, but shall not be limited to, policy pro-
posals relating to monetary mechanisms, foreign investment, trade, the
balance of payments, foreign aid, taxes, international tourism and aviation,
and international treaties and agreements relating to all Such matters. In
addition to other appropriate objectives, such policy proposals should be
developed with a view toward—
(A) strengthening the United States competitive position in World
trade ; -
(B) achieving equilibrium in internatonal payment accounts of the
United States :
(C) increasing exports of goods and Services;
(D) protecting and improving the earnings of foreign investments;
(E) achieving freedom of movement of people, goods, capital, in-
formation, and technology on a reciprocal and worldwide basis; and
(F) increasing the real employment and income of Workers and Con-
Sumers on the basis of international economic activity.
REPORT
SEC. 207. (a) The President shall transmit to the Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Banking and
Currency of the House of Representatives, and the Joint Economic Committee
an annual report on the international economic position of the United States.
Such report (hereinafter referred to as the “International Economic Report”)
shall be submitted not later than sixty days after the beginning of each regular
Session of the Congress, and shall include—
(1) information and statistics describing characteristics of international
economic activity and identifying significant current and foreseeable trends
and developments :
(2) a review of the international economic program of the Federal Gov-
ernment and a review of domestic and foreign economic conditions and
5
other significant matters affecting the balance of international payments
of the United States and of their effect on the international trade, investment,
financial, and monetary position Of the United States; and -
(3) a program for carrying out the policy objectives of this title, together
with Such recommendations for legislation as he may deem necessary Or
desirable.
(b) The President may transmit from time to time to the Congress reports
supplementary to the International Economic Report, each of which may include
such supplementary or revised recommendations as he may deem necessary Or
desirable to achieve the purposes and policy Objectives Set forth in this title.
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND STAFF OF THE COUNCIL
SEC. 208. (a) The staff of the Council shall be headed by an Executive Director
who shall be appointed by the President. It shall be the duty of the Executive
Director to—
(1) direct the activities of the Council staff,
(2) develop the agenda and Supporting materials for Council meetings
and review all matters before the Council, and
(3) establish a work program, including topics and the selection of indi-
viduals to carry Out particular assignments.
(b) (1) With the approval of the Council, the Executive Director may appoint
and fix the compensation of such staff personnel as he deems necessary. Except
as provided in paragraph (2), the staff of the Council shall be appointed subject
to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the
COmpetitive Service, and Shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of
chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classifica-
tion and General Schedule pay rates. -
(2) With the approval Of the Council, the Executive Director may appoint and
fix the compensation of one officer at a rate of basic compensation not to exceed
the rate provided for level IV of the Federal Executive Salary Schedule, and
appoint and fix the compensation of two Officers at rates of basic compensation
not to exceed the rate provided for level V Of the Federal Executive Salary
Schedule. - -
(c) With the approval Of the Council, the Executive Director may procure
temporary and intermittent Services to the same extent as is authorized by
Section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at rates not to exceed the daily equiva-
lent of the rate provided for GS-18.
(d) Upon request of the Executive Director, the head Of any Federal agency
is authorized to detail, on a reimbursable basis, any of its personnel to the
Council to assist it in Carrying Out its duties under this title.
(e) Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code (relating to positions at level II
of the Executive Schedule), is amended by adding at the end thereof the
following: -
(22) Executive Director, Council on International Economic Policy.
AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS
SEC. 209. For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this title, there are
authorized to be appropriated not to exceed $1,400,000 for fiscal year 1973, and
not to exceed $1,600,000 for fiscal year 1974.
REFERRAL OF BILL
Senator SPARKMAN. The bill was referred to the Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. Hearings were held there and
it was reported favorably on June 19. On June 23 the bill was referred
by unanimous consent, on my request, to the Committee on Foreign
Relations for its consideration for a period not to exceed 30 days. That
was because of the overlapping jurisdiction contained in the bill, in
the two titles. -
The chairman of this committee on June 28 wrote to the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget recalling the fact that the origi-
nal Administration request for establishing the Council on Interna-
6
tional Economic Policy had been referred to the Committee on For-
eign Relations and requesting the Director to provide an Administra-
tion witness to testify on the bill today. º
In his letter, Senator Fulbright made the point that the interest of
the Commitee on Foreign Relations relates primarily, although not
exclusively, to Title II of S. 3726. e © tº
We are glad this morning to welcome as a witness for the Adminis:
tration Mr. Frank Carlucci. I believe you have a prepared Statement
and we will be very glad to have you proceed with that. |
STATEMENT OF FRANK C. CARLUCCI, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE
OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Mr. CARLUCCI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I could either read my statement or submit it for the record and try
to summarize it, as you wish.
Senator SPARKMAN. Either way you want. The full statement will
be printed in the record and you can handle it as you see fit. /
Mr. CARLUCCI. Let me just hit the highlights of it, since you have
reviewed the history of the bill.
COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
The Council on International Economic Policy originated with the
recommendation of the Ash Council which pointed out that the re-
sponsibilities for international economic affairs were dispersed among
a number of departments, agencies and committees without consistent,
structured means of providing advice to the President or assuring the
development of a coherent policy considering all the relevant facets
of the various issues.
The council first went into effect on January 19, 1971, with the ap-
pointment of Mr. Peter G. Peterson as the first executive director and
as Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs. He
Served in that capacity until February 29, this year, when he was re-
placed by Mr. Peter Flanigan. *
The chairman's letter asked that we address ourselves to three par-
ticular questions which you mentioned, and let me just review our
position on those briefly.
PRESIDENT’s PURPOSE IN SETTING UP COUNCIL
The President’s purpose in setting up the Council on International
Economic Policy was to structure the advice and support functions in
the important area of international economic policy along the lines of
the National Security Council and the Domestic Council which have
proved so useful to him as Chief Executive.
Essentially, these units of his office are instruments for better orga-
nizing the staff work for the President and his principal policy officers,
to provide for a systematic review of policy options and an orderly
decision-making process.
The President is chairman of the council and the council members
are the high level policy officers.
7
The council staff is necessary to pull together the strands of policy
and to support the President's decisions. The executive director is
head of the staff. It is his essential task to make this mechanism work
for the President and thus it is the Administration's view that he must
be a person Serving in a close personal relationship with the President
and that he should be obligated to no one else for the holding of his
position. -
REQUIRING SENATE CONFIRMATION
To require Senate confirmation could alter the functioning of this
mechanism and reduce its usefulness to the President. Furthermore,
it should be borne in mind that the executive director and the staff
he directs are just that, staff officers. Although they analyze policy
and present policy alternatives—for policy is the substance of their
work—they are not policy-making nor policy-administering officers.
The President and the heads of the departments and agencies, not
the staff of the council, are accountable for policy. They are the ones
to whom the Congress should address its appropriate concerns and
apply the proper checks and balances.
QUESTION OF SUBMITTING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REPORT
The second question that was posed by the chairman's letter was the
question of submitting a report, an international economic report. The
Administration’s original position was that such a report was not
necessary since the information was contained in the economic report
of the President. However, various drafters of the legislation seem to
regard it as necessary; so the Administration has altered its position
and we will be glad to have a report submitted.
The question of to which committee it should be addressed is really a
matter for the Congress to resolve. We would be glad to send it to any
committee the Congress may decide, or just address it “to the Con-
gress” in general.
REEPING RELEVANT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES FULLY AND CURRENTLY
INFORMED -
The third question which we were asked to address relates to re-
Quiring the executive director to keep the relevant congressional com-
mittees fully and currently informed about the council’s activities. The
Administration does not support such a subsection. We think that
keeping the Congress and the public informed of the activities of the
Council on International Economic Policy is the duty of the President
and the members of the council, not the executive director. Moreover,
we believe that they, the accountable policy officers on the council, are
providing and will provide the necessary information; and if there are
some specifics that the Congress would like to have, we would be glad
to take them up.
FIGUREs JUSTIFYING AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATION FOR COUNCIL’s
EXPENSES
The chairman also asked for financial figures justifying the author-
ization of appropriation for the council's expenses. Section 209 of the
8
bill would authorize limiting it to $1.4 million for fiscal 1973 and not
to exceed $1.6 million for fiscal year 1974. We think that this would
be sufficient to cover the staff, consultants and travel activities of the
council; and I might note that this two-year authorization would pro-
vide the committee with an opportunity to review the usefulness of the
council after a two-year period.
FAVORABLY REPORTING TITLE II WITHOUT AMENDMENT RECOMMENDED
I conclude with a recommendation that this committee give a favor-
able report to Title II of S. 3726 without amendment. Its enactment
would be a constructive step in assuring continuing staff machinery in
support of the President's responsibilities in this important area of
international economic policy; and, Mr. Chairman, that concludes the
Summary of my statement and I will submit the entire statement for
the record.
(Mr. Carlucci's prepared statement follows:)
STATEMENT OF FRANK C. CARLUCCI, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE of MANAGEMENT
- AND BUDGET
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am happy to support, on
behalf of the Administration, Title II of S. 3726, which would provide for statu-
tory establishment Of the Council. On International Economic Policy.
On January 19, 191, President Nixon established by memorandum the Council
On International ECOnomic Policy. The purposes of the Council are to :
“1. Achieve consistency between domestic and foreign policy.
“2. Provide a clear top level focus for the full range of international economic
policies—including trade, investment, balance of payments, finance—as a CO-
herent whole, and consider the international economic aspects of essentially
foreign policy issues, such as foreign aid and defense, under the general policy
guidance of the National Security Council. i
“3. Maintain close coordination with basic foreign policy objectives.” -
The President serves as the Chairman of the Council. Other members include
the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Defense, Agriculture, Commerce, and
Labor; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; the Chairman of
the Council of Economic Advisers; the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs; the Executive Director of the Domestic OCuncil; the Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations; and Ambassador-at-large David Kennedy.
The establishment of the Council on International Economic Policy Was rec-
ommended to the President by his Advisory Council on Executive Organization,
chaired by Mr. Roy L. Ash, in late 1970.
The Ash Council analysis concluded that the then-existing structure and pro-
cedures in the Executive Branch for dealing with international economic policy
were inadequate. For example, the Ash Council found that responsibilities for
international economic affairs were dispersed among a number of departments,
agencies, and committees Without consistent, structured means of providing
advice to the President or assuring the development of a coherent policy consider-
ing all the relevant facets of the various issues. Moreover, there Was recognition
of the growing interdependence Of the world's economies and the particular
necessity at this time for the United States to pursue well-thought out, logical
and consistent foreign trade, investment, and monetary policies. &
The Ash Council conceived that, in the overall structure of advice and support
for the President in his Executive Office, the Council on International Economic
Policy would be, alongside the National Security Council and the Domestic Coun-
cil, the third such Presidentially chaired Cabinet-level body of advisers with its
own small independent staff. Its establishment, in effect, rounded out and COm-
d the Overall structure. .
wº January 19, 1971, the President also appointed Mr. Peter G. Peterson a.S
the first Executive Director of the Council and as Assistant to the President for
International Economic Affairs. He served in that capacity until February 29,
this year, when he was replaced by Mr. Peter M. Flanigan.
9
In view of the crucial decisions that the President has had to make during
these past months affecting this nation’s international economic policies and the
Continuing importance Of future decisions, the establishment of the Council was
a timely Step.
As the Council began functioning and a nucleus of staff was assembled on
detail from the Several involved agencies, the Administration proposed legisla-
tion to authorize appropriations for the expense of the Council and the direct
appointment Of Staff. RespOnding to OMB Director George Shultz’s letter of
July 19, 1971, to the President Of the Senate, Chairman Fulbright and Senator
Aiken introduced S.J. ReS. 141 and 139 respectively.
Some members Of the CongreSS, in both Houses, became interested in expand-
ing the Administration's legislative proposal into measures that would provide
for statutory establishment of the Council and set forth other details of the
COuncil’s Operations. For example, in the HOuse, COngressman Ashley introduced
H.R. 8180 and H.R. 14412, and hearings were conducted late this May On the
latter bill by a Subcommittee Of the House Banking and Currency Committee. A
related measure in the Senate was S. 3351, introduced by Senator Brock. It,
with minor changes, was incorporated into S. 3726 as Title II and was favorably
reported by the Senate Committee On Banking and Urban Affairs, June 19. This is
the bill now being considered by your Committee.
While the essential legislative needs, as seen by the Administration, would
be met by the enactment of S.J. Res. 141 or 139, the Administration would not
Oppose a well-COnstructed expanded measure giving fuller statutory prescription
to the establishment of the Council on International Economic Policy. We view
Title II of S. 3726 to be such a measure and would recommend its enactment.
Mr. Chairman, in your letter Of June 28, setting up this hearing, you proposed
that we discuss three particular questions. I shall turn to them now.
The first question is whether Senate confirmation Of the Executive Director of
the Council should be required. The Administration believes that it should not be
SO required.
As I have already mentioned, the President's purpose in Setting up the Council
On International Economic Policy was to structure the advice and Support func-
tions in the important area of international economic policy along the lines Of
the NSC and the Domestic Council, which have proved so useful to him as Chief
Executive. Essentially, these units of his Office are instruments for better Orga-
nizing the staff work for the President and his principal policy officers to provide
for a systematic review of policy Options and an Orderly decision-making process.
The President is the Chairman ; the Council members are the high-level policy
officers. The Council staff is necessary to pull together the Strands of policy
and to support the President’s decisions. The Executive Director is head of the
staff. It is his essential task to make this mechanism WOrk for the President.
Thus, it is the Administration’s view that he must be a person serving in a close
personal relationship with the President and that he should be obligated to no
One else for the holding of his position. To require Senate Confirmation COuld
alter the functioning of this mechanism and reduce its usefulness to the President.
Further, it should be borne in mind that the Executive Director and the Staff
he directs are just that—staff officers. Although they analyze policy and present
policy alternatives—for policy is the substance of their work—they are not
policy-making or policy-administering officers. The President and the heads Of
departments and agencies, not the staff of the Council, are accountable for policy.
They are the ones to whom the Congress should address its appropriate concerns
and apply the proper checks, and balances. They—not the Executive Director Of
the Council, whose function is simply to serve the President and the Council.
The second question regards the necessity for including the Senate Committee
On Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs among the
recipients Of the proposed annual “International Economic Report” under Sec-
tion 207 (a). I should explain the Administration's position on this question in
tWO parts. First, the international aspects Of the U.S. economy are regularly
COVered in the ECOnomic Report Sent to the Congress under the Employment Act.
I refer you, for example, to Chapter 5—“The United States and the World
ECOnomy”—in the Annual Report of the Council to Economic Advisers trans-
mitted in January of this year. There is, therefore, no Executive Branch need to
prepare a Separate International Economic Report. However, the members of
the Congress Who have drawn up bills to establish the Council on International
Economic Policy on a statutory basis believe in the need for such a report. In
View of this Congressional interest, the Administration no longer opposes the
10
provision requiring the separate report. Second, in view of the fact that the re-
port requirement would be legislated primarily to meet Congressionally-felt
needs, the Administration would be quite agreeable to Sending it to any Commit-
tees of the Congress you decide upon. One suggestion you may wish to consider
is the appropriateness of having the President send the report “to the Congress”
rather than several Specified committees, and then the Congress can work out,
as a matter internal to the two Houses, the COmmittees to which it would be
referred.
The third question, which we were asked to address, relates to the desirability
Of adding a new SubSection (4) to section 208 (a) requiring the Executive
Director to keep the relevant Congressional committees fully and currently
informed about the Council’s activities. The Administration does not support
Such a subsection.
Keeping the COngress and the public informed of the activities of the Council
On International Economic Policy, is, in Our view, the duty of the President and
the members of the Council—not the Executive Director. Moreover, we believe
that they, the accountable policy officers on the Council, are providing and will
provide the necessary information. If there is Some Specific element of informa-
tion any committee needs in the performance of its legislative or oversight
functions, we believe that it is appropriate for the COmmittee to Obtain it through
Ordinary means—Oral inquiry, Written letter, public Or closed testimony, etc.
Mr. Chairman, you also asked for financial figures justifying the authorization
Of appropriation for the Council’s expenses. Section 209 of S. 3726 would author-
ize not to exceed $1,400,000 for fiscal year 1973, and not to exceed $1,600,000
for fiscal year 1974. In the 1973 budget sent to the Congress this past January,
the President included an estimate of $1,341,000 for the 1973 expenses of the
Council based on the assumption that authorizing legislation would be enacted.
This amount includes the various costs of a permanent staff of 29, consultants,
and Others detailed On a reimbursable basis to the Council. The 1974 estimates
Of the Council’s expenses have not been prepared, but the amount of $1,600,000
Should be sufficient for SOme modest growth of salaries and expenses in view
Of the likely increased needs of trade negotiations and other pressing interna-
tional policy problems in that year.
While discussing section 209, I might add that one of its effects is to require
Congressional reconsideration of the progress of the Council prior to authorizing
further appropriations for fiscal year 1975 and beyond. Thus, you will, within
two-years time, have the opportunity to review whether the Council is a satis-
factory and Workable mechanism.
I COnclude with the recommendation that this COmmittee—like the COmmittee
on Banking and Urban Affairs—give a favorable report to Title II of S. 3726
without amendment. Its enactment would be a constructive step in assuring
continuing staff machinery in support of the President’s responsibilities in this
important area of international economic policy. -
Senator SPARKMAN. The entire statement will be printed in the
record.
LETTERS FOR THE RECORD
By the way, let me say without objection there will be printed in
the record the letter written by Chairman Fulbright to Mr. Wein-
berger to which you referred. Also, we have had letters from Mr. David
J. Muchow of a Washington law firm and one from Mr. N. R.
Danielian, International Economic Policy Association.
Without objection, I will place in the record those letters and the
statement that they enclosed. - *.
(The information referred to follows:)
JUNE 28, 1972.
Hon. CASPAR W. WEINBERGER,
Director, Office of Management and Budget,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. DIRECTOR: On July 19, 1971, we received a letter—referred by the
President of the Senate to the Committee on Foreign Relations—from the Direc-
tor of the Office of Management and Budget submitting proposed legislation to

11
authorize appropriations for expenses of the Council on International Economic
Policy, and for other purposes. Accordingly, on July 26 I introduced (by request)
Senate Joint Resolution 141. An identical resolution, S.J. Res. 139, was introduced
two days earlier at the request of the Administration by Senator Aiken, the rank-
ing minority member of this Committee.
However, in the intervening period legislation covering the same subject
matter has been considered by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs and has been incorporated as Title II of S. 3726, a bill to extend
and amend the Export Administration Act of 1969. On June 23, 1972, by unani-
mous consent agreement the Senate referred S. 3726 to the Committee on Foreign
Relations with instructions to report back within 30 days.
This Committee plans to hold a hearing on the bill on the morning of July 19,
that is, as SOOn as possible after the Senate reconvenes following the Democratic
Party Convention. Since your Office submitted the original request for this legis-
lation we are asking you to provide an Administration witness to testify on that
date. The concern of this Committee obviously relates primarily, although not
exclusively, to Title II of S. 3726.
Among the questions On which the Witness might be prepared to testify are
the following: the iSSue Of Whether Senate COnfirmation of the Executive Director
Of the Council on International Economic Policy should be required, as argued
by the chief sponsor of S. 3726, Senator Mondale; the necessity for including the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs among the recipients Of the proposed annual “International Economic
Report” under section 207 (a) ; the desirability of adding a new subsection (4)
to section 208 (a) requiring the Executive Director to keep the relevant Con-
gressional committees fully and currently informed about the Council’s activities.
We would also expect to receive the financial figures justifying the authorization
of appropriations for the Council’s expenses.
The exact time and location Of the hearing will be made known to your Office
as SOOn as they are determined. If you have any questions about this matter,
please contact Mr. Donald Henderson of the Committee staff; his telephone
number is 225–5481.
Sincerely yours,
J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman.
SMATHERS AND MERRIGAN,
Washington, D.C., July 14, 1972.
Hon. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, New Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR CHAIRMAN FULBRIGHT : Enclosed please find a Statement by the National
Association of Secondary Material Industries, Inc. (NASMI) on S. 3726 which
would continue the authority conferred by the Export Administration Act and
establish a Council. On International ECOnomic Policy.
We strongly support the adoption of this legislation and urge your Committee
to take no steps which would restrict the export of recycled Solid Waste materials
from this COuntry.
Sincerely,
DAVID J. MUCHOW.
EnClOSure. -
STATEMENT OF M. J. MIGHDOLL, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF SECONDARY MATERIAL INDUSTRIES, INC.
My name is M. J. Mighdoll, and I am the Executive Vice President of the
National Association of Secondary Material Industries, Inc. (NASMI), and I am
pleased to have the opportunity to submit this brief statement to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee with reference to S. 3726 which would extend the
uthority conferred by the Export Administration Act of 1969 and establish a
Ouncil on International ECOnomic Policy.
NASMI, of course, is the trade association which represents America’s metal,
aper, rubber and plastics recycling industries. Its 700 member firms are located
hroughout the United States and they include collectors, processors, consumers
nd exporters of recycled solid waste commodities, principally ferrous and non-
ferrous metal scrap, waste paper and textiles.
12
Today, the Federal Government is vitally concerned about our Nation’s grow-
ing mountains Of Solid Waste materials which defy effective economic disposal
and both Congress and the President have decreed that all impediments and dis-
incentiVeS to the recycling Of these Solid waste materials must be removed. In-
deed, Congress passed the Resource Recovery Act of 1970 and expressly directed
that all federally-sponsored disincentives to recycling should be eliminated at
the earliest possible date. Recently, therefore, a subcommittee of the Joint Eco-
nomic Committee of the Congress held detailed hearings on the economic disin-
centives to recycling and as a result several agencies of the Executive Branch are
presently studying ways and means to remove existing Federal tax disincentives
to the use Of recycled materials and how discriminatory rail and Ocean freight
rates Which decrease Or actually proScribe the utilization and exportation Of
recycled Solid waste materials can be eliminated. The last mentioned problem
is also under active consideration with the Export Expansion Act of 1971 Cur-
rently before the Congress. - -
. Clearly, therefore, we believe that both the Congress and Our industry must be
Certain that legislation Such as the Export Administration Act now before your
Committee is continued in Such form and administered in Such manner that it
will not improperly, unfairly and baselessly prohibit the exportation of recycled
solid waste materials from the United States to foreign markets where they are
Sorely needed and where they can be advantageously sold by U.S. exporters. In
this connection, NASMI is deeply concerned, for example, by a proposal made by
the American Iron and Steel Institute in testimony before the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs On March 14, 1972, whereby Section
4(1)(a) of the Export Administration Act would be amended in such manner
as to enable or require the Secretary. Of Commerce to impose export controls On
recycled scrap metals from the United States simply because there might be
some increased foreign demand, or even the mere possibility of future increased
foreign demand, for U.S. Scrap metals. This proopsal was flatly rejected by the
Senate Banking Committee and we urge your Committee, to the extent you ex-
amine Title I of S. 3726, to similarly reject any such proposal. Patently, the
adoption by your Committee of Such an amendment would furnish a drastic, new,
and totally unnecessary criterion for the triggering Of export COntrols when Such
controls should be imposed Only When they are absolutely necessary because Of
a clear-cut, present, existing need to limit “the excessive drain. Of Scarce ma-
terials” as the Export Administration Act presently provides.
The Iron and Steel Institute Stated in its testimony before the Senate Bank-
ing Committee that the Department of Commerce “can take no action until after
abnormally high exports have occurred over a substantial period of time, and it
has the full measure of Statistical evidence that the exports in question are CauS-
ing short supply and inflationary conditions in the domestic economy.” Obviously,
because the Congress specifically provided in the Export Administration Act of
1969 that the “unwarranted restriction of exports from the United States has a
serious, adverse effect on our balance of payments” and that uneven administra-
tion of export controls unnecessarily curtails U.S. exports, the Secretary of Com-
merce has clearly proceeded correctly and properly in his refusal to impose COn-
trols simply because some U.S. company or some U.S. industry envisions the
future possibility of increased foreign demand for our recycled scrap materials.
Indeed, if any changes are to be wrought by Congress in Title I of S. 3726 at
this time, then NASMI and the recycling industries it represents urge that pro-
posals such as the One made by the Iron and Steel Institute be flatly rejected in
favor of amendments which would make it abundantly clear—
(i) that export controls On recycled materials should be imposed Only
When it is absolutely necessary and unavoidable to prevent the excessive
drain of scarce materials which are vital to our national security or our
Inational economy ; and -
(ii) that Once imposed, export controls on recycled materials should be
removed immediately and without unnecessary delay when they are no
longer required to prevent excessive drains of scarce materials, vital to our
national security or our national economy. -
Recently, for example, export controls on copper scrap were maintained in One
form or another during lengthy periods when they were clearly unnecessary.
And, regarding one of the examples referred to by the Iron and Steel Institute,
the Commerce Department patently erred when it imposed tight export controls
On nickel bearing stainless steel scrap during periods in 1969 and early 1970

13
When there was no supportable reason for the continuation of Such controls. The
law Should be made clear: export controls on recycled materials should be put
into effect and continued in effect only when they are plainly needed for the
reaSOnS mentioned above and they must be removed as soon as those reasons
Cease to exist.
Finally, regarding the specific provisions of S. 3726, we strongly support Title I
Of this legislation which would direct the Secretary of Commerce to remove
eXport Controls from any items now controlled unilaterally by the United States
Which are freely available from foreign sources, consistent with our national
Security. -
We further believe that the establishment of industry-government technical
advisory committees provided by Section 105 of this title will provide a much-
needed mechanism not Only to insure a balanced review of existing controls but
also to foster and encourage Vital cooperation between the private and public
Sectors in future export control matters.
If the Committee requires further information regarding any of the matters
discussed above, we will be pleased to endeavor to supply it. In the meantime,
We Sincerely hope that the Committee will give full, favorable consideration to
the Suggestions we have submitted in this statement and that nothing will be
done here which will frustrate or defeat the National recycling goals set by
Congress in the Resource Recovery Act of 1970.
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC Policy Association,
Washington, D.C., July 17, 1972.
Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN : I am sending my views on S. 3726 in written form, as
yOu requested in your letter Of July 6, 1972. Passage Of that bill seems all the
more necessary to me as foreign economic entanglements grow and as their im-
pOrt On the domestic front becomes more Obvious and more COntroversial.
The enclosed statement recommends S. 3726, and in particular Title II, which
establishes the Council on International Economic Policy with the stature and
resources to do its job.
In addition, my statement recommends adding a long-range, bipartisan, and
long-tenured policy planning capability to the Council by Creating a Foreign
Economic Policy Board. Its members would be appointed subject to Senate Con-
firmation, and the President would pick the Chairman from among the members,
who would also sit on the Council. This Board could also prepare for the Presi-
dent the annual report to Congress On the international economic position of the
United States, called for by S. 3726. We suggest that the report should include
an analysis and forecast of resources entering the balance of payments. Use of
budgetary format would facilitate development of national priorities in our
foreign Operations. -
The time has come to put our international economic house in Order. In my
judgment, S. 3726, amended as suggested, could contribute greatly to this goal.
Sincerely yours,
- N. R. DANIELIAN.
Enclosure.
STATEMENT OF N. R. DANIELIAN, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
- ASSOCIATION
Mr. Chairman, IEPA is a nonprofit research group which has studied the pub-
lic policy issues of U.S. international economic affairs for many years. Our ex-
posure to the results Of badly fragmented and internally inconsistent policy has
led us to conclude that the time has come—and indeed is long past—for struc-
tural reform of the U.S. Government in the international economic field.
My statement will, therefore, deal primarily with Title II of S. 3726, which is
now before your Committee and which establishes the Council on International
Economic Policy. In my view, getting our house in Order for the development
and execution of integrated Overall international economic policies is of primary
importance.
Nevertheless, I can give a general endorsement, at least to the objectives of
Title I of S. 3726, because increasing U.S. exports is vital to correcting our trade
81–190 O—72
14
and payments imbalances. Thus, we should minimize the self-imposed restraints,
consistent of course with any vital and continuing Security needs, by carefully
reviewing the existing restrictions which have developed over the years On
Security grounds. -
With regard to Title II, one can only applaud the purpose, Which is Stated
as providing “closer Federal interagency coordination in the development Of a
more rational and orderly international economic policy for the United States.”
In effect, Title II gives a statutory basis to the Council already established by
Presidential action on January 19, 1971. This bill would give the Council added
stature, permanence, and authorize the resources necessary to make this body
effective. I believe this action is the absolute minimum required and strongly
support enactment of Title II. º
iet me briefly outline the reasons why we feel that the establishment Of a
strengthened Council and related machinery is essential. Each Of the many gov-
ernment departments concerned with one aspect of foreign economic activities
has tended to have its own policies, and often its own constituency. Each tends
to look at the problem through the prism of its own parochial interests and re-
sponsibilities: the State Department necessarily treats international eCOnomic
issues as part of foreign policy; the Treasury Department views them as a Seg-
ment of monetary affairs; while the Defense Department sees them in military
or national security terms. There is confusion about both goals and methods
within the U.S. Government, among Americans generally, and among our foreign
friends and trading partners.
The consequences of the neglect of American foreign economic interests in the
two decades since World War II are readily apparent. The 1971 international
monetary crisis is a direct result of mounting American balance of payments
deficits. These deficits have caused erosion in the value of the dollar, disorder in
the international financial community, and major economic problems With Other
countries. Many of these problems might have been avoided had we recognized
sooner the need to pull together the governmental agencies concerned and to
provide the President with a central focus on the totality of our international
economic relations. It is hard to believe, but for decades we have failed to ask
ourselves the single question : How do we pay for all the things We Want to do
and buy abroad? It is to be hoped that the Council will ask this hard-nosed
Question.
It is, I believe, to the President’s credit that he recognized this need and Cre-
ated by executive action the Council on International Economic Policy, which
has achieved an excellent record during its relatively short life. It is both appro-
priate and necessary to give the Council a statutory basis. *
But it is important to recognize that there are two separate functions involved.
One is to give the President an interdepartmental coordinating mechanism
analogous in purpose, if not in subject matter, to the National Security Council.
The latter body, it should be noted, was set up after World War II by Congres-
sional action in recognition of the fact that in the modern world the United
States could no longer afford to have separate foreign, political, military and
naval policies, but Ought to establish “a national Security” policy at the Presi-
dential level. -
National policy is inherently the responsibility of the Chief Executive, it can
Only be done by him or under his direction, and the Council seems an excellent
Imechansm for achieving it in the international economic field. The Second func-
tion, however, is of a broader and longer range policy-planning nature. And, I am
not at all Sure that the two missions can be satisfactorily combined in one body.
I therefore propose the creation of a separate organization, which might be
called a Foreign Economic Policy Board, to be located in the Executive Office
of the President to perform functions in the international field analogous to those
performed by the Council of Economic Advisers in the domestic field. Obviously,
this Board Would have to have the closest relations with both the Council. Of
Economic Advisers and the Council on International Economic Policy; indeed, its
Chairman should probably be a member of the latter.
The analogy to the Council of Economic Advisers calls to mind that this body
was created by Congress in the Employment Act of 1946 to provide the ma-
Chinery to implement a national policy of seeking full employment.
It is self evident, I think, that the time has come for the United States to
adopt the policy of getting its international accounts and its balance of payments
deficit under control. This would be the precise purpose of the Board. It could
15
be structured SO as to complement and assist the President and his key advisers,
rather than conflict with them ; but it should also have a bipartisan and long- .
tenured character, with a responsibility to make a major annual report to Con-
gress and to the public.
Title III of S. 2394, introduced by Senator Brock about One year ago, would,
in my view, meet these specifications very well. For example, the Board pro-
Vided in his bill would be composed of five members appointed by the President,
and With the COnsent Of the Senate. Each Of the BOard members should be
specially qualified to analyze and interpret international economic trends and to
appraise both governmental and private sector activities relating to foreign eco-
nomic policy. The President would have the power to designate One of the mem-
bers as Chairman, but no more than three of the five would be from the same
political party. Their terms would be staggered, but would last for seven years
after the initial appointments. This pattern would assure both parties, and the
Congress as whole, of a proper role in the planning of long-range international
economic objectives, yet would not place undue restriction. On the President, who
would have the right to select the Chairman from among the members. That is
necessary because the Chairman would be a key link between the Board’s planning
function and the action-COOrdination function Of the COuncil. On International
Economic Policy and its Executive Director.
If such a body were established, it would be the logical One to Submit to the
President for transmission to the Congress the annual report On the international
economic position of the United States, now called for by section 207 of S. 3726.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to see this report include a Special analysis
Of the financial resources affecting the U.S. balance of payments for the preced-
ing year and a forecast for the year ahead. The budgetary format. Of this anal-
ysis, that is, income and Outflows On a sector by Sector basis, WOuld provide
the President and his Council, on the one hand, and the Congress on the other,
With an invaluable tool in assessing priorities and drawing up the necessary
policies.
This last point underscores the root of our problem. In 1971, the United
States Spent abroad approximately $80 billion for imports, foreign travel, mili-
tary expenditures, foreign aid and investments abroad, while we earned from
all SOurces only about $70 billion. The difference, of course, was our deficit on
the basic balance of payments of Over $9.3 billion. Although the devaluation
Of the dollar Will help, it will not, by itself, solve our problems. Devaluation
is limited in its effectiveness and its feasibility, among other reasons, because
Of the resistance Of foreign governments. There are already some $65 billion in
Cumulative U.S. liabilities held abroad arising from these deficits. If we con-
tinue to add to this mountain of unwanted dollars abroad, at the present rates,
it is possible that by 1980, foreigners would own enough dollars to surpass the
value of our investments abroad. We are, in fact, putting our capital in hock
to pay current bills. How long can we continue to do this? What will be the
COnSequences to Our national Welfare, in a real Sense, to Our national Security ?
The problems will multiply several fold when we start to give massive amounts
Of aid to South East Asia, long-term credits to Eastern Europe, and have to
import huge amounts of Oil and other raw materials. This underScores the need
to give Our international economic relationships the priority they deserve and
to get a grip on our financial future. I believe that S. 3726, modified as I have
Suggested, could be of enOrmous value in doing SO.
WITNESS's RECOMMENDATION
Senator SPARKMAN. I believe the summation of your statement, your
recommendation, is that the bill should be enacted as it was reported
by the Banking Committee'
Mr. CARLUCCI. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SPARKMAN. You said without amendment?
Mr. CARLUCCI. Without amendment; yes, sir.
16
DURATION OF COUNCIL
Senator SPARKMAN. What is the duration of the council?
Mr. CARLUCCI. Well, the bill, S. 3726, would give it a two-year au-
thorization period.
Senator SPARKMAN. That is what I meant. It is for two years ac-
cording to that bill?
Mr. CARLUCCI. That is correct, sir. At the end of that period the
Committee would, of course, review it and decide whether there should
be additional authorization.
Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Aiken?
GAO ACCESS TO OPERATIONS OF COUNCIL
Senator AIKEN. As I understand it, the General Accounting Office
would have no access whatsoever to the operations of this councilº
Mr. CARLUCCI. Senator, the General Accounting Office would have
the same access to the Council and the Council's records that it pres-
ently has to other offices of the executive office of the President.
Senator AIKEN. As it has to Mr. Kissinger's office, for instance?
Mr. CARLUCCI. I don’t know whether there has been any precedent.
I am not aware of any General Accounting Office inquiry into the Na-
tional Security Council’s functioning.
Senator SPARKMAN. May I say in that connection we have recently
had a similar matter before the Banking Committee, relating to the
access of the General Accounting Office to certain activities. This in-
volved the Board of Control or Board of Trustees with reference to
this guaranteed loan to Lockheed. I think I can say we have worked
that out quite satisfactorily. You may recall that in connection with
one bill that we passed through the Senate, we state in the report that
the General Accounting Office ought to have the same degree of access
as it has with regularly established departments like the Department
of Defense and not beyond that, neither more nor less. I think it was
satisfactory to the Treasury Department and to the General Account-
ing Office, and I was well pleased with the settling of it.
Senator AIKEN. Didn’t the press report they gave Lockheed another
$100 million? The deficit was increased $100 million. It was supposed
to reduce it.
Senator SPARKMAN. No. I don’t think we have released that much.
I am not sure.
Senator AIKEN. It is beyond my understanding anyway.
Senator SPARKMAN. No, the most recent report has shown them
picking up. -
Senator AIKEN. Have they started selling to China?
Senator SPARKMAN. They are picking up.
Senator AIKEN. I hope.
QUESTION OF CONFIRMING EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
. I haven’t any more questions. Apparently the immediate question
for us to decide is whether we should recommend having the executive
director come before the Senate for confirmation and that is something
that will come up in executive session. I don’t see how it can be settled
here this morning, with four of us present, anyway.
17
Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, it will. We considered that in the Banking
Committee and decided against it and I will be very glad when we
get to executive session to state the reasons. I don’t suppose there is
any need of discussing here, why we decided it that way. It is a purely
voluntary job. There is no salary. It is purely advisory and, after all,
it is only for 2 years. That is correct, isn’t it—those things that I
said? -
Mr. CARLUCCI. That is correct. It will be for no longer than the au-
thorizing legislation. -
PRIORITY OF PROPOSED COUNCIL
Senator AIKEN. This proposed council would have priority over the
Department of Commerce?
Mr. CARLUCCI. Well, Title II—
Senator AIKEN. The Department of Agriculture, and other depart-
ments?
Mr. CARLUCCI. Well, Title II of the bill really sets up a council on
which the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce and
others would sit; the council is chaired by the President. There is a
staff which functions, I would presume, much as the staff to this com-
mittee functions, supplying staffing papers out, getting agendas ready
for meetings of the council; so the Department of Commerce and the
Department of Agriculture activities would essentially be coordinated
through the council mechanism.
Senator AIKEN. In a sense, though, this Council on International
Economic Policy, would have the priority over other departments of
government?
Mr. CARLUCCI. Well, in that the council would be a forum for re-
flecting presidential decisions, which decisions would be implemented
by the various departments, I think what you state is generally accu-
rate. The council, as a body, consists of a number of heads of depart-
ments and agencies.
QUESTIONING SECRETARY OF COMMERCE CONCERNING EXPORT BUSINESS
Senator AIKEN. Suppose we call the Secretary of Commerce before
the committee, which I assume we could do, and ask him questions.
Could he refuse to answer the questions on the ground that he didn’t
have the authority from the Council on International Economic Pol-
icy, providing the questions related to export business?
Mr. CARLUCCI. No, sir; he could not.
Senator AIKEN. He could not ?
Mr. CARLUCCI. In fact, we are arguing that the members of the
council. the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of State, the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Labor,
Director of OMB, Chairman of CEA (Council of Economic Advisers)
and Special Representatives for Trade Negotiations should be the
ones to whom the committee would look for appropriate information
on the council’s activities, not the council’s executive director who is
essentially a staff man for the council and for the President.
Senator AIKEN. I see. Just like we look to the State Department now
to find out what Mr. Kissinger is doing; is that correct?
18
Mr. CARLUCCI. We draw a parallel there, too, yes, sir.
(Laughter.)
Senator AIKEN. We had a bill before us two weeks ago which, in
effect, gave the OEO (Office of Economic Opportunity) priority over
a good share of the agencies and departments of government. We did
get that changed a bit so that the OEO will now supplement them
instead of having priority over the other departments, but I guess I
have said enough. - -
Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Scott?
ANALOGY TO BEST EVIDENCE
Senator SCOTT. Mr. Carlucci, it seems to me this is somewhat anal-
ogous to the best evidence rule, namely, that if congressional com-
mittees want to know what the council is doing, the best evidence for
that is either a report from the President or testimony from members
of the council, as you pointed out, the Secretaries of State, Treasury,
Defense, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, OMB or the other agencies
which make up the council, all of whom could be expected to testify,
if invited 2
Mr. CARLUCCI. That is correct, Senator Scott.
Senator SCOTT. That is the best evidence other than to call the exec-
utive director up here? - -
Mr. CARLUCCI. That is our position, yes, sir.
Senator SCOTT. Those are the only questions I have, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Percy? - -
Senator PERCY. Mr. Carlucci, I have not made a decision yet. I think
I really am in the same position as Senator Case and Senator Javits.
In their absence this morning, I will want to get your thinking to
transmit to them. We didn’t want to reach a conclusion until we heard
your views.
NTUMBER OF POSITIONS CONFIRMED BY SENATE
Can you give me a rough idea in your capacity in the Office of Man-
agement and Budget how many positions are confirmed by the United
States Senate in a year or in the term of a new Administration?
Mr. CARLUCCI. It would probably average out to somewhere in the
neighborhood of eight to ten people in each agency, and we have some
40 or 50 agencies of government, so I expect the number would be
quite considerable, quite large.
Senator PERCY. I have the impression it runs into the thousands
when I see the lists come over from the Department of Defense alone
for their promotion. We confirm promotions within the military
services and they are put through generally by voice vote without
much discussion or dispute.
INTENT AND PURPOSE OF CONFIRMATION
As Deputy Director of Management and Budget, how do you con-
ceive the purpose of confirmation? What is the intention and purpose
of this process? In many cases it is simply pro forma. -
Mr. CARLUCCI. Well, you are quite right; in many cases it is pro
forma. If we add to the executive level positions of the federal gov-
19
ºrnment, which probably number somewhere around 1,000, I would
have to make a guess, but I would like to correct that figure for the
record. If we add to that the military and Foreign Service Officer
promotions, which are really fairly perfunctory, you would have a
Substantial number; that is clear.
I look upon the process strictly as it pertains to the people appointed
to executive level positions—the 1 to 5 categories, executive level posi-
tions, as one which implements the checks and balances process estab-
lished by our Constitution one which insures that the people who will
be developing and implementing policy are people who have the con-
fidence of the Senate of the United States as well as the President of
the United States.
Senator PERCY. Do you feel that it is a useful process?
Mr. CARLUCCI. I certainly feel it is a useful process; yes, sir.
Senator PERCY. Does it tend to remind a man, in exercising his re-
Sponsibility, that there are two branches of government that must be
Served: one, the executive and, the second, the legislative, and that this
process—although painful sometimes—is a worthy institution that
has survived the test of time? -
Mr. CARLUCCI. Well, as one who went through a rather painful con-
firmation process as Director of OEO, I can verify that it is nice to
have Senate confirmation, and it does give you a certain degree of
confidence in carrying out operating responsibilities; and I would
stress operating responsibilities. I think it is very important when
Someone has a responsibility for implementing legislation which has
been passed by the Congress, and operating programs pursuant thereto,
that he know that he enjoys a certain confidence in the Congress of the
United States.
But I would make the distinction between someone who is imple-
menting a specific piece of programmatic policy and someone who is
Serving in a staff capacity to the President. - -
Senator PERCY. When we are considering those in staff capacity,
doesn’t it also involve an element of power, and the whole implication
of the confirmation process that they should also be responsive to the
legislative branch of government?
Mr. CARLUCCI. I am not sure, Senator, how I would define power in
the federal government. After a number of years in the federal service,
I am convinced that power sometimes ebbs and flows and it is a very
illusive matter.
Essentially all power stems from the President in the executive
branch and he is accountable to the people once every four years. He,
it seems to me, is entitled to have the best advice he can get from his
personal staff. Some of these staff advisers may exercise power in the
sense that they influence the President, but they do not have an in-
dependent base of power, such as a cabinet member or an agency has.
That is the distinction we would draw in this case.
PROBLEM OF MAN WIEHO HAS DUAL RESPONSIBILITY
Senator PERCY. I would concur with that when it comes to a position
of, say, assistant or counselor to the President. What I have a problem
with is when you have a man who has a dual responsibility, assistant
to the President—that should be totally and completely privileged—
20
but when he acts in another capacity, has another hat on, shouldn’t he
then present himself to Congress and say, “While one aspect of my re-
lationship is totally and completely privileged, this other aspect is a
role which does involve power, influence, policy and decisions which
are vital to the governing of the republic and I will subject myself to
inquiry and questioning in that role. Whenever it gets into the area of
my relationship, which is privileged, I will understandably abstain.”
And I can’t imagine any member of the Senate of the United States
pushing any inquiry into that area which is clearly privileged.
Mr. CARLUCCI. Well, you have described a division of responsibility
that I am not sure exists in this case, Senator. The executive director
of the Council on International Economic Policy is both advising the
President and acting as a staff to a forum that serves to advise the
President. So the two are essentially inseparable, particularly since the
forum consists generally of cabinet officers who are dealing on a day-
to-day basis with the problems that involve the implementation of
legislation passed by the Congress, and the cabinet officers themselves
can testify before the Congress.
The executive director of this forum does not have an independent
power base in itself. His function is confined to serving as a staff to the
council and advising the President, both in the President’s capacity as
chairman of the council and in his other hat as assistant to the Pres-
ident, in the President's capacity as President of the United States.
NECESSITY OF UNIQUE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH DR. RISSINGER
Senator PERCY. When you take into account real power, though—
the ability to establish policy, the ability to take action and carry it
out—would you say that Dr. Kissinger, for instance, is in a position of
real power and influence and that it is understandable that the Senate
would be somewhat uncomfortable having him totally and completely
removed from their jurisdiction? It seems that some accommodation,
some unique working relationship, should be worked out if we are to
really fulfill our responsibilities.
Mr. CARLUCCI. I don’t question the fact that Dr. Kissinger has con-
siderable power and influence, but that power and influence stem from
his role as an adviser to the President and the decisions themselves are
being made by the President. And as long as that is the case, he is
Serving in a staff function. It is my understanding that he has con-
Sulted informally with various members of the committee.
Senator PERCY. I would like to be the first to say that I think he has
been ingenious in finding a way to walk in the shoes of a Senator. I
can’t imagine that Dr. Kissinger, if elected Senator from the State of
Massachusetts, would not have taken the initiative to find a way to
have a direct contact with the Dr. Kissinger in the White House whom
he knows has made policy, even though the President is ultimately
responsible. Dr. Kissinger actually has been very helpful in giving us
his thoughts and his feelings about the course of foreign policy.
POSSIBILITY OF WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH MIR. FLANIGAN
Senator Scott. If the senator will yield, I wonder if that isn’t the
same sort of thing that would be possible with Mr. Flanigan?
21
Senator PERCY. That is what I am leading up to.
Mr. CARLUCCI. I have discussed this with Mr. Flanigan and he has
indicated he would operate in very much the same Way.
Senator PERCY. That is a very important point. I would feel very
remiss in not insisting upon confirmation if I had the feeling that
Mr. Flanigan, whose position of influence and power. I would be the
last to underestimate, would be immune from us and if he would fol-
low at least the same course that Dr. Kissinger has followed with the
appropriate members of the Senate who have responsibility. It is a
shared responsibility we have in the field. It cuts across a number of
committees; certainly Banking and Currency, and I served on that
distinguished and powerful committee under our fine chairman, and
wouldn’t feel we could carry out our responsibility if we only had
ccess to, say, the Secretary of Commerce, and not to the man who
eally had the responsibility of pulling Commerce and State and
veryone else together. So I think if that is a commitment from the
dministration and supported by Mr. Flanigan, it would help a great
leal. -
MEANS OF CONTACT WITH MIR. EHRLICHMAN
I would think the same thing might be true of Mr. Ehrlichman
who, again, I feel, is one of the most powerful men in the United
States. It is a terrible waste of time for us to go through confirmation
hearings on assistant secretaries and so forth who really cut no ice
whatsoever. We know it and yet we go through this routine and not
guestion the man who actually has the power in domestic policy. There
Ought to be some responsible way, without embarrassment to him,
without embarrassment to the administration, for us to get to know
his thinking and his attitudes better and to have a chance to exchange
views, because possibly we might be able to contribute something to
his own thinking and thus have an input into the domestic council.
And yet I have the feeling that there has been no regularly estab-
lished basis, shall we say, for having contact with him.
Mr. CARLUCCI. Well, I haven’t discussed that subject specifically
with Mr. Ehrlichman, as I have with Mr. Flanigan; but let me stress,
in noting the power and influence of Mr. Ehrlichman, that in my ex-
perience Mr. Ehrlichman has always been very careful to act as a
staff assistant to the President and present to the President staff
jptions rather than personal positions. That is the way that the Do-
mestic Council is set up to function, as the National Security Council.
Senator PERCY. Well, in presenting these options, is there no possi-
bility, after five options have been recommended, that Mr. Ehrlichman
loesn’t add a p.s., “I think option No. 3 is probably the best,” and
loes he stay totally immune from any recommendations to the Presi-
lent and does he not take all of this material and synthesize it and
hen come to a conclusion so that he saves the President the responsi-
bility of—or the necessity of—making that same appraisal for him-
self? The President has the options and he can go through the options,
5ut wouldn’t he want to really know John Ehrlichman’s thinking on
he issue? * - -
Mr. CARLUCCI. Certainly he seeks John Ehrlichman’s thinking. He
lso seeks Casper Weinberger's thinking and the thinking of various





22
cabinet members. In fact, written papers I have seen contain the views
of a rather large number of people whose views the President has
Sought, John Ehrlichman among them. - -
Senator PERCY. Well, I would like to say I have no problem in
making request of John Ehrlichman; I have found him responsive
and understanding. In fact, Senator Case invited him for a lunch
which was interrupted by roll calls which was an exasperating experi-
ence for him. -
Senator CASE. He got enough to eat, I think.
VALUES OF CONFIRMATION PROCESS
Senator PERCY. But I think it was a very good thing. I think it is
necessary to have Some basis for developing a relationship, not to em-
barrass but to seek information and get the benefit of their thinking
and have a chance to make a regular input. I see that as one of the
great values of the confirmation process. When scores of appointees
from Illinois have gone through, I have introduced them to the Sena-
tors and they have learned the thinking of the Senators. I think it is
a healthy and constructive process.
INSISTANCE ON CONFIRMATION CONCERNING PRICE AND wAGE CONTROI,
BOARDS
When we came to the Price and Wage Control Boards, at that time
I took the position that if this were a Democratic Administration and
a Democratic President had appointed a czar of prices and a counter-
part possibly in wages, that the process of confirmation would be
something I really would insist on. I wouldn’t have given that kind of
control over the whole economy of the United States to two men with-
out confirmation while we confirm others who we know will never
make any policy.
But here we had two jobs that were powerful and I really insisted
we subject them to confirmation proceedings because if it would be
right for us to do it in a Democratic Administration, it should be
right to do it in a Republican Administration, and Republicans should
be the first to say no one should be given that kind of power without
confirmation. Would you concur that that was a wise decision for the
Senate to make? Would you concur that it had been helpful?
Mr. CARLUCCI. I would concur it has been helpful in that case.
How PAY BOARD AND PRICE COMMISSION DIFFER FROM COUNCIL
Senator PERCY. I know there is a difference between these jobs.
Mr. CARLUCCI. I would draw a difference between the Pay Board
and the Price Commission and the kinds of programs they are operat-
ing pursuant to statutory authority.
Senator PERCY. Could you expand on that a little bit for the record
because I think it is important that we do understand the distinction
and difference each of those boards has with the executive director of
this council? - -
Mr. CARLUCCI. I would be glad to do that, Senator.
Under the Economic Stabilization Act, the specific responsibility
for carrying out the policy of Congress have been given to the Chair-
23
man of the Price Commission and the Chairman of the Pay Board and
they are in effect in day-to-day contact with the American public in
making decisions that will impact immediately on the public and will
be implemented by staffs under their direct control.
None of these considerations would apply in the case of the Execu-
tive Director of CIEP. His function would be a staff function, one of
pulling together agency recommendations, looking at them logically,
putting staff papers before the council and before the President as
chairman of the council, and seeing that the decisions are implemented
y the agencies. In other words, he would not be in direct contact with
he American public or elements of the economy. The decisions made
in the CIEP forum would be implemented through the respective
agencies, so that the forum itself is essentially a coordinating mech-
anism and the executive director simply serves as the head of the
taff to help pull that coordination together. This is very different
rom the responsibilities of Chairman Grayson and Judge Bolt.
ITNESS’ VIEW OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR WITHOUT SENATE RELATIONSHIP
Senator PERCY. Would you feel—and I will preface this by saying
hat I will do everything I possibly can the next four months to see
hat he doesn’t have that power—but would you feel comfortable with
n executive director appointed by Mr. McGovern, if he is elected,
nless the Senate of the United States has some means of questioning
he man finding out what his points of view were, and to exercise
ome possibility of restraint on policies that he might attempt to
implement that would vitally affect the international economic well-
eing of this country? *
Mr. CARLUCCI. Assuming the job is as I have described it, I think
hat any President should be entitled to have a man in that job without
Senate confirmation in view of the relationship that must exist be-
ween the incumbent and the President.
Senator PERCY. Would you feel more comfortable though, if it
asn’t through confirmation if we did work out some relationship
here we could directly have access to his thinking and have a chance
o make Some input' -
Mr. CARLUCCI. I think it is desirable in the case of all staff members
hat informal consultation should go on and I know, as I said earlier,
r. Flanigan is most anxious to have that kind of informal consulta-
ion. We in OMB seek it and I think it is a very constructive thing to
18, Ve.
Our only point is that we do not want to change the nature of the
rganization by requiring Senate confirmation. We think that would
hange the nature of the organization. We think the same goal can be
chieved through less formal means. -
Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I find the witness this
orning is an able and helpful a witness as he is an able and tough
dministrator.
Senator SCOTT. He should be; he comes from Pennsylvania. He
nows his business.
Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Case?




















24
INSTITUTIONALIZING CONDUCT OF POLICY WITHOUT CONGRESSIONAL
CONTACT
Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, sorry I was not here for the first part
of the discussion. I am deeply interested in the subject. I am quite con-
cerned about the whole concept of institutionalizing and centralizing
the development of foreign policy—economic policy in this case—and
its day-to-day surveillance. The bill provides for a system of Selection
and recommendations coming from the various government depart-
ments and the council then sifting out options and presenting them to
the President without direct contact between the Council and the Con-
gress and vice versa.
The whole bill describes how the Council “Shall prepare for the
President,” “Shall make recommendations for the President,” “Shall
do this for the President,” but says nothing about doing anything for
the Congress.
Now, you say this is an agency in the Office of the President. Well,
the question is: should there be such an agency which further institu-
tionalizes and concentrates the conduct of international economic pol-
icy and places it ultimately in the hands of a single man?
The question of confirmation of the occupant of the staff position,
as you modestly call it, is only for purpose of discussion in the pre-
liminary passage of the bill. After initial confirmation, there will be a
very different aspect to this man’s job. We are not trying to tell the
President whom he may have in this position, but we are trying to es-
tablish that the Senate has a right to call this man to testify in the
future about what goes on in his agency. And it will be an agency;
he will not serve as just an adviser to the President; it will be an
agency, an additional agency for the conduct of foreign economic
policy?
You can talk about staff operations and advice and all the rest of it
as much as you want, but foreign economic policy will be run through
this agency in the future. And the Secretary of State will be less im-
portant in economic policy. The Treasury, Agriculture and Commerce
Departments will all be subordinate to the determinations of the Presi-
dent based upon recommendations of this Council which in turn will
be based on the views of the Council’s staff.
Mr. CARLUCCI. Senator, I guess I would have to differ with your
fundamental premise.
Senator CASE. What is that?
Mr. CARLUCCI. Your premise that this is an agency which will hav
independent power. There are a number of offices in the executive offic
of the President that are not agencies, that are strictly staff offices ad
vising the President. They do not run any programs, so to speak;
and this pariticular council does not run any program pursuant t
any particular piece of legislation as one normally conceives of an
agency.
What it does is to try to coordinate the various programs that ar
being run by the different agencies, and to present staff recommen
dations to the President and to the council, which recommendation
will then be, if approved, implemented by the various agencies.
And in connection with your comment of where does the Con
gress fit in, the Congress has oversight responsibility for all of thes

25
gencies; and the respective agency heads do and will testify both on
heir own activities and on the activities of the Council.
FURTHER REMOVAL OF CONGRESS FROM POLICYMAIKING SUGGESTED
Senator CASE. I don’t disagree with anything you have said, but it is
what you have said that I am concerned about. The Congress should
le involved in and informed of the determination of the policy that
hese Departments are directed to carry out. We want to know about
he reasoning that goes into the fixing of these policies and the facts
Inderlying the reasoning. That is where there is a gap. You have,
\bviously and properly, in representing the view of the White House
und the executive branch said this is none of Congress business.
Now, I am not putting in a belligerent way but I am just trying to
nalyze and dissect what the Senator from Illinois has been saying on
hat this really means. And what this really means, I think, is a fur-
her removal of Congress from any effective participation in the
aking of policy. We must be concerned about the making of the
olicy, not just the carrying out of orders.
Mr. CARLUCCI. In the case of major policy, Senator, the decision is
ade usually by the President.
Senator CASE. Well, you say policy is made by the President—
not by the President plus Congress. When we can’t question, even in
in appropriations request, the people who make policy and ask them
bout why the policy was made, then we are not in a position to do
jur job.
Mr. CARLUCCI. If I may, the President, having made the decision
ANALOGY TO BUDGET PROCESS
Senator CASE. Made what decision, just for example, if you would be
specific?
Mr. CARLUCCI. If I may draw an analogy—
Senator CASE. Yes, take an example. -
Mr. CARLUCCI (continuing). Let me draw an analogy between this
ind of process and the budget process in the Federal Government.
The President has to make a number of hard choices in the budget
Drocess, tradeoffs between programs within agencies, tradeoffs between
gencies. He has to be concerned about problems of inflation and not
ºverybody is going to be pleased by what comes out. But it is generally
greed that he can make these decisions with advice from his staff
n confidence, up to the point when the budget is transmitted to the
Dongress. Then various Cabinet members and the Director of the Office
»f Management and Budget are available to discuss the rationale for
hese decisions with Congress and the Congress can take action as it
bleases on the various programs.
Now, the same situation would apply here.
Senator CASE. May I comment on that analogy, which is an interest-
ng one. Congress can ask various questions of the department heads.
We can ask them what they asked the Bureau of the Budget for in the
irst place and whether they are happy with what they got. Can we
isk them why they were turned down and how the process worked?
Dan we ask them why the Director of OMB and the President said they
ould not have something?



26
In practice, we cannot. You know that we cannot. Long before we
get answers, it is suggested that we are overstepping the bounds. We
never learn why one program has priority over another and what goes
into the decision made by, as you say, the President. -
Well, the decision should be made by Congress in the case of the
budget; and how is Congress going to know what it ought to do about
this if it doesn’t know why the President made his choice. Whom are
we going to ask why the President made his choice? You can’t ask
the President.
Mr. CARLUCCI. Surely the committee can ask the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget and you can surely ask the cabinet
head who is charged with implementing that policy. Moreover, if the
Congress is not satisfied with that policy, it always has the preroga-
tive of changing the authorizing legislation or changing the appro-
priations that the President has requested.
Senator CASE. We do have this power.
Mr. CARLUCCI. It is just a question of at what point in time does
the Congress have access to this process and can make its decisions
felt. We say the President should be entitled to make certain choices
and then present these as a unified package to the Congress, have the
Congress debate it, make its decisions, pass the necessary appropria-
tions as they see fit, alter the legislation as they see fit, which is then
sent back to the President; and we think that this is a proper process.
Senator CASE. This is the way things go, but there is an important
gap. We almost always do not have sufficient information, as to what
went into the establishment of the priorities in the budget case—for
the upping of this and the lowering of that. And no, you can’t ask the
Office of Management and Budget why a certain priority was fixed.
It just doesn’t work that way. You know it doesn’t.
CASE OF DR. EISSINGER
Take the case of Dr. Kissinger. He is a great fellow, one of the
ablest men who ever held public office or taught in a college; but he
is just a human being. We can ask him to our homes; we can talk
with him informally in his office or even in some neutral ground lik
the Supreme Court Building or the Supreme Court Room. He will
talk to us very frankly, and nobody even asks him what he told the
President or what the President told him.
PROBLEM OF BEING SUBJECT TO PERSONALITIES
Senator PERCY. Would you yield at that point, Senator Case?
My problem with that very point is that we are subject to the good
sense, the good judgment, the reasonableness of Dr. Kissinger in this
case. He is an eminently reasonable man who is so objective that h
can walk in our shoes and can appreciate our problems. But what if
he were like a lot of other people I have known—some Republicans,
some Democrats—who are very arbitrary and who don’t even under-
stand the Constitution.
We have to deal in universal principles down here, regardless O
Administration. Our problem is we are too subject to personalities
in this case we have three eminently reasonable men; we have no prob

27
lem in working out over a period of time some accommodation so that
we can fulfill our responsibility, but what if you have three guys you
can’t get at all, who just sit there and say, “You can’t get at us; we are
immune”? Then what do you do?
RIGHT OF PRESIDENT TO RECEIVE CONFIDENTIAL ADVICE
Mr. CARLUCCI. Senator, I think the issue has to be looked at in terms
of how our system functions and less in terms of personalities. I would
argue that the President has a right to receive confidential advice and
have that advice held confidential.
Senator PERCY. Absolutely.
Mr. CARLUCCI. The President, of course, is accountable every four
years. The cabinet members must come up and explain the Presiden-
ial decisions and priorities that have been set as best they can and if
heir explanations fall short, Congress can then work its will. But I
do not think that anybody should be required to testify, for example,
on what specifically they told the President and what the President
aid. - -
Senator PERCY. No one is asking that.
SIZE OF ADVISORY OEPERATION
Senator CASE. I think it depends on who they are; I wouldn’t even
ay nobody. Believe me, I wouldn’t say nobody. I certainly think the
resident is entitled to have a small group of advisors of great com-
etence to whom he can go in complete confidence. But I am less sure
hen he builds his advisor corps up to an agency, as in the case of Dr.
issinger's staff. How many people are working for him?
Mr. CARLUCCI. We have requested 79 positions for the Security
ouncil in 1973.
Senator CASE. Well, there are fixed positions and then there are a
Ot of people assigned from other agencies. It is a great big operation.
t isn’t just a little group of people who go into the closet with the
resident and advise him in a very close way. This isn’t, you know,
d hominem at all. It certainly isn’t, so far as I am concerned. I know
he Senator from Illinois feels the same way as does the Senator from
labama. My remarks are not directed against individuals here or the
resent President.
George Washington started the whole mess when he refused to let
he House have information about the Jay Treaty when Congress was
sked to provide the funds for its implementation. He said, “You can’t
have that.” Why, it was the most outrageous decision, it seems to me.
And ever since then, Presidents have felt they had to do as well as
George Washington in dealing with the Congress. Sometimes it wasn’t
so much the Presidents themselves as the people on the President's
staff.
Imagine George Washington getting away with saying to the Con-
gress, “You can’t have this information on which we are.” And he did
it with a straight face on the suggestion, because he was dealing with
a House committee, that he was helping preserve the Senate's preroga-
tives in the ratification of treaties. Even you have to Smile a little bit
about that one.









28
Mr. CARLUCCI. I hope I don’t have to defend George Washington.
(Laughter.)
AGENCY WITH DIRECTOR NOT SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION ON QUESTIONING
's QUESTIONED
Senator CASE. But again you are quite right; these things must all
be handled on the basis of accommodation and reciprocity. Yet that
isn't good enough when you are establishing a structure by statute;
and that is the reason that we have such trouble with the Foreign Eco-
nomic Council. If the President wants to do this thing informally
and have somebody on his staff coordinate information, let him do it.
But to ask us to set up an agency with a director who is not subject to
confirmation or to questioning because he is technically a member of
the President's staff seems to be suggesting something that is an un-
wise further stratification and insulation of Congress from the deci-
Sion-making process.
Mr. CARLUCCI. If I may just comment briefly on that, Senator
Senator CASE. Sure.
Mr. CARLUCCI (continuing). We are not asking the Congress to set
up an agency. We have been asked to testify on a bill that has been
developed up here, which we favor. We initially
Senator CASE. This was set up originally by executive order.
Mr. CARLUCCI. Well, it had been set up; it had been established by
detailing various people from various agencies and it was set up by
Presidential memorandum. We requested that the Congress vote a
resolution authorizing appropriations for it, but a number of people
on the Hill felt it would be better to have a statutory base for the
entity. We, of course, would be satisfied with the resolution.
NEED FOR RESOLUTION
Senator CASE. Why do you need a resolution? - -
Mr. CARLUCCI. We think it would be good to give it the kind of rec-
ognition that the National Security Council and the Domestic Coun-
cil have; and the Domestic Council, for example, was set up by reorga-
nization plan and not by statute.
Senator CASE. Well, it has the effect of statute.
Mr. CARLUCCI. Yes, it has the effect of statute if not overturned.
Essentially, we have a problem of getting appropriations for ex-
penses of the Council's staff, and hence we sought a resolution which
would authorize the needed appropriations and otherwise recognize
the establishment of the council. That is perhaps a fine distinction, but
it is a distinction we are trying to make. -
CONGRESSIONAL NEED FOR RAW MATERIAL TO MEET RESPONSIBILITIES
Senator CASE. I think that is perfectly reasonable. Yet our chairman
and some of us on the committee are especially sensitive to this issue
because of the many ways in which we have run into it. I think this is
the place to stop and have a look.
Can you concede that the director or the head of the agency, or
whatever you call him, can come up to testify and give us the raw

29
material that comes to him on what goes into the policy-making proc-
*SS, in the formation of the options presented to the President? This
is what we want; this is what we need.
How can Congress ever meet its responsibilities in the joint formu-
lating of policy without the same raw material that the President
gets? And we have got to have that. That is the real objective.
Mr. CARLUCCI. With all respect, Senator, I think that is what we do
give you. -
Senator CASE. Why should there be anything available to the Presi-
dent that is not available to Congress?
Mr. CARLUCCI. We would argue that the President is entitled to get
3onfidential advice and then present his
Senator CASE. From a small group of people.
Mr. CARLUCCI (continuing). Then put out the position of the
President.
Senator CASE. But not from the government of the United States
and its far-flung operations all over the world. There is nothing secret
about that, and shouldn’t be. Perhaps you are going to have some kind
f Security question or Some delicate nuance of relationship in a par-
icular instance where confidentiality cannot be avoided, but on the
road sweep of policy Congress ought to have every bit of information
he staff of this agency has.
Now, that is the position in which I believe. Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man, you have been most generous and I hope you got your homework
lone on other matters while we were dealing with these irrelevancies.
Mr. SPARKMAN. I have been reading the discussion in our commit-
tee on this very measure.
Senator CASE. I know.
Senator PERCY. I have further questions when you finish.
Senator SPARKMAN. You go ahead and then I will come in later.
COUNCIL MEETINGS AND WORKINGS
Senator PERCY. Following up what Senator Case asked, I wonder if
you can supply to us either now or for the record how many meetings
he council has held, how many the President has actually chaired,
and what the attendance has been at the council meetings. In other
words, has the Secretary of the Treasury actually attended or has he
sent a deputy. I think it would be quite important if in the working of
he council—and I have no feeling that it would be different under
another Administration—if in effect the working group that attend the
meeting are designees of the Secretaries perhaps Assistant Secretaries.
It is quite different to have the executive director running that opera-
ion when his power and influence over an Assistant Secretary is con-
iderably more than it would be with Secretary Connally or Secretary
Rogers.
º there are frequent meetings then it would suggest that the coun-
ºil really runs the policy. If the meetings are infrequent, I would
udge the staff may run it then because they apparently don’t need
much direction. I would like as much information on the practical
workings of the council as you can give us, to be supplemented in Some
detail by whatever backup material you can provide.
81–190 O—72—2
30
Mr. CARLUCCI. Let me try to answer your specifics. If my memory
Serves me correctly, there have been three meetings of the council
itself, two of which -
Senator PERCY. That is over how long a period of time?
Mr. CARLUCCI. Since its creation in January, 1971.
Two of these meetings have been chaired by the President. In the
President's absence, the meetings are chaired by the vice chairman who
is the Secretary of State.
I think it is perhaps misleading to judge the activity of the council
as a body by the number of cabinet level meetings that have been
held. There is a group known as the Senior Review Group.
Senator CASE. A what?
Mr. CARLUCCI. Senior Review Group, which is generally at the
Under Secretary level or Assistant Secretary level, which has met
Some 16 times, and there are also various operating groups. The major
Operations Group is chaired by Under Secretary Irwin of the State
Department.
TYPES OF MATTERS DISCUSSED AT FULL AND STUBORDINATE MEETINGS
Senator PERCY. What are the differences in type of matters dis-
cussed at the full meetings which are held, say, every six months, and
at the subordinate meetings that are held, let's say, once a month?
Mr. CARLUCCI. Perhaps I had better submit something for the rec-
ord on that, since I have not participated directly in these meetings.
Obviously, those that are presented at the full meetings chaired by the
President are major policy decisions. There are a number of other
decisions, say, on matters related to tariff negotiations or investments
OverSeas, investment policy, which could perhaps be discussed at the
Senior Review Group level. If there is general agreement at that level
with the Under Secretaries speaking for their Secretaries, there may
not be a need for a meeting of the council itself and papers could be
presented to the President with recommendations of the various
agencies.
So I think the nature of the forum or how the forum operates de-
pends on the type of problem that they are looking at; but I would
be glad to submit some illustrative examples of the kind of issues that
the groups may be dealing with. . *
(Information concerning the organization and functions of the
council follows:)
SUMMARY OF ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC PoEICY (SUPPLIED BY OMB)
MEMBERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION OF THE COUNCIL
Members of the Council are: The President; the Secretary of State; the Sec-
retary of the Treasury ; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of Agriculture;
the Secretary of Commerce; the Secretary of Labor; Ambassador at Large David
M. Kennedy ; the Director, Office of Management and Budget ; the Chairman,
Council of Economic Advisers ; the Assistant to the President for National Se-
curity Affairs; the Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs; the Special
Representatives for Trade Negotiations.
In the absence of the President, meetings are chaired by the Secretary of State.
An Executive Director is designated to assist the Council in the operations. A
Small staff serves the Executive Director in fulfilling this assignment.
31
The Executive Director also serves as Assistant to the President for Interna-
tional Economic Affairs and is compensated from the White House Office ap-
propriations account.
OPERATIONS OF THE COUNCIL
The Council meets periodically, as necessary, to fulfill its function. The Execu-
tive Director Of the Council has ready access to the President and is responsible
for Organizing the general secretariat of the Council and for necessary staff work.
In collaboration with the members of the Council or designated individuals at
the Senior political appointee level and pursuant to the directions Of the Presi-
dent, the responsibilities of the Executive Director include:
Develop the agenda and supporting materials for Council meetings and review
all papers going to the Council.
Help develop a sense of direction, strategy and relationship of the parts to
the whole of this problem area.
Establish a work program, including topics, timing and identification of indi-
vidual assignments and set up task groups on special topics.
In addition to his own small staff, the Executive Director may call upon staff
. from throughout the government and is assisted by the following
rganizational apparatuses :
Senior Review Group, Operations Group, CIEP task groups, Joint CIEP/
ational Security Council interdepartmental groups.
enior Review Group
A Senior Review Group of the Council has been established. The Group :
Reviews papers for Submission to the Council. Such review will assure that
issues are fully and objectively stated, that department and agency views are
fairly and adequately set out, that all realistic alternatives are presented, and
that the iSSues require Presidential decision. A paper prepared by the Opera-
tions Group, task groups, or one or more agencies, which requires Presidential
action but which need not be considered by the Council can be COnsidered by the
Senior Review Group and recommendations, based upon this consideration, can
be sent directly to the President.
Acquisition, for implementation or study to the Operations Group or other
task groups Of the COuncil.
The membership of the Senior Review Group consists of the Assistant to the
President for International Economic Affairs, who serves as Chairman of the
Group, and designated representatives of members of the Council at the senior
political appointee level.
Operations Group
An Operations Group, which includes the Executive Director or his representa-
tive and representatives of the various Council members, has been formed.
ReSponsibilities of the Operations Group include the following:
Follow up On decisions reached.
COOrdination of actions Of the GOvernment where that is necessary.
Review of Operating problems arising Out Of actions Of Other governments Or
Dutstanding international economic developments which do not require Con-
sideration at the Council Or Presidential level.
Responsibility for carrying out such studies as are assigned to it.
The State Department chairs the Operations Group Standing Or Special Sub-
BOmmittees are added from time to time.
Task Groups
The Executive Director may form Task Groups to deal with specific problems,
with Staff work performed by the best expertise available. These groups can
and do use the Services of COnSultants from Outside the government, when
appropriate.
Joint CIEP/NSC Interdepartmental Groups
Whenever issues under consideration by NSC interdepartmental groups in-
:lude significant economic issues, the Assistant to the President for Interna-
iOnal Economic Affairs shall be represented. Economic matters within the
purview of the CIEP, formerly treated by the NSC interdepartmental groups,
have become the responsibility of the CIEP, or are handled through joint NSC/
CIEP working groups.




32
WHO SPEAKS FOR ADMINISTRATION ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY
Senator PERCY. In the foreign economic policy area we have acces
to the State Department. We can directly question the Secretary, th
Under Secretary, but when the Administration asked me to under
take the leadership in sponsoring a piece of legislation that would
create a new position of Under Secretary of State for Economic Af
fairs, I had the very strong implication that it felt it had lost so muc
clout in this field that it needed a full-time, statutory Under Secretar
for Economic Affairs, and they were trying to beef up their operatio
because they had lost power.
Do you think when we have an Assistant Secretary or an Unde
Secretary up for questioning, that he does speak for the Administra
tion on international economic policy, or is he constantly subject to the
Secretary of Commerce, or the Secretary of the Treasury who share
a good deal of this power? How do we get at finding out what polic
really is when, for instance, the State Department is saying we should
expand trade and help the developing nations of the world and Secre
tary Stans is in Europe talking about textile protection and quotas
Mr. CARLUCCI. Well, of course, this would be one of the purpose
of the President's report, to lay out the broad policy as established by
the President, and then individual agencies would be available to
discuss with the committee their pieces of that policy implementatio
process.
With regard to your question on Under Secretary of State for Eco
nomic Affairs, I think you and I discussed this informally before you
did introduce the measure.
Mr. PERCY. And I concurred with it. I felt it was essential.
Mr. CARLUCCI. I think this reflects a growing need for the Stat
Department to have a focal point in an area which is becoming in
creasingly important. They are really just modifying their organiza
tion to keep pace with the times, if you will. I would assume that, whe
the Under Secretary is appointed and he comes up before this com
mittee, he will be speaking with full authority. As you are aware whe
we testify on major matters, we attempt to see that they can speak fo
the Administration. The executive level appointee who comes befor
a committee should be in position of speaking for the Administration
and you should be entitled to interpret it that way.
Power OF AND NEED FOR EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Senator PERCY. I have long felt this is a very big problem, and m
feeling goes back many, many years since the time when I testifie
year after year against the protectionist position of our photographi
and instrumentation field, a position I felt was contrary to the na
tional interest. I believed it was up to the companies to adjust, not t
ask the country to adjust. -
So I felt very strongly about it, so strongly that on two previou
occasions when my successor at Bell and Howell, Peter Peterson, was
asked to come to Washington, I said to the board and to him that
didn’t see how he could do it. Why give up the power he had in a grea
company and come down to take a job here that didn’t have muc
power?
























33
But when this job came along, the creation of this council, I said he
couldn’t afford not to come down and help the President bring order
out of chaos in international economic policy. If he could help, Bell
and ºvel Ought to make any adjustment necessary to make that
possible. - - * -
So I have a very deep personal feeling about this and I don’t under-
stimate the power of this particular job and the need for it.
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR'S ACCESS TO ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL
Our job is to find who in the Administration has the clout, who
akes the decisions, whose thinking is important in the process, and
et access to him. That is my whole point, and I wondered if you could
ell us from the standpoint of the question Senator Case asked about
ower and staff, is there any limitation except in the overall appropria-
ion process level, on the power of the council’s executive director to
btain personnel from existing Federal agencies on an unreimbursable
basis? In other words, can he requisition personnel? I do know that
the President has done the best job of any President I know in getting
away from the process of having in the White House full-time, four-
year or eight-year people assigned to other agencies who never show
up in the budgetary process.
But what access does the executive director here have to additional
personnel to help him, and maybe it is not an agency as such, but di-
rectly and indirectly how many people can be muster to get help in
this very complex field?
Senator CASE. The bill provides there may be people who are drafted
On a reimbursable basis; but there is nothing in here about nonreim-
bursable basis. What's the situation on that?
Senator PERCY. Let's have it both ways then, Mr. Carlucci.
Senator CASE. There is no limit on this except the basis.
Senator PERCY. How many can he have on a nonreimbursable basis
and how many on a reimbursable basis?
Mr. CARLUCCI. The President does have authority to request the
agencies to detail people on a nonreimbursable basis to the White
House. Indeed, the 26 members of the present staff of the CIEP are
bn detail from the agencies. However, President Nixon, as you point
but, Senator Percy, has instituted a policy of cutting down on the
nonreimbursable details and presenting a so-called honest budget.
Senator CASE. Honest?
Mr. CARLUCCI. Honest accounting of the White House staff, which
in itself explains some of the misconceptions that seem to exist on this
|SSUI6.
We would envisage that our request for 29 positions, $1.4 million
with a slight expansion in 1974, would satisfy the needs of the council
for staff and for consultants, such consultants as may be used from
ime to time, and there would not be large numbers of people on de-
ail, either reimbursable or nonreimbursable, from the agencies. In-
Heed, I should think that once the organization has the statutory base
ind has a staff of its own, the agencies would justifiably resist any
letail of people, much like they would resist it if OMB would ask
for it. Congress would be able in its oversight review of the agency,
both in the authorization and the appropriation process, to ascertain





34
how many people are being detailed to the White House staff for this
particular function. - - -
But let me repeat, we envisage that the appropriation request thal
was set out in the 1973 budget document for the council will be suffi
cient for its staffing needs and we don’t forsee any need for people tº
be detailed in addition to that. - * ,
ExAMINATION BY APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
Senator SPARKMAN. If you will yield to me there, of course thi:
whole thing is limited to two years and the amount authorized is,
recall, $1.4 million the first year and $1.6 million the second year and
that is simply the authorization. The Appropriations Committee, when
it takes up whether or not it shall approve the full $1.4 million or less
certainly would have the right, and would be expected to go into all o
these things that you mentioned. Then when the second year appro
priation comes up they will have the right to examine what has been
done during the first year. So I don’t see that there is anything for u.
to be afraid of in that connection. . .
Mr. CARLUCCI. We, of course, would be prepared to testify on th
appropriation request as we do on the White House appropriation
request. - , -
* REQUIREMENTS FOR FULL REPORTS TO COMMITTEES
Senator SPARKMAN. In that connection, there has been a lot said
here about Congress having no part to play in this. We discusset
this thoroughly in the Banking Committee and we wrote in require
ments for full reports to our Banking Committee in the Senate, th
Banking Committee in the House, and the Joint Economic Committee
Certainly, based on those reports we could call up the executive direc
tor or any of the staff or any of the members and hear testimony a
to the substance in the report. We can examine it, go into it, brea
it down. I do not subscribe to the idea that the executive director woul
absolutely refuse to come up and appear before the committee. I thin
there would be things that he could testify on and could easily testif
on without invading executive privilege. I want to say to my frien
from New Jersey that, so far as I am concerned, I have never foun
any great fault in this separation of powers. In fact, I rather like it.
think it is something we ought to guard very carefully and I don
know but what we ought to be grateful to President Washington.
Senator CASE. For manythings, but not this. -
Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, and for upholding the right of the Senat
to consider - - |
Senator CASE. He was cute enough. - * -
Senator SPARKMAN. In considering this treaty situation and many.O
these other things we have, I don’t see any of these scarecrows a lo
of people see in this separation of powers. -
_-'
would MR. FLANIGAN APPEAR IF ASKED?
Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, are you saying you have an agree
ment in this case that Mr. Flanigan will appear before the Bankin
Committee if you ask him to come up?









35
Senator SPARKMAN. No, I didn’t say that. I am saying I felt con-
ident he will respond to a request of Congress to appear to testify re-
garding things that are in the report that he submits to us or is sub-
mitted to us by the council or regarding anything else so long as it
loes not infringe upon executive privilege. In other words, if he has
lealings with outside people other than the President, I see no reason
why he should not be willing to respond to
Senator PERCY. Could Mr. Carlucci, on behalf of the Administra-
ion, respond to that and tell us whether your understanding and
feeling would be supported by the Administration, because if that is
Brue we may have come a long way. -
Senator CASE. Would this director be available to appear before Con-
gress in the way a cabinet official does?
Senator PERCY. Not that we don’t enjoy the coffee type of thing.
Senator CASE. Would he or wouldn’t he?
Mr. CARLUCCI. The staff member would be prepared to come up and
estify.
Senator CASE. The staff director?
Mr. CARLUCCI. On the budget; I don’t know who would be the
ppropriate person. I think this would have to be looked at on an ad hoc
asis. I guess it is fair to say that we would have some concern about
he executive director testifying on a continuing basis in terms of what
[ described earlier by a basic change in the organization regarding
his confidential relationship with the President, but I would be
happy to take a look at it.
Senator SPARKMAN. May I say I accepted that?
Senator CASE. Accepted what?
Senator SPARKMAN. Executive privilege.
Senator CASE. Yes, but this is sharpening the issue and it is a very
fair statement. The answer is the director will not be available for
Juestioning, subject to exceptions.
Senator PERCY. I wouldn’t want Senator Sparkman to be under the
mpression he could call him up when he couldn’t.
MR. FLANIGAN's APPEARANCE AT KLEINDIENST NOMINATION HEARINGS
Senator SPARKMAN. Let me recall in the case of the ITT hearings—
well, it was actually confirmation of Mr. Kleindienst—that Mr. Flan-
gan was asked to appear and testify. There was a clear understanding,
n an exchange of letters, as I recall, that he would testify so long as it
lid not infringe upon the executive privilege of the President's office.
Jnder those conditions he appeared and testified.
Senator PERCY. But would you want to go through that same strug-
tle, Mr. Chairman, because there were considerable negotiations and
he power of withholding the nomination was there.
Senator CASE. There was kicking and Screaming; there was no ques-
ion about that. -
Senator SPARKMAN. The precedent has been established.
IAS PRECEDENT BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR MR. FLANIGAN’s APPEARANCE 2
Senator PERCY. You know if Mr. Carlucci would favorably re-
pond that the precedent has been established and Mr. Flanigan would
36
appear without the struggle that ensued then, then I think much h
been accomplished by these hearings. I am not sure he is prepared
commit the Administration.
Senator CASE. He doesn’t want to leave any misunderstanding i
anyone's mind, I am sure.
Mr. CARLUCCI. That's right. We are drawing a parallel with the D
mestic Council and the National Security Council, in which we woul
much prefer to have the informal consultation route and keep the com
mittee informed that way, since we are concerned about inherentl
changing the nature of the organization from a forum to an operatin
entity. . -
DIRECTOR’s AvAILABILITY TO TESTIFY ON ANNUAL FUND REQUEST
Senator CASE. May I ask a question on this? This would be the ge
eral position. How about his availability to testify in support of t
extension of the legislation in his annual request for funds?
...Mr. CARLUCCI. In his annual request for funds, the Domestic Cou
cil, using the same parallel, has sent up a deputy director to testif
Of course, the deputy director of OMB has testified on annual appr
priations requests for the White House in general, and I would er
visage that would be the procedure we would follow in this case.
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR NOT NORMALLY AVAILABLE FOR COMMITTEE
QUESTIONING
Senator CASE. But still your reservation about the breaking down
the position would make the answer to the chairman’s questions tha
he is not available for questioning by the committee or by any congr
sional committee.
Mr. CARLUCCI. The nature of the position is such that we woul
think that he would not normally be available.
Senator CASE. It is only fair to have that on the record.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR QUESTIONED
Senator SPARKMAN. I don’t see any real distinction between the d
rector and the deputy director. If the deputy director comes—
Senator CASE. He is closer to the power. -
Mr. CARLUCCI. Whether it is OMB or not, the deputy director wi
be accountable for the functioning through the annual appropriati
process, and somebody is going to have to testify for the appropriatio
PARALLEL SITUATION OF IMR. RISSINGER
Senator SPARKMAN. By the way, somebody brought in the som
what parallel situation of Mr. Kissinger.
Senator CASE. Why does his name keep coming up?
Senator SPARKMAN. Did you bring it up 2 Maybe Senator Peró
brought it up. -
(Laughter.) - -
Senator SPARKMAN. Anyway, the Senator from New Jersey knows
I am not sure whether or not Senator Percy has been in any of the
meetings—and I know we have had a great many informal meetin

















37
with Mr. Kissinger in which we have discussed quite fully and infor-
hally matters that have taken place. There has been no record made
r anything like that. -
Senator PERCY. There were notes taken.
Senator SPARKMAN. I think rather satisfactorily. What?
Senator PERCY. There were notes taken and that was agreed in the
egotiations that the chief of staff of the committee was authorized
O take notes and to put them in the record so that it was a formalized
rocedure. -
Senator SPARKMAN. I am thinking more of meetings in private
omes and get-togethers here on the Hill.
Senator CASE. Very pleasant, indeed.
Senator SPARKMAN. I don’t believe any notes were made.
Senator CASE. I think almost too pleasant.
Senator SPARKMAN. I know Senator Case has been at many of those
attended.
Senator CASE. Indeed, and I know Senator Percy made it, too, as
young man and he is coming along in great shape, I think.
(Laughter.)
Senator SPARKMAN. So I have always felt there can be maintained
very fine rapport between the executive and the legislative on an
formal basis without destroying the sacredness of the executive
rivilege. I certainly think that we will be able to do the same thing
h this. -
By the way, I found out that in these private meetings with Mr.
Cissinger at first notes were not taken, but in the last two meetings
hey have been taken, submitted to him, cleared and come back in
heir final form. - -
NONAPPEARANCE OF MIR. FLANIGAN TO DEFEND PENDING LEGISLATION
Senator PERCY. Mr. Carlucci, why is it that Mr. Flanigan is not
ere to defend his own budget and this legislation that would estab-
sh a council of which he will be the operating head, while the Presi-
ent clearly has the ultimate responsibility and authority? Again, was
e asked to be here, Mr. Chairman, and, in other words, is this the
rinciple of it, that he will neither be here to support his budget nor
ill he be here to support the way the policy
Mr. CARLUCCI. Well, the answer
Senator SPARKMAN. I want to say Mr. Carlucci is here complying
fith the request from Chairman Fulbright. I don’t know whether
here was any discussion between Senator Fulbright and Mr. Flanigan
r not. Ihad nothing to do with it.
Mr. CARLUCCI. I am not aware of any, but the Office of Management
nd Budget, of which I am the Deputy Director, has basic responsi-
ility for organizational issues in the Federal Government and we have
asic responsibility for the allocation of financial resources. Hence
is quite usual for us to testify on establishing new organizational
ntities. As you are aware, I have been the principal witness on the
dministration side in the President's major domestic reorganization
roposal. So much the same type of situation applies here.

38
QUESTIONING MR. FLANIGAN DIRECTLY ON BUDGET AND COUNCIL
OPERATION
Senator PERCY. If, for instance, the committee wanted to questio
Mr. Flanigan directly on this budget and how the council operate
Will operate, and has operated in the past and will operate in the future
Would there be any reason that he could not come before the commit
tee for that purpose?
Mr. CARLUCCI. We would certainly be prepared to get the committe
all the information it desires. We in OMB would be prepared to
testify; and, as I indicated earlier, I think a precedent has been se
for having someone on the council staff testify on budgetary matters
We would prefer to utilize the informal route that you described earlie
with regard to Dr. Kissinger and that the chairman described just
few minutes ago in connection with contact between the executiv
director and the committee. Our reason for that, as I explained earlier
is to maintain the sanctity, so to speak, of the concept that we ar
developing here of the council as a forum rather than operating entity
Senator PERCY. But we respect virtually everyone in the Senate, an
ticipating he could be in the President’s chair some day, and we re
spect executive privilege. We would not question him on that; he
would not be put in a position where he was revealing confidences, bu
we simply want to know how this council operates, how it comes to it:
decision-making process. My feeling is the public really has a right to
know how its government operates and it should not be done in th
secrecy of my home or Senator Sparkman's home, without notes taken
after a long negotiation. As the principal sponsor for the Administra.
tion’s executive reorganization bills, I respect the Administration fol
having the guts to state that the Ash report—which was a follow-up
certainly of the Heineman report, which came out of the Hoover Com
mission—“We are going to try to fight this through and make this gov.
ernment function.” These three councils that have been established are
So brilliant in concept and so good that they ought not to be made sub.
ject to the whim of any one President. They ought to be embodied i
law and that is what we are trying to accomplish.
PUTTING MAN IN POWERFUL POSITION REMOVED FROM CONGRESSIONAL
INFLUENCE QUESTIONED
But, on the other hand, as we set them up, I am still concerned tha
we would put a man in a very powerful position—and we all agreed
it is a powerful position—and have him totally and completely re
moved from Congress, from the influence of the Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs Committee. It is a policy matter that I struggled with
and the chairman struggled with for four years on the committee t
find out what is right because we have a clear responsibility in the
trade-tariff area, and we should not be deprived of having the direc
views of the one man whose sole job it is to pull all of this together
This Administration has done a great job in making all of this pos
sible now in an orderly fashion but I think it is such a good job
want to be sure we make as much of it as permanent as we possibly can
It is not a slap at the Administration or any lack of respect because
these three men are about as good men as we would ever hope to hav























39
President appoint, but to see whether or not, keeping away from
xecutive privilege and immunity, there are not certain areas where
e Congress has the responsibility to inquire.
MINISTRATION REACTION TO EMIBODYING CONFIRMATION IN LEGISLATION
My only remaining question is if we do embody confirmation in the
gislation, would the Administration feel so strongly that it might
en not ask for or support legislation to make the council statutory,
d would it just operate the council very informally then on funds
at it can find in the budget someplace else but not specifically pro-
ided for this purpose?
MR. FLANIGAN's RESPONSIBILITY
Mr. CARLUCCI. Senator, if I may respond to several of the points you
hade, I share your high regard for Peter Flanigan, but I think to de-
3ribe him as the one man whose Sole responsibility is to pull all these
olicies together and to give orders to the Secretary of State, Secre-
ury of Commerce
Senator PERCY. I didn’t say give orders; I said it is his sole responsi-
ility to pull it all together. Name any other single individual whose
Inction it is in this government to pull all these things together? He
the only one I can name.
Mr. CARLUCCI. Well, there are various—
Senator PERCY. There are various people spending full time, but it
not their responsibility to pull it together from all agencies. It is
heir responsibility in State to do the State end, in Commerce to do the
ommerce end, and Treasury to do the Treasury end; but he is the One
lan, with his staff, who has the job of pulling it all together and he is
he one man, if he is experienced in that field, who could give us the
Bnefit of a tremendous amount of advice, and to whom we who have
Pep feelings in this field should transmit our thoughts and ideas, not
lat he has to take them at all.
Mr. CARLUCCI. I would argue that the one man who pulls it all to-
*ther is the President and -
Senator CASE. He is a single human being and he has a few other
lings to do.
Mr. CARLUCCI. He has the staff assistance available through. Mr.
lanigan and various others in the White House.
REEPING COMMITTEE AND PUBLIC INFORMED
But let me go back to the earlier point you made, Senator, with re-
ird to the public's right to know how this organization operates and
bw it arrives at its decisions.
We agree with that; we are not disputing that concept for one min-
e and we agree that the Congress should know. It is just a question
how the Congress is kept informed that we are discussing and we
i. with an annual report which sets forth the substance of the
)Ilcy.



40
We think that the appropriate people to testify are the member
of the council who are confirmed by the Senate in all but one or tw
cases and who will certainly be available to this committee.
In addition, we will be prepared and when I say we—OMB an
perhaps Somebody on the council—to testify in the approriation º
ess. Obviously if it is all not working two years from now, you hav
got the extension of the authorization which would be considered b
the Congress; so there are a number of opportunities. In the exampl
you take the important matters of East-West trade—well, surely th
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce are the two peopl
most concerned and would be prepared to testify on these issues. S
we do feel that provision does exist for keeping the committee an
the public informed and it is far from our intent to undermine th
kind of process in any way.
ADMINISTRATION OPPOSITION TO CONIFIRMATION
With regard to your final question, which is really the hypothetic
question of what would we do if the Congress chooses to put—I ta
it you are referring to Senate confirmation, testifying, and what woul
be our position—we strongly oppose that. I cannot predict what th
President’s decision would be if the bill should reach him in that form
Onlv he can make that kind of decision. I cannot make it for him.
enator PERCY. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
I thank Mr. Carlucci very much indeed.
Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Case, do you have any further ques
tions? -
REVISION OBLIGATING EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR TO REEP CONGRESS CURRENTL
t INFORMED - -
Senator CASE. Only one: Perhaps you have dealt with this in you
answers to other questions. Isn’t there a provision in here somewher.
which places the obligation on the executive director, to keep Cor
gress currently advised as to the activities of the council'
Mr. CARLUCCI. That provision is not in this legislation. That was i
the letter that was sent to Mr. Weinberger, a suggestion that it b
written in, and I have addressed it in my prepared statement.
Senator CASE. You have? I see, then I will read it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SPARKMAN: Well, thank you very much.
COMMITTEE ACTION
I hope we can hold an executive session tomorrow afternoon fo
the consideration of this. -
By the way, under the mandate under which this was referred t
the committee
Senator CASE. Is this referred to us
Senator SPARKMAN. I asked it be referred because of this.
Senator CASE. Just for advice or do we have
Senator SPARKMAN. I believe it is for advice. I don’t believe it cal
for a separate report. Isn’t that right?

41
Mr. MARCY, No, sir, Senator, I believe it calls for a report and the
9mmittee will need to act and report, with amendments or without.
Senator SPARKMAN. Whatever action the committee takes, it has to
ake not later than Monday.
Mr. MARCY. That is correct.
Senator SPARKMAN. Tomorrow morning we are going to hold further
earings on the strategic arms limitation agreements. We have called
meeting for 2:30 tomorrow afternoon; haven’t we? -
Mr. MARCY. Yes, sir.
Senator SPARKMAN. Two thirty tomorrow afternoon in executive
assion and I hope we will be able to act on both this and on the SAL
greements. So I hope we will have a quorum present and be ready to
Ct. -
I thought holding it at 2:30 and, of course, it will be in this room.
lven with voting going on the Floor, we will be able to get a quorum.
Senator CASE. The chairman is going to be away?
Senator SPARKMAN. I don’t know.
Mr. MARCY. We don’t expect him back before this weekend at the
rliest.
Senator CASE. Has he any comments on this himself?
Senator SPARKMAN. You mean the chairman? Did you read the letter
e wrote Mr. Weinberger? I think he expressed himself quite well in
hat letter. -
Senator PERCY. Is that June 28th’
Senator SPARKMAN. June 28 and it has been made a part of the
scord.
Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Carlucci.
Mr. CARLUCCI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SPARKMAN. We appreciate your patience.
The committee stands adjourned.
(Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the committee adjourned, subject to th
ill of the chair.) -
O
PROHIBITING MILITARY WEATHER
MODIFICATION?

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M§ tº # iſ ºn | 3 ( &
HEARINGS serence
SUBCOMMITTEE k
()0EANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECONI) SESSION
ON
S. Res. 281
EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE THAT THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT SHOULD SEEK THE AGREEMENT OF OTHER
GOVERNMENTS TO A PROPOSED TREATY PROHIBITING
THE USE OF ANY ENVIRONMENTAL OR GEOPHYSICAL
MODIFICATION ACTIVITY AS A WEAPON OF WAR, OR THE
CARRYING OUT OF ANY RESEARCH OR EXPERIMENTATION
WITH RESPECT THERETO
JULY 26 AND 27, 1972
§
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
TJ.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
82–892 WASHINGTON : 1972
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $1.25
DEPOSITED BY THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERRCA
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois
WILLIAM B. SPON G, J.R., Virginia
CARL MARCY, Chief of Staff
ARTHUR M. KUHL, Chief Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT
- - CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island, Chairman
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR., Virginia HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
ARTHUR M. KUHL, Staff Assistant
DAVID KEANEY, Staff Assistant
(II)
C O N T E N T S
Statements by:
Baum, Werner A., president, University of Rhode Island; U.S. repre-
sentative, Panel of Experts on Meteorological Education and Page
Training, U.N.----------------------------------------------- 89.
Falk, Richard A., professor of international law, Princeton Uni-
Versity----------------------------------------------------- 94
Farley, Philip J., Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency------------------------------------------- 29
Forman, Benjamin, Assistant General Counsel, International Affairs,
Department of Defense--------------------------------------- 33
Gude, Hon. Gilbert, a Representative in Congress from the Eighth
Congressional District of the State of Maryland_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 56
MacDonald, Gordon J. F., member, Council on Environmental
Quality----------------------------------------------------- 70
Malone, Thomas F., dean, graduate school, University of Connecticut,
member, NSF Special Commission on Weather Modification----- 80
Pollack, Herman, Director, Bureau of International Scientific and
Technological Affairs, Department of State; accompanied by Carl
F. Salans, Deputy Legal Adviser - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---------- 17
Reed, Dr. Richard J., president, American Meteorological Society;
Department of Atmospheric Science, University of Washington,
Seattle, Wash----------------------------------------------- 87
White, Robert M., Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, Department of Commerce; accompanied by Donald
Moore, Assistant Administrator for Environmental Modification;
and James Brennan, Office of the General Counsel, NOAA_____ _ _ _ 62
Insertions for the record:
Text of Senate Resolution 281, 92d Congress, second session__ _ _ _ _ _ _
Coordinated executive branch comments on Senate Resolution 281-- - -
“Pell Feels U.S. Wages Weather Warfare,” article by Bruce DeSilva,
the Providence Journal, June 26, 1972--------------------------
“Weather War: A Gathering Storm,” article by Victor Cohn, the
Washington Post, July 2, 1972._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ — — — — — — — — — — —
“Scientists Are Critical of Rainmaking in War,” article by John Noble
Wilford, the New York Times, July 3, 1972.__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 12.
“Rainmaking Is Used as Weapon by U.S.–Cloudseeding in Indo-
china Is Said To Be Aimed at Hindering Troop Movements and
Suppressing Antiaircraft Fire,” article by Seymour M. Hersh, the
:
New York Times, July 3, 1972-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 13.
“Pentagon: Weather as a Weapon of War,” article from the New
York Times, July 9, 1972------------------------------------- 16.
Excerpt from testimony of Dr. Pierre St. Amand from “Weather
Modification,” hearings before the Committee on Commerce, U.S.
Senate, 89th Congress, first and second sessions, on S. 23 and S.
2916------------------------------------------------------- 22.
Classification of interagency study report------------------------- 23.
Use of word “eschew’’ in lieu of “prohibit and prevent” ------------ 31
Technical considerations which lead DOD to conduct research on
enhancing growth of cumulus clouds-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 36.
Department of Defense research projects related to weather modifi- 3
cation------------------------------------------------------ 7.
Rationale of DOD selection of committees to be informed concern-
ing weather modification activities and exchange of letters relating
to requested information------------------------------------- 41
Department of Defense response to query concerning melting polar
icecap------------------------------------------------------ 44
IV
Insertions for the record—Continued
Department of Defense response to query concerning weather modifi- Page
cation over Cuba-------------------------------------------- 45
Mission of OL-2 unit at Udorn Air Force Base__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 47
Department of Defense response to query concerning cloud seeding
to dampen demonstrations----------------------------------- 49
Additional questions submitted by Senator Case and responses of
the Department of Defense----------------------------------- 53
Prepared statement of Prof. Richard A. Falk_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 98
Appendix:
Exchange of correspondence between Congressman Gilbert Gude and
Senator Alan Cranston, Members of Congress for peace through law,
and the Department of Defense and the White House concerning
reported military use of weather modification_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 103
“Rainmaking: Rumored Use Over Laos Alarms Arms Experts,
Scientists,” article by Deborah Shapley, Science Magazine, volume
176, June 16, 1972------------------------------------------- 108
“Technology in Vietnam: Fire Storm Project Fizzled Out,” article by
Deborah Shapley, Science Magazine, volume 177, July 21, 1972.__ – 112
Letter to President Richard M. Nixon from Raymond J. Sherwin,
president, Sierra Club, and Marvin L. Goldberger, chairman,
Federation of American Scientists, dated July 20, 1972.__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 114
“Environmental Impact of Modern Weapons Technology in S.E.
Asia,” article by E. W. Pfeiffer and Arthur H. Westing, from En-
Vironment Magazine--------------------------------------------- 115
Additional remarks by Congressman Gilbert Gude regarding Senate
Resolution 281---------------------------------------------- 124
“Geophysical Warfare—How to Wreck the Environment,” article by
Gordon J. F. MacDonald, from “Unless Peace Comes,” Nigel
Calder, editor, the Viking Press, New York City, 1968- - - - - - - - - - - 124
“Environmental Warfare and Ecocide—Facts, Appraisal, and Pro-
posals,” paper by Richard A. Falk, Princeton University_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 133
Statement of Representative Bella S. Abzug---------...------------ 150
Letter to Senator Claiborne Pell from Philip Handler, president,
National Academy of Sciences, dated July 25, 1972._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - 152
Excerpt from first annual report to the President and the Congress
by the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere-- 154
Excerpt from comments and recommendations of the Secretary of
Commerce on the first annual report of the National Advisory
Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere------------------------- 160
U.S. position paper on recommendation III–218, 1972 U.N. conference
On the human environment----------. ------------------------ 161
PROHIBITING MILITARY WEATHER MODIFICATION
WEDNESDAY, JULY 26, 1972
UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS AND
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE
CoMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONs,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room
4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator Claiborne Pell (chairman).
presiding.
Present: Senators Pell and Case.
Senator PELL. The subcommittee will come to order.
OPENING STATEMENT
This morning the Subcommittee on Oceans and International
Environment opens its public hearings on Senate Resolution 281
This resolution expresses the sense of the Senate that the United
States should seek the agreement of other Governments to a proposed
treaty prohibiting the use of any environmental or geophysical
modification activity as a weapon of war. -
A number of Senators have done me the honor of joining with me
in cosponsoring this resolution. -
I offered this resolution because it was becoming increasingly clear
that the potential for offensive military uses of environmental and
geophysical modification is very real. -
There was also a growing concern among knowledgeable members
of the scientific community that development and use of these mod-
ification techniques, without limitation, could have awesome
consequences. - -
(Text of S. Res. 281 and coordinated executive branch comments
follow :)
[S. Res. 281, 92d Cong., second sess.]
RESOLUTION Expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States Government should seek the .
agreement of other governments to a proposed treaty prohibiting the use of any environmental of geo-
physical modification activity as a weapon of war, or the carrying Out of any research or experimentation
with respect thereto - - - º
Whereas there is vast scientific potential for human betterment through environ-
mental and geophysical controls; and
Whereas there is great danger to the world ecological system if environmental
and geophysical modification activities are not controlled or if used indiscrimi-
nantly; and * *
Whereas the development of weapons-oriented environmental and geophysical
modification activities will create a threat to peace and world order; and .
Whereas the United States Government should seek agreement with other,
governments on the complete cessation of any research, experimentation, or
use of any such activity as a weapon of war: Now, therefore, be it -
(1)
2
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the United States Government
should seek the agreement of other governments to the following treaty providing
for the complete cessation of any research, experimentation, and use of any
environmental or geophysical modification activity as a weapon of war:
“The Parties to this Treaty,
“Recognizing the vast scientific potential for human betterment through
environmental and geophysical controls, - -
“Aware of the great danger to the world ecological system of uncontrolled
and indiscriminate use of environmental and geophysical modification
activities,
“Recognizing that the development of weapons-oriented environmental
and geophysical modification techniques will create a threat to peace and
world order,
“Proclaiming as their principal aim the achievement of an agreement on
the complete cessation of research, experimentation, and use of environmental
and geophysical modification activities as weapons of war,
“Have agreed as follows:
“ARTICLE I
“(1) The States Parties to this Treaty undertake to prohibit and prevent, at
º place, any environmental or geophysical modification activity as a weapon
of war;
“(2) The prohibition in paragraph 1 of this article shall also apply to any
research or experimentation relating to the development of any such activity
as a weapon of war;
“(3) The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to assist, encourage or
induce any State to carry out activities referred to in paragraph 1 of this article
and not to participate in any other way in Such actions.
“ARTICLE II
“In this Treaty, the term ‘environmental or geophysical modification activity”
includes any of the following activities: -
“(1) any weather modification activity which has as a purpose, or has as
one of its principal effects, a change in the atmospheric conditions over any
part of the earth's surface, including, but not limited to, any activity designed
to increase or decrease precipitation, increase or suppress hail, lightning, or
fog, and direct or divert storm systems;
“(2) any climate modification activity which has as a purpose, or has as
One of its principal effects, a change in the long-term atmospheric conditions
over any part of the earth's surface; - -
“(3) any earthquake modification activity which has as a purpose, or has
as one of its principal effects, the release of the strain energy instability
within the solid rock layers beneath the earth’s crust; -
“(4) any ocean modification activity which has as a purpose, or has as
One of its principal effects, a change in the ocean currents or the creation of
a seismic disturbance of the ocean (tidal wave).
“ARTICLE III
“Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties
shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this
Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the pro-
visions of the Treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into account any
relevant technological developments in order to determine whether the definition
in Article II should be amended.
“ARTICLE IV
“1. Any Party may propose an amendment to this Treaty. The text of any
proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which
shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so
by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene
a conference to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment.
“2. Any amendment to this Treaty shall be approved by a majority of the votes
of all the Parties to this Treaty. The amendment shall enter into force for all
#. upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the
arties.
3
“ARTICLE V
“1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
“2. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to
withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the
subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the Supreme interests of its coun-
try. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three
months in advance.
“ARTICLE VI
“1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does
not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of
this Article may accede to it at any time.
“2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments
of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Govern-
ments of the United States of America, , and which are hereby
designated the Depositary Governments.
“3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the
Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty.
“4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited sub-
sequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date
of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
“5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and ac-
ceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument
of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and
the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices.
“6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant
to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.”
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., May 15, 1972.
Hon. J. W. Fulb RIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of
March 21, 1972, requesting coordinated Executive Branch comments on S. Res.
281. This resolution would express the sense of the Senate that the United States
Government should seek the agreement of other governments to a treaty providing
for the complete cessation of any research, experimentation and use of any
environmental or geophysical modification activity as a weapon of war. The text
of a draft treaty is incorporated in the resolution.
As recently as March 16, 1972, the President in his message to the Congress on
science and technology has stressed the potential importance of our earthquake
and hurricane research efforts in reducing loss of life and property from natural
disasters. This emphasis is consistent with the view expressed in the resolution that
such activities may contribute to human betterment.
As the Committee is aware, the Executive Branch has conducted a preliminary
inter-agency review of questions related to international aspects of weather
modification. However, this review did not deal fully with several aspects of S.
Res. 281 and questions that arose relating to other important aspects still remain
unanswered. Therefore, the Department is not in a position to comment on the
substance of S. Res. 281 and recommends that the resolution not be adopted at
this time.
The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the
Administration’s program, there is no objection to the submission of this report.
Sincerely yours,
DAVID M. ABSHIRE,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.
REPORTS OF U.S. WIEATHER MODIFICATION OPERATIONS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA
In addition, there have been unconfirmed and unofficial reports that
the United States has or is attempting to manipulate weather in
4
Southeast Asia as a weapon of warfare. These reports have served to
deepen my own concern.
My own concern started before these reports, I may add.
As chairman of this subcommittee, I wrote the Defense Department
on September 23, 1971, requesting specific information about such
activities. That is more than 9 months ago.
fter 4 months of correspondence, which I made public on the floor
of the Senate on January 26 of this year, the Defense Department
declined to answer my questions on the basis that such replies would
threaten the national security.
This response, coupled with the revelations made in recent articles
by several investigative reporters, leaves no doubt in my mind that
the United States has indeed been conducting weather modification
operations in Southeast Asia.
This is a situation which I find extremely distressing. Rainmaking
as a weapon of war can only lead to the development of vastly more
dangerous environmental techniques whose consequences may be
unknown and may cause irreparable damage to our global environ-
ment. This is why the United States must move quickly to ban all
environmental or geophysical modification techniques from the arse-
nals of war.
The United States has been preeminent in the field of meteorology
and has played a leading role in the development of international
scientific collaboration in the area of long-range weather forecasting.
The military use of weather modification techniques could seriously
jeopardize these peaceful scientific programs and could undermine all
future international cooperation on environmental matters.
WHAT TJNITED STATES SHOULD DO
Therefore, it is imperative that the United States enunciate a
national policy on this subject, which would dedicate all environ-
mental and geophysical modification efforts to peaceful purposes.
Instead of its official silence and actions condoning a gradual drift into
environmental warfare, the administration should actively explore
both the advantages of a renunciation of such operations and the pos-
sible benefits stemming from an initiative for a multilateral “no first
use” agreement. In the absence of such a ban, the way has been left
open to the planning, development, and prosecution of deliberate
environmental or geophysical warfare. -
The United States, as Cochairman of the United Nations Disarm-
ament Committee, should take the initiative in framing and introduc-
ing to the committee a broad treaty imposing a prohibition on all forms
of geophysical and environmental warfare. By these actions the United
States would enhance world order and stability, and encourage a
greater sense of openness in the application of new technologies to
environmental problems of global concern.
At this point I would like to have inserted into the record various
newspaper articles from the Providence, R.I., Journal, from the New
York Times, and from the Washington Post.
(The articles referred to follow :)
5
[From the Providence (Rhode Island) Journal, June 26, 1972.]
PELL FEELS U.S. WAGES WEATHER WARFARE
(By Bruce DeSilva)
WASHINGTON.—The Pentagon has the power to change the weather and already
may have used that power to kill and destroy in Southeast Asia.
“I strongly believe clouds have been seeded in Southeast Asia for military
reasons. There is very little doubt in my mind,” Sen. Claiborne Pell said during
an interview in his Washington office last week.
David Keaney, a member of the professional staff of the Senate foreign relations
committee, is less cautious. “I have no doubt at all,” he said.
Senator Pell said he believes the military has been seeding clouds, perhaps be-
ginning as early as 1966, to clear them away from bombing targets in North
Vietnam. He said he also believes seeding with other chemicals has produced
torrential rains. The rains have washed out portions of the Ho Chi Minh Trail
impeding the infiltration of supplies and men from North to South Vietnam, and
caused floods which killed thousands, he said.
Defense Department spokesmen have admitted that they have the capability
to drastically increase rainfall, but in a sharp exchange of letters with Senator Pell
and in a sharp exchange in a Senate foreign relations committee hearing with Sen.
J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, they have refused to confirm, but carefully
avoided denying, that such activities are under way in Southeast Asia.
Beginning in June of last year and lasting well into the normally dry season in the
fall, North Vietnam was devastated by heavy rains, typhoons and floods.
According to reports by Pierre Darcourt, a French journalist, the heavy rains
triggered mud slides, washed away or weakened roads and breached dikes.
The Associated Press reported that flooding destroyed 10 percent of the country’s
rice crop and killed thousands.
North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong, the Christian Science Monitor
reported, said water levels in the entire Red River and Thai Binh River system
rose to “unprecedented levels.” He called the flooding the “worst disaster since
the beginning of the war.”
An act of God? Perhaps.
But Senator Pell said he believes the disaster was merely the most successful
of Pentagon rainmaking efforts in the region.
The best evidence that the Pentagon is altering the weather is provided in brief
remarks in the Pentagon Papers. The significance of the remarks apparently went
largely unnoticed during the furor of other sensational disclosures in the documents.
According to the Gravel edition of the papers, Volume 4, Page 421, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff presented President Lyndon B. Johnson with a memo in 1967
Suggesting that modifying the weather in the region might be one way of widening
the war without creating dissent at home.
The memo stated in part:
“Laos Operations—Continue as at present plus Operation Pop Eye to reduce
trafficability along infiltration routes. Authority/Policy Changes—Authorization
required to implement operational phase of weather modification process previously
successful tested and evaluated in some area.”
Later that year, the President was presented with a list of escalation proposals,
the Papers indicate. The list included the following item:
“Cause interdicting rains in or near Laos.”
Other evidence concerning the rainmaking efforts are circumstantial. -
In March of last year, Jack Anderson, a nationally syndicated columnist,
claimed in his column that the Air Force has been seeding clouds over Laos and
Cambodia since 1967. He said the project went by the code name of “Inter-
mediary-Compatriot.”
Unlike other Anderson columns, such as the one on the ITT memo or the
disclosure of a secret U.S. posture during the India-Pakistan war, this column
went largely unnoticed nationally.
Last Sept. 23, Senator Pell sent a letter to Rady Johnson, assistant Secretary
of defense for legislative affairs, inquiring about “the Air Force weather modifi-
cation activities against the North Vietnamese.” -
The letter, and all subsequent communication, was made public by the Senator
and was inserted in the Jan. 26 Congressional Record.
6
The letter asked the following questions:
“1. What are the objectives of the project known by the code name ‘Inter-
mediary-Compatriot’? -
“2. How long has this project been in existence? Would you provide a rather
detailed description of this project?
“3. In what specific countries is this project conducted? -
“4. What amounts have been spent on this project over the last three years?
“5. Is the Department conducting any similar offense-oriented weather modi-
fication programs? If so, what are the names of these projects and where are they
being conducted?” . -
ANOTHER LETTER
The following day, Mr. Johnson replied, saying the questions had been referred
to the director of defense research and engineering.
After waiting for a response for two weeks, Senator Pell sent another letter to
Mr. Johnson, again asking for a reply to his earlier questions.
On Nov. 23, Mr. Johnson sent the senator a lengthy reply.
The reply stated in part that “the possibilities inherent in weather modification
techniques to support military operations have been the subject of discussion for
more than 20 years. For a number of these years, the Department of Defense has
been conducting several modest research and development programs relating to
various forms of weather modification.”
In the letter, Mr. Johnson stated that research has been undertaken for “the
suppression of hail and lightning (to reduce damage to military property and
equipment and to increase safety of operations) and the dissipation of fog at air-
ports and within harbors (to enhance operations of safety of aircraft and ships.)”
“RELATIVELY SIMPLE”
The letter added that “One example of fruitful field research has been the in-
vestigation of precipitation augmentation. . . . When the proper meteorological
conditions prevail (that is, when clouds capable of producing natural rain exist) it.
is a relatively simple matter to increase the amount of rain which will fall. The
amount of increase is frequently of the order of 30 to 50 per cent.”
Mr. Keaney said some scientists have told him the increase could actually be
ten or 20 times that. However, he noted, a 50 per cent increase in the monsoon
rains of Southeast Asia can have a tremendous impact.
Mr. Johnson’s letter noted that in 1969, the Department of Defense, at the
request of the Philippines, conducted a six-month rainmaking project on the
Philippine Islands to relieve a drought. “The Philippine government considered
the undertaking so successful that they have subsequently taken steps to acquire
an independent capability,” the letter added.
“I trust,” the letter closed, “that the foregoing information will be helpful
to you and regret the delay in responding to your inquiry.”
QUESTIONS UN ANSWERED
But the letter did not answer a single one of Senator Pell’s questions.
Senator Pell sent a letter to Defense Secretary Melvin Laird on Dec. 3 stating
his dissatisfaction with Mr. Johnson’s letter and requesting “a written response
to the specific questions.” -
Mr. Laird referred the letter to John S. Foster Jr., director of defense research
and engineering, who sent a written reply to Senator Pell on Dec. 16. -
“Certain aspects of our work in this area are classified,” Mr. Foster's letter
said. “Recognizing that the Congress is concerned with the question of the military
application of weather modification technology, I have, at the direction of Secre-
tary Laird, seen to it that the chairmen of the committees of Congress with pri-
mary responsibility for this department’s operations have been completely in-
formed regarding the details of all classified weather modification undertakings
by the department. . -
“RESPECTFULLY DECLINE”
“However, since the information to which I refer has a definite relationship to
national security and is classified as a result, I find it necessary to respectfully
decline to make any further disclosures of the details of these activities at this
time.” -
Senator Pell said he understood the letter to mean that only Sen. John Stennis,
D–Miss., and Rep. F. Edward Hébert, D-La., the chairman of the Senate and House
armed services committees, had been briefed on the matter.
7
The briefings were confidential and make it impossible for those two legislators
to discuss the matter even if they want to.
Senator Pell said he has been offered a classified briefing but has declined to
accept it because it would limit his ability to ask Defense Department officials
probing questions about the project at future Senate hearings and limit his
freedom to speak out on the subject.
LARGELY UN NOTICED
When Mr. Laird appeared before the foreign relations committee in April to
testify concerning renewed bombing of the North, Senator Pell and Senator
Fulbright questioned him briefly on weather modification. The exchange went
largely unnoticed in the press.
Senator Pell asked Mr. Laird if the United States had engaged in rainmaking
activities “for military reasons in Southeast Asia.”
Mr. Laird replied, “I don’t discuss the operating authority that we go forward
with as far as Southeast Asia, specifically, but I would be glad to discuss with you
the techniques that have been used outside the battle zone.”
Senator Fulbright asked, “Why do you decline to discuss weather control
activities in North Vietnam, yet you freely discuss B-52 flights over North
Vietnam?”
After a brief exchange between Mr. Laird and Senator Fulbright, Mr. Laird
said, “We have never engaged in the type of activity over North Vietnam.”
Senator Pell said last week that Mr. Laird carefully limited his response to
“activity over North Vietnam.” It would be expected that clouds would be seeded
over Laos or Cambodia or over the Tonkin Gulf, depending on the time of year,
rather than over North Vietnam, Senator Pell added.
The senator said the Defense Department has been “extremely sensitive” to
questioning about weather modification and that information about it has been
difficult to get.
Such an operation is easy to keep secret, because three men in a small plane are
all that is needed to carry it out. Large numbers of men need not be involved, the
senator said.
Senator Pell said one indication that the Pentagon is involved in weather modi-
fication over Vietnam is the United States’ decision to torpedo a resolution on
weather modification at the United Nations Environmental Conference in Stock-
holm earlier this month. -
A resolution on the question required that before taking any action that might
have an effect on the climate, a government should evaluate the change that
could occur and disseminate its findings.
“IT GIVES THEM AN ouT’’
The United States succeeded in amending the agreement to say that informa-
tion will be disseminated ‘‘to the maximum extent feasible.”
“It gives them an out. They can say that dissemination is not feasible for secu-
rity reasons,” Senator Pell said.
Fearful that the Pentagon's tinkering with natural phenomenon may not be
limited to make rain, Senator Pell has prepared a draft of a treaty that would ban
all weather and climate modification activities as weapons of war.
On March 17, he introduced a resolution in the Senate stating that it is “the
sense of the Senate” that such a treaty be negotiated. Among its 14 sponsors are
Senators Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, George McGovern of South
Dakota, and Hubert H. Humphrey, Minnesota.
“When I proposed the seabed treaty (banning nuclear arms from the ocean
floors), a string of ABM’s along the Atlantic Ridge and creepy crawlers (tank-like
weapons that would crawl along the ocean floor) were on the drawing board at the
Pentagon.” Senator Pell said.
CAN LEAD TO DISASTER
Weather modification is also “a weapon that can lead to disaster,” he said.
If the Pentagon can make rain, is it also trying to develop ways to divert ty-
phoons to the shores of other nations or cause earthquakes? the senator wondered.
Without a treaty banning such activities, an inland nation could melt the
antarctic ice (which can be easily done by sprinkling soot on it according to scien-
tists) and raise the level of the sea by 300 feet, he said.
8
Senator Pell referred to an article by Gordon J. F. McDonald, a member of the
Council for Environmental Quality in the Nixon administration, which was printed
in 1968 in a book titled “Unless Peace Comes.”
... In the article, Mr. McDonald said weather and climate modification “might be
Carried out covertly since nature's great irregularity permits storms, flooding,
earthquakes, and tidal waves to be viewed as unusual but not unexpected.”
OR EVEN IS NOWN
“Such a secret war will never be declared or ever known by the affected popula-
tion. It could go on for years with only the security forces involved, being aware
of it,” the article stated.
“These are the kinds of weapons I don’t want to see developed,” Senator Pell
Said, adding that the Soviet Union is doing research on weather and climate
modification.
Senator Pell said he plans hearings on his resolution and treaty late next month
Or in August.
He said he expects to have “some exciting witnesses” for the hearings and hopes
the hearings will “flush out” the truth concerning Pentagon weather modification
activities.
[From the Washington Post, July 2, 1972]
WEATHER WAR: A GATHERING STORM
(By Victor Cohn)
Technological America, that accomplished laser-radar-electronic warrior, has
been learning to use still another remote-control weapon: control of the weather
for military purposes.
Indochina—by the evidence of a long-ignored passage in the Pentagon Papers—
has been a test battleground, the site of purposeful rain-making along the Ho Chi
Minh trails. Some accusers, going further, hold American rain-makers responsible
for the flood disasters that struck North Vietnam last year.
How much there is past a hard kernel of truth behind an array of increasingly
serious accusations is unclear. Yet the very possibility that there has been serious
weather war—as well as the emerging fact that the Pentagon has been systemati-
cally developing a rain-making capability—is enough to chill many scientists.
These scientists include fearful prophets who warn of future “geophysical
warfare”—wars waged by adjusting, changing, modifying and ultimately de-
spoiling the air, water and earth.
They also include a growing number of weather-modifiers, scientists interested
in the peaceful uses of seeding clouds, modifying hurricanes or preventing hail to
help farmers and everyone else.
OPERATION POP EYE
The term “seeding” simply means making the proper clouds yield rain, or de-
structive force, by bombarding them with silver iodide particles. The particles
act as condensation nuclei around which moisture can form. The would-be cloud
engineers want to develop such programs through international cooperation, be-
cause both weather and weather modification ignore borders.
Weather modification, these men believe, is on the verge of huge advances, and
needs only a period of concentrated research, in a framework of interstate and
international rules.
But “if it turns out that the U.S. has militaristic uses for weather modification,”
one weather scientist maintains, “international weather programs would drop
dead.”
A prominent White House scientist, Dr. Gordon J. F. MacDonald, geophysicist-
member of the President’s three-man Council on Environmental Quality, is among
those who believe it is important for 11ations to agree not to wage weather war-
“before,” as he put it, “it becomes a reality.”
Sen. Claiborne Pell (D–R.I.) is prominent among members of Congress who
believe it has become a reality. “There is very little doubt in my mind,” he says.
Rep. Gilbert Gude (R—Ma.) states: “There's no doubt in my mind that it's going
on in Vietnam.”
9
“I think there's no doubt rain-making was used in Laos on the trail,” says a
Senate committee aide well versed in defense affairs. “And I think there's little
doubt that it has been used fairly recently; that is, in 1971.”
Such use, in 1971 or otherwise, may have been only sporadic, several sources
believe. “Otherwise,” said one, “a lot more people would have known about it
long ago.” ... "
It is a “successful” pre-1967 use, sometime in the years of Vietnam escalation,
possibly in 1966, that is documented in the “Senator Gravel” edition of the
Pentagon Papers. In late February, 1967, this document discloses the Joint
Chiefs of Staff prepared a list of “alternative strategies’’ for President Johnson.
One, titled “Laos Operations,” read: . .
“Continue as at present plus Operation Pop Eye to reduce trafficability along
infiltration routes . . . Authorization required to implement operational phase
of weather modification process previously successfully tested and evaluated in same
area.” (Italic added.) .
In 1967—according to columnist Jack Anderson, who published the first
allegation of Indochina rain-making—U.S. forces started secret Project Inter-
mediary Compatriot “to hamper enemy logistics . . . (with) claimed success in
creating man-made cloudbursts . . . (and) flooding conditions” along the Ho
Chi Minh trails, “making them impassable.”
“CLASSIFIED’’ work
Senator Pell, most persistently, and Rep. Gude and Sen. Alan Cranston (D-
Calif.), on behalf of Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, have showered
the Pentagon with inquiries since Anderson published his charges in March, 1971.
Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and Director of Defense Research and Engineer-
ing John Foster have repeatedly replied (to quote Laird): “Some aspects of our
work in this area have a definite relationship to national security and are classified
accordingly.” *.
In April, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright
(D-Ark.), pressed further, asking Laird: “Why do you decline to discuss weather
control activities in North Vietnam, yet you freely discuss B-52 flights over Viet-
nam?” Laird replied blandly, “We have never engaged in that type of activity
Over North Vietnam.” -
Fulbright failed to go on to ask Laird about Laos or Cambodia or the Gulf of
Tonkin, where some Vietnam weather originates. “He just didn’t follow up on
that question,” one of his staff explains. “He was trying to cover a whole range of
things.”
The Defense Department freely reports that it has “field capabilities” for
making rain. It used them in the Philippines in 1969, in a six-month “precipitation
augmentation project” at the Philippines request; in India in 1967, at a similar
invitation; over Okinawa and Midway islands, and in June, July, and August
1971, over drought-stricken Texas, at the urgent request of Gov. Preston Smith.
Pierre Saint-Amand, head of earth and planetary sciences for the Naval Ord-
nance Laboratory at China Lake, Calif., led the Philippine Project, which that
government considered highly successful. The India and Midway tries failed for
lack of suitable clouds. But the Texas effort, by Air Force crews, was “remarkably
successful,” in Saint-Amand's view. -
Navy rain-makers are currently involved in two long-range California pro-
grams—one over the Pacific off Santa Barbara, an attempt to increase rainfall
over a national forest; the other over the Central Sierras to try to increase the
snow-pack for electric utilities that depend on water power. -
Air Force weather modifying is done by Air Weather Service, working out of
Scott Field, East St. Louis, Ill., with participation by the Environmental Tech-
nology Applications Center at Suitland, Md. Operations over Indochina are flown
out of Udorn Air Force Base, Thailand, says a Senate source.
“None of the weather research work in the entire DOD is classified,” Saint-
Amand adds—the word research should be noted here. “Our labs are open to
anyone who wants to come and see what we’re doing.” Chief Scientist John N.
Howard of the Air Force's Cambridge Research Laboratories at Bedford, Mass.,
made a similar statement. The Defense Department’s Advanced Research Proj-
ects Agency (ARPA) likewise reports conducting only unclassified research.
An ARPA study called Nile Blue has been cited by some of the military’s ac-
cusers as prime evidence of nefarious DOD rainmaking. Actually, Nile Blue
is a study by computer of how purposeful or accidental man-made changes might
10
affect the globe's year-to-year climate rather than the day-to-day conditions
called weather.
Nile Blue has been funded this year at $2.5 million but will rise to $3.1 million
in fiscal 1973, with use of a new super-computer, Illiac IV, designed at the Uni-
Yºy of Illinois and now being installed at Ames Research Center, Moffett Field,
alif.
Defending the project, ARPA Director Stephen J. Lukasik told the Senate
Appropriations Committee in March: “Since it now appears highly probable that
major world powers have the ability to create modifications of climate that might
be seriously detrimental to the security of this country, Nile Blue . . . was estab-
lished in FY 70 to achieve a U.S. capability to (1) evaluate all consequences of
a variety of possible actions . . . (2) detect trends in the global circulation which
foretell changes . . . and (3) determine if possible, means to counter potentially
deleterious climatic changes . . .”
“What this means,” Lukasik explains, “is learning how much you have to tickle
the atmosphere to perturb the earth’s climate. I guess we’d call it a threat assess-
ment.” -
A VISION OF ECO CIDE
How might such changes be made by one country desiring to harm another?
The highly respected Dr. MacDonald, who will leave the White House soon to
teach at Dartmouth, wrote a 1968 warning against geophysical warfare, titled
“How to Wreck the Environment.” On weather war in Indochina, he now says
only, “I wouldn’t know about that.” But melting the Arctic ice cap by some
means, he conjectured in 1968, might be one future way in which a land-locked
equatorial country could flood the world's coastal cities while insuring itself a
temporate climate with abundant rainfall.
“As economic competition among many advanced nations heightens,” he
warned, “it may be to a country’s advantage to ensure a peaceful natural environ-
ment for itself and a disturbed environment for its competitors. Operations . . .
might be carried out covertly . . . The years of drought and storm would be at-
tributed to unkindly nature and only after a nation were thoroughly drained
would an armed takeover be attempted.”
Far-fetched? Short-term rain-making—which MacDonald in 1968 called only
a “future” military possibility—already seems an easier, if capricious, weapon.
“When the proper meteorological conditions prevail (that is, when clouds
capable of producing natural rain exist),” Laird told Sen. Pell in a November
letter, “it is a relatively simple matter to increase the amount foſ rain which will
fall. The amount of increase is frequently of the order of 30 to 50 per cent.”
Laird carefully added: “Massive downpours have not been produced, and
theoretical knowledge at hand indicates that this will probably always be the
case.” This, if oblique, seemed to quarrel with the allegations that the 1971
North Vietnam floods had been produced by the Pentagon. Pell, however, main-
tains that U.S. cloud-seeding produced the floods, which he says killed thousands.
“IT IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE”
Robert M. White, the nation’s chief weather man as director of the Commerce
Department’s National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
declined to discuss military matters in an interview. But to the question, “Could
cloud seeding cause flooding?” he—unlike Laird—said, “Yes, it is entirely possible
to get heavy rains out of certain clouds.”
“In the past decade,” White added, “there has been a considerable change of
view in the scientific community on weather modification. I think most knowl-
edgeable people would agree that we have primitive capabilities for modifying
certain weather patterns. And it is reasonable now to look to possible development
of more sophisticated ones.”
Among patterns that can “predictably” be modified, he said, are: cold fog (which
can be cleared from airfields); cumulus clouds (most common in the tropics—“In
Florida,” White said, “we have been able almost at will to make them grow
explosively”); orographic clouds (moist air moving up over mountains—“At the
right temperature you can begin thinking of milking them for water”) and hail-
storms (which can often be suppressed, according to recent claims by the Russians,
who fire silver iodide into them from rockets and artillery).
11
Beyond these, there are storms like hurricanes—a Hurricane Agnes, for ex-
ample—which cannot yet be reliably suppressed, “but for which we have some
encouraging results,” in White's view.
All in all, he sums up, “We’re beginning to move from a situation where every-
thing that happens in the atmosphere is an act of God to where some things are
an act of man.”
THE MORAL ISSUE
What perturbs many scientists is the morality of using such “acts of man”
for military purposes.
The Navy’s Saint-Amand emphatically does not see turning weather into a
weapon as something inherently evil. “If you estimate the amount of damage
done by impeding someone's transportation versus blowing or burning them up,
I don’t think it is so immoral,” he told Science magazine.
Most scientists, left-wing and establishment, seem to disagree.
The Science for Vietnam, Chicago Collective—a radical anti-war group of
scientists and students who first spotted the passage in the Pentagon Papers—
charges: “The U.S. government has embarked on a totally new and insidious
form of warfare . . . (that) could disrupt the economy and Social structure of a
small country; it could create famine . . .”
University of Connecticut Graduate Dean Thomas Malone, chairman of the
National Academy of Sciences’ Weather Modification Panel, likewise says: “I’m
opposed to it.” He urges a treaty that would not merely ban weather war but go
on to encourage international weather modification “in a positive way.” A 1971
Academy study urged the United States to sponsor a United Nations resolution
dedicating all weather modifying to peace.
Unless nations do this, Malone told Science, “we will face horrendous political
problems—putting the genie back in the bottle.”
Pell argues that present military activities “could very well lead to another
international arms race.” “The use of rain-making as a weapon of war can only
lead to the development of vastly more dangerous environmental techniques,”
he says. “We must move quickly to place weather, climate and geophysical modi-
fication off limits.”
Joined by 13 colleagues (Mc Govern, Humphrey, Case, Cooper, Cranston,
Hart, Hughes, Javits, Kennedy, Mondale, Nelson, Tunney and Williams), he
has proposed a Senate resolution urging that the United States seek a treaty to
bar both weather war and research into it. As chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee’s international environment Subcommittee, Pell will try to
smoke Laird out further at upcoming hearings, perhaps this month.
LACK OF RIESPONSE
The administration, too, may be considering the Subject. But how seriously
it is doing SO is unsure.
The Pentagon's Foster told Gude that the National Security Council Under
Secretaries' Committee “at the request of Dr. Kissinger is currently meeting to
formulate a definitive national policy. Presumably this policy, when completed,
will be announced to the nation in some appropriate fashion.”
The NSC unit involved is headed by Herman Pollock, the State Department's
director of international scientific affairs. He reports that it has considered only
peaceful weather-making, not military.
Pell is undiscouraged by lack of administration response So far to the pleas
that it support his proposed treaty, or that the President declare that the United
States will never be first to wage weather war.
“I remember what happened five years ago when I first introduced a draft
treaty to ban nuclear weapons from the seabed,” he says. “I got rather unreal
executive branch comment, just as we're getting now. But I knew very well that
a strip of missiles along the Atlantic ridge and ‘creepy crawlers'—tank-like
underwater missile carriers—were on the drawing board at the Pentagon.
“I see the same process now. I think that given a few years, we'll get Some
sort of treaty here, too.”
Of all fields of science, Dean Malone has said, none has produced more world
cooperation than meteorology. “What a tragic reversal it would be if we started
using our knowledge to beat one another over the head.”
12
[From the New York Times, July 3, 1972]
SCIENTISTS ARE CRITICAL OF RAINMAKING IN WAR
(By John Noble Wilford)
After years of rainmaking experimentation, scientists are still not sure they
understand the short-term effects of cloud-seeding, much less the possible long-
term impact on the ecology of a region or the entire world.
This uncertainty has led to increasing concern among scientists over the use
of weather modification as an instrument of warfare.
Dr. Matthew Meselson, professor of biology at Harvard University, was
quoted in the June 16 issue of the magazine Science as saying:
“It is obvious that weather modification used as a weapon of war has the
potential for causing large-scale and quite possibly uncontrollable and unpre-
dictable destruction. Furthermore, such destruction might well have a far greater
impact on civilians than on combatants. This would be especially true in areas
where subsistence agriculture is practiced, in food-deficit areas, and in areas
subject to flooding.”
ISSUE RAISED RECENTILY
The issue has also been raised in recent months by the National Academy of
Sciences, on the floor of the United States Senate and at the international environ-
mental meeting at Stockholm last month.
Recognizing the many potential problems, the national academy issued a
statement last year urging the Nixon Administration to sponsor a United Nations
resolution “dedicating all weather modification efforts to peaceful purposes and
establishing, preferably within the framework of international nongovernmental
scientific organizations, an advisory mechanism for consideration of weather-
modification problems of potential international concern.”
Senator Claiborne Pell, Democrat of Rhode Island, and 13 other Senators
recently filed a resolution calling on the United States to join in a treaty outlawing
“any use of any environmental or geophysical modification activity as a weapon
of war, or the carrying out of any research or experimentation with respect
thereto.”
But, during the Stockholm conference, the United States delegation was instru-
mental in inserting a weakening clause in a recommendation calling for all gov-
ernments to “carefully evaluate the likelihood and magnitude of climactic effects”
from weather modification and to disseminate their findings.
Tſ. S. SPONSORS STUDY
The weakening clause included the words, “to the maximum extent feasible.”
Officials later acknowledged that possible military use of weather modification
was the basis for the amendment.
However, the Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency is
sponsoring research to determine how much and what kind of tinkering with the
atmosphere is required to disturb the climate on a global scale—an indication
that the Pentagon is not sure of the ecological impact of weather warfare.
The Defense Department acknowledges that it conducted “precipitation aug-
mentation projects” in the Philippines in 1969, in India in 1967, over Okinawa.
and the Mid islands in 1971 and in Texas last summer—all at the request of the
governments involved.
The results were mixed—success in the Philippines and Texas, but not else-
where. Other tests over the years have failed to increase rainfall, or else failed to
convince meteorologists that the rains would not have fallen without human
intervention.
But tests in Florida, in 1968 and 1970, led civilian scientists to conclude that
clouds seeded with silver iodide crystals rained more than three times as much as
unseeded clouds. The experiment, conducted by the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration, produced “explosive” growth of rain clouds.
CONTROWERSY REMAINS
While conceding that “there’s still quite a bit of controversy over whether your
seeding caused rain or not,” Ferguson Hall of the agency’s Office of Environ-
mental Modification said yesterday in a telephone interview from his Rockville,
Ma., office: “We seem to be on the verge of having convinced ourselves rain-
making will work in certain cases.”
13
Rainmaking research primarily involves experiments in seeding clouds with
silver iodide, dry ice, common salt and other chemicals that can act as condensa-
tion nuclei. The Federal Government is spending about $20-million annually on
weather-modification research.
There are two types of clouds, warm and cold, and thus two processes by which
seeding is believed to trigger rainfall.
In 1946, the first American experiments in cloud seeding, by Vincent J. Schaefer
of the General Electric Research Laboratory in Schenectady, were aimed at
supercooled clouds. From an airplane, Mr. Schaefer dropped three pounds of dry
ice (frozen carbon dioxide) into clouds to create billions of glistening ice crystals.
MOISTURE TO ICE
Dry ice—or silver iodide, which is more commonly used today—turns moisture
in the clouds to ice crystals that grow larger and larger until they are heavy enough
to fall as either rain or Snow. 4.
Silver iodide is ordinarily used as the seeding agent because its crystals are
similar to those of ice and it is more effective in causing supercooled water drops
to freeze.
In warm clouds, salt or silver iodide particles can cause moisture to coalesce
into water droplets large enough to fall as rain. This would be the type of experi-
ments that could be effective in tropical or semitropical areas, such as Southeast
Asia.
The type of seeding agent that could cause a highly acidic rainfall, as reported
in Southeast Asia, has not been disclosed. Civilian scientists are loathe to discuss
the possibility, except to note that the method has a name—hygroscopic seeding.
Most cloud-seeding operations are conducted by airplane—the C-130 in
Vietnam. But small rockets can also be used to deliver the seeding agent.
gº-
[From the New York Times, July 3, 1972]
RAINMAKING IS USED As WEAPON BY U.S.–CLOUD-SEEDING IN INDOCHINA. Is
SAID TO BE AIMED AT HINDERING TROOP MOVEMENTS AND SUPPRESSING
ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE
(By Seymour M. Hersh)
WASHINGTON, July 2.-The United States has been secretly seeding clouds
over North Vietnam, Laos and South Vietnam to increase and control the rainfałł
for military purposes.
Government sources, both civilian and military, said during an extensive series
of interviews that the Air Force cloud-seeding program has been aimed most
recently at hindering movement of North Vietnamese troops and equipment and
suppressing enemy antiaircraft missile fire.
The disclosure confirmed growing speculation in Congressional and scientific
circles about the use of weather modification in Southeast Asia. Despite years of
experiments with rainmaking in the United States and elsewhere, scientists are
not sure they understand its long-term effect on the ecology of a region.
SOME OPPOSED PROGRAM
The weather manipulation in Indochina, which was first tried in South Vietnam
in 1963, is the first confirmed use of meteorological warfare. Although it is not
prohibited by any international conventions on warfare, artificial rainmaking has
been strenuously opposed by some State Department officials.
It could not be determined whether the operations were being conducted in
connection with the current North Vietnamese offensive or the renewed American
bombing of the North.
EFFECTIVENESS DOUBTED
Beginning in 1967, some State Department officials protested that the United
States, by deliberately altering the natural rainfall in parts of Indochina, was
taking environmental risks of unknown proportions. But many advocates of the
operation have found little wrong with using weather modification as a military
Weapon.
“What’s worse,” one official asked, “dropping bombs or rain?”
82–892—72 2
14
All of the officials interviewed said that the United States did not have the
capability to cause heavy floods during the summer in the northern parts of
North Vietnam, where serious floods occurred last year.
Officially, the White House and State Department declined comment on the
use of meteorological warfare. “This is one of those things where no one is going
to say anything,” one official said. --
Most officials interviewed agreed that the seeding had accomplished one of its
main objectives—muddying roads and flooding lines of communication. But there
were also many military and Government officials who expressed doubt that the
project had caused any dramatic results.
The sources, without providing details, also said that a method had been
developed for treating clouds with a chemical that eventually produced an acidic
rainfall capable of fouling the operation of North Vietnamese radar equipment used
for directing surface-to-air missiles.
In addition to hampering SAM missiles and delaying North Vietnamese infiltra-
tion, the rainmaking program had the following purposes:
—Providing rain and cloud cover for infiltration of South Vietnamese com-
mando and intelligence teams into North Vietnam.
—Serving as a “spoiler” for North Vietnamese attacks and raids in South
Vietnam.
—Altering or tailoring the rain patterns over North Vietnam and Laos to aid
United States bombing missions.
—Diverting North Vietnamese men and material from military operations to
keep muddied roads and lines of communication in operation.
REYED TO MONSOON
The cloud-Seeding operations necessarily were keyed to the two main monsoon
seasons that affect Laos and Vietnam. “It was just trying to add on to something
that you already got,” one officer said.
Military Sources said that one main goal was to increase the duration of the
Southwest monsoon, which spawns high-rising cumulus clouds—those most
susceptible to cloud-seeding—over the panhandle areas of Laos and North
Vietnam from May to early October. The longer rainy season thus would give
the Air Force more opportunity to trigger rainstorms.
“We were trying to arrange the weather pattern to suit our convenience,”
said one former Government official who had detailed knowledge of the operation.
According to interviews, the Central Intelligence Agency initiated the use of
cloud-seeding over Hue, in the northen part of South Vietnam. “We first used that
stuff in about August of 1963,” one former C.I.A. agent said, “when the Diem
regime was having all that trouble with the Buddhists.”
“They would just stand around during demonstrations when the police threw
tear gas at them, but we noticed that when the rains came they wouldn’t stay on,”
the former agent said. -
“The agency got an Air America Beechcraft and had it rigged up with silver
iodide,'. he said. “There was another demonstration and we seeded the area. It
rained.
A similar cloud-seeding was carried out by C.I.A. aircraft in Saigon at least
Once during the summer of 1964, the former agent said.
EXPANDED TO TRAIL
The intelligence agency expanded its cloud-seeding activities to the Ho Chi
Minh supply trail in Laos Sometime in the middle nineteen-sixties, a number of .
Government Sources said. By 1967, the Air Force had become involved although,
as one former Government official Said, “the agency was calling all the shots.”
º assumed the agency had a mandate from the White House to do it,”
he added.
A number of former CIA and high-ranking Johnson Administration officials
depicted the operations along the trail as experimental.
The art had not yet advanced to the point where it was possible to predict
the results of a Seeding operation with any degree of confidence, one Government
official said. “We used to go out flying around and looking for a certain cloud
formation,” the official said. “And we made a lot of mistakes. Once we dumped
seven inches of rain in two hours on one of our Special Forces camps.”
Despite the professed skepticism on the part of some members of the Johnson
Administration, military men apparently took the weather modification pro-
gram much more seriously.
15
According to a document contained in the Pentagon papers, the Defense
Department's Secret history of the war, weather modification was one of seven
basic options for Stepping up the war that were presented on request by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to the White House in late February, 1967.
The document described the weather program over Laos—officially known as
Operation Pop-Eye—as an attempt “to reduce trafficability along infiltration
routes.’
It said that Presidential authorization was “required to implement operational
phase of weather modification process previously successfully tested and evaluated
in same area.” The brief Summary concluded by stating that “risk of compromise
is minimal.”
A similar option was cited in another 1967 working document published in
the Pentagon papers. Neither attracted any immediate public attention.
The Laos cloud-seeding operations did provoke, however, a lengthy and bitter,
albeit secret, dispute inside the Johnson Administration in 1967. A team of State
Department attorneys and officials protested that the use of cloud-seeding was a
dangerous precedent for the United States.
“I felt that the military and agency hadn’t analyzed it to determine if it was in
our interest,” one official who was involved in the dispute said. He also was
concerned over the rigid secrecy of the project, he said, “although it might have
been all right to keep it secret if you did it once and didn’t want the precedent
to become known.”
The general feeling was summarized by one former State Department official
who said he was concerned that the rainmaking “might violate what we considered
the general rule of thumb for an illegal weapon of war—something that would
cause unusual suffering or disproportionate damage.” There was also concern
he added, because of the unknown ecological risks.
A Nixon Administration official said that he believed the first use of weather
modification over North Vietnam took place in late 1968 or early 1969 when rain
was increased in an attempt to hamper the ability of antiaircraft missiles to hit
American jets in the panhandle region near the Laotian border.
Over the next two years, this official added, “it seemed to get more important—
the reports were coming more frequently.”
It could not be learned how many specific missions were carried out in any year.
One well-informed source said that Navy scientists were responsible for developing
a new kind of chemical agent effective in the warm stratus clouds that often
shielded many key antiaircraft sites in northern parts of North Vietnam.
The chemical, he said, “produced a rain that had an acidic quality to it and it
would foul up mechanical equipment—like radars, trucks and tanks.”
“This wasn’t originally in our planning,” the official added, “it was a refine-
ment.’
Apparently, many Air Force cloud-seeding missions were conducted over
North Vietnam and Laos simply to confuse or “attenuate’—a word used by many
military men—the radar equipment that controls antiaircraft missiles. The
planes used for such operations, C-130's, must fly at relatively slow speeds and
at altitudes no greater than 22,000 feet to disperse the rainmaking chemicals
effectively.
A number of officials confirmed that cloud-seeding had been widely used in
South Vietnam, particularly in the north along the Laos border. “We tried to use
it in connection with air and ground operations,” a military officer explained.
One Government official explained more explicitly that “if you were expecting
a raid from their side, you would try to control the weather to make it more
difficult.” This official estimated that more than half of the actual cloud-seeding
operations in 1969 and 1970 took place in South Vietnam.
Much of the basic research was provided by Navy scientists, and the seeding
operations were flown by the Air Weather Service of the Air Force.
By 1967, or possibly earlier, the Air Force flights were originating from a special
operations group at Udorn air base in Thailand. No more than four C-130's,
and usually only two, were assigned in the highly restricted section of the base.
IEach plane was capable of carrying out more than one mission on one flight.
One former high-ranking official said in an interview that by the end of 1971 the
program, which had been given at least three different code names since the middle
nineteen-sixties, was under the direct control of the White House.
Interviews determined that many usually well-informed members of the
Nixon Administration had been kept in the dark.
In the last year, there have been repeated inquiries and publicly posed questions
by members of Congress about the weather modification programs in Southeast
16
Asia, but no accurate information has been provided to them by the Department
of Defense.
“This kind of thing was a bomb, and Henry restricted information about it to
those who had to know,” said one well-placed Government official, referring to
Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security.
Nonetheless the official said, “I understood it to be a spoiling action—that this
was descriptive of what was going on north of the DMZ with the roads and the
SAM sites.”
Another source said that most of the weather modification activities eventually
were conducted with the aid and support of the South Vietnamese. “I think we
were trying to teach the South Vietnamese how to fly the cloud-seeding missions,”
the Source Said.
It was impossible to learn where the staffing and research for the secret weather
operation were carried out. Sources at the Air Force Cambridge Research Labora-
tories at Hanscomb Field in Bedford, Mass., and at the Air Weather Service
headquarters, while acknowledging that they had heard of the secret operation,
said they had no information about its research center. -
One Government Source did say that a group was “now evaluating the program
to see how much additional rain was caused.” He would not elaborate.
[From the New York Times, July 9, 1972]
PENTAGON: WEATHER As A WEAPON OF WAR
WASHINGTON.—Dr. Gordon J. F. MacDonald, a prominent geophysicist who
had just completed a tour as vice president of the Defense Department’s Institute
of Defense Analysis, published in 1968 a little-noted but chilling study on the
military potential of meteorological warfare. He listed a number of options avail-
able to those who would choose to tamper with nature. Among them:
Altering the world’s temperature by rocketing materials into the earth's upper
atmosphere to either absorb light (thereby cooling the surface below) or absorb
outgoing heat (thereby heating the Surface below). This technique could be
targeted at a specific area.
Triggering tidal waves by Setting off a series of underground explosions along
the edge of the Continental Shelf, or by producing a natural earthquake. A guided
tidal wave could be achieved by correctly shaping the energy-release sources.
Changing the physical makeup of the atmosphere by creating, with a rocket or
similar weapon, a “hole” in the important ozone layer between 10 and 30 miles up
that is responsible for absorbing much of the ultra-violet light cast from the sun.
Without the protective layer of Ozone, a molecular form of oxygen, the radiation
would be fatal to all human, plant and animal life that could not take shelter in
the affected area below.
Dr. MacDonald (who is now a member of the White House Council on Environ-
mental Quality) made it clear that his essay was based only on speculation. Last
week, however, it became known that at least part of his macabre weather arsenal
had been secretly in use by the United States since the 1960’s.
Air Force planes, supported by the Central Intelligence Agency, have been
waging a systematic war of rain on the infiltration trails of Laos, Cambodia,
North Vietnam and South Vietnam. The intent: suppress enemy antimissile fire,
provide cover for South Vietnamese commando teams penetrating the North and
hinder the movement of men and materiel from North Vietnam into the South.
The first experimental rain-making mission was flown by the C.I.A. in South
Vietnam in 1963, but it was not until 1965 that a group of Air Force scientists
officially was ordered to start thinking of ways to turn nature into a military tool.
“We all sat down in a big brain-storming session,” said one of the scientists who
participated at the Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories at Hanscomb
Field near Bedford, Mass. “The idea was to increase the rain and reduce the
trafficability in all of Southeast Asia.”
Within a year, the Air Force and C.I.A. began a highly Secret rain-making project
over the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, known as “Operation Pop-Eye.” There were
heated protests from the State Department, and eventually a directive from the
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara ordering a halt to the project. Instead,
well qualified sources said last week, “it went underground—into the dark.”
From 1969 through at least early this year, weather warfare was a covert
operation being directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with White House
acquiescence.
17
The fact that the program existed at all came to light only last week in The
New York Times. But, despite an extensive investigation, if could not be learned
how successful the program had been, how many missions were conducted or
whether it was still being used in connection with the heavy bombing of North
Vietnam that followed the enemy offensive last April.
Making rain has long been technically feasible. Scientists have learned that
rain fall can be increased by as much as 40 per cent after seeding clouds by air-
craft with silver-iodide particles. Other chemicals, including dry ice, also have
been used with success, both in the United States and in Southeast Asia.
Military and Government specialists acknowledge that there is little precise
scientific knowledge of the short-range impact of cloud seeding and practically
none of the long-range ecological effect of changing the amount of natural rainfall.
Some scientists have published data, suggesting that weather modification, in
combination with other ecological stresses such as air pollution and pesticides,
may have a synergistic effect—that is, result in collective changes far greater
than either abuse would have caused by itself.
In Indochina, where heavy bombing already has robbed much of the landscape
of its natural water-holding capability by destroying foliage and trees, artificially
induced rains may result in far greater flooding than expected, along with heavier
Soil erosion.
Technically, there are no international agreements outlawing such warfare.
But Government officials made clear last week that the weather-making activity
of the Air Force was shielded from public view because of White House sensitivity
to what could be regarded as the impropriety of the action. The issue, one well-
informed official said, was one in which Henry A. Kissinger, the President’s
national-security adviser, took a personal hand. “This kind of thing was a bomb,”
tººl said, “and Henry restricted information about it to those who had
to know.
Senator PELL. I hope that these hearings, today and tomorrow, will
generate the action necessary to further this objective. We are pleased,
therefore, to have before us this morning Mr. Herman Pollack who
will present the Department of State's position.
I welcome Herman Pollack as an old friend and colleague in the
days when I used to be in the Department, but I would also express a
certain disappointment that the Secretary or the Under Secretary did
not see fit to come and discuss the subject themselves. This is no
personal reflection on Mr. Pollack, but I think it might have been
more helpful to the committee if a witness of Mr. Alexis Johnson's
level of responsibility had come forward.
I welcome Mr. Pollack as an old friend. I am glad he is here.
Would you like to proceed, Mr. Pollack?
STATEMENT OF HERMAN POLLACK, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF INTER-
NATIONAL SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL AFFAIRS, DEPART-
MENT OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY CARL F. SALANS, DEPUTY
LEGAL ADVISER
Mr. POLLACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My presentation this morning will first recount the interest and
actions of the Department of State in recent years regarding policy on
weather modification, a topic central to the resolution which is the
subject of this hearing. Against that background I will then comment
on the broader scope of the resolution.
STATE DEPARTMENT APPROACH TO NEW TECHNOLOGIES
The State Department follows closely the development of all new
technologies which appear to have the potential of impacting on the
international affairs of the United States.
18
Quite frequently, when a new branch of technology is in its early
developmental phase, it is not possible to define with any precision its
future impact, much less to be sure whether its impact will be primarily
beneficial or primarily harmful. At early stages of development, the
facts necessary to make such a judgment are simply not at hand.
Under the circumstances, the formulation of general policy is prema-
ture and we establish a “watching brief.” When the development of
the technology reaches an appropriate stage, the Secretary’s attention
is drawn to it and the analysis and formulation of policy gets seriously
underway.
The State Department approach to weather modification has
followed essentially that pattern. Parenthetically, I might say that
the art—if I may call it that—of climate, earthquake or ocean modifi-
cation is not yet at a point where even a “watching brief,” as we use
the term, is in order. These are areas of great paucity of scientific data
and understanding.
DEVELOPMENTS CAUSING ESTABLISHMENT OF WATCHING BRIEF
Returning now to weather modification, as you know experiments
on the modification of clouds through seeding with various agents
started shortly after the end of the Second World War and by the
early 1960's it seemed likely that this technology, when further
developed and when more answers were known, might some day
produce vast benefits through enhancing rainfall and might also pose
new tasks in international relations. At about the same time, the first
efforts to moderate the intensity of hurricanes through seeding were
initiated. It was these developments, nearly 10 years ago, that
caused the State Department to establish its watching brief on
weather modification; and responsibility for maintaining this brief
was assigned to the Bureau which I head.
DEVELOPMENTS IN 1968 TO 1970 PERIOD
In the period 1968 to 1970 several developments occurred which
made it clear that weather modification was progressing beyond the
early experimental phase and was approaching the stage where at
least a few types of human intervention in weather processes might
well be approaching operational status. Among these developments I
will mention three in particular: - -
The studies of the Department of Interior showed that proper
seeding of winter clouds might enhance the Snow-pack in the Colorado
River Valley by perhaps 20 or 30 percent. Such an achievement would
enhance the fresh water available in the whole river valley during the
Spring and Summer months. -
The experiments of Dr. Joanne Simpson and her associates at the
NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) labora-
tory in Miami produced manifold increases in the rainfall from
isolated tropical cumulus clouds.
The experiments known as “Project Stormfury” aimed at modera-
tion of violent hurricanes appear to have produced their first sub-
stantially positive results in a series of experiments on Hurricane
Debbie of 1969.
y
19
REPLACEMENT OF WATCHING BRIEF BY MORE ACTIVE STUDY
This combination of events provided us with some of the informa-
tion needed for the development of policy to control or facilitate the
impact of this new technology. I have at hand the memorandum
which I sent to Secretary Rogers on November 16, 1970, informing
him that the time had come for the watching brief on weather modifi-
cation to be replaced by a more active study of the implications for
our foreign policy. It reported that:
. . . U.S. scientists who have heretofore been very cautious and guarded in
their assessment of progress in this field are now showing visible signs of excite-
ment at recent events. This is especially so with regard to the highly successful
seeding of cumulus clouds in tropical areas for the purpose of increasing rainfall.
Equally a source of excitement is the mounting evidence that the force of hur-
ricanes and typhoons can be lessened by seeding techniques.
Clouds and storms are unconscious of sovereignty. International law on weather
modification is practically nonexistent. The problems that operational weather
modification technology will pose to this Department and the foreign offices of
the world are therefore self-evident.
Steps are underway to set up intra-Department and interagency committees
to develop plans and policies for the international reception of this new technology.
Shortly thereafter, in a statement to the House Committee on
Science and Astronautics, Secretary Rogers made particular mention
of weather modification as a potential boon in assisting the economic
problems of the developing nations. He also pointed to the need to
consider international arrangements to deal with the applications
of this new phenomenon. I was pleased to note, Mr. Chairman, that
you quoted this section of Secretary Rogers' statement in your speech
on the Senate floor last March 17.
CONCLUSIONS OF INTERA GENCY STUDY.
The interagency study to which I referred in my memorandum to
the Secretary got underway in the spring of 1971. The study which
was completed earlier this year came to certain conclusions regarding
civilian aspects of weather modification.
The objective of our programs is to advance civilian weather
modification research and development efforts and to apply this
technology for human benefit. To this end, we will further inter-
national cooperation and understanding in this rapidly developing
field and conduct our programs with maximum openness and within
the framework of clear safeguards designed to protect the interests of
the United States and of other countries. With regard to assisting
other countries, we will consider each request on the basis of its own
merits. We will not, in any case, encourage activities involving a high
risk of damage or where the effects cannot be foreseen with reasonable
a SSUIT alſ) Cé.
Although the science of weather modification is still experimental
and at an early stage in its development, the U.S. Government will
maintain continuing review of the international aspects of weather
modification generally.
The Department of State, with appropriate interagency support, is
instituting and overseeing implementation of appropriate guidelines
for U.S. activities, will review any requests from other countries for
assistance in weather modification activity, and will report on policy
issues as the need develops. -
20
As was indicated in Mr. Abshire's letter of May 15, 1972, to Senator
Fulbright, the study came to no conclusions with respect to inter-
national agreements on military aspects of weather modification.
CLIMATE MODIFICATION
With respect to climate modification, we shall continue research in
this area in the hope that there may be a potential for human benefit.
However, no climate modification experiment will be conducted until
we can predict its total impact with great assurance and, of course, no
such activity would be conducted without thorough consultations
among interested agencies and approval at the highest levels of Govern-
ment. I might observe that it goes without saying that the administra-
tion would not use techniques for climate modification for hostile
purposes even should they come to be developed.
NOT ADOPTING SENATE RESOLUTION 281 RECOMMENDED
In summary, with respect to Senate Resolution 281 and simply
stated, we believe that there is at present too much uncertainty about
essential facts and that the factual basis itself is insufficient to make
possible any fundamental decisions on whether a treaty dealing with
military aspects is feasible and desirable. For example, how could we
verify suspected violations or monitor compliance by other signatories
of an international agreement prohibiting the use of weather modifi-
cation, much less climate, earthquake, or ocean modification about
which we know next to nothing? Furthermore, how could we dis-
tinguish between weather modification research and development
which is directed toward military application and that which is to be
used for purely civilian purposes, since the techniques involved may
be the same?
Relevant questions such as these will have to be answered, through
further study and research, before it is possible to formulate a solid
basis for decisions on issues such as are raised by Senate Resolution 281.
It is therefore our conclusion that actions such as those recommended
in Senate Resolution 281 are premature. Accordingly, the Department
of State recommends that this resolution not be adopted.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I will be pleased to
respond to questions.
I am accompanied by Mr. Salans, of the Office of Legal Adviser.
Senator PELL. Thank you very much for a very clear statement of
unclear intentions.
I appreciate the position in which you are. In going through your
statement, I made a couple of notes as we were moving along.
REASON FOR NOT MENTION ING U.S. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
You said:
In the period 1968 to 1970 several developments occurred which made it clear
that weather modification was proceeding beyond the early experimental phase and
was approaching the stage where at least a few types of human intervention in
Weather processes might well be approaching operational status.
I believe at that time the Department of Defense was conducting
weather modification activities in Southeast Asia.
21
Are you free to say why these operations were not mentioned in
your statement?
Mr. Poll ACK. Mr. Senator, in his letter to Senator Cranston and
Congressman Gude of March 18, Secretary Laird indicated there were
some aspects of the work of the Department of Defense which had a
definite relationship to national security and possible uses of weather
modification which were classified accordingly.
Therefore, I regret that I am unable to discuss the question which
you have raised.
TERMS OF REFERENCE OF INTERAGENCY STUDY.
Senator PELL. You mentioned an interagency study, which I believe
you chaired. Could you give us the terms of reference of that study?
Could you describe it to us?
Mr. Poli,ACK. I am afraid that the terms of reference of the study
or its content would have to be considered as internal executive
branch documents. I don’t believe I can make those available.
Senator PELL. I realize that, but could you outline them to us for
the committee? You are dealing with the subject of the broad range
of weather modification. Without going into the question of executive
privilege or classification, could you give us an idea of the broad
outline of that study?
Mr. PollACK. I think the nature of the conclusions that I describe
beginning on page 5 do indicate the subject matter that was covered
within the study.
Senator PELL. But you would not be free in an open session to give
us any more of the actual terms of reference that were given to you
for conducting that study?
Mr. Poll,ACK. I do not believe so.
POTENTIAL SERIOUSINESS OF PROBLEM
Senator PELL. In view of your capacity as chairman or as Director
of the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs
of the Department, do you believe that this type of warfare is a poten-
tially serious problem?
Mr. Poll.ACK. I believe that the statement that I read with respect
to weather modification would clearly indicate that my answer is in
the affirmative.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CLIMATE AND WIEATHER MODIFICATION
Senator PELL. Incidentally, in connection with that statement, I
was most struck by your phrase:
I might observe that it goes without saying that the administration would not
use techniques for climate modification for hostile purposes even if they should
come to be developed.
What, in your view, is the difference between climate modification
and weather modification?
Mr. Poli,ACK. I think the basic distinction that I would make and
that most others make is that climate modification is generally thought
of as long-term, not in terms of years or decades but possibly centuries.
22
The extent of climate modification is generally conceived of to be
widespread, not involving a limited area but areas occupied by one,
two, three, or numerous nations.
Weather modification is transitory, temporary, and limited in its
geographic impact.
WOULD ADMINISTRATION ESCHEW WEATHER MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES.”
Senator PELL. In other words, the phrase you are using here is
carefully chosen. It would not apply to weather modification. You
are saying specifically climate modification?
Mr. Poll,ACK. This phrase relates to climate modification as I
have described it; yes.
Senator PELL. You would not be willing to make the statement that
the administration would eschew techniques for weather modification
for hostile purposes?
Mr. PollACK. No; this statement, sir, is directed toward climate
modification.
(Committee staff note: An excerpt from the testimony of Dr. Pierre
St. Amand during hearings entitled, Weather Modification, Hearings
before the Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, 89th
Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions on S. 23 and S. 2916, bills relating to
weather modification, Part 1, ’’ follows:)
STATEMENTS OF COMDR. PAUL T. JoBGENSON AND DR. PIERRE ST. AMAND,
GEOPHYSICS GROUP, NAVAL ORDNANCE TEST STATION, CHINA LAKE, CALIF.
Dr. ST. AMAND. The Naval Ordnance Test Station began work in weather modi-
fication in 1961 taking advantage of the fact that we have an almost unique posi-
tion in the country to do development work in the production of nuclei for cloud
seeding. The original work depended on an invention by a pair of chemists who
worked there—a Dr. Burkhart and Dr. Finnegan—in which they developed a
method for producing a reaction from silver iodide or lead iodide smoke. As time
has gone by the program has expanded. The number of things we now produce for
weather modification has greatly increased and the scope of our interest has
increased.
Primarily the work is aimed at giving the U.S. Navy and the other armed forces,
if they should care to use it, the capability of modifying the environment, to their
own advantage, or to the disadvantage of an enemy. We regard the weather as a
weapon. Anything one can use to get his way is a weapon and the weather is as
good a one as any.
COMPOSITION OF INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE
Senator PELL. Going back to the interagency committee which you
chair, would you be free to discuss the composition of the committee,
the membership of it?
Mr. PollACK. To the best of my recollection, the membership con-
sists of those agencies who are, of course, members of the National
Security Council. I would have to check back. I am sure the Depart-
ment of Commerce was represented, which is not ordinarily a member
of the National Security Council. I would have to check whether there
were any other agencies. This would mean State, Defense, and all the
other agencies that are members of the NSC ordinarily, plus the De-
partment of Commerce. -
23
REPORT PRODUCED BY WITNESS’s COMMITTEE
Senator PELL. You say your committee did produce a final report?
Mr. Poll,ACK. I beg your pardon?
Senator PELL. Did your committee produce a final report?
Mr. Poll,ACK. We produced a report. I am hesitating on the use of
the term “final,” because the subject is under continuing review.
Senator PELL. The date was May 1972?
Mr. Poli,ACK. That may be right. It was completed earlier this year.
Senator PELL. Would you be free to tell us the classification of that
report?
Mr. Poll,ACK. I frankly don’t recall.
Senator PELL. But it is classified? You are sure of that?
Mr. Poll,ACK. I assume it was, sir.
Senator PELL. If it was not classified, could we have it included in
the record?
Mr. PollACK. It was classified.
Senator PELL. Maybe the attorney could recall if it was top secret.
Mr. Poll,ACK. I simply don’t recall the classification.
Senator PELL. I wonder if you can submit the classification for the
record.
Mr. Poll,ACK. I should think so.
Senator PELL. Would that be proper?
Mr. Poll,ACK. We will examine whether we can.
Senator PELL. You can’t make a commitment that you will let us
know the classification of the report?
Mr. POLLACK. I think we can.
(The information referred to follows:)
CLASSIFICATION OF INTERAGENCY STUDY REPORT
(Supplied by Department of State)
The classification of the report was confidential.
Senator PELL. I thank you very much. -
Did your report take into account the current belief that the United
º is engaging or has engaged in weather modification in Southeast
S18,
Mr. Poll,ACK. Senator Pell, I regret I will have to return to the earlier
statement, that this was an internal executive branch document, and I
am not at liberty to reveal its contents.
STUDY'S CONSIDERATION OF MILITARY USES OF WEATHER
MODIFICATION DOUBTED
Senator PELL. Not having had, as you know, a briefing on this
subject, though I believe this information should be in the public
domain, I consider myself a little freer in that regard. I have reason
to believe that you did not consider the military uses of weather
modification as reported.
I guess I am getting into very complicated points here, but bear
with me for a moment. Presuming I am correct and you did not have
access to its current military uses, would you be able to give me any
easºns as to why you think you were not given access to its military
U1S6S
24
Mr. Poll,ACK. Senator, I am afraid I didn’t follow that.
Senator PELL. It is very complicated. I have reason to believe that
your study did not get into the military uses of weather modification,
that you were not given access to it. Would you be able to confirm
that statement in any way?
Mr. PoELACK. Senator, the study did get into military uses.
Senator PELL. It did?
Mr. PollACK. Yes.
Senator PELL. I am not only delighted, but interested.
Mr. Poll,ACK. I should really say military aspects rather than
military uses. We did cover the military as well as the civilian.
Senator PELL. The military and civilian aspects?
Mr. POLLACK. The study came to no conclusions, as I stated earlier,
with respect to international agreements on military aspects.
SAFEGUARDS RELATING TO U.S. INTERESTS
Senator PELL. In your statement, you say, “To this end we will
further international cooperation and understanding in this rapidly
developing field and conduct our programs with maximum openness
and within the framework of clear safeguards designed to protect the
interests of the United States and of other countries.” What do you
mean by the phrase, “within the framework of clear safeguards
designed to protect the interests of the United States”?
Mr. Poll,ACK. Among the safeguards that would relate to the in-
terests of the United States would be the liability provisions.
Senator PELL. The what?
Mr. Poll,ACK. The liability, safety from liability claims. We are
here discussing conducting a program internationally. We have re-
ceived a request from the Azores, just 10 days ago, and a program is
currently underway at the request of the Portuguese Government to
try to augment the rain in a drought-ridden area of the Azores.
Protecting the interests of the United States in that case would be,
No. 1, to make sure that we are satisfied that there would be no risk
to the environment or ecology of the area or to third parties; second, to
be fairly confident that we knew what the consequences of our seeding
would be and that we were not engaging in a completely speculative
activity.
The third factor, and there may be others, would have been the
one I mentioned earlier of protecting ourselves from any liability,
requesting the Portuguese Government to take on that responsibility
if they wished this service.
OVERSEEING IMPLEMENTATION OF APPROPRIATE GUIDELINES
Senator PELL. Then you say that the Department of State, with
appropriate interagency support, is instituting and overseeing imple-
mentation of appropriate guidelines for U.S. activities, to review any
requests. -
Does this mean overseeing implementation of appropriate guide-
lines for U.S. activities both of a civilian and military nature or only
of a civilian nature?
Mr. PoELACK. The paragraph you read is a further discussion of the
civilian aspects of weather modification.
25
Senator PELL. You would not be instituting or overseeing implemen-
tation of appropriate guidelines of all activities? - - *
Mr. PoELACK. I think the question of whether that would go
beyond civilian returns to the earlier position I took with respect to
the national security aspects of military activities, and I simply cannot
go into that. -
Senator PELL. I realize we are dancing around on the head of a pin,
but we have all this secondary evidence or information that leads one
to believe military activities are being engaged in. I don’t think there
is a person in this room who doesn’t. -
I would hope eventually that this fact could be brought into the
open, but this is a decision of the executive branch.
PARALLEE, OF DIRAFT SEAT3EDS TREATY
Returning to more general questions in connection with my pro-
posed treaty, I would draw a parallel between it and a draft treaty
in the form of a resolution introduced some years ago that would
have prohibited nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the
seabed and ocean floor, 70 percent of the earth's surface.
I can remember the immediate response of the executive branch,
then under President Johnson's guidance, was very much the same
as now, rather unenthusiastic or nonresponsive with regard to these
possible weapons systems. - -
At that point, these weapons systems were only on the drawing
boards, the ABM's for the mid-Atlantic seabed floor, and were not
in use in any way.
But the men in the Pentagon, and presumably in the Kremlin,
wanted to have their options kept open and wanted no part of an
agreement which would eschew the use of these weapons. After 5
years, I had the satisfaction of seeing an agreement concluded pro-
hibiting such weapons on the seabed floor.
Fortunately, these drawings have remained drawings. The problem
now is that we are talking about weapons systems that are, in my view,
in being, not just on the drawing boards. That is why I hope that the
5-year lag it took to bring forth an agreement with regard to weapons
on the seabed floor would be shorter in this case. -
STATE DEPARTMENT POSITION ON AGREEMENT PROHIBITING
ENVIRONMENTAL WAR FARE
In connection with that, what are the considerations in favor of an
international agreement prohibiting the use of environmental warfare?
Do you have a general view in the Department with regard to a
general prohibition on using environmental warfare as a means of
warfare? - - -
Mr. Poll,ACK. Could you be a little clearer as to what you mean by
environmental warfare? :
Senator PELL. What are the considerations in favor of an interna-
tional agreement prohibiting the use of environmental warfare?
I am not saying you approve of it, but what is your own position as
director of the scientific branch? What are the elements in favor of
such an agreement along the lines that we Senators have proposed?
26
Mr. Poll,ACK. Sir, if you are talking about environmental warfare,
I fear I need to know more precisely what we are talking about.
Senator PELL. We are talking about weather modification, geo-
physical modification. I am talking about these uses of weather modi-
fication techniques.
Mr. Poll,Ack. The general position that we have tried to reflect
in this statement is that we simply at this point do not have enough
data on hand to know what a prudent posture for the United States
to take would be with respect to international arrangements, be they
treaty or others, with respect to the subject of your resolution.
CONSULTATION UNDER STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATIONº. 218
Senator PELL. Some of us were at the Stockholm Conference on
International Environment. I think it was one of the most significant
conferences in which this Nation has engaged for a long time.
At that conference there was a recommendation, No. 218, which
had to do with whether the eschewing of weather modifications should
exist. It was pretty well gutted by the United States inserting the
phrase that we would only consult with other nations when we engaged
in weather modification techniques “to the maximum extent feasible.”
I was wondering if you would let us know under what circumstances
would it not be feasible for the U.S. Government to report its weather
modification activities. I add that the phrase “to the maximum extent
feasible” was inserted at the request of the executive branch at that
conference.
Mr. Poll,ACK. May I say a word or two about that?
Senator PELL. Certainly. -
Mr. Poll,ACK. There were two clauses in the proposed recommenda-
tion. The recommendation was No. 218. The first clause recommended
that governments “carefully evaluate the likelihood and magnitude of
climatic effects and determine their findings before embarking on such
activities.” The phrase, “to the maximum extent feasible” relates to
that clause. -
The second clause recommended that governments “consult fully
other interested states when activities carrying a risk of such effects
are being contemplated or implemented.” The phrase “wherever
practicable” related to the second clause.
Senator PELL. In other words, the “feasible” relates only to the
first clause—to carefully evaluate the likelihood and magnitude—but
not to the second one—to consult fully?
Mr. Poll,ACK. Yes; “to the maximum extent feasible was inserted”
at the recommendation of the United States. It was made in advance
of the conference. It was to amend the verb “disseminate.”
This is a rather common problem with respect to the obligation as
to how far you have to go in making documents and data available to
how many different nations, and so forth. I don’t know what the legal
term would be, but in my judgment it would be a clause of reason.
Senator PELL. Am I correct in saying that the second phrase,
“consult fully other interested states when activities carrying a risk
of such effects are being contemplated or implemented” remains
unqualified?
Mr. Poll,ACK. That remained unqualified.
27
Senator PELL. Pressing the subject for a moment, if I may, if for
the sake of argument one was engaged in weather modification activi-
ties in any part of the globe, would that mean then that we have an
obligation to “consult fully other interested states when activities
carrying risks of such effects are being contemplated or implemented”?
Mr. Poll,ACK. This recommendation was adopted by the conference
in Stockholm. The subject will come up before the General Assembly
this fall. The legislative history that will accompany this has not yet
been established. But at the moment this is a recommendation to the
governments. This is not an obligation upon the governments.
Senator PELL. In other words, if this recommendation is imple-
mented, it would then mean that if we were engaged in weather
modification in any part of the World, we would then, if we accepted
the recommended obligation, be obligated to consult fully other
interested states?
Mr. Poll,ACK. I assume if it were an obligation and we accepted
the obligation, your statement would be correct.
QUESTION OF CONSULTATION UNDER RECOMMENDATION 218
Senator CASE. You have made a very good explanation of this.
But why don’t you come clean and say, “Sure, we will consult, and
this is a universal obligation”?
You have made it clear that to the extent feasible applies only to
the dissemination part. Why don’t you give the appearance as well as
have the substance of frankness with us? Have you any reason not to?
Mr. POLLACK. It is simply, sir, that the meaning of this clause has
not yet been established. It has not yet been acted on by the General
Assembly. :
Senator CASE. What effect did we mean it to have?
Mr. POLLACK. It might be helpful if I were to read the position that
the ºted States carried into the Stockholm Conference with respect
to that.
Senator CASE. The point is that Mr. Pell is a Democrat. He is
interested in making his own case. I am a Republican and I am inter-
ested in having you make the best case for the administration. Will
you come clean with it?
Mr. Poll,ACK. Yes, I will. I have been trying to do that this
morning. -
Senator PELL. I will add that we are both Americans.
Senator CASE. Of course we are, but you know what we are doing.
Senator PELL. We want to see a treaty like this passed. When we
had a Democratic administration, with all due respect to my Republi-
can colleague, I went after the administration just as hard.
Mr. POLLACK. The last time this question was examined was in
connection with the preparation for the Stockholm Conference. I
am reading now from the position paper dated May 15, that was
prepared for the instruction of our delegation. It said with respect
to the amendments, that is both of the amendments, that if they
fail, the delegates should not support the recommendation unless he
makes a statement to the effect that “the recommendation is unreal-
istic because it fails to take into account the imperfect state of our
knowledge as to the mechanism by which man's activity might
28
affect climate and thus in turn affect the ability of the government
to do more than what is feasible and practical in meeting all of the
terms of the recommendation.” - -
I do not believe that the U.S. Government has since reconsidered
this question. Of course, it will have to do so as it prepares for the
discussion of this item at the General Assembly meeting.
But this represents the last authoritative position of the executive
branch with respect to those two recommendations.
Senator PELL. At Stockholm, and Senator Case was there, too, I
took exception to the insertion of this phrase because I thought it
basically gutted the recommendation. I didn’t realize you were only
talking about paragraph A. I thought you were talking about B.
But I believe this gutted that phrase. I was very much in a minority.
I believe very strongly that when you go outside the United States
your delegation has to speak with one mouth. You can’t speak with
different mouths. I kept my mouth shut publicly. But in the delegation
meeting I protested privately. Within the delegation I was concerned
about the use of this phrase.
I wonder in this regard why the administration or the delegation
proposed the second phrase, “consult fully other interested States
whenever practicable.” That was defeated, as you know.
Mr. Poll,ACK. I think, sir, the reason that was incorporated in the
position paper before the delegation is responsive to that.
Had I been commenting on this personally, I would have found it
very difficult to know at what point contemplation begins, for example.
The terminology leaves something to be desired. When I agree to
consult about what I begin to contemplate, I need to understand a
little bit more about what the process of contemplation is.
If I am going to take an absolute obligation to consult, that is.
WEAKENING OF U.S. POSITION AT STOCKHOLM SUGGESTED
Senator PELL. I think these little amendments that were put in,
some of which were accepted and some of which were not, combined
with the concern about herbicides in the back of most people's minds
there, helped give our position at Stockholm a certain weakness. It
did not give us the strongest position we really should have had be-
cause we played such a huge role in trying to move ahead into the
Stockholm Conference. --
VALIDITY OF PRESS ARTICLES
You have probably read the articles in the press by Mr. De Silva
of the Providence Journal, Seymor Hersh, New York Times, Mr.
Wilford of the New York Times, and also in the Washington Post.
Have you any comment on the validity of these articles?
Mr. Poll,ACK. No, sir.
Senator PELL. You are not in a position to comment?
Mr. Poll.ACK. I have no comment on them.
IMPORTANCE OF TREATY
Senator PELL. I thank you very much for coming forward. I
would hope as the months and years go by we really could move ahead
29
and get a treaty of this sort. As I said earlier, it is much more important
than the treaty with regard to the Seabed and ocean floor because the
evidence would point to the fact we are talking about weapons systems
in being and not on the drawing board.
I thank you very much.
Senator Case?
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Dr. Pollack to
take some questions, which I will not ask now, and answer them for
the record.
Mr. Poll,ACK. I will be pleased to do that, sir.
Senator PELL. I would hope in unclassified form.
Mr. PoELACK. Yes, sir.
Senator CASE. Yes.
Senator PELL. I thank both of you for coming today.
Our next witness is Mr. Philip J. Farley, Deputy Director of the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
STATEMENT OF PHILIP J. FARLEY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMIENT AGENCY
Mr. FARLEY. Thank you, Senator Pell.
Mr. Pollack has described for you our policy on certain inter-
national aspects of weather modification, and identified other areas
where study is still required. In Support of his statement, I will
address briefly the area of arms control.
In holding these hearings on Senate Resolution 281, you are seeking
to focus attention on a potential preventive arms control measure.
My agency is of course mindful, Mr. Chairman, of the similar role
you played in connection with another arms control measure—the
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons
and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the
Ocean Floor and on the Subsoil Thereof. We agree that the pos-
sibilities of arms control in this new field deserve the most careful
study and consideration, along with other international aspects of
civilian environmental modification activities.
As Mr. Pollack has indicated, this administration has already begun
this process. My agency participated in the preliminary study of the
international aspects of weather modification activities, done by the
NSC Under Secretary’s Group, and will participate in the continuing
review. I want to assure this committee that, while this is a relatively
new subject, we in ACDA are very conscious of our responsibility to
see that in this process relevant arms control aspects are fully
considered.
However, given the need for further understanding of these subjects,
we are not prepared to endorse a resolution to the effect that we should
seek the agreement of other governments to a specific treaty, or to
take positions on the substance of the matter.
I noted, in the speech with which you introduced the resolution
to the Senate, that one of your objectives was to generate discussion
of the subject. In this spirit, I want to make one general observation.
82–892—72
o
*_2
30
Your draft treaty applies not only to experimentation or use of any
environmental or geophysical modification activity “as a weapon of
war,” but also to research. Does this take sufficient account of the
nearly identical nature of the techniques involved in civilian and
military applications of these activities? It may be impossible to
distinguish between research and perhaps testing on such applications
as cloud seeding, for military or civilian purposes. How would it be
possible to avoid the consequences of hampering research on what
might be highly desirable civilian applications? If these problems
were avoided by restricting your proposal to a limitation on the use
of such activities, this would leave the question, referred to by Mr.
Pollack, of whether and how we could satisfy ourselves as to com-
pliance with any such agreement.
Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by thanking you for bringing your
proposal to public attention. We will examine carefully the testimony
and discussion during these hearings to be sure we are taking into
account all relevant information and points of view.
This concludes my brief statement, Mr. Chairman.
RESEARCH RELATED TO CIVILIAN USES
Senator PELL. I thank you for your statement. I think your point
about research, and not prohibiting its use because of its relationship
to civilian uses, is a pretty valid one. I think in the public domain it
would pretty well take care of itself.
EFFORT IS TO REMOVE SECRECY
What I am trying to do, and many of us in the Congress are trying
to do, is to try to get the Secrecy removed from this area. If we can
remove the secret nature of these activities, I think many of the
pieces will then fall in place.
But it is the very secrecy of the operation that adds, I think, to its
danger for the future.
An excellent series of examples was given by Gordon McDonald in
his book about 5 years ago. He mentioned the point that it is the
secrecy of these activities that perhaps enhance the military use. A
nation might not even be aware of the fact that these various activities
were being engaged in as they suffered from the results.
POSSIBLE PREFERABILITY OF TERM “ESCHEW’’
I think your suggestion with regard to research is a good one.
Another change that I intend to make in the second draft of this
treaty, because the draft in Senate Resolution 281 is merely the
first of half a dozen drafts of the final agreement that I hope will
finally be signed and come into effect, is to use the word “eschew”
rather than “prohibit” or “prevent.”
I understand that has a better legal sense. Would you comment in
that specific regard, from the viewpoint of the ACDA, why it is that
the word “eschew” is more preferable to “prohibit” or “prevent?”
Mr. FARLEY. Mr Chairman, this is a new idea to me. If you wish,
I would be glad to have some thought given to this and give you an
answer, but I have not considered this question of the possible
preferability of the term “eschew.”
31
Senator PELL. I would be grateful and I would hope also it would
be in an unclassified form.
(The information referred to follows:)
j
USE OF WORD “EscHEw” IN LIEU of “PROHIBIT AND PREVENT.”
(Supplied by ACDA)
Without having had the benefit of hearing the arguments of those who have
suggested the use of the word “eschew’’ in lieu of “prohibit and prevent,” I can
offer only the following initial reactions:
1. The word “eschew” suggests to me avoidance, and thus might not amount
to an unqualified undertaking. On the other hand, if the use of that word is in-
tended to allow activities such as rescue of downed airmen or fog dispersal at
airports, it would seem to me to be an unreliable way of achieving this objective.
2. The words “prohibit and prevent” appear to be derived from the undertaking
in Article I of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, in which the parties undertake “to
prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out” nuclear explosions of specified types.
There the words “prohibit and prevent” appear to me to add to the under-
taking of the state not to carry out the proscribed activities a responsibility to
take appropriate action to ensure that its employees, agents, or others under its
jurisdiction or control do not carry out such activities.
OPENNESS OF RESEARCH
Mr. FARLEY. Could I just say, because my silence might be mis-
interpreted, that in your previous remarks when you spoke of the
importance of avoidance of secrecy, I was not clear whether you
intended those to apply to research, which was what the discussion
began with.
It is my understanding that the research in this field is open. I would
not want the contrary impression appear to be one that I agreed with.
Senator PELL. I understand there is classified research in this field
being conducted under the Defense Department. The next witness
will be able to shed light on that. I would be delighted if he indicated
that this research was not classified.
OTHER NATIONS' INTEREST IN SUBJECT OF TREATY
In connection with the general background, are you familiar with
any other interest in or discussion of the subject of this treaty from
other nations.
Mr. FARLEY. I am not aware of any of a governmental nature.
There have been some suggestions from nongovernmental bodies, but
there has not been active discussion, to my knowledge, of this matter,
for example, in the United Nations or in the Geneva Conference or
the Committee on Disarmament. Again, if I am ignorant of anything,
I will supplement that answer.
OTHER PROPOSALS ON SUBJECT
Senator PELL. Also, what proposals on this subject have been made
by other nations or international groups or within our own Govern-
ment? Maybe you could submit this for the record at a later date, if
there are any other proposals. •
I am trying to get together in this hearing all of the information
obtainable. -
32
Mr. FARLEY. The only one I am aware of is by the body known as
World Peace Through Law Center. You may be acquainted with that.
OTHER NATIONS' POTENTIAL FOR WEATHER MoDIFICATION ACTIVITIES
Senator PELL. Do you believe that other nations have the potential
to engage in weather modification activities directed against our own
Nation? -
Mr. FARLEY. There are a number of other nations who are engaged
in research on weather modification and who have a general technical
capability in this field. Indeed, I believe one of your subsequent wit-
nesses, perhaps not today, will say something about what is being
done in this general field by other countries. . .
That suggests, therefore, that one of the questions which we have
to look at in considering the merits of an arms control approach is
the possibility that we may have more to gain by a general agreement
which removes the threat to us than we have to gain from uses of
our own of these techniques for military purposes. That is one of the
questions we have under examination.
PAST RECOMMENDATIONS TO LIMIT U.S. WEATHER MODIFICATION
ACTIVITIES
Senator PELL. I think it was about 7 years ago, in 1965, a Special
Commission on Weather Modification recommended to the National
Science Foundation a Presidential statement of policy limiting
American weather modification activities to peaceful purposes.
In 1966, a year later, a report entitled “Weather Modification and
Control,” prepared for the Commerce Committee, had the statement
to the general effect that such an agreement should be signed or should
be moved ahead. - - -
What was the response of the ACDA to comments such as these
when they were made 6 or 7 years ago? - -
Mr. FARLEY. I do not know of any response by ACDA at that
time. My awareness of an ACiDA interest in this subject dates essenti-
ally with the beginning of the interagency study which Mr. Pollack
has made reference to in his statement and discussion with you.
Senator PELL. You were part of that interagency study?
Mr. FARLEY. Yes. I might add that that is one reason that I am
here today in reply to your letter to Mr. Smith, since in his absence
I represented ACDA. -
INFORMING ACDA OF U.S. ARMED SERVICES WEATHER MODIFICATION
ACTIVITIES -
Senator PELL. Is your agency fully and currently informed regarding
weather modification activities, no matter what kind, of the U.S.
armed services?
Mr. FARLEY. It is always difficult to answer flatly whether one
is fully informed.
Senator PELL. We weren’t informed in the Foreign Relations
Committee that we were conducting a war in Laos until it had been
going on for almost 2 years.
Mr. FARLEY. I cannot say unequivocally that I am.
33
HAS ACDA. OPPOSED WEATHER MODIFICATION ACTIVITIES IN INDO CHINA?
Senator PELL. I realize the restrictions under which you operate,
but has the ACDA opposed weather modification activities by mili-
tary and civilian agencies in Indochina?
Mr. FARLEY. We have not been involved in any discussion of this
issue.
Senator PELL. You have not bean involved in any discussion of it?
Mr. FARLEY. No.
Senator PELL. Senator Case? -
Senator CASE. I think, Mr. Chairman, you have raised those
questions that I would like to have Mr. Farley answer on the record.
I have no questions. Thank you very much.
Senator PELL. Thank you very much, indeed, Mr. Farley.
Mr. FARLEY. Thank you.
Senator PELL. Our next witness is Benjamin Forman, Assistant
General Counsel, International Affairs, Department of Defense.
STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN FORMAN, ASSISTANT GENERAL COUN-
SEL, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. FoEMAN. Mr. Chairman, before presenting my prepared state-
ment, I would like to acknowledge receipt of your letter to Secretary
Laird, which we received on this past Monday, July 24, requesting
that Dr. St. Amand accompany me as backup witness.
In checking to ascertain whether this request could be met, it was
found that Dr. St. Amand was out of the country and could not return
in time to be with me at this hearing.
Senator PELL. I regret that. Does that mean that the Department
of Defense will be perfectly willing to have him come up as a witness
at another time when he is in this country?
Mr. FoEMAN. As a Department of Defense witness?
Senator PELL. Yes. -
Mr. FoEMAN. I don’t know the answer to that. Offhand I don’t see
any objection.
Senator PELL. He is out of the country, not in Philadelphia?
Mr. FoEMAN. No, he is out of the country. In fact, he is in the
Azores at the moment engaged in the cloud seeding to which Mr.
Pollack referred.
Senator PELL. Thank you very much.
Mr. FoEMAN. Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee:
Along with such other Government agencies as the Department of
Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, Housing and Urban Development,
Transportation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
and the National Science Foundation, the Department of Defense
conducts research and development programs pertaining to the general
subject matter of this hearing under the aegis of the Interdepartmental
Committee for Atmospheric Sciences (ICAS) of the Federal Council
for Science and Technology.
In relative dollar terms, the research and development effort of the
Department of Defense in this area is approximately .05 percent
of the Department’s total research and development budget. Com-
paring our relative level of effort in dollars with that of the other
Government agencies involved, the Department of Defense ranks
34
fourth. The major portion of the national weather modification re-
Search and development programs is conducted by the Departments
of Commerce and Interior, together with the National Science
Foundation.
The Department of Defense has no unique weather modification
techniques. Its research and development projects relating to en-
vironmental and geophysical modification activities are conducted on
an unclassified basis. The results of the research and development are
available to the public through the National Technical Information
Service of the Department of Commerce.
MAJOR DIEFENSE INTERESTS
Research by the Department of Defense in this area is conducted
because of two major defense interests. The first of these is the pro-
tection of personnel and resources against weather hazards and thus
the improvement of our operational capabilities. Research programs
to meet this objective include investigations of techniques to dissipate
warm fog and cold fog and the seeding of cumulus clouds to inhibit or
enhance their growth. The President’s budget for fiscal year 1973
proposes $1,429,000 for this area of research by DOD. The second
major interest is guarding against technological surprise by increasing
our understanding of the capabilities any potential enemy might
possess in this area. To this end the President’s budget for fiscal year
1973 proposes $3,090,000 for exploratory development by DOD, de-
signed to develop a capability to predict climatic change due to
natural phenomena or inadvertent or deliberate human actions. This
research depends heavily on computer simulation; it is a threat ex-
ploration program to determine whether there is a threat, where it is,
and of what it might consist.
CONDUCT OF DOD RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Department of Defense research and development is conducted
both in the laboratory (DOD, academic, and industrial) and in the
field. As indicated in the report of the Inter-departmental Committee
for Atmospheric Sciences, the field efforts are usually joint efforts
with other government agencies. One of the best known of these efforts
has been the one conducted with the Department of Commerce
(NOAA), known as Project Stormfury, which has investigated the
possibilities of ameliorating the severity of damage caused by hurri-
canes and typhoons.
WEATHER MODIFICATION OPERATIONS
The Department of Defense also conducts some weather modifi-
cation operations. We have not, as Secretary Laird has previously
stated to the parent committee of this subcommittee, ever engaged in
weather modification activities over North Vietnam. The Depart-
ment of Defense has conducted cold fog modification at air bases in
Alaska, the United States and Germany, where there is significant
occurrence of the cold fog phenomena. It has participated in rain
enhancement projects in Texas, India, the Philippines, and Okinawa.
As announced to the press on July 21 by the Department of State, the
35
Department of Defense is currently undertaking a rain enhancement
project in the Azores at the request of the Government of Portugal,
which was made through diplomatic channels, in an effort to relieve
severe drought conditions. Reports thus far received indicate favor-
able but not yet definitive results. As Mr. Pollack has indicated to the
committee, all such requests for assistance are subject to thorough
interdepartmental review in Washington. This review includes an
evaluation of the probable effects.
INADEQUACY OF KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES
Notwithstanding the fact that studies in this area have been
conducted now for some 25 years by the Federal, academic, and
industrial communities, there remains a great deal that the Depart-
ment of Defense does not know about the atmospheric sciences. As
indicated in the June 1971 ICAS report on weather modification,
there are a number of technical problems on which further research
and development is required. According to Department of Defense
researchers, our knowledge of other areas of environmental and
geophysical modification is even more inadequate.
HOLDING ACTION ON S. R.E.S. 281 IN ABEYANCE RECOMMENDED
In light of our present state of knowledge, the Department of
Defense believes that it does not yet have sufficient knowledge to
make an informed judgment as to whether a treaty along the lines of
Senate Resolution 281 would be in the national interest. Similarly,
this Department is not able intelligently to draft such a treaty if a
treaty were, in fact, in the national interest. And, finally, the Depart-
ment does not possess at this time the requisite scientific knowledge
and techniques to be able to verify compliance with such a treaty.
In the circumstances, the Department of Defense is not in a position
to comment on the substance of Senate Resolution 281. It accordingly
recommends that committee action on the resolution at this time be
held in abeyance.
Senator PELL. Thank you very much indeed.
BASIS OF DOD INTEREST IN WIEATHER MODIFICATION
I have several questions that I would like to ask you. What is the
reason for the Department of Defense's interest in weather modifica-
tion, the basis for it?
Mr. FoEMAN. As I indicated in my prepared statement, our basic
reason in the field of weather modification is to protect our personnel
and resources against weather hazards and thus improve our opera-
tional capabilities. I mentioned in this regard, for example, the
problem of cold fog dissipation which has an obvious impact on the
ability of our planes to take off and land from air fields where the
cold fog phenomena exists. Similarly, of course, you have the problem
of thunderstorms, hail, lightning, and how they might affect opera-
tions while you are flying.
Senator PELL. You say protection of personnel against weather
hazards and improved operational capabilities are perhaps prime
defense interests. Why would you want to seed cumulus clouds to
enhance their growth? The two would go against each other.
36
Mr. FORMAN. I don’t think they necessarily do. Let's take, for
example, the question of the Azores. Why is the Department of
Defense engaged in the operation in the Azores rather than the
Department of Commerce, for example, which I suppose could equally
do the job? We have, as I am fully aware this committee knows, bases
in the Azores. We have personnel there and they are, of course,
affected by the drought condition. It is, therefore, in our interest to be
able to alleviate that condition, apart from the general interest in good
relations with Portugal and the benefits to the people who live in
the Azores.
(The following information was subsequently supplied:)
TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONs WHICH LEAD DOD TO CONDUCT RESEARCH ON
ENHANCING GROWTH OF CUMULUS CLOUDS
(Supplied By Department of Defense)
There are also several technical considerations which lead DOD to conduct
research on enhancing the growth of cumulus clouds.
1. Knowledge of enhancement technology complements and furthers the
attainment of inhibition technology.
2. Enhancement of cloud growth is a possible technique for hail and lightning
Suppression.
3. Causing rainfall in unpopulated areas some distance from our bases and
installations may reduce the possibility of damaging storms afterwards in the
vicinity of those facilities.
4. To build a technology base for the capability to verify the use of weather
modification by an enemy.
EEGINNING OF DOD WEATHER MODIFICATION RESEARCH
Senator PELL. When did the Defense Department begin its research
in the whole area of weather modification? -
Mr. FoEMAN. I don’t know the exact date. Dr. Foster's letter to
you earlier this year indicated it was some years ago.
PAST AND PRESENT DOD WEATHER MODIFICATION RESEARCH
PROJECTS
Senator PELL. I wonder if you could describe now or submit for the
record in an unclassified form a running statement of past and present
DOD research projects related to weather modification.
Mr. FoEMAN. Yes; I could submit for the record—for example, I
happen to have brought with me a technical report, No. 244, of the
Air Weather Service of the U.S. Air Force, which is their fourth annual
survey report on the weather service modification program. It is a
public document.
Senator PELL. We would like to have it in our files, if you could.
Maybe you could give a compilation of the different programs.
Mr. FoEMAN. This discusses a number of programs which were
conducted during the fiscal year 1971. It is the most recent report to
have been published. It was published in April of this year. Would you
like earlier reports?
Senator PELL. I would like the dates and a sentence description of
each program for the record. Could you submit that for the record?
Mr. FoEMAN. Yes.
Senator PELL. Thank you very much.
(The information referred to follows:)
37
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESEARCH PROJECTS RELATED TO WEATHER
MODIFICATION
(Supplied by Department of Defense)
PART I
Examples of Department of Defense R&D Projects in Weather Modification:
FY 71, 72, & 73.
Fiscal year 1971
Army: Continued a basic review of materials for seeding, development of
cumulus cloud models for weather modification, and a joint project with the Air
Force for seeding cumulus clouds. Experiments continued for dissipating warm
clouds by heat sources and helicopter backwash. Continued efforts to develop
operational methods for clearing warm fog and stratus, and to improve existing
techniques for clearing supercooled fog. Continued investigating methods for
preventing high electrical fields in cumulus clouds (lightning suppression).
Navy: Carried on with the development of pyrotechnic as well as other fog and
cloud treating devices; conducted both theoretical studies and field experiments to
develop improved treatment techniques. With the Department of Agriculture,
expanded instrumentation of the jointly developed seashore test site for study of
advection fog. Continued its participation with ESSA (now NOAA) in Project
Stormfury, with major attention devoted to systematic exploitation of conditions
under which tropical cyclones are susceptible to modification.
Air Force: With the Navy, continued different approaches to development of the
automated airborne instruments needed for making fine-scale measurements of
cloud drop sizes, and producing these data in a computer-compatible output for-
mat. Activity focused on dissipation of fog and low stratus.
Fiscal year 1972
Army: Field studies concentrated on the modification of warm fog and were
conducted jointly with the Navy, Air Force, and National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration (NOAA). Investigations of atmospheric electrical structure
near cumulus clouds and related modification possibilities were continued. The
Army continued its participation in the National Hail Research Experiment
(a project in hail suppression).
Navy: Warm fog and tropical storms continued to be the primary targets of the
Navy's weather modification research effort. Emphasis continued on laboratory
and field tests of nucleating materials, and methods of dispersal. Computer models
of fog and convective processes were updated and improved through incorporation
of laboratory and field experimental data.
Air Force: Results of warm fog modification experiments conducted in California
during Jan. 71 were evaluated with an eye toward a larger test to be conducted in
1972. The purpose was to evaluate promising warm fog modification techniques
* consider new approaches toward dispersing this operationally restrictive
condition.
Fiscal year 1973
Army: Studies will continue to acquire a better understanding of the physical
processes in the atmosphere which cause the formation, growth, and dissipation
of clouds, fog, and rain, with emphasis on warm fogs. Development of numerical
models describing the life cycle of natural radiation fog and describing various
methods of modification of radiation and advective fog will be continued. Field
studies will concentrate on the dispersal of warm fog by helicopter downwash
to obtain the information required to define the limits of this technique. Develop-
ment of a mobile propane dispenser for dissipation of local supercooled fogs will
continue. Investigations of atmospheric electrical structure near cumulus clouds
will be continued.
Navy: Warm fog and tropical storms continue to be the primary targets of the
Navy’s weather modification research effort. Emphasis will continue on laboratory
and field tests of nucleating materials, and methods of dispersal. Computer
models of fog and convective processes will be updated and improved through the
incorporation of laboratory and field experimental data, and new empirical and
theoretical results. Development efforts will continue on instruments and methods
for studying natural cloud processes and for evaluating experiments.
Air Force: Full-scale field tests of the airborne hygroscopic particle seeding
techniques of warm fog dissipation will be conducted at an Air Force base on an
38
operational basis. A pilot study using a ground-based heated-plume technique to
dissipate warm fog will be conducted at Wandenberg AFB, California.
NOTE.-Source documents for the information given above are: Interdepart-
mental Committee for Atmospheric Sciences Report No. 14, January, 1970;
Interdepartmental Committee for Atmospheric Sciences Report No. 15, March,
1971; and Interdepartmental Committee for Atmospheric Sciences Report No.
16, May, 1972.
PART II
Examples of Department of Defense R&D Field Tests and Evaluations in
Weather Modification.
Fiscal year 1968
Air Force:
1. Project WARM FOG, conducted at Travis AF Base, Calif.; project initiated
to determine the feasibility of using jet engines for the quick-reaction dissipation
of fog.
2. Project COLD FOG III, conducted at Wiesbaden AB, Germany: no tests
were made under the project since no persistent supercooled fogs occurred at the
base. However, COLD FOG I and II had previously made use of dry-ice cakes
suspended in tethered balloons to initiate crystallization in the supercooled fog.
3. Project COLD WAND, conducted at Fairchild AFB, Washington: project
tested use of liquid propane as a cooling agent in fog modification; the technique
has been used operationally at Orly Airport, France since 1964.
4. Project COLD HORN, conducted at Grafenwohr AI, Germany: project
tested a fog—modification technique using vented liquid carbon dioxide (CO2) as
the glaciating agent. -
5. Project COLD FAN, conducted at Kingsley Field, Oregon: project tested
using a carbon dioxide dispenser in both stationary and mobile configurations in
dispersing supercooled fog.
6. Project COLD COWL, conducted at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska: tested the
use of crushed dry ice dropped from an aircraft in dissipating supercooled fog.
NOTE.-See Air Weather Service Technical Report 209, dated November 1968,
attached, for further details.
Navy: Continued cloud physics studies; progress in engineering weather modi-
fication experiments by computer modelling; participation in PROJECT STORM-
FURY was limited by a dearth of tropical storm activity.
Fiscal year 1969
Air Force:
1. Projects continued from FY 68, viz COLD COWL and COLD WAND.
2. Project COLD CRYSTAL in Europe, conducted at Hahn, Bitburg and
Spangdahlem Air Bases, was very similar to Project COLD COWL in Alaska;
aircraft dispensed crushed dry ice to dissipate supercooled fog.
3. Project COLD PLUME was conducted at Kinglsey Field, Oregon: liquid
pºpane was dispensed from ground-based trailers for dissipation of supercooled
O9. *
4. Project COMBAT WARM; tested dispersal of tiny hygroscopic particles
from a ground-based blower to dissipate warm fog; as the particles fall to earth,
they absorb and remove moisture from the fog layer. Sodium nitrate (NaNO3)
was used as the seeding material.
NoTE.—See Air Weather Service Technical Report 213, dated June 1969,
attached, for further details.
Navy: Continued cloud physics studies at the Naval Research Laboratory:
continued to develop computer models which describe the basic physical pro-
cesses important to weather modification research (experiments can thus be con-
ducted on a sound engineering basis); had highly successful participation with
NOAA in PROJECT STORMFUR.Y.
Fiscal year 1970
Air Force: Project COLD WAND continued at Fairchild AFB, Wash.; Project
COLD COWL continued at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska; and Project COLD CRYS-
TAL continued at Hahn, Bitburg and Spangdahlem AB in Germany. (See Air
Yºº Service Technical Report 236, dated August 1970, attached, for further
etails). -
Navy: Cloud physics investigations continued at the Naval Research Labora-
tory; computerized investigations focused on the use of hygroscopic materials,
heat, and helicopter mixing as means of fog dissipation; continued efforts in
39
theoretical and laboratory research, field tests and evaluations, and engineering
development of hardware items. (See A Summary of the U.S. Navy Program and
FY 1970 Progress in Weather Modification and Control, dated December 1970,
attached, for further details.)
Fiscal year 1971
Air Force: A total of 6 projects were carried out: 4 to dissipate supercooled fog,
1 to dissipate warm fog, and one to increase precipitation.
Project Location Mlode Agent
Cold Wand------------------------- Fairchild AFB----------- Ground based.----------- Liquid propane.
Cold Flake------------------------- Hahn AB-------------------- do----------------- Do.
Cold Cowl-------------------------- Elmendorf AFB---------- Airborne--------------- Crushed dry ice.
Cold Crystal------------------------ Germany-------------------- do----------------- D0. -
Warm Fog-------------------------- McClellan AFB--------------- do----------------- Hygroscopic solution.
Cold Rain-------------------------- Texas----------------------- do----------------- Silver iodide flares.
NOTES
A complete description of each of these projects can be found in Air Weather Service Technical Report 244, dated April
1972, copy attached.
Navy: Projects described for fiscal year 1970 above continued.
A complete description of the Navy effort can be found in “A Summary of the U.S. Navy Program and fiscal year 1971
Progress in Weather Mlodification and Control, dated January 1972, copy attached.
Project Cold Rain: This U.S Air Force project was conducted in June 1971 and
formed a part of a large Texas drought-relief program directed by the Bureau of
Reclamation. Supercooled cumulus clouds were seeded with silver-iodide nucleat-
ing material to increase rainfall (over what would have occurred naturally) in as
wide a geographic area as possible. Air Force WC-130 aircraft were used as seeding
platforms for Project Cold Rain.
NOTE.-A very complete description of Project Cold Rain is contained in the
ºned copy of Air Weather Service Technical Report 245, dated December
1971.
Project Gromet II: Gromet II was a rain enhancement project undertaken in
the Philippine Islands at the request of the Philippine Government toward the
end of a period of severe drought. The U.S. Air Force had operational responsibility
for Gromet II, and the U.S. Navy Naval Weapons Center provided technical
direction. Between 28 April and 18 June 1969, 58 seeding missions were conducted.
Each had as its primary objective the production of useful rain. The project was
Successful and the Philippine Government expressed official appreciation.
NOTE.-A very comprehensive description of Project Gromet II is contained
in the attached copy of Naval Weapons Center Technical Publication 5097,
dated May 1971, entitled “Gromet II, Rainfall Augmentation in the Philippine
Islands.”
Lists of enclosures:
1. Air Weather Service Technical Report 203 (USAF) dated May 1968.
2. Air Weather Service Technical Report 209 (USAF) dated November 1968.
3. Air Weather Service Technical Report 213 (USAF) dated June 1969.
4. Air Weather Service Technical Report 236 (USAF) dated August 1970.
5. “A Summary of the U.S. Navy Program and FY 1970 Progress in Weather
Mºjication and Control” (Navy Weather Research Facility) dated December
1970.
6. Air Weather Service Technical Report 244 (USAF) dated April 1972.
7. “A Summary of the U.S. Navy Program and FY 1971 Progress in Weather
Modification and Control” (Environmental Prediction Research Facility) dated
January 1972.
8. Air Weather Service Technical Report 245 (USAF) dated December 1971.
9. “Gromet II, Rainfall Augmentation in the Philippine Islands,” Naval
Weapons Center Technical Publication 5097, dated May 1971.
10. “Project Foggy Cloud III, Phase I,” Naval Weapons Center Technical
Publication 5297, dated April 1972.
11 Project Stormfury Annual Report 1970, Dept. of Naval/Dept. of Com-
merce, dated May 1971.
(Enclosures referred to are in the Committee files.)
40
COORDINATION WITH STATE DEPARTMENT
Do you coordinate with the State Department in your weather
modification activities, such as in the Azores? You do that with the
State Department, I presume.
Mr. ForMAN. In fact, as I indicated, the request of the Government
of Portugal was made through diplomatic channels, and the message
back to the Portuguese Government was a State Department message.
IMPORTANCE OF WEATHER MODIFICATION AS OFFENSIVE STRATEGY
Senator PELL. What importance is attached by DOD to weather
modification as an offensive strategy?
Mr. FoEMAN. I am not sure I understand the nature of your
Question, Senator.
Senator PELL. Let me rephrase it more simply. Is there any impor-
tance, and, if so, what degree, attached by the Defense Department
to weather modification as a means of offensive strategy? In other
words, is it of no importance at all as a matter of offensive strategy or
is it sometimes contemplated as a means of offensive strategy?
Mr. FoEMAN. Mr. Chairman, as you know, and as your recent
colloquy with Mr. Pollack has reiterated, the position of the Depart-
ment of Defense is that it will not comment on operational uses in
this area. .
Senator PELL. Do you mean will not comment in open session?
Mr. FoEMAN. Yes. This is classified.
GENERAL VOGT's REFUSAL TO COMMENT IN ExECUTIVE SESSION
Senator PELL. I would like to add at this point when General Vogt.
was here in a classified session of the committee we asked him whether
we were engaging in these activities in Southeast Asia and his answer
was he couldn’t comment in executive session. I think perhaps the real
answer is the executive branch won’t comment on it in executive session
or in open session. - -
I think the record should show without a violation of confidence that
he would not comment in executive session either.
INFORMING OF ARMED SERVICES AND APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES
Mr. FoEMAN. I think the record should also show, Mr. Chairman,
and indeed it does show since you put it into the Congressional Record,
the Department of Defense has informed the chairmen of the two
Armed Services Committees and the two Appropriations Committees
as to the classified nature of certain aspects of our activities in this
alſ (28,.
WHY AREN'T FOREIGN RELATIONS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEES
INFORMED"
Senator PELL. That is true. I think the phrase you used in your
letter was, “the appropriate committees,” if my recollection is correct.
Why aren’t the Foreign Relations Committee and the Foreign Affairs
Committee appropriate committees to inform of such activities which
41
obviously cross frontiers? The chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee, to the best of my knowledge, has not been informed.
Or would you be willing to correct me on that? I wish you would.
Mr. ForMAN. No; I can’t correct you. The letter that Mr. Pollack
referred to was of this past March from Mr. Laird to Mr. Cranston,
who is a cosponsor of your resolution. It specifies that the chairmen
of the four committees I mentioned were the ones who were fully
informed.
Senator PELL. I think the letter I received referred to the appro-
priate committees. -
Mr. FoEMAN. That was, I think, an earlier letter. This more recent
letter is dated March 18.
SHOULD FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE BE INFORMED2
Senator PELL. Do you not think this would be of concern to the
Foreign Relations Committee and they should be informed?
Mr. FoEMAN. I am not in a position to answer that question,
Senator. , -
BASIS FOR DOD SELECTION OF COMMITTEES
Senator CASE. What is the basis for the selection of committees
by the Department of Defense? -
Mr. FoEMAN. I can’t speak to that, sir. I did not make the selection.
Senator CASE. Could you have an answer provided for the record
from the Department of Defense? Have you access to the people in
the Department who made that determination?
Mr. FoEMAN. Senator, I could take the question back with me.
Senator CASE. Where are you going to take it?
Mr. FoEMAN. To the Secretary’s office.
Senator CASE. Is it the Secretary with whom you will talk? -
Mr. FoEMAN. Yes. It is the Secretary who signed the letter I
just referred to. -
Senator CASE. If it is appropriate, I would like to have that an-
swered. Though I am a member of the Appropriations Committee,
I don’t think, as such, that puts me in a different status than as a
member of this committee. I would like to know the rationale by which
the Defense Department assumes the authority to make the selection.
Second, I would like to know the rationale which governs the selection.
This is a subject in which I am deeply interested, Mr. Chairman.
(N OTE.-Subsequently the Department of Defense supplied for
the record this statement.
RATIONALE of DOD SELECTION OF COMMITTEES To BE INFORMED CONCERNING
WEATHER MODIFICATION ACTIVITIES -
It is not appropriate for a Department or Agency of the Executive Branch
of the Government to become involved in jurisdictional issues between Com-
mittees of the Congress. The disposition of classified information provided to the
Congress through the Congressional Committee of primary jurisdiction over the
particular Department of the Executive Branch is a matter for Legislative
Branch determination. - -
42
Further related to the subject was the following exchange of letters:
SEPTEMBER 14, 1972.
Mr. RADY JOHNSON,
Office of Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, Department of Defense, Pentagon,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. JoHNSON: Pursuant to today’s conversation between John Marks
of my staff and Colonel Harry Dunn of your office, I would be grateful if you
could send a reply for the hearing record on S. Res. 281 to the question I asked
Mr. Forman on July 26.
Specifically, I would like to know why the Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees were chosen, and the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Com-
mittees were not chosen to receive information on 1) the overall weather modifica-
tion program, 2) the tactical application of weather modification in Southeast
Asia, and 3) Project Intermediary Compatriot. I would be grateful to learn how
such a decision is made, and whether or not the Defense Department would be
willing to share the same information with the Foreign Relations Committee
now that there is a prospective international agreement concerning weather
modification before the Committee.
Sincerely,
CLIFFORD P. CASE,
U.S. Senator.
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., September 21, 1972.
Hon. CLIFFORD P. CASE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR CASE: This is in response to your letter of September 14, 1972,
which requests information as to how the Department of Defense determines
which committees of the Congress to keep informed of matters pertaining to
its administrative responsibilities.
As stated in the insert for the record provided to the subcommittee on
September 7, 1972, the Department does not consider it appropriate to become
involved in committee jurisdictional issues. As a practical matter however, the
Department routinely and traditionally conducts its business on a daily basis with
those committees of the Senate and House of Representatives, which under the
rules of those two bodies have jurisdiction over the authorization and appropria-
tions for the various functions assigned to the Department. In the functional
areas of Operation and Maintenance, Procurement, Research and Development,
Manpower, Military Construction and others, the Committees assigned juris–
diction by the Senate and House Rules are the Armed Services and Appropriation
Committees.
With regard to your second question, I respectfully refer you to Dr. Foster's
letter of December 16, 1971, in response to a similar request by Chairman Pell,
a copy of which is attached.
Sincerely yours,
J. FRED BUZHARDT.
Attachment as Stated.
DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING,
Washington, D.C., December 10, 1971.
Hon. CLAIBORNE PELL,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Oceans and International Environment, Committee on
Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Your letter of 3 December 1971, which was addressed
to the Secretary of Defense, has been referred to this office for reply. In your
letter you expressed dissatisfaction with information previously furnished to you
by Mr. Rady Johnson on the subject of Department of Defense weather modifica-
tion activities.
Certain aspects of our work in this area are classified. Recognizing that the
Congress is concerned with the question of the military application of weather
modification technology I have, at the direction of Secretary Laird seen to it that
the Chairmen of the Committees of Congress with primary responsibility for this
43
Department's operations have been completely informed regarding the details of
all classified weather modification undertakings by the Department. However,
since the information to which I refer has a definite relationship to national
security and is classified as a result, I find it necessary to respectfully and regret-
fully decline to make any further disclosure of the details of these activities at this
time.
Sincerely,
(s) JOHN S. FosTER, JR.
Senator Case informed the chairman of the committee, Mr.
Fulbright, that he considered the information supplied by the Depart-
ment of Defense to be “nonresponsive” to the questions raised and it
was agreed that at a later time consideration would be given to the
subject of obtaining an informative response to the question **)
Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Senator Case.
As a member of the subcommittee dealing with this subject, I am
particularly grateful to you for giving us the time that you have given.
INFORMING COMMITTEE IN EXECUTIVE SESSION AIBOUT WARTIME
USE QUESTIONED
While the chairmen of those four committees have been informed,
your earlier statement that you could inform us on the subject only
in executive session is not correct.
Mr. FoEMAN. Senator, I didn’t understand you to be addressing
yourself solely to Southeast Asia when you made that comment. I
just don’t know the answer when you are talking as possible opera-
tional use in wartime.
Senator PELL. But the only war in which we are engaged is in
Southeast Asia. When Senator Fulbright asked General Vogt whether
we are using it, to the best of my recollection, his answer was that
he could not comment on this subject in executive session.
Mr. FoEMAN. I am not disputing that, Mr. Chairman; I am merely
observing, if I understood your initial question correctly, that you
were talking about possible offensive uses in wartime and not con-
fining yourself to the present hostilities in Indochina. It is that on
which I am uncertain. Obviously, there are certain things which
would be apparent to anyone who might think about the subject as
to the possible uses one might make of weather modification. I could
speculate as to some of it myself.
I would be hesitant to speculate in open session because I might
be getting into areas which are classified. I just don’t know. Whether
these possible uses, which, as I say, are entirely irrelevant from what
we are or not doing in Indochina or might have done, are classified,
I am just not certain. I mean I am not certain to what extent they
might be revealed to your committee.
POSSIBILITY OF MELTING POLAR ICECAP
Senator PELL. Getting into a few of these possible uses, has the
Defense Department ever studied the possibility of what may sound
like far-out proposals, though they are not really, such as changing
the axis of the earth. Have you ever studied the possibility of melting
the polar icecap?
Mr. FoEMAN. Senator, I am informed we just don’t know how to
do much of anything in this area, that we don’t know how to modify
44
the currents of the ocean or the atmospheric currents above us. There
are a great many things we just don’t know in the geophysical field.
The study I mentioned earlier about computer simulation of possible
climatic effects or predicting climatic changes—if I may refresh my
recollection for a moment—does not deal with how to remove the
Arctic ice, but it does go into the question of will we have climatic
variations due to major changes on the earth's surface such as the
removal of Arctic ice, and to what extent can we predict this on a
computer.
As I indicated, I am told by our researchers that our state of knowl-
º in this area is virtually nonexistent. We just don’t know how to
o it.
Senator PELL. Have there ever been any field trials or experiments
in melting the polar icecap conducted by DOD’
Mr. FoEMAN. I don’t know this.
Senator PELL. You simply don’t know?
Mr. FoEMAN. I don’t know.
lºor PELL, Could you find out and submit for the record your
reply?
Mr. FoEMAN. I will check. As I say, I have been informed that our
capability to engage in any sort of modification along geophysical
lines does not exist.
Senator PELL. Still, would you submit for the record whether or
not DOD has engaged in any experiments with regard to melting
of the polar icecap. It should not be classified.
Mr. FoEMAN. The icecap as such?
Senator PELL. Yes. Could you do that?
Mr. FORMAN. Yes.
(The information referred to follows:)
DOD RESPONSE TO QUERY CONCERNING MELTING Pola R. ICECAP
DOD has not engaged in any experiments or field trials to melt the polar icecap.
Senator PELL. That certainly would not have to be classified.
Mr. ForMAN. I should see no reason why it should be as a research
project. e e º
Senator PELL. I am trying to keep this as unclassified as we can.
RESEARCH RELATING TO GENERATION OF EARTHQUAKES
What research has DOD conducted relating to the generation of
earthquakes, what geophysical activities?
Mr. FoEMAN. My understanding is that our research in the field
of earthquakes is virtually nil or is nil in the modification sense that
you are addressing. We do, of course, do research on earthquakes in a
different area. That is the area of the problem of verification, of the
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It is in that field, in the verification aspect,
rather than the modification aspect.
HAS DOD ENGAGED IN WEATHER MODIFICATION OVER CUBA?
Senator PELL. Has DOD engaged in any weather modifications
Over Cuba?
Mr. FoEMAN. I don’t know the answer to that question.
Senator PELL. Could you submit that for the record, please?
45
Mr. FoEMAN. Certainly.
(The information referred to follows:)
DoD RESPONSE TO QUERY CONCERNING WEATHER MoDIFICATION OVER CUBA
DOD has not engaged in any weather modification over Cuba.
COORDINATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL OF GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH
EXPERIMIENTS
Senator PELL. What provision is made for coordination between
DOD and State and with foreign governments in the case of any
environmental or geophysical research experiments?
In other words, do we let other countries know the results of our
seismic research under the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty?
Mr. FoEMAN. Yes; generally speaking, the other nations are in-
formed of the results of our research, or I should say of our operations.
OPERATION POPEYE AND INTERMEDIARY COMPATRIOT
Senator PELL. Were Operation Popeye and Intermediary Compa-
triot coordinated with the State Department? Were they aware of
these operations? Could you describe them to us, briefly?
Mr. FoEMAN. Senator, all I know of those operations is what I
have read in the papers and the Congressional Record in the last 6
months or so, speaking personally.
Senator PELL. This is why we asked Mr. Laird to send us a com-
petent witness.
Mr. FoEMAN. Going beyond that, of course, as you have been told
by Mr. Laird and by Dr. Foster, the Department of Defense has no
comment to make.
Senator PELL. You are right. They told us this, as I said, in both
public and private sessions. Would you be free to say whether these
operations were coordinated with the governments of the nations
involved, Thailand and Laos?
Mr. FoEMAN. I can’t add to what I have already said. That is the
position of the Department.
Senator PELL. Presumably, then, these projects are classified; is that
correct?
Mr. FoEMAN. I don’t wish to even admit, sir, that there were such
projects.
Senator PELL. I think the name of the project is public knowledge.
Mr. FoEMAN. I have read that statement in the newspapers, but, as
you know, the mere fact that something appears in the newspaper
does not necessarily mean that the Department of Defense or other
Government agencies, as the case may be, will comment on the accu-
racy of the story. By way of analogy, we are in this area, I think,
somewhat in the position that we are with regard to publicity with
respect to nuclear weapons, where, as you know, the policy is neither
to confirm or deny.
Senator PELL. I don’t know whether the executive branch admits to
the validity of the so-called Pentagon Papers, but on page 421, volume
4, of the edition put out by Beacon Press of Boston—and I believe
they have been reprinted by the Government Printing Office—it refers
82–892—72—4
46
to Laos operations “Continue as at present plus Operation Popeye
to reduce trafficability along infiltration routes.” That is on page 421.
You are not free to comment on the validity of that statement?
Mr. FoEMAN. No, sir.
WHY CAN'T WITNESS COMMENT ON SOUTHEAST ASIA OPERATIONS”
Senator PELL. If you were free to comment on our operations or
nonoperations on the Greenland Icecap or with regard to earthquakes
or submit a comment on Cuba, why is it that you cannot comment on
any of these operations in Southeast Asia? What is the difference?
Mr. FoEMAN. Senator, perhaps my answer was a little elliptical.
All I intended to convey was that I would take your questions back to
the Pentagon. I am not sure what the response will be. I don’t know
whether it will be a flat answer or the answer will be that this falls
within the previous general statement, with certain aspects relating to
national security and classified accordingly.
Senator PELL. Is there any reason why any Member of the House
and Senate should be denied information relating to weather modifica-
tion activities on a classified basis? What is the reason for this wool
that we find in this regard? It is extremely frustrating because theo-
retically we have a certain oversight responsibility. We authorize and
appropriate money the use of which we don’t always know. Why is it
that we are denied either in an open session or in a closed session
information with regard to these activities or these nonactivities?
Mr. FoEMAN. I am unable to elaborate on the statements which
have been made in this regard, Senator.
Senator PELL. Could you give us the reason why you are unable to
answer this question?
Mr. FoEMAN. Senator, if I am correct in my recollection, both you
and Senator Case a little while ago in effect asked that question of me,
and I undertook in response to your request to pass it along to the
Secretary's office. That is all I can do.
WITNESS' TERMS OF REFERENCE IN ANSWERING QUESTIONS
Senator PELL. Basically, would this be permissible from your
viewpoint? What are the terms of reference that have been given to
you in answering our questions? On any question in regard to weather
modification in Southeast Asia you are not permitted to answer; is
that correct?
Mr. ForMAN. Other than what the Secretary has said with regard
to North Vietnam.
Senator PELL. He said in answer to a question from the chairman,
I believe, that no such activities were being engaged in over North
Vietnam. He did not say Southeast Asia. He limited himself to
North Vietnam.
Mr. FoEMAN. Correct.
MISSION OF OL-2 UNIT AT UD ORN AIR FORCE BASE
Senator PELL. Would you be free to comment on the mission of the
unit that had the description OL-2 stationed at Udorn Air Force Base
in Thailand or would this be beyond your terms of reference?
47
Mr. FoEMAN. I don’t know the unit and I don’t know whether, if I
did know of the unit, it would or would not be within my terms of
reference.
Senator PELL. Could I ask you to take that back and submit for
the record a brief résumé of the mission of the unit authorized by the
Congress and paid for by the taxpayers? In this particular case, if you
wish to make it classified, make it classified.
Could you permit yourself to do that?
Mr. FoEMAN. I will certainly take back anything the chairman asks
me to take back. But I cannot commit the Department of Defense
as to the answer, sir.
(The information referred to follows:)
MISSION OF OL–2 UNIT AT UDORN AIR FORCE BASE
(Supplied by Department of Defense)
The mission of the unit is to provide aerial reconnaissance weather data as
may be necessary to support 7AF combat operations. In addition, provides storm
weather reconnaissance as requested by the Joint Typhoon Warning Center.
Senator PELL. This is one of the reasons why we asked Secretary
Laird for somebody who would be able to give these answers.
ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN POPEYE AND INTERMEDIARY COMPATRIOT
If we ask you these questions and there is no comment, we just go
through the ritual. In what weather modification activities has the
American Government engaged in in Southeast Asia other than
Popeye and Intermediary Compatriot?
Mr. FoEMAN. The same answer, Mr. Chairman.
HAVE ARMED SERVICES PROVIDED SUPPORT FOR CIA2
Senator PELL. Have the armed services provided support to the
CIA for the purpose of carrying on weather modification activities?
Mr. FoEMAN. The same answer, Mr. Chairman.
DOES DOD SHARE INFORMATION WITH OTHER CIVILIAN AGENCIES.”
Senator PELL. Does the DOD share information concerning its
weather modification activities with other civilian agencies?
Mr. FoEMAN. The same answer, Mr. Chairman.
WHY DOD RATHER THAN CIVILIAN AGENCIES.”
Senator PELL. You mentioned earlier that the armed services have
engaged in a number of weather modification operations at the re-
quest of and in cooperation with other governments.
Why should such activities be carried out by DOD rather than one
of the civilian agencies, such as NOAA or the Department of Com-
merce?
Mr. FoEMAN. I believe I gave one example or one reason in the case
of the Azores, as one reason why DOD was doing it rather than others.
It might also be that the assets for undertaking the operation which
are already in place are those of DOD. Therefore, it would be less ex-
pensive for DOD to do it.
48
COULD WEATHER MODIFICATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA BREACH DIKES.”
Senator PELL. Could weather modifications in Southeast Asia, if
conducted, produce flooding and breaching of the dikes? That is not
saying what we are doing. I am asking if they were conducted could
they produce breaching of the dikes and floods?
Mr. FoEMAN. I don’t think I can go beyond the answer given from
a technical point of view to you earlier by Dr. Foster. You are asking
me to speculate on the outcome of the state of the art.
I am sorry, the letter I referred to was from Rady Johnson to you,
dated November 23, 1971. I would like to read that particular para-
graph.
There is no known way to make rain under all conditions. When the proper
meteorological conditions prevail, that is, when clouds capable of producing natural
rain exist, it is a relatively simple matter to increase the amount of rain which
will fall. The amount of rain is frequently of the order of 30 to 50 percent. This
augmentation is well within the natural limits of rainfall for regions within which
experiments have been conducted. Massive downpours far in excess of natural
occurrences have not been produced, and theoretical knowledge at hand indicates
that this will probably always be the case.
Similarly, there is no known technique which will permit the steering of storms
in a specific area. .
CAPABILITY OF DISSIPATING CLOUDS
Senator PELL. In addition to the seeding of clouds producing storms,
is it not also a military capability to be able to seed clouds and dis-
sipate them so as to expose the targets for possible bombing?
Mr. FORMAN. Again, Mr. Chairman, we are getting into the area
which I indicated earlier I could speculate as could anybody else who
thinks about the matter as to possible military applications of weather
modification activities.
Since I am not informed as to which of these possible speculative
uses might in fact be incorporated into existing planning or con-
tingency thinking, I would prefer not to speculate about the subject
lest my speculation be possibly construed as evidence of the fact that
we are in fact so planning or thinking.
CONSUITATION CON CEFINING CLOUD SEED ING TO DAMPEN
DEMONSTRATIONS
Senator PELL. Coming closer to home—and I hope this is not a
classified answer—has the Department of Defense ever been consulted
regarding the possibility of cloud seeding to produce rain to coincide
with antiwar demonstrations around Washington or other cities?
Mr. FoEMAN. I don’t know the answer to that.
Senator PELL. Could you find that out? Would that fall within
your terms of reference? Would you let us know?
Mr. FoEMAN. I will let you know.
Senator PELL. On an unclassified basis?
Mr. FoEMAN. Well, the answer will certainly be unclassified.
Senator PELL. Right. But the question is: Has DOD ever been con-
sulted regarding the possibility of cloud seeding to dampen
demonstrations?
Mr. FoEMAN. I presume when you say “consulted,” you mean re-
quested by some other Government agency or department?
49
Senator PELL. Exactly.
(The information referred to follows:)
DOD RESPONSE TO QUERY CONCERNING CLOUD SEEDING To DAMPEN
DEMONSTRATIONS
No such request was ever made to DOD.
RESEARCH CONCERN IN G. PRODUCTION OF ACIDIC FAIN FALL
Senator PELL. Has any means been developed to the best of your
knowledge, to treat clouds with chemicals that would produce acidic
rainfall capable of fouling mechanical equipment, such as radar,
trucks, artillery, or antiaircraft weapons? I am not talking about a
geographic area, but a general field of knowledge.
Mr. FoEMAN. You are talking research now?
Senator PELL. Yes.
Mr. FoEMAN. Not use and not operation. I don’t know the answer
to that question. As I indicated, our research is unclassified. The re-
ports are available.
Senator PELL. I am reading a press report and I wondered if you
would comment on its validity. It is to the effect that a method is
being developed for treating clouds with a chemical that eventually
produces an acidic rainfall capable of fouling the operation, in this
case, of North Vietnamese radar equipment.
The question I directed to you was whether the research was
being done.
Mr. FoEMAN. As I indicated, sir, I don’t know the answer to that.
The research, as I have previously said, is unclassified. Our reports
are distributed widely through the NTIS (National Technical In-
formation Service) of the Department of Commerce. Certainly, if we
have done it, it should show up in the periodic bibliographies.
AVAILAB IIITY OF WEATHER MODIFICATION RESEARCH
Senator PELL. Is all research in connection with weather modifi-
cation activities unclassified?
Mr. ForMAN. This is what I have been informed, that all our
research is conducted on an unclassified basis and the results of that
research is made available to the public.
Let me modify that to some extent. We might conceivably have
some research result which is proprietary. For example, if the work
were done by some industrial firm, there might conceivably be some
technical knowledge which is not classified but yet proprietary to the
firm and which might, therefore, not be widely disseminated but made
available only on a limited distribution basis to those who are engaged
in the field and who are obligated by contract to respect the proprie-
tary rights.
Senator PELL. Would this include the research done at China Lake
Research Center?
Mr. FoEMAN. So far as I know, it is unclassified in this area.
Senator PELL. In what area?
Mr. FoEMAN. Weather modification. As you know, there is other
research done at China Lake, which is a naval weapons center.
50
AVAILABILITY OF DIR. ST. AMAND TO TESTIFY
Senator PELL. But the weather modification is unclassified. Dr. St.
Amand is the head of that laboratory; is he not?
Mr. FoEMAN. I am not sure of his job description.
Senator PELL. He is head of the weather modification portion of it.
Mr. FoEMAN. I note from your letter to Secretary Laird that you
describe him as the head of the Earth and Planetary Sciences Division
of the Naval Weapons Center, China Lake.
Senator PELL. So his work would be unclassified?
Mr. ForMAN. Yes, sir. .
Senator PELL. So there is no reason why he could not come up here
without any wraps from the administration and be able to tell us
freely of his activities?
Mr. FoEMAN. I would presume if the questions were confined to
the actual research being conducted and the results of the research as
distinguished from the possible application of the research in terms
of military application, he should be able to testify in that area.
REASON FOR, DEFENSE DEPARTMENT MODIFICATION
OF RECOMMENDATION 218
Senator PELL. Going for a minute to the recent Stockholm meeting,
why did the Defense Department want to modify Recommendation
No. 218? What was the reason for that?
Mr. FoEMAN. I think Dr. Pollack has indicated the basic reasons.
I don’t know that I can enlarge upon what he said other than to remind
the chairman that, at least so far as I can recall, it is fairly standard
language in these treaties to modify these absolute obligations by such
words as “to the maximum extent feasible” or “where practicable,”
and so forth.
If I am not incorrect in my recollection, I believe the Seabed Arms
Control Treaty, to which reference has been made, has similar language
in its text.
TEASON FOR EXECUTIVE BRANCH SECRECY
Senator PELL. I want to return for a moment to the central point
that bothers me.
What is the reason for the secrecy of the executive branch in this
regard both in executive session and in open session? Why won’t they
discuss activities of this nature, either to say they are being done or
are not being done? I can’t get to my own satisfaction the reasons for it.
What we are dealing with here is the question, as Mr. Pollack
pointed out, of not just climate modification, which he said we would
eschew, but weather modification.
I realize weather modification is not going to change the weather
over Chicago 3 days later. But weather modification crosses frontiers.
This was made very clear when Secretary Laird said we are engaging
in no operations over North Vietnam. You don’t have to engage in
them over North Vietnam to have an effect.
The general question is: Isn’t it generally better to be rained on
with rain instead of rained on with bombs? The answer is “Yes, unless
the rain produces floods that kill or seeding clears the clouds in order
to drop bombs.”
51
It also opens up a Pandora's box of new weaponry. My own thought
is when you open this door, when this particular camel get’s his nose
under the tent of the arsenal of weapons and bores in, there will be
many more weapons along these lines that will develop, some of which
are outlined in Dr. MacDonald's excellent book. He will be a witness
here tomorrow.
We are dealing with the environment, with the climate, which is the
property of all citizens everywhere. This flat refusal to comment in
this field creates a very bad impression, not only in the minds of
the American public but I think of the Congress, too.
In my own 12 years here I don’t recall a single area where comment
is as flatly refused as this. If we are talking about the creation of rain
to flood out the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which may produce floods as
well that would be devastating to many of the civilians—if we are
doing that, why can’t we say so?
We are certainly saying we are dropping weapons that kill now.
What is the reason behind the adamancy of the executive department?
Can you give me some enlightenment? We have been very patient on
the Hill, but there is a tremendous sense of frustration, and it is the
right of the public, the taxpayer, to know about it.
Can you give me a little guidance as to the thinking, the reasoning,
or the rationale of the Defense Department in saying no comment, or
the same comment and refusing to reply in open or private session?
Could you give me a little help?
Mr. FoEMAN. I regret that I am unable to, sir. I would, however,
like to call your attention to the fact that a few minutes ago when
you were talking about the general area, you used the word “climate.”
I presume that was inadvertent.
Senator PELL. I am sorry?
Mr. FoEMAN. I said that a few minutes ago in your statement you
used the word “climate” in the context of changing the environment,
as well as weather modification.
Senator PELL. Mr. Pollack said the United States would not engage
in any climate modification activities. What we are talking about
here is weather modification, a more tactical as opposed to strategic
approach.
Mr. FoEMAN. I merely wanted to make that point, sir. I am sure
you did not intend to use the word “climate” in the sense that Mr.
Pollack used it.
Senator PELL. I didn’t. I said I agreed with Mr. Pollack.
Mr. FoEMAN. I thought you said we would not comment about
“climate.”
Senator PELL. I said the Government eschewed the use of climate
modification. I accept that. What I am discussing with you is weather
modification, a very different subject, as you well know, which is the
specific subject of the draft treaty on which I am trying to get a
comment from the executive branch of the Government.
I don’t talk about climate modification. I talk about weather
modification which is a localized use of weather changing for military
I’08,SOIOS.
REASON FOR EXECUTIVE BRANCH REFUSAIL TO COMMENT
I recognize you are speaking here as an intelligent individual but
with certain guidance from the executive branch. However, I don’t
52
think I have ever heard as unresponsive a series of replies in open or
closed session really since I have been here on the Hill. -
I again would ask you: Could you not give us a little general,
broad, philosophical background without being specific on the reason
the executive branch refuses to comment in either closed or open
session on this subject?
Mr. FoEMAN. Mr. Chairman, I repeat, as I said earlier when
Senator Case was here, all I can do is take that question back to the
Secretary’s office for an answer. I am not in a position to respond to it.
Senator PELL. I am deeply aggravated, deeply disappointed and
must, I think, really recess this committee with the request for perhaps
Somebody who can comment. At least that broad comment would be
of interest to the American people, and certainly to me, as to why it
should be so classified.
I hope we will not continue doing these things. I think it ought to be
a matter of public knowledge. If it is in private knowledge we will
find the same weapons being used against us. We will find other
examples of weather modification or environmental modification being
#: that will have an effect on our agriculture, our fisheries, our own
II6 IlêI’€.
WITNESS' INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING DISCUSSING WEATHER
MODIFICATION
I think we should bring these approaches into the open. Rather
than saying that this will conclude the appearance of this particular
witness, I think I must press you one step further and say are you
under instructions not to discuss this subject?
Mr. FORMAN. I am sorry, I don’t understand what you mean by
this subject.
Senator PELL. This subject being the use of weather modification
activities for military purposes in Southeast Asia.
Mr. FoEMAN. Yes, sir.
Senator PELL. You are under instructions in that regard?
Mr. FoEMAN. Yes, sir.
Senator PELL. Then I really must recess this hearing and ask you
to take back the message to the Secretary of extreme disappointment
On my part, and on the part of the committee, and hope that a more
forthcoming witness, not criticizing you as an individual, but a
witness with instructions that will permit him to answer the general
questions I have asked, would be forthcoming, or that you could
submit for the record such information.
Mr. FORMAN. I understand.
Senator PELL. On that note of frustration, I think I must recess
this committee.
If you or another witness care to come back tomorrow, you would
be most welcome, particularly with regard to the last question of
what is the reason for the refusal of the Department to discuss this.
If a witness will come back tomorrow with that reply in an un-
classified form, we will put him on ahead of all the other witnesses.
I would hope that he might.
Accordingly, this committee is recessed until 10 o'clock tomorrow
morning.
53
(Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the subcommittee recessed, subject
to the call of the Chair.)
(Additional questions submitted by Senator Case and responses of
the Department of Defense follow:)
ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CASE AND
RESPONSES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Question 1: The Advanced Research Projects Agency’s multimillion-dollar
climatological modeling project is unclassified, uses some of the most advanced
computer technology in the world, and is available for use by NASA and other
civilian agencies. Are any parts of NILE BLUE, now renamed Climate Dynamics,
classified? Since its aim is to model the globe's climate—a pheonomenon very
much affected by non-military activities as industrial pollution—what is the
justification for ARPA’s sponsorship of the project? Why shouldn’t Climate
Dynamics be transferred to a civilian agency?
Answer (a): Are any parts of NILE BLUE (now renamed Climate Dynamics)
clsssified? No.
(b): What is the justification for ARPA’s sponsorship of the project? Why
shouldn’t Climate Dynamics be transferred to a civilian agency?
The Soviet Union has invested considerable effort and resources in developing
a well organized and extensive program in climate modification research. The
Director of the Soviet Hydrometeorological Service has declared that active
modification of climate is an objective of this research. A number of Specific
projects have been proposed to alleviate the harsh Russian climate with attendant
benefits to agriculture, navigation, and resource exploitation. These include
removal of the Arctic pack ice, damming of the Bering Straits, and diversion of
Siberian rivers,
These programs clearly might affect the climate of other parts of the world,
including the United States and its allies. Even marginal changes in temperature
and rainfall could drastically damage agriculture, shipping, and indeed the entire
economy. Military operations would also be impacted if the boundaries of pack
ice, the ice-free seasons of naval bases, the frequency of obscuring clouds, etc.
were altered. Thus climatic changes are clearly potentially grave threats to
national Security, and have consequent implications for military planning.
For these reasons, it is incumbent upon the DOD to develop a capability to
predict the climatic effects of foreign actions and to detect modifications which
may be in progress. With a scientifically credible detection capability, world
opinion and the instruments of national power may be mobilized to reverse actions
damaging to the national interest. These specialized national security questions
are incompatible with the missions of the civil agencies, whose meteorological
programs center on weather prediction and basic research in atmospheric physics.
Question 2: Has the Department conducted any detailed studies on the long-
range effects of extensive weather modification activities?
Answer: No.
Question 3: In your statement, you stated the Department of Defense's field
research and development efforts are “usually joint efforts.” Could you name and
describe the projects which are not joint efforts?
Answer: See attachments to insert on page 37.
Question 4: Is there any classified weather modification research going on at
present? If so, what is its extent, its budget, and its purpose? Do the China
Lake Naval Ordnance Laboratory, or the Air Force Cambridge Research Labora-
tories play a role? If so, what is it?
Answer: No classified weather modification research is being conducted.
PROHIBITING MILITARY WEATHER MODIFICATION
THURSDAY, JULY 27, 1972
UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS AND
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE
CoMMITTEE ON FoREIGN RELATIONs,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., room 4221,
New Senate Office Building, Senator Claiborne Pell (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Pell and Case.
Senator PELL. The Subcommittee on Oceans and International
Environment will come to order.
OPENING STATEMENT
In opening our hearing this morning on this subject, I would like
to read into the record a letter which I wrote Secretary Laird yesterday.
It reads as follows:
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: You no doubt have been informed that I felt compelled
this morning to recess the hearing of the Subcommittee on Oceans and Inter-
national Environment because of the nonresponsive testimony of Mr. Benjamin
Forman, Assistant General Counsel, International Affairs, of the Department of
Defense. The subject matter in question concerned the weather modification
activities of the Defense Department in Southeast Asia.
Although Mr. Forman readily discussed aspects of weather modification in
which he said the Defense Department had no operational programs, Mr. Forman
indicated that he was under instructions not to answer the subcommittee’s
questions concerning weather modification in Southeast Asia, on the grounds of
the security classification of the information involved. When asked why such
information should be classified, or why the restrictions had been placed upon his
testimony, Mr. Forman found himself unable to respond. Accordingly, I recessed
the hearing and asked Mr. Forman to relay to you my request that he return to
the Subcommittee hearing tomorrow with answers to my questions or that some
Other Defense Department witness appear who could explain the reason for
invoking security classification.
The explanation for the extraordinary secrecy with which this subject is
treated by the executive branch is a complete mystery to me. The fact that the
United States has engaged in weather modification in Southeast Asia is no longer
a Secret. On what basis can the Defense Department openly discuss its bombing
operations in North Vietnam and at the same time invoke secrecy in the case of
weather modification?
I sincerely hope that you will send a representative to tomorrow’s hearings to
address the questions left unanswered today. As I informed Mr. Forman, the
Subcommittee will arrange for your representative to appear at the outset of
tomorrow’s hearing.
There have been various telephone calls back and forth. At last
report there would be no witness coming up today. Am I correct? Is
anybody from the Defense Department here?
(No response.)
(55)
56
Senator PELL. No. So I want to read that letter into the record
and reexpress my shock and concern and, really, indignation at the
way we are apparently engaging in these activities and cloaking them
in secrecy and not commenting on them. As was brought out yester-
day, we will not comment on them as a Government either in open
session or closed session. So I imagine this seems to be one of, I hope,
a small number of activities on which the Congress is supposed to be
absolutely uninformed except for the four chairmen of the Armed
Services and the Appropriations Committees. I understand there are
inquiries being made through the press. The information that reaches
them is not as complete as it might be.
I would add that we will resume these hearings any time the De-
fense Department finds itself in a more responsive mood.
Today we continue our hearings on Senate Resolution 281, which
expresses the sense of the Senate that the United States should
seek the agreement of other Governments to a proposed treaty pro-
hibiting the use of any environmental or geophysical modification
activity as a weapon of war.
Yesterday the Defense Department witness admitted that he had
been instructed not to answer any questions concerning military
weather modification operations in Southeast Asia. This response
reinforces my own belief that the United States is, indeed, utilizing
weather modification techniques as a weapon of warfare. Such action
may cause irreparable damage to our global environment and could
undermine existing peaceful scientific projects, such as the global
atmospheric research program and the world weather watch.
I sincerely hope that the administration will reconsider its position
on this issue of environmental warfare before more damaging prece-
dents are set.
I know that a number of the distinguished witnesses here today
share this view, and I am looking forward to hearing their testimony.
Our first witness today is my own colleague in the Congress, Con-
gressman Gilbert Gude. Is he here?
HEARING PER O CEDUFE
make their plans accordingly. I understand that Dr. White has a
pressing engagement afterward, and I hope Dr. MacDonald would
forgive me if I ask Dr. White to come in ahead of him.
Welcome, colleague, to the session. I would add the witnesses can
STATEMENT OF HON. GILBERT GUDE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CON-
GRESS FROM THE EIGHTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IMARYLAND
Mr. GUDE. Mr. Chairman, it is a distinct privilege to appear before
this subcommittee. You, Mr. Chairman, have a remarkable record of
sponsoring arms control measures, particularly the Seabed Treaty,
for which we owe you so much. It is encouraging, therefore, that this
committee is considering the challenge to good sense and arms control
raised by the specter of geophysical warfare.
I have served for almost 2 years as Chairman of the World Environ-
ment and International Cooperation Committee of Members of Con-
gress for Peace through Law—MCPL. MCPL is a bipartisan, bi-
57
cameral association of 32 Senators and 101 Congressmen. Together
with Senator Alan Cranston, our committee's Vice Chairman, we
have been investigating the military use of weather modification since
March of 1971. -
I have noted that you will hear from a number of eminent scien-
tists today, and that yesterday you were briefed by administration
spokesmen, such as it was. I will leave the technical details of this
new form of warfare to these experts. I do want to explore, however,
three major areas of my concern over the development and use of
environmental warfare techniques: The arms control implications,
the effects on the U.S. scientific community, and the environmental
Consequences.
ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE TECHNIQUES
Concerning arms control implications, it appears that this country
has precipitously blundered into a most unwise use of technology. The
arms control implications are staggering. As Senator Cranston and I
pointed out to the Secretary of Defense on June 15, 1971;
Using weather modification as a military tool opens the door to a vast unknown
category of warfare. Although techniques are primitive today, experience with
Other military systems suggests that refinements inevitably will come.”
We are taking a step that demands gifted foresight and prophecy
beyond our powers. For this reason alone, caution—even abstention—
should be our guide.
COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS
Why should we be so alarmed about a technique that is not nearly
as lethal as other forms of warfare? There are several reasons: First,
there are distinct command and control problems associated with
geophysical warfare and weather modification in particular. We simply
do not have effective short- or long-term control over the climates of
the world. We can create certain disturbances, but as civilian ex-
periments have shown, control is not very precise. In a military en-
vironment, control over the results of weather experimentation is
even more uncertain.
The command problem is no less acute. Since the technology to date
does not involve great expense or sophisticated equipment, it is not
difficult to imagine the use of weather modification by many different
military subunits. In fact, there have been reports that we have trained
the South Vietnamese to use weather modification. There are no
double-key Safing mechanisms here, no exclusive possession as with
nuclear weapons.
POTENTIAL INDISCRIMINATENESS
We must also consider that the use of weather modification is
potentially indiscriminate. Unlike other weapons, the winds and
Seas are not so directable that we can discriminate between one target
and another. By their nature, they are area wide weapons. We cannot
flood Only military targets or cause drought in areas producing only
military rations. The technology will be used against people regardless
of their uniform or occupation. Weather modification will inevitably
strike civilians harder than nearby military objectives. Will rain along
the Ho Chi Minh Trail succeed where years of bombing has not?
58
And what price will it exact from the agrarian societies along its
path, both friend and foe?
DIFFICULTY OF DETECTION
The issues of command, control, and discrimination highlight
another disturbing characteristic of weather modification, the diffi-
culty of detection. Unlike other weapons, it may be possible to initiate
military weather modification projects without being detected. In
other words, the military results may not be visibly tied to the initiat-
ing party. This raises the possibility of the clandestine use of geo-
physical warfare where a country does not know if it has been attacked.
The uncertainty of this situation, the fear of not knowing how another
country may be altering your climate, is highly destabilizing.
POSSIBILITY OF FALSE CHARGES
I can also envision another possibility. Suppose, for example, that
a U.S. plane flys a routine, nonmilitary mission near Chile, Egypt, or
Tanzania and by some quirk of fate a major earthquake, flood, or
forest fire occurs in one of these countries. Because we have been tink-
ering with geophysical warfare, we could be charged with creating
that environmental calamity due to the mere proximity of the U.S.
aircraft. Propaganda would echo around the world. There is ample
precedent for believing that this could happen. We need only remem-
ber the incident during the Korean war when the North Koreans
unjustly claimed that we were using poison gas.
ADMINISTRATION LEADERSHIP IN ARMS CONTROL FIELD
The administration has shown great leadership in the arms control
field. SALT and the ban on biological weapons are two excellent
examples. It is to this record that we should look for a model to follow.
There are certain parallels between weather modification and the
early use of chemical warfare in Vietnam. Then, as now, we did not
know the long-term consequences of our actions. We are only now
beginning to understand how profound was our effect on the Viet-
namese ecology. We cannot afford to repeat this experience. There-
fore, I propose that the President's initiative in the biological field
could be used as a relevant model for restrictions on geophysical
warfare.
CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARY ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE ON SCIENTIFIC
COMMIUNITY
Mr. Chairman, my second area of concern deals with the conse-
quences of U.S. military environmental warfare on the U.S. scientific
community. Geophysical warfare can poison the atmosphere sur-
rounding legitimate international programs such as the global at-
mospheric research program, the international hydrological decade
and meteorology in general. We have already seen that it caused the
U.S. delegation at the Stockholm Conference to water down a recom-
mendation on climatic changes. The potential for embarrassment is
great and for that reason Senator Cranston and I conducted our
59
correspondence with the Defense Department in private for over a
year until the issue broke in the press.
Our scientific community could come under suspicion or attack at
these international meetings. The trust built over the years by our
excellent atmospheric scientists could be dispelled in one stroke of
Pentagon experimentation. For this reason, it is of paramount im-
portance that the Secretary of Defense publicly divorce, all U.S.
military weather modification or geophysical research activities from
civilian organizations.
The U.S. Forest Service already has been drawn into the Vietnam
conflict and in a most disturbing manner. Who would have thought
that the same agency that teaches “Help Smoky stamp out forest
fires!” would be contracted by the Pentagon to help create firestorms
in Vietnam. It is a sign of the pervasive influence of this mistaken war.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WEATHER MODIFICATION
In recent years we have come to realize that many of our activities
in society have undesirable environmental consequences. Too often
we learn of these after much of the damage has been done. The area
of weather modification has potential for causing considerable environ-
mental harm and I regret the fact that the public has been kept
ignorant of what developments are taking place.
The Department of Defense has testified that it is conducting a
study of climate modification known as Project Nile Blue. Under this
study a sophisticated computer called the Illiac TV will further advance
our technological knowledge of how to change weather patterns.
Obviously, such knowledge can be used for offensive military purposes.
Today there exists the strong likelihood that we have artifically
increased rainfall in Indochina. Obviously, this activity can be
significantly destructive. Floods and intense downpours can do more
than hinder troop movements; they kill people and they destroy
property.
Such operations are still at a primitive stage; however, beyond
making rain, we just look to the possibility of prolonging droughts,
redirecting storms and hurricanes and setting off earthquakes with
small nuclear devices. Even the possibility of permanently changing
the world’s climate by tampering with the polar ice cap is no longer
in the realm of science fiction.
We learned at the dawn of the atomic age that no military potential
will long remain in the sole control of one power. It may be possible,
for example, that as the Soviets develop their computer technology
their weather control technology will progress correspondingly. But
we should not be forced into this field due to some possible Soviet
interest and neither should we encourage the U.S.S.R. to increase its
capability because of our experimentations. It is in the best interest
of both countries to avoid a technology race that could culminate in
environmental disasters.
Many authorities have testified that weather modification is a
Pandora's box. This is true in more ways than one. We not only do
not know how far our technology will take us, but we also have no
idea of what may be the permanent consequences of the experiments
we have conducted so far. The top secret acidic rain, produced by the
60
so-called hydroscopic seeding, is a prime example. Has it changed
the acid content of the soil? Does it destroy plant life or alter the
ecosystem of the area on which it falls?
ABSENCE OF NATIONAL POLICY ON WIEATHER MODIFICATION
In the exchange of correspondence with the Department of Defense,
Senator Cranston and I repeatedly inquired about U.S. national
policy regarding weather modification. In one reply we were told that
weather modification has been discussed in DOD for some 20 years.
It probably goes back even further, for during World War II we
solved a fog problem at Iwo Jima airport by blasting the top off
a nearby hill. Regardless of the time span, the most startling point
is that only recently has an Under Secretary’s committee been
convened to formulate a definitive national policy. Twenty years or
more we have been moving toward a new form of warfare with no
overall policy guidance. Deputy Director of Research and Engineering,
John S. Foster, has said that “Presumably this policy when completed
will be announced to the Nation in some appropriate fashion.”
I think we have all waited too long. I must also note that the
Pentagon has been most uncooperative in our search for answers.
They have decided to keep this aspect of our Vietnam policy secret
from the public and from Congress except for one or two committee
chairmen.
F.EC OMIMIENDATIONS
In light of the potential embarrassment and environmental hazards
involved in geophysical warfare, I have three firm recommendations:
First, I recommend that all geophysical research and development
be conducted under open, civilian auspices except disignated defensive
military applications designed to Save lives. Picking up downed pilots
and fog control at airports would be examples of permitted activities.
There is no justification for DOD to remain in the business of har-
nessing the environment for military use. -
Second, I recommend that the United States reject all forms of
geophysical warfare as of a date certain and request other nations to
join in an international treaty to that effect. The model of the bio-
logical agreements could well be followed, including a no first-use
provision.
Third, I recommend the creation of a civilian oversight board com-
posed of representatives of the National Academy of Sciences—NAS,
Environmental Protection Agency—EPA, Department of Defense—
DOD, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency—ACDA, Department
of Agriculture, Department of the Interior, Department of Com-
merce—NOAA, NASA, Department of State and a nonvoting repre-
sentative from the United States Intelligence Board—USIB, to be
chaired by NAS, to insure that all environmental research and opera-
tions do not have covert military applications and to insure the
divorce of military and civilian Scientists studying geophysical
engineering. -
61
INSERTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks except to ask that my
exchange of correspondence with the Department of Defense be
placed in the record at this point, along with the two excellent articles
from Science magazine by reporter Deborah Shapley; and a letter to
the President jointly signed by the Federation of American Scientists
and the Sierra Club.
Senator PELL. Without objection, they will be placed in the record.
(See appendix, pp. 103 and 108.)
ARTICLE BY MIR. PFFIFFER AND ME. WESTING
Mr. GUDE. I also commend to the committee a recent article ap-
pearing in Environment magazine by E. W. Pfeiffer and Arthur H.
Westing on the “Environmental Impact of Modern Weapons Tech-
nology in Southeast Asia.” (See appendix, p. 115.)
Thank you. I appreciate your consideration.
Senator PELL. Thank you very much for a thoughful and construc-
tive statement.
TJNJUST ACCUSATIONS
I was particularly struck by the point that we can be accused
unjustly of engaging in this kind of activity if we don’t open up our
present activities. We could be accused unjustly, as you pointed out,
if a plane or vessel happened to be in the proximity of a natural
disaster somewhere around the world.
S. R.E.S. 281 DRAFT PROPOSAL AS WORKING MODEL
In connection with your second recommendation to the effect that
we would join in an international treaty, I was wondering if you had
a chance to go over Senate Resolution 281 and what your reaction
was to that particular draft proposal as a working model.
Mr. GUDE. I am strongly in support of the general thrust of the
resolution, Senator Pell, and would like to submit comments point by
point to your resolution.
Senator PELL. I would welcome those comments as I look at this
first draft with improvements made in the use of the word “eschew”
rather than “prohibit,” which, I believe, is a legal connotation that is
preferable. I would hope that before too many years have gone by we
would see emerging at the United Nations some treaty of this sort.
I thank you very much for coming up and giving us your time.
Mr. GUDE. Thank you, Senator Pell.
Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Gude, very much.
The next witness is Dr. Robert White, Administrator of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Com-
merce, a friend and individual whom I admire very much.
Would you introduce your colleagues?
82–892—72—5
62
STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. WHITE, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
0CEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE; ACCOMPANIED BY DONALD MOORE, ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION; AND
JAMES BRENNAN, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NOAA
Mr. WHITE. I’d be glad to do that, Mr. Chairman.
On my left I have Donald Moore, our Assistant Administrator,
Environmental Modification; and on my right is James Brennan of
our General Counsel's Office.
I welcome this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee
today to discuss the international aspects of weather modification and
the possible control of other geophysical processes.
There is no doubt in my mind that we have only just begun to
develop the potential for human betterment by the artificial modifica-
tion of natural environmental processes. Our capabilities for con-
sciously affecting environmental processes are still primitive. Our
scientific understanding on which such capabilities are based is limited.
Nevertheless, we have reached a point where some of our techniques
are useful. This is true in the field of weather control. In other fields,
such as earthquake control, only the theoretical possibilities are under
examination. Because it is in the field of weather control where the
widest spread activity is now going on, I would like to focus my
remarks on the status in this field.
ABILITY TO AFFECT PRECIPITATION PROCESSES
What is the nature of the weather control capabilities we now
possess? Almost all capabilities are based on the concept of seeding
cloud systems with agents such as silver iodide, dry ice or salt, thereby
providing nuclei which affect the precipitation processes.
We now have the ability to disperse cold fog where water droplets
are below freezing. This technology is widely used at airports around
the world where cold fog occurs with some regularity. In the case of
warm fog, present experimental techniques have shown some promise,
but no reliable and practical warm fog dispersal system now exists.
Success with warm fog dispersion can make it possible to deal success-
fully with the remaining airports having significant fog problems.
We now have the ability to modify rain or snow in certain geographi-
cal regions and under certain meteorological conditions. Experiments
in Florida with tropical cumulus and with clouds formed on the up-
slopes of mountains in the West indicate that rain can be increased
in a reasonably predictable way when cloud conditions are right. In
other types of clouds and in other geographical locations, the results
have been mixed and in some cases precipitation appears to have been
suppressed when the opposite effect was intended.
As we learn more about precipitation processes, we can look forward
to the time when we can deal successfully with a broader range of
meteorological phenomena and over wide geographical areas. In time,
we should be able to increase precipitation in a predictable manner
for the purposes of increasing soil moisture, replenishing reservoirs
and the like. As our knowledge expands we can look forward to the
time when it will be possible to redistribute precipitation in order to
63
make more efficient use of the moisture reaching the ground. We can
also visualize the possibility that one day our science and technology
may enable us to suppress unwanted precipitation. One need only
recall the recent Rapid City and east coast flood disasters to realize
the tremendous benefits to be derived from such a capability.
However, the full potential of precipitation enhancement, redis-
tribution and suppression will not be realized until we learn a great
deal more than we know now about the physics and dynamics of
clouds and cloud systems. Improved nucleation theory, better tech-
niques for delivering the seeding agents to the target area, more accu-
rate and reliable instrumentation, carefully designed and controlled field
experiments and the development of computer models to simulate
the actual microphysical and dynamic changes that take place during
seeding, all are needed before we can say we understand the processes
involved and can routinely obtain predictable and beneficial results.
HAIL AND LIGHTNING SUPPRESSION
Hail and lightning suppression through weather modification is
showing increasing promise. The Russians and French are obtaining
results in suppressing hail to reduce crop damage and our U.S. experi-
ments in hail suppression are now maturing. The United States has
reported some success with experiments to reduce forest fires through
lightning suppression techniques.
MODIFYING HTJ REICANES AND OTHER SEVERE STORMS
We are exploring the possibility of modifying hurricanes and other
severe storms. Theoretical and experimental work in the last decade
have placed our approach to these problems on a sound scientific basis
with encouraging results. In experiments in hurricane Debbie of
several years ago, the maximum winds in the hurricane eyewall were
reduced by as much as 30 percent. While this was extremely encourag-
ing, many more such experiments will be necessary to confirm these
results as a change of this magnitude is within the natural variability
of hurricanes. The benefits of a successful hurricane moderation capa-
bility would be tremendous. Hurricanes, typhoons and tropical
cyclones bring devastation by wind, flood-producing rain and—most
lethal of all—the storm surge. Hurricane Betsy in 1965 ushered in the
era of the billion dollar hurricane, causing $1,420,500,000 in property
damage—slightly exceeded in 1969 by Camille, with $1,420,700,000
in damage.
In a recent study of hurricane modification, Stanford Research
Institute estimates benefits of up to $200 million from moderating
single storms such as Betsy or Camille. No dollar values can be placed
on the reduction in human suffering that would also result.
EFFECT OF CILOTD SEEDING OUTSIDE SEED ED AREA
Another unknown in weather modification is the effect that cloud
seeding may have on weather outside the area undergoing seeding.
Some preliminary studies indicate that such an effect may in fact occur.
Additional study of this is needed.
64
INTERNATIONAL INTEREST IN WIEATHER MODIFICATION
The potential benefits of weather modification are widely recognized
in many nations, and work in this field is spreading. The following
countries have active programs to determine means for increasing
precipitation when and where it is needed: Australia, Brazil, India,
Israel, Japan, Mexico, the Philippines and the U.S.S.R. Countries
actively engaged in studying means for dispersing fog include Canada,
France and the U.S.S.R. Countries having active hail suppression
lºgº; programs include Canada, France, Italy, Japan and the
Perhaps just as important, many nations are now actively seeking
assistance in the use of weather modification techniques to alleviate
water shortages and reduce hail-induced crop losses. The United States
has assisted these countries in a variety of ways. We have loaned
experts who act as consultants to the meteorological agencies of the
countries concerned. These experts study the climatology of the area
and advise on weather modification techniques and field programs. In
other cases, private U.S. weather modification companies have entered
into contracts with foreign countries for the purpose of augmenting
precipitation and/or suppressing hail. Countries that have received
U.S. assistance or have contracted with the U.S. companies in recent
years include Afghanistan, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cyprus, Ethiopia,
Iran, Kenya, Libya, the Philippines and Taiwan.
International interest in weather modification is high and growing.
But such common interest in weather is not new. The nations of the
world depend upon one another for weather data. Storms move across
national boundaries and all countries depend on one another to be
forewarned of these events. Weather has been a binding international
force and traditionally it has been an area of almost selfless collabora-
tion among nations. To coordinate the international data exchanges
and other meteorological activities, the United Nations has established
the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). The WMO and its
predecessor organization, the International Meteorological Organiza-
tion, date back to 1873.
NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND COOPERATION
Now that certain kinds of weather modification are a reality, it is
possible for actions in one country to affect the weather of another.
The potential for conflict is immediately apparent and the need for
international coordination and cooperation becomes vital if we are to
make progress and realize the potential benefits of this technology.
International cooperation in weather modification is of long-standing.
The WMO has considered the subject of international weather modifi-
cation for two decades.
The need for international cooperation is illustrated by Project
Stormfury, a program designed to investigate the feasibility of
reducing the intensity of hurricanes. The program is a joint Depart-
ment of Commerce/Department of Defense endeavor and is co-
ordinated with foreign countries in the operating areas by the State
Department. This program has been in continuous operation in the
Gulf, Caribbean and Western Atlantic since 1962. We are hopeful of
moving the experiment to the Pacific in a few years to enable us to
65
experiment on more storms and in a larger area. The cooperation of
countries such as the Philippines, Japan, Taiwan, Korea and the
Peoples Republic of China will be indispensable to this experiment,
inasmuch as the typhoons involved in the experiment will probably
eventually enter one or more of these countries.
FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
International cooperation takes many forms. Much of the useful
exchange is outside governmental channels on a scientist-to-scientist
basis. It also results from bilateral and multilateral agreements. A
good example of the latter is the exchange program with the U.S.S.R.
On behalf of the United States, NOAA sponsored an exchange in the
field of weather modification in 1969 with the Soviet Hydrometeoro-
logical Service under the U.S./U.S.S.R. exchange agreement. A six-
man U.S. delegation visited the Soviet Union for 4 weeks in May of
1969 and the Soviet delegation returned the visit in the fall of 1969.
As a follow-up to this exchange, the National Center for Atmospheric
Research and the Hydrometeorological Service of the U.S.S.R. are
exchanging visits this year in the field of hail suppression.
U.S. DEPENDENCE ON OTHER COUNTRIES' COOPERATION
I cite these examples to illustrate that the United States depends
on the cooperation of other countries for the furtherance of its own
weather modification programs. The research and experimentation
going on in all countries are contributing daily to our knowledge of
weather modification. This open exchange of information will be
increasingly important as the science advances worldwide. To insure
the continued advancement of weather modification research and
development, and to apply this technology for human benefit, the
United States must conduct its civilian programs with maximum
openness and within the framework of specific safeguards designed to
protect the interests of the United States and of other countries.
SENATE RESOLUTION 281
Mr. Chairman, to this point I have focused my remarks exclusively
on the status and international apsects of weather modification. I
would now like to turn to Senate Resolution 281. Our views on the
proposed treaty have been given by the Department of State. There
are, however, two points concerning the resolution that I wish to note.
First, in my view, it is not possible to draw clear distinctions
between research and technological development on weather modi-
fication for hostile and nonhostile purposes.
The second point I wish to make concerns the state of our knowl-
edge regarding environmental and geophysical control. The question
arises as to whether we know enough about artificial interference with
the forces of nature to consider a meaningful treaty at this time. I
have already discussed the limited nature of our knowledge of weather
modification.
We do not fully understand the full impact on the long-term climatic
changes now taking place in the earth's atmosphere due to the activities
of man or as a result of natural causes—for example, volcanoes. We
66
know very little about the possibilities of inducing lasting climatic
change as this knowledge depends to a large extent on research now
being carried out on the general circulation of the atmosphere and the
interaction between ocean and atmosphere.
As I mentioned earlier, earthquake control must be considered far
in the future. A few experiments indicate that it may be possible to
stimulate small earthquakes along known active faults by injection of
a fluid under high pressure through a bore hole, but the extrapolation
of this work to the deliberate release of significant energy by an earth-
quake fault is highly conjectural.
Large-scale modification of the oceans also seems remote at this
time.
The concept underlying the proposed treaty is an important one
that deserves extensive discussion and further study. However, our
knowledge of environmental control techniques must be further
advanced before it would be desirable to consider proposal of any
treaty.
I will be glad to answer any questions you may have.
Senator PELL. Thank you very much indeed, Dr. White.
I was very struck by the sentence in your statement where you
talked about the importance of the openness of the research and
experimentation going on and the need to cooperate between nations
in this regard.
DESIRABILITY OF PROHIBITING USE OF WEATHER MODIFICATION IN
WARFARE
I want to ask you whether you believe it would be desirable to
prohibit the use of weather modification in warfare?
I realize that you have put your views into the Department of
State as a lead agency and, as you know, they have opposed the
pressing ahead with my Senate resolution as of now. But I would like
to put to you the more general question as to whether you believe it
would be desirable, in our national interest, to prohibit the use of
weather modification in warfare, as a general statement, without going
into the specifics of this treaty? -
Mr. WHITE. Mr. Chairman, I would have to defer, on that question,
to those agencies of the Government that are responsible for formulat-
ing that kind of national policy. The decisions as to what is in the
general national interest on this matter are the responsibility of the
Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
and the Department of Defense. -
Senator PELL. Right. You were not here, I don’t think, yesterday.
We had the Department of Defense witness with us and I think in
my 12 years here I have never received such a series of replies to the
effect that he couldn’t reply. He said he was under instructions in this
regard. The thing that is so frustrating for this committee is that in
private, executive session we also were told that no comments can be
made in this field. One is left with the conclusion this is of such para-
mount national interest, it is so secret, that the Congress is not to be
trusted with it, in closed or open session. The Defense Department
says it has informed the four chairmen of the appropriate committees.
The Foreign Relations Committee is not one. So I am trying to create
a general viewpoint or a consensus as to what would be best for the
country, and really for humanity, as we move on down the road.
67
HAS NOAA COOPERATED IN WEATHER MODIFICATION ACTIVITIES IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA’”
Going back to your own agency, has NOAA cooperated in weather
modification activities in Southeast Asia?
Mr. WHITE. No, sir.
Senator PELL. So you would not be directly part of or cognizant of
any operations in that part of the world?
Mr. WHITE. I have no knowledge of any of the alleged weather
modification activities in Southeast Asia.
Senator PELL. Thank you.
DISCHARGING RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF MILITARY
- OPERATIONS
Do you think that in your own work you could discharge a respon-
sibility effectively when you are in international conferences without
knowledge of whatever military operations we are engaged in in this
field? Do you feel inhibited?
Mr. WHITE. Mr. Chairman, I believe that it is likely that the kind
of publicity that has now been given to the alleged operations in Viet-
nam will cause difficulties for us in international conferences where we
are discussing meteorology. I say this on the basis of previous ex-
periences I personally have had in international conferences going back
a number of years.
For example, some years ago the Soviet Union, on the basis of articles
or statements which had appeared, leveled accusations that the United
States was planning the military use of weather modification. So I
think it would be fair to say that there is a good chance that the kind of
attention that has been given to this problem in the press and other-
wise will likely give rise to similar kinds of statements in international
conferences and will make it difficult for us. -
However, I should also say that there is no evidence to date, on the
basis of my interactions with other countries, that any of these things
have in any way impeded to this point in time our ability to cooperate
with these nations on weather modification.
Senator PELL. We were both together at the Stockholm Conference,
a really remarkable conference, and, one at which I was very glad to
have been with you. We saw the damage that was done to our position
by the various environmental activities in which we had engaged in
South Vietnam. I would think it would be very much the same kind of
circumstance if the weather activities in which we have engaged be-
came established.
PROHIBITING ACTIVITIES BEFORE THEY ARE TO O FAR DEVELOPED
Along the same line, wouldn’t it be a good idea to get a treaty pro-
hibiting these activities into effect before they are too far developed?
When I worked on the Seabed Disarmament Treaty and we pre-
vented weapons of mass destruction, those weapons were on the draw-
ing boards of the nations involved, the Soviet Union and our own.
There is evidence from the excellent articles by Mr. DeSilva and Mr.
Hersh and others in the press here that we are engaged in these activi-
ties in Indochina. The question I am putting to you is—it is an iffy
68
question—isn’t it better if the weapons are in being to move ahead
even faster with some kind of prohibition than if they are just on the
drawing board?
Mr. WHITE. Again, Mr. Chairman, I must go back to the point I
made previously. I do not feel myself personally qualified to comment
on the possible military applications of weather modification and their
implication for a treaty, or for how such treaty would be drawn. I
would again say I would have to defer to those agencies of our Govern-
ment who have the responsibility for such matters.
Senator PELL. I understand completely and sympathize with your
position. The problem we face is that the executive branch agencies
that are responsible decline to inform us and it all seems to move up
and up and up, as we understand it, to the powerful and potent Dr.
Kissinger, who is the head of the NSC, where these decisions are made.
I believe we will succeed eventually in ventilating this subject and it
will become a matter of record. - . " .
CAUSE OF RECENT FILOODS IN UNITED STATES
Is there any evidence that the North Vietnamese, the Chinese, or
§. Ryssians caused the recent floods in our own northern United
tates' - - -
Mr. WHITE. None whatsoever. I hope the question, Mr. Chairman,
is asked in a humorous vein because this was the greatest disaster ever
to strike the east coast of the United States. - -
Senator PELL. I am well aware of that. .
Mr. WHITE. And there is no shred of evidence of any kind of any-
body or group tampering with the weather during this circumstance.
FLOODS IN NORTH WIETNAM
Senator PELL. Do you think there is any relationship between the
disastrous floods a couple of years ago in North Vietnam and our own
activities?
Mr. WHITE. I am not familiar with the details of the flooding there or
the meteorological circumstances pertaining to them, so I couldn’t
answer that question. -
PROJECTS UNIDER MAY 23 AGREEMENT WITH SOVIET UNION
Senator PELL. You mentioned in your statement a bilateral agree-
ment with the Soviet Union dealing with hail suppression. Could you
fill us in with any other weather modification project that would be
carried out under the authority of the agreement that was signed by
the Soviet Union on May 23, 1972? Are there any others?
Mr. WHITE. Well, we have had rather extensive cooperation. A lot of
us have been to their laboratories and have watched their experiments.
I have been there myself. We have gained the information that they
have. In turn they have been here.
We are presently cooperating in hail-suppression experiments. This
is the first time there have been long-term visits and participation by
scientists of each side in the activities of the other. In that sense, be-
cause of the long-term nature of the exchange, it differs from the
previous Ones.
69
RAPID CITY FLOOD DISASTER
Senator PELL. In connection with the Rapid City flood disaster, do
you think there is any relationship with the cloud-seeding experiments
conducted by the South Dakota School of Science and Technology?
Mr. WHITE. I believe that the analysis that I have seen, prepared
under the direction of the Bureau of Reclamation, and also at the re-
quest of the Governor of that State, indicates there was no connec-
tion between the seeding and that flood.
INCREASED RAINFALL IN EVERGLADES PARK
Senator PELL. When there was some concern with regard to the dry-
ing up of the Everglades Park, so near that marvelous installation we
struggled to get in Rhode Island but which is now in Florida, there
were some cloud-seeding experiments. I was wondering if there is any
relationship to these experiments and the increase in rainfall that oc-
curred there?
Mr. WHITE. Well, that was a very serious situation. They had a
severe drought there several seasons ago, and we were requested by
the Governor of Florida to extend our experimental work, which had
been directed at increasing rainfall from cumulus clouds, to see if we
could not ameliorate the drought. At that time we did conduct a series
of seeding experiments down there. The results indicate that our seed-
ing did have some effect in ameliorating some of the drought in local
8.I’628,S.
GETTING RID OF CLOUDS OVER AIRPORTS
Senator PELL. As I understand it, we are now able to get rid of
clouds over airports if they are in warm droplets but not if in cold
droplets? -
Mr. WHITE. The reverse is true. If the droplets are below freezing,
it is possible to get them to crystallize and drop out.
Senator PELL. We have not yet developed a technique for the other?
Mr. WHITE. There are many experimental techniques being used.
SEEDING SYSTEM AIBLE TO CAUSE ACIDIC RAIN
Senator PELL. In your statement, you mentioned that most cloud
seeding is conducted with agents such as silver iodide, dry ice, and
salt. Are you aware of any seeding system that can cause acidic rain?
If so, how is this done?
Mr. WHITE. Well, I am not aware of any.
Senator PELL. If there were such a system within the Government,
would you be aware of it, or could it be developed outside of your
knowledge?
Mr. WHITE. Mr. Chairman, there are many things going on in the
Federal Government, of course, that are being done without my
knowledge.
Senator PELL. But not in the weather modification field, I would
hope, which is your area?
Mr. WHITE. I do not know all of the activities that are going on in
the Federal Government in weather modification. I do know all of
them that are unclassified. I have access to that information.
Senator PELL. Thank you.
70
REQUIRING FEDERAL AGENCIES TO REPORT WIEATHER MODIFICATION
ACTIVITIES
This is a rather technical question. I want to read it carefully so I
get it straight:
In 1958, the National Science Foundation was given authority by
public law to require all people engaged in weather modification
activities to report such activities. Ten years later, in 1968, this
authority was repealed in another law. For 4 years, now, no agency
or department has such authority. Then a year ago, another law was
passed that required all people, all persons engaged in nonfederally
sponsored weather modification activities in the United States to
report those activities to the Department of Commerce, to your
department.
Do you believe that federally sponsored projects should also be
required to report to a central point; that is, you? -
Mr. WHITE. The legislation as it was written and the rules and
regulations that are now being promulgated and are being reviewed
through the Federal Register, of course, pertain to non-Federal
agencies. However, we are taking steps within the Federal Government
to prepare an Executive order that will require Federal agencies to
report in exactly the same way.
Senator PELL. I thank you very much indeed, Dr. White, and
appreciate your coming very much indeed.
Mr. WHITE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. -
Senator PELL. Our next witness is Dr. Gordon MacDonald, a
member of the President's Council on Environmental Quality and the
author of a chapter in a remarkable book put out by the Viking Press
called “Unless Peace Comes,” which I was rereading the night before
last. I must say I think it is probably the first scientific description
written in terms that a layman like myself can understand of what
could happen if we start fiddling with nature, the atmosphere, geo-
physical conditions, too much. I am very grateful for your coming up
and being willing to testify at this time.
Do you have a prepared statement?
STATEMENT OF GORDON J. F. MACDONALD, MEMBER, COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, Mr. Chairman. -
I very much appreciate the opportunity to testify before this sub
committee today on the subject of geophysical warfare, with special
emphasis on weather modification and the policy problems it presents
to our country.
Senator PELL. Excuse me for interrupting. I think this would be
interesting for the sake of the committee record. Without objection, I
will ask there be placed in the record the chapter you wrote in this
book on how to wreck the environment, page 181 to page 206. (See
appendix, p. 124.)
Mr. MACDONALD. Thank you. As I was mentioning, I appreciate
this opportunity to discuss geophysical warfare, though I will give
special emphasis to weather modification and the policy problems it
presents to our country.
71
In my own view, it is indeed a hopeful indication of things to come
that your subcommittee is already addressing itself to this very
important issue.
Throughout his history, man has lived totally dependent on the
whims of weather. Improper rainfall or sudden flood all too often
brought extreme privation and death. Indeed, weather was so impor-
tant to man as to be a major recipient of his religious attention. But
with the benefit of the past 25 years of accumulated knowledge,
growth of technology and experimentation, we can now look forward
to managing to a limited but important extent this most significant
aspect of his environment for the benefit of all mankind.
WHAT WIEATHER MODIFICATION IS
What is weather modification? Briefly, it consists of stimulating
certain particular meteorological conditions that are capable of
producing desired weather phenomena or ameliorating undesirable
ones. Thus, while man cannot directly create the weather he wants by
brute force, except in such places as the Astrodome, he can in certain
circumstances trigger instabilities in the atmosphere to modify existing
weather conditions, much as a single shout can sometimes trigger an
avalanche. Research in weather modification thus focuses upon
identifying these meteorological instabilities, learning how they can
be triggered, and understanding the ways they work and the results
they achieve.
CONDUCT AND APPLICATION OF WEATHER MODIFICATION RESEARCH
Weather modification research is being conducted and applied in a
variety of ways. For some time now, airports have been cleared of
supercooled ground fog by seeding the fog with dry ice or silver iodide.
One airline has estimated that this procedure has a 5-to-1 payoff of
benefits over costs. By contrast, the artificial generation and main-
tenance of ground fog can be used to protect orchards against frost.
Much of the present effort in weather modification today is being
devoted to the objective of clean water augmentation. We now have
a substantial amount of experience in understanding the meteoro-
logical circumstances under which cloud seeding will increase snowpack
on the mountains. In a very real sense, this is banking winter's precipi-
tation. In the spring the snowpack melts and provides the runoff for
the river basin area which produces clean water for urban use, elec-
trical power generation, and irrigation. Snow augmentation in the
Colorado River Basin is estimated to be able to produce an increase
of about 2 million acre-feet of clean water each year. Clean water
augmentation can also be done anywhere that nature provides the
potential in existing cloud systems. Where rainfall is marginal, an
increase of only 5 percent rainfall at the right time of year may mean
the difference between crop failure and a bountiful harvest.
A REAS OF RESEARCH NEEDING FURTHER EXPLORATION
Characteristic of young and promising areas of human endeavor,
much more research on weather modification is needed. Hail suppres–
Sion efforts offer attractive research opportunities for example. Ex-
72
periments performed in the United States have indicated that
seeding with silver iodide can measurably reduce hail damage. More
extensive work is being done by the Soviet Union where several
million acres of farmland are being protected from hail damage by
the use of silver iodide injected into critical parts of storm systems
by means of artillery shells.
Vitally important research on storms, hurricanes and tornadoes
that seeks to discover, understand and exploit these storms' hidden
instability weaknesses is being conducted at several governmental
and university laboratories across the country and in other nations.
One particularly important area of research that needs further
exploration is the modeling of atmospheric processes. Such research is
now being conducted on cloud droplet growth, fog, rain and hurri-
cane models and even in modeling the entire earth’s atmosphere. This
last effort, now being conducted at UCLA, NOAA, the National
Center for Atmospheric Research, and other laboratories, is neces-
sary if we are to be able to foresee the downstream consequences of
individual weather modification actions.
KEY TO DETERMINING OPTIMITUM NATIONAL POLICY
It is this crucial need for more research that is the key to de-
termining the optimum national policy in the area of weather modi-
fication over the next several years. The proposed Senate Resolution
281, a rightful recognition of the importance that weather modifica-
tion will have in the years to come, proposes a treaty that would seek
a complete cessation of research, experimentation and use of environ-
mental and geophysical modification activities as weapons of war.
It is important at this early fertile point in the development of
beneficial weather modification capability that research in this area be
as unfettered as possible. Such a capability, as with most other tech-
nical achievements, is essentially neutral. Whether one wishes to en-
courage rainfall to relieve thirsty croplands or to thwart an enemy
objective, the techniques used in either event could be almost
identical. Because the fruits of any given research effort can be ap-
plied in many ways, the majority of which are often not discernible at
the time the research is conducted, the wording of the proposed
resolution may well have a dampening effect on the conduct and
funding of further scientific studies. Restrictions on research should
therefore be weighed very carefully, in view of the potential bene-
fits that weather control offers in terms of lives preserved, crops saved
and damage averted.
Weather modification is one of the most important scientific
developments now visible on the horizon. If research and applications
in this field are properly encouraged and managed, man may soon free
himself from stoic acceptance of capricious weather and thereby reap
a bountiful harvest of additional crops, new water resources and a
safer environment. On the other hand, restricted research and poor
public management of environmental applications may cause unfore-
seen and possibly calamitous consequences. The need for proper and
public research and management is clear.
73
NEED FOR PRIOR ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
While I firmly believe that weather modification projects and re-
search should be encouraged and moved forward, I am well aware of
the need for appropriate safeguards to protect the environment. Thus,
I believe no specific major project to control or modify the weather
should be done by the United States for its own benefit or for the
benefit of other countries seeking our assistance unless the results of
our efforts can be foreseen with reasonable assurance. I believe that
the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act requiring
the submission of an environmental impact statement is an appro-
priate mechanism to accomplish the objectives of assessing the en-
vironmental implications of a project and of notifying the public of
its potential effects.
The potential for great good or great evil is contained within almost
all of man's scientific and technological advances. It is the same with
our efforts to escape from the vagaries of the excesses of uncontrolled
weather. It is the potential for external harm resulting from blind
pursuit of the good that makes careful environmental assessment
prior to the implementation a sine qua non for any extensive weather
modification program.
I will now be happy to answer any questions that you may have.
Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Dr. MacDonald.
PROGRESS SINCE MR. MAC DONALD'S ARTICLE
Senator PELL. In connection with your article, I was wondering if
there are any points in it you would like to update? As far as I know,
it is the most complete description written for a layman of what can
happen when we meddle with the Pandora's box of geophysical modi-
fication, although I must add my own interest in this was stimulated
not by what was going on in Indochina, but by reading the SMIC
(Study of Man's Impact on Climate) report. That shocked me so
much when I read it I got started on this interest in these hearings and
these other things then fell in place, making me realize the importance
of what we are trying to do.
d Are there any points you would like to make to bring this up to
ate?
Mr. MACDONALD. Mr. Chairman, I think a great deal of progress
has been made over the past 6 years since that article was written in
terms of advancing our technology for modifying the weather. The
results referred to by Dr. White in terms of seeding tropical cumulus
clouds, the increase in our knowledge and capabilities of increasing
snowpack in certain mountainous regions, our increased knowledge
with regard to the behavior of fogs and increasing knowledge in
behavior of warmer fogs, specifically, the increased research in hurri-
canes, potential modification of hurricanes—all of these are clear
advances over the description that I gave a few years ago.
Additionally, I would say that very substantial advances have
been made in the areas of earthquake prediction which, in my mind,
very likely will lead to the possibility that we might in the future be
able to do something about earthquake modification.
74
The detailed studies of the Denver earthquake and others have very
substantially increased our scientific knowledge so that I would
expect that in the next few years we will have increased capability
in the general area of environmental engineering.
POSSIBILITY OF PRODUCING EARTHQUAKE
Senator PELL. Along this line, to simplify it even further for the
record and for those who are here, would I not be correct in my
statement that if you have a potential opponent who has the mis-
fortune to have a capital city or resource near one of the major flaws
in the earth's surface, that by creating strains, irregularities, ex-
plosions, many thousands of miles away in another part of the flaw,
we could develop a technique that would produce an earthquake in
the enemy’s area without his realizing it? -
Mr. MACDONALD. As I wrote, this is certainly a possibility. We
do not have today the knowledge, the Scientific understanding of the
mechanism of earthquakes, how earthquakes are produced, to under-
take confidently such a project; nor do I think does any other country.
I would point out that in the recently signed U.S./U.S.S.R. agree-
ment, that one specific area for cooperation in the environment was
the field of earthquake prediction. The Soviets have had a very active
program in earthquake prediction comparable in magnitude and in
interest to our program. We felt at the time that agreement was
negotiated that this would be an important area for cooperation.
I would also note that a further area for cooperation agreed upon
between the Soviets and the United States was the whole question
of weather and climate modification. This is included within the
environmental agreement.
Senator PELL. So, for the sake of argument, if we had another war
with Japan, 100 or 50 years from now, part of the way that war could
be fought, since both the west coast of America and the east coast of
Japan lie along the same flaw, would be for each of us to research very
hard the creation of earthquakes in the other's vital areas?
|Mr. MACDONALD. I think it is a possibility; it is certainly a pos-
sibility I have speculated on, but I would emphasize that as of today
neither we nor the Japanese have a capability in hand nor are we
likely to have it in hand in the foreseeable future, that is, in the next
couple of decades.
Senator PELL. There is another subject on which I would like to
get a little more of your thinking.
POSSIBILITY OF INFLUENCING HUMAN BE HAVIOR
You mentioned brainwaves—the possibility of being able to change
the electroimpulses with a harmful or detrimental effect on human
beings. Could you enlarge on how that could be developed and what
the effect would be?
Mr. MACDONALD. I would say this was by far the most speculative
of the various means that one might use in the environment as a
potential weapon. The basic notion there was to create, within the
cavity between the electrically charged ionosphere in the higher part
of the atmosphere and conducting layers of the surface of the earth,
75
this neutral cavity, to create waves, electrical waves, that would be
tuned to the brainwaves; the natural electrical rhythm of most
mammalian brains, including man, is around 10 cycles per second, and
there are indications that if you tune in at this frequency, that is,
these low frequencies of about 10 cycles per second, you can produce
changes in behavioral patterns or in responses. -
This is a very highly speculative suggestion. The reason I used it
in that particular article was to emphasize the point that changes that
one can bring about in the environment may have very subtle effects
that are not immediately recognized, that even human behavior might
be influenced through changing the environmental conditions and
that, of course, is why I used it as an example and wish to emphasize
the need to really understand what we are undertaking before we go
forward with any major environmental modification.
Senator PELL. In view of the rate of growth of man's knowledge,
particularly scientific knowledge, these abstract ideas of 4 or 5 years
ago may not be abstract when we come to the year 2000, which some of
us here may have the good or bad fortune to see, depending in part
what we do with this treaty, I think.
Along that line, what would be the effect of brainwaves on human
beings? You have described them in your book as having unpleasant
effects. What would be the form of unpleasantness?
I realize this is a little esoteric. I am not trying to embarrass you,
but I want to make a record here which, if somebody is looking at it
in the year 2000 or 1990, makes some sense.
Mr. MACDONALD. As I mentioned, the primitive experimentation
conducted primarily on primates in a number of centers would in-
dicate that their actual behavioral characteristics are altered; their
responses undergo changes; they do not respond as rapidly when you
are tuned in at the proper frequency as if the subject is not exposed
to some electrical activity; but as I emphasize in my statement and
also in the book, this is indeed a very highly speculative subject.
PROBLEM OF NOT KNOWING WIHAT CAN BE DONE COVERTLY
Senator PELL. Right, but one of the problems with this, as with all
forms of weather modification, is that one does not know what can
be done covertly. That is why I asked the seemingly facetious question
if the Soviets, the Chinese and North Vietnamese had anything to do
with our disastrous east coast floods. Even if they had, we wouldn’t
know about it. That is the point here.
CONCERN OVER PROHIBITION OF RESEARCH
Along this same line, I found your statement really very, very
forthcoming and interesting, but I also understand your concern over
the prohibition of research. This point was brought up yesterday by
the executive branch witness, too. I think this is one of the modifica-
tions I must make in my treaty.
As I said, this is the first draft and I think it would be improved if
we modify it in this regard.
76
ESCHEWING USE OF WEATHER MODIFICATION IN WARFAIRE
If the treaty is modified in this regard, what would be your view
with regard to the general substance of the resolution, that is, eschew-
ing of the use of weather modification in warfare?
Mr. MACDONALD. Mr. Chairman, as a member of the executive, I
would have to defer an answer to that question to the responsible
º the Department of Defense, the Department of State and
Senator PELL. I understand that. I do not wish to embarrass you.
The villain here, I think, is really DOD and NSC.
REVIEW AND CLEARANCE OF WITNESS' TESTIMONY
Né this regard, has your testimony been reviewed and cleared by the
º
Mr. MACDoNALD. Yes, sir.
RESTRICTIONS PLACED UPON WITNESS
Senator PELL. Have any restrictions been placed on you?
Mr. MACDoNALD. Yes, sir.
Senator PELL. Thank you very much.
DOD SHARING OF RESEARCH AND OPERATION RESULTS
Does DOD share with the scientific community the results of either
its º or operation of weather modification activities around the
WOTC (
I am not trying to mousetrap you. That includes Indochina.
Mr. MACDONALD. The unclassified portions of the Department of
Defense activities are indeed shared with other nations. They are
shared with other agencies of Government through the mechanism
of the Interdepartmental Committee on Atmospheric Sciences. I am
not privy to any classified work that the Department may have under-
way or not have underway.
Senator PELL. Would the scientific community be aware of what the
defense community is doing in this area in a classified way?
Mr. MACDoNALD. Certainly the scientific community, unless they
had the proper clearances and the need to know, as determined by the
Department of Defense, members of the scientific community would
be unaware of any classified activities.
Senator PELL. This is a question of opinion that I am wondering if
it would be within your terms of guidance to respond to us.
DESIRABILITY OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHOUT CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT
As a civilian scientist, do you believe it is desirable or undesirable
to have the military community engage in research, field experiments,
weather modification operations, without the benefit of the scrutiny
or oversight of civilian scientists?
Mr. MACDoNALD. Well, the situation today certainly in terms of
the unclassified activities undertaken by the Department of Defense
is that this research is open to public scrutiny, to comment, to review.
77
Some years ago I chaired a panel for the National Academy of
Science that undertook an overall study of weather modification efforts
and we looked at what the Department of Defense had underway,
looked at it critically, again in the unclassified area.
Senator PELL. But my basic question is addressed to you in your
civilian role. In other words, do you think it is a good idea for the
military, in classified or nonclassified areas, to engage in such activities
without civilian oversight of nongovernment employed scientists?
It is a question of opinion I am asking.
Mr. MACDONALD. My opinion is that the unclassified work is being
subjected to scrutiny of outside scientists.
Senator PELL. With that I agree. Is it your opinion that it is proper
for the classified work to be conducted without outside scientists
exercising some oversight over it?
Mr. MACDONALD. Again, since it is an iffy question, it would involve
judgments as to the military applicability of whether outside scientists
would have competency in this area. It would be an open question and
I could not honestly and truthfully give you a blank yes or no answer
to that. I think it is a very difficult question and I think one the
Defense Department should be particularly concerned about.
RECENT NSC STUDY
Senator PELL. Has the Council on Environmental Quality been
involved in the recent NSC study on these subjects?
Mr. MACDONALD. No.
Senator PELL. Do you happen to know if the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency was involved?
Mr. MACDONALD. To my knowledge, they were not involved.
SHIFTING EARTH's AXIS
Senator PELL. Going back to the techniques that could be used,
because part of the purpose of this hearing is to inform our people of
the various measures that could be used, Jules Verne first wrote and
Estes Kefauver later discovered the question of trying to shift the
earth's axis, which would have a deleterious effect on many of us in
this part of the world and a beneficial effect on some of the more
tropical climates. Is this, in your view inconceivable to be done by man
or could it be done by man?
Mr. MACDONALD. It just so happens that Walter Monk and I wrote
a book about a decade ago called “Rotation of the Earth,” in which we
used as one of the examples Jules Werne and Senator Kefauver's
suggestion, and pointed out the fact that both Verne and Senator
Refauver had forgotten about the earth’s bulge, the equatorial bulge
which exerts a great stability to the earth's rotational axis. As a result,
we certainly do not possess the capability today of producing large
shifts in the position of the axis of rotation of the earth.
AIREAS OF CONCERN FOR FUTURE
Senator PELL. So the real weapons that we’re talking about, which
I for one want to see precluded from man's arsenal, would be dealing
with precipitation, melting of the ice cap, creation of earthquakes,
82—892—72—6
78
stimuli under water and, finally, conceivably, the question of some
kind of electrical waves—those four general thrusts.
Do you see any other possible developments in this field of weather
modification, geophysical modification, that we ought to be concerned
about in the future?
Mr. MACDONALD. I think those four general areas cover the field
well. Again, in my article I referred to a number of others on which
rather substantial research is now being conducted, that is, changing
the ozone balance of the stratosphere.
Senator PELL. We were doing this thanks to the SST now.
Mr. MACDONALD. As a result of the interest in the SST, we now have
a very vigorous research program to determine the mechanisms by
which ozones can be depleted or increased within the stratosphere;
so I think if you add modification of that part of the atmosphere to
our list, it would be a comprehensive list at the present time.
DECREASING OZONE IN ATMOSPHERE
Senator PELL. I read somewhere that the ozone in the atmosphere
is being depleted at the rate of .02 percent a year. That would mean,
with the proposed use of the SST in the defenses of Russia and
America, that we will eventually deplete the atmosphere of ozone.
Would that not be correct?
Mr. MACDONALD. Again, I would just be on very unsure technical
grounds to comment on whether the ozone is indeed decreasing at the
present time. I know of reports that ozone levels have been decreasing.
Based on our instrumentation capabilities of determining the levels
of ozone in the stratosphere, the variability of ozone, and the abun-
dance of ozone, I would seriously question that there is at the present
time any long-term trend.
What I find heartening is that even though we do not have a super-
sonic transport program underway in this country, we do have an
extensive research program to find out what the atmospheric effects
of SST's on the high atmosphere will be. .
REASON FOR CHANGE IN OZONE CONTENT
Senator CASE. To the extent that there is a change or depletion of
ozone, is it established or reasonably established that it is due to
flights by airplanes and other activities of man or not? Or is it due to
some other cause, if it exists?
Mr. MACDONALD. In my view, there is no convincing evidence that
any postulated change in the Ozone content is due to man’s activity
at present.
PREDICAMENT OF CONGRESS
Senator PELL. I have one final, general query.
Do you have any thoughts as to the predicament in which we in
the Congress find ourselves? You are a scientist and a pioneer in this
book in calling attention to the political dangers in this area. We are
Senators also concerned about the impact of weather modification
eventually on our own constituents. How can we, the Congress, ad-
dress ourselves intelligently to this subject, if knowledgeable Govern-
ment scientists as yourself have to speak out under the wraps that
you do? It puts us in a terrible predicament.
79
Do you have any suggestion as an American citizen how the Con-
gress can become more informed in this field?
Mr. MACDONALD. I certainly don’t have a suggestion at this time.
I very clearly understand the problem that you labor under. In part,
for this reason I emphasize the importance of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act in my statement, that this is a mechanism to bring
to the public's attention the environmental implications of new
technology.
We in the Council on Environmental Quality believe that it is very
important that weather modification projects undertaken by the
United States undergo the kind of environmental assessment as re-
quired by the National Environmental Policy Act, and that these
assessments be made public.
Senator PELL. Perhaps this will come out of the little secretariat
that is being developed out of the Stockholm Conference eventually.
I think we can only hope that will happen.
That is all I have.
Senator Case? .
Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think you and Dr.
MacDonald have covered this beautifully.
First, I would like to say that there is scarcely anybody I know of
downtown in whom I have greater confidence than Dr. MacDonald
as a result of very direct personal connections with his work and his
help in certain matters affecting my own State, such as Tocks
Island
Mr. MACDONALD. Thank you.
PUTTING WIFAPS ON WITNESS
Senator CASE (continuing). And other problems of a similar nature.
I was interested in your very frank answer that you were under
wraps. Who put the wraps on?
Mr. MACDONALD. Senator
Senator CASE. How was it done?
Mr. MACDONALD. The typical process of preparing testimony. The
individual agencies prepare drafts; these drafts are then circulated to
other interested agencies for comment. In this case, the clearance
process was handled by the Office of Management and Budget in
consultations with the National Security Council. This is not unusual.
Every time I have testified as a witness for the administration, I
have gone through a similar clearance process.
Senator CASE. Well, I was interested in particular as far as the
National Security Council’s role was concerned. They didn’t talk to
you directly?
Mr. MACDONALD. Members of the Security Council were in contact
with me directly; yes, sir.
Senator CASE. This is interesting because recently the question
has come up as to a comparable agency, recently created or about to
be created by statute, and in the President’s office, in the field of
international economic policy. The question of whether this is an
operating agency or staff for the President solely is what I am inter-
ested in, and in either case, of course, whether it interposes another
layer of insulation between the decisionmaking process and the
Congress, and the Congress and the public. That is why I asked the
question.
80
It isn't strange that the Office of Management and Budget should
Fº an executive decision, a departmental decision, to everybody,
I think. r
I think, Mr. Chairman, I don’t have any further questions at the
moment.
Senator PELL. Thank you.
Thank you very much, indeed, Mr. MacDonald. Perhaps someday
when you are translated into a civilian we may again have renewal of
tºilº here and develop further the imagination showed in your
OOK.
Mr. MACDONALD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator PELL. Thank you very, very much indeed for coming.
Our next witness is Dr. Thomas Malone, who is dean of the graduate
school, University of Connecticut, member of the National Science
Foundation (NSF) Special Commission on Weather Modification,
and extremely knowledgeable in this area.
Dr. Malone?
STATEMENT OF THOMAS F. MALONE, DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL,
UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT, MEMBER, NSF SPECIAL COMMIS-
SION ON WEATHER MODIFICATION
Mr. MALONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Case.
It seems to me that answers to three questions are required to
comment constructively on Senate Resolution 281: (1) Has the science
and technology of weather modification advanced to the stage at
which major issues of national policy are beginning to emerge? (2) Are
critical issues of foreign policy involved? (3) Are the treaty provisions
of Senate Resolution 281 responsive to the problems and opportunities
presented by developments in the field of weather modification?
DEVELOPMENTS OVER RECENT YEARS
Five developments over recent years lead me to the judgment that
the answer to the first question is in the affirmative:
1. Understanding of the physical processes in the atmosphere that
link one day's weather with the weather on a subsequent day has now
progressed to the point at which these processes can be expressed in
equations that constitute meaningful mathematical models. These
models are increasingly useful in prediction and in simulation, per-
mitting us to seek answers to “what if?” questions.
2. Modern measurement technology, ranging from meteorological
satellites for global measurements to Doppler radar for ascertaining
some of the relevant physical characteristics of a single cloud, is
bringing within reach the kind of observations we need to make sure
that our mathematical models approximate the real atmosphere.
3. Advances in computer technology are matching the growing
Sophistication and complexity of the models and greatly enhancing
the powers of these new analytical tools.
4. The accumulating results of field experiments with cloud-seeding
techniques have yielded results that, while not rigorously conclusive
in all cases, are yearly becoming more persuasive that significant
weather control is within reach.
81
5. There is a growing awareness that a doubling time on the Order
of a decade or so for population, energy use, and the capability to
convert natural resources into goods and services may well be leading
us to a situation in which human activity impacts with sufficient
force on the atmosphere to produce inadvertent climate modification.
NEW IMPERATIVES IN FOREIGN POLICY
With respect to new imperatives in foreign policy, one of the most
prescient comments made was in 1955 by Prof. John von Neuman,
cited by Senator Pell in introducing this resolution, in which von
Neuman remarked on the need “to develop new political forms and
procedures” when “global climate control becomes possible.”
I well recall a small meeting convened by Prof. Bruno Rossi of
MIT in 1961 at the suggestion of the President's Science Adviser to
consider scientific initiatives that would foster closer cooperation
among the nations of the world. It was precisely the prospect that
man might one day be able to control weather that catalyzed the group
and ultimately led to President Kennedy's proposal to the United
Nations for initiation of a far-ranging world meteorological program
that is even now acquiring structure and gaining momentum. I sought
to reflect the views of the community of atmospheric scientists in this
country in a keynote address at an International Conference on Cloud
Physics in Canberra, Austrialia, when I urged strengthening and unify-
ing international cooperation in atmospheric sciences, adding that “we
must recognize the wisdom and prudence of fostering international
cooperation while the problem of weather control is a purely scientific
one of uncertain outcome. Should this outcome be affirmative, a
Pandora's box of scientific and political problems would be opened.
Much could be gained; little would be lost by forging the links among
scientists and nations that would better prepare us for the stresses
and strains that we dare not exclude as a possibility. One cannot
view with equanimity several unilateral crash programs to achieve
weather control nor extended conferences at Geneva in attempts to
resolve differences.
REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMISSION ON WELFARE MODIFICATION
This matter was explored in greater depth by a special commission
on weather modification, authorized by the National Science Board
in late 1963, which issued its report in December 1965. The relevant
part of that report follows:
The program of research required to develop the capability to modify weather
and climate suggest a strong emphasis upon international cooperation. The ex-
tensive and significant work that is being done in other countries underscores the
need for promoting the international exchange of data and research findings for
the purpose of maximizing their usefulness. The need for international collabora-
tion in the actual planning and conduct of research activities may be expected to
increase as research moves out of the laboratory and into the realm of field ex-
periments associated with the study of the dynamics of climate, the establishment
of a global weather observation network and the investigation of other aspects of
the general atmospheric circulation. The technological and human resources
required for the conduct of this type of research are far beyond the capability of
most countries to provide individually.
Looking into the future to the time when field experiments with weather or
climate modification are expanded in scope and number and involve actual at-
82
tempts to introduce changes in the atmosphere, some form of international col-
laboration will be essential in the planning and execution of projects that may have
an effect not only upon the immediate localities but on areas in other countries
and even upon other continents distant from the scene of work. It is possible that
situations of this sort may arise in the near future if an expanded program of
field experiments in cloud seeding is undertaken in areas near the northern or
Southern borders of the United States. An expansion in experimentation with trop-
ical hurricanes may also present international complications.
In the present stage of world affairs, any scientific advance contributing sig-
nificantly to man’s ability to affect the natural environment inevitably has a
bearing upon the political relations among nations and the quest for peace and
Security. The importance to military operations of a capability for modifying
weather conditions is obvious. It must be recognized that there is a remote possi-
bility that sometime in the future a nation might develop the capability to use
Weather modification to inflict damage on the economy and civil population of
another country.
It is essential to develop the political and social controls over the use of this
power which will maximize the opportunities for its constructive and peaceful
use and minimize the factors which tend to involve it in the tensions and conflicts
inherent in human society. The challenge and the opportunity which are presented
to the world community by the prospect of man’s achieving a power to modify his
ºhere environment is one of the most exciting long-range aspects of the
Subject.
Thought must be given to the types of international organizations that will
be needed and the functions they should perform, if and when major operations.
in weather and climate modification affecting large continental areas become
feasible. Whether the assignment of operational responsibility to an international
agency should be considered for the future deserves thought even at this early
date. Consideration might be given to new concepts of international organization
* * the new problems of a technical or political nature that might be precip-
1Ua, U62 Ci.
The very fact that the development of a capability for influencing the atmos-
pheric environment is still in its infancy should widen the opportunity presented
by this scientific endeavor to develop attitudes and patterns of collaboration
which can contribute not only to the achievement of the practical, technological
goals, but also to the relaxation of international tensions.
Rarely has a more ample and inviting opportunity been afforded for advance
thinking and planning regarding the impact of a technological development upon
international relations. Progress in the diminution of international tensions and
the achievement of peace will come not so much from the dramatic resolution of
basic international controversies as from the far less spectacular widening of
areas of mutual interest among rival nations and from the growth in ways of
COOperation. The field of weather and climate modification can serve well in this
regard, in addition to realizing benefits of a more limited practical nature.
The Commission believes that:
(1) It would be highly desirable for the Government of the United States, in
Connection with the expansion of its program of weather and climate modification,
to issue a basic statement of its views on the relationship of this national effort to
the interests, hopes and possible apprehensions of the rest of the world. Early
enunciation of national policy embodying two main points are recommended:
(a) that it is the purpose of the United States, with normal and due regard to its
OWn basic interests, to pursue its efforts in weather and climate modification for
peaceful ends and for the constructive improvement of conditions of human life
throughout the world; and (b) that the United States, recognizing the interests
and concerns of other countries, welcomes and solicits their cooperation, directly
and through international arrangements, for the mutual achievement of human
well-being.
This cooperation should cover both research and, ultimately, operational
programs of interest to other countries. It should be concerned not only with
deliberate, but also inadvertent human interventions in the atmosphere that
affect weather and climate. Such a policy declaration could be issued by the
President or appropriately incorporated in any basic legislation on the subject of
Weather modification which the Congress may enact.
(2) Steps should be taken by the United States, in concert with other nations,
to explore the international institutional mechanisms that may be appropriate
to foster international cooperation and cope with the problems which may be
83
anticipated in the field of weather and climate modification. The United Nations
and its specialized agencies—for example, the World Meteorological Organization-
is suggested as a possible intergovernmental framework. The International
Council of Scientific Unions and its associated unions—for example, the Inter-
national Union of Geodesy and Geophysics—could be a suitable nongovernmental
framework for these mechanisms.
(3) A major limitation affecting both advanced and developing countries is the
shortage of trained personnel in atmospheric sciences at all levels. Attention
should be given to the question of how greater emphasis can be given to atmos-
pheric sciences in existing bilateral and mulitlateral programs of education and
technical cooperation, and to what additional measures may be needed to fill
this deficiency.
(4) Encouragement should be given to research on the impact of weather
modification measures in foreign countries. The need has been previously discussed
for greater attention to the biological, economic and Social aspects of Weather
modification in the United States. A different set of problems may well be en-
countered in many of the developing countries where the natural environment
and patterns of economic and social life present contrasts to those prevailing in
this country. A greater significance of these differences must precede any attempt
to evaluate the suitability of various weather and climate modification practices
for specific foreign areas and to design appropriate programs of cooperation.
1965 REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES
That these views were shared by atmospheric scientists of other
countries was indicated in the 1965 report of the Committee on
Atmospheric Sciences established under the joint aegis of the Inter-
national Union of Geodesy and Geophysics and the International
Council of Scientific Unions:
A prerequisite for the scientific exploration of large-scale climate modification
is the ability to assess the probable consequence of conscious intervention in natural
weather processes. Global dynamic modeling techniques, to which reference has
already been made, are a powerful tool with which to assess these consequences
and to design scientifically meaningful experiments to be conducted in the atmos-
phere. At the moment, the use of mathematical models for the purpose is Seriously
hampered by precisely the obstacles this program is intended to remove. Any
contribution to an understanding of the scientific possibilities and limitations of
large-scale climate modification could be of great importance. Moreover, it is
highly desirable that such studies proceed as an international cooperative effort.
VIEWS OF METEOROLOGISTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES
Meteorologists in other countries share this view. The head of the
Soviet Hydrometeorological Service wrotein the World Meteorological
Organization Bulletin in 1967:
It is not difficult to understand that the problem of transforming the climate
on a world or regional scale is, by its very nature, an international One, requiring
the united efforts and the coordination of the activities of all countries. Ever
more rapidly humanity is approaching the stage in its symbiosis with nature,
when it can turn to practical account all the natural resources of the Earth and
when, as a result, it will become capable of thinking in terms of natural phenomena
on a planetary scale . . . It is hardly necessary to prove that, in these circum-
stances, all mankind should regard itself as a single whole in relation to the Sur-
rounding world. There is no other way.
In a report on “The Atmospheric Sciences and Man's Needs—
Priorities for the Future,” published in 1971, the Committee on Atmos-
pheric Sciences of the National Academy of Sciences recommended
that “in order to safeguard the life-sustaining properties of the atmos-
phere for the common benefit of mankind, the U.S. Government is
urged to present for adoption by the United Nations General Assembly
84
a resolution dedicating all weather-modification efforts to peaceful
purposes and establishing, preferably within the framework of inter-
national nongovernmental Scientific organizations, an advisory mecha-
nism for consideration of weather-modification problems of potential
international concern before they reach critical levels.”
Particularly notable was the view of 30 scientists from 14 countries
gathered in Stockholm, Sweden, during the summer of 1971 to Study
Man's Impact on Climate—SMIC–under the sponsorship of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Their report included this
paSSage:
We have a conviction that mankind can influence the climate, especially if he
proceeds at the present accelerating pace. We hope that the rate of progress of
our understanding can match the growing urgency of taking action before some
devastating forces are set in motion, forces that we may be powerless to reverse.
Fortunately, the atmosphere-ocean system seems to be sufficiently ponderous and
to possess enough inertia so that we probably have time to obtain a much better
understanding before serious changes occur, but we must certainly devote more
effort to the task than it has received in the past. Unfortunately, the machinery
through which effective international action could be taken is also ponderous; in
fact, in some cases we shall first have to invent such machinery, and this may take
Some time, too.
SMIC went on to recommend:
That an international agreement be sought to prevent large-scale—directly
affecting over 1 million square kilometers—experiments in persistent or long-term
climate modification until the scientific community reaches a consensus on the
consequences of the modification.
Even such a skeptic as Prof. Jerzy Neyman had a change of heart
in 1970 and in the “Review of the International Statistical Institu-
tion,” volume 38, No. 1, lent his name to an article which made the
point:
Having had contact with rain stimulation since 1951 (1) and after becoming
thoroughly disillusioned in 1960, we changed our minds when, in 1964, we became
acquainted with the seven annual reports on the Swiss hail-suppression experiment
Grossversuch III (2). This excellent experiment indicated to us that, after all,
there is something reasonable in the prospect of being able to stimulate rain by
cloud seeding . . .
And it went on to express conviction that:
Because of the importance of weather modification in a great number of coun-
tries, an international effort to advance the knowledge and to build up the relevant
technology is clearly indicated.
STRENGTHS AND WEAK.NESSES OF SENATE RESOLUTION 281
These viewpoints have been culled from the literature to drive home
the point that scientists concerned with this matter have been keenly
aware of its international implications for more than a decade and
have been urging the kind of action which is beginning to take shape
in Senate Resolution 281. This, then, brings us to our third question:
What are the strengths and weaknesses of Senate Resolution 281?
First, let me say, Senator Pell, that I am delighted you are exercising
this initiative and I encourage you to continue with the effort to do
in this area what you did so favorably in stimulating action toward a
treaty concerned with the implementation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion on the ocean floor.
Since I cannot pose as an expert in international jurisprudence, it
would be inappropriate to attempt editing of the proposed treaty. I
85
would, however, suggest that consideration be given to the following
oints:
p 1. An agreement “eschewing the hostile use of any environmental
or geophysical modification” is more specific and likely to accomplish
our ends than a simple prohibition of these activities as a weapon of
war. It would permit clearings of supercooled fog over an Air Force
base but would prohibit use of rain augmentation to harass an ad-
M. § degrading soil trafficability or disrupting the normal hydro-
OQ-1C CVC10. .
. g; jº. not think military research should be explicitly prohibited
because (a) it is almost impossible to differentiate between research
directed at beneficial use and research directed at fashioning geo-
physical weaponry; (b) our national civilian effort in this field would
be seriously disrupted because we freely intermingle military and
civilian resources; and (c) our military forces must have expert Scien-
tific competence to fulfill their role in providing national security.
3. A treaty “eschewing the hostile use of environmental modifica-
tion” would acquire an entirely new dimension as an imaginative
application of emerging science and technology in fashioning foreign
policy if it were coupled to a strong recommendation urging inter-
national cooperation along the lines suggested by the several groups,
national and international, which have studied this problem over the
past several years. For example, the National Academy of Sciences
has pointed out a need for a strongly interdisciplinary laboratory
with an explicit mission of developing the scientific and technical
capability to minimize present ambiguity in attempts at weather
modification. Such an institute might well be internationalized. In
my view, the time is propitious to take such a step. Scientists of
different nations working side by side at a research institute would
be, in my judgment, an effective and desirable alternative to placing
all research activities in the public domain, a step that might prove
difficult in the present state of international tensions.
4. Finally, I would respectfully differ with some of my colleagues
who feel that our knowledge base is inadequate to initiate the steps
leading to a treaty of the kind you propose. We can see the things
that have to be done to close the knowledge gaps and every fiber of
my being strengthens my conviction that now, before we get any
further, is the time to reach international understanding.
ADIDITIONAL POINTS
In closing, I would like to make three additional points:
1. In a broad sense, the issue we are discussing today is simply
one manifestation of impact on science, technology, and world affairs.
Scientists are particularly sensitive that these advances be used for
the betterment of mankind rather than to exacerbate conflict. Here is
an opportunity to make one of those small, correct decisions that
John von Neuman told us would be necessary if society is to survive
technology.
2. We must stand away from the small ephemeral advantages the
use of an emerging capability in weather modification might provide
us in a world trouble spot and assess the long-term costs and benefits.
As one who has traveled to many countries over the last few years, I
am satisfied that our national interest will best be served if we adopt
86
as a policy a role of leadership in exploring beneficial uses of weather
modification and protect ourselves against deleterious effects of inad-
vertent climate modification. We have a good foundation in the global
atmospheric research program on which to build. It would be a tragedy
if progress along these lines made during the sixties were to be irretriev-
ably lost during the seventies.
3. If we are to adapt to the kind of world in which we are going to
find ourselves during the next century, we should pay heed to the basis
for rationality described by the philosopher, Emmanuel Kant, in his
book “The Critique of Pure Reason,” published almost 200 years ago,
in which he said:
. . . the whole interest of reason, speculative as well as practical, is centered in
the three following questions: (1) What can I know? (2) What ought I to do? (3)
What may I hope?
Today you are raising the question: What ought we to do? I hope
that our decision will be the moral and wise one.
Thank you, Senator Case. That is the end of my testimony.
Senator CASE (presiding). Thank you very much.
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT FUNDING OF UNIVERSITY RESEARCH
Have you any comments on the question of Defense Department
funding of university research in this area and have you any experience
with it in your school? -
Mr. MALONE. Yes, sir; it has over the years, I think, been quite help-
ful in adding to our fund of knowledge. The shift toward support by a
civilian agency, specifically the National Science Foundation, I think
is a desirable one.
Senator CASE. For what reason? -
Mr. MALONE. Because there is a growing awareness that the kinds
of capabilities that we have mean that we have to fashion a different
kind of world, one in which the military forces are not the dominating,
activating mechanism, and I think that the search for new knowledge
is not always compatible with the kind of classification which is some-
times attendant on certain military programs.
Senator CASE. There is some inhibiting effect from that particular
kind of relationship. -
DEALING WITH COUNTRIES BEETIND IRON CURTAIN
On the other side of the coin, in your suggestion of international ef-
forts in this research field, have you any experience, a judgment, as to
the possibility of dealing, for example, with countries behind the Iron
Curtain on a sound basis?
Mr. MALONE. Yes, sir, I have; and I am encouraged that it is pos-
sible to do this. We are embarked upon this now in the global at-
mospheric research program, and in 1974 it is planned that ships and
aircraft from countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain will gather
together in the Atlantic for an experiment. The attitude and the
actions of the countries behind the Iron Curtain encourage me to
believe that cooperation in weather research is possible.
87
EFFECT OF SOCIALIST SYSTEM ON SOCIALIST SCIENTISTS
Senator CASE. Does your observation include any observation of in-
hibiting effects of the socialist system upon the socialist scientists com-
parable or analagous to the military inhibitions?
Mr. MALONE. No, sir; I don’t think of scientists flourishing under a
socialist regime. I think that our own system is superior and that it is
certainly one in which I find myself more comfortable, but I can’t
honestly say that there are drastic inhibitions in the pursuit of science
in the socialistic regime.
CoNFLICT BETWEEN SCIENTISTS' BELIEFS AND GOVERNMENT's
RELU CTANCE
Senator CASE. You are as aware, of course, as we are—more so,
I am pretty sure, because of your longer experience—than I am of
the conflict between the scientists who believe some kind of interna-
tional agreements in this area is desirable and our official governmental
reluctance to enter into it. What is the underlying reasoning, in your
opinion?
Mr. MALONE. I wish I had a satisfactory answer for that. I don’t.
Senator CASE. You don’t have any doubt about the soundness of
the scientific view.
Thank you very much. I appreciate your being here and so does
Senator Pell. He has been called away because of the serious illness
of his mother and asked me to carry on for him.
Mr. MALONE. Thank you.
Senator CASE. Our next witness is Dr. Richard Reed.
You have a prepared statement; haven’t you?
STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD J. REED, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN
METEOROLOGICAL SOCIETY; DEPARTMENT OF ATMOSPHERIC
SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, SEATTLE, WASH.
Mr. REED. Yes.
Senator CASE. Do you want to submit it for the record and go on
your own?
Mr. REED. Yes.
Senator CASE. You could hardly do better than read it, if you
want to—one page.
Mr. REED. I appreciate this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to appear
before the subcommittee and present the views of the American
Meteorological Society on the issues raised by the proposed Senate
Resolution 281. The statement which I am about to read was prepared
by the Committee on Public Policy of the American Meteorological
Society and has been approved by the executive committee as an
official Society statement.
The purpose of this statement is to urge that measures be taken
Senator CASE. You agree with it, I take it?
Mr. REED. I certainly do.
Senator CASE. Did you write it?
Mr. REED. I had a hand in writing it.
88
The purpose of this statement is to urge that measures be taken to
secure international agreement dedicating weather and climate modi-
fication to peaceful purposes. The American Meteorological Society
feels that there are compelling reasons for such agreement.
Man has already demonstrated the ability to modify the weather
in limited ways. Local enhancement of precipitation along mountain
slopes and clearing of cold fog from airports are examples of current
applications of modification techniques. Other uses, such as hail and
lightning suppression, are definitely within the realm of possibility
and are under active development. These are all examples of socially
beneficial applications. It is also conceivable that weather and climate
modification can be used for aggressive and destructive purposes.
The full potentialities of modification will not be known until much
more research and field testing are accomplished. Proper testing and
evaluation can only be carried out under carefully controlled condi-
tions. Premature use of modification methods in situations where
experimental controls are inadequate and where harmful consequences
may ensue will jeopardize the realization of the future beneficial uses.
Weather and climate modification are specialized areas within the
broader field of meteorology. Activities in these areas necessarily affect.
the science as a whole. Because of the global character of weather,
meteorology has traditionally brought the nations of the world
together in many cooperative endeavors. The operation of the national
weather services, as well as the conduct of important international
research efforts, such as the global atmospheric research program—
GARP-depend crucially on the cooperation and good will that
now exist in the international meteorological community. The present
harmonious relationships could be endangered if knowledge gained
in weather modification is used by one nation in a manner detrimental
to another. - -
At present, the science and technology of weather modification are
in their infancy. Their promise for good is immense; their potential
as an instrument of war is not yet established. No better time could
be found for dedicating man’s efforts in modifying the weather to con-
structive use. The banning of chemical and biological warfare and of
nuclear testing in the atmosphere provide ample precedents for putting
limitations on man's destructive capabilities.
In order to facilitate the development of beneficial uses of weather
and climate modification and to promote continued international
cooperation in meteorology, the American Meteorological Society
urges the U.S. Government to present for adoption by the United
Nations General Assembly a resolution pledging all nations to refrain
from using weather modification for hostile purposes. Thank you.
Senator CASE. Thank you very much, Dr. Reed.
POSSIBILITY OF NOT DETECTING WIOLATION OF AGREEMENT
Do you have any comments on the suggestion that was made by
Dr. MacDonald that it would be possible in some area, in some of
these methods of modification of the environment, to do something
a million miles away that wasn’t detectable; for instance, we here
triggering earthquakes somewhere else? I ask you this in relation to
your suggestion that the banning of chemical and biological warfare
and nuclear testing in the atmosphere are precedents. Is it not true
89
some of these things could not be detected, as a violation of an agree-
ment of this sort?
Mr. REED. Well, I don’t think we could rule out this possibility,
looking far into the future, but I think it would be very difficult to
be specific on this question in our current state of knowledge. It would
be hard to give you a realistic example based on what we now know.
Senator CASE. That is not a serious reason?
Mr. REED. No; we do not regard that possibility at this stage as
being a serious reason.
wAs WITNESS’ STATEMENT CLEARED BY NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL?
Senator CASE. Some evilminded person on the staff suggested I
ask whether your statement was cleared by the National Security
Council.
Mr. REED. I am supposedly a free agent.
Senator CASE. I am very much obliged to you, sir. Thank you.
Our next witness is Mr. Werner A. Baum. Very nice to have you.
Would you proceed as you would like.
STATEMENT OF WERNER A, BAUM, PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF
RHODE ISLAND; U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, PANEL OF EXPERTS ON
METEOROLOGICAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING, U.N.
Mr. BAUM. Mr. Chairman, I deeply appreciate this opportunity to
speak to Senate Resolution 281, expressing the sense of the Senate
that the U.S. Government should seek the agreement of other govern-
ments to a proposed treaty prohibiting the use of any environmental
or geophysical modification as a weapon of war. I appreciate the
opportunity as an educator with a special concern for the welfare of
future generations on this planet. I appreciate the opportunity as a
meteorologist with a special concern for our understanding of the
atmosphere and our ability to predict and control its behavior; and
I appreciate the opportunity as a Rhode Islander.
COMMENDATION OF SENATOR PELL
As a citizen of Rhode Island, I take pride in the fact that one of
our Senators had the foresight and understanding to introduce this
resolution more than 4 months ago on behalf of a bipartisan group of
distinguished members of the Senate. Mr. Claiborne Pell has a solidly
established record of legislative effectiveness from such actions as
steering through the Senate the bill establishing the sea-grant colleges
and the recently enacted higher education legislation. He now adds
to that record the perception of a new problem, a problem of poten-
tially vast consequences for mankind.
MEMBERSHIP OF GROUP COLLABORATING WITH SENATO.R. PELL
Senator CASE. Do you recall the membership of the distinguished
group you mentioned collaborating with Senator Pell?
Mr. BAUM. I have it here.
Senator CASE. Would you read the names off?
Mr. BAUM. Yes, sir.
90
The first name is Mr. Case; Mr. Cooper, Mr. Cranston, Mr. Hart,
Mr. Hughes, Mr. Humphrey, Mr. Javits, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Mc-
Govern, Mr. Mondale, Mr. Nelson, Mr. Tunney, and Mr. Williams.
Senator CASE. It is a bipartisan group and I appreciate your
bringing that matter out.
Mr. BAUM. You are asking all of us to face that problem while
there is still time.
APPROVAL OF SENATE RESOLUTION 281 WITH ONE MODIFICATION URGED
I urge you to approve Senate Resolution 281, with one major
modification which I shall discuss shortly.
I urge you to do so because of my concern for those men and women
who will follow us on earth. Other witnesses have discussed and will
discuss the scientific status of weather modification, or weather man-
agement, as I prefer to call it, as we now see it. The plain fact is that
there remains a vast sector of ignorance about the effects and natural
implications of weather management. We have only one atmosphere
on this planet and it may be more deadly than Russian roulette to
play with it before we know what we may produce.
EXAMPLE OF ABILITY TO CREATE OR DESTROY HURRICANES
Let me give one hypothetical example, admittedly extreme, to
make the basic point: -
Let me suppose that we could create or destroy hurricanes at will,
something we cannot now do nor expect to be able to do in the foresee-
able future. Now, superficially it would seem quite desirable to eliminate
hurricanes as a nuisance and a danger to mankind. However, in fact,
the hurricane serves to transport large amounts of converted solar
energy from tropical latitudes to polar latitudes. Somehow this trans-
port must be accomplished if the earth is to have a reasonably stable
climate, as the energy input from the sun will always be greater in the
tropics than in high latitudes. If the hurricane is eliminated as one of
the energy transport mechanisms, some other adjustment in the atmos-
phere-ocean system will have to take place. In 1972, no one can tell
you what that adjustment would be. It could be a calamity for life
forms as we know them. No subset of mankind should take it upon
itself to initiate such a deadly gamble. Though this example is extreme,
the principle it illustrates is applicable to a broad spectrum of weather
management activities. -
Senator CASE. Just as a layman, I would like to know a little bit
more about how this transportation of energy takes place.
Mr. BAUM. Well, one significant form
Senator CASE. Does it bring heat up from the tropics and so forth?
Mr. BAUM. Yes; and one significant way it does that, Senator, is
that ocean water is evaporated by the heat in the tropics and that heat
is carried northward in latent form within the water vapor. When this
water vapor condenses in higher latitudes that heat is then released in
the higher latitude, so you have affected a transport of heat energy
from low to high latitudes that way.
Senator CASE. You have to realize many of us are children on this
subject and I appreciate that very much. It is terribly helpful. But
this indicates it isn’t evilminded people that are going to use these
91
things for bad purposes; it is people playing around. When I say
playing around, I mean just hit or miss, seeking of knowledge and
whatnot. They may be dangerous, too?
Mr. BAUM. Quite possibly.
WORLD WIEATHER PROGRAM
I urge you as a meteorologist to approve Senate Resolution 281.
We have long known that better understanding of the atmosphere, as
well as greater ability to predict its behavior and to manage it, would
require international expenditures of money and energies on a coopera-
tive basis on a global scale. After many years of effort, of initiative by
the President of the United States, of discussion by the General
Assembly of the United Nations, of supportive actions by the Congress
and numerous other legislative and executive agencies around the
globe, we are at last in the early stages of implementing the so-called
world weather program. This program, primarily through the great
improvement of our observational network and through the conduct
of large-scale international field experiments, promises to increase
dramatically our ability to predict weather phenomena. Success of the
world weather program depends critically on faith and trust among the
participating nations, nations which cover the entire spectrum of
political and economic philosophies. The world weather program
would and should collapse if it became clear that one or more of the
participating nations was seeking knowledge for use in meteorological
warfare, the rest of mankind be damned. We would lose a major op-
portunity for man to improve his condition on earth.
REPORT OF NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE
Mr. Chairman, last autumn President Nixon appointed me to the
National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere, pre-
sumably because of my background in meteorology. You will recall
that this committee was established by you and your colleagues under
Public Law 92–125, approved in August 1971, and was directed to
submit a comprehensive annual report to the President and to the
Congress setting forth an overall assessment of the status of the
Nation’s marine and atmospheric activities. The first report from
NACOA, together with comments and recommendations by the
Secretary of Commerce, will be reaching you shortly.
In its first year, the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and
Atmosphere did not address itself specifically to Senate Resolution
281, so I cannot say that the committee endorses the resolution.
However, we did address ourselves in depth to the status of weather
modification and our report will contain a chapter on this topic. We
touch on some of the same objectives to which the resolution addresses
itself. Allow me to quote from an approved draft version of our report,
subject to editorial change before it reaches you formally.
We note five areas in the field of weather modification in which
action is required, namely, legislation, research and technology,
hurricanes, public policy and international matters. In the latter
area. We State :
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International agreement should be arrived at and the necessary institutional
arrangements developed to eschew the hostile uses of weather modification and
to investigate inadvertent changes in the global climate . . .
We also make the following statement in our draft report:
NACOA wishes to associate itself with the position taken by the National
Academy of Sciences that in order to safeguard the life-sustaining properties of
the atmosphere for the common benefit of mankind, the U.S. Government is
urged to present for adoption by the United Nations General Assembly a resolution
dedicating all weather modification efforts to peaceful purposes and establishing,
preferably within the framework of international nongovernmental scientific
organization, an advisory mechanism for consideration of weather modification
problems of potential international concern before they reach critical levels.
It is clear, then, that the National Advisory Committee on Oceans
and Atmosphere is supportive of the philosophy embodied in the
resolution under consideration.
CONTROLLING EXPERIMENTATION BIJT NOT RESEARCH SUGGESTED
Mr. Chairman, I do not propose to address myself to the details or
precise working of the resolution. Others are by far more qualified
to do so. In conclusion, however, I do wish to suggest one major
modification. I have reference to Article I, paragraph 2, of the proposed
treaty, which deals with the prohibition of research or experimentation.
Experimentation, whether domestic or international, should be con-
trolled in any case for the kinds of reasons I have already mentioned.
Research, on the other hand, probably cannot and should not be
controlled.
I do not see how we could effectively distinguish between weather
management research which is intended for peaceful application and
research which is intended for weaponry. History has surely taught us
that the same research result can be used constructively or destruc-
tively. The same meteorological research is used to design civilian
aircraft and the military bomber.
And, finally, while I do not want my country to use weather modi-
fication as a weapon of war, I want it to know how to do so. We
cannot really control the research done by others and I want to be
very certain we know at least as much or more than they know.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator CASE. Thank you very much. I like the statement. I like
the tone of it, too.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXPERIMENT AND RESEARCH
What is the distinction between experiment and research? I am not
questioning; I want to know what you had in mind when you made
this distinction.
Mr. BAUM. Research is in part clearly distinguishable, in the sense
it might be theoretical; it might be laboratory; it might be the kind
of research that constructs models and tests them on computers, for
example.
There is a gray area which is a little difficult.
By experimentation I mean any introduction of materials into the
atmosphere or any other work on the atmosphere itself where there is
any reasonable doubt that there might be major consequences which
cannot be anticipated. That kind of experimentation it seems to me
must be very strictly controlled.
93
SEEDING OF HIURRICANIES
Senator CASE. Then you wouldn't, or would you, go into the middle
of a hurricane and seed it or something like that?
Mr. BAUM. First of all, that experimentation is carefully controlled
in the sense that there are very thorough ground rules and details
which I don’t recall offhand. The hurricane must be a certain distance
away from any land mass; it must not have any reasonable probability
of striking a land mass within 18 hours, or some such figure. And all
those safeguards are built into those experiments.
In addition, the kind of things we are doing or are now capable of
doing can produce—we are quite confident they can produce—only
very minor shortlived effect.
EXPERIMIENTATION ON MODERATE SCALE
Senator CASE. What you really mean is the experimentation on the
moderate scale isn’t going to do any substantial harm, that you are
reasonably sure; you wouldn’t stop the experiments such as that?
Mr. BAUM. No, I certainly would not and I doubt we can or should
stop experiments that are adequately safeguarded.
WHO IS GOING TO SAFEGUARD EXPERIMENTS?
Senator CASE. Who is going to safeguard them?
Mr. BAUM. Well
Senator CASE. Seriously.
Mr. BAUM (continuing). That is a very serious question which re-
quires some congressional attention, in my personal opinion. We have
here a problem which is somewhat analogous to the one we face in the
atomic energy field, for example, as to whether the agency which is
responsible for developing a field, as the AEC is, should also have
safeguarding authority, as I believe it does have.
One might argue that the safeguarding authority ought to be in
different hands than the agency which is trying to develop the field.
At the moment I believe that, for example, in the case of hurricane
modification, which is being conducted jointly by NOAA and the
Navy, to the best of my knowledge it is an entirely voluntary
internal self-controlled mechanism which has been established by
NOAA and the Navy because of their awareness of the problem.
I believe it is entirely voluntary.
Senator CASE. Do you think that anything of the nature of an
extension of the authority or the mechanisms provided in the En-
vironmental Policy Act is desirable and should we make it more
specific? -
Mr. BAUM. I am not prepared to give a specific answer offhand,
Senator.
I do believe that the Congress should address itself to the policy
question which is contained here, and I believe that there should be a
thorough exploration of alternatives and some mechanism should be
established which assures the people of the United States that weather
modification activity is preassessed and monitored and authorized only
under circumstances which are construed to be safe and productive.
82—892—72—7
94
Senator CASE. Well, I appreciate that very much. The reason I
brought up the analogy of the environmental policy mechanism is,
first, of course, Dr. MacDonald referred to it naturally and also
it is because it has no ultimate sanction except the fact that the
information is brought out and laid out and everybody sees it and then
the President and the Congress would have a chance to make a de-
cision about carrying forward a certain project. This may be the
best way, rather than having any policemen actually established in
the legislation.
I just wondered whether that might not be a possiblity at least
as a start?
I am very much obliged to you and I know Senator Pell is.
Thank you for coming.
Mr. BAUM. Thank you.
Senator CASE. Dr. Falk, nice to have you, sir.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD A. FALK, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
Mr. FALK. I wish to express my gratitude to the subcommittee
for allowing me to appear before it to present my views today.
With your permission, Senator Case, I will not read the entire
opening statement that I prepared, but would like your permission to
submit it for the record.
Senator CASE. Please do. That surely will be very much in order.
You go ahead in your own way.
Mr. FALK. Thank you.
Senator CASE. Say enough to get me started.
Mr. FALK. I will try. -
TJ.S. TACTICS AND WEAPONRY IN INDO CHINA
In recent months I have become increasingly aware of the extent to
which tactics and weaponry designed to destroy or interfere with the
environment have been relied upon by the United States in Indo-
china. In support of this short statement, I am submitting a longer
paper prepared for a June 1972, conference on environmental warfare
held in Stockholm, Sweden, that considers some of these policies from
the perspective of international law and offers certain proposals.
(See appendix, p. 133.)
In the weeks since this paper was written, new disclosures have
suggested that large-scale efforts were made in 1965–67 by the United
States to cause massive forest fires in areas of South Vietnam occupied
by opposition forces. Also in recent weeks evidence has been accumu-
lating that dikes and dams have been damaged by bombardment
causing a severe danger of massive flooding in the Red River Delta,
imperiling the lives of millions of North Vietnamese civilians. Thus,
these hearings are being held at a time when there is an international
emergency of such grave proportions that even the Secretary General
of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, has lent the prestige of his
office to charges of dike-bombing and imminent catastrophe.
It is notable that Mr. Waldheim, on taking office, criticized his
predecessor, U Thant, because he had at times sacrificed his influence
by being critical of one or the other great powers, and it is, I would
95
suspect, in the belief that this is an emergency of first order of magni-
tude that Mr. Waldheim was led to the departure from his own
injunction of prudence when he took office.
BASES FOR LEGAL APPRAISAL OF RECO URSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL
WAFFAIRE
I think it is important to make clear that although recourse to
environmental warfare is often considered a relative novelty, it does
not occupy a legal vacuum. We have two main bases for legal appraisal:
(1) Customary principles of international law. Not all of international
law is reduced to treaty form. Especially with respect to the law of war,
where technology and doctrine change so rapidly, the role of customary
principles of international law is especially important. These principles
are set forth in greater detail in my accompanying paper, but in
essence, these principles forbid reliance on tactics and weaponry that
are indiscriminate in impact—that is, do not discriminate between
legitimate military targets and illegitimate civilian targets; dispro-
portional in effect—that is, that the damage caused is disproportional
to the military objective served; and that are inhumane in character—
that is, that are inherently cruel and offend minimum and widely
shared moral sensibilities. -
It should be emphasized that much of international law in all fields
continues to be embodied in the form of rules and principles of cus-
tomary international law. -
The Supreme Court has declared in very clear terms that customary
international law should be applied as often as it is relevant to a domes-
tic legal controversy. In recent years the Supreme Court has routinely
relied on customary international law to adjudicate a series of claims
arising out of the expropriation of American investments by foreign
governments. I think that the authoritative status of relevant prin-
ciples of customary international law makes it clearly illegal to engage
in most of the forms of environmental warfare that have been the sub-
ject of consideration in relation to the Indochina, War.
These principles also bear, it seems to me, on the recent American
contention that the bombing of the dikes or dams, to the extent it takes
place, is an incidental consequence of trying to strike military targets,
such as truck traffic or SAM missile implacements on dike structures
in North Vietnam, represents a disproportional military objective
relative to the gravity of the civilian destruction that might reasonably
result from such a military policy. - -
The Second source of existing international law that bears on this
subject matter arises from the war crimes prosecutions after World
War II.
We have some actual precedents which seem relevant to the assess-
ment of the legal status of environmental warfare. These precedents
were created at war crimes trials often carried out under the principal
initiative of the U.S. Government.
A very significant case involves the prosecution at Nuremberg of
Arthur Seyss-Inquart, a Nazi high commissioner of Holland who was
charged with flooding 500,000 acres of land, thereby causing civilian
misery. Seyss-Inquart was sentenced to death for various atrocious
acts, but even he resisted superior orders to flood Holland indis-
criminantly and proved before the court that he had thereby spared
Dutch civilians much misery.
96
In another little reported case, the United Nations War Crimes
Commission recommended that German occupying officials be charged
as war criminals because they had pursued “a policy of ruthless
exploitation of Polish forestry.”
Two principal conclusions emerge from this analysis:
(1) Indiscriminate, disproportionate, and inhumane forms of
environmental warfare violate international law as presently consti-
tuted; (2) Such a legal appraisal is evidently neither understood nor
accepted by governmental officials in this country.
CONFUSION CONCERNING LEGAL STATUS OF POLICIES
It is worth noting that even journalists generally critical of these
policies also appear to be confused about their legal status. Thus,
Seymour Hersh implies a legal vacuum when he writes: “Technically,
there are no international agreements outlawing such warfare”—New
York Times, July 9, 1972, section 4, page 3—as if all of international
law is treaty law; and Robert Reinhold says flatly, “Of course, fire
is not new as a weapon of war; it is not illegal”—New York Times,
July 23, 1972, section 4, page 2—as if past violations can serve as
precedents or that the context of application is not relevant to the
appraisal of a weapon's legal status.
NEED TO ADOPT EXPLICIT RULES AND PRINCIPLES OF PROHIBITION
These conclusions suggest strongly the need to adopt explicit rules
and principles of prohibition with respect to all principal forms of
geophysical warfare. Such a treaty of prohibition as recommended
by Senate Resolution 281 is extremely important to counteract the
state practice exhibited by the United States throughout the course
of the Vietnam war.
It is clearly true that other governments feel entitled to rely upon
war policies that were relied upon by others without formal rebuke in
the past. It is also true that many intelligent members of our own
society do not understand a government to be bound by international
law unless the rules of prohibition are embodied in treaty form.
Therefore, it seems necessary to seek general treaty rules of prohibition
and then seek widespread ratification. No other course of action is
likely to encourage a stable legal regime that might deter national
military establishments from planning more lethal varieties of environ-
mental warfare for future wars.
It also seems desirable to pursue a clear-cut prohibition that goes
across the board. Such an approach has been successfully used in the
Geneva protocol of 1925 with respect to poison gas, although recent
American claims that such a prohibition does not extend to riot
control agents or military herbicides threatens the clarity of the
threshold.
It is very important to seek standards of prohibition that are as
unambiguous as possible in international law, as enforcement and
guidance depend to such a great extent upon mobilizing world public
opinion and upon self-enforcement and self-interpretation on the
national level. Such standards of prohibition are particularly important
in this area of geophysical modification where techniques are just
beginning to develop and where the drive for peaceful uses is certain
97
to extend the technological frontiers for weather and terrestrial manip-
ulation in the years ahead.
For similar reasons, it is critical to retain a broad sense of the
scope of geophysical warfare. It is essential to reach all human efforts
to modify normal air and water flows with the intention of securing
a military advantage. It is also necessary to embrace military efforts
to induce earthquakes or volcanoes.
And, finally, it is necessary to include military tactics designed to
alter the earth’s surface, as by deforestation and defoliation, whether
by Rome plow, fire, or chemical. We are dealing with an amorphous
set of military possibilities that may pose dangerous threats to national
security and world stability unless effectively discouraged by a strong
treaty of prohibition.
The future possibility of a geophysical cold war or secret war is
very menacing; the target society or region may not even know that
it is being intentionally victimized by its adversary.
One purpose of such a treaty of prohibition is to help crystallize a
moral consensus that reinforces the legal claims. The process of treaty
ratification is itself important because it lends the prestige of
governments to a specific legal undertaking and obliges national
officials to justify the legal obligations in relation to national interests.
ECOCIDE OR GEOCIDE CONVENTION SUGGESTED
I would also like to emphasize that, in addition to Senate Resolution
281, it would be desirable for this committee to hold hearings in
the near future to consider proposing the preparation for early adop-
tion of an ecocide or geocide convention to complement the genocide
convention. Such a proposal would help focus world attention on the
magnitude of the problems posed by geophysical warfare and might
strengthen inhibitions on weapons development and use in the future.
I have prepared a draft ecocide convention which is submitted here as
annex 1 of my supporting paper. .
CONNECTION BETWEEN PRESENT CRISIS AND EFFORT TO SPARE MANIKINID
I would like to conclude my statement by stressing the connection
between the present crisis created by our tactics in Indochina and a
fº effort to spare mankind from geophysical warfare in the
uture.
To be silent about the present crimes against the environment is to
compromise the integrity of the wider claims on the subject. I would
appeal to you not only in your capacity as elected representatives of
the American people, but also as human beings, given a small oppor-
tunity to raise your voices against the prospect of awesome calamity
in Vietnam should the combined effects of artificial rainmaking,
natural precipitation, and weakened and wrecked dams and dikes
cause major flooding during the weeks ahead in the Red River Delta.
One eyewitness observer of the bombing of the dikes, the Swedish
Ambassador to North Vietnam, Jean-Christophe Oberg, a respected
diplomat, has said:
Everyone, even diplomats, must react as human beings. I have no intention of
witnessing passively what is happening.
98
And on another recent occasion, Ambassador Oberg observed:
If a catastrophe occurs in a few months, at the time of the monsoon, we shall
know who is responsible. But this must not be allowed to happen. The lives of
millions of people are in jeopardy and an unprecedented famine could occur in
North Vietnam.
Thank you.
(Mr. Falk's prepared statement follows:)
PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD A. FALK, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAw,
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, HEARINGS, JULY 27, 1972, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANs
AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS
By way of background, the subject of these hearings joins two of my deepest
professional concerns. As an international lawyer and political scientist, I have
been interested in the global dimensions of environmental problems and have
published a book entitled This Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposals for
Human Survival (Random House, 1971). For more than a decade I have been
professionally concerned and personally disturbed by America's involvement in
the Indochina War and have devoted considerable attention to the legal aspects
of this involvement. In this connection I have served as Chairman and Rap-
porteur of the Civil War Panel of the American Society of International Law,
Chairman of the Consultative Council of the Lawyers Committee on American
Policy Towards Vietnam, and editor of and contributor to a three volume series
entitled The Vietnam War and International Law (Princeton University Press,
1968, 1969, 1972).
In recent months I have become increasingly aware of the extent to which
tactics and weaponry designed to destroy or interfere with the environment have
been relied upon by the United States in Indochina. In support of this short
statement, I am submitting a longer paper prepared for a June 1972 conference
on environmental warfare held in Stockholm, Sweden, that considers some of these
policies from the perspective of international law and offers certain proposals.
In the weeks since this paper was written new disclosures have suggested that
large-scale efforts were made in 1965–67 by the United States to cause massive
forest fires in areas of South Vietnam occupied by opposition forces. Also in recent
weeks evidence has been accumulating that dikes and dams have been damaged
by bombardment causing a severe danger of massive flooding in the Red River
Delta imperiling the lives of millions of North Vietnamese civilians. Thus these
hearings are being held at a time when there is an international emergency of such
grave proportions that even the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kurt
Waldheim, has lent the prestige of his office to charges of dike-bombing and
imminent catastrophe.
I think it important to make clear that although recourse to environmental
warfare is often considered a relative novelty it does not occupy a legal Vacuum.
We have two main bases for legal appraisal:
(1) Customary principles of international law.—Not all of international law is
reduced to treaty form. Especially with respect to the law of war, where technology
and doctrine change so rapidly, the roll of customary principles of international
law is especially important. These principles are set forth in greater detail in my
accompanying paper, but in essence, these principles forbid reliance on tactics and
weaponry that are indiscriminale in impact (that is, do not discriminate between
legitimate military targets and illegitimate civilian targets), disproportional in
effect (that is, that the damage caused is disproportional to the military objective
served), and that are inhumane in character (that is, that are inherently cruel and
offend minimum and widely shared moral sensibilities). It should be emphasized
that much of international law in all fields continues to be embodied in the form
of rules and principles of customary international law. The Supreme Court has
declared in very clear terms that customary international law should be applied
as often as it is relevant to a domestic legal controversy. In recent years the
Supreme Court has routinely relied on customary international law to adjudicate
a series of claims arising out of the expropriation of American investments by
foreign governments. I think that the authoritative status of relevant principles of
customary international law makes it clearly illegal to engage in most of the forms
of environmental warfare that have been the subject of consideration in relation
to the Indochina War.
99
(2) War Crimes Proseculions after World War II.--We have some actual
precedents which seem relevant to the assessment of the legal status of environ-
mental warfare. These precedents were created at war crimes trials often carried
out under the principal initiative of the United States Government. A very
significant case involves the prosecution at Nuremberg of Arthur Seyss-Inquart,
a Nazi High Commissioner of Holland who was charged, among other things, with
flooding 500,000 acres of land, thereby causing civilian misery. Seyss-Inquart
was sentenced to death for various atrocious acts, but even he resisted superior
orders to flood Holland indiscriminately and proved before the court that he had
thereby spared Dutch civilians much misery. In another little reported case, the
United Nations War Crimes Commission recommended that German occupying
officials be charged as war criminals because they had pursued “a policy of ruthless
exploitation of Polish forestry.” War crimes are defined in Nuremberg Principle
VI (b) as including “plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of
cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.” This
language is broad enough to reach the main forms of environmental warfare.
It is important also to appreciate that even American recourse to environmental
tactics and policies is not a novelty. In the Korean War on May 13, 1953, twenty
F-84 fighter-bombers attacked the Toksan irrigation dam in North Korea and,
according to a staff study published in the Air University Quarterly Review
“skip-bombed their loads of high explosives into the hard-packed earthen walls
of the dam.” In praising the efficacy of these strikes the staff study considered
their main impact to have been on 75% of “the controlled water supply for
North Korea’s rice production.” (See “Attack on the Irrigation Dams in North
Korea,” Air University Quarterly Review, Winter 1953–54). The study goes on
to claim that the capacity of airpower to generate “rice famine” also served as a
Warning to future enemies of the United States. As is well-known by now, similar
tactics of warfare have been repeatedly introduced into the Vietnam War. As long
ago as 1965–67, the earlier period of heavy bombardment of North Vietnam, there
were documented accounts of bombs falling repeatedly on dike sections. Tºecent
disclosures, eye-witness reports, substantiated rumors, and semi-denials in rela-
tion to the bombardment of dikes and dams, artificial rainmaking, and induced
forest fires lend additional substance to the generalized conclusion that waging
environmental warfare, despite its dubious legal status, is unfortunately not alien
to the military mind or its civilian overseers in this country.
Two principal conclusions emerge from this analysis:
(1) Indiscriminate, disproportionate, and inhumane forms of environmental
Warfare violate international law as presently constituted;
(2) Such a legal appraisal is evidently neither understood nor accepted by
governmental officials and others in this country. It is worth noting that even
journalists generally critical of these military policies also appear to be confused
about their legal status. Thus, Seymour Hersch implies a legal vacuum when he
writes “Technically, there are no international agreements outlawing such war-
fare,” (N.Y. Times, July 9, 1972, Sect. 4, p. 3) fallaciously writing as if all of
international law is treaty law; and Robert Reinhold says flatly, “Of course, fire
is not new as a weapon of war; it is not illegal” (N.Y. Times, July 23, 1972, Sect.
4, p. 2) as if past violations can serve as precedents or that the context of use
º: target, purpose, etc.) is not relevant to the appraisal of a weapon's legal
SU8, UUIS.
These conclusions suggest strongly the need to adopt explicit rules and principles
of prohibition with respect to all principal forms of geophysical warfare. Such a
treaty of prohibition as recommended by S. Res. 281 is extremely important to
counteract the state practice exhibited by the United States throughout the course
of the Vietnam War. It is clearly true that other governments feel entitled to rely
upon war policies that were relied upon by others without formal rebuke in the
past. It is also true that many intelligent members of our own society do not
understand a government to be bound by international law unless the rules of
prohibition are embodied in treaty form. Therefore, it seems necessary and
desirable to seek general treaty rules of prohibition and then seek widespread
ratification. Indeed, no other course of action is likely to encourage a stable legal
regime that might deter national military establishments from planning more lethal
varieties of environmental warfare for future wars.
It also seems essential to insist upon a clear-cut prohibition that goes across the
board. Such an approach has been successfully used in the Geneva Protocol of
1925 with respect to poison gas, although recent American claims that such a
prohibition does not extend to riot control agents or military herbicides threatens
100
to compromise the clarity of the threshold. It is very important to seek standards
of prohibition that are as unambiguous as possible in international law, as enforce-
ment and policy guidance depend to such a great extent upon mobilizing world
public opinion and upon self-enforcement and self-interpretation on the national
level. Such standards of prohibition are particularly important in this area of
geophysical modification where techniques are just beginning to develop and
where the drive for “peaceful uses” is certain to extend the technological frontiers
for weather and terrestrial manipulation in the years ahead far beyond the horizons
of present anticipation.
For similar reasons, it is critical to retain a broad sense of the scope of geo-
physical warfare. It is essential to reach all human efforts to modify normal air
and water flows with the intention of Securing a military advantage. It is also
necessary to embrace military efforts to induce earthquakes or volcanos. And,
finally, it is necessary to include military tactics designed to alter the earth's
surface, as by deforestation and defoliation, whether by Rome Plow, fire or
chemical, or as by flooding, whether by rain making or the bombardment of
dikes, dams, and irrigation systems. We are dealing with an indefinite, but menac-
ing, set of military possibilities that may pose dangerous threats to national
security and world stability unless effectively discouraged by a strong treaty of
prohibition. The future possibility of a geophysical “cold war” or “secret war” is
particularly troublesome; the target Society or region may not even know that it
is being intentionally victimized by its adversary, or it may suspect that it is a
target when adverse natural phenomena are indeed accidents of nature.
One purpose of such a treaty of prohibition is to help crystallize a moral con-
sensus that reinforces the legal claims. The process of treaty ratification is itself
helpful because it lends the prestige and honor of governments to a specific legal
undertaking and obliges national officials to justify the legal obligations in re-
lation to national interests.
I would hope that this Subcommittee would also hold hearings in the near fu-
ture to consider the wisdom of proposing the adopton of an ecocide or geocide
convention to compliment the Genocide Convention. Such a proposal would help
focus world attention on the magnitude of the problems posed by geophysical
warfare and might strengthen inhibitions on weapons developments and use in the
future. I have prepared a draft ecocide convention which is submitted here as
Annex 1 of my supporting paper.
I would like to conclude my statement by stressing the connection between the
present crisis created by our tactics in Indochina and a genuine effort to spare
mankind from geophysical warfare in the future. To be silent about the present
crimes against the environment is to compromise the integrity of wider claims on
this initial subject. I would appeal to you not only in your capacity as elected rep-
resentatives of the American people, but as human beings, given a small oppor-
tunity to raise your voices against the prospect of awesome calamity in Vietnam
should the combined effects of artificial rainmaking, natural precipitation, and
weakened and wrecked dams and dikes cause major flooding during the weeks
ahead in the Red River Delta. One eyewitness observer of the bombing of the
dikes, the Swedish Ambassador to North Vietnam, Jean-Christophe Oberg, a re-
spected diplomat, has said, “Everyone, even diplomats, must react as human
beings . . . I have no intention of witnessing passively what is happening.” And
on another recent occasion Ambassador Oberg observed: “If a catastrophe occurs
in a few months, at the time of the monsoon, we shall know who is responsible.
But this must not be allowed to happen. The lives of millions of people are in
jeopardy, and an unprecedented famine could occur in North Vietnam.” (from
Fred Branfman's collection of eye-witness Western reports of bombing of dikes.)
Senator CASE. Thank you, Dr. Falk.
Your longer paper will be included in the record and the annexes to
it that you referred to. (See appendix, p.133.)
I find nothing to question in your statement and I am very grateful
to you for coming. I know Senator Pell will be, too.
Thank you very much.
Mr. FALK. Thank you.
Senator CASE. Is there anything that anyone else here would like
to comment on as to what has been said so far by any of the witnesses?
101
ISSUE OF PROHIBITION OF RESEARCH
Mr. FALK. Could I make a brief comment on the issue of the
prohibition of research?
Senator CASE. I wish you would.
Mr. FALK. I unfortunately didn’t have the benefit of the resolution
before I came today because I was in upstate Vermont, but it seems
to me that it is important to balance on the One side the sorts of
considerations that have been advanced for not inhibiting research
with the dangers that seem to me so self-evident in many areas of
government of allowing research of this character to proceed under
classified or secret auspices. So I would think that one way of modify-
ing the present language of the resolution and still not losing all its
important inhibiting effect would be to require research to be con-
ducted on an open or unclassified basis and be subjected to some form
of congressional and possible citizen scrutiny on a continuing basis.
I think that, as I say, there is so much evidence that governments
and our own Government has abused the prerogatives of Secrecy with
respect to subject matter of this sort that I think it is very important
not to altogether eliminate the effort to control research that was
placed in the original treaty formulation.
Senator CASE. I am very much obliged for that particular insight,
too. It is somewhat along the line of the idea of the environmental
quality openness without necessarily a specific policeman to say no.
I take it you rely upon the scientific community and the public and
the Congress in the light of knowledge of what was proposed or is
going to be, to apply the restraint at least in the first instance?
Mr. FALK. Yes, sir; that is correct, and also not to allow any
exclusive military research. There could be research with military
participation, it seems to me, but not research that was under the
exclusive domain of the military or other security-related agencies of
the Government. All research should involve participation of civilian
components, in other words, and all research, it seems to me, should
be subject to public scrutiny with possibly certain very exceptional
circumstances justifying some kind of limited nondisclosure.
I can imagine certain things which it would be better for the world
not to know and, therefore, I can see certain exceptions, circumstances
where it might accordingly be appropriate to overcome this general
bias in favor of openness.
Senator CASE. We already have a lot of controlled research and
secret research under the Atomic Energy Act, of course. We have
been going the other way in this area as far as legislation goes. I
think this is a very interesting and provocative suggestion and I
apreciate it.
Mr. FALK. Thank you.
Senator CASE. Thank you very much.
The hearing will be adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.
(Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject
to the call of the Chair.)
A PP E N DIX
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FOR PEACE THROUGH LAw,
Washington, D.C., June 15, 1971.
Hon. MELVIN R. LAIRD, ."
Secretary of Defense, ſ
Washington, D.C. *
DEAR M.R. SECRETARY: We have noted recent reports that the Air Force is
using weather modification techniques to wash out sections of the Ho Chi Minh
Trail. At first glance, this appears to be a relatively harmless defensive project,
but it carries some disturbing implications.
Using weather modification as a military tool opens the door to a vast unknown
category of warfare. A hough techniques are primitive today, experience with
other military systems suggests that refinements inevitably will come.
At present, we do not know the ecological consequences of such activities.
The possible redirection of storm centers producing prolonged drought conditions
Or fostering other types of climatic changes, however, suggests awesome potential.
To move into this area without the most painstaking analysis of environmental
implications would be most unwise. Indeed, it would be scientifically and morally
wrong for the United States to become the first nation to use such capability for
military purposes.
Unless there is a clear government policy to the contrary, the United States
may find itself charged, rightly or wrongly, with initiating a new form of warfare.
Other nations might well justify wartime weather or climatic alteration activity
On the basis of our involvement in this area. U.S. military weather modification
projects could also embarrass our scientists engaged in legitimate research.
We feel the Administration should discontinue any weather modification opera-
tion in a military environment. We would appreciate being advised of the admin-
istration’s policy on this question as well as obtaining the complete background
about Air Force weather alteration activities in Indo-China and any other similar
projects planned or underway.
Sincerely,
GILBERT GUDE,
Chairman, Committee on World Environment and
International Cooperation.
- ALAN CRANSTON,
Vice-Chairman, Committee on World Environment
and International Cooperation.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., June 22, 1971.
Hon. ALAN CRANSTON, -
Vice-chairman, Committee on World Environment and International Co-operation,
Members of Congress for Peace through Law, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR CRANSTON: Secretary Laird has asked that I acknowledge
your letter of June 15 regarding weather modification techniques.
Your letter is receiving attention and you will be advised further at a later date.
Sincerely,
J. F. LAWRENCE,
Brigadier General, USMC,
Deputy Assistant to the Secretary for Legislative Affairs.
(103)
104
DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING,
- Washington, D.C., July 12, 1971.
Hon. GILBERT GUDE, -
Chairman, Committee on World Environment and International Co-operation,
Members of Congress for Peace through Law, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. GUDE: Your letter of June 15, 1971, which was addressed to the
Secretary of Defense, has been referred to this office for reply. In your letter you
expressed concern over reported military use of weather modification techniques
by the Department of Defense.
The possibilities inherent in weather modification techniques to support military
operations have been the subject of discussion for more than 20 years. For a
number of these years the Department of Defense has been conducting several
modest research and development programs relating to various forms of weather
modification. These programs are carried out, in concert with other Government
Departments and Agencies, under the aegis of the Interdepartmental Committee
for Atmospheric Sciences (ICAS). The results of the programs are reported
annually to ICAS, and are additionally reported in appropriate scientific journals
for consideration by the scientific community.
Weather modification research on the part of the Department of Defense
stems principally from two major interests. The first of these is the enhance-
ment of our own operational posture through weather modification activities.
Two examples of this type of employment are: The suppression of hail and
lightning (to reduce damage to military property and equipment, and to increase
safety of operations), and the dissipation of fog at airfields and within harbors
(to enhance operational safety of aircraft and ships). The other interest is an
understanding of what capabilities our potential enemies may possess in the
area of weather modification operations. For example, the Soviets have demon-
strated a technique for hail suppression. Suitably designed artillery shells are
fired into cumulus clouds to reduce hailfall from those clouds. These experiments
are conducted by Soviet military personnel using military equipment.
DOD research in this area is conducted in the laboratory and in the field.
The field efforts, usually joint ventures with one or more other government
agencies, are all carefully controlled operations, based on the best available
theoretical knowledge. One example of fruitful field research has been the investi-
gation of precipitation augmentation. This research has established a significant
point: There is no known way to “make rain” under all conditions. When the
proper meteorological conditions prevail (that is, when clouds capable of pro-
ducing natural rain exist), it is a relatively simple matter to increase the
amount of rain which will fall. The amount of increase is frequently of the
order of 30 to 50%. This augmentation is well within the natural limits of
rainfall for regions within which experiments have been conducted. Massive down-
pours, far in excess of natural occurrences, have not been produced, and theo-
retical knowledge at hand indicates that this will probably always be the case.
Similarly, there is no known technique which will permit the steering of storms
into a specific area. The closest approach to large storm modification thus far
attempted is the Department of Commerce (NOAA)/Department of Defense
joint effort known as Project STORMFURY. In this project, studies are being
made on ways to ameliorate the maximum wind speed in hurricanes and ty–
phoons in order to reduce the severity of damage caused by these very destruc-
tive Storms.
The field capabilities of the Department of Defense have been utilized on
several occasions in attempts to alleviate severe drought conditions. In 1969 at
the request of the Government of the Philippines, the Department of Defense
conducted a six months’ precipitation augmentation project in the Philippine
archipelago. The Philippine Government considered the undertaking so successful
that they have subsequently taken steps to acquire an independent capability to
augment rainfall on an annual basis when required. Similarly, we have just com-
pleted a one-month project in Texas at the request of the Governor of that State.
The operation appears to have been moderately successful in alleviating Texas'
severe water shortage. On the other hand, attempts to solve similar problems in
India and at Midway Islands were near or total failures due to the absence of
suitable cloud formations.
Laboratory efforts conducted by the Department of Defense are designed in
large part to explore the questions concerning the ecology that you raise in your
letter. Many of these experiments are numerical investigations which utilize large
computers to model the atmosphere. Because of the magnitude of the problem,
this effort is currently very much limited by the size and capabilities of existing
105
computers. When new computers now being designed are placed in service,
however, we hope this effort can be expanded to include models on a global scale.
Such work is being undertaken because DOD recognizes, as does your Committee,
that large scale weather modification operations must not be attempted until
there is full and reliable theoretical knowledge which assures that such operations
will not have an adverse effect upon the World’s climate. -
Regarding your question of the Administration's policy toward weather modi-
fication, the Under Secretaries' Committee, at the request of Dr. Kissinger, is
currently meeting to formulate a definitive National Policy. Presumably this
policy, when completed, will be announced to the Nation in some appropriate
fashion.
The Department of Defense has no comment concerning the reported use of
weather modification techniques in Indo-China.
Sincerely, -
JoHN S. FosTER, JR.
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FOR PEACE THROUGH LAw,
Washington, D.C., October 15, 1971.
Hon. MELVIN R. LAIRD,
Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D.C. .
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In a letter dated June 15, we wrote requesting specific
information regarding the use of weather modification techniques by the Air
Force or other U.S. agencies in South East Asia.
Dr. John S. Foster, in his reply July 12, gave us useful data concerning the
development for such techniques, but failed to direct his comments specifically to
Our request. We find his decision to withhold information with a “no comment”
unsatisfactory and inappropriate.
In particular, we would like answers to the following questions:
What types of weather alteration programs are conducted in South East Asia?
Under whose authority? In which countries? Do these countries have knowledge
of and give approval for these activities? How long have these programs been in
force, operationally and experimentally?
How many people are involved and what are the total yearly costs associated
with these activities?
What is the national policy regarding the use of weather modification in a war
zone or as a military tactic? Who established this policy and how is it reviewed
for specific projects? -
As you know, there has been increasing concern among our colleagues about
excessive classification of information—a concern which we share particularly in
relation to a policy as potentially dangerous and counterproductive as weather
alteration. Since we assume that the information requested would not be of such
a sensitive nature as to warrant the invoking of Executive privilege by the Presi-
dent, we do expect a complete reply.
We remain deeply concerned about the disturbing implications of these activi-
ties and would be pleased to cooperate with the Administration in developing
national policy in this area.
Sincerely,
GILBERT GUDE,
Chairman, Committee on World Environment
and International Cooperation.
ALAN CRANSTON,
Vice-Chairman, Committee on World Environment
and International Cooperation.
DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING,
Washington, D.C., December 8, 1971.
Hon. GILBERT GUDE,
Chairman, Committee on World Environment and International Cooperation.
Hon. ALAN CRANSTON, - -
Vice-Chairman, Committee on World Environment and International Cooperation,
Members of Congress for Peace through Law, Washington, D.C.
GENTLEMEN: This is in response to your letter of 15 October 1971 to the
Secretary of Defense, wherein you express dissatisfaction with my earlier answer
to your inquiry regarding our activities in the field of weather modification.
106
Certain aspects of our work in this area are classified. Recognizing that the
Congress is concerned with activities which bear on the quality of our environ-
ment I have, at the direction of Secretary Laird, seen to it that the Chairmen of
the Committees of Congress with primary responsibility for this Department's
operations have been completely informed regarding the details of all classified
weather modification undertakings by the Department. However, since the in-
formation to which I refer has a definite relationship to national security and is
classified as a result, I find it necessary to respectfully and regretfully decline to
make a public disclosure of the details of these activities at this time.
Sincerely,
- John S. FosTER, JR.
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FOR PEACE THROUGH LAw,
Washington, D.C., January 27, 1972.
THE PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We are concerned that the United States is experi-
menting with weather modification as a military tactic in South East Asia. It is
our belief that this program is extremely volatile and bears with it the possibility
of considerable embarrassment. -
Using weather modification as a military tool opens the door to a vast unknown
category of warfare. At present, we simply do not know the potential ecological
consequences of such activities. Although techniques are primitive today, experi-
ence with other military systems Suggests that refinements inevitably will come.
We recognize that civilian research in the weather modification field has great
merit. The world’s food problem remains critical and we must learn to manage
Our environment productively, yet without harm. That is no justification, how-
ever, for the unilateral military use of this technology. Furthermore, to continue
the bulk of weather research under military auspices is an unwarranted intrusion
into the scientific community. If other nations sought to make an issue of our
actions, it could prove highly embarrassing to Our Own scientists.
The use of military weather modification reminds us of the early use of defoliants
and herbicides in Vietnam. Then, as now, we had little knowledge of the long-
range environmental or political implications. There seemed to be no clear cut
national policy and as a result the U.S. was severely criticized.
We hope that you will see fit to review the present activities in Indochina and
establish an announced policy prohibiting the future use of environmental warfare.
We would be pleased to cooperate with you in this matter and offer any assistance
that you might deem appropriate.
Sincerely yours,
GILBERT GUDE,
Member of Congress,
Chairman.
ALAN CRANSTON,
U.S. Senator,
Vice-Chairman.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
|Washington, February 1, 1973.
Hon. GILBERT GUDE, -
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR GIL: This will acknowledge your letter of January 27 in which you were
joined by Senator Cranston, on behalf of the Members of Congress for Peace
through Law, in urging that weather modification techniques not be used as a
military tool in Southeast Asia. You may be assured your letter will be brought to
the President's attention and also shared with the appropriate members of the
staff. - -
With cordial regards,
Sincerely,
WILLIAM E. T.IMMONs,
Assistant to the President.
107
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
- Washington, March 18, 1972.
Hon. GILBERT GUDE,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C
D EAR M.R. GUDE: Your letter of 27 January 1972, signed by you and Senator
Cranston, addressed to the President, has been referred to me for reply. In your
letter you expressed concern with the possible military use of weather modification.
The Departments of Commerce and Interior together with the National Science
Foundation have the major portion of the national weather modification programs.
The Department of Defense has no unique weather modification techniques nor
is its program of research large in comparison to the total Federal effort.
Some aspects of our work in this area have a definite relationship to national
security and are classified accordingly. The Chairmen of the Senate and House
Appropriations and Armed Services Committees have been fully informed on
these classified aspects.
Sincerely, -
(Signed) MELVIN R. LAIRD.
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FOR PEACE THROUGH LAw,
Washington, D.C., March 31, 1972.
THE PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Since last June I have corresponded with various officials
of your Administration regarding military applications of weather modification.
Secretary Laird has informed me, however, that this subject is classified due to its
sensitive national Security implications.
With science progressing at a geometric rate, it will not be long before the ca-
pability to alter weather or even specific climates is an accepted fact. Long before
then we must consider the environmental and political as well as military conse-
quences of this new technology. It will be far easier to deal with this problem now
rather than later. -
I would hope that you could review the weather modification program to deter-
mine if it can be declassified. If U.S. projects are exclusively defensive in nature,
then that should be made known. If not, there is serious question about the pro-
priety of this activity.
More important, however, I would recommend that the Department of Defense
issue a “no first use” proclamation regarding the offensive employment of environ-
mental warfare. Perhaps this could be incorporated into a carefully prepared inter-
national treaty initiated by this Administration.
Your leadership in the field of chemical-biological warfare offers the best possible
model for this proposed treaty. Both CBW and weather modification have serious
command and control problems and if used, would be indiscriminate.
It would seem logical that the issue of weather modification should be brought
before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. This step
would again demonstrate the willingness of the U.S. to take leadership on arms
control questions.
Sincerely,
GILBERT GUDE,
Chairman, World Environment and
International Cooperation Committee.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
|Washington, April 4, 1972.
Hon. GILBERT GUDE,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR GIL: In Bill Timmons’ absence, I wish to acknowledge and thank you
for your letter on behalf of Members of Congress for Peace through Law suggesting
that the subject of the military application of weather modification be placed on
º for discussion at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
at Geneva.
108
You may be assured your letter will be brought to the President's attention
and also shared with the appropriate members of the staff.
With warm regards,
Sincerely,
RICHARD K. Coor,
Deputy Assistant to the President.
[From Science magazine, Vol. 176, June 16, 1972]
RAINMAKING: RUMORED USE OVER LAOS ALARMS ARMS ExPERTs,
SCIENTISTS
(By Deborah Shapley)
For the past year, rumors and speculation, along with occasional bits of cir-
cumstantial evidence, have accumulated in Washington to the effect that the
military has tried to increase rainfall in Indochina to hinder enemy infiltration
into South Vietnam—in effect, using the weather as a weapon of war. But Pentagon
officials have been extremely tight-lipped about it, even to prominent members
of Congress, and it appears that the old saying is now turned around: The generals
are probably doing something about the weather, but nobody’s talking about it.
The Pentagon Papers makes references to such activities as having been successfully
carried out in Laos, and a Jack Anderson column in the Washington Post a year
ago described a top-secret operation over the Ho Chi Minh trail.
The only denial so far has come from Department of Defense (DOD) Secretary
Melvin R. Laird in congressional testimony. However, all Laird denied was the
use of weather control “over North Vietnam,” and, since the Anderson column
and The Pentagon Papers concern Laos and the Ho Chi Minh trail, which runs
...; Laos and Cambodia, no real answers to the speculations have been
TOV1016O1.
p The DOD has admitted that various forms of climate modification have been
considered by the military for more than 20 years. A well-known geophysicist
formerly with DOD's Institute for Defense Analyses, Gordon J. F. MacDonald
(who now sits on the Council for Environmental Quality), wrote a Cassandra-like
chapter on potential geophysical warfare in 1968, which described control of
rainfall, drought, earthquakes, and even possible tinkering in the Arctic." The
Indochina, allegations are limited to charges that the DOD has augmented rainfall
to muddy up trails, thus hindering the flow of men and vehicles to the south,
but some scientists and arms experts regard even this limited activity as a camel's
nose under the geophysical tent.
The issue has an important scientific dimension, too, for meteorology is one of
the most internationally minded of all scientific fields. Many prominent U.S.
meteorologists have for years favored a ban on military uses of weather control.
Describing their reactions even to the possibility that these techniques have been
used, they use such words as “distressed,” and “appalled.” They add that weather
control in Indochina could hurt international, peaceful weather research. Hence,
the issue of whether the DOD has been, or might be, seeding clouds over Asia,
holds implications beyond the horizons of Indochina alone.
The only direct evidence that weather modification techniques have been used
in Indochina comes from some references in The Pentagon Papers which indicate
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), probably in 1966, had rainfall experiments
conducted over Laos “successfully.” In 1967, the JCS urged President Lyndon
B. Johnson to authorize an operational weather program with the innocuous
name of Operation POP EYE as a means of escalating the war. According to the
Gravel edition of the papers, volume 4, page 421, the JCS suggested to Johnson
in a memo that this might be one way of widening the war with minimal political
repercussions at home.” -
4. LAOS OPERATIONS.–Continue as at present plus Operation POP EYE to
reduce trafficability along infiltration routes.
Authority/Policy Changes—Authorization required to implement operational
phase of “reather modification process previously successfully tested and evaluated
in Same area.
1 G. J. F. MacDonald, “How to wreck the environment,” in Unless Peace Comes: A Scientific Forecast
of New Weapons, Nigel Calder, Ed. (Viking Press, New York, 1968).
2 The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decision making on Vietnam (Bea-
con Press, Boston, Mass.), Vol. 4. -
109
Risks/Impact—Normal military operational risks. Risk of compromise is
minimal. -
Again, on 21 February 1967, the President was handed a “shopping list” of
escalation proposals recommended by the JCS and apparently written by John
McNaughton of the Office of International Security Affairs in DOD. Volume 4,
page 146, lists among the recommendations:
8. Cause interdicting rains in or near Laos.
The narrative text summarizes the rest of the memo:
The discussion section of the paper dealt with each of the eight specific option
areas noting our capability in each instance to inflict heavy damage or complete
destruction to the facilities in question. - -
Evidently, the JCS considered weather modification worthy of consideration
as One way of waging war.
Some who have been closely associated with The Pentagon Papers study,
asked about these references, pointed out that the study was compiled by civilians
with relatively little knowledge or data on day-to-day combat operations. They
Say it is reasonable to infer that the relatively few references to weather modifica-
tion activities in The Pentagon Papers are no clue to the actual extent of military
weather modification operations.
The other evidence that rainfall augmentation might still be going on is cir-
cumstantial. On 18 March 1971, the well-known syndicated columnist, Jack
Anderson, in his column in the Washington Post, claimed that the Ho Chi Minh
trail, which runs through both Laos and Cambodia, had been seeded by the Air
Force since 1967 (the date of JCS recommendations listed in The Pentagon Papers).
In part, Anderson wrote:
The hush-hush project, known by the code name “Intermediary-Compatriot,”
was started in 1967 to hamper enemy logistics. Those who fly the rainmaking
missions believe they have increased the precipitation over the jungle roadways
during the wet seasons.
. . . These assertedly have caused flooding conditions along the trails, making
them impassable.
The Ho Chi Minh trails will get their next monsoon bath from May to Sep-
tember. . . . Only those with top security clearance knew, until now, that nature
would be assisted by the U.S. Air Force.
Anderson was alleging that “Intermediary-Compatriot” would be going on
from May to September 1971. The Pentagon has never confirmed or denied the
charge. Its response, in fact, has been to say that the answers are classified—a
Statement that leads some liberal congressmen to conclude they must be doing it.
John S. Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DR. & E), replied
in an almost identical fashion to written queries from Senator Claiborne Pell
§3. Senator Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), and Representative Gilbert Gude
–Md.).
- Certain aspects of our work in this area ſweather modification] are classified.
Recognizing that the Congress is concerned ... I have, at the direction of Secretary
Laird seen to it that the Chairmen of the Committees of Congress with primary
responsibility for this Department's operations have been completely informed
regarding the details of all classified weather modification undertakings by the
Department. However, since the information to which I refer has a definite
relationship to national Security and is classified as a result, I find it necessary
to respectfully and regretfully decline to make a public disclosure of the details
of these activities at this time.
Pell will try to get some elaboration on this statement from DOD when he
holds hearings on a draft treaty banning environmental modifications for military
purposes. However, so far, Laird is the only DOD official who has been asked
point-blank whether the military is modifying weather in the war. In April,
Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), asked him about it, although the question-
ing was limited to North Vietnam.
FULBRIGHT: “. . . In other words, you have never engaged in the use of this,
whatever it may be, weather control, although you have a capability of it. Is
that the reason?”
LAIRD: “We have never engaged in that type of activity over North Vietnam.”
Although it sounds harmless, in Indochina, rainfall augmentation can have
key military and tactical advantages. The purpose of cloud seeding would be
to muddy up the hundreds of trail networks which wind southward and east-
ward through Laos and Cambodia, providing vital links between North Vietnam
and China, and South Vietnam. Impeding the traffic of men and materiel which
82—892—72—8
110
flows constantly through this jungled, often mountainous terrain has been the
key objective of the United States' billion-dollar bombing campaigns since 1965.
But a flood can mess up a road or pathway as much as a bomb explosion can.
Moreover, it is much cheaper, and highly covert. Scientists say that only if the
Laotians and Cambodians took extensive samples of rainwater and systematically
tested them for trace elements, could they actually prove that the normal rainfall
had been artificially increased. -
Moreover, this form of weather modification is equally covert to the side em-
ploying it. According to civilian Scientists, a cloud-seeding plane can be any type
of plane. It needs little special equipment, and 35 to 100 pounds of silver iodide
for a 6-hour seeding mission. Even if equipped with racks for the dropping of
pyrotechnic flares—one technique for Seeding—a weather modification plane
would look the same as a reconnaissance plane which drops similar flares. Not
only would the Laotians have a difficult time discovering our cloud-seeding
activities, Americans would have difficulty too.”
One of the most eminent of DOD's weather scientists is Pierre Saint-Amand,
who is head of the Earth and Planetary Sciences Division of the Naval Ordnance
Taboratory, Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, California. He says that the
alleged use of cloud seeding in Indochina is “outside of my ability to answer.”
Like other DOD spokesmen on the subject of weather modification, Saint-Amand
is eager to point out that the Soviet Union is doing extensive weather modification
research.
As to the potential of cloud seeding for impeding infiltration routes, Saint-
Amand said, “I don’t think using weather to discourage people from moving is a
bad thing to do. If you estimate the amount of damage done by impeding some-
one’s transportation, versus blowing them up or burning them up, I don’t think it
is so immoral.” In effect weather is no less humane a weapon than bombing and
gunfire.
Civilian meteorologists, however, tend to be far more cautious about the efficacy
of current weather modification techniques. They say, anxiously, that in few cases
can cloud seeding be actually proved to work, The DOD, for example, claims that
a cloud-seeding project over Texas during a drought was successful because heavy
rainfall followed the seeding. However, fince the rain fell in many areas besides
those seeded, there is no way of knowing whether the rainfall would have occurred
anyway, and in what amounts. -
Civilian weather scientists almost universally favor limiting or banning military
operations in which weather modification techniques are used, and they can point
to a fairly long history of recommending same. In 1971, a National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) study of the future of the atmospheric sciences resolved that: 4
The U.S. Government is urged to present for adoption by the United Nations
General Assembly a resolution dedicating all weather modification efforts to
peaceful purposes and establishing, preferably within the framework of interna-
tional nongovernmental scientific organizations, an advisory mechanism for
consideration of weather-modification problems of potential international concern
before they reach critical levels. -
One of the most prominent meteorologists is Thomas F. Malone, of the Uni-
versity of Connecticut, who is chairman of the NAS panel on weather
modification of the academy’s Committee on Atmospheric Sciences and one
organizer with the World Meteorological Organization of the United Nations
of the Global Atmospheric Research Program (GARP). Malone says, “I have
made speeches for 10 years saying we should get together and do this work
internationally before it got to the point of being operational. Otherwise we
M. º horrendous political problems . . . putting the genie back into the
Ottle.
Joanne Simpson, who has made cloud modification experiments at the Ex-
perimental Meteorological Laboratory of the National Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), was asked how she would react to seeing
the results of her work applied in warfare. She said, “I would be grieved to
See my work used for military purposes because I got involved in this kind
of work to do useful things, not destructive things.”
And Joseph Smagorinsky, a NOAA meteorologist who has modeled climate
and weather and who is on the executive committee of the GARP organizing
3 The civilian experiments which would parallel this activity are reported in “Seeding Cumulus Clouds
in Florida: New 1970 Results” by Joanne Simpson and William L. Woodley (Science, 9 April 1971). See
also Science, 7 May 1971, for a general review of weather modification progress.
4 The Atmospheric Sciences and Man’s Needs: Priorities for the Future, Recommendation III–6, Commit-
ztee on Atmospheric Sciences, National Research Council (National Academy of Sciences, Washington,
D.C., 1971) p. 61.
111
committee, expressed stronger opposition: “These programs are a cooperative
effort of many nations, and each gives up a certain amount of autonomy to
work together,” he said. “If they felt this would be used against them, there
would very definitely be a cooling off.” Smagorinsky pointed out that one part
of the GARP plan will put about 20 ships and 10 to 15 airplanes over the
Atlantic working together. They will come from many countries, including the
United States and the Soviet Union. If it turns out that the United States
has militaristic uses for weather modification, “this sort of thing would drop
dead. It would undo everything that Science has been able to do. It would
have absolutely tragic effects.”
Walter O. Roberts, director of the National Center for Atmospheric Research
in Boulder, Colorado, takes a more conservative view. “I think it very unlikely
that deliberate weather modification is a particularly effective weapon,” he said.
“I’m very concerned about international, inadvertent weather modification as a
result of pollution; I don’t consider meteorological use in warfare as much of a
threat. But if you could visit a hurricane on Somebody, I would be very opposed
and consider it very serious.”
Concern over the military aspects of weather modification has been expressed
by a number of defense specialists and arms control experts. Many see a parallel
with chemical and biological weapons, which have similar inadvertent effects on
environment, and also affect both soldier and civilian. Leslie Gelb, now of the
Brookings Institution, who directed from within DOD the 47-volume Pentagon
study of the war, which was later leaked as the Pentagon Papers, said, “My
instinctive reaction to the use of this kind of technique is negative. Like chemical
and biological weapons, it deals in an area that would become essentially un-
controllable. But I have no categorical answer on it because I don’t know enough
of the scientific aspects.”
Representative Gude, who with Cranston, has attempted to find out about
Indochina weather control for Over a year and has never even been offered a
DOD classified briefing, says, “There's a similarity between chemical and biologi-
cal weapons and weather control. You could have a snowballing effect in both
cases, an effect on nature over which you lose control.”
Matthew Meselson, professor of biology at Harvard, and a long-time consultant
to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who is identified with the success-
ful campaign to ban biological warfare, was asked about the parallel to chemical
and biological warfare. He said, “First, I have no knowledge one way or the other
as to whether the United States has engaged in weather modification in connection
with military activities in southeast Asia.
“However, it is obvious that weather modification used as a weapon of war has
the potential for causing large scale and quite possibly uncontrollable and un-
predictable destruction. Furthermore, such destruction might well have a far
greater impact on civilians than on combatants. This would be especially true
in areas where subsistence agriculture is practiced, in food deficit areas, and in
areas subject to flooding.”
Leonard S. Rodberg, a fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies who assisted in
publishing the Gravel Pentagon Papers, said, “I don’t think we have a right to
experiment on other people. It’s a standard issue which in medical terms would be
called informed consent. The people in that area [Indochina] are totally dependent
on the weather for their livelihoods. If we change the pattern we destroy their
ability to exist. We’ve done it not only with weather modification but with de-
foliants and herbicides.” Rodberg adds, “It’s quite clear that many kinds of ex-
perimentation have been permitted in Indochina. So long as it's not a large opera-
tion that would get a lot of publicity, anything can be done.”
Most of those queried favored some sort of ban on military uses of weather
modification technology. But Adrian S. Fisher, deputy director of the Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency from 1961–1969, now dean of the Georgetown
University Law School, says, “Weather modification is really an appropriate sub-
ject, not only for an arms control agreement, but for a peaceful uses agreement,”
which would “regulate allocation of resources in such a way as to recognize its
good qualities as well as its bad ones.”
Finally, another well-known arms control specialist, Herbert P. Scoville, Jr.,
favors a ban on weather modification’s military uses. “I would strongly support
any statement that we ought to ban the use of weather modification for military
purposes and seek an international agreement on this.
“At some stage of the game, somebody may start doing it—even if it's not go-
ing on now. To me it is a terrible way to be using science.”
112
[From Science magazine, Vol. 177, July 21, 1972]
TECHNOLOGY IN WIETNAM : FIRE STORM PROJECT FIZZLED OUT
(By Deborah Shapley)
The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), which is attached to
the Department of Defense (DOD) made at least three attempts, in 1965, 1966,
and 1967, to light what defense planners termed “fire storms”—the name used
to describe the World War II holocausts at Hamburg, Dresden, and elsewhere—in
Some of South Vietnam's most valuable timber country. All three attempts,
however, fizzled out. One may have even caused rainfall instead of a big forest
fire.
The attempts were known by such euphemistic names as Sherwood Forest,
Hot Tip, and Operation Pink Rose. They took place in the Mekong Terrace
Section of South Vietnam—a central plains area which contains several luxury
timbers, such as mahogany and rosewood, and half of South Vietnam's sawmills.
Timbering is said to be one of the few industries that could develop into prime
importance for the South Vietnamese economy. Nonetheless, experts from the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) were called in by ARPA to advise on
how to effectively burn the forests. The project's budget was on the order of
$1 million.
Military sources say that the attempted jungle fires took place in areas where
there were no “permanent type villages,” although they allow that Viet Cong
Supply depots and base camps were in the woods. But Senator Gaylord Nelson
(D-Wis.) views the fire projects as part of the U.S.’s “callous” and “unprecedented
environmental warfare” which has involved “an outrageous use of technology.”
The USDA fire service role in the project was led by Craig Chandler, a fire
storm expert who is now director of fire research for the Forest Service. The fire
storm project is also discussed in a classified paper, obtained by Science, written
by Arthur F. McConnell, Jr., a lieutenant colonel in the Air Force who was
involved with the Ranch Hand defoliation missions.
Two reasons were given for the project. One was that, by creating a fire which
would “crown,” that is, burn out defoliated tops of trees, the fire would remove
layers of jungle canopy and make reconnaissance from the air more effective. A
second reason was that a large-scale jungle fire which reached the tree tops would
also destroy the ground cover and make concealment and camouflage by the enemy
from U.S. bombing strikes or ground attack impossible.
Fire storms can be many times more dangerous than regular fires; they have
occurred accidentally in forests in the American West, as well as in Australia and
Southern France; they also occurred in urban areas, including Dresden and Ham-
burg, and on at least two occasions in Tokyo during a 1923 earthquake and during
bombing raids in 1944–1945.
In a fire storm, the area of intense burning sucks in oxygen at such a rate that
high-speed, cyclone-like ground winds are created, blowing into the fire at Speeds
which may exceed 100 miles an hour. The Hamburg fire chief, for example, report-
ing on the fire storm of July 1943, said that many people died from the intense
heat even though they were located 150 meters from the nearest burning building.”
Both McConnell's classified paper (which was later sanitized and published in
the Air University Review º and ARPA Officials used the term fire storm to describe
the burning projects in Vietnam. Chandler says he was asked on a number of
occasions during the operation of the project whether a fire storm could be ignited
in the humid, tropical jungle. Although lighting a fire storm might be feasible under
certain conditions in temperate areas, such as the western United States, Chandler
Said he told the military it was not feasible to do so in the jungle.
Nonetheless, the fire storm project, as it came to be known, was started under
ARPA authorizing order 818. Its final reports are all classified, although some press
reports appeared at the time of the attempts. Chandler said he was willing to be
interviewed only about those aspects of the project which he had already Seen
appear in unclassified publications.
The project began at the request of CINCPAC, the office of the Commander in
Chief of the Pacific which runs operations in Vietnam. Chemical defoliants were
then coming into use in the war. However, the jungle canopy, which can extend
upward in tiers to a height of 100 feet from the ground, was not transparent
enough after defoliating missions. An ARPA spokesman said, “The question posed
1 “Field notes on World War II German fire experience,” title of contract No. N228(62479)—65419 to Carl F.
Miller and James W. Kerr, October 1965, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, Calif. -
2. º º version was published as: A. F. McConnell, Jr., “Mission: Ranch Hand,” Air Univ. Rev
, 89 (1970). -
113
by CINCPAC was: couldn’t we burn the jungle area in the so-called ‘hot zones'
Of infiltration?”
ARPA hired the fire research section of the USDA Forest Service to carry
out the Order, and offered the support of its 25-member field unit which had
been stationed in Vietnam since 1961. The USDA did some preliminary research,
then participated in the first “field test”—as ARPA calls it—in the Boi Loi
woods near the Iron triangle near Tay Ninh city. The area is due west of Saigon,
close to the Cambodian border. As in all the fire storm attempts, at the beginning
of the dry season Ranch Hand crews defoliated the area, the dead leaves were
permitted to dry out for a period, thus preparing the fuel supply. Then ignition
was attempted. Hence, in April or May of 1965, a section of the Boi Loi woods
was ignited. According to McConnell's paper, the project, “Operation. Sherwood
Forest,” was “a massive attempt to burn out a defoliated section of the Boi
Loi woods in the hope of denying the enemy an extremely vital base camp area.”
Unfortunately, it was raining on the day the field units tried to light the fire.
The lighting attempt went ahead, but nothing happened because of the rain.
The failure to ignite the woods under the right weather conditions was the reason
a second attempt was made a year later.
Chandler recalls two subsequent major attempts, but McConnell's paper
implies that there may have been more. “It is interesting to note,” McConnell
wrote before the Air Force censor deleted the passage, “that during this period
and for the next year, several ‘fire storm’ projects similar to the Boi Loi woods
effort were made in conjunction with the Vietnamese Air Force.” Asked about
this, ARPA officials noted that one of the jobs of the ARPA field unit was to
transfer technical skills to the Vietnamese; however, the officials doubted that
the incendiary technology was ever successful enough to be passed along to U.S.
allies.
The second major burning attempt, code named Hot Tip, was made much
farther north, in the Chu Pong Mountains, about halfway between the South
Vietnamese cities of Pleiku and Kontum. Ranch Hand crews again defoliated a
forest tract probably less than 30 Square miles in area. Chandler recalls that the
fire was lit sometime in either January, February, or early March of 1966.
“This one wasn’t done in the rain,” says Chandler. “It was more successful than
the first attempt. We recommended some changes afterward, which is why there
was a third attempt.” Later, an Associated Press account termed this attempt an
“incendiary raid” made by “tactical bombers.” According to other sources, the
fire burned parts of the forest and ground cover, but failed to continue burning,
or to spread. One reason, of course, was the high humidity of the jungle. The other
was apparently the temperature and wind conditions.
The third and biggest attempt, code named Operation Pink Rose, took place in a
Viet Cong stronghold northeast of Saigon near Xuan Loc, in February or early
March of 1967. The area staked out for burning was probably 30 square miles. In
this case, although weather conditions were perfect, the fire was followed by a
rainstorm which put it out. Some accounts say that the fire may have caused the
rainstorm. Thus, all three of the attempts were considered failures.
According to McConnell's original paper, in a passage that was later slightly
altered: “One of the highlights of this period [early 1967] was Operation ‘Pink
Rose,’ the third jungle-burning project carried out by Ranch Hand crews. In
support of this project, the squadron flew approximately 225 sorties and delivered
over a quarter-million gallons of herbicide on selected target areas in War Zones
C and D.” One military observer, L. L. Herzog, a lieutenant commander, who saw
the Pink Rose incendiaries dropping from the sky, was later quoted as saying,
“It looked just like the Fourth of July.” -
Chandler says, “The rain came the evening afterwards. The country doesn’t
burn well. This is why there was never any expectation on our part that fires
were going to spread.” Chandler would say only that the incendiaries used for
Operation Pink Rose were “of a World War II type” and that after the third
attempt, the Forest Service experts who had worked on the project wrote a
report to ARPA advising that no further “field tests” or research be carried out.
Much of ARPA’s field research in South Vietnam, including the trail sensor
network and the foliage penetration radar, has come into wide use in the war.
Other projects, such as Pink Rose, which don’t work out, are allowed to quietly
die. “This was clearly one of those ideas that should have been given the very
quietest funeral,” an ARPA official said. ARPA briefed the relevant officials in
the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense on USDA’s conclusions,
and that was that. “Its really was a nutty idea to begin with,” said an ARPA
Official.
114
Despite the unanimous “nyet” of the USDA and ARPA to the feasibility of
Starting fire Storms, or self-propagating fires, in the damp Vietnamese jungle,
two questions about the project remain. One is why the term fire storm came to
be applied in the first place to the project. McConnell, the former Ranch Hand
chief who mentioned fire storms in the course of his paper, said he recalled picking
up the term from military sources. +
Jay Bentley, a forester, now retired, who was with the fire research service, and
headed up the fieldwork for Hot Tip, the second attempt, said he did not recall
even hearing the term fire storm in connection with the project until he read it
in the newspapers. As to who raised the expectation that a Dresdenor Hamburg-
like holocaust would be created in the jungles, Bentley says, “I didn’t expect very
much to result or think the expectation was very high as far as ARPA was con-
cerned.” This statement, as well as ARPA’s skeptical attitude toward the project,
would seem to imply that the enthusiastic—and horrific—term fire storm emanated
from military command sources, over the expert technical advice of the civilians
and ARPA.
Another question is what would have happened if the experts had indeed
found a way to spark big fires. ARPA sources said unhesitatingly that if Pink Rose
had succeeded, the military commanders would have doubtless gone on to use
fire-lighting in other situations.
Incendiary technology would have been added, along with herbicides, weather
modification, and other environmental weapons, to the DOD arsenal.
Yet, discussing their own role, both the ARPA spokesmen and the Forest
Service experts merely claim that they were giving neutral, technical advice.
Chandler obviously likes trees, yet he also supports the jungle-burning project
because, in his words, “it was part of a military operation” and no villages
“friendly or unfriendly” were involved. “This was definitely not a burn-up-people
project,” he says. And a high ARPA official defends the agency's role thus:
“Here was a situation which came up which clearly no one knew what the facts
Were. . . . We were, as research people, asked to look into the technical possi-
bilities and to tell people who make political decisions what the facts were.”
These statements rivet the issue back to the historic claim by scientists that their
technical advice is morally neutral and, by implication, divorced from the uses
to which the technology they develop is ultimately applied. Perhaps there were
no villages involved in what ARPA blandly called the “field tests” of the incendi-
ary projects. Yet clearly there was no insurance that villages would not someday be
included in the target area.
The fire storm project is now a mere historical event which its perpetrators
Would prefer to forget. But another issue may loom very much in the present and
future and relates to the matter of ecocide. According to Forest Service experts
Who have surveyed and inventoried the forest resources of South Vietnam and
their alteration due to the war, at least 1 million hectares were defoliated, as of
1967, and that total may have reached 3.5 million by 1969.” Defoliation has
taken place, not just a few times in a few strategic patches of jungle; some areas
have been sprayed for almost 10 years. The tropical hardwood forests of the
Mekong Terrace are drier now than they were in 1965–1967 when humidity
dampened Pink Rose projects. It is still possible that fires might recur as a mode
of warfare in the collective memory of CINCPAC and the military commanders.
As one ARPA official said, “If the system has any institutional memory whatever,
if this suggestion is ever made again, they’ll look into the files and find out it
doesn’t work.”
SIERRA CLUB,
San Francisco, July 30, 1973.
President RICHARD M. Nixon,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It has been revealed only recently that the United States
government has been using weather modification as a weapon of war in Southeast
Asia. We protest both the unilateral escalation of weaponry and the perversion of
environmental forces by their use as instruments of warfare. These are forces that
have the potential of doing mankind untold good. .
This action by our government is a clear violation of the principles of the
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
adopted in Stockholm on June 16, 1972, to which the United States is a party.
3 Barry R. Flamm and Jay H. Cravens, “Effects of war damage on the forest resources of South Vietnam,”
J. Forest. 69, 784 (1971).
115
This Declaration stated that:
“States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, . . . the responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”
The revelation that we use weather modification as an instrument of war raises
serious question as to our good faith in entering into this Solemn compact and Our
intention to abide by it.
We believe that such environmental modification activities can have significant
unforeseen consequences with widespread and perhaps uncontrollable damage.
We the public have not been informed of the reason for using environmental
engineering as a weapon of war any more than we were of its use until the recent
publications. But, even if it has been effective, which we do not see claimed or
substantiated, the United States should seek to lead the world’s nations away from
new armaments, not towards another arms race. The use of weather modification
as part of such a race would be particularly tragic because meteorology has been
a model of international cooperation.
Accordingly, we call upon you to announce that the United States will seek
international agreement on the principle of providing for the complete cessation of
any research, experimentation, or use of any environmental or geophysical
modification activity as a weapon of war. The United States should henceforth
dedicate all geophysical and environmental research to peaceful purposes and
should actively seek the cooperation of other nations in programs of joint research
on geophysical phenomena, their control, and their peaceful use.
RAYMOND J. SHERWIN,
President, Sierra Club.
MARVIN L. GOLDBERGER,
Chairman, Federation of American Scientists.
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT of MoDERN WEAPONs TECHNOLOGY IN S.E. ASIA
(By E. W. Pfeiffer and Arthur H. Westing, Copyright 1971, Committee for
- Environmental Information)
[Reprinted with permission from Environment magazine, 438 North Skinker Blvd.,
St. Louis, Missouri 63130]
The following three reports on Vietnam were prepared for Environment by two
U.S. scientists who have had considerable experience in that country. They are
Dr. E. W. Pfeiffer, Zoologist from the University of Montana, and Dr. Arthur H.
Westing, botanist from Windham College, Putney, Vermont. Both scientists had
previously traveled to Vietnam to investigate the effects of wartime use of herbi-
cides (see Environment, March 1971, p. 34). In August, they visited Vietnam on
behalf of the Scientists’ Institute for Public Information and Environment; their
trip was supported in part by the Fund for Investigative Journalism and the
D. J. B. Foundation. They explored, among other things, ways in which the
landscape has been drastically altered by high explosives, including 7.5-ton bombs,
and special bulldozers. (Previous reports dealt with the effects of herbicide
spraying.) -
In Summary, the investigations reveal that military operations in Vietnam have
disrupted the economy and cultural life of the people, as did saturation bombing
and mechanized armies in Europe in World War II. For the most part, the high
explosives used in the Indochina War have devastated the land rather than major
cities, but the destruction has seriously damaged forests and soil on which the
Vietnamese depend. For example, bulldozers equipped to clear jungles to the
forest floor and thus deny cover to the opposing soldiers have already destroyed
more than $40 million worth of timber and rubber trees. Timber not destroyed
outright frequently contains shrapnel that either breaks saw blades or promotes
disease that weakens the wood. In the wake of jungle-clearing operations come
Soil erosion, flash floods, and invasion by economically useless weeds. The esti-
mated ten million or more bomb craters in South Vietnam disrupt rice farming
and fill with water to become breeding places for disease-bearing mosquitoes.
Special blockbuster bombs—the largest aerial weapons available short of nuclear
weapons—uproot all vegetation in football-field-size areas and kill or injure all
animal life for almost a mile in every direction. An as yet undetermined cost of
the war will be the long-term ecological and Sociological effects of this devastation.
116
I. CRATERS
(By E. W. Pfeiffer)
During the Indochina war the U.S. has dropped more than two times the
tonnage of bombs that was dropped in Europe, Asia, and Africa during World
War II, most of it in Vietnam, a country about the size of New England or one-
half the size of the state of Montana. Rockets, artillery shells, and mines have
been exploded on a vast scale in many areas in Vietnam, in addition to explosives
dropped from aircraft. This ordnance has been used principally in free-fire zones
or special strike zones, which all people except the National Liberation Front and
its North Vietnamese allies have supposedly vacated. Data on the extent of the
free-fire zones of South Vietnam would permit calculation of the percent of
Vietnamese land surface that has been intensively subjected to these weapons.
These data are not, however, presently available.
Although few details have been released regarding expenditures or target loca-
tions for the various types of munitions, the following Summary figures for all of
Indochina have been made available by the Department of Defense:
MUNITIONS USED IN INDOCHINA WAR
[In millions of pounds]
Air Surface
Year munitions munitions Total
1965------------------------------------------------------------- 630 7 630
1966------------------------------------------------------------- 1,024 1, 164 2, 188
1967------------------------------------------------------------- 1, 866 2, 413 4, 278
1968------------------------------------------------------------- 2,863 3,003 5, 866
1969------------------------------------------------------------- 2,774 2, 808 5, 583
1970------------------------------------------------------------- 1,955 2, 389 4, 344
Total------------------------------------------------------ 11, 112 11, 777 22, 889
We do not know what fraction of the 23 billion pounds of munitions expended
during these six years was small arms and other ordnance that would not produce
craters (nor do we know what the distribution is among South Vietnam, North
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos). To make some wild assumptions, if half the
minitions (by weight) were of the sort that produce craters (bombs, shells, etc.)
and if each was a 500-pound bomb, then Indochina’s landscape would now be
more or less permanently rearranged by more than twenty million craters. Using
an estimated average diameter of 30 feet, the holes alone would cover a combined
area of about 325,000 acres. Although occasional, scattered craters can be found
almost anywhere in rural South Vietnam, we have observed large areas of severe
craterization in the provinces of Tay Ninh, Long Khanh, Gia Dinh, Hau Nghia,
Binh Duong, Quang Ngai, Quang Tin, and Quang Nam. We have been told about
similar areas in Kien Giang, An Xuyen, and Quang Tri. No type of habitat
seems to be spared, including forests and swamps, fields and paddies. Many
Severely craterized areas—such as the so-called free-fire zones, free-bomb zones,
Or specified strike zones—were formerly inhabited and farmed. Such regions of
important military activity as War Zones C and D, the Iron Triangle, the Rung
Sat and U Minh Special War Zones, the Demilitarized Zone, and the Ho Chi
Minh Trail are among those regions that have been subjected to repeated Satu-
ration or pattern bombing.
What is this unprecedented bombardment doing to Vietnam and its people?
In order to make a preliminary assessment of the effects of these explosives
Arthur H. Westing and I visited Vietnam in August 1971. In preparation for
Our trip we had sought information from many sources on effects of bomb
craters resulting from military activities, but were unable to find any significant
information.
We flew over bombed areas in helicopters and rode in armored personnel carriers
to observe at first hand craters from B-52 Strikes. We interviewed in the field
Vietnamese farmers who were trying to reclaim bombed land, Vietnamese loggers
who were operating in bombed and shelled areas, and several Vietnamese and
American officials. -
In order to judge the magnitude of the problem it is necessary to have some idea
of the number of bombs dropped and the amount of territory affected. Earlier
studies have presented data which suggest that some 7.5 million craters have
117
been formed as a result of the massive bombardment. Although we estimate that
the current figure for South Vietnam is in excess of 10 million, we are currently
awaiting Department of Defense data to verify this figure.
The standard weapon of the B-52s is a 500-pound bomb; each B-52 carries
108 five-hundred pound bombs. Each bomb produces a hole 20 to 50 feet wide
and 5 to 20 feet deep, depending on Soil conditions. The bombs are usually dropped
from over 30,000 feet by the B-52 aircraft and can have sufficient force on impact
to penetrate deeply into certain types of Soil.
Severely bombed areas observed on our trip included the following land types:
heavily cultivated areas of the Mekong Delta, intensively cultivated mountain
valleys in the northern region of Vietnam, mangrove forests, evergreen hardwood
forests of the flat terraces northwest of Saigon, and evergreen hardwood forests
of the precipitous mountain areas in the Da Nang-Quang Ngai area.
Because of the war situation at the time of our visit, we were unable to fly over,
even at high altitude, the most intensively bombed regions of South Vietnam
which lie in the northwest corner of the country and along the Demilitarized Zone.
We were also very disappointed to find that security problems made it very
difficult to visit on foot bombed areas in all of the regions that we attempted to
study. It is important to note that there are areas of South Vietnam, particularly
in the delta region, that do not reveal, at least from the air at 3,000 feet, much
evidence of war damage. Large areas, however, have been hit very intensively by
several types of ecologically devastating Weapons.
What are the effects of the massive bombardments on cultivated areas such as
the Mekong Delta? Our observations made both in wet and (on previous visits)
dry seasons show that in the delta, the B-52 craters and those caused by large
artillery shells are permanently filled with water, probably because the craters
penetrate the water table. In many areas waters of different colors fill adjacent
craters. Some of the waters in the craters are aquamarine while others have a
more bluish to greenish tint, and many are simply a muddy brown. These dif-
ferences in coloration are apparently due to growths of varying types of algae.
It is interesting that different growths occurred in contiguous craters.
I was able to visit on foot three such craters in an agricultural area about 30
miles south of My Tho in the heart of the Mekong Delta. The area, near the hamlet
of Hoi Son, had been a free-fire zone until fairly recently, but farmers were now
being resettled on their land because senior officials considered the region relatively
secure. The degree of security became evident: During my stay in the area. U.S.
aircraft were rocketing and strafing only a few miles away. I interviewed some
families who had left the area eleven years ago because of the fighting. They took
me to three craters made in 1967. I would estimate that they were caused by 500-
pound bombs dropped by fighter bombers. Each crater was about 30 feet in
diameter, filled with water and, at the time of my visit, about 5 feet deep in the
center, as proven by one of my guides. He waded into the center of the crater
where he could just manage to keep his nose above water while standing. The
entire immediate vicinity had been a rice paddie; the rice had been replaced by a
very tall reed (6 to 8 feet), genus Phragmites, which surrounded the craters at a
distance of 10 to 20 feet. Growing from the rim of the craters and into the reeds
was a species of relatively short grass, genus Brachiaria. A taller grass, Scirpus,
was also prevalent. The whole area was inundated by very shallow water, as it was
the middle of the wet season. The farmers were growing seed rice near the craters
and were plowing under the reeds and grasses in preparation for planting rice.
It was obvious that they could not use the cratered areas for rice cultivation,
because the water was much too deep. One solution to the problem is to bring in
soil from elsewhere. Although I could not confirm it, one farmer said that the
craters I observed yielded exceptionally good fish catches. The fish presumably
had moved into the craters during the monsoon flooding. Surrounding the area.
that had been cultivated in rice were banana, coconut, and jackfruit trees. The
jackfruit was dead as a result of herbicides; the coconut trees were destroyed by
the bombing, leaving only bare stumps.
In our conversations with these and other farmers who were trying to resettle
their fought-over land, it became obvious that their main problem was the presence
of unexploded munitions in the areas. The Hoi Son people stated that within
the last few weeks three women had been killed and one badly wounded when
plows detonated unexploded weapons. We learned that mines in some resettled
areas have been cleared, but the problem of locating and neutralizing unexploded
ordnance before land is resettled is an urgent one. On several occasions we en-
countered the fear of unexploded munitions, which probably accounts for a
phenomenon we often observed from the air: fields with craters were usually not
being cultivated although nearby fields were. One farmer whom we interviewed
118
Stated that the people do not like to plow in the bombed areas because the shrapnel
in the dirt cuts the buffalos' hoofs, resulting in infection. -
According to science spokesmen of the U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment (USAID) and the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), bomb
Craters are sometimes used as sources of freshwater for irrigation. In much of the
Southern Mekong Delta, brackish (salty) water floods cultivated lands at high
tides if it is not kept back by dikes. Thus, irrigation is necessary and freshwater
in the craters could be useful.
Presumably the permanently water-filled crater areas of the delta region are
excellent breeding grounds for certain species of mosquitoes and other carriers
(vectors) of disease. Those craters not invaded by predators of mosquito larvae
provide conditions for greatly accelerated reproduction of mosquitoes and other
vectors. According to MACV-Command Information pamphlet 6–70, February
1970, “malaria has been causing increasing concern in Vietnam. . . . Up until
recently it (Plasmodium falciparum) only affected regions of I and II Corps but
has now spread to other areas throughout the country.” We discussed with several
Scientists the possible relationship between craterization and this increase in
malaria, but no studies have yet been made of this problem as far as we could
determine. A USAID specialist in public health with headquarters in Saigon stated
that the current alarming increase in hemorrhagic (dengue) fever seen in the
Vietnamese was not related to craterization because the mosquito vector for this
disease, Aédes aegypti, lives only in and around houses and would thus not be
affected by ecological changes such as craterization. (We do not know of any
field research which supports this view.) We flew a mosquito-control spray mission
in a C-123 aircraft from which malathion was being sprayed (one-half pound per
acre) over and around an Australian military base. There are only two aircraft
now carrying out this program, and, as far as we were able to determine, there is
Ino Spray program involving treatment of cratered areas.
We observed many craters in isolated mountain valleys near Da Nang. They
were in small clusters in mountain rice fields and thus were probably caused
either by artillery or fighter-bomber strikes and not by B-52s. In these valleys
the craters were generally filled with water as in the delta, but they probably are
without water in the dry season and thus cannot be used for fish culture. The
paddies that had been cratered were not being cultivated. During our visit we flew
over many rice paddies with ponds in the centers almost comparable in size (about
ten feet across) to the bomb craters, but these were fish ponds and apparently
did not interfere with the cultivation of the rice surrounding the ponds. It is thus
unlikely that scattered craters could create changes in soil moisture or other
conditions that would make cratered paddies uncultivatable.
We observed from the air large areas of the mangrove swamps of the Rung
Sat Zone which had been subjected to very heavy B-52 strikes. These are all
permanently water-filled and obviously would make transportation into the area.
very difficult. This could be of some significance because the mangrove forests
have been regularly used as sources of wood for charcoal and for fishing grounds.
We observed many craters at first hand in the Boi Loi woods area. This had
been an evergreen hardwood forest on the flat terrace northwest of Saigon.
Most mature trees were dead from defoliation (herbicide spraying) but there was
a very thick understory of useless broadleafed brush, vines, bamboo, and
Imperata grass reaching a height of 15 to 20 feet. Craters were very numer-
Ous in this area and were scattered at least every 100 feet or so. Each crater
was 20 to 30 feet across and 5 to 10 or more feet deep. They were all in a
grey podzolic soil (a poor soil often formed in cool, humid climates) with poorly
defined horizons (layers). There were many generations of craters. The most
recent ones were bare of vegetation but contained a little rain water at the
bottom. In the older ones a few sprigs of grass, probably Imperata, were Sprouting
in the center. (We also noted the begining of plant growth in the center of
some of the water-filled craters in the delta.) As the craters age the grass
grows radially, covering the bottom, and finally grows up the sides to meet
vines growing down from the peripheral vegetation. There is some filling of Old
craters with soil washed down from the sides, but this is limited because old
craters completely covered with grass were still 5 to 10 feet deep. We did not
observe any broadleafed plants invading these holes.
We were able to learn something of the effects of Saturation bombing and
artillery fire upon forest timber resources through interviews with loggers and Saw-
mill operators and by inspection of damaged logs, mainly in the Ben Cat and
Chon Thanh areas. We also interviewed South Vietnam forestry officials about
the problems of utilizing bombed forest areas. These officials indicated that
119
loggers do not like to operate in bombed timber because the trees have metal
fragments in them which greatly reduce the value of the logs. (One logger estimated
that the price of logs containing metal is reduced by 30 percent.) We could under-
stand the reason for the reduced value when we observed piles of saws with teeth
ripped out and examined discarded logs from which we dug pieces of metal. In
some logs there were dead areas about twelve inches in diameter and six inches
deep from which we recovered bomb fragments. We learned that when mature
timber is punctured by metals such as steel shards or bullets, entry is provided for
disease organisms, probably fungi, which result in dead areas that increase in size
as the wound ages. Thus, largely unlike trees in temperate Zones, the trees of
Vietnam are susceptible to rot when penetrated by metal. This greatly decreases
the value of the timber and also weakens trees so that they are much more subject
to being blown down. An official of a French rubber plantation told us that he
had lost many rubber trees on his plantation because the trees had been weakened
by fungus infection following bomb damage and then blown down in one of the
frequent violent wind storms that occur in the area. The loggers whom we inter-
viewed said that the craters in the forest made passage very difficult for trucks
and loaders, a situation that necessitated cutting much shorter logs than desirable
in such areas. (We saw 90 foot logs coming out of undamaged forests.) 4.
We were able to observe from a high-flying helicopter the craters caused in a
mountain forest near Da Nang by a B-52 strike about one and one-half years
earlier. The craters were still obvious on the mountainside and along the ridges.
The large burned areas in these forests appeared to be even more significant; they
had apparently resulted from fires started by various types of ordnance such as
White phosphorus, napalm, and flares.
We tentatively conclude that those cultivated areas hit heavily with conven-
tional high explosives will be very difficult, if not impossible, to recultivate. They
can perhaps be used as fish-rearing ponds or, in certain situations, as sources of
freshwater for irrigation. They may provide additional breeding areas for insect
vectors of disease. In the forested areas that have not been killed by chemical
defoliation, the bombing has created problems that are probably just as great as
those caused by defoliation. However, the immediate problem of greatest concern
is the vast number of unexploded mines, bombs, rockets, and so forth, that must
be removed if the land is to be resettled. Since the Department of Defense reports
that approximately 1 to 2 percent of our air and ground munitions fail to explode,
; are Several hundred thousand of these randomly buried throughout Indo-
CIll]] 3,.
We recommend studies to determine the relationship of water-filled craters to
the Spread of certain deseases and to determine how cratered areas can best be
rehabilitated. We also recommend that greatly expanded operations be initiated
to locate and neutralize unexploded ordnance in agriculturally useful areas.
II. LEVELING THE JUNGLE
(By Arthur H. Westing)
Despite the lavish application of great wealth and superior technology, the U.S.
has made surprisingly little headway over the years against the National Libera-
tion Front and its North Vietnamese allies. With the growing realization that the
forest functions as a key ally of guerrilla fighters by providing cover and sanctuary,
more and more effort has been directed toward its obliteration. For a number of
years reliance was placed primarily on chemical destruction. This approach reached
its peak in 1967, but largely because of pressure exerted by the scientific com-
munity, it now not only has been reduced to a low level (see Environment, July/
August 1970, p. 16) but also has been entirely “Vietnamized.” The herbicidal as-
Saluit has left South Vietnam with a legacy of many millions of dead, now rotting
trees, and with locally debilitated ecosystems. A second approach that has been
employed through the years to make the forest less hospitable to the other side is
a bombing and shelling program of incredible magnitude. The 23 billion pounds
of total munitions expended in Indochina between 1965 and 1970 alone are more
than double those used by us throughout World War II in all theaters.
In recent years, however, a new technique has emerged. Born about 1965, de-
veloping into major proportions in 1968, and growing ever since, a vast program
systematic forest bulldozing now exists. The U.S. Engineer Command in Vietnam
is daily putting Hercules and his twelve labors to shame. This report outlines the
methods, Scope, and magnitude of this “jungle eating” program and speculates
On its economic and ecological impacts.
120
The basic tool of the landclearing operations in Vietnam is the 20-ton T)–7E
Caterpillar tractor fitted with a massive 11-foot wide, 2.5-ton “Rome plow”
blade equipped with a special 3-foot splitting lance or “stinger,” and with 14 tons
of added armor. A very limited number of the even more immense D-9 tractors
are also in use. More than twice the size and weight of the D–7, each of these
machines is said to be the operational equal of several. The tractors are presently
organized into five companies of three platoons each, each company operating 30
or more tractors. Unofficially, the companies go under such names as Rome
Runners, Land Barons, and Jungle Eaters. These outfits bulldoze continuously
from dawn to dusk, seven days a week under what can only be described as
spine-twisting and gut-wrenching (to say nothing of dangerous) conditions. No
tree appears to be too large and no jungle too dense to escape these powerful
machines in what must certainly be the most intense land-claring program known
to history.
The bulldozing began on a very small scale in 1965 and was devoted primarily
to the clearing of roadsides and other lines of communication in order to dis-
courage enemy ambushes. It was not until mid-1967 that the tractors were or—
ganized into Small units. By the beginning of 1968, most of the major road systems
in the central half of South Vietnam (Military Regions II and III) had already
been cleared. Although this mission still continues, virtually all major roads in
the country have now been cleared for 300 to 600 feet or more on each side. These
Swaths throughout forest and plantation are now a conspicuous feature of the
Vietnamese landscape. In Some instances chemical herbicide treatment has helped
to maintain these strips in a treeless condition.
The employment of massed tractors organized into companies for extensive
forest clearing began in 1968, and the program has expanded ever since. In its
primary mission of denying forest cover and sanctuary, the “Rome plow” appears
to be without equal. Effectiveness of the tractors is clearly superior to that of
aerial application of chemical antiplant agents. The devices are considered, for
example, to be playing an instrumental role in the attempt to “secure” the region
centered around Saigon (Military Region III). They are also of considerable im–
portance in the northern half of the country (Military Regions I and II). The U.S.
has outfitted and is training two Vietnamese landclearing companies as one of the
facets of “Vietnamization.”
We were able to spend one day in action with the 984th Landclearing Company,
which at the time was operating in the southeastern corner of Tay Ninh province.
During our stay, the company was in the final stages of obleterating the Boi Loi
woods. More accurately, it was supplying the coup de grace to this longtime enemy
stronghold that previously had been treated at least once with herbicides, had
been subjected to saturation bombing from B-52 stratofortresses, and had also
been shelled by artillery.
We joined the outfit on its twenty-seventh day in the Boi Loi woods. During
the past 26 it had already scraped clean 6,037 acres. Several days more and this
job would be finished, permitting the 984th to move on to greener pastures.
Before this job, the men had eliminated the 9,000-acre Ho Bo woods in nearby
west-central Binh Duong province.
The Boi Loi woods was enemy territory and we were dropped in by helicopter.
We accompanied one of the platoon commanders in his armored personnel carrier
and were flanked by several Sheridan tanks of the Eleventh Armored Cavalry.
Although we had no contact with the enemy that day and hit no landmines, we
were informed that both were regular occurences. In the past 26 days, for example,
Several enemy attacks had been repulsed and the tractors had set off no less than
37 mines in the course of their work. (Seven casualties from landmines had been
Sustained during this period.)
In operation, the tractors were strung out in a long staggered formation, the
lead tractor being directed for much of the time by the company commander
circling Overhead in a small helicopter. The large number of bomb craters made the
job of maneuvering the large tracked vehicles most difficult. The heat was oppres–
sive (hovering around 130 degrees F. in the tractor cabs) and the work was truly
arduous. But the morale of the men seemed very high, despite their fifteen-hour
Work days, seven days a week, wet season and dry. The company was proud of its
abilities and accomplishments and, we are told, was among the rare units in
Vietnam without a drug problem.
At the time of our visit, the unbulldozed terrain was covered largly by a tangle
of head-high, broad-leafed brushy plants and vines intermingled with Imperata
grass and shrubby bamboos. Of the scattered trees, more than half were dead.
The plow blades were set to skim the surface, each tractor scraping bare almost an
acre per hour. The big trees came crashing to the ground with great regularity.
121
Most were simply pushed over, but the really large ones were first split by the
Stinger.
The terrain was flat and the soil a heavy grey podzolic, so that neither erosion
nor laterization (hardening of soils to a brick-like substance) are likely to be
problems here. In view of available seed (or other reproductive plant parts) and
shadeless conditions, this area is likely to be quickly dominated by a combination
of Imperata grass and shrubby bamboos, thereby largely precluding reforestation
for years (perhaps decades) to come. In other areas we inspected in Binh Duong
province that had been bulldozed two or three years previously, by far the most
prevalent vegetation was the worthless and pernicious weed Imperata. Indeed, of
the thousands of acres of formerly bulldozed areas that we were able to see on
this and our previous visits, there was only one area, where forest trees (a com-
mercially low-grade species of Dipterocarpus) were recolonizing naturally. Where
bulldozing is done in more hilly terrain, erosion can become a severe liability.
Moreover, with the elimination of the enormous water-holding capacity of an
extant forest, the heavy rains characteristic of Vietnam can produce severe flood
damage. We learned of one devastating flash flood in a recently bulldozed area
in Khanh Hoa province.
It cannot be denied that there are advantages to the bulldozing, given the
conditions of this grim war. First, bulldozing largely clears areas of landmines,
an ever-present horror throughout much of Vietnam to all who attempt to re-
utilize a war-visited area. (One Vietnamese whom we came to know has so far lost
six relatives to mines left behind by one side or the other.) Secondly, some of the
timber can subsequently be salvaged, particularly for firewood and charcoal
manufacture. Thirdly, some of the bulldozed lands in “secure” areas have been
taken over for agricultural pursuits, although this is often not feasible even in
such areas because of extensive craterization by explosives. Farming is particularly
evident in the roadside strips near population centers. A small fraction of the
clearing by bulldozers is actually said to be done with subsequent resettlement
or agricultural pursuits in mind (see, for example, New York Times, July 15, 1971,
p. 3).
Bulldozing has, according to official military sources, leveled over 750,000
acres to date. I estimate that clearing continues at a rate of more than 1,000
acres per day. Because I was unable to obtain a breakdown of land and land use
categories that have fallen to the relentless bulldozers, it is difficult to estimate
the overall economic loss that can be attributed to these operations. However,
some partial indications can be presented. With respect to the timber resource,
the South Vietnamese forest service has determined that at least 126,000 acres of
prime timber lands accessible to lumber operations have been destroyed through
1970, together with an estimated twenty million board feet of marketable tropical
hardwood timber. At recent Saigon market values, averaging about $72 per
thousand board feet, this amounts to a loss of $14.7 million. To this sum must be
added a future loss due to destruction of growing stock. With respect to the rubber
resource, the French rubber interests in South Vietnam have determined that
substantially more than 2,500 acres of producing rubber trees (representing
just over 1 percent of South Vietnam’s total rubber) have so far been destroyed by
bulldozers There are about 120 rubber trees per acre, with an average value of
$88 per tree. Total loss here can thus be estimated to exceed $26.4 million. (I might
add that to the consternation of the French owners, they have received no
compensation.)
There are, of course, many other losses attributable to the bulldozer program,
most of which are impossible to quantify. Among them can be listed site degrada-
tion, erosion, weed invasion, destruction of wildlife habitat, flood damage, and
miscellaneous property loss. One recent press report from western Hau Nghia
province tells of the obliteration by bulldozers of a still partially inhabited
farming region and the consequent disruptive impact (New York Times, May 7,
1971, p. 5). Even whole villages have been obliterated (Nation, Oct. 23, 1967, p.
397). Discussions with professional Vietnamese foresters revealed yet another
headache connected with the landclearing operations. In its nationwide forest
conservation program, the South Vietnamese forest service issues timber-cutting
permits on a judiciously restricted basis. However, corrupt province chiefs have,
during the past year or so, come to realize that a denied local cutting permit can
often be circumvented by turning to the Vietnamese Defense Department and,
for pretended reasons of military necessity, request that the area be designated for
bulldozing. If the request is granted, the chiefs can then cut the timber for personal
profit. Finally, another use of the bulldozers results in a small amount of additional
and unnecessary damage. In their lighter moments the engineers occasionally
122
turn to carving up the landscape for the sheer hell of it. Thus one can now find a
U.S. First Infantry Division emblem, covering some 1,500 acres, carved into the
landscape about 25 miles northwest of Saigon (New York Times, Apr. 5, 1970, p. 7);
a giant peace symbol is similarly engraved near Hue (H/ife magazine, July 2, 1971,
p. 72).
| In conclusion, the question is raised—although not answered—of how much
forest loss can be sustained by an area before the regional ecology is adversely
affected to a substantial extent. Before the war, more than 25 million acres of
South Vietnam were covered by forest, representing about 60 percent of the coun-
try’s total area of 43 million acres. So far, the war has claimed at the very least
3 million acres of the forest cover. The herbicide program has accounted for some-
what more than a third of this, the bulldozing somewhat less than a third, and the
bomb, rocket, and shell craters (plus damage from other munitions) the remainder.
Although the estimated 12 percent reduction in forest cover may not have a dra-
matic influence on the overall ecology of South Vietnam, detailed investigation
will elucidate the magnitude of the Subtle changes that have resulted. In the
numerous local areas of severe damage, often covering several thousands of con-
tiguous acres, the repercussions—both ecological and sociological—will be pro-
found.
III. THE BIG BOMB
(By Arthur H. Westing)
In this report I summarize our findings about a new bomb in the U.S. arsenal, a
bomb unique to the Second Indochina War. Owing to the paucity of information
domestically available, I describe in Some detail the bomb's general characteristics
and employment.
The BLU-82/B general-purpose high-explosive concussion bomb turns out to
be one ºf the most awesome and least publicized weapons to have been spawned by
the war. It is a bomb with record-breaking dimensions; It is 4.5 feet in diameter,
over 11 feet long, and weighs 15,000 pounds. Within its thin steel case are 12,600
pounds of a special, dense blasting agent (DBA–22M) consisting of a gelled aqueous
slurry of ammonium nitrate and aluminum powder (plus a binding agent). This
formulation provides a concussive blast surpassed only by that of a nuclear bomb.
Often referred to in Vietnam as the ‘‘Daisy Cutter” and sometimes as the
“Cheeseburger,” this super bomb is delivered by C-130E aircraft (of the 463rd
Wing of the Seventh Air Force flying out of Cam Ranh Bay air base). Even
though the bomb is floated to the ground by parachute from altitudes of 7,000
to 10,000 feet and occasionally even over 20,000 feet, the Seventh Air Force
claims that the point of impact seldom is more than 300 feet off target and usually
less than 150 feet. Timing of the drop is determined by ground radar. .
The Daisy Cutter was developed primarily for the instant creation of clearings
in dense jungle. Such clearings can then be used immediately as a landing zone
by assault helicopters in locations inaccessible to conventional land-clearing
equipment and techniques. The progentitor of this unique bomb was the 10,000
pound “blockbuster” bomb of World War II. Several dozen or more of these
bombs were left over from that conflict. . These were used in Indochina on an
experimental basis, apparently beginning in 1967. The presently used BLU-82/B
was developed and became operational in early 1970.
The bomb is detonated by an impact fuse at the end of an attached three-foot
probe which sets off the main charge simultaneously at both ends of the bomb
just above the ground. If all goes well, the resulting radial blast leaves no
crater, but rather uproots and blows away all trees and other obstructions—
even in heavy jungle—to create a virtually perfect clearing about the size of a
football field. Although the size of each clearing differs, of course, according to
local conditions of terrain and vegetation, the average radius of the opening,
according to the Air Force, is about 160 feet, and its area thus about two acres.
No fires are reported to have been set by these bombs and only minimal charring
occurs. The blast is spectacular: A mushroom cloud rises some 6,000 feet into
the air, and light aircraft flying more than two miles from the explosion are badly
shaken by the shockwave. The landing Zone, suitable for landing within minutes
of the blast, can accommodate one to several assault helicopters at a time. The
military code name for such an operation is “Commando Vault.”
According to the Seventh Air Force, the average rate of use of the Daisy Cutters
in South Vietnam has been one to two per week in recent months. (We were made
aware of five drops during a one-week period in mid-August.) Although the total
number of drops to date is classified information, an official spokesman for the
U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV) informed me that it is
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well in excess of 100. One press report claims that 160 drops occurred prior to
June of 1970 (Los Angeles Times, June 1, 1970, p. 20). Most of the drops in South
Vietnam have occurred in the northern half of the country and in the delta region
to the South (Military Regions I, II, and IV). Information on the drops in Cam-
bodia, and Laos was not made available to us.
In the briefing we received on the Commando Vault operations, an official
spokesman for the Seventh Air Force stressed and restressed that use of the Daisy
Cutters was restricted to the creation of landing zones and that they were nothing
more than “explosive bulldozers.” He went into some detail on how the local popul
lace is always alerted prior to a drop. On the other hand, we learned from another
local Air Force source that exceedingly strict security is always maintained before
a drop to avoid alerting the enemy; the flight crew does not even receive the target
location or drop time until just before takeoff.
The Daisy Cutter is officially designated as a general-purpose bomb and has
been used in a number of ways in Indochina, beyond the creation of landing zones.
One Air Force report explains that the bomb can be used for road interdiction by
triggering landslides. In the Hanoi press this past Spring (in an otherwise uncon-
firmed report) there is a description of the obliteration of an entire hamlet in
Laos by this means. We also learned from three independent sources (two military
and One embassy) that the Daisy Cutter has been and is being employed against
enemy in Suspected enemy troop concentrations. Moreover, in one of the Com-
mando Vault missions we inspected from the air, the bomb had been dropped,
according to Our official military guide, onto a suspected enemy rocket emplace-
ment. This mission had been carried out in June of this year in Quang Nam prov-
ince nineteen miles Southwest of Da Nang. The antipersonnel use of this bomb has
also been reported in the press (for example, New York Times, Apr. 13, 1971, p. 1;
Apr. 15, 1971, p. 5; Apr. 18, 1971, p. E2). Press reports describe one additional
use for the bomb, that of removing the thick jungle canopy above suspected enemy
storage areas (New York Times, Apr. 15, 1971, p. 5).
What is the environmental impact of a Daisy Cutter? Here I am chagrined to
report that of the scores of Commando Vault missions, old and new, no site could
be found by MACV in an area secure enough for us to visit. U.S. citizens are generally
not aware that the National Liberation. Front and its North Vietnamese allies con-
trol virtually all of the forest and other wild lands of South Vietnam. Moreover,
we could find no one who had examined or even thought about these sites with
ecology in mind, not even the MACV science advisor or his staff. Although the im-
mediate overt impact is easy to surmise, the more subtle and long-term effects
must await further study.
According to an official Seventh Air Force source, the blast of a Daisy Cutter
is of such intensity that all terrestrial and arboreal wildlife (as well as any luckless
humans) within a radius of approximately 3,280 feet are killed outright by the
concussive shockwave. The lethal Zone from one such bomb thus covers an area
of about 776 acres. Beyond this circle of death, concussion injury diminishes to
insignificance radially outward for a distance of another 1,640 feet or so. This
larger area of both death and injury to wildlife thus encompasses about 1,746
acres per bomb. Assuming that the total number of bomb drops to date has been
150, the forest area totally eliminated by this means has been only about 300
acres. Of much greater concern, all the wildlife occupying 116,400 acres or more
have been killed. The wildlife on again as much area have sustained injuries. The
Daisy Cutter thus adds significantly to the already severe stress imposed by the
war on Vietnam’s wildlife.
With respect to the vegetation, my information on damage is less complete.
The innermost circle of two acres is, of course, totally annihilated. (One press
report claims that even the worms in the ground are killed in this zone [Life
magazine, May 21, 1971, p. 41].) I suspect that damage to the flora beyond the
central, cleared area becomes negligible within a modest distance, but actual
extent of damage will require on-site investigation. Recolonization by plants in
the central, cleared Zone seems to be fairly rapid, at least in the delta region.
An Air Force officer familiar with the delta told us that a Commando Vault landing
Zone blasted out in that region looks green from the air within several weeks;
it often becomes unusable within several months because of the regrowth of brush.
Past experience suggests that the upland clearings will be quickly invaded primarily
by Imperata grass and/or a variety of low-growing, brushy bamboo species, all
tenacious and worthless weeds.
The Daisy Cutter is, in the words of one military officer we met in Vietnam,
“a super bomb with super punch.” MACV has been using these bombs on a steady
basis for more than a year and a half now, apparently with no mention of them in
124
the official daily, weekly, or monthly war news summaries. One senior Seventh
Air Force officer explained to us, “they have such a devastating effect that we hate
to give them much publicity.”
The Commando Vault 7.5 ton bombs provide just one more means by which we
casually rearrange the environment of Indochina with little if any concern about
either the immediate or the long-term impact on the ecology of the area. I am
painfully aware of how little in the way of biological data this report contains, but
in providing the first detailed account of this new, indiscriminately wide-area
weapon for the open literature, I hope that it will stimulate the necessary wildlife
and other ecological studies as conditions permit.
ADDITIONAL REMARKS BY CONGRESSMAN GILBERT GUDE REGARDING S. RES. 281
OCTOBER 6, 1972.
Senator CLAIBORNE PELL,
Chairman, Oceans and International Environment Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I subscribe to the general thrust of S. Res. 281. However,
I would like to make a few qualifying remarks.
First, it should be recognized that some environmental warfare techniques
inevitably will be developed in the course of legitimate civilian research. Thus
article I (2) has a built-in vagueness when seeking “to apply to any research or
experimentation relating to the development of any such activity as a weapon of
war.” It appears that any Treaty must rest more on political and moral commit-
ments not to use or exploit new technologies than on an attempt to stop partic-
ular research and development programs.
Second, in view of the possibilities for unauthorized use of environmental war-
fare techniques, the use of such practices by non-signatory nations, or questions
arising from the “non-military” use of environmental modification activity, I
think it would be prudent to:
(a) Establish an international scientific monitoring and investigatory commis-
sion to determine the extent of any claimed environmental damage relating to
military geophysical modification activities;
(b) Make provision for the body of data collected by the commission to be
released, if desired by the principles, to the International Court of Justice for
advisory or binding judgement on the merits of the case.
Third, I believe that the phrase “as a weapon of war” must be more clearly
defined so that there is as precise a distinction as possible between legitimate
civilian research and prohibited military research. We must be careful not to
inhibit the justifiable and promising environmental research now being conducted
by civilian scientists world-wide.
Fourth, I question whether S. Res. 281 adequately deals with the problem of
isolated safety and defensive weather modification activities in quasi-military
situations. For example, would S. Res. 281 prohibit the dispersal of fog at a
military airport in order to land military or civilian aircraft? It is my belief that
such techniques make sense and save lives but there is no allowance in the Treaty
for such activities.
These remarks should not be construed as being overly critical of S. Res. 281.
On the contrary, I applaud your leadership in this field and encourage you to press
forward with determination.
With best regards,
GILBERT GUDE, Member of Congress.
[GEOPHYSICAL WAR FARE]
HOW TO WRECK THE ENVIRONMENT*
(By Gordon J. F. MacDonald, United States)
Professor MacDonald is associate director of the Institute of Geophysics and
Planetary Physics at the University of California, Los Angeles. His researches
have embraced a remarkable diversity of natural phenomena, and his pro-
*From “Unless Peace Comes,” Nigel Calder, Ed., The Viking Press, New York City, 1968.
125
fessional interests are further extended by his participation in national
science policy-making. He is a member of President Johnson's Science Advisory
Committee. - w k - .
Among future means of obtaining national objectives by force, one possibility
hinges on man’s ability to control and manipulate the environment of his planet.
When achieved, this power over his environment will provide man with a new
force capable of doing great and indiscriminate damage. Our present primitive
understanding of deliberate environmental change makes it difficult to imagine
a world in which geophysical warfare is practiced. Such a world might be one
in which nuclear weapons were effectively banned and the weapons of maSS
destruction were those of environmental catastrophe. Alternatively, I can envisage
a world of nuclear stability resulting from parity in Such weapons, rendered
unstable by the development by one nation of an advanced technology capable
of modifying the earth’s environment. Or geophysical weapons may be part of
each nation’s armory. As I will argue, these weapons are peculiarly Suited for
COvert Or Secret WarS. - -
Science-fiction literature contains many suggestions of how wars would progress
if man indeed possessed the ability to change weather, climate, or Ocean currents.
Many of these fictional suggestions, and other more serious discussions, fail to
take into account the limitations of nature. Jules Verne gave a detailed discussion
of displacing the earth's polar caps, thus making the world’s climatic Zones more
equitable (Les Voyages Ea:traordinaires; Sans Dessus Dessows, Metzel, 1889).
Werne's proposal was to eliminate the twenty-three-degree tilt in the earth's axis,
putting it at right angles to the sun-earth plane. However, as Verne correctly
pointed out in a subsequent discussion, the earth's equatorial bulge Stabilizes our
planet, and even the launching of a 180,000-ton projectile would produce a dis-
placement of only one-tenth of a micron. Senator Estes Kefauver, Vice-Presiden-
tial candidate in the 1956 American election, rediscovered Werne's original pro-
posal and was seriously concerned with the tipping of the earth's axis. He reported
that the earth's axis could, as the result of an H-bomb explosion, be displaced by
ten degrees. Either Senator Kefauver or his scientific advisers neglected the
stabilizing influence of the earth’s bulge. The maximum displacement that can
be expected from the explosion of a one-hundred-megaton H-weapon is less than
one micron, as Walter Munk and I pointed out in our book, Rotation of the Earth
(Cambridge University Press, New York, 1960). - -
Substantial progress within the environmental sciences is slowly overcoming
the gap between fact and fiction regarding manipulations of the earth's physical
environment. As these manipulations become possible, history shows that attempts
may be made to use them in support of national ambitions. To consider the
consequences of environmental modification in struggles among nations, We
need to consider the present state of the subject and how postulated developments
in the field could lead, ten to fifty years from now, to weapons systems that would
use nature in new and perhaps unexpected ways. : •
The key to geophysical warfare is the identification of the environmental
instabilities to which the addition of a small amount of energy would release
vastly greater amounts of energy. Environmental instability is a situation in
which nature has stored energy in some part of the earth or its surroundings
far in excess of that which is usual. To trigger this instability the required energy
might be introduced violently by explosions or gently by small bits of material
able to induce rapid changes by acting as catalysts or nucleating agents. The
mechanism for energy storage might be the accumulation of strain over hundreds
of millions of years in the solid earth, or the supercooling of water vapor in the
atmosphere by updrafts taking place over a few tens of minutes. Effects of releasing
this energy could be worldwide, as in the case of altering climate, or regional,
as in the case of locally excited earthquakes or enhanced precipitation.
WEATHER MODIFICATION
The earth’s atmosphere is an envelope of air that rotates, for the most part, at
the same speed as the underlying continents and oceans. The relative motion
between the atmosphere and the earth arises from sources and sinks of energy
that vary in location and strength but which have, as their ultimate source, the
sun's radiation. The quantities of energy involved in weather systems exceed by a
substantial margin the quantity of energy under man's direct control. For instance,
the typical amount of energy expended in a single tornado funnel is equivalent to
about fifty kilotons of explosives; a single thunderstorm tower exchanges about ten
times this much energy during its lifetime; an Atlantic hurricane of moderate size
may draw from the sea more than 1000 megatons of energy. These vast quantities
of energy make it unlikely that brute-force techniques will lead to sensible weather
82—892—72—9
126
modification. Results could be achieved, however, by Working on the instabilities
in the atmosphere.
We are now beginning to understand several kinds of instabilities in the atmos-
phere. Supercooled water droplets in cold clouds are unstable, but they remain
liquid for substantial periods of time unless Supplied with nuclei on which they can
freeze. Conversion of water droplets to ice through the introduction of artificial
nuclei can provide a local source of energy. This released heat can cause rising air
currents, which in turn lead to further formation of Supercooled water. This
process may lead to rainfall at the ground greater than that which would have been
produced without the artificial nucleation. A second instability may arise, in which
water vapor condenses into water, again affecting the distribution of sensible
energy. On a larger scale, there is the so-called baroclinic instability of atmospheric
waves that girdle the planet. Through the imbalance of heat between equator and
pole, energy in this instability is stored, to be released in the creation of large
cyclonic storms in the temperate zones. There are other, less well understood
instabilities capable of affecting climate; I shall return to them later. -
What is the present situation with respect to weather modification and what
might be reasonably expected in the future? Experiments over the past eighteen
years have demonstrated unequivocally that clouds composed of Supercooled
water droplets can be transformed into ice-crystal clouds by seeding them with
silver iodide, “dry ice” (frozen carbon dioxide), and other suitable chemical
agents. This discovery has been applied operationally in the clearance of airports
covered by supercooled ground fog. No analogous technique has yet evolved for
clearing warm fog, although several promising leads are now being investigated.
In the case of warm fog, the atmospheric instability is that water vapor distributed
in small drops contains more surface energy than the same water distributed in
large drops. The trick for clearance of this warm fog will be to discover some way
of getting the small drops to organize themselves into larger ones and then fall
to the ground.
There is increasing, though inconclusive, evidence that rainfall from some
types of clouds and storm systems in temperate regions can be increased by ten
to fifteen per cent by seeding. Somewhat more controversial evidence indicates
that precipitation can be increased from tropical cumulus by techniques similar
to those employed in temperate regions. Preliminary experiments on hurricanes
have the aim of dissipating the clouds surrounding the eye of the storm in order
to spread the energy of the hurricane and reduce its force. The results are con-
troversial but indicate that seeding can, in certain circumstances, lead to a marked
growth in the seeded cloud. This possiblity may have merit in hurricane modifica-
tion, but experimentation has not yet resulted in a definitive statement.
Regarding the Suppression of lightning, there is mixed but largely promising
evidence that the frequency of clould-to-ground strokes can be reduced by the
introduction of “chaff” strips of metallic foil of the kind used for creating spurious
echoes in enemy radars.
In looking to the future, it is quite clear that substantial advances will be made
in all of these areas of weather modification. Today, both military and civilian
air transport benefit from progress in the clearance of ground fog. Furthcr prog-
ress in the technology of introducing the seeding agent into the fog makes it likely
that this type of fog dispersal will become routine. In a sense, fog clearing is the
first military application of deliberate manipulation of weather, but it is, of
course, very limited. -
Large field programs are being undertaken in the United States to explore
further the possibility of enhancing precipitation, particularly in the western
and northeastern states. On the high ground of the western states, snow from
winter storms provides much of the country’s moisture. Investigations are under
way to see if seeding can lead to an increased snowpack and thus enhance the
water resources. Intense interest in this form of weather modification, coupled
with an increased investigation of the physics of clouds, is likely to lead to effec-
tive cloud modification within the nest five to fifteen years. At present the effects
are measured only statistically, and too little has been done in cloud observation
before and after seeding in the way of precisely pinpointing which clouds are most
likely to be affected.
As far as military applications are concerned, I conjecture that precipitation
enhancement would have a limited value in classical tactical situations, and then
Only in the future when controls are more thoroughly understood. One could, for
example, imagine field commanders calling for local enhancement of precipitation
to cover Or impede various ground operations. An alternative use of cloud seeding
might be applied strategically. We are presently uncertain about the effect of
127
seeding on precipitation down wind from the seeded clouds. Preliminary analysis
suggests that there is no effect 200–300 miles down wind, but that continued
seeding over a long stretch of dry land clearly could remove sufficient moisture to
prevent rain 1000 miles down wind. This extended effect leads to the possibility
of covertly removing moisture from the atmosphere so that a nation dependent
on water vapor crossing a competitor country could be subjected to years of
drought. The operation could be concealed by the statistical irregularity of the
atmosphere. A nation possessing superior technology in environmental manipula-
tion could damage an adversary without revealing its intent.
Modification of storms, too, could have major strategic implications. As I have
mentioned, preliminary experiments have been carried out on the seeding of
hurricanes. The dynamics of hurricanes and the mechanism by which energy is
transferred from the ocean into the atmosphere supporting the hurricane are
poorly understood. Yet various schemes for both dissipation and steering can be
imagined. Although hurricanes originate in tropical regions, they can travel into
temperate latitudes, as the residents of New England know only too well. A
controlled hurricane could be used as a weapon to terrorize opponents over
Substantial parts of the populated world.
It is generally supposed that a hurricane draws most of its energy from the Sea
over which it passes. The necessary process of heat transfer depends on wave
action that permits the air to come in contact with a volume of water. This
interaction between the air and water also stirs the upper layers of the atmosphere
and permits the hurricane to draw on a substantially larger reservoir of heat than
just the warm surface water. There may be ways, using monomolecular films of
materials like those developed for covering reservoirs to reduce evaporation, for
decreasing the local interaction between sea and air and thus preventing the
Ocean from providing energy to the hurricane in an accelerated fashion. Such a
procedure, coupled with selective seeding, might provide hurricane guidance
mechanisms. At present we are a long way from having the basic data and under-
Standing necessary to carry out such experiments; nevertheless, the long-term
possibility of developing and applying such techniques under the cover of nature's
irregularities presents a disquieting prospect.
CLIMATE MODIFICATION
In considering whether or not climate modification is possible, it is useful to
examine climate variations under natural conditions. Firm geological evidence
exists of a long sequence of Ice Ages, in the relatively recent past, which shows
that the world's climate has been in a state of slow evolution. There is also good
geological, archaeological, and historical evidence for a pattern of smaller, more
rapid fluctuations Superimposed on the slow evolutionary change. For example, in
Europe the climate of the early period following the last Ice Age was continental,
with hot Summers and cold winters. In the sixth millennium B.C., there was a
change to a warm humid climate with a mean temperature of five degrees Fahren-
heit higher than at present and a heavy rainfall that caused considerable growth
of peat. This period, known as a climatic optimum, was accentuated in Scandinavia
by a land subsidence that permitted a greater influx of warm Atlantic water into
the large Baltic Sea. r
The climatic Optimum was peculiar. While on the whole there was a very gradual
decrease of rainfall, the decrease was interrupted by long droughts during which
the Surface peat dried. This fluctuation occurred several times, the main dry
periods being from 2000 to 1900, 1200 to 1000, and 700 to 500 B.C. The last, a dry
heat wave lasting approximately 200 years, was the best developed. The drought,
though not sufficiently intense to interrupt the steady development of forests,
did cause extensive migrations of peoples from drier to wetter regions.
A change to colder and wetter conditions occurred in Europe about 500 B.C.
and was by far the greatest and most abrupt alteration in climate since the end
of the last Ice Age. It had a catastrophic effect on the early civilization of Europe:
large areas of forest were killed by the rapid growth of peat, and the levels of the
Alpine lakes rose Suddenly, flooding many of the lake settlements. This climatic
change did not last long; by the beginning of the Christian era, conditions did not
differ greatly from current ones. Since then climatic variations have continued to
occur, and although none has been as dramatic as that of 500 B.C., a perturbation
known as the little ice age of the seventeenth century is a recent noteworthy
example. The cause of these historical changes in climate remains shrouded in .
mystery. The rapid changes of climate in the past suggest to many that there
exist instabilities affecting the balance of solar radiation.
128
Indeed, climate is primarily determined by the balance between the incoming
short wave from the Sun (principally light) and the loss of outgoing long-wave
radiation (principally heat). -
Three factors dominate the balance: the energy of the sun, the surface character
of terrestrial regions (water, ice, vegetation, desert, etc.), and the transparency of
the earth's atmosphere to different forms of radiated energy. In the last connection,
the effect of clouds in making cool days and relatively warm nights is a matter of
familiar experience. But clouds are a manifestation rather than an original de-
terminant of weather and climate; of more fundamental significance is the effect
of gases in the atmosphere, which absorb much of the radiation in transit from the
sun to the earth or from the earth into Space. Intense X-rays and ultraviolet from
the Sun, together with high-energy atomic particles, are arrested in the upper
atmosphere. Only the narrow band of visible light and some short radio waves
traverse the atmosphere without serious interruption.
There has been much controversy in recent years about conjectured over-all
effects on the world’s climate of emissions of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere
from furnaces and engines burning fossil fuels, and some about possible influences
of the exhaust from large rockets on the transparency of the upper atmosphere.
Carbon dioxide placed in the atmosphere since the start of the industrial revolution
has produced an increase in the average temperature of the lower atmosphere of a
few tenths of a degree Fahrenheit. The water vapor that may be introduced into
the stratosphere by the superSonic transport may also result in a similar tempera-
ture rise. In principle it would be feasible to introduce material into the upper
atmosphere that would absorb either incoming light (thereby cooling the surface)
or Outgoing heat (thereby warming the surface). In practice, in the rarefied and
windswept upper atmosphere, the material would disperse rather quickly, so that
military use of such a technique would probably rely upon global rather than local
effects. Moreover, molecular material will tend to decompose, and even elemental
materials will eventually be lost by diffusion into space or precipitation to the
Surface. At intermediate levels, in the stratosphere, materials may tend to accumu-
late, though the mixing time for this part of the atmosphere is certainly less than
ten years and may be a few months. If a nation’s meteorologists calculated that a
general warming or cooling of the earth was in their national interest, improving
their climate while worsening others, the temptation to release materials from
high-altitude rockets might exist. At present we know took little about the para-
doxical effects of warming and cooling, however, to tell what the outcome might be.
More sudden, perhaps much briefer but nevertheless disastrous, effects are
predictable if chemical or physical means were developed for attacking one of the
natural constituents of the atmosphere—ozone. A low concentration of ozone
(Os, a rare molecular form of oxygen) in a layer between fifteen and fifty kilometers
altitude has the utmost significance for life on land. It is responsible for absorbing
the greater part of the ultraviolet from the Sun. In mild doses, this radiation causes
sunburn; if the full force of it were experienced at the surface, it would be fatal
to all life—including farm crops and herds—that could not take shelter. The
ozone is replenished daily, but a temporary “hole” in the ozone layer over a
target area might be created by physical or chemical action. For example, ultra-
violet at 250 millimicrons wave length decomposes ozone molecules, and Ozone
reacts readily with a wide range of materials.
At present, we can only tentatively speculate about modifying the short-wave
radiation at its source, the sum. We have discovered major instabilities on the
sun's surface that might be manipulated many years hence. In a solar flare, for
example, 101" megatons of energy are stored in distorted magnetic fields. With
advanced techniques of launching rockets and setting off large explosions, we may
sometime in the future learn to trigger these instabilities. For the near future,
however, modification will not be in the short-wave incoming radiation but in
the long-wave outgoing radiation.
The usual schemes for modifying climate involve the manipulation of large ice
fields. The persistence of these large ice fields is due to the cooling effects of the ice
itself, both in reflecting (rather than absorbing) incoming shortwave radiation
and in radiating heat at a higher rate than the usual ground cover. A commonly
suggested means of climate modification involves thin layers of colored material
spread on an icy surface, thus inhibiting both the reflection and radiation processes,
melting the ice, and thereby altering the climate. Such a procedure presents ob-
vious technical and logistic difficulties. For example, if one wished to create a
surface coating of as little as one micron thickness to cover a square 1000 kilometers
in size, the total material for this extremely thin coating would weigh a million
tons or more, depending upon its density. So the proposals to dust from the air
129
some of the globe's extended ice sheets are unrealistic and reflect a brute-force
technique, taking no advantage of instabilities within the environment.
Although it may be technologically difficult to change an ice cap's surface
character, and thus its thermal properties, it may be possible to move the ice,
taking into account the gravitational instability of ice caps. The gravitational
potential energy of water as a thick, high ice cap is much greater than it would be
at sea level. This fact makes it possible, at least in principle, to devise schemes for
bringing about a redistribution in the ice. Indeed, A. T. Wilson has proposed a
cyclical theory for the Ice Ages, based on this instability.
The main points of Wilson's theory are as follows:
1. Antarctica is covered by an ice sheet several kilometers thick. Pressure at the
bottom of the ice is great enough to keep the ice at or near its melting point; water
is an unusual material in that a pressure increase lowers rather than raises its
melting point. An increase in thickness of the ice sheet could result in meiting at the
bottom. The resulting ice-water mixture along the sole of the glacier would permit
flow by a process of freezing and melting—a flow process much more effective than
ordinary plastic flow. -
2. If such an instability occurs, the ice sheet will flow out onto the surrounding
sea, and a large ice shelf will be formed between Antarctica and the ocean around
it. As a consequence, short-wave solar radiation will be reflected, and there will be
enhanced loss of heat by radiation at the long wave lengths, causing cooling and
the inducement of world-wide glaciation. - -
3. Once the ice shelf is in the ocean, it will begin to melt and eventually will be
removed. The ice remaining on land will be much thinner than before. As the re-
flectivity of the southern hemisphere decreases with the melting of the Antarctic
ice cap, the global climate will grow warmer again, corresponding to the start of an
interglacial period. The ice cap will slowly form again.
Commenting on Wilson's theory, J. T. Hollin has noted the possibility of a catas-
trophic surge or advance of the ice sheet, such as has been recorded from small
glaciers on numerous occasions. The largest surge yet reported is probably that of
the ice cap in Spitsbergen, which advanced up to twenty-one kilometers on a front
of thirty kilometers sometime between 1935 and 1938. There are also reports of
glacial advances at speeds up to one hundred meters per day. Hollin speculates
that, once the bottom-melting phase of a gravitationally unstable ice cap is reached
it will move quickly. In addition to trapped geothermal heat melting the ice at the
bottom, there are additional contributions frch frictional heat generated as the
glacier scrapes along the solid ground.
If the speculative theory of Wilson is correct (and there are many attractive
features to it), then a mechanism does exist for catastrophically altering the
earth’s climate. The release of thermal energy, perhaps through nuclear explosions
along the base of an ice sheet, could initiate outward sliding of the ice sheet which
would then be sustained by gravitational energy. One megaton of energy is suffi-
cient to melt about 100 million tons of ice. One hundred megatons of energy
would convert 0.1 cm. of ice into a thin layer of water covering the entire Ant-
arctic ice cap. Lesser amounts of energy suitably placed could undoubtedly
initiate the outward flow of the ice.
What would be the consequences of such an operation? The immediate effect
of this vast quantity of ice surging into the water, if velocities of one hundred
meters per day are appropriate, would be to create massive tsunamis (tidal
waves) that would completely wreck coastal regions even in the Northern Hemi-
Sphere. There would then follow marked changes in climate brought about by the
Suddenly changed reflectivity of the earth. At a rate of one hundred meters per
day, the center of the ice sheet would reach the land’s edge in forty years.
Who would stand to benefit from such application? The logical candidate
would be a landlocked equatorial country. An extended glacial period would
insure near-Arctic conditions over much of the temperate zone, but temperate
climate with abundant rainfall would be the rule in the present tropical regions.
FUTURE OF WEATHER AND CLIMATE MODIFICATION
The foregoing perhaps represents a more positive view of weather and climate
modification than that held by many earth scientists. I believe this view is justified
as it is based on three Scientific and technological advances. First, understanding
of basic meteorology has advanced to such an extent that mathematical models
of the atmosphere here have been developed incorporating the most important
elements. Physical processes in clouds, in turbulent exchanges at the surface, and
130
in transmission of radiation through the atmosphere are no longer as mysterious
as they once were. The volumes simulated by the models range from the size of a
single cloud to the entire atmosphere; these models are no longer primitive
representations.
Secondly, the advent of high-speed computers enables atmospheric models
to be studied in greater detail. These computers have a peculiar importance to
weather modification, since they will enable scientists to carry out extended
experiments to test whether or not various schemes for manipulating the atmos-
phere are indeed possible and what the outcome should be.
The third advance lending support to expectations for weather and climate
modification is the new array of instruments developed to observe and detect
changes in the atmosphere. The most dramatic and perhaps the most powerful
is the meteorological satellite, which provides a platform whence the atmosphere
can be observed, not only in geographically inaccessible regions, but also with
entirely new physical measurements. For example, meteorological satellites of
the future will permit the determination of humidity, temperature, and pressure
as averaged over substantial volumes of the atmosphere, providing quantities
that are needed to develop the mathematical models. Sophisticated surface
instrumentation, for observing detailed processes within smaller parts of the
atmosphere, provides us with far more powerful tools with which to look at clouds
and at the interaction of the atmosphere with its boundaries than those which
were available ten or twenty years ago.
EARTHQUAIKE MODIFICATION
What causes earthquakes? Over geological time, the irregular distribution of
heat-producing radioactive elements in the rock layers gives rise to subsurface
temperature differences between various parts of the earth. In the continents,
granites and similar rocks have concentrated radioactive elements near the surface;
no similar concentration has taken place in the suboceanic regions, which may as a
result be more than one hundred degrees centigrade cooler than the corresponding
subcontinental regions. Such variations in temperature along a horizontal line,
due to the differences in the vertical distribution of heat-producing elements, give
rise to large thermal stresses, causing strain analogous to that which cracks a
glass tumbler filled with hot water. The strain tends to be greatest in regions of
abrupt temperature change along a horizontal line through the earth’s crust. The
strain may be partially relieved by the slow convective flow of material in the deep
earth which is thought by some geophysicists to push continents about. But the
strain can also be relieved by sharp fractures or by movements along previous
faults in rocks near the surface. Movement along a fault radiates energy outward,
which results in an earthquake. Each year approximately 200 megatons of strain
energy is released in this fashion, the largest earthquakes corresponding to energy
of the order of 100 megations. The energy released depends on the volume of material
affected. The largest earthquakes take place along faults having a linear dimension
of 1000 kilometers, whereas smaller ones take place along faults of one kilometer
or less.
Major earthquakes tend to be located along two main belts. One belt, along
which about eighty-five percent of the total energy is released, passes around the
Pacific and affects countries whose coastlines border this ocean, for example
Japan and the west coast of North America. The second belt passes through the
Mediterranean regions eastward through Asia and joins the first belt in Indonesia.
Along these two belts, large earthquakes occur with varying frequencies. In
California a large earthquake might be expected once every fifty to one hundred
years, while Chile might expect such a disturbance once every ten to twenty years.
Sometimes major earthquakes have occurred in regions ordinarily thought of as
being free from risk. For example, the New Madrid earthquake of 1811–1812
devastated a large area of central North America, but had only slight cultural
effects because of the area’s sparse population.
Today, our detailed understanding of the mechanism that causes an earthquake
and of how the related instabilities can be triggered is limited. Only within the
last few years have serious discussions of earthquake prediction begun, whereas
moderately reliable weather forecasts have been available for about the last thirty
to fifty years. Currently, substantial effort is being made, primarily by Japan and
the United States, to develop techniques for forecasting earthquakes. These tech-
niques are based to a large extent on the determination of changing strain condi-
tions of materials in the rocks surrounding recognized fault zones. Of possible
value is the observation that before an earthquake the accumulating strain
accelerates.
131
Control of earthquakes is a prospect even more distant than that of forecasting,
although two techniques have been suggested through recent experience.
1. In the course of the underground testing of nuclear weapons at the Nevada
test site, it was observed that an explosion apparently released local strain in the
earth. The hypothesis is that the swift build-up of strain due to the sudden
release of energy in an explosion discharges strain energy over a large volume
of material. -
2. Another method of releasing strain energy has appeared from pumping of
underground water in the vicinity of Denver, Colorado, which has led to a series
of small earthquakes. The hypothesis here is that underground water has provided
local lubrication permitting adjacent blocks to slip by one another.
The use as a weapon System of the strain energy instability within the solid
earth requires an effective triggering mechanism. A scheme for pumping water
seems clumsy and easily detectable. On the other hand, if the strain pattern in
the crust can be accurately determined, the phased or timed release of energy from
Smaller faults, designed to trigger a large fault at Some distance, could be contem-
plated. This timed release could be activated through small explosions and thus
it might be possible to use this release of energy stored in small faults at some
distance from a major fault to trigger that major fault. For example, the San
Andreas fault zone, passing near Los Angeles and San Francisco, is part of the
great earthquake belt surrounding the Pacific. Good knowledge of the strain
within this belt might permit the setting off of the San Andreas zone by timed
explosions in the China. Sea and Philippine Sea. In contrast with certain meteor-
ological operations, it would seem rather unlikely that such an attack could be
carried out covertly under the guise of natural earthquakes. -
MODIFICATION OF OCIE ANS
We are still in the very early stages of developing the theory and techniques for
predicting the State of the oceans. In the past two decades methods have been de-
vised for the prediction of surface waves and surface wind distribution. A warning
º the tsunamis (tidal waves) produced by earthquakes has also been de-
veloped. -
Certain currents within the oceans have been identified, but we do not yet know
what the variable components are; that is, what the weather within the ocean is.
Thus we have not been able to identify any instabilities within the oceanic circu-
lation that might be easily manipulated. As in the case of the solid earth, we can
only speculate tentatively about how oceanic processes might be controlled.
One instability offering potential as a future weapon system is that associated
with tsunamis. These frequently originate from the slumping into the deep ocean
of loosely consolidated sediments and rocks perched on the continental shelf.
Movement of these sediments can trigger the release of vast quantities of gravita-
tional energy, part of which is converted in the motion of the tsunami. For example,
if, along a 1000-kilometer edge of a continental shelf, a block 100 meters deep and
ten kilometers wide were dropped a distance of 100 meters, about 100 megatons of
energy would be released. This release would be catastrophic to any coastal nation.
How could it be achieved? A series of phased explosions, perhaps setting off natural
earthquakes, would be a most effective way. I could even speculate on planning a
guided tidal wave, where guidance is achieved by correctly shaping the source
which releases energy.
RRAIN WAVES AROUND THE WORLD2
At heights of forty to fifty kilometers above the earth’s surface substantial
numbers of charged particles are found which make this part of the atmosphere,
the ionosphere, a good conductor of electricity. The rocks and oceans are also more
conducting than the lower atmosphere. Thus, we live in an insulating atmosphere
between two spherical conducting shells or, as the radio engineer would put it,
in an earth-ionosphere cavity, or wave guide. Radio waves striking either con-
ducting shell tend to be reflected back into the cavity, and this phenomenon is
what makes conventional long-distance radio communication possible. Only
recently, however, has there been any interest in natural electrical resonances
within the earth-ionosphere wave guide. Like any such cavity, the earth ionosphere
wave guide will tend to sustain radio oscillation at certain frequencies in prefer-
ence to others. These resonant frequencies are primarily determined by the size
of the earth and the speed of light, but the properties of the ionosphere modify
them to a certain extent. The lowest resonances begin at about eight cycles per
second, far below the frequencies ordinarily used for radio communication.
132
Because of their long wave length and small field strength, they are difficult to
detect. Moreover, they die down quickly, within one sixteenth of a second or so;
in engineering terms, the cavity has a short-time constant.
The natural resonant Oscillations are excited by lightning strokes, cloud-to-
ground strokes being a much more efficient Source than horizontal cloud-to-cloud
discharges. On the average, about one hundred lightning strokes occur each second
(primarily concentrated in the equatorial regions), so that normally about six
lightning flashes are available to introduce energy before a particular oscillation
dies down. A typical oscillation's field strength is of the order of 0.3 millivolts
per meter.
The power of the Oscillations varies geographically. For example, for a source
located on the equator in Brazil the maximum intensity of the oscillation is
near the source and at the opposite side of the earth (around Indonesia). The
intensity is lower in intermediate regions and toward the poles. -
One can imagine several ways in which to increase the intensity of such
electrical oscillations. The number of lightning strokes per second could be en-
hanced by artificially increasing their original number. Substantial progress has
been made in the understanding of the physics of lightning and of how it
might be controlled. The natural oscillations are excited by randomly occurring
strokes. The excitation of timed strokes would enhance the efficiency with which
energy is injected into an Oscillation. Furthermore, the time constant of the
oscillation would be doubled by a fourfold increase in the electrical conductivity
of the ionosphere, so that any scheme for enhancing that conductivity (for
example, by injecting readily ionized vapor) lowers the energy losses and
lengthens the time constant, which would permit a greater number of phased
lightning strokes before the decay of an Oscillation.
The enhanced low-frequency electrical oscillations in the earth-ionosphere
cavity relate to possible weapons systems through a little understood aspect of
brain physiology. Electrical activity in the brain is concentrated at certain fre-
quencies, some of it extremely slow, a little around five cycles per second, and very
conspicuous activity (the so-called alpha rhythm) around ten cycles per second.
Some experiments have been done in the use of a flickering light to pull the
brain's alpha rhythm into unnatural Synchrony with it; the visual stimulation
leads to electrical stimulation. There has also been work on direct electrical
driving of the brain. In experiments discussed by Norbert Wiener, a sheet of
tin is suspended from the ceiling and connected to a generator working at ten
cycles per second. - -
With large field strengths of one or two volts per centimeter oscillating at the
alpha-rhythm frequency, decidedly unpleasant Sensations are noted by human
subjects. -
#. Brain Research Institute of the University of California is investigating
the effect of weak Oscillating fields on human behavior. The field strengths in
these experiments are of the order of a few hundredths of a volt per centimeter.
Subjects show small but measurable degradation in performance when exposed
to oscillating fields for periods of up to fifteen minutes.
The field strengths in these experiments are still much stronger, by a factor of
about 1000, than the observed natural oscillations in the earth-ionosphere cavity.
However, as previously noted, the intensity of the natural fluctuations could be
increased substantially and in principle could be maintained for a long time, as
tropical thunderstorms are always available for manipulation. The proper geo-
graphical location of the source of lighting, coupled with accurately timed, arti-
fically excited strokes, could lead to a pattern of oscillations that produced
relatively high power levels over certain regions of the earth and substantially
lower levels over other regions. In this way, one could develop a system that
would Seriously impair brain performance in very large populations in selected
regions over an extended period.
The scheme I have Susggested is admittedly far-fetched, but I have used it to
indicate the rather subtle connections between variations in man’s environmental
conditions and his behavior. Perturbation of the environment can produce changes
in behavior patterns. Since our understanding of both behavioral and environ-
mental manipulation is rudimentary, schemes of behavioral alteration on the
Surface seem unrealistic. No matter how deeply disturbing the thought of using
the environment to manipulate behavior for national advantage is to some, the
.* permitting such use will very probably develop within the next few
€C&Cl6S. -
133
SECRET WAR AND CHANGING RELATIONSHIPS
Deficiencies both in the basic understanding of the physical processes in the
environment and in the technology of environmental change make it highly
unlikely that environmental modification will be an attractive weapon system in
any direct military confrontation in the near future. Man already possesses highly
effective tools for destruction. Eventually, however, means other than open
warfare may be used to secure national advantage. As economic competition among
many advanced nations heightens, it may be to a country’s advantage to ensure
a peaceful natural environment for itself and a disturbed environment for its
competitors. Operations producing such conditions might be carried out covertly,
since nature's great irregularity permits storms, floods, droughts, earthquakes,
and tidal waves to be viewed as unusual but not unexpected. Such a “secret war”
need never be declared or even known by the affected populations. It could go on
for years with only the security forces involved being aware of it. The years of
drought and storm would be attributed to unkindly nature, and only after a
nation was thoroughly drained would an armed takeover be attempted.
In addition to their covert nature, a feature common to several modification
schemes is their ability to affect the earth as a whole. The environment knows no
political boundaries; it is independent of the institutions based on geography,
and the effects of modification can be projected from any one point to any other
on the earth. Because environmental modification may be a dominant feature of
future world decades, there is concern that this incipient technology is in total
conflict with many of the traditional geographical and political units and concepts.
Political, legal, economic, and sociological consequences of deliberate environ-
mental modification, even for peaceful purposes, will be of such complexity that
perhaps all our present involvements in nuclear affairs will seem simple. Our
understanding of basic environmental science and technology is primitive, but
still more primitive are our notions of the proper political forms and procedures to
deal with the consequences of modification. All experience shows that less signifi-
cant technological changes than environmental control finally transform political
and social relationships. Experience also shows that these transformations are not
necessarily predictable, and that guesses we might make now, based on precedent,
are likely to be quite wrong. It would seem, however, that these nonscientific,
nontechnological problems are of such magnitude that they deserve consideration
by serious students throughout the world if society is to live comfortably in a
controlled environment.
Author's note: In the section on weather modification I have drawn heavily on
Weather and Climate Modification (National Academy of Sciences, National
Research Council, Washington, 1966). A. T. Wilson’s paper on “Origin of Ice
Ages” appeared in Nature, vol. 201, pp. 147–49 (1964), and J. T. Hollin's comments
in vol. 208, pp. 12–16 (1965). Release of tectonic strain by underground nuclear
explosion was reported by F. Press and C. Archambeau in Journal of Geophysical
Research, vol. 67, pp. 337–43 (1962), and man-made earthquakes in Denver by
D. Evans in Geotimes, vol. 10, pp. 11–17. I am grateful to J. Homer and W. Ross
Adey, of the Brain Research Institute of the University of California at Los
Angeles, for information on the experimental investigation of the influence of
magnetic fields on human behavior.
ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE AND ECOCIDE—FACTS, APPRAISAL, AND PROPOSALS
(REVISED VERSION)
(By Richard A. Falk, Princeton University)
I
In Indochina during the past decade we have the first modern instance in which
the environment has been selected as a “military” target appropriate for com-
prehensive and systematic destruction. Such an occurrence does not merely reflect
the depravity of the high-technology sensibilities of the war-planners. It carries
out the demonic logic of counterinsurgency warfare, especially when the insurgent
threat is both formidable and set in a tropical locale. Recourse to deliberate forms
of environmental warfare is part of the wider military conviction that the only
way to defeat the insurgent is to deny him the cover, the food, and the life-support
of the countryside. -
S2—892—72 1()
134
Under such conditions bombers and artillery seek to disrupt all activity, and
insurgent forces find it more difficult to mass for effective attack. Such policies
have led in Indochina to the destruction of vast tracts of forest land and to so-called
“crop-denial programs.” The U.S. Government has altered tactics in recent years,
shifting from chemical herbicides to Rome Plows as the principal means to strip
away the protective cover of the natural landscape, but the basic rationale of
separating the people from their land and its life-support characteristics persists.
Such policies must be coupled with the more familiar tenets of counterinsurgency
doctrine which seek to dry up the sea of civilians in which the insurgent fish at-
tempt to swim. This drying up process is translated militarily into making the
countryside unfit for civilian habitation. To turn Indochina into a sea of fire and
compel peasants to flee their ancestral homes was consciously embodied in a
series of war policies including “free-fire Zones,” “search and destroy” operations,
and the various efforts to move villagers forcibly into secure areas. Therefore, it
is important to understand the extent to which environmental warfare is linked
to the overall tactics of high-technology counterinsurgency warfare, and extends
the indiscriminateness of warfare carried on against people to the land itself.
Just as counterinsurgency warfare tends toward genocide with respect to the
people, so it tends toward ecocide with respect to the environment.
It may be more than coincidental that at the historical moment when we are
in the process of discovering the extent to which man's normal activities are
destroying the ecological basis of life on the planet that we should also be con-
fronted by this extraordinary enterprise in Indochina of deliberate environmental
destruction. These conscious and unconscious tendencies need to be linked in any
adequate formulation of the world order challenge confronting mankind. It is
also worth noting that so far, at least, the target area of environmental warfare
is the Third World, a sector of world society that has largely disavowed the
relevance of the ecological agenda to its schedule of priorities. Environmental
warfare is a dramatic reminder of the extent to which the planet as a whole must
mobilize a response to the ecological challenge to sustain life on earth and beat
back reversions to barbarism emanating from the “advanced” regions and applied
to those that are relatively “backward.” It is a form of dangerous provincialism
for the countries of Asia and Africa to call for “benign neglect” when it comes to
this subject-matter; perhaps the relevance of ecological issues can be grasped more
clearly by Third World leaders and peoples in relation to environmental warfare.
II
On a more technical level there are several issues of related concern that need
to be considered. First of all, it seems important to assess the extent to which
patterns of environmental warfare violate existing criteria of legal judgment.
Secondly, there is a need to promote the development of new law that captures
the uniqueness of recent developments and anticipates future dangers; in partic–
ular, the search for clear standards of legal prohibition directed explicitly toward
environmental warfare might help shape future conduct. Many governments
have been reluctant to protest against what the United States has been doing
in Indochina and so have avoided a concern with environmental warfare. At this
stage it is possible to formulate, at least, a series of public demands around which
popular support needs to be rallied if governments and world institutions are
going to join in the movement for rectifying action.
III
In considering the relevance of international law I wish to make several pre-
liminary points that bear on more specific assessments:
(1) The connection between treaties and customary international law.
(2) The role of world community consensus in interpreting the requirements
of international law.
(3) The importance of principles of customary international law for the in-
terpretation of the legal status of disputed tactics of warfare.
(4) The importance of moral considerations in judging what is permissible
behavior of governments and their officials.
(5) The significant distinction between the illegality of governmental conduct
and º criminality of individual conduct (whether or not in the line of official
duty).
135
1. The connection between treaties and customary international law
There has been a tendency by governments to confine the scope of the law of
war to treaty law. Such confinement is improper. Even the US Army Field Manual
27–10 acknowledges that customary international law complements treaty rules.
It is important to understand that customary norms exist and apply because of
the degree to which modern weaponry and battlefield tactics have evolved since
the time when the basic treaties were formulated at the turn of the century.
The broad lawmaking treaties in 1907 bearing on the law of war were themselves
specific embodiments of general principles of belligerent restraint as they related
to war technology and tactics existing at that time. These customary principles,
more than the treaty rules they gave rise to, remain the primary basis for giving
legal substance to the law of war in the face of a drastically altered technological
and military environment. New treaties would be desirable, because of their
capacity to generate agreed interpretations of the specific implications of new
weaponry and tactics in relation to the customary principles underlying the law
of war. Such treaties could provide authoritative reading of limits on State be-
havior and would also be more likely to engender respect as contemporary
government officials would have taken part in the reformulation process and
renewed their commitments by participating in the treaty-making rituals of
solemnity."
But in the absence of a new round of Hague-type conferences the best ground
that exists for legal judgment is to examine contested belligerent practices in
light of the more general policies to which they gave expression. Customary
principles of international law [see section (3) below] are of great importance in an
effort to understand the legal status of the various dimensions of environmental
warfare.
2. The role of world community consensus in interpreting the requirements of inter-
national law
The increasing number of actors, their diversity, and the complexity of inter-
national life make it more difficult to rely upon procedures based on governmental
consent to develop either binding new interpretations of old rules or the generation
of new rules of international law. In such a context a consensus of governments
acting within the scope of formal procedures is increasingly viewed as capable of
generating authoritative interpretations and standards. The most significant
arena, wherein these newer procedures of law-creation have been used is the
General Assembly of the United Nations. The status of these resolutions remains
controversial, especially among the more sovereignty-oriented governments, but
I think the record of reliance on such resolutions in areas of arms control, space,
and human rights creates a body of practice in support of the contention that
these resolutions can, where intended by a large majority of governments, declare
and create law. - -
It is true that the degree of authoritativeness and effectiveness of such law-
making activity will depend on a number of factors including the strength and
quality of consensus, the strength and quality of dissent, the specificity of demand,
the willingness to implement conformity with prior legal and moral expectations.
The basic point is that the General Assembly now possesses a quasi-legislative.
competence that needs to be seriously considered whenever it is relevant, especially
when it sets forth a prevailing interpretation of the content of a previously agreed
upon legal rule. ~
3. The importance of principles of customary international law for the interpretation
of disputed tactics of warfare
Four principles of customary international law provide guidelines for the
ſºpretation of any belligerent conduct not specifically covered by valid treaty
I’Ulle .
I. Principle of necessity.—No tactic or weapon may be employed in war that
inflicts superfluous suffering on its victims even if used in the pursuit of an other-
wise reasonable military objective.
II. Principle of humanity.—No tactic or weapon may be employed in war that
is inherently cruel and offends minimum and widely shared moral sensibilities.
1 Such an argument is convincingly set forth in Abram Chayes, “An Inquiry into the Workings Of Arms
Control Agreements,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 85 (March 1972), pp. 905–969.
136
III. Principle of proportionality.—No weapon or tactic may be employed in
war that inflicts death, injury, and destruction disproportionate to its contribution
to the pursuit of lawful military objectives.
IV. Principle of discrimination.—No weapon or tactic may be employed in war
that fails to discriminate between military and non-military targets and that is
either inherently or in practice incapable of discriminating between combatants
and noncombatants.
. These four principles are general and are admittedly difficult to apply to the
complexities of the battlefield. However, a rule of reason can be used to identify
patterns (as distinct from instances) of clear violation, where the weapons and
tactics are used in Such a way as cannot be reasonably construed as compatible
with these principles of overriding constraint. Such principles also reflect a
minimum moral content that underlies the whole enterprise of a law of war, ad-
mitting its inevitable horror, but still striving for a mitigating framework of
restraint. .
Customary principles of international law are especially important in relation to
the law of war because of its dynamic character. The underlying commitment of
governments to restraint depends upon the interplay between good faith adherence
to these four principles and the actualities of war. The famous DeMartens clause
inserted in the Hague Conventions acknowledged this importance:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high
contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in
the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and belligerents remain
under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as
they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the
laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience.
Widely ratified treaties such as the 1925 Geneva Protocol on Gas, Chemical,
and Bacteriological Warfare may also attain the status of customary international
law by virtue of a consensus among governments active in the world community—
even if the consensus falls short of unanimity—and thereby bind non-parties.
The reasoning here is analogous to that used in section (2) to discuss the potentially
authoritative status of General Assembly Resolutions purporting to interpret a
treaty. G. A. Resolution 2603A (XXIV), which extends the coverage of the
Geneva Protocol to tear gas and herbicides, illustrates both an effort to make a
binding interpretation of a treaty rule and to extend the coverage of the treaty to
the entire community including nonparties. In the test of G. A. Resolution 2603A
“the General Assembly . . . called for the strict observance by all States of the
principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol” and “Declares as contrary to the
generally recognized rules of international law as embodied in the Geneva Pro-
tocol” the use of tear gas and chemical herbicides. The point here, which will be
discussed later, is that the United States is bound by “the principles and objec-
tives” of the Geneva Protocol, including the interpretation of its scope even though
it has not ratified the treaty, In essence, such a conclusion reflects the view that an
impartial third party—for instance, the International Court of Justice—would
find that the United States is bound by the Geneva Protocol and by the inter-
pretation of its scope affirmed by the overwhelming majority of governments.
Such a prediction may be made either because the Resolution is itself law-pro-
claiming and authoritative or because it is indeed an accurate declaration of the
proper meaning of the Geneva Protocol (and parallel norm in customary inter-
national law). . . . ; -
As a practical matter, U.S. ratification may still be important because much
of the international law of war depends for effective application upon self-enforce-
ment, especially when the actor is a major state not in conflict (and hence not
deterred by) another major state. The United States would be much more likely
to respect the Geneva Protocol, as generally, if it explicitly ratified the treaty,
even though it remains the case that it is bound by its terms even prior
to ratification.” -
: A final point has to do with the common contention that governments have
generally used whatever weapons and tactics seemed to confer upon them a mili-
tary advantage without according much, if any, heed to restraining principles
of customary international law, or for that matter, of treaty law. There is even
a common misunderstanding that a claim of military necessity overrides legal
restraints. The agreed understanding of governments embodied in the law of war
is that legal restraints have been formulated with due regard for military necessity,
and that any further unilateral abridgements are violations. To say that the law
2 Indeed, it could diminish the scope of its obligation by accompanying its ratification with either a res-
ervation or a statement of understanding which maintained the option to use herbicides and riot control
gåSSeS.
137
of war is frequently violated is merely to affirm that governments are not very
law-abiding in this area, and are indeed criminally disposed, especially where
their vital interests are at stake.
Such a conclusion argues more for a different system of law enforcement—
perhaps spearheaded by a law-minded citizenry—than for a suspension or nega-
tion of these international rules. Also, there is evidence, even bearing directly on
the use of gas in war, to suggest that legal restraints were respected including by
the United States, despite the fact that it has not been a party to the Geneva
Protocol, and despite the prospect of some military advantage resulting from the
use of gas in the Pacific island warfare against the Japanese during World War II.
4. The importance of moral factors in judging what is permissible behavior of govern-
ments and their officials -
The law of war attempts to reconcile minimum morality with the practical
realities of war. This reconciliation is best summarized in the four principles of
customary international law. The moral sense of the community provides a
legislative direction for the growth and understanding of international law.
In no area is it as appropriate as in relation to war to contend that “the law”
does and should reflect that which ought to have been done or not done by govern-
ments and their representatives. Morality, in this sense, attempts to fill the legisla-
tive vacuum created by the institutional deficiencies of international Society and
adapt law to some extent to the rapidly changing realities of war. In this sense the
growth of the international law of war may contain a greater element of retro-
activity than in the more developed constitutional systems of domestic Society,
but the retroactivity exists only on a legalistic plane. The Nuremberg initiative
provides our most dramatic illustration of a legislative Spasm in international law
that rested on the firmest grounds of shared morality, but aroused criticism from
legalistically inclined observers.” The Indochina context, given the public outrage
over the desecration of the land at a time of rising environmental consciousness,
creates a target of opportunity comparable to Nuremberg. Surely it is no exaggera-
tion to consider the forests and plantations treated by Agent Orange as an
Auschwitz for environmental values, certainly not from the perspective of such a
distinct environmental species as the mangrove tree or nipa palm. And just as the
Genocide Convention came along to formalize part of what had already been
Condemned and punished at Nuremberg, so an Ecocide Convention could help
i. forward into the future a legal condemnation of environmental warfare in
nqochina. -
5. The significant distinction between the illegality of governmental conduct and the
criminality of individual conduct
International law is most characteristically concerned with regulating the
behavior of governments. The laws of war are binding on governments, although
national legal systems generally make the laws of war binding on combat personnel
and provide criminal sanctions applicable in the event of violations.” As well, the
Nuremberg approach makes individuals criminally liable for violations of the laws
of war even if the violations were committed in the line of duty and in deference to
orders issued by bureaucratic or military superiors. That is, international law
directs that individual conformity with the laws of war take precedence over
normal obligations to domestic law or military and civilian lines of command. The
practical consequences of such a directive have engendered many difficulties during
the Indochina War for conscientious Americans. The Nuremberg obligation may be
taken more seriously in the United States than elsewhere because of a tradition of
respect for individual conscience and because the war crimes trials after World
War II were so greatly a reflection of American initiative. Daniel Ellsberg and
Anthony Russo, draft and tax resisters, and an expanding national movement of
civil disobedience all draw support from the wider logic of Nuremberg which
implies not only a citizen’s duty to refuse participation in illegal war policies or an
illegal war, but also creates a legal basis for individual action to prevent govern-
mental crimes of war. IV -
It is now possible to assess the legality of the main components of environ-
mental warfare as it has been waged in Indochina. It is important legally to
distinguish between weapons and tactics that are designed to damage the environ-
3 For range of responses see William J. Bosch, “Judgment on Nuremberg: American Attitudes toward
the Major German War-Crime Trials,” Chapel Hill, N.C., University of North Carolina Press, 1970.
4 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 even have a common provision obliging Parties to the treaties “to
enact º lºſion necessary to provide effective penal sanctions” for persons committing or Ordering
“grave breaches.” --
138
ment and those that, like bombs, are designed to strike human or societal targets,
but may also, as a side effect, damage the environment. It is also important to
distinguish between specific occasions of environmental warfare and persistent
patterns of warfare that produce cumulative effects on ecosystems that can be
properly called “ecocide” or policies that can be designated as “ecocidal.” And,
finally, it is necessary to decide whether the scope of environmental warfare
includes the human effects of these weapons. The issue on one level is whether
man is to be conceived, for this purpose, as an integral element of “the environ-
ment”; at a more practical level the issue is whether human side effects of chemical
weapons like 2,4,5-T are to be included in a discussion of environmental warfare.
The problem with the more expansive definition is that all forms of warfare
are detrimental to man and his artifacts, and in this sense all warfare could be
conceived to be environmental (or ecological) warfare, thereby missing the
distinctive feature of American warfare in Indochina and the specific dangers
of ecostystem destruction that are posed by high-technology counterinsurgency
warfare, especially if carried on in tropical settings. At the same time it is
artificial to ignore altogether our own human concerns, and an Orientation toward
the subject based on a conception of human ecology seems appropriate, wherein
bonds between man and nature provide an essential focus for inquiry. Thereforc,
we define environmental warfare as including all those weapons and tacties
which either intend to destroy the environment perse or disrupt normal relation-
ships between man and nature on a sustained basis. The focus is on environ-
mental warfare as practiced by the United States in Indochina, rather than On
the full gamut of weaponry detrimental to environmental values, which would
certainly include biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons as well as those
discussed here.
We will consider the legal status following weapons and tactics used in Indo-
china from this perspective:
(1) The use of herbicides.
(2) The use of Rome Plows to achieve deforestation.
(3) Bombardment and artillery fire.
(4) Reported reliance on weather modification techniques.
1. The Use of Herbicides.—There is extensive information available on the use of
herbicides in the Indochina War, principally in South Vietnam.5 The major chem-
icals used as military herbicides were Agent Orange (a mixture of 2,4-D and 2,4,
5–T) used against forest vegetation; Agent White (a mixture of 2,4-D and
Picloram) also used mainly against forest vegetation; Agent Blue (Cacodylic Acid)
used against rice and other crops. Defense Department figures disclose a steady
escalation in the use of chemical herbicides from 1962 up through the early months
of 1968, with a slight tapering off up through the middle of 1969 when the last
figures were released. In this period, 4,560,600 acres of forest land and 505,000
acres of crop land were sprayed, the total amounting to 5,065,600 acres, or more
than 10% of the entire area of South Vietnam (see evidence on Cambodia). The
rate of application has been roughly thirteen times the dose recommended for
domestic use by the U.S. Drug Administration.
President Richard Nixon reportedly terminated the use of herbicides for crop
destruction and announced a phase-out of the defoliation efforts in 1970. Defolia-
tion has not been halted by Nixon, but rather the task has been shifted from
chemicals to plows, which from an ecological point of view achieve even more
disastrous results.
The environmental damage caused by defoliants can still not be fully assessed.
However, there is strong evidence to suggest that some varieties of trees in South
Vietnam, particularly nipa palms and mangroves, have been destroyed, not merely
defoliated, by a single application; multiple applications kill other trees. The
AAAS-HAC study concluded that half of the hardwood trees north and west of
Saigon have been damaged. Westing estimates that by December 1970, 35% of
South Vietnam’s dense forests had been sprayed; 25% once, 10% more than once.
Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, speaking in Paris on behalf of the Provisional Revolu-
tionary Government of South Vietnam, alleged that between 1961 and 1969 43%
of arable land and 44% of forest land had been sprayed at least once and in many
cases two, three, or more times. In this process over 1,293,000 persons were
“directly contaminated.” 6 John Lewallen concludes: “The forests of South
5 See esp. J. B. Neilands, G. H. Orians, E. W. Pfeffer, Alje Vennemma, and Arthur H. Westing, “Harvest
of Death: Chemical Warfare in Vietnam and Cambodia.” New York, Free Press, 1972; John Lewallen,
“Ecology of Devastation: Indochina,” Baltimore, Md., Penguin, 1971; Thomas Whiteside, “The Withering
Pain: America’s Herbicidal Folly,” New York, Norton, 1971.
6 Madame Nguyen Thi Binh made this statement at the Paris Peace Conference, Feb. 19, 1970 (quoted
in Barry Weissberg, ed., “Ecocide in Indochina,” San Francisco, Calif., Canfield Press, 1970, p. 19).
139
Vietnam have not been merely damaged for decades or centuries to come. Nor have
they simply been deprived of rare tree species. It is probable that many areas will
experience an ecosystem succession under which forest will be replaced by
Savanna.” ” Often elephant grass overwhelms a forest area that has been defoliated
to such an extent as to prevent reforestation altogether.
There is ample evidence, then, that military herbicides have been extensively
used throughout South Vietnam, especially heavily along rivers, estuaries, on
villages and base perimeters, and in relation to suspected base areas and Supply
trails. Defoliants were generally sprayed from the air in specially fitted C-123
cargo planes, often near populated areas and with their dispersal significantly
spread beyond intended areas by wind factors. As a consequence, the herbicides
contaminated crops, either leading to their destruction or, as the evidence sug-
gests, to teratogenic effects on unborn children. There have been numerous
authenticated reports of human and animal poisoning throughout the course of
the war.
Military rationale.—The basic military justification for the massive defoliation
program was to deny the NLF protective Gover, thereby guarding defensive posi-
tions against ambush and surprise attack and enabling improved target identifica-
tion for offensive operations. The destruction of crops was justified as an effort
to deny food to NLF forces in areas under their control.
Legal rationale.—The legal rationale of the U.S. Goverment has been well
stated by J. Fred Buzhardt, General Counsel to the Department of Defense, in a
letter to Senator J. William Fulbright, dated April 5, 1971:
[N]either the Hague Regulations nor the rules of customary international
law applicable to the conduct of war prohibit the use of anti-plant chemicals
for defoliation or the destruction of crops, provided that their use against
crops does not cause such crops as food to be poisoned by direct contact,
and Such use must not cause unnecessary destruction of enemy property.
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 adds no prohibitions relating either the use
of chemical herbicides or to crop destruction to those above. Bearing in view
that neither the legislative history nor the practice of States draw chemical
herbicides within its prohibitions, any attempt by the United States to
include such agents within the Protocol would be the result of its own policy
termination, amounting to a self-denial of the use of weapons. Such a de-
termination is not compelled by the 1907 Hague Regulations, the Geneva
Protocol of 1925, or the rules of customary international law.
In essence, the United States Government claims that no existing rules of inter-
national law prohibit the military use of herbicides.
Legal appraisal.—It seems clear that an overwhelming majority of governments
regards (1) the Geneva Protocol as binding on non-parties, and (2) as extending
its prohibition to cover military herbicides. The protocol is binding because it
enjoys the status of customary international law, a status that the United States
has not seriously challenged. Indeed, the U.S. Government has argued its adher-
ence to the terms of the Protocol, contending only that its prohibition does not ex-
tend to military herbicides (or riot control gasses). In submitting the Protocol to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for ratification Secretary of State William
Rogers provided an accompanying statement which said: “It is the United States’
understanding of the protocol that it does not prohibit the use in war of riot-con-
trol agents and chemical herbicides.”8
Such an understanding of the scope of the Protocol is not shared by the inter-
national community as a whole. UN General Assembly Resolution 2603A (XXIV)
Supported by a majority of 80–3 (with 36 abstentions) indicated its express inten-
tion to dispel “any uncertainty” as to the scope of the Protocol and contained the
following operative paragraph:
Declares as contrary to the generally recognized rules of international law as
embodied in the Geneva. Protocol the use in international armed conflicts of
any chemical agents of warfare: chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid,
or Solid, which might be employed because of their toxic effects on man,
animals, or plants.
This paragraph puts forward a dual basis for disregarding the more restrictive
understanding of the Protocol put forward by the American government. First of
all, G.A. Resolution 2603A constitutes evidence of what most governments regard
the scope of the prohibition to be. Secondly, 2603A is itself supported by a consen-
sus of such a character as to give its law-declaring claims an authoritative status by
Virtue of the quasi-legislative competence enjoyed by the General Assembly.
7 Lewallen, p. 80.
8 Mr. Pogers’ testimony was on March 5, 1971.
140
This view of the scope of the Geneva. Protocol derived from positive inter-
national law also accord with the emerging moral consensus and community ex-
pectations relating to environmental quality. Hence, when in doubt as to the scope
of a treaty rule it seems desirable to seek a determination that accords with un-
folding community sentiments. On the level of customary international law, the
broad principles of discrimination and proportionality seem at odds with the
novel claim to attack vast areas of forest land so as to deprive an adversary of
natural cover. It is questionable whether high-technology counterinsurgeney war-
fare waged against a low-technology opponent can ever be reconciled in its basic
character with the framework of restraint provided by the four principles of
customary international law. In this sense the problems raised by claims to use
military herbicides are but part of a larger set of legal concerns.
On balance, it seems possible to conclude that the American use of military
herbicides in Indochina violated the Geneva Protocol, which is both a treaty and a
standard of prohibition that enjoys the status of customary international law.
This assessment of existing law could be confirmed by seeking an Advisory
Opinion on the status and scope of the Geneva Protocol from the International
Court of Justice. Such an Advisory Opinion is not really necessary, but if, as
expected, it confirmed the interpretation of the Protocol embodied in 2603A then
it would lay the American contention to rest once and for all.
When it comes to crop destruction the prohibition on military herbicides stands
on even stronger legal ground. As Tom Farer points out, such tactics are “at best
indiscriminate, and they may in fact discriminate against civilians because, even
if the food supply which survives defoliation was distributed evenly, in absolute
terms civilians would suffer disproportionately in that there are more of them and
many civilians, the young, for instance, have particularly intense needs for certain
foods.” 9 Government studies have indeed convincingly shown that crop de-
struction as in intentional military tactic had the principal effect of reducing the
food available to civilians; NLF food requirements were given priority in areas
under their control and were small enough in relation to available food to be
satisfied. A former high official in the so-called pacification program in Vietnam,
L. Craig Johnstone, put the effects of crop destruction as follows: “In the course of
investigations of the program in Saigon and in the provinces of Vietnam, I found
that the program was having much more profound effects on civilian noncom-
batants than on the enemy. Evaluations sponsored by a number of official and
unofficial agencies have all concluded that a very high percentage of all the food
destroyed under the crop destruction program had been destined for civilian, not
military use.
The program had its greatest effects on the enemy-controlled civilian popula-
tions of central and northern South Vietnam. In Vietnam the crop destruction
program created widespread misery and many refugees.” 19 Of course, such effects
on the civilian population are evidently a central ingredient of counterinsurgent
strategy vis-a-vis the countryside, and so crop destruction is fully consistent with
such war policies aimed at refugee generation and pacification as “free-fire zones,”
“harassment and interdiction” artillery fire, forcible removal of refugees, and
“search and destroy” missions. The use of chemical herbicides to destroy crops
destined for civilian consumption is one of the points where the allegations of
ecocide merge with allegations of genocide.
2. Use of Rome Plows and bulldozing equipment.—A second major form of war-
fare waged directly against the environment has been to clear the land of vegeta-
#. by means of systematic plowing. According to Paul R. Ehrlich and John P.
oldren:
Perhaps the crudest tool the United States is using to destroy the ecology
in Indochina is the ‘Rome plow.’ This is a heavily armored D7E caterpillar
bulldozer with a 2.5 ton blade. The Rome plow can cut a swath through the
heaviest forest. It has been used to clear several hundred yards on each side
of all main roads in South Vietnam. In mid-1971 five land clearing companies
were at work, each with some thirty plows, mowing down Vietnamese forests.
By then some 800,000 acres had been cleared and the clearing was continuing
at a rate of about 2,000 acres (3 square miles) daily.11
Pfeiffer and Westing conclude that by 1971 Rome plowing “had apparently
replaced the use of herbicides to deny forest cover and sanctuary to the other side.”
They conclude the Rome plowing is more effective than chemicals and “is probably
more destructive of the environment.” This tactic has been used to “scrape clean
9 Tom J. Farer, “The Laws of War 25 Years After Nuremberg,” International Conciliation, No. 583, May
1971, p. 20. .
10 Johnstone, “Ecocide and the Geneva Protocol,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 49, pp. 711–720, at 719.
11 “Ecocide in Indochina” (mimeo. paper), Dec. 1971, p. 2.
141
the remaining few areas of the Boi Loi Woods northwest of Saigon.” Pfeiffer and
Westing visited an area of forest that had been plowed several years previously
and it was covered with cogon grass which, according to these experts, makes
“further successional stages to the original hardwood forest very unlikely.” It
is clear that such plowing inflicts ecological damage that may last for a very long
period of time, perhaps permanently.
Legal rationale.—As far as I am aware, no attempt has been made to defend
Rome plowing as a legitimate tactic of war. A defense of this practice, if attempted,
would undoubtedly rest on the argument that it is a legitimate military objective
to deny the enemy protective cover and that, in any event, no rules of prohibi—
tion can be discovered in either Treaty or customary international law.
Legal Appraisal.--All of the law of war was drafted and evolved in a pre-eco-
logical frame of mind. There are no standards or rules that contemplated a military
Strategy that sought to destroy the environment as such. Article 22 of the Annex
to the Hague Convention on Land Warfare could be relevant in interpreting pres-
ent content: “the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited.” The United States Supreme Court often interprets Constitutional
norms as embracing conduct not contemplated at the time of ratification, but re-
flecting an evolving sense of limits within the world community.
Nevertheless, I think it is not easy to conclude that Rome plowing, however
much it offends ecological consciousness, constitutes a violation of existing stand-
ards of international law. It points up the need for the formulation of clear stand-
ards of prohibition, in a new Protocol on Environmental Warfare (Annex 2).
Finally, it is possible to view such environmental devastation as an instance of
“a crime against humanity” in the Nuremberg sense, suggesting again the quasi-
legislative potentialities created in a situation of moral outrage. The link between
environmental destruction of the Vietnamese forests and crimes against humanity
is by way of “human ecology,” the environment being interrelated in organic
fashion with human existence.
Indeed there is some relatively hard evidence to support such an inference.
In the official history of the UN War Crimes Commission there is the following
report:
During the final months of its existence the Committee was asked in a
Polish case (Commission No. 7150) to determine whether ten Germans, all
of whom had been heads of various Departments in the Forestry Adminis-
tration in Poland during the German occupation (1939–1944), could be listed
as war criminals on a charge of pillaging Polish public property. It was
alleged that the accused in their official capacities caused the wholesale
cutting of Polish timber to an extent far in excess of what was necessary to
preserve the timber resources of the country, with a loss to the Polish nation
of the sum of 6,525,000,000 zloty. It was pointed out that the Germans, who
had been among the first as a nation to foster scientific forestry, had entered
Poland and wilfully felled the Polish forests without the least regard to the
basic principles of forestry. The Polish representative presented a copy of
a circular signed by Goering under date of 25th January, 1940, in which
were laid down principles for a policy of ruthless exploitation of Polish
forestry. It was decided by the Committee that prima facie existence of a
war crime had been shown and nine of the officials charged were listed as
accused war criminals.18
3. Bombardment and artillery fire.—Pfeiffer and Westing have usefully sum-
marized the general information available:
In the seven years between 1965 and 1971 the U.S. military forces exploded
26 billion pounds (13 million tons) of munitions in Indochina, half from the
air and half from weapons on the ground. . . . For the people as a whole
it represents an average of 142 pounds of explosive per acre of land and
584 pounds per person . . . most of the bombardment was concentrated in
time (within the years from 1967 on) and in area. Of the 26 billion pounds,
21 billion were exploded within South Vietnam, one billion in North Vietnam,
and 2.6 billion in Southern Laos.14
These awesome statistics will be further augmented by the escalation of bombing
in 1972 to the highest levels of the war. Unlike categories I and II practices,
12 Arthur W. Westing and E. W. Pfeiffer, “The Cratering of Indochina,” Scientific American, Vol. 226,
May 1972, pp. 26–29, at 26–28.
lºs “History of the UN War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War,” London,
, p. 496. -
14 Westing and Pfeiffer, p. 21.
142
category III practices are not designed, per se, to destroy the environment. The
element of intentionality is probably absent, although with the accumulation of
experience the environmental consequence of bombing patterns becomes part
of what is known by the war planners.
On the basis of the evidence available it is clear that several distinct patterns
of ordinance use should be separately considered for purposes of legal analysis:
Craterization.—Pfeiffer and Westing estimate 26 million craters, covering an
area of 423,000 acres, and representing a displacement of about 3.4 billion cubic
yards of earth. Much of the cratering has been caused by 500 pound bombs
dropped from high altitude B–52 flights and from large artillery shells. Such a
bomb typically produces a crater that is thirty to forty feet wide and five to
twenty feet deep (depending on topographical conditions), although larger craters
have been reported. The effects of craters are numerous:
(1) Arable and timber land are withdrawn from use virtually indefinitely.15
(2) Unexploded bombs or fragments make neighboring land unsatisfactory for
normal use and cause injury to man and animals.
(3) Craters that penetrate the water table become breeding grounds for mos-
quitoes, increasing the incidence of malaria and dengue fever.
(4) Craters displace soil, and especially in hilly areas accentuate soil runoff
and erosion, causing laterization of the land in and around craters.
(5) Bombardment of forest areas has harmed the timber industry by outright
destruction; also, metal shrads weaken trees and make them vulnerable to fungus
infection.
Legal rationale.—The bombardment involves legitimate bombardment of
suspected concentrations of enemy troops or supplies. Environmental damage is
an unintended side-effect that is not regulated in any way by existing international
law. To the extent the bombing is indiscriminate then it is subject to independent
attack. The demonstration of environmental damage adds little to the legal
analysis of the status of Indochina bombing patterns.
Legal appraisal.—It is true that no explicit rules of prohibition seem available
to assess the legal status of craterization. However, the scale and magnitude of
bombardment raises special issues under Article 22 of the Annex to the Hague
Convention on Land Warfare and in relation to Crimes Against Humanity as
specified at Nuremberg.
It does seem desirable, nevertheless, to seek new legal rules and principles that
are explicitly concerned with the environmental side-effects of standard war
policies. Also it is necessary in this context to regard belligerent action beyond
the capacity of the environment to absorb and respond in a short period of time
as involving the independent crime of ecocide.
Would a Nuremberg II tribunal convened to assess liability of American leaders
for craterization in Indochina convict on this count? It is difficult to predict the
outcome on this issue because the law is murky and because of an apparent absence
of a direct intent to destroy the environment on the part of American civilian and
military leaders. - - * -
“Daisy-cutters.”—Gigantic bombs, weighing 15,000 pounds, were being dropped
at an estimated rate of two per week since mid-1971 in South Vietnam to establish
instant clearings for firebase helicopter landing areas, and, according to Some
accounts, on areas of suspected troop concentrations. These bombs kill all animals
and people who happen to be within a quarter-mile radius of the blast. The cleared
area is completely deforested.
Legal rationale.—Bombing and damage incidental to valid military purpose in a
context where no rule of prohibition exists. *
Legal appraisal.—The specific action does not seem to violate positive norms of
international law. Condemnation is partly an expression of outrage in relation to
overall devastation of Indochina and partly an expression of an emerging eco-
logical consciousness. Again, the legal retroactivity of prohibition in a Nuremberg
II setting would be more than offset by a sense that such bombs are indiscriminate
in effect and disrupt in fundamental fashion man’s links to the environment.
Electronic battlefield; systematic bombing; “free-fire zones.”—In these settings
bombing patterns are indiscriminate with respect to all that breathes and moves.
The saturation bombing also devastates the land and tends to depopulate the area
subject to attack. Fred Branfman has described in agonizing detail the total
destruction of the idyllic and prosperous agricultural subsociety of 50,000 in the
Plaine des Jarres in Laos.10
15 Same 24.
16 Fred Branfman, ed., “Voices from the Plain of Jars,” New York, Harper Colophon, 1972.
143
Legal rationale.—There is none. The facts have been officially repressed or
distorted by the U.S. Government.
Legal appraisal.—To the extent these war policies involve attacks on civilian
targets, such as rural villages, they are clearly in violation of international law.
To the extent that the separate acts of environmental destruction are considered
the legal status is, at present, more problematic. To the extent that an inhabited
ecosystem, such as the Plaine des Jarres, is devastated by direct action, then it
seems to be a crime against humanity in the spirit of Nuremberg I.
4. Weather Modification.17—There is an increasing indication that the United
States has seeded clouds over Laos in order to increase rainfall. The military
rationale for such a tactic is to muddy or cause flooding in the vicinity of the
network of roadways constituting the Ho Chi Minh trail. A cloud-seeding plane
like a reconnaisance plane that drops flares could accomplish its mission by drop-
ping 35 to 100 pounds of silver iodine over a six-hour period. The Defense Depart-
ment has shrouded the subject in secrecy and has refused to make any statements
of unequivocal denial or confirmation. Nevertheless, a series of collateral accounts,
including some references in the Pentagon Papers and some leaked information
appearing on March 18, 1971, in a news column by Jack Anderson create a strong
basis for believing that weather modification has been used in Indochina as a
deliberate weapon of war.
Such tactics, because of their relative covertness and widespread potential for
devastating impacts on a target area (and, perhaps, on global weather patterns
as well) pose a danger of great magnitude to the future of world order. It seems
very important to arouse public concern at this time and seek a clearcut pro-
hibition on weather modification for military purposes. 18
Because of the secrecy surrounding the activity and its novelty in the history
of warfare, it is virtually impossible to carry legal analysis any further at this
stage. Even more so than poison gas and bacteriological weapons, weather mod-
ification poses dangers of indiscriminate and uncontrollable damage, clearly a
menacing genie that needs to be recaptured and confined for all time. It seems
mandatory in such circumstances to seek an absolute legal prohibition on the
practice of weather modification for military purposes.
On the basis of this brief description of the legal status of the main elements of
environmental warfare in Indochina, it seems clear that there are two distinct
sets of tasks: - -
(1) To take steps to strengthen and clarify international law with respect to
the prohibition of weapons and tactics that inflict environmental damage, and
designate as a distinct crime those cumulative war effects that do not merely
disrupt, but substantially and irreversibly destroy a distinct ecosystem.
(2) To take steps to stop and rectify the ecological devastation of Indochina,
to censure the United States for these actions, to impose upon the United States
a minimum burden of making available ample resources to permit ecological re-
habilitation to the extent possible in the shortest time and in the most humane
manner, and to assessfully the various ecological effects of the war upon Indochina.
To accomplish (1) we suggest the following action, illustrated by draft
instruments:
A Proposed International Convention on the Crime of Ecocide (Annex 1).
A Draft Protocol on Environmental Warfare (Annex 2).
A Draft Petition, to be signed by individuals and non-governmental orga-
nizations, addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations
(Annex 3).
To deal with the more specific problems generated by the Indochina War we
propose the following:
A Draft Peoples Petition of Redress on Ecocide and Environmental
Warfare addressed to governments and to the United Nations (Annex 4).
VI
There are special difficulties that pertain to taking appropriate legal action with
respect to environmental devastation in Indochina. First of all, the United States
as a preeminent state in the world system is able to block serious inquiry into this
17 This section relies upon Deborah Shapley, “Rainmaking: Rumored Use Over Laos Alarms Arms
Experts, Scientists,” Science, Vol. 176, 16 June 1972, pp. 1216–1220.
18 Senator Claiborne Pell “strongly believes” that clouds in North Vietnam have been seeded since 1966,
and have caused thousands of deaths by provoking devastating floods. See New York Times, June 27,
1972, p. 12. Apprehension is increased by the connection between rainmaking and confirmed reports that
dikes have been bombed.
144
subject-matter. I believe this obstructive capability accounted for the failure to
inscribe the issue of environmental warfare on the agenda of the UN Conference
on the Human Environment. Secondly, and relatedly, the United Nations is not
able to pursue effective initiatives without the assenting participation of its most
powerful Members, especially the United States; the silence of the Organization
through a decade of warfare in Indochina is a shocking revelation of the extent to
which the Charter is a dead letter whenever its violation is primarily attributable
to one of the two superpowers. Thirdly, the United States has not lost the Indo-
china War in the way in which Germany lost World War II, and as such, its
leaders and policies are unlikely to be subjected to critical review by either an
independent commission of inquiry or by an intergovernmental tribunal of
judgment.
Given these realities, it is necessary to develop an action plan that has some
prospect for success. This plan will have to discount the possibilities of relying
upon governments or inter-government organizations, although governments that
are willing to formulate a critical response, as did Premier Olaf Palme at the Stock-
holm Conference in June, 1972, help greatly to expose the failure of public insti-
tutions to protect public values. Similarly, petitions seeking redress of grievances
directed at those institutions entrusted with formal responsibility help to expose
institutional responses that Sustain or acquiesce in the practice of environmental
warfare and ecocide. Such efforts to present petitions emphasize the need to
Stimulate a world populist movement, both nationally and internationally, as a
way of eroding the power of governments over lives and ecological destinies.
The most important arenas of action may be non-governmental in character.
At some point it may even be desirable to organize a peoples’ commission of in-
quiry and redress that seeks to focus the facts of environmental devastation and
º on Indochina, and to formulate appropriate demands for censure and
relief. - -
On a more fundamental level, the issues of environmental warfare are peculiarly
resistant to inter-governmental collaboration because of their apparent link with
counterinsurgency warfare. It is the counterinsurgent that tends to pursue the
tactics and rely upon the weapons that do the most damage to the environment.
That is, governments have a particular interest in being able to use their techno-
logical advantages to neutralize whatever advantages of dispersal and maneuver-
ability are enjoyed by an insurgent. In Indochina this technological and tactical
gap has led almost all of the serious environmental damage to have been inflicted
by the forces aligned with the incumbent government. It can be argued, in addition,
that without military herbicides, Rome plowing, and massive airpower, battlefield
outcomes would have been decisively in favor of the insurgent forces. Therefore,
it would seem to be the case that environmental devastation is a virtually in-
evitable byproduct of a sustained campaign of counterinsurgency, especially if
carried out in the tropics against insurgent forces enjoying a strong base of popular
support; in such circumstances not only must the Sea be drained to imperil the
fish, but its life-supporting ecology must be destroyed as well. Given the prospect
of future insurgent challenges, it is unlikely that governments will be agreeable,
at least not without a major populist campaign beforehand, to foreclose by aSSent
to legal prohibitions their military options for counterinsurgent response.
This consideration suggests wider grounds for skepticism as to legal responses.
Even in the Third World a large technological gap exists between the weaponry
and tactics of the government and that of its internal challengers. Throughout
the world most governments are confronted by insurgent challenges and seek to
use all effective means to defeat them. The common governmental consensus is
abetted by arms sales and transfers which make all governments increasingly
dependent on high-technology military establishments. From this dependence,
the willingness and capability to wage environmental warfare is almost certain
to follow.
It needs to be understood that international law, by and large, continues to
reflect the perceived self-interest of governments. Both in terms of formation and
implementation international law presupposes reciprocal interests in patterns of
voluntary compliance. As such, international law is a consensual system. If these
interests do not exist or are not perceived to exist, then it is difficult to generate
new law or enforce old law in international affairs. This general comment is pecu-
liarly true for the law of war which raises vital questions of governmental Survival.
Unlike interstate warfare, the insurgent actor is unrepresented in the international
legal order, and the law is likely to be shaped to serve the perceived military
interests of governments (i.e. actual and potential counterinsurgents).
Such conclusions reinforce our view that the state system is inherently incapable
145
of organizing the defense of the planet against ecological destruction.19 As such,
the prospects for ecological protection are intimately linked with the prospects
of initiating a world populist movement that incorporates the ecological imperative
at the same time that it works to Secure equity for all men on earth.
ANNEx 1
A PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE CRIME OF EcoCIDE
The Contracting Parties: -
Acting on the belief that ecocide is a crime under international law, con-
trary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations, and condemned by peoples
and governments of good will throughout the world; t
Recognizing that we are living in a period of increasing danger of ecological
collapse; -
Acknowledging that man has consciously and unconsciously inflicted
irreparable damage to the environment in times of war and peace;
Being convinced that the pursuit of ecological quality requires interna-
tional guidelines and procedures for cooperation and enforcement, -
Hereby agree:
AIRTICLE I
The Contracting Parties confirm that ecocide, whether committed in time of
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake
to prevent and to punish. -
ARTICLE II
In the present Convention, ecocide means any of the following acts committed
with intent to disrupt or destroy, in whole or in part, a human ecosystem:
(a) The use of weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, bacteriological,
chemical, or other.
(b) The use of chemical herbicides to defoliate and deforest natural forests for
miltary purposes. - - -
(c) The use of bombs and artillery in such quantity, density, or size as to im-
pair the quality of the soil or to enhance the prospect of diseases dangerous to
human beings, animals, or crops. -
(d) The use of bulldozing equipment to destroy large tracts of forest or crop-
land for military purposes.
(e) The use of techniques designed to increase or decrease rainfall or otherwise
modify weather as a weapon of war. - - -
(f) The forcible removal of human beings or animals from their habitual places of
habitation to expedite the pursuit of military or industrial objectives.
ARTICLE III
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Ecocide.
(b) Conspiracy to commit ecocide.
(c) Direct and public incitement to ecocide.
(d) Attempt to commit ecocide.
(e) Complicity in ecocide.
ARTICLE IV
Persons committing ecocide as defined in Article II or any of the acts described
in Article III shall be punished, at least to the extent of being removed for a
period of years from any position of leadership of public trust. Constitutionally
responsible rulers, public officials, military commanders, or private individuals
may all be charged with and convicted of the crimes associated with ecocide as
set forth in Article III.
ARTICLE V1
The United Nations shall establish a Commission for the Investigation of
Ecocide as soon as this Convention comes into force. This Commission shall be
composed of fifteen experts on international law and assisted by a staff conversant
with ecology. The principal tasks of the Commission shall be to investigate al-
19 This position is developed in my book “This Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposals for Human
Survival,” New York, Random House, 1971. -
1 Article V may be the most controversial provision in this proposal, and could be either deleted altogether
Or appended as an optional protocol, to enhance the prospects for ratification of the basic Convention.
146
legations of ecocide whenever made by governments of States, by the principal
officer of any international institution whether or not part of the United Nations
Organization, by resolution of the General Assembly or Security Council, or
by petition signed by at least 1000 private persons. The Commission shall have
power of subpoena and to take depositions; all hearings of the Commission shall
by open and transcripts of proceedings shall be a matter of public record. If the
Commission concludes by majority vote, after investigating the allegations that
none of the acts described in Article III has been committed then it shall issue a
dismissal of the complaint accompanied by a short statement of reasons. If the
Commission concludes, by majority vote, after investigating the allegations that
acts within the scope of Article III have been or are being committed then it
shall issue a cease and desist order, a statement recommending prosecution or
sanction of specific individuals or groups, and a statement of reasons supporting
its decisions. The Commission shall also recommend whether prosecution proceeds
under national, regional, international or ad hoc auspices. Regardless of decision
minority members of the Commission may attach dissenting or concurring opinions
to the majority decision. In the event of a tie vote in the Commission, the Chairman
shall cast a second vote. The Commisssion shall have rule-making capacity to
regulate fully its operations to assure full realization of the objectives of this
Convention but with due regard for the human rights of individuals as embodied
in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.
ARTICLE VI
The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respec-
tive Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of
the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for
persons guilty of ecocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III.
ARTICLE VII
Persons charged with ecocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article
III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of
which the act was committed, or by Such international penal tribunal as may
have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have
accepted its jurisdiction.
ARTICLE VIII
Ecocide and the other acts enumerated in Article III shall not be considered
as political crimes for the purpose of extradition.
The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in Such cases to grant extradition
in accordance with their laws and treaties in force.
ARTICLE IX
Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United
Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they
consider appropriate for the prevention, and Suppression of acts of ecocide or
any of the other acts enumerated in Article III.
AIRTICLE X
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, appli-
cation or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the
responsibility of a State for ecocide or any of the other acts enumerated in
Article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the
request of any of the parties to the dispute.
AIRTICLE XI
The present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and
Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall bear the date of. . . .
ARTICLE XII
The present Convention shall be open until . . . for signature on behalf of any
Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State to which an
invitation to sign has been addressed by the General Assembly.
The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification
shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
147
After . . . the present Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any Member
of the United Nations and of any non-member State which has received an
invitation as aforesaid.
Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations.
AIRTICLE XIII
Any Contracting Party may at any time, by notification addressed to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, extend the application of the present
Convention to all or any of the territories for the conduct of whose foreign
relations that Contracting Party is responsible.
ARTICLE XIV
On the day when the first twenty instruments of ratification or accession have
been deposited, the Secretary-General shall draw up a procès-verbal and transmit
a copy of it to each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member
States contemplated in Article XII.
The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following
the date of deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession.
Any ratification or accession effected subsequent to the latter date shall become
effective on the ninetieth day following the deposit of the instrument of ratification
Or accession.
ARTICLE XV
The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of ten years as from
the date of its coming into force.
It shall thereafter remain in force for successive periods of five years for such
Contracting Parties as have not denounced it at least six months before the
expiration of the current period.
Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the Sec-
retary-General of the United Nations.
ARTICLE XVI
If, as a result of denunciations the number of Parties to the present Convention
should become less than sixteen, the Convention shall cease to be in force as from
the date on which the last of these denunciations shall become effective.
ARTICLE XVII
A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time
by any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the
Secretary-General.
The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect
of Such request.
AIRTICLE XVIII
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all Members of the
United Nations and the non-member States contemplated in Article XII of the
following:
Y (a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accordance with Article
(b) Notifications received in accordance with Article XIII.
(c) The date upon which the present Convention comes into force in accordance
with Article XIV. -
(d) Denunciations received in accordance with Article XV.
(e) The abrogation of the Convention in accordance with Article XVI.
(f) Notifications received in accordance with Article XVII.
ARTICLE XIX
The original of the present Convention shall be deposited in the archives of the
United Nations.
A certified copy of the Convention shall be transmitted to all Members of the
United Nations and to the non-member States contemplated in Article XII.
148
ARTICLE XX
The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the
|United Nations on the date of its coming into force.
B
Resolution relating to the study by the International Law Commission of the
question of an international criminal jurisdiction.
The General Assembly:
Considering that the discussion of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Ecocide has raised the question of the desirability
and possibility of having persons charged with ecocide tried by a competent
international tribunal; -
Considering that, in the course of development of the international com-
munity, there will be an increasing need of an international judicial organ for
the trial of certain crimes under international law; -
Invites the International Law Commission to study the desirability and
possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of
persons charged with ecocide or other crimes over which jurisdiction will be
conferred upon that organ by international conventions;
Requests the International Law Commission in carrying out this task to
pay attention to the possibility of establishing a Criminal Chamber of the
International Court of Justice.
ANNEx 2
DRAFT PROTOCOL ON ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE
Considering that environmental warfare has been condemned by public opinion
throughout the world and that the deliberate destruction of the environment
disrupts the ecological basis of life on earth; * - ,
Mindful of the extent to which the future of mankind is linked with the rapid
development of protective attitudes toward environmental quality;
Conscious of the extent to which existing and prospective weapons and tactics
of warfare, particularly counterinSurgency warfare or reliance on nuclear weapons,
disrupt ecological patterns for long periods of time and destroy beneficial relation-
ship between man and nature;
Recalling such prior expressions of collective concern with the general effects
% §v, sº expressed in General Assembly Resolutions 1653 (XVI) and 2603A
y
We, as representatives of governments and as citizens of the world community,
do hereby commit ourselves as a matter of conscience and of law to refrain from
the use of tactics and weapons of war that inflict irreparable harm to the environ-
ment or disrupt fundamental ecological relationships;
This Protocol prohibits in particular:
1. All efforts to defoliate or destroy forests or crops by means of chemicals
or bulldozing;
2. Any pattern of bombardment that results in extensive craterization of .
the land or in deep craters that generate health hazards; -
3. Any reliance on weapons of mass destruction of life or any weapons or
tactics that are likely to kill or injure large numbers of animals.
We, as undersigned, will seek to gain as many individual and institutional
accessions to this Protocol as possible;
The Protocol shall come into effect after the first five signatures and is binding
thereafter on all governments of the world because it is a declaration of restraints
on warfare that already are embodied in the rules and principles of international
law;
Violation of this Protocol shall be deemed an international crime of grave
magnitude that can be charged and considered, by fair trial proceedings, wherever
an alleged culprit can be apprehended; in cases of extreme necessity trials in
absentia are authorized.
Done in Stockholm, Sweden, June, 1972.
149
ANNEX 3
DRAFT PETITION ON EcoCIDE AND ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE
The undersigned:
Mindful of their concern with the ecological quality of this planet and with
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
Gravely concerned by the evidence of ecological devastation in Indochina.
and by the spread of counterinsurgency weaponry and doctrine to govern-
ments throughout the world;
Fearful of the further willingness of governments to conduct their opera-
tions without due deference for the conditions of ecological welfare, especially
during periods of armed conflict.
1. Declare that—
(a) The commission of acts of ecocide is an international crime in violation of
the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, is a direct violation
of the Charter of the United Nations and violates the sense of minimum moral
obligation prevailing in the world community.
(b) The protection of man’s relation to natural ecosystems, is a legal, moral
obligation deserving of the highest respect and directly related to the prospects
for human survival and social development.
(c) Any government, organization, group or individual that commits, plans, Sup-
ports, or advocates ecocide shall be considered as committing an international
crime of grave magnitude and as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and in
violation of the ecological imperative.
2. Request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to take the following
StepS- -
§ Convene an emergency session of the Security Council to order the United
States to cease and desist from all war policies responsible for the ecological devas-
tation of Indochina. - .
(b) Compile a report on the ecological damage done to Indochina and urge the
establishment of a commission of inquiry composed of experts that would submit
periodic reports to the General Assembly of ecological effects of the war on Indo-
china, and courses of action, together with funding, available to secure maximum
rehabilitation of ecological quality.
(c) Request the International Law Commission to prepare an International Con-
vention on Ecocide, a Protocol on Environmental Warfare, and a Code on indivi-
dual and collective responsibility relative to the crime of ecocide.
(d) Convene a conference of governments during 1974 to take appropriate legal
steps to outlaw ecocide and to provide the legal framework needed to prohibit en-
vironmental warfare, including principles and procedures to assess responsibility
and to enjoin activity destructive of environmental values.
ANNEX 4
PEOPLES PETITION OF REDRESS ON ECOCIDE AND ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE
The Undersigned: - -
Recognizing that modern weapons of mass destruction are capable of causing
widespread and enduring devastation of the human environment;
Concerned by the evidence of long-term, extensive ecological damage caused in
Indochina by a variety of weapons including bombs, napalm, herbicides, plows, and
poisonous gases used principally and massively by the United States in the course
of waging the Indochina War;
And further concerned by reports of the supply and sale of these means of wag-
ing war by the United States to other governments including the Saigon adminis-
tration of South Vietnam and the government of Portugal;
Do hereby petition all governments to renounce weapons and tactics of war de-
signed to inflict damage to the environment as such;
And call especially on the Government of the United States of America to im-
mediately stop the destruction of the human environment in Indochina, and to
stop the sale and transfer of weaponry designed primarily to carry on environ-
mental warfare;
And call upon the United Nations to take steps immediately to condemn re-
liance by the United States on environmental warfare in Indochina, to investigate
and report the full extent of ecological damage resulting from the Indochina War;
to consider and recommend steps that could be taken to restore the environment
in Indochina as rapidly as possible; and to assess responsibility for ecological dam-
82–892—72—11
150
age and to call for appropriate reparations from the government(s) responsible
after the termination of hostilities; -
We further appeal to the United Nations to convene promptly a world con-
ference to draw up an international convention prohibiting recourse to weapons
and military tactics designed primarily to destroy or modify the human environ-
ment and to prepare a draft convention on Ecocide to parallel the Genocide
Convention.
STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE BELLA S. ABZUG FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
FoEEIGN AFFAIRS.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to have the op-
portunity to present my views on the issue of weather modification for military
purposes. Let me begin with two quotations:
Today, black is the dominant color of the northern and eastern reaches of
the Plain [of Jars]. Napalm is dropped regularly to burn off the grass and
undergrowth that covers the Plain and fills its many narrow ravines. The
fires seem to burn constantly, creating rectangles of black.
That is from “Plain Facts”, an article by T. D. Allman which appeared in the
Far Eastern Economic Review of January 18, 1972.
There is evidence that herbicides can cause genetic damage:
Within the last two years, there have been numerous reports of increasing
birth abnormalities throughout South Vietnam, and photographs of gro-
tesquely deformed babies have begun to appear in Vietnamese newspapers.
According to “The Indochina Story,” written by the Committee of Concerned
Asian Scholars, and published by Bantam in 1970.
In addition to the horrors of napalm and herbicide, we are using geophysical
warfare in Vietnam. An article by Seymour Hersh in The Washington Evening
Star of July 3, 1972, quoted a former CIA agent as saying: “We first used that
stuff (silver iodide to seed the rain clouds) in about August of 1963, when the
Diem regime was having all that trouble with the Buddhists.” The former agent
continued, “They would just stand around during demonstrations when the police
threw tear gas at them, but we noticed that when the rains came they wouldn’t
stay on.”
As documented in the New York Times by Seymour Hersh, the middle 1960's
saw an expansion of the cloud seeding activities to the Ho Chi Minh Supply Trai-
in Laos. By 1967, the Air Force had become involved in the cloud seeding operal
tions. Yet the results weren’t always as expected. One government official has
said, as quoted in the July 3 Hersh story, “Once we dumped seven inches of rain
in two hours on one of our Special Forces Camps.” Professor Jerzy Neyman,
director of the University of California’s Statistical Laboratory, who has headed
a Navy research project analyzing weather control experiments since 1965, “is
convinced . . . that cloud seeding does indeed yield significant results, but that
the results have often proved far different from what was intended . . .” I con-
sider that, indeed, the cloud seeding in Vietnam could have increased the rainfall
considerably,” (Neyman has said) . . . “A substantial decrease could also have
occurred.”
Neyman also found that in Arizona, “during seven years of experimental efforts
to relieve drought by cloud seeding, the experiments yielded a significant loss of
rainfall over the Santa Catalina Mountain target area, and caused an average 40
percent loss of rainfall over an area 65 miles away.”
Despite the unpredictability of cloud seeding, it still appears to be taking place
in Indochina. On March 18, 1971, Jack Anderson reported that “Intermediary-
Compatriot” a “hush-hush” project which “increased the precipitation over the
jungle roadways during the wet seasons . . . would be going on from May to
September 1971.”
To go into somewhat more detail, Dr. Matthew Meselson, Professor of Biology
at Harvard University, has stated that:
It is obvious that weather modification used as a weapon of war has the
potential of causing large scale and quite possibly uncontrolable and unpre-
dictable destruction. Furthermore, such destruction might well have a far
greater impact on civilians than on combatants. This would be especially true
in areas where subsistence agriculture is practiced in food-deficit areas, and
in areas subject to flooding.
The amount of damage we can do through weather modification is tremendous.
Tests in Florida in 1968 and 1970 showed that seeded clouds grew explosively and
151
produced more than three times as much rain as unseeded clouds. Other tests have
shown the increase in rain production in seeded clouds could range from 30%–50%
to as much as 10 or 20 times that amount. However, even a 50% increase can have
tremendous impact.
In their book, “Ecological Effects of Weather Modification: A Problem Analy-
sis,” C. F. Cooper and W. C. Jolly refute many of the old theories on weather
modification. The false argument that weather control has little or no biological
effect because the amount of change is rejected. Instead, the authors state that
the weather modification combines with other ecological stresses such as air
pollution, herbicides, and pesticides to cause a greater effect than the sum of the
individual effects. By using bulldozers, herbicides, and bombings, we clear hun-
dreds of kilometers of natural vegetation, thus destroying the water-holding
capacity of the land. Adding the increased rainfall caused by weather modification,
the land is plagued with extensive flooding, loss of life, and soil erosion. This
destroys balance as well as the possibility of further vegetation.
Two other reports on the ecological damage done by weather modification,
“Hydrologic Consequences of Rainfall Augmentation” by Alan M. Lumb which
appeared in “American Society of Civil Engineers Hydraulics Divisions Journal”
of July 1971 and “Possible Effects of Precipitation Modification of Stream Chan-
nels Geometry and Sediment Yield” by Albert Rango, published in “Water
Resources Research” in December 1970, agree that increased rainfall causes
much land erosion and changing sedimentary patterns.
Weather modification alters the structure of plant and animal communities due
to changes in three different biological rates in weather-sensitive species: reproduc-
tion, growth, and mortality. These changes may take several years to become
evident, but their destructive capacity is considerable.
The most widely used cloud seeding chemical is silver iodide, AgI. The silver
ion released from the breakdown of this chemical is one of the most toxic heavy
metal ions, especially with regard to microorganisms and fish, but the ion some-
times forms insoluble compounds harmless to animals. The silver from cloud
seeding will retard the growth of algae, fungi, bacteria, and fish in fresh water.
This in turn interferes with food and nutrient cycles and the return of nutrients
to the water. Other biological effects include changes in temperatures, oxygen
concentration, presence or absence of other cations, and pH (acidity). So far as
we now know, the iodine ion in silver iodide poses no environmental danger.
According to the July 3rd Washington Star article, the use in Indochina of a
chemical agent, different from silver iodide, and only effective in warm stratus
clouds, has been causing an acidic rainfall which affects trucks, tanks, and radar,
especially Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) radar. This acidity also affects the pH and
thus the ecological balance of the ecosystems on which it is dropped.
There has been some dispute as to the suitability for seeding of the types of
cloud patterns over North Vietnam. Some have said that the clouds over the
northern part of Vietnam are stratus and therefore cannot be seeded successfully
with silver iodide. However, Mr. Donald Moore, Assistant Administrator of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, has stated that he has seen
no significant difference in cloud patterns over various areas of Vietnam. He has
said that significant cloud pattern changes come with climactic, rather than with
minor geographic changes. During the monsoon season, cumulus clouds, which
definitely can be seeded successfully, prevail over all of Vietnam. Also, Mr.
Schloemer, the Assistant Director of the Environmental Data Service of N. O.
A. A., has confirmed Mr. Moore's statement and has added that in the upslope
and mountain areas (which would include the Ho Chi Minh trail) there may be
a 10% or 15% increase in rain, which means an extra heavy rainfall.
|Furthermore, even if they are not suitable for silver iodide seeding, stratus
clouds can be seeded by means of the acidic chemical which I mentioned earlier.
On March 17, 1972, Senator Pell submitted Senate Resolution 281, expressing
the sense of the Senate that the United States should seek negotiation of a treaty
to prohibit the use of environmental or geophysical modification. I applaud and
support this action, but I do not think we can wait to negotiate a treaty. We must
end the indiscriminate killing and ecological destruction in Indochina, now, and
I will soon be introducing legislation which would end the United States’ use of
geophysical warfare. I ask that the text of my bill be printed in the record at the
conclusion of my statement.
Congress must take the initiative. Inordinate power has been arrogated to the
President, despite the fact that our Constitution establishes the power of Congress
to declare war and to make military appropriations. We must—for the sake of the
American people and all humanity—reassert our constitutional responsibilities.
152
The only trouble with rain, as is pointed out in the Sermon on the Mount, is
that it falls on the just and unjust alike. The same cloudbursts that flood the
Ho Chi Minh trail also wash out the homes and fields of innocent civilians. It is
our responsibility to stop the use of weather modification techniques as a weapon
of war. . -
A BILL To prohibit the United States from engaging in weather modification
- activities for military purposes
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, that, notwithstanding any other provision of law,
none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by any Act may be obligated or
expended– -
p (1) weather modification activities (including, but not limited to cloud
seeding) as weapons of War;
(2) the type of activities carried out by the Department of Defense in
Vietnam under the code names of Operation Sherwood Forests, Operation
Hot Tip, and Operation Pink Rose in which so-called fire storms or fires over
a large area were, or were attempted to be, intentionally ignited;
(3) entering into or carrying out any contract or agreement providing
agents, delivery systems, dissemination equipment, or instructions for the
military application of weather modification techniques, or for deliberately
igniting so-called fire storms or fires over large areas for military purposes
(as described in clause (2)); or -
(4) procuring or maintaining agents, delivery systems, or dissemination
equipment for the purpose of modifying weather conditions for military
purposes, or igniting so-called fire Storms or fires over large areas for military
purposes (as described in clause (2)).
NATIONAL ACADEMY of SCIENCEs,
OFFICE of THE PRESIDENT,
Washington, D.C., July 25, 1972.
Hon. CLAIBORNE PELL,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR PELL: Thank you for your letter of July 14 inviting me to
testify before the Subcommittee on Oceans and International Environment of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations concerning the provisions of Senate
Resolution 281. As was indicated to Mr. Keaney on the Committee staff, my
absence from Washington prevents me from being available to testify on July 27.
I am, however, pleased to submit for your record a statement of my personal
views on this proposed resolution. Although I do not speak officially for the
membership of the Academy, I am confident that I reflect the views of the great
majority of our membership.
S. Resolution 281 would express the sense of the Senate that the United States
Government should seek the agreement of other governments to a proposed
treaty which would prohibit the use of any environmental or geophysical modifi-
cation activity as a weapon of war, or the carrying out of any research or experi-
mentation with respect thereto. -
At its annual meeting on 26 April 1972, the membership of the Academy
adopted a resolution urging that the United States evolve foreign policies that
would deemphasize reliance on military force, and employ our national scientific
and technological capability for the furtherance of human welfare, the world
over. That resolution reads as follows:
“Whereas, the National Academy of Sciences was chartered by Act of Congress
in 1863 to provide the federal government with advice on scientific and techno-
logical questions, and
Whereas, such a charter carries with it the responsibility to offer its advice on
basic issues involving science and technology, the members of the National
Academy of Sciences meeting at the 1972 Annual Meeting therefore instruct
the President of the Academy to transmit the following resolution: The National
Academy of Sciences respectfully requests the President and the Congress of the
United States to evolve foreign policies in which the development and application
of science and technology in industry, agriculture, and health for the furtherance
of human welfare are major elements, and reliance on military force, whether
153
direct or indirect, is de-emphasized. The Academy stands ready to assist the
government in developing and implementing such policies and is eager to coop-
erate vigorously with scientists and technologists of other countries in furthering
these goals.” -
The position of the National Academy on the deemphasis of military force as
an element of foreign policy is consistent with the proposed expression of the
sense of the Senate as contained in S. Resolution 281.
I also would like to call your attention to a recent study completed under the
auspices of the Academy’s National Research Council. While not an official
expression of Academy views, the report of that study does give expression to
similar concerns by a group of scientists who were selected for their individual
competence and judgment in these areas. Specifically, I refer to a 1971 report,
entitled “The Atmospheric Sciences and Man's Needs” prepared by our Committee
on Atmospheric Sciences.
This report identifies ways in which the atmospheric sciences can contribute
to important human needs and deals with the problems of public policy associated
with weather modification. The Committee concluded that in their view, the
common benefit of mankind would be best served if the United Nations General
Assembly were to adopt a resolution, “dedicating all weather-modification efforts
to peaceful purposes and establishing, preferably within the framework of inter-
national nongovernmental Scientific Organizations, an advisory mechanism for
consideration of weather-modification problems of potential international concern
before they reach critical levels.” This report also addressed the potential uses of
weather modification for military application. The following statement of that
report has direct relevance to your consideration. “In view of the unity of the
global atmosphere and the complexities and technical uncertainties of the subject,
efforts to use weather modification for military advantage would be likely to be
ineffective from the strictly military point of view and would at the same time
offer the world increased tensions and new dangers.”
My personal view is that any large scale intervention in natural energy-transfer
processes, whether in the atmosphere, the oceans or beneath the earth's crust,
would be highly irresponsible because of our limited understanding of such proces-
Ses and the results that might occur by such an act. History has been a constant
Witness to the continuing and appalling refinement by mankind of the instruments
of waging war. The recent exponential acceleration of this process, through the
application of modern technology, seems hardly to have deterred the willingness
of mankind to further refine this process of international violence. Thus the objec-
tives sought in S. Resolution 281 for constraining, through international agreement,
experimentation in new uses of technology for developing weapons of war should
be given high national priority by the U.S. Government.
Our recent successes in international control, i.e., nuclear test ban, restriction
On and uses of chemical and bilogical warfare, and strategic arms control, should
most certainly be extended to cover these additional areas of military intervention.
I am aware of those who argue that biological weapons are more “humane”
than flamethrowers, TNT, or nuclear weapons, who suggest that induced rainfall
that immobilizes the delivery of supplies, is preferable to aircraft dropping laser-
guided bombs. And, to honest men, the argument is troubling. But it is surely time
that mankind called a halt. It is grotesquely immoral that scientific understanding
and technological capabilities developed for human welfare to protect the public
health, enhance agricultural productivity, and minimize the natural violence of
large Storms should be so distorted as to become weapons of war. We are already
sufficiently proficient at killing one another, we have already unleashed immense
forces we can scarcely control.
The task before mankind is to regain that control, not only to “convert the sword
into the plowshare,” but to prevent the conversion of newly available or potentially
available plowshares into yet newer swords. Before it is too late, our nation, for
many years “the last, best hope of man,” should return to its almost abandoned
position of international moral leadership. An important set of beginnings has
already been made, as noted earlier. And the recent agreements resulting from
SALT and the President’s accomplishments in Moscow are heartening indeed.
The Self-denying ordinance to avoid the use of growing understanding of the great
physical forces operative in the continents, the oceans, and the atmosphere,
would be entirely consonant with regaining our own national self-image and with-
Out damage to the national security. .
Thus, I am pleased to advise of my accord with the goals and objectives which
you seek to achieve through the enactment of Senate Resolution 281. I would defer,
Of course, to others who are more qualified concerning the precise legal wording
154
Or form which such an international agreement should take. In line with the posi-
tion adopted by the membership of the National Academy, you may be sure that
We Stand ready to utilize the scientific and technological resources available to us
in Supporting the purposes set forth in the proposed Senate resolution.
Sincerely yours,
PHILIP HANDLER,
President.
(Excerpt from First Annual Report to the President and the Congress by the
National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere, dated June 30, 1972,
transmitted September 27, 1972.)
WEATHER MODIFICATION
Both deliberate and inadvertent weather modifications are possible today.
Potential benefits and potential risks are great and raise grave social, legal, eco-
nomic, and jurisdictional issues. In this section NACOA discusses the effort it be-
lieves desirable in: legislation to define rights, responsibilities, and a sense of
purpose; research to hasten and extend our abilities to reduce risks; and inter-
national agreement to promote peaceful uses of weather modification and to
eschew its hostile uses.
ON THE THRESHOLD OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL
NACOA is persuaded that we stand on the threshold of a new era of environ-
mental control. The scientific literature indicates today, that under certain
limited conditions, man can increase or decrease rainfall, increase or decrease
Snowpack in the mountains, and clear fogs over runways and highways. Claims
of Suppressing hail in the Soviet Union are impressive. A large-scale effort is
now being mounted to develop better methods of hail suppression in the United
States. The capability to diminish the force of a hurricane (though not the ability
to steer it) seems to be near at hand. Further research and development make it
likely that some of today’s limitations will soon be removed and man may before
long deliberately exert an even greater influence on the weather. These develop-
ments require our serious attention now.
Our ability to treat these problems has been increased by advances in mathe-
matical modeling of atmospheric processes, increases in the speed and capacity
of computers on which these models are run, and new forms of instrumentation.
Delivery systems for cloud seeding (rockets, land-based and airborne nuclei
generators) and predictive methods for local meteorological conditions are being
rapidly developed. These advances make possible methods of measurement and
diminish the reliance on a long expensive series of statistical observations which
seek to filter a faint signal from a large background “noise.” The result is an
acceleration of the entire field.
While our capabilities and understanding are growing, so are the dangers. In
some parts of the United States operational weather modification has been carried
out for nearly twenty years and operations are also being carried out in many
foreign lands. The results are often unrecorded or unpublished. There is also
increasing concern that man’s activities inadvertently affect the weather and
thereby modify the climate. The more we have learned about deliberate weather
modification, the more reason we have to be concerned over the inadvertent
effects of various substances now being released into the atmosphere. These ef-
fects can extend to the global scale as well as being local in nature.
The potential benefits from weather control and conscious climate modification
are very large. So are the potential risks—particularly from inadvertent climate
modification. Furthermore, any technique enabling man to control large-scale
phenomena necessarily raises grave social, legal, and economic issues where effects
extend across state and national boundaries. There is still time to address these
issues rationally before operational weather modification grows at a pace which
forces hasty moves. This opportunity should not be wasted, and NACOA be-
lieves that the time has come to take action along several broad fronts.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR, ACTION
NACOA sees five areas in which action is required. - - - tº - e.
Legislation.—Legislation to define rights and responsibilities of citizens, the
States, and the Federal Government is needed promptly. So is legislation to define
155
means for regulating and licensing private operators, organizational responsibility
in the Federal Government, and above all, a sense of national purpose. More
specifically, legislation is needed to designate responsibility in ameliorating those
weather disturbances that produce public states of emergency, to establish the
procedures under which the Federal Government and its employees may legiti-
mately modify the weather, to define the rights and responsibilities of commercial
weather modifiers, and to designate responsibility (probably Federal) for monitor-
ing inadvertent weather modification. Regulation is also badly needed, but the
issue of separating the responsibility for regulation from promotion of operations,
always delicate, deserves more study.
Research and Technology.—Development of the technology by which precipita-
tion can be increased, decreased, and redistributed should be hastened through
increased funding for basic research in cloud physics and the optical properties of
particulates, for computer modeling, experiment design and field work, and the
development of remote-sensing devices (e.g., satellites and Coppler radar).
Hurricanes.—Research and development of the technology to mitigate the
effects of hurricanes should be accelerated. This may involve moving Project
Stormfury from the Atlantic to the Pacific, where the greater incidence of this
type of storm makes the cost-effectiveness much higher.
Public Policy.—A detailed public examination of the policy issues inherent in
weather modification should be undertaken. It seems clear that operational
weather modification will open the way to substantial social benefits, but the
matter of potential social losses cannot be dismissed out of hand. Increasingly
the question will be asked “Who benefits from weather modification?” All major
consequences of large-scale operational programs should be assessed in advance
of their implementation. NACOA believes both national and international report-
ing systems should be developed. Rarely—if ever before—has there been a more
attractive opportunity for creative thinking and planning regarding the impact of a
potential technological development upon international relations. This opportun-
ity should not be lost.
International.—International agreement should be arrived at and the necessary
institutional arrangements developed to eschew the hostile uses of weather modi-
fication and to investigate inadvertent changes in the global climate. The Global
Atmospheric Research experiment now planned for 1977 can, with some other
activities during that period, provide a superb tool for analyzing the vital inter-
action between long-term oceanic changes and natural or man-made climatic
changes. It may be desirable to have an international conference, say in 1974, to
discuss issues such as promoting the peaceful use of weather modification and
possible collaborative efforts in inadvertent weather modification. The national
laboratory dedicated to weather modification, proposed by a National Academy of
Sciences study, should be internationalized.
NACOA wishes to associate itself with the position taken by the National
Academy of Sciences that in order to safeguard the life-sustaining properties of the
atmosphere for the common benefit of mankind, the U.S. Government is urged to
present for adoption by the United Nations General Assembly a resolution dedicating
all weather-modification efforts to peaceful purposes and establishing, preferably within
the framework of international nongovernmental scientific organization, an advisory
mechanism for consideration of weather-modification problems of potential international
concern before they reach critical levels.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Before discussing existing efforts and suggested changes in more detail, it is
useful to review briefly the history of weather modification and how we got to
the present state. The era of scientific weather modification began in 1946 when
Vincent Schaefer and Irving Langmuir demonstrated that it was possible to
initiate precipitation by dropping pellets of carbon dioxide from an airplane into
a cloud composed of water droplets at below-freezing temperatures. This dramatic
development led to Project Cirrus, a broad theoretical and field program intended
to establish a strong scientific basis for cloud modification. Perhaps the most
important scientific finding was that silver iodide crystals were as effective as dry
ice in transforming supercooled clouds into ice-crystal clouds, and thence to rain.
More spectacular—and more controversial—were (1) an experiment with seeding
a hurricane off the coast, with inconclusive results and (2) experiments by Lang-
muir that convinced him (but very few others) that periodic seeding of the
atmosphere with silver iodide in the southwestern United States produced corres-
ponding periodicities in the rainfall 2,000 miles to the east.
156
Enough interest was stimulated by Project Cirrus to set in motion two other
agency projects. The first was the Cloud Physics Project under the auspices of
the U.S. Weather Bureau, the Air Force, and the National Advisory Committee
for Aeronautics, conducted from 1948 to 1951. The second was a 5-year Depart-
ment of Defense project which began in 1952. These serious efforts yielded in-
conclusive results because of their brevity, the primitive state of the art of
instrumentation, and partly because the design of the experiments was not
sufficiently sophisticated to filter out the natural variability of the atmosphere.
Meanwhile, a determined band of meteorological entrepreneurs moved in and
Succeeded in placing nearly ten percent of the land area of the country under
Commercial seeding, from strategically located silver iodide generators, at an
annual cost of between 3 and 5 million dollars. The movement spread to 30 other
COuntries. - -
Sufficient interest and controversy were generated by these results that Congress
established in 1953 an Advisory Committee on Weather Control to study and
evaluate the results of private and public experiments. Its report issued in 1958
Was Cautiously optimistic, concluding that increases of 10 to 15 percent in rainfall
Were induced by seeding spring and winter storms in the mountainous areas of the
Western United States. More long-term research was recommended with special
responsibilities being assigned to the National Science Foundation. The Advisory
Committee report was subjected to considerable attack, primarily on statistical
grounds. However, the NSF did mount a modest but sound program of funda–
mental research and field experimentation, which laid an important basis for the
next decade. As a result of extravagant claims and questionable practices by a few
Commercial cloud seeders, and controversy on statistical interpretation of experi-
mental results, the field did not flourish during the early 1960's.
A two-pronged study was initiated in 1963 and 1964, by the National Academy
of Sciences and a Special Commission of the National Science Board. Their reports,
issued early in 1966, were moderately optimistic. The conclusions of the 1953
Advisory Committee that the order of a 10-percent increase in precipitation can
be expected from seeding orographic storms in western United States were sub-
Stantiated. Subsequent studies by the Academy and the Interdepartmental Com-
mittee for Atmospheric Sciences have reinforced early findings.
PRESENT STATE OF THE ART
For certain meteorological conditions the evidence is persuasive that it is
possible to increase precipitation by substantial amounts and on other occasions
to decrease precipitation by substantial amounts.
There is ambiguous evidence that the effects of seeding may influence pre-
cipitation at points 100 to 200 kilometers from the site of the seeding. This matter
must be clarified.
It now appears possible to acquire the additional knowledge necessary to
predict the effects of seeding on a wide variety of cloud types and systems (con-
vective, Orographic, stratiform, migratory storm systems, etc.) in different
geographic areas from reasonably realistic computerized cloud models.
Supercooled fog can be dissipated on an operational basis.
There is encouraging evidence that hail can be suppressed.
There is encouraging evidence that the intensity of winds in a hurricane can
be reduced.
There is evidence that further development will lead to operational techniques
for decreasing the frequency and duration of cloud-to-ground lightning dis-
charges, with a subsequent reduction in forest fires.
Advances in remote-sensing techniques are the first steps toward methods to
modify tornadoes. A -
No completely accepted technique yet exists for dissipating warm fog, but the
the potential economic benefits and the encouraging prospects of such a capa-
bility warrant further research.
The prospects of inadvertent modification of weather and climate by changing
the chemical composition of the atmosphere, the particle concentration, or by
the discharge of heat are so real, and so likely to be realized within a matter of
decades, that a major program of research appears to be warranted.
Weather modification issues now reach to the stratosphere. It has been suggested
that exhaust emissions from SST's may decrease the ozone concentration at high
altitude and lead to an increase in ultraviolet radiation at the Earth's surface.
Fortunately, the way appears clear to resolve this question before SST's are
Operational.
157
Ongoing national projects
The Federal programs in weather modification are coordinated under the Inter-
departmental Committee for Atmospheric Science (ICAS) of the Federal Com-
mittee for Science and Technology. A number of the research projects representing
voluntary combinations of resources of several of the interested Federal agencies
are National Projects. They include Snowpack augmentation, surface-wind reduc-
tion in hurricanes, increase of natural rainfall in areas where needed, reduction
of damaging hailfall, spreading heavy Great Lakes Snowfall over a wider area, and
improving visibility in warm and cold fogs. Though agency funding for weather
modification has lately been increased—in the last 2 years from $16 million
(FY '71) to $20 million (FY '72 Estimate) to $25 million (FY '73 Budget)—the
projects have characteristically been inadequately coordinated, underfunded
through fragmentation, often not backed up by basic research, and undertaken
with obsolete equipment. This is not a criticism of any specific project, but of the
lack of central planning and execution. -
SOME POTENTIAL BENEFITS
Although too much reliance should not be placed on benefit-to-cost analysis,
attractive ratios are already being achieved in Some areas of weather modifica-
tion. The Southern California, Edison Project in the upper San Joaquin River
Basin in the Sierra Nevada range has been operated continuously every winter
Since the 1950–51 season. Although the exact figures are proprietary, the meteor-
ologist in charge reports that annual runoff has been increased 8 percent over the
lifetime of the project. Bureau of Reclamation studies indicate something like a
10 to 1 ratio of benefit-to-cost for orographic precipitation enhancement of this
Sort.” However, these operational programs are limited in number and have
remained relatively constant through many years. Many programs having large
potential benefits at attractive operational costs are not operational today due to
limitations in the present technology. This translates to limitations on the re-
Sources (laboratory facilities, scientific manpower, instrumented aircraft, com-
puter time, etc.) necessary to improve the technology.
Hail suppression has been operational in the USSR for many years with reported
benefit-to-cost ratios of as high as 17 to 1. Lightning-caused forest fires produce
losses in excess of $100 million annually and destroy valuable forests. An opera-
tional technique for lightning suppression is expected to yield a benefit-to-cost
ratio of at least 5 to 1. A semioperational program in Alaska now beginning its
fourth season reflected this ratio in the 1971 summer season. Cold fog dispersal
Over airport runways is now operational, where this type of fog is prevalent, with
a return in benefits six times the cost of the program. Warm fog is even more
prevalent, and it seems likely that a similar benefit-to-cost ratio will be attained
When the operational techniques for its dispersal are perfected.
It is estimated that the hurricane modification program alone, when operational,
Would cost about $5 million annually and could reduce property damage and
related costs by $100 million annually, a benefit-to-cost ratio of 20 to 1.
There is another vast area which suffers a shortage of annual precipitation,
reaching drought proportions in far too many years. This is the northern Great
Plains area of the country. In this region, where summer rainfall is both Scanty
and Sporadic, crop-production technique is based on trapping a portion of 1 year's
rainfall to help support grain production in the subsequent year, and one crop is
produced each 2 years per unit of land area. On the basis of soil quality, the
potential exists for annual crops given a modest increase in rainfall. This area,
which has been largely ignored by the Federal Government in its weather modi-
fication program, should be explored.
TECHNICAL OBST ACLES TO PROGRESS
Progress in any technical endeavor depends upon our theoretical understanding,
Our ability to measure, our facilities for experimentation, and our ability to mount
and manage large-scale field experiments. We have made significant progress in all
four areas in the last decade.
cºivate communication from Robert D. Elliott, North American Weather Consultants, Santa Barbara,
Uällſ.
2 “Some Considerations of Benefit-to-Cost Relationships Regarding Use of Weather Modification,” by
Loren W. Crow, April 7, 1972, Contract to NOAA, LWC #99.
158.
Understanding
In order to make progress in the National Projects and other applications of
Weather modification, a great deal more must be learned about the natural
weather processes and how these processes can be modified to bring about the
desired effect. Some of these areas where measurements are essential include:
Origin, detection, and Counting of natural ice nuclei; modes of nucleation, optimum
particle size and numbers, and inadvertent Sources of artificial ice nuclei; detection,
Counting, and variability of natural cloud condensation nuclei; inadvertent
Sources of artificial cloud condensation nuclei; water vapor, liquid water, rate of
riming, cloud drop size, etc.; ice crystal type and size; and temperature in cloud,
vertical and horizontal flow, electrical field, etc. -
Instrumentation
The key to increasing our knowledge of the processes involved is accurate
measurements of all of the needed information. This requires development of
instruments and the means to test and calibrate these instruments under actual or
simulated conditions. The priority areas requiring attention are: (1) airborne
instrumentation that can rapidly and accurately provide measurement of the
type discussed in the preceding paragraph; and (2) more effective nucleating agents
and more efficient methods of getting the nucleating agents into the target area.
Significant progress has been made in recent years in satellite technology
and in remote sensing from aircraft and from the ground. NOAA’s coming high
resolution geostationary satellite and its developments in Doppler and optical
radars and other remote-sensing techniques will make significant contributions
to the advancement of the technology of weather modification. Satellites and
remote sensing should be able to tell us something of the physical changes taking
place within the seeded cloud and thus aid in the evaluation of field experiments.
In the final analysis, however, it is the precipitation on the ground and the
runoff into the rivers and reservoirs that count where precipitation enhancement
is the goal. Measuring the true difference in precipitation and runoff between
seeded and unseeded areas continues to be the best hope for assessing results,
but a vast improvement in this area is needed. Here radar, in combination with
recording rain gages, represents the primary hope.
FA CILITIES
A significant one-time investment in facilities will be required in order to support
the developmental programs. The more important of these include:
Cloud chambers to stimulate the natural environment to enable the study of
the natural processes involved and how they are affected by artificial stimulation.
A test and calibration facility. NOAA has in operation the analog to what is
needed here, i.e., National Oceanographic Instrumentation Center. Here new
instrumentation developed by both public and private organizations are tested
in modern facilities, and reports are issued as to their accuracy, reliability, main-
tainability, etc. The Center also provides a calibration service to both public
and private organizations. Such a facility is urgently needed in the weather
modification field.
Modern well-instrumented aircraft. A majority of the needed aircraft already
exist in the private sector. The Federal Government need only be concerned with
providing the minimum number of heavy aircraft equipped with sensing and
recording systems, radars, and seeding capabilities required of the program.
NACOA notes with concern the need to cancel NOAA’s planned move of its
hurricane modification project (Project Stormfury) to the Pacific for lack of
such aircraft.
Field earperimentation
As discussed previously, the Federal agencies are currently engaged in a variety
of field programs. In almost every case the field programs are restricted by limited
resources of one kind or another to the point where the programs are suboptimal
and progress has been at a snail’s pace. One would hope that the primary objectives
of Federal programs to enhance rainfall, eliminate fog, and suppress hail and
lightning would be the transfer of this technology to the private sector where it
could produce an expansion of existing industries and create new ones.
What is badly needed is a field experiment which brings to bear all of the
resources that can contribute to the success of the experiment. The experimental
area might be somewhere in the Great Plains and should operate on a year-around
basis. Experiments should be carried out with summer cumulus, winter upslope
stratus, and winter migratory storms. The program should employ the latest in
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meteorological satellite and remote-sensing technologies, well-instrumented
aircraft, and an increased density of surface, upper air, and radar observations
of the National Weather Service. The emphasis should be on providing the tools
necessary to fully measure and observe the physical and dynamic changes taking
place both naturally and under the influence of seeding. Maximum effort should
be made to determine results through direct observation of the changes in the
cloud. In addition, the experiment should be designed in such a way as to provide
optimum conditions for a statistical evaluation (e.g., random crossover design).
The technologies developed by NOAA in Florida with dynamic seeding of tropical
cumulus, by NOAA with seeding of low stratiform clouds over the Great Lakes,
and by Bureau of Reclamation supported programs in the Dakotas and Texas
provide the initial groundwork for this effort. The field experiment should be
concentrated in an area less than the size of a State. From this experiment should
come the basic knowledge which is needed for most phases of weather modification.
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS AND REGULATION
Weather modification today within the Federal Government is carried out by
Seven agencies to meet their individual mission needs. The Department of Trans-
portation is concerned with the effect of fog on airport operations, the Depart-
ment of Agriculture is concerned with the reduction of lightning-caused forest
fires, the Department of the Interior is interested in increasing the water supplies
in the West, and the Department of Commerce is interested in abating hurricanes
and other severe storms and in reducing or increasing precipitation for a wide
variety of purposes. What is lacking is a central focus for the overall effort. Some
progress has been made in this direction with NOAA having been assigned re-
sponsibility for monitoring the weather modification activities within the coun-
try, both Federal and non-Federal. More importantly, though, is the need to
have a single Federal agency responsible for taking the lead in development
of the technology of the overall program. The present fragmented approach is
moving the country ahead in weather modification in an erratic fashion.
Certain basic facilities and services which represent common needs of most
Federal programs do not exist. Instrument development programs are critical
to progress in weather modification, yet no focused program in this area is in
evidence. There is a strong need for a central Federal facility to test, evaluate,
and calibrate instrumentation and equipment used in field experiments. Again,
no such facility exists. The lead agency should be responsible for doing the type
of field experiment recommended for the Great Plains area. It should focus on
drawing on the research results of the NSF and other Federal agencies and
testing these in an operational environment. The end objective would be a feed-
back to the mission-oriented programs of the other Federal agencies, and a
technology transfer to the private weather modification sector.
There is an immediate need for some form of regulation. As the Federal Govern-
ment invests increasing resources in major field projects such as the National
Hail Research Experiment and the Great Plains project, it becomes imperative
that these experiments not be compromised by other seeding activities on their
peripheries. To illustrate the problem, there recently was a test carried out to
determine whether a seeding program upstream of a field project could be affecting
the project. The results showed that 20 to 30 percent of the seeding agent intro-
duced 100 miles upstream was actually contaminating the field project. In addi-
tion, the National Science Foundation has reported that two major weather
modification projects supported by the NSF in the western United States were
seriously compromised by unregulated cloud seeding in the vicinity of the projects.
In one of the cases, the Foundation investment of over a quarter of a million
dollars was negated by the lack of regulation.
Regulation at this time should be the minimum necessary to ensure that critical
Federal experiments are not vitiated as a result of contamination by a nearby
Seeding activity and to ensure that all commercial operators are licensed and meet
certain Specified Standards to protect the populace from unsafe seeding procedures.
EVALUATION
Experimental weather modification is an activity that does not lend itself to
demonstrating a precise connection between actions and outcomes. The accuracy
of assessment after the fact can be increased by better use of advanced instrumen-
tation such as geostationary satellites, modern radars, computer models, aircraft
probes, nuclei counters, etc. However, even with the best of instrumentation it is
160
impossible to measure all variables over a region of several hundreds of square
miles. Even with unlimited funding, exact evaluation of an experiment is not
possible. In the case of operational weather modifications, there are economic
limits to the instrumentation that can be afforded. Therefore, decisions regarding
Operation must be made with only part of the data at hand. Whether the missing
data are of serious consequences depend upon the specific circumstances. If
Operational weather modification is to be more generally applied, the decision
making apparatus for determining when and how to permit operations needs to
be improved. -
Therefore, NACOA wishes to emphasize need to integrate statistical and other
analytical approaches (most computer modeling) to reduce the uncertainty in
evaluating the efficacy of weather modification. NACOA urges all agencies that
Sponsor research and development in weather modification, and all those who con-
duct operations, to explore and utilize both statistical and nonstatistical tech-
niques and to conduct studies designed to bring these approaches together.
(Excerpt from Comments and Recommendations of the Secretary of Commerce
on the First Annual Report of the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and
Atmosphere, transmitted September 27, 1972.)
WEATHER MODIFICATION
I believe that NACOA has correctly assessed the exciting outlook in the field of
weather modification. There is no question that developments of the last decade
have put us on the threshold of weather control. To realize the potential of this
new technology, the Committee urges action in the field of legislation, research
and technology, hurricane control, public policy and international relations.
I welcome both the Committee’s analysis of the present status of weather modi-
fication technology and its many recommendations for action. The present national
plans for development of this field closely follow many of the suggestions of the
Committee. The public policy positions, especially as they relate to the inter-
national aspects of weather modification and our posture in this field, are being
studied by the Administration. The Committee's views on these matters will be
considered in the course of these studies.
The need for Federal legislation to define the rights and responsibilities of
citizens, States, and the Federal Government; to establish regulatory mechanisms
and liability provisions; and to protect the public is strongly supported by NACOA.
Along these lines this Administration recommended legislation that has been en-
acted requiring the reporting of all weather modification activity to the Secretary
of Commerce. I welcome the views of the Committee concerning the need for
further legislation.
The analysis of national needs for research and technology in weather modifica-
tion is a balanced and comprehensive treatment. The findings and recommenda-
tions offer a sound basis for further development of the national effort.
The review of the technical obstacles to progress in this field provides a frame-
work for organizing our scientific effort, directed at understanding critical physical
processes, and for our technological development effort in instrumentation and
facilities. The call of the Committee for an expanded field effort in the Great
Plains region of the United States is welcomed, and initial plans for such an effort
are being prepared. - -
Some concern has been expressed by NACOA about the fragmentation of effort
among the many agencies of the Federal Government, and NACOA recommends
that a single Federal Agency take the lead in the development of the technology of
weather modification. I agree with this recommendation for establishment of a
central focus within the United States Government for carrying out research and
development in all phases of weather modification. However, I believe that weather
modification technology should remain available for use by all agencies of the
Federal Government in the discharge of their mission responsibilities. It would also
be unwise to divorce the necessary supporting research that would be required for
the application of weather modification techniques from the agency with respon-
sibility for such application.
The Committee has given special attention to the national effort in hurricane
modification. I agree that this effort represents one that must be fostered at an
accelerated pace. I welcome the views of NACOA on this issue, as we develop our
plans for this effort. - -
The Committee's concern for the public policy issues is deeply appreciated.
Weather modification carries with it the potential for social gain, but not without
161
the threat of concomitant social losses. It is clear that careful technological
assessments of the consequences of the application of weather modification are
required before decisions for widespread use are made. There is no question that
we do not know enough at the present about many of the public policy issues
involved, and they require continuing study. Studies are already being sponsored
by the National Science Foundation and NOAA. -
The realization that weather modification has critical international implications
is strongly emphasized by NACOA. The Administration is conscious of these im-
plications and welcomes NACOA’s views on these matters. It is the policy of this
Administration to foster international collaboration in this field to the maximum
extent possible. We are moving to follow up the recommendations of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm this year for
the monitoring and study of inadvertent weather modification in cooperation with
other nations. We are working closely with all nations of the world on the World
Weather Program and its research phase, the Global Atmospheric Research
Program. We are continuing our exchanges of Scientists with the Soviet Union and
other countries in many phases of weather modification, and are extending as-
sistance to developing countries in those instances where weather modification
appears to be a useful tool in ameliorating weather-related problems.
U.S. PosLTION PAPER ON RECOMMENDATION III–218
1972 UN CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT—POSITION PAPER
Subject.—Identification and Control of Pollutants: Climate: III–218
Recommendation.—It is recommended that Governments be especially mindful
of activities in which there is an appreciable risk of effect on climate, and, (a) care-
fully evaluate the likelihood and magnitude of climatic effects and disseminate
their findings before embarking on such activities, (b) consult fully other interested
States when activities carrying a risk of such effects are being contemplated or
implemented.
U.S. Position.—The USG has submitted to the Conference Secretariat two
editorial changes which if accepted would modify the above recommendation to
read as follows:
Recommendation.—It is recommended that Governments be especially mindful
of activities in which there is an appreciable risk of effect on climate, and, (a) care-
fully evaluate the likelihood and magnitude of climatic effects and to the maacimum
eactent feasible, disseminate their findings before embarking on such activities, (b)
consult fully other interested States wherever practicable when activities carrying
a risk of such effects are being contemplated or implemented.
If the Conference document does not reflect the proposed U.S. amendments,
the delegate should propose such amendments. *
His reasons as to (a) should be that as currently worded the recommendation is
to some extent unrealistic since the mechanisms by which man’s activities might
affect climate are largely not known. Hence, the insert—to the maacimum eactent
feasible—before “disseminate” their findings.
Amendment to (b) should be similarly supported accompanied by a statement
that with regards to possible international effects of activities such as weather
modification that might affect climate, the U.S. practice has been to notify and
consult with possible affected State's governments to the maximum extent
practicable.
If amendments fail then Delegate should not support the recommendation unless
he makes a statement to the effect that the recommendation is unrealistic because
it fails to take into account the imperfect state of our knowledge as to mechanism
by which man’s activities might affect climate, and this in turn affects the abilities
of Governments to do more than what is feasible and practicable in meeting all
the terms of the recommendation.
Discussion.—The U.S. practice with regard to possible international effects of
activities such as weather modification that might affect climate has been to notify
and consult with possible affected State's governments to the maximum extent
feasible. In certain cases, plans have been materially altered to accommodate
other government’s fears of possible untoward effects on their territories.
Analysis of the global atmospheric monitoring network data is required to eval-
uate the effects of changes in atmospheric composition on climate. For example,
data already collected at baseline monitoring stations, principally at Mauna Loa,
Hawaii, show that atmospheric CO2 has increased by approximately 3.4% (from
312 to 323 ppm) between 1958 and 1971. There is no general agreement within
the scientific community as to precisely what effect such a change in CO2 content
162
will have on the world climate. Research, analysis, and modeling of such effects
is badly needed in order to make rational decisions on the climatic impact of man’s
activities.
Speech Talking Points.-Worldwide cooperation is important. If one nation,
or even several, follow the Recommendation, and others do not, the idea will fail.
As man’s technology continues to grow, his capacity to affect his environment
and even the climate itself will expand; ultimately, if not in fact already, the
stakes of all nations, indeed of all mankind, in the concept of international cooper-
ation in environmental protection will become immense.
The U.S. Delegation should note that the first part of the Recommendation is
to some extent unrealistic since the mechanisms by which man’s activities might
affect climate are to a great extent imperfectly known. Hence, the recommenda-
tions on analysis of the monitoring data and research on the modeling of climatic
effects of pollutants are of prime significance to realizing the goals of the
Recommendation.
Concept of Cost, Resources, and Timing of Carrying Out Recommendation.—The
costs and resources required for carrying out the internal evaluation of activities
required by this Recommendation should be borne or supplied by each State.
Judging by the U.S. experience so far, such costs and resources should not prove
burdensome. Members should be encouraged to set up such controls as soon as
possible.
O
REVISED UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION
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BEFORE TEIE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
EXECUTIVE G, 92D CONGRESS, 2D SESSION
THE UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION, AS REVISED AT
I’ARIS ON JULY 24, 1971, TOGETHER WITH TWO RELATED
PROTOCOLS
AUGUST 2, 1972
§§
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
D.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
83-500 WASHINGTON : 1972
DEPOSITEE BY THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERica
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
ERANK CHURCH, Idaho - JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
EDMUND S. MUSIKIE, Maine f CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois
WILLIAM B. SPON G, JR., Virginia
CARL MARCY, Chief of Staff
ARTHUR M. KUHL, Chief Clerk
(II)
C O N T E N T S
Statements by:
Finkelstein, Herman, section of international law, American Bar
Association, accompanied by Charles H. Leib, section of patent,
trademark and copyright law, ABA--------------------- — — — — — — —
Kaminstein, Abraham L., honorary consultant in copyright, Library
of Congress-----------------------------------------------
Rarp, Irwin, counsel, the Authors League of America_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-__
Lacy, Dan, senior vice president, McGraw-Hill Book Co., on behalf
of the Association of American Publishers, accompanied by Leo
Albert, president, Prentice-Hall International; W. Bradford Wiley,
chairman and chief executive, John Wiley and Sons; Richard P.
Sernett, secretary and general counsel, Scott, Foresman; and
Robert W. Frase, vice president, Association of American
Publishers--------------------------------------------------
Ladd, Hon. Bruce C., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Commercial Affairs and Business Activities, accompanied by
George D. Cary, Register of Copyrights, Library of Congress; and
Harvey J. Winter, Director, Office of Business Protection, De-
partment of State-------------------------------------------
Linden, Bella L., counsel, Linden and Deutsch, on behalf of Crowell
Collier and MacMillan, Inc., and Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
Inc., accompanied by William Jovanovich, chairman and chief
executive officer, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.; and Raymond
Hagel, chairman of the board, president and chief executive officer,
Crowell Collier and MacMillan, Inc.----------------------------
Prepared statements—
George D. Cary, Register of Copyrights--------------------------
Article XV of Universal Copyright Convention and Connally
Reservation---------------------------------------------
Irwin Karp, for the Authors League of America--------------------
Bella L. Linden, on behalf of Crowell Collier and MacMillan, Inc., and
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.------------------------------
Dan Lacy, senior vice president, McGraw-Hill Book Co., on behalf of
the Association of American Publishers------------------------
Herman Finkelstein, section of international law, and Charles H.
Lieb, section of patent, trademark and copyright law, on behalf of
the American Bar Association--------------------------------
Abraham L. Kaminstein----------------------------------------
APPENDIX
Exhibits A through D submitted by Mrs. Bella Linden:
A. A statement opposing ratification and alternatively a proposal to
mitigate the economic losses of American authors and publishers
in the event of ratification of Paris text of U.C.C - - - - - - - - - - - -
B. Letter to Senator J. W. Fulbright from David M. Abshire, Assist-
amt Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, dated June
21, 1972, enclosing chart comparing provisions for developing
Page
Feist, Leonard, executive vice president, National Music Publishers
37
76
81
24
63
41
19
30
68
79
81
83
C. Paris Revision of the Universal Copyright Convention—a response
to comments of the Department of State--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
D. “Downgrading the Protection of International Copyright,” article
by Irwin Karp, Publishers Weekly, September 27, 1971-------
109
118
(III)
IV
American Bar Association, Committee on International Patent, Trade-
mark, and Copyright Relations of the Section on International Law—
“Copyrights, Paris revision of Universal and Berne Copyright Conven-
tions-July 1971"-----------------------------------------------
Joint report of section of international and comparative law and section
of patent, trademark, and copyright law, American Bar Association____
Memorandum to Mr. Robert L. Bernstein and Mr. Sanford Cobb regard-
ing CCM and Harcourt Brace opposition to ratification of Paris U.C.C.
Treaty, dated June 2, 1972---------------------------------------
“International Copyright Turns Another Corner,” article by Barbara
Ringer, “International Copyright,” November 8, 1971---------------
Text of statement of Executive Bureau of International Confederation of
Societies of Authors and Composers (CISAC) endorsing ratification of
1971 Paris revision of Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions----
Letter and enclosure to Senator J. W. Fulbright from Irwin Karp, counsel,
The Authors League of America, Inc., dated August 3, 1972 -
Page
126
146
148
149
155
156
REVISED UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 2, 1972
UNITED STATES SENATE,
CoMMITTEE ON FoREIGN RELATIONs,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:45 a.m., in Room
4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (Chairman),
presiding.
Present: Senators Fulbright, Javits and Percy.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
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The CHAIRMAN. We will move to the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion, Executive G, 92–2. Our first witness is Mr. Bruce Ladd, Jr.,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Commercial and Business Activities,
Department of State.
Mr. Ladd, will you come forward?
STATEMENT OF HON. BRUCE C. LADD, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS AND BUSINESS
ACTIVITIES; ACCOMPANIED BY GEORGE D. CARY, REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS; AND HARVEY J. WINTER,
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF BUSINESS PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. LADD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Department of State appreciates very much having this op-
portunity to present its views on the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion, as it was revised at Paris in July of 1971.
Accompanying me today, on my left, is George Cary, Register of
Copyrights of the Library of Congress; and, on my right, is Harvey
Winter who is Director of the Office of Business Protection at the
Department of State. Mr. Cary also has a prepared statement on the
revised Universal Copyright Convention, which he will submit for the
record, which discusses some of the more technical aspects of the
Convention.
Before taking up the substance of the Paris revision of the UCC, I
would like to briefly cite some of the historical background that I
think is important.
NEGOTIATION OF UCC
Just 20 years ago, in August of 1952, the Intergovernmental Copy-
right Conference to negotiate a new worldwide copyright convention
(1)
2
was convened in Geneva, Switzerland, largely at the initiative of the
United States. One of the primary reasons for convening this confer-
ence was to develop a new copyright agreement which would be
acceptable to those States which had not been able to join the only
existing worldwide convention, the Berne Convention, for a variety
of reasons. The major developed country in this category was the
United States.
The Universal Copyright Convention—UCC—was successfully ne–
gotiated and the United States ratified the convention in 1954. It
came into force in 1955 and has been the keystone of our international
copyright regulations since that date. As of the present date, 61
States are parties to the UCC.
REVISION OF BIFRNE CONVENTION
The next important development in the international copyright
field was the Stockholm Intellectual Property Conference in 1967.
One of the objectives of this conference was to revise the Berne Con-
vention and include special provisions for the benefit of developing
countries.
Since the United States was not a party to the Berne Convention,
the United States delegation attended the Stockholm conference only
in an observer capacity. The revision of the Berne Convention brought
forth the so-called Stockholm Protocol which contained special provi-
sions for developing countries in acquiring rights to copyrighted works
for educational purposes. The protocol gave developing countries very
broad and practically uncontrolled privileges regarding works copy-
righted in Berne member states. Thus, there was a drastic shift in the
direction of international copyright that threatened the foundations
on which all multilateral copyright protection had been built since the
negotiation of the Berne Convention in 1886. Many U.S. works, which
had been protected under this convention by simultaneous publication
in a Berne member state, were directly affected by this development.
Generally, the Stockholm Protocol was considered unacceptable by
the developed countries and by the end of 1967 it was seriously ques-
tioned whether any important developed countries would approve the
protocol. As a matter of fact, to date no major developed country has
ratified or acceded to the Stockholm Protocol. -
POSITION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
When it became apparent during 1968 that developed countries
were not going to accept the protocol, the developing countries, under
the leadership of India, made their position quite clear. If positive
steps were not taken to meet the legitimate needs of developing
countries for copyrighted works for education, then these countries
would seriously consider withdrawing from the Berne Convention.
Because of a special clause in the UCC known as the “Berne safeguard
clause,” countries renouncing Berne could not rely on the UCC for
protection in countries that were parties to both conventions. The
result of the renunciation of Berne would have been the exodus of
the developing countries from both major copyright conventions and
a virtual collapse of the international copyright system as we know
it today. Undoubtedly the unauthorized use of copyrighted works,
3
that is, book piracy, would have become an accepted practice in these
developing countries with resultant adverse effects on American
authors and publishers, and indeed on our balance of payments
position. The United States is the leading book exporting country of
the world and enjoys a strongly favorable balance of trade in books.
The official Department of Commerce figures for 1971 show U.S.
book exports in the amount of $177 million and U.S. book imports
totaling $101 million. However, since these official statistics do not
include shipments valued at less than $500, the true export figure is
substantially greater. Further, these trade statistics do not include
several million dollars a year in “invisible exports” in the form of
º received for permission to translate or republish American
WOI’KS.
PREPARATORY WORK FOR PARIS CONFERENCE
To forestall developing countries renouncing the copyright conven-
tions, the United States and other developed countries, including the
United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and France, took
the initiative in carrying out a series of preparatory meetings in 1969
and 1970 which paved the way to the Paris Conference in July 1971,
to revise simultaneously UCC and Berne. This preparatory work was
undertaken with the full cooperation of the developing countries.
The two basic objectives of this simultaneous revision were set
forth in the Washington Recommendation of September 1969:
(1) The level of protection in the UCC would be improved by the
adoption of certain minimum rights, that is, the rights of reproduction,
public performance and broadcasting. At the same time special pro-
visions for the benefit of developing countries would be included in
the UCC. Finally, the so-called Berne safeguard clause would be sus-
pended to permit developing countries to leave the Berne Convention,
if they wished, without penalty under the UCC.
(2) The Stockholm Protocol would be separated from the Berne
Convention and, in turn, the developing countries would be able to
substitute the special provisions included for their benefit in the UCC.
However, as a protective measure, it was provided that the Stock-
holm Protocol would not be separated from the 1967 text of the Berne
Convention until such time as France, Spain, the United Kingdom
and the United States had ratified the revised text of the UCC. The
purpose of this was to make ratification or accession to the revised
text of UCC, which would contain new concessions for developing
countries, the quid pro quo for separation of the Stockholm Protocol
from the Berne Convention.
Because of the interrelationship and, in certain respects, the inter-
dependence of the two conventions, the diplomatic conferences for
the revision of the UCC and the Berne Convention were held at
the same time in Paris at UNESCO, July 5 to 24, 1971. In all, 45
member states of the UCC participated in the conference; 30 other
states had observer delegations and 3 intergovernmental organiza-
tions were represented at the conference.
REVERSAL IN TREND REPRESENTED BY STOCKHOLM PROTOCOL
At the Paris conference there was a significant reversal in the
trend represented by the Stockholm Protocol. A number of important
4
demands of developing countries were abandoned at Paris with
respect to broadcasting rights and broad uses of literary and artistic
works for “teaching, study and research in all fields of education.”
Essentially, the concessions for developing countries at the Paris
conference were limited to the rights of translation and reproduction.
INTRODUCTION OF CERTAIN BASIC RIGHTS OF AUTHORS
This revision of the UCC in Paris was the first since its adoption
in 1952. It is generally recognized that the UCC was improved by
the introduction of certain basic rights of authors. This has been
accomplished in the following way: Article IVbis makes specific
reference to Article I. Article I, which remains unchanged from the
1952 convention sets forth the undertaking of each contracting state
to provide for “the adequate and effective protection of the rights of
authors and other copyright proprietors in literary, scientific and
artistic works, including writings, musical, dramatic and cinemato-
graphic works, and paintings, engravings and sculpture.” The new
Article IVbis provides that the rights referred to in Article I shall
include, and I quote, “the basic rights ensuring the author's economic
interests, including the exclusive right to authorize reproduction
by any means, public performance and broadcasting.” These rights
apply to works protected under the convention either in their original
form or in any form recognizably derived from the original. It is
further provided that any contracting state may, by its domestic
legislation, make exceptions to such rights that do not conflict with
the spirit and provisions of the convention, but that any state whose
legislation so provides shall nevertheless accord a reasonable de-
gree of effective protection to each of the rights to which exception
has been made.
SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS FOR DIEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Articles Vbis, Vter, and Wouater are the new articles in the revised
UCC which parallel articles in the revised Berne Convention providing
special exceptions for developing countries.
Article Vbis sets forth the procedure whereby a contracting state
regarded as a developing country in conformity with the established
practice of the General Assembly of the United Nations may take
advantage of the special translation and reproduction provisions.
In connection with the two key provisions of the UCC revision,
Article Vter on translations and Article Vauater on reproduction, the
following points should be stressed:
(1) Compulsory licenses under Article Wter are to be granted in con-
nection with “teaching, scholarship or research” under Article Voluater
for “systematic instructional activity.” The emphasis obviously is on
the use of copyrighted materials for educational purposes.
(2) Article Wter reduces the present 7 year period of absolute
exclusive translation rights to 3 years for a developing country and
“in the case of a translation into a language not in general use in one
or more developed countries” that are party to either the 1952 or the
1971 text of the UCC, the period can be further reduced to one year.
(3) The applicable periods of exclusivity, during which no license
can be issued under Article Wauater, vary. In general, the period is
5 years but a 3-year period is applicable to “works of the natural
5
and physical sciences, including mathematics and technology” and the
term is 7 years for “works of fiction, poetry, drama and music, and
for art books.”
(4) Certain provisions in Articles Wter and Vauater prohibit the ex-
port of copies and prescribe that the compulsory license shall be valid
only for publication in the contracting state where it has been applied
for. It follows that these provisions are considered as prohibiting a
licensee from having copies reproduced outside the territory of the
contracting state granting the license. However, as explained in the
Report of the General Rapporteur, Mr. Kaminstein who, I believe,
will testify later in the day, this prohibition does not apply under cer-
tain carefully defined conditions; in other words, “The contracting
state granting the license has within its territory, no printing or re-
production facilities or such facilities exist but are incapable for eco-
nomic or practical reasons of reproducing the copies.” !
(5) Both Articles Wter and Vouater state that “due provision shall
be made at the national level to ensure” that compulsory licenses pro-
vide for “just compensation that is consistent with standards of
royalties normally operating in the case of licenses freely negotiated
between persons in the two countries concerned.”
REVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINAL CLAUSES
The administrative and final clauses of the UCC were also revised.
Among the more important changes were the suspension of the Berne
“safeguard clause” for developing countries, and an increase from 12
to 18 countries in the membership of the important Intergovernmental
Copyright Committee. In addition, UNESCO was asked to continue
to serve as the Secretariat for that committee.
TWO PROTOCOLS IN REVISED UCC
The two protocols in the revised UCC correspond in effect to the
two protocols of the 1952 Convention. Protocol 1 relates to the appli-
cation of the convention to works of stateless persons and refugees,
and Protocol 2 concerns the application of the convention to the works
of certain international Organizations.
SIGNING OF CONVENTION
At the conclusion of the UCC revision conference, which lasted
some 3 weeks, 26 states signed that convention, including the United
States and other developed countries such as the United Kingdom,
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Sweden and Japan.
Subsequent to the conference, four additional states signed the
Convention. .
COMPULSORY LICENSING PFOVISIONS
During the past year some concern has been expressed about the
compulsory licensing provisions of the Paris revision of the UCC. In
this connection I would wish to point out that the concept of com-
pulsory licensing in the revised UCC is by no means a new one. A
provision for compulsory licensing for translation rights has been an
integral part of that convention since its negotiation in 1952. To the
best of our knowledge, the right to a compulsory license has never
6
been invoked in any UCC member state. Instead, acceptable terms
have been worked out between the interested parties without recourse
to a compulsory license. It is not possible, really, to draw any firm
conclusion from this past experience but at least it suggests the
possibility that compulsory licensing may not be resorted to on any
widespread basis in the future under a revised UCC.
PARALLELISM BETWEEN NEW TEXT OF UCC AND BERNE CONVENTION
As I have previously noted, one of the basic purposes of the diplo-
matic conference in Paris was to effect revision of the Berne Copyright
Convention parallel to that of the UCC. In this connection, the
Stockholm Act of Berne was replaced by the new Paris Act. Although
the substantive copyright changes adopted at the Stockholm Con-
ference were repeated without any changes in the Paris Act, the
special exceptions for developing countries contained in the Stock-
holm Protocol were replaced by an appendix to the Paris Act of
the Berne Convention. Taking into account certain differences in
structure between the Berne Convention and the UCC, these
exceptions follow very closely the exceptions in the revised text of
the UCC. Once the Paris Act of Berne comes into force, a country
may not ratify or accede to the Stockholm Act of 1967 and the
protocol. Because of the continuing concern of U.S. copyright interests
about the protocol, this, as far as we are concerned is a definite plus
for the United States. In this connection, it should be noted that one
of the conditions for the entry into force of the new Paris Act is that
France, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States become
bound by the revised text of the UCC. -
The parallelism between the new text of the UCC and Berne was
carefully devised in order to give developing countries the option of
staying in the Berne Convention. Further, the parallelism was
designed to maintain the equilibrium between the two conventions.
RATIFICATION OF REVISED UCC IN NATIONAL INTEREST
The Department of State and other interested agencies believe
strongly that ratification of the revised UCC is indeed in the national
interest. The principal and overriding reason for this position is the
one that I have mentioned. If the legitimate needs of developing
countries for access to foreign copyrighted materials are not satisfied,
then these countries may well exercise their sovereign right to denounce
their international treaty commitments. Once they do this, they can,
of course, quite legally reproduce or translate any and all copyrighted
materials they desire without authorization regardless of the use to
which they are to be put, and without the requirement of making any
compensation. They can, in fact, go even further by exporting such
materials to other countries. If such a situation occurs, it will mark
the end of the international copyright system with resultant adverse
effects on the interests of all U.S. copyright proprietors abroad.
There is now clear evidence that such action is seriously being
studied in a developing country which is a party to both copyright
conventions. We have been informed by our Embassy in Pakistan
that on May 8, 1972, the Pakistan Minister of Education announced
that his country was considering withdrawing from the Universal
7
Copyright Convention and the Berne Convention. As a result of
consultation between U.S. Embassy officials and officials of the Paki-
stan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education, we
have determined that the primary reason for considering withdrawal
is dissatisfaction with the two copyright conventions that are now
presently in force. However, the Pakistani officials consulted have
indicated their satisfaction with the revised UCC and Berne Conven-
tions. They are concerned, nontheless, that many years may pass
before these conventions will be ratified by a sufficient number of
states so that they can go into effect; and, as I have noted above, four
specific countries, including the United States, must ratify the revised
UCC before the revised Berne Convention can enter into force. In
effect, Mr. Chairman, we have somewhat of a veto power over Berne
in this way even though we are not a party to Berne. I would be very
surprised if there are not other developing countries that share the
concern of Pakistan. - -
REVISED UCC CONSTITUTES FAIR AND JUST COMPROMISE
We know that there may be certain articles in the revised UCC
which do not entirely satisfy everyone, but the negotiation of an
important convention with a large number of states in attendance
involves give and take. It is the Department of State's belief that the
revised UCC constitutes a fair and just compromise between the
developed countries that produce the bulk of copyrighted materials
and the developing countries that wish to use these materials for
educational and research purposes on the best possible terms.
VIEWS OF PRIVATE COPYRIGHT GROUPS
During the preparatory work for the revision of the UCC, the De-
partment of State and the Copyright Office consulted with the prin-
cipal U.S. private copyright groups through the State Department's
International Copyright Advisory Panel to obtain their views on
the proposed revision. Because of the diverse nature of these copy-
right groups, there were divergent views on some of the key points
of the proposed revision. In the development of the U.S. position for
the diplomatic conference, all views were carefully considered and we
believe that we were successful in arriving at a position that was
balanced and fair.
The product of the conference—the revised Universal Copyright
Convention—has been carefully studied by the interested private
copyright groups in this country and has met with widespread ap-
proval. Following I might list a few of the organizations which have
endorsed U.S. ratification of the proposed revised UCC:
American Bar Association; American Patent Law Association;
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers—ASCAP;
Association of American Publishers; Broadcast Music, Inc.—BMI;
Music Publishers Association of the United States, Inc.; National
Association of Broadcasters; National Music Publishers Association;
Recording Industry Association of America; Ad Hoc Committee of
Educational Organizations and Institutions on Copyright Law Re-
vision—National Education Association.
8
Of these organizations, I would like to mention specifically the
American Bar Association and the fact that the ABA’s House of
Delegates believed the question of early U.S. ratification of the re-
vised Universal Copyright Convention was important enough to be
considered at an extraordinary session in February of this year.
EARLY RATIFICATION RECOMMENDED
We believe that it is a matter of consequence for the United States
to be among the first to ratify the revised Universal Copyright Con-
vention. One major developed country, the United Kingdom, whose
publishers and authors have as much at stake as their American
counterparts, has already ratified the UCC. It is well known that the
United States played a very active part not only in the negotiation
of the revised Universal Copyright Convention, but also in the
initiation of this project and, indeed, in the initiation of the UCC
itself. For this and other reasons that I have mentioned, early ratifi-
cation of the UCC by the United States would be consistent with our
leading role in behalf of international copyright protection and would
advance our basic foreign policy objective of more effective protec-
tion abroad for the intellectual property rights of American nationals.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. -
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ladd.
(Prepared statement of Mr. Cary follows:)
STATEMENT BY GEORGE D. CARY, REGISTER OF CopyRIGHTS BEFORE THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE UNIVERSAL
CoPYRIGHT CONVENTION As REVISED AT PARIs on July 24, 1971 (ExECU-
TIVE G, 92D Congress, 2D SESSION)
I am George D. Cary, Register of Copyrights.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am very pleased to appear
before this committee to represent the Library of Congress and the Copyright
Office in support of ratification of the revised Universal Copyright Convention
signed at Paris, France on July 24, 1971, by the United States and 25 other
member countries. The revised Convention has now been submitted by the
President of the United States to the Senate for its advice and consent prior to
ratification. The Library of Congress and the Copyright Office completely and
unreservedly urge ratification of the revised Convention. It is not necessary to
revise the United States copyright law in any way to implement this Convention.
BACKGROUND OF THE U.C. C. REVISION
The Universal Copyright Convention was established twenty years ago through
the efforts of the United States and other countries, many of which already were
members of the Berne Convention, as a simple, low-level protection convention
that would accommodate diverse legal systems and countries who were unable
or unwilling to join the Berne Union. Unquestionably, adherence of the United
States was essential if the new convention were to succeed. The United States
did ratify the Universal Copyright Convention. It came into effect on September
16, 1955. The United States. has assumed a leadership role in the operation of
this Convention. Since we have not entered the Berne Union, the Universal
Copyright Convention remains the primary vehicle for protection of American
intellectual property (e.g., literary, artistic, and musical works) in foreign
countries. -
Since the establishment of the U.C.C., developments in the international field
have led to a crisis situation in international copyright. As new nations emerge
from the former colonial empires, a viewpoint developed that copyright presented
a significant impediment to cultural and educational growth in developing coun-
tries. During the last decade, developing countries have pressed vigorously their
belief that the present international copyright regimes should be modified to
permit easier access to copyrighted materials in order to foster the cultural and
educational growth of their people.
9
In 1967, the developing countries Ostensibly obtained significant concessions
within the Berne Union when special provisions were incorporated in a Protocol
Regarding Developing Countries, which constitutes an integral part of the Stock-
holm Revision of the Berne Convention. The substantive provisions of the Stock-
holm Revision, including the Protocol, however, have not entered into force.
Once free from the concentrated diplomatic pressures of the Stockholm Confer-
ence, the governments of most developed countries came to the conclusion that
the concessions granted the developing countries were too great. It became obvious
that the Protocol would not generally be accepted in developed countries. The
developing countries alone could have entered the necessary ratifications to bring
the Protocol into force, but, because of a provision insisted upon by the United
Kingdom [Article 32 of the Stockholm Act], such a course was futile. The Protocol
cannot be applied to works originating in countries that do not ratify the Stock-
holm Act or formally accept application of the Protocol.
When it became apparent that the Stockholm Protocol would not be accepted
by developed countries, the developing countries turned to the Universal Copy-
right Convention and pressed for revision of that Convention. They particularly
pressed for abrogation of the “Berne safeguard clause” in the U.C.C. so that it
would be possible for Berne member developing countries to denounce their obli-
gations under the Berne Convention without incurring the penalty set by the
“Berne safeguard clause” in the U.C.C., which is loss of U.C.C. protection in
countries that belong to both Conventions. The international copyright atmos-
phere also reverberated with threats to denounce both major international con-
ventions and to rely upon an “outlaw” status to obtain the desired access by their
people to the cultural heritage of the world community. - -
Neither “naked” revision of the “safeguard clause” nor denounciation of
both international conventions would be beneficial to authors’ interests or to the
developing countries, at least in the long run. Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed.
The developing countries are genuinely interested in remaining within the inter-
national copyright regimes and in affording protection for their authors and foreign
authors.
The United States assumed a leadership role and was instrumental in abating
the crisis. We took the initiative in proposing an international copyright study
group which could reflect carefully and calmly about the way out of the crisis for
developing countries, developed countries, and the authors of both groups. The
International Copyright Joint Study Group met in Washington in the fall of 1969
and a framework for a solution was agreed upon. The so-called Washington
Recommendation of the Study Group called for simultaneous revision of the
Universal Copyright Convention and the Berne Convention to accomplish the
following goals: abrogation of the “safeguard clause” in the U.C.C. in favor of
developing countries; separation of the Stockholm Protocol from the remainder
of the Stockholm Act; inclusion of the minimum rights of reproduction, public
performance, and broadcasting in the U.C.C.; inclusion of special provisions for
developing countries in the U.C.C.; and links between the two major Conventions
permitting Berne member developing countries to apply the special exceptions in
their favor in relations with other Berne members.
Several preparatory meetings followed this Washington meeting, and the
Berne Convention and the U.C.C. were revised, in accordance with the Washing-
ton Recommendation, at the Paris Diplomatic Conferences in July 1971.
SALIENT PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED U.C. C. . . . . . .
The revised Universal Copyright Convention represents the culmination of
several years of careful, patient negotiation and hard work by representatives of
developed and developing countries. In this country, the private sector was con-
sulted and informed at each step of the way toward revision of the Convention.
In the context of the past five years in international copyright, the revised U.C.C.
must be viewed as beneficial to the interests of authors generally. From the per-
spective of the Stockholm Protocol, it should be clear that the Paris Diplomatic
Conferences of 1971 reversed an apparent “anti-copyright” trend at the inter-
national level and turned the thoughts of the international copyright community
toward protection of authors’ rights, notwithstanding the concessions to develop-
ing countries. The excesses of the Stockholm Protocol have been eliminated. The
concessions are reasonable and will permit compulsory licensing with respect to
the translation and reproduction rights only with appropriate safeguards and
restrictions regarding the purpose of the use. - - . . . .
Specification of Minimum Rights.--The revised U.C.C. for the first time specifi-
cally includes the minimum rights of reproduction, public performance, and
10
broadcasting. These rights are mentioned in a new Article IVbis. Previously in the
U.C.C. there was only the general obligation to provide “adequate and effective
|protection of the rights of authors,” and a seven year period of exclusive transla-
tion rights. Specific mention of the rights of reproduction, public performance,
and broadcasting is not imitative, nor is it necessary for any present member of
the U.C.C., including the United States, to amend its copyright law as a condition
of adhering to the revised Convention. We do have the obligation, under the
revised Convention, of according a “reasonable degree of effective protection to
each of the rights” specifically mentioned and, although exceptions are permitted,
the exception should not “conflict with the spirit and provisions” of the revised
text. We are fully confident that our present copyright law enables us to fulfill the
obligations of the new Article IVbis. We believe that the specification of additional
minimum rights can only benefit authors.
Abrogation of the “Safeguard Clause.”—The present “safeguard clause” in the
1952 U.C.C. text makes the Berne Convention predominant over the Universal
Copyright Convention in the case of relations between two countries that are
members of both conventions. The clause also carries the penalty mentioned
previously for denunciation of the Berne Convention: loss of U.C.C. protection
in Berne-U.C.C. countries. Article XVII and the Appendix Declaration are
amended in the revised text to remove the penalty for denunciation of the Berne
Convention, in the case of developing countries. This amendment would have no
effect on the United States because we are not a member of the Berne Conven-
tion. The “safeguard clause” is of significance only to Berne members.
Special Ea:ceptions for Developing Countries.—The revised text includes new
Articles Wter and WQuater, permitting compulsory licensing by nationals of devel-
oping countries under certain conditions with respect to the rights of translation
and reproduction. .
Article V of the present text already permits translations under compulsory
licenses seven years after publication, unless the author has published a transla-
tion in a particular language for which a compulsory license might be requested.
In the more than fifteen years of experience with these provisions, the compulsory
license has been resorted to rarely, if ever.
Experience under this provision suggests that the detailed compulsory licens-
ing mechanism established under the revised text may be resorted to only in the
event that voluntary licensing agreements fail.
Authors and copyright proprietors can foreclose the issuance of any compulsory
licenses by effecting publication of the work within specified periods from first
publication during which they enjoy exclusive rights. In the case of the transla-
tion exception, under Article Wter the author can stop compulsory licenses by
publication of a translation in the particular language within three years of first
publication in the case of translation into a “world language,” or within one year
in the case of all other languages. Under the reproduction exception, the exclusive
right periods are longer, giving the authors more time to decide upon publication
in developing countries. The periods are: seven years for works of fiction, poetry,
music, and drama; three years for works of the natural and physical sciences and
mathematics; and five years for all other works. The work must be published in a
given developing country within the exclusive right period at the usual price for
comparable works in that country. -
Even after compulsory licenses have been issued, the exclusive right can be re-
captured by effecting publication in the developing country at any time in the
case of reproductions. The comparable provision for translations is complicated
by the existing compulsory licensing mechanism of Article V, but the exclusive
right can be recaptured by publication of the translation within seven years of
first publication and even beyond that time if the prospective licensee does not
utilize the present Article V system. -
In order to grant compulsory licenses to their nationals, the developing coun-
tries must establish specific procedural mechanisms. Compulsory licenses may be
granted only for limited purposes. Translation licenses are permitted only for
purposes of “teaching, scholarship or research.” Reproduction licenses are per-
mitted only for “systematic instructional activities.” Compulsory licenses can be
issued only after the national of the developing country has contacted or attempted
to contact the author or proprietor to negotiate voluntary licenses. The proprietor
therefore will have notice and can arrange for a publication in the developing
country which would forestall any compulsory license, or he may of course agree
to a voluntary license.
In addition to the procedural safeguards spelled out in the revised text, the
Report of the General Rapporteur by former Register of Copyrights, Abraham L.
11
Kaminstein, conteins many authoritative interpretations that further limit the
circumstances under which compulsory licenses may be issued. For example, if
the copyright owner makes a reasonable offer to grant a voluntary license, the
prospective licensee's refusal to accept the terms cannot be used as a basis for
granting a compulsory license. Also, if the copyright owner files a list of the works
he owns with the competent authority in the developing country, an applicant
for a compulsory license must first contact the owner to negotiate a voluntary
license; he cannot claim that he is unable to contact the owner.
If the procedural barriers are hurdled and compulsory licenses are issued, the
author is entitled to a “just compensation that is consistent with standards of
royalties normally operating on licenses freely negotiated between persons in the
two countries concerned.” Further, developing countries are obligated to assure
transmittal of payment, or, if national currency regulations intervene, the com-
petent authority shall make all efforts by the use of international machinery to
insure payment in world convertible currency.
If compulsory licenses are issued, they operate essentially only within the
territory of the granting authority. Export of copies produced under compulsory
licenses will not be permitted, subject to very limited circumstances. Orie ex-
ception permits export, under severe restrictions, to nationals of the developing
country who are living abroad. A more important “exception” does not appear
in the text. It appears as an interpretation in the Report of the General Rap-
porteur. The interpretation would permit a developing country that lacks printing
or reproduction facilities or whose facilities are incapable for economic or practical
reasons of reproducing the work in question to grant a license allowing the licensee
to have the editorial and reproduction processes done abroad. All copies must be
returned in bulk for distribution only within the given developing country. The
Report emphasizes that in all other cases the editorial preparation and reproduc-
tion must be done in the licensing country.
ADVANTAGES OF THE REVISED U. C. C. OVIER THE STOCKHOLM PROTOCOL
In discussing the U.C.C. revision, it is pertinent to point out the advantages
of this revision over the Stockholm Protocol. Let me briefly contrast a few of the
provisions of the Protocol that have been eliminated or modified in favor of
author interests in the revised U.C.C.
Of prime importance is the complete elimination of the Protocol’s “catch all”
provision permitting any use of copyrighted works for purposes of “teaching,
study and research,” at nominal compensation or none at all.
The Protocol contains special exceptions for broadcasting that have not been
carried over into the revised texts of the Berne and Universal Conventions.
In the case of translations and reproductions, the purposes for which comp.llsory
licenses can be issued have been tightened. The translation exception in the
Protocol has no purpose limitation. Under the revised U.C.C., use is permissible
only for “teaching, scholarship or research.” The reproduction exception applies
to rather broad areas encompassed by “educational and cultural purposes” under
the Protocol, in contrast to the revised U.C.C. formulation of “systematic
instructional activities.” • * .
Export of copies produced under the translation and reproduction exceptions
of the Protocol is not prohibited at all. Export is essentially prohibited under the
revised U.C.C.
The right to compensation for translations is not assured under the Protocol
throughout the life of the copyright. This right is assured under the revised U.C.C.
Except for works of the natural and physical sciences and mathematics, the
Protocol contains a shorter exclusive right period with respect to reproductions
than the revised U.C.C. *
Other technical improvements over the Protocol relate to the procedural require-
ments and the notice requirement (if the original work bore notice of copyright).
IMPORTANCE OF RATIFICATION BY THE UNITED STATES
The revised text of the Berne Convention contains an unusual condition. Unless
the United States, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom ratify the revised
U.C.C., the Berne revision cannot come into force. This condition was included
at the request of the developing countries to assure them that the developed
countries would not once again, as in the case of the Stockholm Protocol, refuse
to follow through and ratify the special provisions for developing countries in the
revised Conventions. Moreover, if the revised Berne text does not come into
12
force, the real danger is that the developing countries may denounce both conven-
tions and resort to international literary piracy, which would adversely affect
U.S. authors and publishers.
We believe that the revised U.C.C. represents a reasonable accommodation of
divergent interests. The developing countries have legitimate need for access to
copyrighted works. At the same time, the developing countries must protect the
interests of their own authors and publishers. Compulsory licenses should be kept
to a minimum and authors should in any case be compensated. We believe that
these objectives will be achieved through the revised U.C.C. A number of U.S.
groups interested in copyright also approve of these objectives. In addition to the
American Bar Association, whose House of Delegates approved the ratification
of the U.C.C. in special urgent proceedings at its Mid-Winter meeting this year,
the following organizations have also signified their endorsement of ratification:
American Patent Law Association.
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP).
Association of American Publishers.
Broadcast Music, Inc.
Music Publishers Association of the U.S. Inc.
National Association of Broadcasters.
National Music Publishers Association.
Recording Industry Association of America.
Ad Hoc Committee of the National Educational Association.
As to compulsory licensing it was a foregone conclusion that such concept
would be included in the revised U.C.C. As far as the United States is concerned,
it should be noted that the U.S. copyright law of 1909 pioneered the concept
with our compulsory licensing scheme for recordings of musical compositions. In
the interest of authors’ rights, the developed countries sought and achieved a
large number of conditions on the grant of compulsory licenses. Copyright owners
will receive royalties for any compulsory licenses. Authors are given an oppor-
tunity to prevent compulsory licenses by publication of the translation or the
reproduction in the particular developing country. The exclusive right once lost
may be regained under certain circumstances.
The concessions made to the developing countries represent the minimum that
those governments have indicated they need to meet the enormous educational
needs of their people.
If the United States fails to ratify the revised U.C.C., the Berne revision will
not come into force. Developing countries may well denounce any international
copyright obligations and resort to “Taiwan’’ type literary piracy. The resulting
loss of faith resulting from the failure of the U.S. to ratify the revised U.C.C.
would severely diminish, if not nullify, any leadership role of the United States
at future meetings on intellectual property. The contours of the new crisis in
international copyright cannot be clearly perceived, but, if such a crisis develops,
neither the interests of the United States generally nor the cause of authors’
rights would be well served.
We have reached a reasonable compromise that balances the legitimate needs
of developing countries and the rights of authors and publishers throughout the
.. and in this country. I strongly urge approval of the revised U.C.C. by
the Senate.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Winter or Mr. Cary, do you wish to make a
statement in addition before we ask questions?
COUNTRIES WHICH RATIFIED REVISED UCC
You noted the United Kingdom had ratified. How many countries
have ratified the revised Universal Copyright Convention?
Mr. LADD. Only the United Kingdom has ratified.
CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF BIFRNE CONVENTION
The CHAIRMAN. As revised it will then be the only convention. What
happens to the Berne Convention? Does it continue in existence?
Mr. LADD. Very definitely; the Berne Convention is really the
grandfather convention. - - - - ‘. . -
13
The CHAIRMAN. The grandfather; this does not supplant it?
Mr. LADD. The revised UCC does not supplant it, but what we have
done here is revised two conventions simultaneously
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. LADD (continuing). So as to provide easier access to the copy-
righted materials for developing countries, the rights being equal in
each of the two conventions.
DEFINITION OF A DEVELOPING COUNTRY
The CHAIRMAN. What is the criterion for a developing country?
What do you mean by that?
Mr. LADD. An excellent question and one that was dealt with at
great length at Paris in July. It is very difficult to come up with a
specific definition of a “developing country,” as we learned at the
conference. The decision regarding a country’s level of development is
considered, to be properly left up to that country.
This is so because there is no single criterion that applies to all
countries in all contexts, and only those countries themselves can
determine whether they are not, in fact, in a developing status.
I believe there is a provision in the revised UCC whereby this
declaration by the country that it is in a developing status must be
renewed every 10 years so that it prompts a reconsideration of this
Status.
We are not too concerned at this point that countries that are not
legitimately regarded in world opinion and common parlance as
“developing countries” will claim developing country status for the
purpose of this convention. We believe that by acceding to the con-
vention that they will undertake their responsibilities seriously and
they will fulfill the obligations of this convention.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me approach it differently. How many coun-
tries have now ratified this revised convention?
Mr. LADD. Just the one, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. The UK?
Mr. LADD. Just the UK.
The CHAIR MAN. On the orginal UCC, how many countries were
there? Did you say forty-five countries had ratified?
Mr. LADD. I believe that it is 61.
The CHAIRMAN. Of those, how many had claimed to be developing
countries? -
Mr. LADD. Under the existing—the original—1952 UCC, we have
not had these additional rights of exceptions for developing countries
and thus there has been no need under the original UCC to claim
that status. y
The CHAIRMAN. Is there any way you can indicate even an estimate
of how many are developing countries? -
Mr. LADD. I think we could answer that.
The CHAIRMAN. These are questions that I know probably will be
asked and often are asked in the course of the debate or consideration.
I would like to have some kind of an answer on the record of what is
a developing country.
Mr. LADD. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman
The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.
83—500—72—2
14
Mr. LADD. I think what we can do is indicate a list of UCC member
countries today which could potentially avail themselves of the
exceptions provided in the revised UCC.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. What would it be?
Mr. LADD. If you wish, I could indicate some of those countries.
The CHAIRMAN. I was really interested in the proportion. Could
you name some of them and say about how many there are?
Mr. LADD. It appears to me, sir, there are roughly 20 to 30.
The CHAIRMAN. Twenty out of the 60, about?
Mr. LADD. It would be about 30 based on the current membership
of the 1952 convention.
TJ.N. CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING DEVELOPING COUNTRY
The CHAIRMAN. My attention is called to Article Vbis which says,
“Any contracting state regarded as a developing country in conformity
with the established practice of the General Assembly of the United
Nations may, by a notification deposited with the Director General
of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion at the time of its ratification, acceptance or accession or there-
after, avail itself of any or all of the exceptions provided for in Articles
Wter and Vauater.” -
So in the United Nations General Assembly there is apparently
some criteria for determining whether a country is developing or not;
isn’t there?
Mr. LADD. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. That is the measure by which it could be deter-
mined here; is that right? You accept that basis?
Mr. LADD. This specific proposal was made to follow the U.N.
General Assembly criteria.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
REVISED UCC BROADER THAN U. N. DEFINITION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY
Mr. LADD. In Paris, it was felt, however, that it might be too con-
straining and I believe I am correct in saying that the definition of a
developing country, as under the revised UCC, generally may be a
little broader than only those that may be construed as developing
by the U.N. General Assembly practice.
The CHAIRMAN. It would include all of those plus some others, if
they chose to exercise the right. Is that the right way to put it?
Mr. LADD. Yes, that is correct.
SOVIET UNION NOT PARTY TO BERNE OR UCC 2
The CHAIRMAN. Did the Soviet Union sign the UCC?
Mr. LADD. No, sir. The Soviet Union is not a party to either one
of the two major conventions.
The CHAIRMAN. Either Berne or UCC?
Mr. LADD. Yes, that is correct.
15
ATTITUDE OF SOVIET UNION
The CHAIRMAN. What has been their attitude? Have they ignored
all rights of authors?
Mr. LADD. Up to this point, apparently the Soviet Union has de-
cided that it has more to gain by not belonging than it has by belong-
ing to one of the international copyright conventions. I am reminded
that it was not until 1955 that the United States adhered to an inter-
national copyright convention, the UCC.
The CHAIRMAN. What's that? .
Mr. LADD. The United States did not belong to any copyright
convention.
WHY UNITED STATES DIDN'T BELONG TO BERNE CONVENTION
The CHAIRMAN. Is that why we didn’t belong to the Berne
Convention?
Mr. LADD. No, not entirely.
The CHAIRMAN. Why was it?
Mr. LADD. We did not belong to Berne because of the very complex
nature of our own domestic copyright law, which, as you may know,
has been under constant study now for a number of years. We simply
cannot qualify for membership in Berne at this stage because of our
domestic law. We do not have certain provisions that countries must
have in their domestic law to adhere to Berne.
SOVIET UNION's ATTITUDE TOWARD UCC
Now, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we have discussed
the subject with them. I think they are more interested today. It is
my understanding that this was one of the subjects that the Joint
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission discussed recently, and that
the Soviet Union is looking with renewed interest on the possibility
of adhering specifically to the UCC.
DOES TAIWAN BELONG TO UCC?
The CHAIRMAN. Does Taiwan belong to the UCC?
Mr. LADD. No, sir. We would be anxious to have them join the
UCC.
WHY TWO CONCURRENT CONVENTIONS'''
The CHAIRMAN. I am not right clear why there are these two con-
ventions in the copyright field—the Berne and the UCC. I don’t have
a very great background on it. My first question is, why, when you
negotiate a new one, doesn’t it sort of occupy the field? Why do you
have two concurrent ones—the Berne and the UCC and now the
Berne and revised UCC? Why is that? «
Mr. LADD. An excellent question. I think that the best answer is
that the Berne Convention provides higher standards of protection
for its member countries and is, therefore, most desirable from a copy-
right proprietor standpoint. Because the United States in its domestic
16
law could not meet those standards, the UCC was created in 1952
and came into effect in 1955 primarily to accommodate the United
States.
TJ.S. INABILITY TO CONFORM TO BERNE CONVENTION
The CHAIRMAN. I didn’t understand that. What is so peculiar
about our domestic law that we could not conform to the Berne
Convention?
Mr. LADD. I might refer to the Register of Copyrights on the
question and within the constraints of time. Mr. Cary, if I may, would
you care to answer that? s
Mr. CARY. Thank you.
Very briefly, Senator, the United States has been trying to get its
law changed in order to become a member of the Berne Convention
ever since the mid-20's, but none of these attempts were ever
successful.
The CHAIRMAN. You mean the Congress wouldn’t go along or what?
Mr. CARY. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. What was the reason?
Mr. CARY. Well, there were several reasons. Basically, there is a
philosophical difference between the concept of copyright in the
United States and the concept that exists in Europe. In Europe, for
example, copyright is looked upon as being something that is a product
of the author's mind and should be protected automatically; whereas,
in this country, the concept is that this is a privilege given to an author
by the Congress and in order to exercise that privilege he has to give
a little quid pro quo. Now, one of these quid pro quos that I mentioned
is what we call the formalities.
The CHAIRMAN. What? - -
Mr. CARY. Formalities. You have to put a copyright notice in a
certain place in the work and you have to register it; and you have to
manufacture it in this country and so forth. You don’t have that in
the European concept. So until we can get these provisions in our law
out of the law, we really cannot adhere to the Berne Convention and
so far we have been unsuccessful.
The CHAIRMAN. Did you try?
Mr. CARY. Oh, yes, since—
The CHAIRMAN. What happened to the effort?
Mr. CARY. They were all nullified; nothing ever came of it.
The CHAIRMAN. By the Congress?
Mr. CARY. It never passed.
The CHAIRMAN. You submitted laws—
Mr. CARY. Yes. -
The CHAIRMAN (continuing). Requiring this and they were de-
feated -
Mr. CARY. That's right. - -
The CHAIRMAN (continuing further). Or failed of passage in the
Congress? - - -
Mr. CARY. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Going back to the 1920's?
Mr. CARY. That's right. The present copyright bill, which is pend-
ing in the Senate now, contains enough changes in it that it should go a
long way toward permitting us to adhere to the Berne Convention,
but until that is done, we have to rely for our international protection
on the UCC. That is why there are these two conventions.
17
OPPOSITION TO MA KING UNITED STATES CAPABLE OF JOINING BERNE
CONVENTION
The CHAIRMAN. I am curious. Who opposes the enactment of your
proposal to make us capable of joining the Berne Convention?
Mr. CARY. Well, to give you
The CHAIRMAN. The publishers or authors or who?
Mr. CARY. As I remember it, back in the 1920's it was primarily, at
least one of the leading opponents, was the motion picture interests
because there is a doctrine, which the Europeans have, which we do
not have in our law or our concepts, of the moral right. This is a right
that an author has to be recognized as the father, as it were, of his
work, and the right to require that if any modification of his work is
made, this is done with his permission. The motion picture interests
at that time, as I understand it, felt that when they purchased the
right to produce a work on the stage or in the motion pictures, that
they then had the right to modify the story to any degree that they
considered necessary without obtaining the permission of the author.
So, they naturally opposed the legal recognition of the concept
of moral rights. That is one of the problems we faced in considering
joining the Berne Convention.
Then, of course, as I said, there were these formality problems
which people just didn’t want to change. There were such things also
as the duration of copyright. In the European concept the duration
of copyright usually is made dependent upon the author's life and so
many years after his death; whereas, this country has historically
always maintained a period of years.
The CHAIRMAN. What is that period now?
Mr. CARY. It is 28 years for a copyright; and if you renew it, you
get another 28 years, making a total of 56 years.
Mr. LADD. Under the Berne Convention, the rule is the author's
life plus 50 years; so there is a basic difference there in the tenure of
the copyright itself.
The CHAIRMAN. So it was the movie industry that objected pri-
marily?
Mr. CARY. I don’t say they were the main ones.
The CHAIRMAN. You did say that. Well, I misunderstood you.
Mr. CARY. They were one of the main ones, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Who was the main one? Who else objected?
Mr. CARY. Well, there was the problem of the manufacturing
clause and the labor unions were against modification of it because
they felt that it provided protection for them. I think they still do.
The CHAIRMAN. Are they still this way? Are they still opposing any
changes?
Mr. CARY. The last time this came up was some years ago when
we ratified the UCC in 1955, and they still had the same feeling,
although they did adhere to a concept of amending the manufactur-
ing clause to a degree, but they still did not want to give it up.
The CHAIRMAN. I see. -
REVISED UCC BEST WE CAN DO UNIDER, CIRCUMSTANCES
Am I right in saying this? This revised UCC is the best we can do
because in view of these other circumstances we cannot become a
member of Berne. Is that correctly describing it?
18
Mr. LADD. Yes, sir, that is a very fair analysis. I might say we
are not entirely unprotected even under Berne because there is what
is sometimes referred to as the “backdoor Berne.” I wrote a book in
1968, Senator, and dedicated it in part to you and it was published
simultaneously in Canada. Canada is a member of Berne and there-
fore books published in Canada enjoy Berne protection as well as
UCC protection. We would like to do better than that. We would
like not to take advantage of “backdoor” Berne and be a full-fledged
member, but, as Mr. Cary has pointed out, until our archaic domestic
copyright law, which goes back to 1909, can be revised, we can’t
º: to Berne. A revised copyright bill has been passed by the
OUISé.
YEARS OF PROTECTION CARRIED BY REVISED CONVENTION
The CHAIRMAN. I see. What years of protection does the revised
convention carry—the same as the United States—28 years?
Mr. LADD. Yes, the term has not been changed in the revised UCC.
The original UCC provides for 25 years for a country like the United
States which computes the term of protection from the date of first
publication. This was set up to come under the U.S. 28-year term of
protection.
Mr. CHAIRMAN. Subject also to extension, another 25 years?
Mr. LADD. It requires that as a minimum a state like the United
States wishing to join the UCC has to provide a term of at least 25
years. Now, such a state, of course, is welcome to renew it, but that
is up to the sovereign state to do that.
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTE UNDER CONVENTION
The CHAIRMAN. What if a dispute arises under this convention?
How will it be settled? -
Mr. LADD. There is a provision for the International Court of
Justice to receive such disputes. Article 15 makes direct reference to
the Court. However, we do have other remedies for disputes, princi-
pally negotiations in good faith between the parties involved, diplo-
matic exchanges between the countries, and the good faith interests
of those who adhere to the convention. Finally, if it becomes quite
clear that there are defects in these revisions, we can consider further
revisions in the convention itself.
IS CONNALLY AMENDMENT OVERRIDDEN”
The CHAIRMAN. If we ratify this, do we, in effect, accept the
jurisdiction of the International Court? Would this, for example,
override the Connally reservation which was attached to the original
“accession”—if I may use that word in quotes—to the International
Court?
Mr. LADD. I answer that with some trepidation in that I am not a
copyright lawyer and international lawyer, nor in fact a lawyer. I
might read Article 15, very briefly, which says that:
A dispute between two or more contracting states concerning the interpretation
or application of this convention, not settled by negotiation, shall, unless the
States concerned agree on some other method of settlement, be brought before
the International Court of Justice for determination by it.
We can look into that for you.
19
The CHAIRMAN. This is a type of question that could be asked and
it has been controversial—not with me. I think I am the only member
of the Senate still living or still present in the Senate who voted
against the Connally amendment. In any case it arises every now
and then and I wish you would put a positive answer in the record
for it. I think that it would override it.
Mr. LADD. Yes, sir. - -
The CHAIRMAN. I am not saying that it offended me at all, but
just simply on the record that it would override it.
Mr. LADD. We will supply that for the record.
The CHAIRMAN. I think that would be an agreement by us ex-
plicitly to accept the jursidiction in these cases in spite of the Connally
reservation. That is the way I look at it, but I think you ought to
put that answer in the record.
Mr. LADD. We will, sir.
(The information referred to follows:)
ARTICLE XV OF UCC AND CONNALLY RESERVATION
Supplied by Department of State
Article XV of the Universal Copyright Convention provides for submission
to the International Court of Justice of disputes between Contracting States
concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, unless the Parties
involved agree on another means of settlement. This provision is not affected by
the reservation attached to the United States’ acceptance of the Court’s com-
pulsory jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court of Interna-
º Justice, since it is a separate and independent basis for the Court's juris-
iction.
MEANING OF NOT PERMITTING RESERVATIONS
The CHAIRMAN. Article XX provides that “Reservations to this
convention shall not be permitted.”
What do you mean by that, that the Senate should take it or leave
º º that what that means, that we cannot put any reservations on
this' -
Mr. LADD. That is my understanding, yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. It is your understanding we take it as is or reject
it? Is that correct?
Mr. LADD. That is correct.
NO EFFECT ON U.S. DOMESTIC COPYRIGHT LAW
The CHAIRMAN. Does this convention have any effect upon our
domestic copyright law, the one to which you have already referred?
Mr. LADD. No, sir; it does not. It does not require any implementing
legislation or additional legislation, and so far as we can tell; it does
notº any way interfere with a domestic law that should be interfered
with.
The CHAIRMAN. Should be interfered with? You are going to have
to interfere with it by more direct means. Is that what you are saying?
Mr. LADD. That's right.
The CHAIRMAN. You are not trying to change these laws by treaty
process
Mr. LADD. That’s correct.
20
The CHAIRMAN (continuing). I assume, because you thought that
might run into difficulties, too, and it probably would? .
Mr. LADD. Yes, sir.
BILL PENDING IN SENATE
Mr. CARY. May I interpose, Senator, there is a bill presently
pending in the Senate which has been there for some years which will
rectify or correct a lot of these inequities. As soon as the Senate
Judiciary Committee reports out that bill, we will be very happy to
have your support of it.
The CHAIRMAN. How long has it been before the Judiciary Com-
mittee?
Mr. CARY. Welk, it has been there for a couple of years, primarily
on one point, namely, the matter of cable television; and with the
recent agreement which was announced by the White House and by
the FCC, their new rules, we have some hope that maybe this will
get unstuck and get along its way.
The CHAIRMAN. Is this that question of the FCC taking jurisdiction
over cable television?
Mr. CARY. That has something to do with it.
The CHAIRMAN. That having been more or less settled, then you
think the cable television people would withdraw their objections?
Mr. CARY. Senator McClellan, who is chairing the subcommittee
that is handling this, has indicated that it is a little late in the session
now to start doing anything about it, but he will, the first thing next
year when the new Congress comes into session, attempt to get this
out of the Senate next year.
The CHAIRMAN. Good.
Do you have any questions, Senator Percy?
Senator PERCY. I have for Mr. Ladd.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, proceed.
Senator PERCY. They may duplicate, Mr. Chairman, other questions
you have asked, and if they do, I hope you will say so.
The CHAIRMAN. They can indicate.
IMPROVIED LEVEL OF PROTECTION FOR. U.S. COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
Senator PERCY. I would like an explanation as to how the revised
Universal Copyright Convention improves the level of protection for
American copyright holders.
Mr. LADD. There are additional rights, Senator, that had not previ-
ously been in the UCC which are included as a result of these revi-
SIOI).S.
The purpose of the revision, of course, was to provide certain ex-
ceptions for developing countries for educational purposes. The UCC
has been strengthened by the introduction of certain basic rights of
authors, including the exclusive right to authorize broadcasting, public
performance and reproduction by any means—that is, an author has
a right to authorize those means, broadcasting, public performance
and reproduction. The existing UCC only refers to the rather vague
provision of “adequate and effective protection.” It did not refer
specifically to these basic rights.
21
It might be noted that in providing special exceptions for develop-
ing countries, the UCC was updated to meet the economic and politi-
cal realities of the times. As such it should prove to be a far more viable
instrument in every respect.
Senator PERCY. Are the American authors and publishers going to
be worse off or better off economically with respect to the developing
countries under the revised convention?
Mr. LADD. I feel I might leave that question to the publishers’ and
authors’ representatives who will be testifying here this morning.
Senator PERCY. What is your judgment and what have they ad-
vised you? Have they told you they are going to be worse off or better
off or will there be no change?
Mr. LADD. We believe that the revised UCC will strengthen the
position of authors and copyright proprietors. Specifically, within the
framework of the Convention what we are trying to do, Senator, is to
preserve the entire international copyright system as we know it
today.
It has been in great jeopardy since 1967 because of the Stockholm
Protocol. The whole intent and purpose behind the revised UCC was
to put the pieces back together and preserve an effective, coherent
system of copyright. We believe that is accomplished and the authors
and copyright proprietors will be benefited.
HAVE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BEEN HARMED BY PAST CONVENTIONS 2
Senator PERCY. In your opinion, have developing countries been
seriously harmed by past copyright conventions?
Mr. LADD. Have developing countries been harmed?
Senator PERCY. Yes.
Mr. LADD. I don’t believe you can say that developing countries
have been harmed by the copyright conventions. They are receivers
and users of copyright material rather than producers. I think what
we are trying to do here is to help them by providing exceptions
under the conventions for developing countries.
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' CONSIDERATION OF BOLTING CONVENTIONS
Senator PERCY. I had heard that some developing countries seri-
ously considered bolting from the existing conventions unless some
concessions were made to them which certainly would have been
injurious to publishers and authors. Is this true?
Mr. LADD. This is true.
Senator PERCY. Did you feel there was a serious chance they might
have bolted and not been a part of future conventions?
Mr. LADD. Very serious. It is much more than rhetoric or inter-
national politics. I alluded in my prepared statement to the situation
we have right now with Pakistan where it was indicated that this
Government was intending to withdraw from both the major con-
ventions. We undertook discussions with them. We explained that
the new provisions under the revised UCC and Berne would appre-
ciably assist them. Pakistan is now in a “wait-and-see” posture to see
whether or not the United States and some of the other key developed
22
countries, are going to move ahead expeditiously with adherence to
the revised UCC as has the United Kingdom. If we can do that, I
think they will be satisfied and I think we will preserve the interna-
tional copyright system.
DEFINITION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES
Senator PERCY. Critics of the convention who have contacted my
office have argued that the definition of what a developing country is
and what educational activities are under the revised convention are
simply too vague. -
In your testimony or in your colloquy with the chairman, have you
clarified those particular phrases or terms so that they are not subject
to misinterpretation?
Mr. LADD. I believe we have, Senator. Simply put, while there may
be—as lawyers are prone to disagree from time to time—some concern
that these terms are not specific enough, within the framework of
trying to deal with 60 or more countries in an international convention
of this kind, I think we have achieved what is a very fair and balanced
conclusion. -
ADEQUACY OF CONSULTATION WITH PUBLISHERS AND ALTHORS
Senator PERCY. During the course of our negotiations, were you
in adequate consultation with publishers and authors so that their
input could be reflected in our negotiating terms? I am particularly
concerned with compulsory licensing, on which I have some very
definite opinions. - . -
Mr. LADD. The answer is affirmative. Not only did we consult at
great length with the State Department's Advisory Panel on Copy-
right and with the Copyright Office and other governmental agencies,
but we also had one of the largest delegations at the Paris Confer-
ence—about 25 members. Among those delegates were several mem-
bers of our Advisory Panel on Copyright including a representative
of the publishers’ interests, Mr. Robert Frase who is the Executive
Director of the American Association of Publishers. -
We were in constant, daily, if not hourly, contact with these copy-
right interests in Paris as we revised the UCC.
OTHER BENEFITS OF REVISION OF UCC AND BERNE CONVENTION
Senator PERCY. What other benefits can you visualize, Mr. Ladd,
coming from the simultaneous revision of the Universal Copyright
Convention and the Berne Convention? For instance, is it possible
that some of the Asian countries might ratify who now sanction book
piracy or that you might be able to induce more countries to come in
as a result of this? Are there other benefits that might flow from it?
Mr. LADD. This is part of the object to make the convention, with-
out watering down its basic protection, to make it more palatable,
more acceptable, to those countries who have not acceded to either
one of the two conventions.
Because the standards for UCC are lower, I think it is more likely
that countries not now party to either one will be inclined to accede
to the UCC. If you have in mind the case of Taiwan, where there has
been and I suppose continues to be some book piracy, that is almost
23
an exception. They have made apparently a decision to continue to
permit unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted works.
I might say though that through negotiations with Taiwan, while
we have not succeeded in getting them to adhere to the convention,
we have succeeded in getting them to agree not to export. There is a
law now in Taiwan and, so far as we can tell, it is being effectively
policed—not to export the books that they are reproducing in that
country without permission.
EFFECT OF REFUSAL TO APPROVE RATIFICATION
Senator PERCY. Lastly, I think you have by your testimony and
comments clearly pointed out some of the advantages. However, on
the other side of the coin, what would be the effect upon authors and
publishers if the Senate of the United States refused to approve rati-
fication of copyright convention? -
Mr. LADD. I would say that the impact would be most unfavor-
able. I must allude again to the fact that we are struggling here to
maintain an international copyright system. The Pakistan case may
be a good case in point. Unless the major developed countries can evi-
dence good faith and show that they do believe in these conventions
that were negotiated in July 1971 and put them into effect through
ratification, then the developing countries will consider very seriously
leaving the conventions that they are now party to. The result of that,
of course, would be that you would develop not just one Taiwan but
many. I think that would have a most dire impact on all of the authors
and publishers of this country. -
Senator PERCY. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ladd.
The next witness is Mr. Irwin Karp. .
Senator JAVITs. Mr. Chairman, before you call the next witness,
may I have a word.
The CHAIRMAN. I only point out we only had one witness and we
used an hour and a half. We will not begin to make our record. -
Senator JAVITs. Mr. Chairman, normally I would have the authority
to question a witness, but I shall waive that. I just wish to state I have
a very profound interest in this convention. It involves a tremendous
number of publishers and authors in my home city and home state,
and I just wish to, as quite a few of their representatives are here,
state my interest and that I shall take very profound note of what
they have to say and how they wish to see this thing handled in the
hope of being able to serve the general purpose of worldwide pro-
tection in respect of publication, including the Communist countries
Where I know there is an enormous problem.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. I didn’t mean the Senator would not have an
opportunity to ask questions. We have a number of other witnesses.
Mr. Karp from New York, counsel for the Authors League of America,
is the next witness. I am sure in the process of their testimony I would
. my time to the Senator from New York and he can say all he
WISEléS.
I was simply trying to move along. The last witnesses were repre-
Sentatives of the State Department and we have examined them at
24
length on their attitude toward this, as to the effect of the agreement.
The Senator from New York will have all the time he wishes for these
other witnesses. In fact, several are his constituents; in fact, most of
them. He can expound at length.
Senator JAVITs. I shall not.
Senator PERCY. If Mr. Ladd were not from Illinois, I would extend
all my time. He is a very fine constituent.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Karp?
Thank you, Mr. Ladd. That was a very, very good presentation.
Mr. Karp is the counsel for the Authors League of America.
Mr. Karp, you have, I believe, quite a lengthy statement. Would
it be possible to insert that and to summarize it for the committee
because we are running out of time?
STATEMENT OF IRWIN KARP, COUNSEL, THE AUTHORS LEAGUE
OF AMERICA -
Mr. KARP. Yes, Mr. Chairman. It was not my intention to read
the whole statement, only to summarize part of it.
The CHAIRMAN. We will put your whole statement in the record.
Mr. KARP. I appreciate that.
The CHAIRMAN. And if you would point out the critical questions
that arise in the minds of your clients—
ONE-WAY STREET IN REVISED UCC
Mr. KARP. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the 1971
convention would revise the present Universal Copyright Convention
essentially in only one respect: it would allow so-called developing
countries to publish works of foreign authors in translations or in the
original language without the author's consent and without the
publisher's consent, and at a royalty fixed by the government or
agency of that licensing country. It does this by adding to the present
convention a whole new series of provisions concerning compulsory
licensing.
On the other hand, the developed countries would continue to give
full copyright protection to authors from all countries and would not
be able to adopt such systems.
I say that only by way of contrast. The last thing in the world we
would want is for any country, especially a developed country, to
do this, but this is a one-way street.
UPGRADED PROTECTION OF AUTHOR’s RIGHTS QUESTIONED
It has been suggested, and I deal with this much more fully in the
statement I have submitted, that additional benefits are secured by
the convention, particularly the upgrading of protection through
certain references to authors’ rights. I must say that that is essentially
Semantic window dressing, that really accomplished nothing. All that
that article of the convention does is to specify that the general
statement of rights already there in the convention is understood to
include the rights of reproduction, of public performance and broadcast.
Most people would have agreed that they are there anyway and
that is borne out by the report of the convention which emphasizes
25
that any member nation at present need not change its law at all in
order to comply with this new section. In other words, the present
law of any member country is good enough. So if something new had
been added that couldn’t have been logical.
The new article does not change what is now in the convention
and only some words are added to make it a little more palatable;
and then the words are followed with a caveat that every country
can make exceptions to those rights if it chooses.
So what may have been given with the left hand would have been
taken back with the right.
PURPOSE OF CONVENTION
But in any event, that is hardly the purpose of the convention. The
whole purpose of the convention was to set up a compulsory licensing
system. .#
EFFECT IF CONVENTION IS NOT RATIFIED BY UNITED STATES
If the convention is not ratified by the United States, I should
point out, that would not be the end of our membership. We would
just continue to be bound by the 1952 convention; we would not have
to have our authors’ works exposed to the new regulations of the 1971
convention.
The CHAIRMAN. Could I ask a question there?
PROBABILITY OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITHDRAWING
FROM CONVENTIONS
The preceding witness stated that they were faced with the prob-
ability of certain developing countries withdrawing from the Berne
Convention and the UCC, in which case he thought it would be much
worse than this convention. What do you say to that argument?
Mr. KARP. Well, Mr. Chairman, first of all, my statement points
out that The Authors League and other private organizations don’t
have any effective means of determining that; nor do we have the
means, which only the Congress of the United States has, for taking
measures to counter it. Such measures could have been taken and have
been taken in the past. That is the only reason we don’t oppose rati-
fication. We don’t support it because this is a bad convention; we don’t
support it because we don’t want to be in position of being accused
by people in the future of having caused this exodus which we don’t
know will occur or will not occur, and which we can’t prevent.
All we can do is call to the committee's attention the reasons why
we think the new convention is inequitable and potentially very
injurious, and answer some of these arguments—which I am going to
do—in answer to your question. And we also recommend to the com-
mittee, that if the Senate decides after reviewing the record
thoroughly, that on balance it should ratify, then it take certain
action in connection with the ratification that would mitigate some
of the damages which this convention may cause.
Coming back to your specific question, the threat that countries
would leave the Universal Copyright Convention or the Berne Con-
vention was first voiced—and did not occur—in 1967 or 1968 after the
26
Stockholm Protocol was rushed through by the developing countries,
and then no developed country would ratify it. Because they recognized
with horror how silly they had been, they wouldn’t ratify the piece
of paper they had signed at Stockholm. Whether developing countries
will leave is problematical or which ones would do it. In fact, one of .
the things we think the Senate should do before it decides on ratifica-
tion is to have the State Department find out, because we have heard
rumors that some of these countries are threatening to leave in any
event. Certainly it would be sort of a futile waste and futile destruction
of our rights to have the Senate ratify the treaty, to have the U.S.
ratify, that is, and then find some of the developing countries have
nonetheless departed.
So our first recommendation, really, is that the Senate learn what
these countries intend to do. As Mr. Ladd has testified, only Great
Britain has ratified so far and it would be imprudent for us to take
this irrevocable step to find out that many of them are going to leave
anyway. . -
Secondly, we think that you have to balance the advantages and
disadvantages of nations leaving this convention. The developed
countries which are the major markets for many American publishers
and authors are not going to leave and have not threatened to leave.
It is certain of the developing countries who may. Now, many coun-
tries don’t belong to the convention right now; it is of no great conse-
quence to us - -
The CHAIRMAN. There are 61, I believe he said, who belong.
Mr. KARP. Yes. ; - - - - . . .
The CHAIRMAN. Taking the United Nations, what are there now,
130 members?
Mr. KARP. I believe approximately that.
The CHAIRMAN. It is not quite half, I guess?
Mr. KARP. That's right. - .
FREEDOM IN DETERMINATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY
If some of the developing countries leave, it is very likely they will
come back and they will come back to a convention that hasn’t been
weakened by this revision. If they stay in, the convention will have
been weakened for probably a hundred years because every country
is essentially free to determine whether it is developing or not. There
are no U.N. standards; that should be made very clear. That is another
case of semantic window dressing. The U.N. has no established practice.
It has different lists of developing countries for different purposes.
Thé CHAIRMAN. Give me an example.
Mr. KARP. Well, the Committee on Assessments has a standard of
$300 per capita annual income. Several of the countries that claim to
be developing, that led the fight for the new convention, several of
the countries in that category, like Brazil—not Brazil—I will come
to Brazil separately for other reasons—Argentina, Israel and other
countries that are listed have per capita incomes well above $300. In
fact, some of them have per capita incomes well above per capita
incomes of countries that the State Department seems to think are
developed countries. - -
Secondly, several of the countries that will claim to be developing
countries have publishing industries that far outproduce the publish-
27
ing industries of developed countries or those we thought were safely
in the developing category. Several countries that claim to be develop-
ing, and here we come to Brazil, have some of the largest military
budgets in the world. Brazil last year had an annual military budget
of $792 million, the largest in South America.
I cite in my statement a report from the New York Times on Brazil’s
purchase of the remaining equipment required for One squadron of
Mirage fighters last year, total cost, $100 million.
Now, I simply can’t accept as a matter of commonsense a country
that can afford to spend almost $1 billion a year on national defense
as a developing country for the purposes of this convention.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Karp, they can’t afford it. We urge them to do
it by our policies of arms sales. A lot of these countries can’t afford it,
but we make it possible by grants and long-term concessional loans
and high power pressure for them to buy our arms. You know that.
TJRGING VOLUNTARY LICENSING ROUTE SUGGESTED
Mr. KARP. Senator, I know that and one of the things we recom-
mend is for a very modest—I would submit—microscopic sum we
could urge them to go the voluntary route, and help them go the vol-
untary route, on the licensing of the rights of American authors. In
the last fiscal year when Brazil was spending that $792 million, the
U.S. Information Agency which does act as a voluntary conduit be-
tween publishers and other countries, especially developing countries
and the United States, in negotiating licenses and paying license fees
to American authors, that agency spent a grand total of $83,000 on
this project. For $830,000 you could pay all the royalties in the world
probably for the next 10 years for all American authors in those de-
veloping countries that really couldn’t do it themselves.
SUBSIDY INVOLVED IN TREATY
What this treaty involves is really a subsidy. We have no basic
objection to subsidies to developing countries, truly developing coun-
tries. The only trouble with this treaty is that it asks the author and
publisher not only here but in other countries to pay the subsidy by
having his rights appropriated at a royalty that is bound to be lower.
Compulsory licensing royalties are always lower; it is always bound
to be lower than the fair value of what is taken and what could have
been negotiated. -
The CHAIRMAN. What is an example?
Mr. KARP. I have a letter from Mr. Fanget who used to be head of
the Publications Division of the U.S. Information Agency which he
wrote to us last year in connection with the program where the U.S.
Information Agency pays royalties in, say, Asia, $100 for ten thousand
copies or less, $200 for more than ten thousand; that is voluntary, and
authors are willing to accept that per country. . . . .
On the other hand, he says, the rights in the noncommercial lan-
guages bring less than in the commercial languages; it is often difficult
for American publishers or authors to sell rights in most of the Asian
languages directly to the foreign publishers; and the latter expect,
sometimes expect, to pay as little as $25; often they are not able to
pay in dollars at all. One of the defects of this treaty is that it writes
28
that right into the compulsory license clause, as an exception to the
obligation to pay. And I have a hunch the compulsory license royalty
is going to be closer to the $25 than the $100 or $200 or $300 in that
type of country.
This treaty writes into that provision the exception that the royal-
ties have to be paid subject to currency control which means an auto-
matic opportunity for most countries who do not want to pay anything
to block even the meager pittance that they may fix.
QUESTION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' LEAVING
Therefore, Senator, summarizing in response to your question, some
of these countries may leave. You have got to balance against that
the fact that if we ratify the treaty you will have for the next fifty or
one hundred years this level of protection will be lower in probably
much more than half of the membership of the UCC at present and
perhaps as much as three-quarters.
I have estimated that every Asian, African, Middle Eastern, South
American country can qualify because it is its own judge of its status,
and only a handful of European countries, the United States and Japan
may end up being developed countries.
I might also point out that, as we noted in the statement, many
developed countries who in good faith intended to treat themselves
as such under this convention, have a perfectly legitimate right to
call themselves developing because by almost every standard—per
capita income, size of publishing industry, ability to finance a defense
establishment—they are more poorly situated, economically, than
countries like Brazil, Argentina, Israel, Yugoslavia and others who
claim to be “developing.”
So what you are faced with is the prospect that you might have 80,
90 or 100 countries saying they are developing countries who can do
this under this treaty now or as they come in. Therefore, our second
recommendation to the committee is that before the Senate consents
to ratification it should ask the State Department to take a reading,
and ask these other countries what they intend to declare themselves
8.S.
We did ask Mr. Ladd, in a letter some months ago, for that informa-
tion and he was very kind to tell us that he didn’t have it but would
try to get it. I have not heard since and I understand he sent out some
inquiries. But I do think that the Senate should make a more official
request for the State Department to find out which of these countries
are going to come in claiming they are entitled to establish compulsory
licenses and which will claim they are not.
The CHAIRMAN. I tried to ask him that a moment ago. I don’t
know how important he thought it was. He indicated he thought it
was about 30, or between 20 and 30.
Mr. KARP. He gave me a list just in terms of marketing, from a
U.N. study on marketing, where 31 or 32 are on the list and that
does not include all of them by any means; that was half the member-
ship right now.
The CHAIRMAN. That was his estimate?
Mr. KARP. Yes. Going by the per capita standard and others
you can get more. And then as I point out there is no standard. It
29
just says in accordance with the practices of the U.N., which do not
exist as a specific practice and without a specific definition.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Javits, do you have any questions?
Senator JAVITs. No, thank you. I think I have the picture very
well.
Mr. KARP. Mr. Chairman, I might point out just one or two other
points. -
SUGGESTION THAT LICENSES WON'T BE ISSUED
It has been suggested this is all a tempest in a teapot and these
licenses won’t be issued. Well, the obvious answer to that is, first of
all, if they are not going to issue them, why change the treaty?
CUT DOWN IN TIME PERIOD OF LICENSE
Secondly, too many countries fought too hard to cut the time
period down from 7 years to either 3 or 1, and that is the crucial
issue here. One year after—or 3 years after publication—a transla-
tion license becomes much more useful. And, as a result of some
last minute changes, which I have described in the statement,
changes which we objected to bitterly but without success, it becomes
very profitable for developing countries to make use of these licenses.
They can use a single translation; they can go outside their own
borders, each one, and have the thing mass-produced in Taiwan—
not in Taiwan but in a member country. If Taiwan joined it could
then go into business printing for the developing countries under
compulsory licenses which is a very nice arrangement commercially
because you don’t have to pay royalties at the same level.
NO REAL PROTECTION FOR AUTHORS AND PTJBLISHERS
This treaty, with a system of compulsory licensing, as I point out
in the statement, provides no real protection for authors and pub-
lishers; they just can’t defend against them.
ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTING TREATY NOT AFFECTED BY IT
I might also point out while a long list of names was read off of
organizations supporting the treaty, you can understand why they
do; they are not affected by it. The only people this treaty is aimed at,
and will affect, are authors and publishers of books and literary ma-
terial like magazine articles, primarily books, and those people who
produce audio-visual materials used for systematic instruction.
Music publishers are not affected. The developing countries don’t
even care about it. Records stayed out; they are not subject to com-
pulsory licensing under this treaty. The motion picture industry is
all right too; it is not affected either. So, therefore, feeling they have
nothing to lose by the treaty and worried about the possible exodus
of some developing countries, their attitude is, “I am all right, Jack,
so I am for ratification.”
They are not concerned about authors and publishers as such.
83—500–72
3
30
BASIS OF ABA END ORSEMENT
The ABA which also endorsed ratification of the treaty, did so on
the basis of a skimpy report which I think in only three lines of three
pages, three lines dealt with the crucial issue; and the membership
of the House of Delegates was advised that “certain changes” are
made in the compulsory licensing provision, nothing said about the
loopholes, nothing said about the weaknesses. And members of the
ABA, some of whom are present in this room, who opposed ratifica-
tion or had serious questions, never participated in any debate, never
even knew about it, actually. I don’t think that type of endorsement
of a convention really is worth much.
CONSIDERATION OF RECOMMENDED STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES URGED
I think much more important is the study of the treaty and of
these possible weaknesses and possible consequences. And I would
earnestly urge the committee to consider the recommendations we
have made at the last page of our statement for a statement of prin-
ciples by the Senate, in the report of this committee or in the resolu-
tion should it decide to ratify it. I think that if the Senate makes
clear to those countries the United States may well pull out of the
UCC itself if they abuse this convention, or if developed countries
proclaim themselves as nations entitled to compulsory licenses, or if
they didn’t set up a system for prompt and easy arbitration of dis-
putes between authors and licensing authorities, I think this may
have some effect. But I do say that serious defects of this treaty de-
serve your earnest consideration before you reach a decision.
I want to thank you very much for hearing me.
(Mr. Karp's prepared statement follows:)
STATEMENT OF IRWIN KARP, FOR THE AUTHORS LEAGUE OF AMERICA
The Universal Copyright Convention as Revised in Paris on July 24, 1971
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, my name is Irwin Karp. I am
attorney for the Authors League of America, a national society of professional
writers and dramatists. The President has asked the Senate’s advice and consent
to ratification by the United States of the “Universal Copyright Convention as
Revised in Paris, on July 24, 1971’’. I appreciate this opportunity to testify for
the Authors League on this question.
If ratified, the 1971 Convention would revise some of the provisions of the
1952 Universal Copyright Convention (“UCC”) of which the United States is a
member. The principal changes would permit any “developing” country in the
UCC to grant compulsory licenses to translate or reproduce books by authors of
other member nations without their consent, and at royalties fixed by the licensing
country. Since there is no definition of a “developing” country, each member will
be free to determine its own status; and many countries with established publish-
ing industries and large military budgets Would make these unauthorized uses of
books by American authors, at government-fixed royalties. However, the United
States and other developed countries would have to continue granting full protec-
tion to authors from all UCC members, and could not adopt such systems.
The 1971 Convention would thus downgrade the level of copyright protection
now required of members of the 1952 UCC, which contains a far more limited
translation clause. The new convention must be ratified by the United States
to subject American authors to these compulsory licensing systems in other
countries (and to make effective the 1971 Berne Convention revision, which
contains identical compulsory licensing clauses). Without U.S. ratification,
American authors would continue to be protected under the 1952 UCC.
31
THE POSITION OF THE AUTHORS LEAGUE
The Authors League does not ask the Senate to approve ratification of the 1971
UCC because of its serious inequities. Nor does the League oppose ratification,
for reasons discussed below. The League does wish to call attention to these
inequities; and to urge that if the Senate decides for ratification, it ground its
consent on a statement of principles that would reduce abuses of the Convention
and mitigate the injury its compulsory license system could cause authors here
and in other countries, developed as well as developing. The League also suggests
that the Senate should have information as to the intentions of other UCC
members on ratification before it reaches its decision.
THE INTEREST OF AUTHORS
Authors will bear the brunt of the damages caused by the new compulsory
licensing provisions. While American publishers of text and technical books
license foreign publications of these works, the authors receive a substantial share
of the income. American authors of general trade books (as distinguished from
texts and technical works) receive most or all of the income from translations and
foreign publication of these works. These authors have far more to lose from the
compulsory licensing system than do their American publishers.
It should be emphasized that authors of books will be the principal victims.
Some organizations representing creators or distributors of movies, music and
other non-literary works are unconcerned by these dangers. The reason is simple.
Their members are not affected. If the licensing provisions had included these non-
literary media, the list of organizations endorsing ratification would have been
shorter. -
THE IN EQUITIES OF THE COMPULSORY LICENSING PROVISIONS
In his closing remarks, the Chairman of the Revision Conference said that the
system of compillsory licensing would not satisfy the “world of authors” in the
developed or developing countries; and he expressed the hop that compulsory
licenses would be an eacception and not the ordinary means of providing for the
publishing of foreign authors’ books in developing countries. He recognized that a
compulsory license appropriates an author's work without his consent, and for a
government-fixed compensation that may be inadequate, Indeed the scheme of the
1971 Convention recognized that the compulsory license provisions were a retreat
from accepted principles of international copyright protection, allowing only the
“developing” countries to appropriate authors’ rights in this fashion, and requiring
developed countries to give full protection to those rights.
The rationalization for the compulsory license provisions was that “developing”
countries could not always afford to pay royalties under voluntary agreements.
Actually, the provisions require authors and publishers to subsidize publishing
and education in these nations by involuntarily contributing their literary rights
for inadequate compensation. The Authors League pointed out that it was unfair
for the cost to be borne by writers and publishers rather than by the governments
of the United States and other developed nations. American manufacturers of
aircraft, arms, soft drinks or other products are not compelled by compulsory
licenses—to contribute their products to developing countries which need, but
cannot afford to pay the prices asked for, these products. The subsidies in these
cases are provided by the United States. Certainly the modest amounts required to
subsidize the payment by developing countries of fair translation and reproduction
fees to American authors could be provided by the United States. And these
amounts could still be provided, by increasing the appropriations of the United
States Information Agency which now pays fees to U.S. authors for licensing
rights to publishers in these countries.
During the drafting of the 1971 Convention, the Authors League and other
organizations consulted with the Department of State and The Copyright Office.
While pointing out the basic inequity of the compulsory licensing approach, we
suggested provisions that would preserve for authors a modicum of protection
if such a system were adopted. Some of these were adopted. We were told that
others would be impossible to “sell” to the developing countries. Whether they
could have been adopted if more vigorously pressed in the drafting stages, we
do not know since the League and other organizations did not participate in this
work. The final draft of the 1971 convention which emerged from the drafting
committee of the UCC was hardly one that, in the words of the Conference
32
Chairman, would satisfy the world of authors. But, as spokesmen for the de-
veloped countries emphasized in their opening speeches at the Paris conference,
the final draft was a package deal which could not be tampered with, at the risk
of disturbing the “delicate balance” reached by the drafting committee.
Nonetheless, the developing countries forced through changes in the text which
further weakened the protection of authors against the damaging effect of com-
pulsory licenses. Moreover, several nations who could not realistically be con-
sidered “developing” for the purposes of the UCC, made it clear they intended
to claim that status, thus greatly increasing the number of countries which might
appropriate authors rights under the compulsory licensing provisions.
THE LOOPHOLES IN THE LICENSING PEROVISIONS
(1) The 1952 UCC allows any member to grant a non-exclusive license to
translate a book into its language if an authorized translation has not been pub-
lished within 7 years. The final draft of the 1971 UCC provided that for purposes
of teaching and scholarship, a developing country could issue compulsory licenses
for translation into languages generally used in developed countries after 3 years;
and into other languages, after 1 year. However, this provision was amended on
the floor to shorten the 3 year term to 1 year if the developed countries using the
language agree. Only English, French and Spanish are excepted. Thus Brazil,
by agreement with Portugal, will be able to grant compulsory licenses to translate
American books into its language within the shortest time period.
(2) In the final draft, compulsory licenses for translation could be issued “only
for the purpose of teaching, scholarship or research”; and compulsory licenses for
reproduction of a book (in its original language or authorized translation) could
be granted only “for use in connection with systematic instructional activities.”
These phrases were intended to limit the scope of compulsory licenses; and mini-
mize their impact. However the developing countries were able to dilute the
effect of these limitations. The Report of the UCC conference (its “committee”
report) states that “scholarship” refers not only to activities in schools “but also
to a wide range of Organized educational activities intended for participation at
any age level and devoted to the study of any subject.” The Report also said
that the phrase “use in connection with systematic instructional activities”—
which was to limit reproduction licenses—“is intended to include not only ac-
tivities in connection with the formal and informal curriculum of an educational
institution but also systematic out-of-school education”.
Moreover, the statements of developing country delegates for the record,
unchallenged by delegates from developing countries, set the stage for an over-
broad interpretation of both phrases that would permit the public sale of com-
pulsorily-licensed translations and reproductions so long as they had some tenuous
connection with ‘‘education’’; for example, inclusion on the reading list of an
adult education course, or a radio or television lecture series.
(3) We had understood that if a developing country granted a compulsory
license, the printing or reproduction had to be done within its boundaries. This
placed a natural limit on the amount of licensing. And this limit was actually
inherent in the proviso that such licenses be valid only for publication in the
licensing country, since the 1952 UCC defines “publication” to include the
reproduction as well as the distribution of copies. Under pressure from the devel-
oping nations the Conference adopted a binding interpretation in the Report
which stated that while “ordinarily’’ a licensee could not have copies reproduced
outside the licensing country, this limitation does not apply where the country
does not have printing or reproduction facilities, or its facilities “are incapable
for economic or practical reasons of reproducing the copies.” Each developing
country will be its own judge of these factors. The interpretation also declares
that a license may use a foreign translator; and that several developing countries
can use the same translator.
These changes multiply the dangers of compulsory licensing. They allow
several developing countries to issue compulsory licenses for the same work, use
one translator, and have the work reproduced in quantity in another UCC or
Berne country with modern facilities. As a result, they can obtain mass production
and low costs; and the added advantage of paying lower royalties than they would
have paid under a voluntary contract with the author. Thus compulsory licensing
becomes an even more attractive alternative to voluntary arrangements between
an author and developing countries that want to use his book. Despite the hope
of the Conference Chairman, compulsory licensing may become the rule, rather
than the exception.
33
THE ExPANSION OF THE “DEVELOPING COUNTRY” CONCEPT
Even more disturbing than these last minute changes in the allegedly inviolable
“package deal” was the ominous evidence that compulsory licensing would be
used far more widely than had ever been anticipated. The principal argument
for the 1971 UCC had been that India, Pakistan, the emerging African nations
and other truly developing nations needed this form of subsidy. But on the
floor of the Paris Conference it became apparent that many countries in the
UCC who are not “developing” in this context will nonetheless claim this privi–
leged status, and the power to make unauthorized uses of foreign works under
a compulsory license system. The 1971 UCC defines a developing country as one
so regarded “in conformity with the established practice of the U.N. General
Assembly.” There is no explicit “practice” or single list of “developing countries.”
The U.N.'s Committee on Assessments has considered developing countries
as those with per capita income of $300 or less. But many countries at the Paris
Conference resisted proposals that this or any other specific criteria be written
into the UCC or Berne Conventions. From a practical viewpoint, most members
will be free to determine their own status.
Several of the present UCC members who may claim “developing” status and
compulsory licensing privileges have annual per capita incomes well above the
$300 figure: e.g., Argentina, Chile, Greece, Israel and Mexico. And there are others.
Some of these have higher per capital incomes than other UCC members like Ice-
land, Spain and Portugal who have been considered safely in the “developed”
category. (United Nations Statistical Yearbook, New York; 1971—pp. 597–601).
Several of the present UCC members who are, likely to claim “developing”
status have publishing industries that produce many more titles annually than do
publishing firms in some “developed” countries. In 1968, Yugoslavia (a putative
“developing” claimant) published twice as many titles as Norway and Canada,
and many more than Belgium and Switzerland (all of whom, hopefully, will con-
sider themselves “developed.”) And Israel, Brazil and Argentina (who considered
themselves “developing” at the Paris conference) each published many more titles
than did Ireland, Andorra, Iceland or Monaco (who have usually been considered,
until now, as “developed” nations) (UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1971).
Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Yugoslavia and other potential claimants to developing
country status have established publishing industries, and have negotiated licenses
with American authors and publishers over the years. If they proclaim themselves
“developing”, they will be free to grant compulsory licenses to their for-profit and
non-commercial publishers, on terms much more advantageous to them, and far
more onerous to U.S. writers and publishers.
Many UCC members who are likely to claim developing country status and
compulsory licensing privileges are well able to support very sizeable military es-
tablishments, at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars annually. For example:
On May 21, 1972 the New York Times reported that Brazil—which considers
itself a “developing nation for UCC purposes—announced the purchase of a $59
million traffic control and radar system” bringing the cost of equipping the country
with one squadron of French-built Mirage jet fighters to over $100 million.” The
Times said that in 1970 Brazil had a defense budget of $792 million. Argentina,
Columbia, Peru and Venezuela have also purchased Mirage fighters, said the
Times, and their defense appropriations have increased 348% between 1940 and
1970. All of these countries are likely to Claim “developing country” status under
the UCC for compulsory licensing purposes. We respectfully submit that they are
capable of paying the modest royalties called for under voluntary licensing ar-
rangements with U.S. authors and publishers.
In light of the loose interpretation of “developing country” successfully as-
serted by some nations at the Paris conference, it is not certain how many present
(or future) UCC members might claim that status. Mrs. Bella Linden, attorney
for two major publishers, estimates that more than 80 present members might do
so. And in view of the loose interpretation, practically every South American,
African, Middle Eastern and Asian nation (except Japan) might place itself in
the “developing” category. Indeed, some of the European “developed” countries
with lower per capita income, smaller publishing output, or slighter defense bud-
gets might conclude they had as much right as Yugoslavia, Brazil, Israel or Ar-
gentina to be considered “developing” for UCC-compulsory licensing purposes.
The Authors League asked the State Department which UCC members had
designated themselves, formally or informally, as “developing” under the 1971
Convention. It did not have the information and has sent inquiries to its posts
34
in Some of the countries which might make the claim. We believe that before
reaching a decision on ratification, the Senate should have the Department deter-
mine, to the fullest extent possible, which UCC members will claim they are
developing countries. Otherwise the United States may discover, after it has taken
the irrevocable step of ratification, that only this country, Japan and a mere
handful of Western European nations will give full protection to authors rights,
and not indulge in compulsory licensing of translations and reproductions. If
compulsory licensing were limited to truly developing countries, the damage to
authors might be mitigated to some extent. If several other UCC members also
claim that privilege, widespread injury to authors is likely.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE COMPULSORY LICENSING SYSTEM
(1) Proponents of ratification assure authors that few licenses will be issued. If
So, there would be no reason to tamper so drastically with the fabric of inter-
national copyright protection. We believe that many countries fought to reduce
the period for issuing translation licenses from 7 years to 1 year (3 years for world
languages), and to establish the reproduction license, because they intend to grant
Such licenses extensively. Moreover, the last minute changes which allow outside
(and cooperative) printing and translation make compulsory licenses cheap and
attractive. And the likely increase in the number of self-proclaimed developing
countries portends a larger number of compulsory licenses than might have been
anticipated.
(2) Proponents of the 1971 Convention say that authors can prevent compulsory
licenses by publishing authorized translations. But authors and publishers cannot
afford the substantial expense of translating a book into several languages simply
to prevent compulsory licenses. They need art audience in that language and a
publisher in the foreign country who is willing to issue the book. These are exactly
what the compulsory licensing system may deny them. Since an applicant for a
compulsory license is not required to use it within any time period, the author
would ºver know if he was spending money to defeat a license that might never be
€X€I’CISéOl.
(3) While the 1971 UCC allows an author to terminate a license by issuing an
authorized edition in the licensing country, it may be difficult to find a publisher
in a country which owns or controls the publishing firms (or firm), including the
one that has already issued the compulsory-license edition. Moreover, the author-
ized edition must be sold at a price related to that charged for comparable works;
and that price may be near, at or below cost—if comparable works are sold by a
state owned or subsidized publisher.
(4) It is also contended that authors are protected because the compulsory
license cannot be granted unless the author's or publisher's authorization for a
license is requested and denied. But this brings us to the basic inequity of a com-
pulsory license system. It is inevitable the author will be offered a royalty lower
than he would obtain in free and voluntary negotiations. He is under the gun. If
he refuses the applicant's offer, the applicant can obtain a compulsory license at a
royalty fixed by its government (and the applicant may even be an agency of that
government). No minimum royalties are specified in the Convention; and if the
author is not satisfied with the government-fixed royalty, he can only challenge it
in the courts of that country, thousands of miles away. He cannot afford to do that.
Nor can he afford to challenge, in that forum, any of the other determinations
made by the licensing country, including its decision that it is entitled to exercise
the outside printing privilege.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF NON-RATIFICATION
(1) Proponents of ratification claim that the 1971 Convention upgrades the
level of protection in the 1952 UCC. Article I of the 1952 text requires member
states “to provide for the adequate and effective protection of the rights of
authors and other copyright proprietors”. It remains unchanged in the 1971
Convention; and is supplemented by a new provision stating that these rights
“include the basic rights insuring the author’s economic interests, including the
exclusive right to authorize reproduction by any means, public performance and
broadcasting.” But it is doubtful that this language (in Art. IV bis) adds much
to the existing obligation to provide “adequate and effective” protection for au–
thors rights. Moreover, the new article allows members to make exceptions to
these rights “that do not conflict with the spirit and provisions of this Conven-
tion”. Balanced against these slight improvements, if they be improvements, are
35
the new compulsory licensing provisions which constitute a serious downgrading
of copyright protection under the UCC.
(2) The principal argument for ratification made by some, including publishers,
is that despite the defects of the 1971 Convention, the consequences of non-
ratification will be more harmful. They say that developing countries will leave
the UCC and Berne and be free to use American works without compensation;
and that these countries will also supply unauthorized copies to member coun-
tries. However many countries are free to do this now, since they do not belong
to either Convention. Moreover the danger that departing developing countries
would become copying centers is less of a threat then the possibility that China,
the Soviet Union or other countries already outside the Conventions might do so.
Actually authors of member countries including the U.S. will still have to rely
for protection on the copyright laws of member countries, which prohibit the
sale of piratical copies.
(3) On the other hand, if the 1971 UCC is ratified, the structure of international
copyright protection will be eroded for decades. Any member which proclaims
itself a developing country retains that status for ten years and can renew it for
successive decades. If some of the countries we have referred to—with per capita
income well over $300, large defense establishments and viable publishing indus-
tries—claim to still be “developing”, consider how long it will take for less affluent
nations to decide they have emerged from that status, and abandon compulsory
licensing. Furthermore, if a country leaves the 1952 UCC or Berne because the
1971 Convention is not ratified, its authors will no longer be granted protection
in other UCC countries. At some point the desire for that protection may persuade
them to rejoin. But under the 1971 Convention, they are free to issue compulsory
licenses, while their authors will continue to receive full protection in the developed
countries, safe from the encroachments of compulsory licensing.
(4) Similar threats of a developing country exodus were made after the abor-
tive Stockholm protocol, and never materialized. It is likely that if the 1971 UCC
were not ratified some nations might leave the UCC. However the Authors
League, and the other organizations representing copyright Owners, are not in a
position to determine which nations would depart. Only the government can
determine that, and only the Congress possesses the power to take steps which
might effectively counter such threats of withdrawal. Therefore it would be
inappropriate for the Authors League to urge the Senate not to ratify the 1971
Convention; since we cannot accurately determine the consequences, and do not
have the power to affect them.
(5) However, it is appropriate for us to note that there have been reports that
Pakistan, the Philippines and other countries (India is among those mentioned)
may not ratify the 1971 UCC even if the United States does, and might withdraw
from the 1952 UCC despite U.S. ratification of the new convention. Since the
purpose of the 1971 text, with its weakening of protection for authors, is to
persuade developing countries to remain in the UCC—it would be pointless for
the United States to ratify the 1971 Convention, only to see several countries
then withdraw from UCC. Such an exodus would make U.S. ratification a futile
sacrifice of authors rights. Therefore we believe that before the Senate reaches a
decision on ratification, it should have the State Department determine whethcr
the developing countries will remain in the UCC, and will ratify the 1971 text,
if the U.S. does.
IMPROVING INTERNATION AL COPYRIGHT RELATIONS
It has been argued that U.S. ratification of the 1971 UCC will improve inter-
national copyright relations and aid the education and culture of developing
countries. We believe that U.S. can make far more positive contributions in these
areas—and should do so whether or not it ratifies the Convention. Indeed, to
ratify—which means that U.S. authors and publishers, not the United States,
will be doing the subsidizing—and then take none of the meaningful steps that
are required, would make ratification a hollow gesture.
The United States can improve international copyright relations and protection
by finally eliminating from its Copyright Law those provisions which deny authors
the protection granted them in Berne Convention countries (e.g., the manufactur-
ing clause and the juke-box clause); and it can raise the level of U.S. copyright
protection to the minimum standards required so that the U.S. can join the Berne
Convention. It can do so by enacting the long pending Copyright Revision Bill, or
by revising the few sections of the present Act that need improvement.
36
The United States can help developing countries improve their educational and
publishing institutions by providing funds, through loans or subsidies, to establish
viable publishing facilities in the developing countries. And it can help the truly
developing countries acquire rights to publish American books—on a voluntary
basis—by increasing the appropriations of the United States Information Agency
so that it can expand its present program, acquire more licenses for developing
country publishers when they request them, and pay adequate fees to American
authors for these licenses.
RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) The Authors League respectfully recommends to the Committee that before
the Senate reach a decision on ratification of the 1971 UCC, it should determine
(i) whether any of the developing countries intend to withdraw from the UCC even
if the United States ratifies; and (ii) which members of the UCC intend to claim
developing country status.
(2) The Authors League also recommends that if the Senate decides for ratifi-
cation of the 1971 UCC, it ground its consent on a statement of principles (in the
Committee’s report, or the Resolution), containing the following points:
A. The United States believes the purpose of the 1971 UCC was to make
the compulsory license privilege available only to truly developing countries.
That while there is no definition of the term in the Convention, the U.S.
believes that nations with annual per capita incomes over a designated
amount, publishing industries of a specified size, or defense budgets in excess
of a stated figure, should not claim developing country status for UCC pur-
poses. That if such UCC members do establish compulsory licensing systems
under claim of that status, the U.S. will have to re-examine its relations with
the UCC and the possibility of its withdrawal from the Convention.
B. The United States believes that, in the words of the Conference
Chairman, compulsory licenses should be an exception and not the ordinary
means of providing for publication of foreign works in developing countries.
Therefore, the U.S. would have to carefully re-examine its adherence to
the UCC if nations which established compulsory license systems did not
design and administer them in a manner which permitted the maximum of
voluntary bargaining, provided simple and effective means of redressing
authors’ grievances, and assured payment of adequate compensation to
authors. In this connection, the U.S. would consider the failure of developing
country publishers to make full use of the licensing program of the United
States Information Agency before resorting to compulsory licensing, a
breach of the spirit of the 1971 Convention.
C. The United States believes that the spirit of the Convention requires
a nation to promptly terminate its developing country status for UCC
purposes when it has emerged from that status.
D. The United States believes that UNESCO must make every effort to
establish a realistic definition of “developing country”; establish a forum
for the prompt determination of disputes between member nations on that
issue, and others that may arise concerning the interpretation of the Con-
vention; and that UNESCO must seek to establish a forum for the binding
arbitration of disputes between authors and licensing nations (and authori-
ties), in a simple and inexpensive manner, so that authors’ rights cannot be
frustrated and destroyed through lack of an effective means of protecting
their rights against abuses of the compulsory licensing provisions.
The Authors League wishes to thank the Committee for this opportunity to
present these views on the problem of ratifying the 1971 Universal Copyright
Convention.
WITNESS’ RECOMMENDATIONS
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. In order that I understand
it, you are recommending that in our report we take note of your
recommendations and express our views, but you are not recommending
we reject the convention; is that correct?
Mr. KARP. That’s right, only for the reason that we just are in no
position to determine, and we hope the committee will determine,
which countries will actually refuse
37
The CHAIRMAN. We will be glad to ask the State Department if
they can do that. I am not sure whether they can or not.
Mr. Ladd didn’t seem very optimistic about being able to determine
that.
Mr. KARP. Well, Senator, this is, of course, one of the reasons it is
hard for outsiders, even though we were consultants in some of these
proceedings, to take final positions.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. KARP. I would think, in my humble opinion, that if these
countries were informed that the Senate of the United States would
like to know what position they are taking on the treaty and whether
they intend to ratify it or not before the Senate decides, they would
tell vou.
T. CHAIRMAN. What you want to know is whether they are going
to take a position that they are a developing country?
Mr. KARP. That’s right and whether they will ratify if we do.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Let's see what we can find out about it.
Mr. KARP. Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
The next witness is Mr. Leonard Feist, Executive Vice President,
National Music Publishers Association, New York.
STATEMENT OF LEONARD FEIST, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,
NATIONAL MUSIC PUBLISHERS ASS00IATION
Mr. FEIST. Mr. Chairman, I would have submitted a written state-
ment, and will delete in my oral testimony some of the material given
by Mr. Ladd. :
The CHAIRMAN. We will put your entire statement in the record and
you can comment on it, if you please.
Mr. FEIST. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I am Leonard Feist,
Executive Vice President of the National Music Publishers Associa-
tion, Inc., the trade association of the publishers of popular music.
I am also here on behalf of the Music Publishers Association of the
United States, Inc., the trade association of the publishers of educa-
tional, church and concert music, an association of which I was at
one time president. The membership of both associations includes
nearly all the significant companies in their respective fields, large
and small. Both have their offices in New York City.
I trust during the course of my statement, Mr. Chairman, I will
make clear that the music publishing field does have valid and sincere
concerns in the field of international copyright.
RATIFICATION SUPPORTED
I appear here in support of the ratification of the Paris Act of the
Universal Copyright Convention of the United States. I believe that
the ratification of this revision of the international copyright treaty
to which the United States presently adheres is in the best interests
of this country. This conclusion is based on long and frequently in-
tense personal involvement in the process which finally resulted in the
drafting and signature in Paris of the treaty presently before you for
consideration.
38
STOCKHOLM PROTOCOL
It was my honor to be an adviser to the United States observer
delegation to the Stockholm conference for the revision of the Berne
Convention. I was present during the long weeks in June and July,
1967—there is a typo in my statement; it should be 1967, not '65–
while the Stockholm Protocol relative to developing countries was
debated, drafted and finally adopted. I sat with fellow members of
the American delegation and witnessed what was a depressing erosion
of the rights of authors, a drastic dilution of the international protec-
tion of intellectual property as it relates to developing countries. This
victory by the developing countries proved to be a hollow one, for no
significant country has yet acceded to the Stockholm Protocol.
DEVELOPMENTS RELATIVE TO UCC
As a member of the State Department’s panel of advisers on in-
ternational copyright in the period since the Stockholm conference,
I have remained closely in touch with the developments relative to
the UCC and the possible consequences of the Stockholm Protocol
on its structure. During this critical trying period, it was heartening
to note the manner in which the responsible officials of our State De-
partment and of the Copyright Office, as well as members of the United
States copyright community, played a leadership role in working
toward a resolution of the tense international copyright dilemma and
in formulating innovative concepts for its resolution.
Again in Paris in July 1971, I was honored to be an adviser to the
U.S. delegation to the UCC revision conference, to be present and
part of what resulted in a delicate balance between the legitimate
interests of the creative artists of developed countries and their pub-
lishers, and the concerns of developing countries for their educational
needs and aspirations.
PARALLEL REVISIONS OF BIERNE CONVENTION AND UCC
As has already been described, the Paris Conference resulted in
parallel revisions of the Berne Convention and the UCC which, in
effect, killed the infamous Stockholm Protocol, strengthened the
basic protection of the UCC, related the two conventions to each
other in a workable manner, seems to have resolved the concerns of
developing countries and, hopefully, restored mutual trust between
developing and developed countries in this area. It is to be hoped
that the threat that some leading developing countries would abandon
the international copyright community will now be resolved and they
will remain within its structure,
DANGER IF BERNE AND UCC DON'T COME INTO FORCE
The dangers to international copyright triggered by the Stockholm
Protocol were very real. Should the Paris Acts of Berne and UCC
not come into force, that danger would, I believe, be so much more
acute that another resolution might prove infinitely more difficult, if
not impossible.
39
U.S. RESPONSIBILITY TO worDD COPYRIGHT COMMUNITY
The United States has a very real responsibility to the world copy-
right community at this moment. We have undertaken a leadership
in resolving the Stockholm dilemma and were among those who
played a central role in developing the formula which proved ac-
ceptable to all interested parties, particularly those in conflict. By
ratifying this treaty, we will take the final and conclusive step im–
plicit in our course of action thus far.
CONCERN OF MTUSIC PUBLISHERS
Mr. Karp, in his testimony, indicated or suggested that the music
publishers have no interest. It is true that we do not have interest to
the degree that other parties in the copyright field may have. Never-
theless, we are greatly concerned with the strength of international
copyright. We are greatly concerned with the standards. We would
be alarmed if the structure of the Berne Convention and of the UCC
were seriously damaged.
I will now turn from my general observations as a participant,
albeit a minor one, in the proceedings which resulted in the Paris
decision, to some specific observations on the impact of the revision
of the UCC on American music publishers.
MAINTENANCE OF BERNE CONVENTION's LEVEL OF PROTECTION
The high level of protection of the Berne Convention among de-
veloped countries has been maintained and this is of great importance
to American copyright proprietors. While the United States is not
now a member of Berne, it is to be hoped that revision of our own
domestic law will finally make that feasible. Meanwhile, we continue
to enjoy the higher level of protection provided by that convention
through what is referred to as the back door. The Paris Act of the
Berne Convention will come into force only upon ratification of the
Paris Act of the UCC by this country, France and Spain, as well as
the United Kingdom, which has already done so.
INCLUSION OF SPECIFIC RIGHTS IN REVISED UCC
The inclusion in the revised UCC of the rights of reproduction,
public performance and broadcasting for the first time, is a step
toward its strengthening, I believe. No longer will it be necessary to
rely exclusively on national treatment, which is the present basis of
protection, for certain specific rights are now spelled out and, needless
to say, public performance and broadcasting are of particular and
special importance in music.
COMPULSORY LICENSING PROVISIONS
The compulsory licensing provisions made available to developing
countries with respect to the reproduction and translation of copy-
righted works have been the cause of prolonged discussion and con-
cern. The music publishing business is on record as being opposed to
compulsory licensing as it is now included in our own domestic law.
40
It is not inconsistent, however, that we view the compulsory licensing
provisions in the UCC in a different light.
To demonstrate the difference between the provisions of our domes-
tic law as it pertains to compulsory licensing for the reproduction of
phonograms and the provisions of the revised Universal and Berne
Copyright Conventions would take more time than is available here.
Therefore, let me say in brief that although we oppose compulsory
licensing practically and specifically in a particular and special situa-
tion, we do believe that its inclusion relative to developing countries
will prove to be neither onerous nor unworkable if those developing
countries which take advantage of the provisions do not do so cynically
and if their actions in this field are governed by morality and integrity.
It is to be hoped that this is the manner in which these countries
will conduct themselves since, if this is their future course of action,
the convention includes procedures and safeguards which would make
the transactions equitable.
Let me point out, Mr. Chairman, that the compulsory license is not
a matter of immediate and inevitable invocation, if I may use the
word. There is a period provided for the negotiation of licenses before
a compulsory license may be invoked. That period varies with respect
to the various materials involved. With respect to the reproduction
rights and the compulsory license involved in that, the compulsory
license only comes into being after attempts to reach a negotiated
license have failed, and the treaty itself says, “Due provision shall
be made at the national level to ensure that the license provides for
just compensation that is consistent with standards of royalties nor-
mally operating in the case of licenses freely negotiated between
persons in the two countries concerned.”
And in the case of music, we do negotiate many licenses frequently,
continually, with some countries which may choose to call themselves
developing countries.
The market for western music is strong in many developing coun-
tries. The market for western music in some of the developing coun-
tries in the east, however, is at this moment not strong.
Let me emphasize now, Mr. Chairman, that I speak only for music
publishers. It would be presumptuous of me to suggest the implica-
tions and consequences for other fields of copyright.
Within a compulsory licensing situation, the clearance of rights
could prove to be troublesome and cumbersome. Music, however,
has pioneered in the clearance of rights both domestically and inter-
nationally, and a well-structured working system has been brought
into being. The established procedures which developing countries
must follow before a compulsory license can be invoked, seem to us
to present no insurmountable problems for processing and I have
no doubt that if the traffic in compulsory licenses for the reproduc-
tion of copyrighted works develops to any substantial degree, an
international structure will be brought into being to simplify the
procedures and avoid confusion or practical difficulties.
As to the translation of lyrics of musical works, we are very pleased
that the report accompanying the revised convention specifically
states: “The Conference stipulated that the words, lyrics or text of
musical compositions were not covered by the translation provisions
of Article Vter,” which relates to compulsory licenses of translations
for developing countries. This decision of the conference is predicated
41
on the fact that the lyric is an integral part of a musical work and
as regards the author's moral rights, it is not possible to make a
literal translation of the words of a vocal work in view of the fact
that the rhythmic pattern of the music must be respected.
TRIBUTE TO MEMBERS OF STATE DEPARTMENT AND COPYRIGHT OFFICE
Before closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to pay particular
tribute to those members of our State Department and to those
members of our Copyright Office who devoted themselves with such
energy and dedication to the resolution of the recent copyright di-
lemma and it was indeed a dilemma, Mr. Chairman. It was indeed
possible that the entire structure of international copyright would
collapse and this is a point to which I particularly address myself,
even though, as Mr. Karp has suggested, we may not have the same
vital interests in this particular or in some particular aspects of this
treaty before you as other copyright groups.
PARIS ACT OF UCC SHOULD BIE PROMPTLY RATIFIED
In summary, Mr. Chairman, it is the belief of the associations for
which I speak here today that the Paris Act of the Universal Copy-
right Convention should be promptly ratified by the United States.
I thank you very much for the opportunity to present our views
to you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Feist.
Senator Javits?
Senator JAVITs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Glad to see you, Mr.
Feist. We will consider very seriously what you say.
Mr. FEIST. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Feist.
The next witness is Mrs. Bella L. Linden, Copyright Counsel,
Crowell Collier and Macmillan, Inc., and Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
New York.
Senator JAVITS. Mrs. Linden has two of our most prominent
publishers with her. May they be heard en bloc?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.
You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF BELLA L. LINDEN, COUNSEL, LINDEN AND DEUTSCH,
ON BEHALF OF CROWELL COLLIER AND MACMILLAN, INC., AND
HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH, INC.; ACCOMPANIED BY WIL-
LIAM JOVANOVICH, CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH, INC.; AND RAYMOND HAGEL,
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, CROWELL COLLIER AND MACMILLAN, INC.
Mrs. LINDEN. Mr. Chairman, I would appreciate your aid and
patience with me. I represent two of the major educational publishers
and we are here with a statement that I would like to refer to more
fully than the prior two witnesses were able to do. After all, it is our
ox that is being gored. We would like the opportunity to have men of
42
your experience and understanding hear and see face to face the people
whose problems we would like to present to you.
Therefore, although my statement is not really a long one and I
will cut parts of it out, I would like your indulgence to read some of it
in full, if I may.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, you may proceed.
Mrs. LINDEN. Thank you, sir. -
The CHAIRMAN. You didn’t give the reporter the names of your
associates.
Mrs. LINDEN. Yes. Mr. William Jovanovich and Mr. Raymond
Hagel.
Senator JAVITs. Mr. Jovanovich is Board Chairman of Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich and Mr. Raymond Hagel is Chairman of the Board
of Crowell Collier and Macmillan, Inc.
Mr. Chairman, before you start, may I explain that I will have to
leave, but I will stay as long as I can. I don’t want to seem impolite.
Mrs. LINDEN. Mr. Chairman, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich and
Crowell Collier and Macmillan are two of the five largest educational
publishers in the United States. May I add a comment that has been
provoked by the testimony of the last witness, Mr. Leonard Feist,
of the Music Publishers Association.
Crowell Collier and Macmillan is the largest publisher of serious
music in the United States, and during the testimony of Mr. Feist,
Mr. Hagel handed me a note in which he says, “As the largest publisher
of serious music, we have no real interest in the revisions. As a book
publisher, our concern is vital.”
REVISED UCC EFFECTS SAME RESULTS AS STOCKHOLM REVISION
I was present both at Stockholm and Paris. In July, 1971, the
diplomatic conferences at Paris led, as you have heard so amply
referred to, to parallel revisions of both the Universal and Berne
Copyright Conventions. The draft documents for the Paris revisions
were principally designed to make it cheaper for developing countries
to use intellectual property created by authors and publishers in the
developed countries, but these drafts were also originally intended to
give authors and publishers of the developed countries adequate pro-
tection for the fruits of their labors and to avoid the broad concessions
railroaded at Stockholm.
However, during the Paris conferences, the same block of countries
which operated at Stockholm again railroaded concessions so that the
Paris revisions of the Universal Copyright Convention now before
this committee, albeit in different verbiage, effect the same results as
the Stockholm revision which the United States delegation, the Copy-
right Office and representatives of those interested in protecting
private property rights in literary property so successfully decried
after Stockholm. - -
I recognize among those who have testified this morning some of
my most vocal and staunch friends in the successful effort to defeat
the Stockholm Protocol. All grow older; apparently some more tired
than others.
43
RELAXATION OF ATTITUDE CONCERNING DAMAGE TO EDUCATIONAL
PUBLISHERS AND ATUTHORS
I have here a copy of a memorandum that Mr. Leo Albert, President
of the international publishing branch of Prentice-Hall, wrote to
Mr. Curtis Benjamin, with a copy to Mr. Robert Frase—Mr. Ben-
jamin of McGraw-Hill and Mr. Frase who was adverted to earlier, of
the American Publishers Association. The memorandum is dated
March 29, 1972. The reason I am reading part of it into the record
now is to point out that there is no sincere belief that the conventions
in the Paris revisions are really less damaging to educational publishers
and authors than was the Stockholm Protocol. There is simply a
relaxation of attitude. Perhaps it is indelicate of me to include it in
testimony, but their attitude seems to be if an act is inevitable, relax
and accept it.
“Leo Albert to Curtis Benjamin of McGraw-Hill to Bob Frase,
indicated copy to Bob Frase and Bella Linden. Re: Universal Copy-
right Convention revision report prepared by Bella Linden.
“Bella tells me she gave you a copy of her report in Washington.
I have also received a copy. I think it is an excellent report in that it
very accurately zeroes in on the problems.”
Here the next paragraph is Mr. Albert's interpretation of my
attitude: “Entre nous, Bella does not object to ratification in principle,
realizing that developing countries do need special consideration
where copyright is concerned. She does, however, object to ratification
devoid of any further consideration being given to publishers and
authors by the ratifiers—namely, the U.S. Government. And in that
context I wholeheartedly endorse her recommendation. Many of
us have said on many occasions that manufacturers of tractors are
not asked to give their tractors away when our government deems
it advisable to donate such equipment to developing countries. I
think it is only fair for publishers and authors to be treated the same
Wav.’’
May I add that neither Harcourt Brace nor Crowell Collier are
members of the Association of American Publishers; so the association
really does not speak for all or even all of the important educational
publishers.
May I also point out that I see here among my good friends
Mr. Herman Finkelstein, counsel for ASCAP, who is here today
apparently to testify on behalf of ratification, supporting the resolution
passed by the American Bar Association.
Mr. Karp's earlier statements are absolutely correct. The American
Bar Association, usually so meticulous with respect to the legal
nature and consequences of international treaties, slipped up, I
regret to say, on this one. Theirs was the most cursory analysis and
the substance of their entire report is really, if I read Mr. Finkelstein’s
and Mr. Charles Lieb's prepared statement correctly, set forth in
that statement. It isn’t much of a report, Mr. Chairman.
Furthermore, may I say that ASCAP, the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers, which Mr. Finkelstein repre-
Sents in everyday life, passed a resolution endorsing the position
44
of CISAC, another performing rights society, that even though they
are in favor of ratification, they still think that provision should be
made for the authors and publishers. The authors and publishers of
educational material should not be required to subsidize the
concessions.
This is not in haec verba of the resolution, but I asked Mr. Finkelstein
this morning if, in substance, I had it correct and he said yes, I did.
I am putting it on the record simply because no one else is going to
do so today, to my knowledge.
RESULT OF FAILING TO RATIFY 1971 REVISION
May I emphasize what Mr. Karp said earlier. The Universal Copy-
right Convention of 1955 will stay in existence. We will be members
of it; we will be subject to membership requirements and have all
the benefits of it even if we do not ratify the 1971 revision. All that
happens if we fail to ratify the 1971 revision is that our authors and
publishers of educational material, among others, will not be made
subject to the preemption, and expropriation of their property as
sanctioned by the 1971 Paris revisions.
THREATS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
I don’t have to emphasize to men of the experience of the Senators
here that there are always threats in negotiation: “We will quit.
We will leave the convention. We will leave the negotiation. We will
leave this or that unless we get our way.”
Chicken Little cried the sky was falling. The sky didn’t fall. There
are those of us who wish to take the position that they are not experts
on the sky and they don’t know whether it is falling or not. All I can
say is that in 1967, after Stockholm, the threats were made; in 1971
the threats were made again; in 1972 the threats are continuing.
It is in the interests, as I think that your own investigation will
show, of the developing countries to maintain their convention re-
lationships. I do not believe that there will be any mass exodus.
OBJECTIONS TO COMPULSORY DICENSING AND CONCESSIONS
May I itemize our basic objections, Mr. Chairman?
We object, first, to the establishment of a vehicle for the expropria-
tion of the private property of American citizens without adequate
compensation. Senate ratification of this treaty will constitute prior,
formal United States approval of multinational expropriation in form
and magnitude without precedent in our history.
Mr. Bruce Ladd of the State Department says the compulsory
translation license of the existing convention has never been used;
therefore the new compulsory licenses will not be used. The so-called
“certain concessions” that the ABA refers to and the compulsory
license that has been presented to you in a nebulous, round shape, are
very, very specific and very different indeed from the existing provision
and go to the jugular of educational publishing.
There is a big difference, gentlemen, between a compulsory license
seven or ten years after the publication of a work and a compulsory
license one or three years after publication. The bargaining positions,
45
I don’t have to tell you, are vastly different. There is a big difference
between these periods and when you talk in terms of scientific,
technical and educational literary properties—we all know about the
rate of obsolescence of information in property of that kind—we are
talking about the current property of my clients and not a nebulous
intellectual concept.
ELIMINATION OF OVER 80 COUNTRIES FROM MARIKET
Secondly, ratification effectively eliminates in excess of 80 coun-
tries, gentlemen, from a normal and needed market of American
authors and publishers.
The CHAIRMAN. I didn’t understand that.
Mrs. LINDEN. There are at least 80—we counted them in our
office taking into account various possible standards—countries which
have and could claim developing-country status.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. -
Mrs. LINDEN. And I think our mathematics is not that faulty.
REVISIONS SELF-DEFEATING IN TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT
CONCEPT
Thirdly, the Paris revisions are entirely self-defeating in terms of
the concept of international copyright. It is nonsense to say that we
are getting other benefits. Mr. Karp was amply clear, articulate and
accurate in his analysis.
In discussions and correspondence which have taken place prior
to today’s hearing, and in the testimony by Mr. Bruce Ladd, it has
been explained that the executive branch of the government views
the Paris revision in terms of foreign economic assistance and a na-
tional policy commitment to help fulfill certain needs of the developing
countries. We do not agree that the Paris revisions provide foreign
economic assistance of any real significance. Here are the statistics:
The educational budget of the developing countries is spent for
school construction, teacher salaries and classroom equipment. The
cost of textbooks generally amounts to less than 5 percent. You know
where we got the 5 percent? Five percent is a maximum even in a
country like the United States and in developing countries it is that
or considerably less.
Mr. Jovanovich tells me it is actually less than 2 percent. So we
are taking a very optimistic figure of what developing countries spend
on textbooks.
All right, let's say they spent 5 percent; the rest of their budget goes
for school construction, teachers’ salaries and classroom equipment.
Authors’ royalties normally might represent about 10 percent of this
5 percent; therefore, a fraction of 1 percent of the educational budget.
But this fraction of 1 percent represents in dollars a substantial loss
of income to individual authors. Thus, while the loss of potential
royalties would be sorry deprivation to educational authors and
severely disabling to American educational publishing, the financial
contribution to education in developing countries is illusory.
The revised Universal Copyright Convention does not provide
developing countries with printing presses, nor make any effort to
encourage the development of indigenous industry and native creative
83—500—72—4
46
effort in the developing countries. The fact is that the provisions
respecting foreign manufacture of works produced under the compul-
sory licenses which were railroaded in Paris will lead to the establish-
ment of publishing consortiums of private wealth operating on a
profit-making basis, serving a safe market protected from American
competition. They will not even offer the possibility of employment
to citizens of the developing countries because compulsory licensees
can use translators and printing and publishing facilities outside the
developing country.
If that is different from the freedom of export under the Stockholm
Protocol, it is hardly a difference which my clients find comforting.
LIMITATION OF CONCESSIONS TO TEACHING, SCHOLARSHIP AND RESEARCH
Much has been made by the proponents of ratification of the fact
that the concessions are limited “only to teaching, scholarship and
research.” They point out that compulsory translation licenses may
only be granted for the purposes of “teaching, scholarship or research,”
while compulsory reproduction licenses are limited to use in connec-
tion with “systematic instructional activities.”
The proponents of ratification therefore contend that expropriation
of the rights of American authors and publishers is limited only to all
of the textbooks, audio-visual materials, scientific, technical and ref-
erence works, film and microforms, and programed learning ma-
terials of Crowell Collier and Macmillan, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
and all other American publishers of similar products and all of the
authors who create the works of education, research and scholarship.
Their modest demand is that, in the national interest, these com-
panies and authors must forego their entire market in more than 80
countries.
REASON STATE DEPARTMENT ACCEPTED PROVISIONS
The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by “in the national interest”?
What is the reason you think the State Department accepted these
provisions which you find so offensive?
Mrs. LINDEN. I think—I was there, as I say, and I am not diplo-
matic by nature or by training and therefore if I am too blunt or too
sharp, may I again Say I would appreciate your indulgence and
patience with me in that regard.
The CHAIRMAN. I am not offended by candor at all. Go ahead.
Mrs. LINDEN. I think the sense at both times was and is that the
United States has to be on the defensive.
The CHAIRMAN. To what?
Mrs. LINDEN. Be on the defensive with developing countries. In
our meetings with India and others, the attitude taken was, “You
owe it to us; you have gotten rich off of us; you have to give us this.”
Our position at all times, both in Stockholm and in Paris, was a
very defensive one of the rich uncle at the poor nephew’s wedding,
where he feels he owes the world a living. That attitude is not a foreign
policy attitude that I think has proven profitable in the past, and it
is not one that I personally would encourage. Nonetheless, if experts
of the State Department and the Foreign Relations Committee think
it is an appropriate posture, it should not be at the cost and expense
47
of a particular segment of our society. Furthermore, since our State
Department and our Government have not taken the attitude of
acknowledging and acceding to preemption or expropriation tactics of
foreign countries when it comes to industrial property or oil or IBM
equipment or planes or other tangible objects, it is appalling to me that
they should even consider that intellectual property of this country is
second class and of less value than industrial property.
U.S. REGARD FOR INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITIES
The CHAIRMAN. You are not surprised. I mean, this is not unique
at all.
Mrs. LINDEN. I am sorry
The CHAIRMAN. It does not surprise you? Why do you express any
surprise at that? Do you see in any other line any comparable regard
for intellectual activities to those which you mentioned?
Mrs. LINDEN. I am sorry; I don’t follow you.
The CHAIRMAN. It had never occurred to me that we held intellec-
tual activity in very great respect in this country, certainly not in
the public field.
Mrs. LINDEN. I am afraid that—I wish that I could say this off
the record, but I guess on the record, too, I agree with you.
The CHAIRMAN. Then I only ask you why you are so surprised that
they don’t exhibit the same concern about the expropriation of a book
that they do the expropriation of an oil well or a telephone company?
Mrs. LINDEN. Well, I guess I would not be surprised in certain
segments of the society, but when the State Department officially takes
that position and when the Copyright Cºffice, the protectors, allegedly,
of intellectual property, take that position, I am surprised and I guess
more appalled than surprised; and I suppose your admonition is
accurate; I shouldn’t be surprised.
The CHAIRMAN. I don’t know why I asked you that. The rest of
your testimony seems so sophisticated that I wondered why you were
so surprised at a development of this kind.
WITNESS' POSITION ON OLD AND NEW UCC
I still am not quite clear, since you were there and I was not,
about why you think the State Department agreed to this provision.
If I understand you correctly, you think we are much better off
with the existing situation
Mrs. LINDEN. Of course.
The CHAIRMAN (continuing). The existing UCC, than this new one.
Is that correct? * *
Mrs. LINDEN. Of course, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that correct?
Mrs. LINDEN. Of course; absolutely.
º CHAIRMAN. And you are very strongly against our approving
this?
Mrs. LINDEN. Of course; it is a sign of weakness.
The CHAIRMAN. You are not like Mr. Karp, saying we don’t like it,
but we have no objection to your agreeing to it? Am I clear on that?
Mrs. LINDEN. I think you are absolutely clear on that.
48
The CHAIRMAN. Are you the only organization that you know of
who takes this strong position against approval of this?
Mrs. LINDEN. Yes, because we are the only ones who are really
seriously injured.
The CHAIRMAN. You are the principal producers of educational
publications; is that correct? -
Mrs. LINDEN. Among the principal ones, yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think those who are in your same situation
share your views about it?
Mrs. LINDEN. I do think, as I read from Mr. Leo Albert's
memorandum—
The CHAIRMAN. That is what I meant.
Mrs. LINDEN, Yes, but I do find that the official position of the
American Publishers Association is, as I stated so indelicately, that
they are going to take it so relax and enjoy it.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mrs. LINDEN. I think that is really basically it.
WITNESS' POSITION ON EFFORTS TO CHANGE DOMESTIC LAw
The CHAIRMAN. Do you favor or oppose the efforts to change do-
mestic law in such a way as to enable us to join the Berne
Convention? -
Mrs. LINDEN. Mr. Chairman, of course I favor it, but may I say
this: I sat here—yes, maybe I am still a little naive even though
perhaps I don’t appear so on the surface—I sat here and listened to the
tenuous connection that was made between justification of these com-
pulsory licensing concessions and our interests in Berne and, yes, again
I was shocked and appalled. Our nonadherence to Berne and our
promised domestic copyright revisions were not caused as a conse-
quence in large measure of the motion picture activity. That was one
factor, one, certainly not even a major factor in the kind of internecine
warfare that even underlies the testimony that is being given today.
No one is willing or prepared—perhaps they are smarter than I–
to permit to surface any illumination on the private concerns that
motivate both testimony and concern with domestic legislation.
Wherever anyone has an interest, real or imagined, or strategic or
diplomatic reasons that have nothing to do with the basic issues, they
take a stand, and in your experience, Senator Fulbright—I have
followed your career—I know that you are much more fully aware
than I how such stands are taken.
The CHAIRMAN. No, I wouldn’t say that. I come from a very simple
community that doesn’t have many of these interests with which you
are familiar. **
DISADVANTAGES OF NOT APPROVING A GREEMENT
But let me ask you in another way. What are the disadvantages, if
we do not approve this new agreement, to anybody in the publishing
field or in the intellectual field?
Mrs. LINDEN. Well, I think a disadvantage of ratification is the
weight that we will have given to the threats, to the blackmail that
“We will quit”. These developing nations at the moment, if they are
not using much of our material, are contributing nothing to our authors
49
and publishers. If we do not ratify and they quit, the disadvantage, I
believe, is greater to them than to us. Again, it is so difficult for me
to recreate the atmosphere of both Stockholm and Paris. You know,
at the same time the developing countries insisted, self-righteously
and morally, that we owe them these concessions, they also insisted
that they were entitled to full copyright protection, for example,
their primitive African art—which I admit on the record I own a
collection of. They demanded that they own the copyright, that I
can’t reproduce the primitive art that is archaic—one hundred, 150
years old—without giving some royalty to a developing country.
They also insisted that their folk music should be subject to copy-
right; so we are not even talking about their indigenous publishing
possibilities and whether they are real or a dream. Every country
believes it has writers and authors and will develop its own educa-
tional system and they have people in the country who sincerely are
making efforts in that direction; and I say that at the same time that
they were grabbing with full strength whatever copyright protection
they could presently get or foresee for their own national interests,
they self-righteously took the position that we owe it to them to
make concessions. This attitude is not unfamiliar in the United States,
too, and I am suggesting that it was an attitude and an atmosphere
of pressure, of self-righteousness, of apology on the part of the
developed and more affluent nations. Also, the fact is that when your
ox isn’t being gored it is very easy to be a nice guy and what happened
was that since the developing countries were zeroing in only on the
market of educational authors and publishers, everyone else could
be a nice guy, go to luncheons and cocktail parties and shake hands
and participate in Sessions with the developing countries and give in—
at our expense, not theirs. That is really what it amounts to.
EFFECT OF PAKISTANI OF INDIAN WITHDRAWAL
The CHAIRMAN. Supposing we don’t sign this or don’t approve it,
and Pakistan, which has been mentioned, and others, say, “Well,
all right, we withdraw from the UCC.” Does that harm you or hurt
you? What would be the effect upon people in your position?
Mrs. LINDEN. Well, I would say two things——
The CHAIRMAN. Are you any worse off than you are now?
Mrs. LINDEN. Educational publishers would be in the same position
as they would be under the Paris revision of 1971.
The CHAIRMAN. You are no worse off?
Mrs. LINDEN. No. They would be worse off. You see,_
The CHAIRMAN. Why would they be worse off?
Mrs. LINDEN. Well, because—let's take India as a more apt example,
because I did not participate in the Pakistani negotiations, but I
did in the Indian situation.
India has a motion picture industry and a good one and they produce
a lot of film and they certainly want protection for their motion
picture industry; and all their threats about quitting, I think, are
sheer nonsense. It is pressure and it is pressure which we submit to.
The CHAIRMAN. Supposing they do, though. Whom does this harm
or what harm does it do?
50
Mrs. LINDEN. If they quit, insofar as educational publishers are
concerned, they will have free use of the American authors' and
publishers’ educational materials.
The CHAIRMAN. They just take what they like?
Mrs. LINDEN. Yes, but that is what they are going to do under the
1971 revision anyway.
The CHAIRMAN. So you are saying that is the same as it would be?
Mrs. LINDEN. Yes, six is the same as a half dozen in my book.
The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean. The compulsory licensing
would have the same net result on your clients; is that right?
Mrs. LaNDEN. That's right.
The CHAIRMAN. I wanted to be clear for the record.
Mrs. LINDEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. What we are saying is that all
the intellectual, as Mr. Karp said, window dressing, all the esoteric
professorial construction and analysis of the tons of verbiage, lead to
the same conclusion—it is six or a half dozen.
May I point out
WHY STATE DEPARTMENT THINKS AGREEMENT ADVANTAGEOUS
The CHAIRMAN. That being the case, then I come back again to
the fact that I am very puzzled why the State Department thinks
this is such an advantageous agreement and wants us to approve it.
What do we gain by it?
Mrs. LINDEN. I think—
The CHAIRMAN. How do you read it? You were there. You heard
all of it. What in the world is the reason, if you are right?
Mrs. LINDEN. Well, you probably have more experience as a
Senator than I have as a lawyer in cross-examining witnesses.
The CHAIRMAN. No; I don’t.
Mrs. LINDEN. Let me say this: When a witness first takes a position
on anything, you ask him a question and then you lead them with
further questions. Most witnesses are intractable even though they
know they were wrong in their first blurting out of their statement.
I think that is true of an awful lot of people. I think the State Depart-
ment representatives were advocates participating in the treaty nego-
tiations and wanted to see it concluded. I think the State Department
may, in all fairness, have interests outside of copyright, outside of
this treaty entirely, in dealing with these nations.
The CHAIRMAN. What interests? Go ahead. That is what I want to
know.
Mrs. LINDEN. I wouldn’t know. The State Department deals with
developing countries on a plethora of issues that are totally unrelated
to intellectual property.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that’s right.
Mrs. LINDEN. In their relationship with these various governments
and governmental representatives, they undoubtedly take tough,
intractable stances. That is my imagination working. -
The CHAIRMAN. I didn’t get that. What?
Mrs. LINDEN. I think in some issues our State Department has to
take pretty tough stands with developing countries.
The CHAIRMAN. You mean to get them to vote with us in the U.N.”
Mrs. LINDEN. Beg pardon?
51
The CHAIRMAN. You mean to persuade them to vote with us in
the U.N.”
Mrs. LINDEN. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. That type of thing?
Mrs. LINDEN. Yes, and the Paris concessions seem to be a very little
cost and nobody is making a noise. Mr. Jovanovich wishes to make a
COmment.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
QUESTION OF STATE DEPARTMENT's ATTITUDE
Mr. JovaNovich. Yes, I was not in Paris, but I would note that
we are having problems in the U.S. in revising the 1909 copyright
law. You heard about that earlier today, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. Jov ANOVICH. This has actually been going on 8 years, not a
couple of years but 8 years, and it may go on another 25 years before
we get a revision of the 1909 copyright act.
One thing emerges in domestic discussions about copyright which
may be applicable here: education—nobody is against education; it
is like home, mother and God; it is perfectly safe to say you are in
favor of education and in fact you ought to be in favor of education.
So when the developing countries come forth and say, “We simply
want to have the benefits of the scientific, educational, instructional
material which you as developed countries prepared,” it is very hard, I
think, for anybody in the State Department to say, “Well, we are going
to be tough about this. That is property. That is property that belongs
to people; we have no right to give it away by treaty,” and they say,
“Well, it is very difficult to take a position against the dissemination of
information.”
After all, there are certain educational groups in the U.S. who think
that our domestic copyright law should permit schools, which are non-
profit organizations, to use educational materials rather freely without
payment.
So, if we have people in this country who feel this way, it is not to
be wondered really that the State Department would be loath to take
the position that it was standing in the way of the intellectual develop-
ment of other countries. The fact that this is private property is
another question, but it reminds me of what Jesse Unruh once said.
Somebody said, “Why are campus politics so nasty?” and he said,
“Because the stakes are so low.”
Well, the stakes here aren’t very big. The State Department isn’t
giving away billions of dollars; it is giving away a few millions of
dollars. It happens to be our millions of dollars. I would guess that if
the State Department were in Paris and the subject was giving away
major industrial installations, it would be a little more careful. For one
thing, everybody can be nasty about industry, you know; that is a
popular sport. I think you just indulged in it yourself a bit. It is easy
to be against IBM because they are so big. We publishers play this
role ourselves.
But when you talk about intellectual property it is very difficult to
stand up and say, “Look, this is property,” and it may be more
respectable, it may be more palatable than, let’s say, steamshovels, to
talk about, but it still is property.
52
So my answer to the question of the State Department's attitude
is: the stakes were low; they could be heroes; everybody wants to be
a hero. I think if I were in their position I probably would have said
it is easier to be compliant on this issue. We may have to fight a
tougher one somewhere else.
COMPARATIVE LOSS FROM CONVENTION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES'
WITH DRAWAL
The CHAIRMAN. Do you see that you are going to lose much more
this way than if the developing countries withdraw from the conven-
tion?
Mr. JovaNovICH. No. I don’t think the developing countries will
withdraw. They have more to lose from withdrawing from the copy-
right conventions.
The CHAIRMAN. They have?
Mr. Jov ANOVICH. They certainly do.
The CHAIRMAN. Has Pakistan much to lose?
Mr. Jov ANOVICH. Pakistan hasn’t got much of anything to lose,
but India is another matter.
The CHAIRMAN. You think they would have?
Mr. JovaNovich. I think that on the products of their film industry,
on their audio-visual materials, they want copyrights.
EXAMPLE OF CTU BA
The CHAIRMAN. While I have you there is one other example. Take
Cuba. Is she a member of the existing UCC or the Berne Convention?
Mr. JovaNov1CH. I don’t really know. -
Mrs. LINDEN. Yes, I believe she is.
Mr. JovaNovICH. We are not selling them books in Cuba.
The CHAIRMAN. If we agree to this convention, would the Cubans
be entitled to a compulsory license under this convention?
Mrs. LINDEN. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. She would be?
Mrs. LINDEN. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. I wondered. Often some of my colleagues like to
use Cuba as a whipping boy for all kinds of things and I wondered
whether or not you had thought about that.
Mr. Jov ANovich. Well, the problem of the Soviet Union is not
really related to this question; I mean, to get into that is to get into
a vast subject which is not, I think, the subject of this discussion.
ISSUE OF WHETHER OF, NOT MATERIALS ARE PROPERTY
The real issue is whether or not you hold educational, scientific,
instructional materials to be property, and if you hold it to be prop-
erty, whether to maintain it and treat it as such. I think Mr. Hagel of
Crowell Collier maintains that transactions in such materials ought
to be conducted and contracted in a normal way. This revision does
not provide for that. -
I can imagine that a group of Frenchmen—why Frenchmen? be-
cause of Frenchmen—getting together, setting up a printing press,
and beginning, forming a consortium and beginning to prepare mate-
53
rials for five or six African countries that use the French language,
which they can do very easily. This revision doesn’t even say that the
materials have to be produced in that developing country. They can
be produced in Switzerland. •' -
I don’t know why the U.N. doesn’t have a criterion for declining
countries, you know. Maybe the U.K. could ask for some special
consideration as a declining country. I mean, if you are going up you
might as well go down. There are going to be declining countries who
will say to themselves, “Let’s take advantage of this. Let's set up a
consortium and prepare books for these people,” which they can do
under this revision.
The CHAIRMAN. How would you rate the U.S. on that? Is it de-
clining or going up?
Mr. Jov ANOVICH. No, the United States is in great shape.
The CHAIRMAN. It is?
Mr. Jov ANOVICH. Yes, sir. We are just beginning.
The CHAIRMAN. Anything else?
Mrs. LINDEN. If I may, I would like to get on record
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The CHAIRMAN. The staff says, in checking the lists of the U.N.
members, of 132 they can find only about 17 or 18 that they would
consider developed. All the rest would be developing.
Mrs. LINDEN. I wouldn’t quarrel with him particularly since it is
left to them to look in the mirror and make their own decisions and
there is really no machinery for proper, appropriate challenging. I
would like to see someone wait for a case to come up in Senegal where
we are critical of their own estimate of what is fair and just compensa-
tion to American publishers and authors. Can you imagine any situa-
tion in which a developing country feels that it is not fair to take
from American authors and publishers with the most infinitesimal
payment? Under the Paris revisions what is fair is left to the judgment
and the rationalization of developing countries, who find it easy to
rationalize themselves into expropriating our oil wells, industry, et
cetera. As you so aptly pointed out, knowledge is more ephemeral and,
as Mr. Jovanovich stated, they can rationalize they are doing it for
the sake of education and therefore it is an appropriate activity.
AUTHORS OF EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND RESEARCH WORKS
I would like to point out, Mr. Chairman, that the authors of edu-
cational, scientific and research works are not the highly publicized
personalities who write best sellers and appear on late evening tele-
vision talk shows. Most are practicing teachers. Few educational
authors become rich as a result of their writings. The NEA (National
Education Association) at times has attempted to speak for edu-
cational authors but, may I say, the NEA talks for teachers who are
users of these materials and a small ad hoc committee of the NEA
has in the past, on domestic issues, insisted their view is shared by all
of the educational authors in the U.S. I submit unequivocally that that
is inaccurate and I am phrasing it as charitably as I can. Actually,
the authors of these materials do not have an organization to speak
for their interests. The cooperative relationship between publishers
54
and authors of textbooks, scientific and technical works is such that
traditionally these authors look to their publishers to protect their
interests. Accordingly, although not designated by anyone as their
official spokesman, it falls upon us to call their interests and needs
to the attention of this committee.
To the extent it is possible to describe a typical textbook author,
he or she is a member of the faculty of a highly regarded, though
probably not Ivy League, college or university, enjoys an excellent
reputation in his or her own field but is little known outside of it,
has an income well under $20,000 a year and counts on royalties to
pay for braces for the children's teeth, a second car for the family, a
vacation or study year abroad or some similar expense.
More often than not, royalties on textbooks, reference works or
professional books are split between several authors. Sole authorship
of an educational or reference work usually entails many thousands
of hours over a period of several years doing library and other research,
field-testing and consulting.
Authors’ royalties on school textbooks average about 6.3 percent
of the total selling price; on college and professional works, authors’
royalties represent an average of 15.8 percent of sales—in either case
a small fraction of 1 percent of any nation’s total educational expend-
itures.
EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND RESEARCH PUBLISHERS
I will not take your time to describe the functions of educational,
scientific and research publishers. It is set forth in my prepared
statement. It is clear that all the platitudes and lovely pro-ratification
comments that were expressed this morning did not zero in on the
activities of the authors and publishers of educational materials,
including audio-visual materials, film strips, et cetera.
WHY PLJBLISHERS ARE MORE DETERMINED THAN AUTHORS LEAGUE
The CHAIRMAN. Why do you think you are so much more deter-
mined as publishers than the representatives of the authors them-
selves, the Authors League of America? Mr. Karp did not like it, but
he said he didn’t oppose it. I would think the authors would be just
as determined about this as the publishers.
Mrs. LINDEN. Mr. Chairman, that is the point I am making. The
members of the Authors League of America are the authors of novels,
poetry and plays.
The CHAIRMAN. Not textbooks?
Mrs. LINDEN. Precisely. And Mrs. Karp has stated that the Paris
revisions offer a “dismal” prospect even for the members of the
Authors League.
Mr. Hagel would like to make a statement. Is that all right with you,
Mr. Chairman?
The CHAIRMAN. Sure.
SURVEY OF TEXTBOOK AlJTHORS
Mr. HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, we sent our own authors a summary of
the proposed revisions, particularly our authors of college, elementary
55
and high school textbooks. I am not aware of any other survey that
has been made by anyone to determine the position of the American
citizens whose earnings are being talked about. We have received thus
far only a small response and I mention this with some shame because
as far as I know it is the only sample. We have 14 letters back; 13 of
the 14 responding authors of textbooks oppose these revisions that
are under discussion today.
Thank you.
LACK OF TEXTBOOK ATTHORS IN AUTHORS LEAGUE OF AMERICA
The CHAIRMAN. If I understand it, the Authors League of America
does not include many authors of textbooks. Why is that? Do they
have any separate organization or don’t they organize?
Mrs. LINDEN. Well, because textbook authors
The CHAIRMAN. Are primarily teachers?
Mrs. LINDEN. Yes, or they are on staffs of universities.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mrs. LINDEN. There are very few that earn enough from the writing
itself to make that a full-time career.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mrs. LINDEN. Also, they are spread all over the country, much
more so than, say, the dramatists where Broadway and the West
Coast are the focal points of their interest.
The CHAIRMAN. Okay.
Do you have anything else to say?
WITNESSES NOT MEMBERS OF AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PIJ BLISHERS
Mr. JovaNovich. Senator Fulbright, I think it would be unfair to
leave this table without pointing out that Crowell Collier and Mac-
millan and Harcourt Brace Jovanovich are among the five largest
educational publishers in the U.S. We are not members of the American
Association of Publishers.
The American Association of Publishers does, I think, favor ratifica-
tion of this and, therefore, we are not speaking for others. We are
speaking for ourselves.
The CHAIRMAN. Are those people who specialize in fiction?
Mr. Jov ANOVICH. No. There are others in the association who are en-
gaged in business similar to the kind of publishing that Crowell
Collier and Macmillan and Harcourt Brace Jovanovich engage in.
We are simply not members of the association. We take a different
view. I don’t know that all members of that association favor ratifica-
tion. I have no way of knowing. But we are speaking for ourselves and
we think we are speaking for educational authors; we think we are
also speaking for some other educational publishers, but we have no
other way of knowing.
Mr. Hagel and I simply want to point out that our two very large
companies are not members of the American Association of Publishers
and we are speaking, therefore, not for an association, not for hundreds
of publishers, but for ourselves. We may also be speaking for scores of
others; we don’t know.
56
PERCENTAGE OF EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHING WITNESSES'
FIRMS REPRESENT
The CHAIRMAN. Could you say, since you have raised that, what
percentage, roughly, of the educational publishing business your two
firms represent? You don’t have to be precise about it. Are you
half of it?
Mr. Jov ANOVICH. Oh, no; I would say around 15 percent.
The CHAIRMAN. Fifteen percent. Is it fair to say the other 85 per-
cent did approve?
Mrs. LINDEN. No.
Mr. Jov ANOVICH. We don’t know. All I say is we don’t represent
the association.
SENTIMIENTS OF PRENTICE–HALL
Mrs. LINDEN. Mr. Chairman, I refer to my earlier comment con-
cerning the memorandum of Mr. Leo Albert of Prentice-Hall. Prentice-
Hall is a member of the association. Prentice-Hall is apparently one of
the group that says, “Look, they are going to take it from us; let's
give it willingly.” Nonetheless, the true sentiments are expressed in
the memorandum of March 29, 1972. I know of no analysis of the
Universal and Berne copyright conventions that was sent to all of the
association members similar to the analysis and charts which I
prepared and which are attached as exhibit A to my statement. I do
know that Mr. Albert, in the last paragraph of his memorandum to
Mr. Curtis Benjamin stated the following: “Bella has offered to meet
with us to discuss her paper further whenever we are available. She
has also extended to me a reservation,”—humorous—“(New Jersey
being a developing state) by allowing us to reproduce as many copies
of her report as necessary without payment of advance and for a
nominal fixed fee of one bushel of Jersey tomatoes in season.”
I don’t believe that my report was passed to all of the members of
the association. I don’t believe that the charts attached to my report
which analyze Berne, the UCC, the Stockholm Protocol and the
Paris revisions, were passed around, I don’t believe a similar analysis
was done. I don’t believe the educational position was pointed out in
this fashion.
STATE DEPARTMENT POSITION ON COMPENSATION
QUESTIONED
I do know that the Copyright Office prepared similar charts. I do
know they were annexed to the State Department's response to you
in reply to your inquiry when you first received Mr. Hagel's letter
and my report. I know that the Copyright Office charts are structured
differently—you know, two people, their writing style is different and
the structure is different—but the fact is that nowhere did the State
Department say that the Linden chart was in the slightest way
inaccurate. Nowhere in its response to you did the State Department
say that the Paris revisions do not constitute prior expropriation.
The State Department's position was that “they are going to quit;
they are threatening us and therefore this is the best we could have
done under the circumstances and therefore this is what we did.”
Nowhere did Mr. Bruce Ladd say in his statement that the concept
of assuring compensation to American authors and publishers similar
57
to the philosophy of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 is wrong.
Nowhere did he say that compensation is unnecessary or unwarranted
or that it shouldn’t be considered. But I do know that Mr. Bruce Ladd
said to me this morning, in the presence of these gentlemen, that the
only trouble with pressing for compensation is that it would delay
ratification of the Paris revision. He asked me: “Why can’t we treat
these two things separately?” He said: “Why don’t we ratify the
treaty and then if you are really hurt, you come back to Congress and
you ask for relief.”
And my response was I don’t know of any situation where once
something is given away you can get it back; and I said, “Further-
more, Bruce, we are all too familiar with the salami style of bargaining
where after each year all you can prove is only that another slice of
salami was taken away from you. And the fact is that is all we have
got; all we have is educational publishing.”
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mrs. Linden. It has been a
very interesting exposure of the question, I think. We will certainly
consider it most seriously.
Thank you very much.
(Mrs. Linden's prepared statement follows:)
STATEMENT OF BELLA L. LINDEN ON RATIFICATION OF THE PARIS REVISION
OF THE UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION SUBMITTED ON BEHALF OF
CROWELL COLLIER AND MACMILLAN, INC. AND HARCOURT BRACE Jov ANOVICH,
INC.
Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee, my name is Bella L. Linden.
I am a partner in the law firm of Linden and Deutsch, and am appearing on
behalf of Crowell Collier and Macmillan, Inc. and Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
Inc. Crowell Collier and Macmillan and Harcourt Brace Jovanovich are among
the five largest educational publishers in the United States.
Mr. William Jovanovich, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, Inc. and Mr. Raymond Hagel, Chairman of the Board,
President and Chief Executive Officer of Crowell Collier and Macmillan consider
this Committee hearing to be of such fundamental importance to the interests
of educational, professional and scientific authorship and publishing that they
both are here today. May I present Mr. Hagel and Mr. Jovanovich; both are
available to answer questions.
I was among the panel of advisors to the United States delegations to the
Stockholm Conference for revision of the Berne Copyright Convention in 1967
and to the Paris Conferences for revision of the Berne and Universal Copyright
Conventions in 1971. I was counsel for many years to the American Textbook
Publishers Institute, which has recently merged with the American Book Publishers
Council. I was a member of the Panel of Experts appointed by the Register of
Copyrights to consider revison of our domestic copyright law, and am now a
member of the Committee on Scientific and Technical Information (COSATI)
of the Federal Council for Science and Technology and Chairman of the COSATI
sub-panel on rights of access to computerized information systems.
I was present at the Stockholm Conference five years ago when the Stockholm
Protocol for Developing Countries was railroaded to adoption as part of a revision
of the Berne Copyright Convention. The Stockholm Protocol granted, in sub-
stance, the same broad concessions to the eighty so-called developing countries
for use of others' literary properties as are before this Committee for considera–
tion. The United States delegation was then among the leaders in its vocal and
active objection to the Protocol. The Stockholm Protocol was so effectively
criticized in the developed countries that it never came into effect.
In July, 1971 diplomatic conferences at Paris led to parallel revisions of both
the Universal and Berne Copyright Conventions. The draft documents for the
Paris revisions were principally designed to make it cheaper for developing coun-
tries to use intellectual property created by authors and publishers in the de-
veloped countries, but these drafts were also intended to give authors and pub-
lishers of the developed countries adequate protection for the fruits of their
58
labors. During the Paris conferences, however, the same bloc of countries which
operated at Stockholm again railroaded concessions so that the Paris revision of
the Universal Copyright Convention now before this Committee, albeit in different
verbiage, effects the same results as the Stockholm revision which the United
States Delegation, the Copyright Office, and representatives of those interested in
protecting private property rights in literary property so successfully decried
after Stockholm.
I recognize among those who have testified this morning some of my most vocal
and staunch friends in the successful effort to defeat the Stockhoim Protocol. All
grow older; apparently, some more tired than others. To paraphrase an indelicate
cliche, I seem to perceive the prevailing attitude today as–if an Act is inevitable,
relax and accept it. Apparently this holds especially true with respect to the Paris
revisions of the Universal Copyright Convention. -
What all objected to at Stockholm, and what we object to today, is the following.
The Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris:
1. Establishes a vehicle for the expropriation of the private property of American
citizens without adequate compensation. Senate ratification of this treaty will
constitute prior, formal United States approval of multi-national expropriation
in form and magnitude without precedent in our history;
2. Effectively eliminates in excess of eighty countries from a normal and needed
market of American authors and publishers; and
3. Is entirely self-defeating in terms of the concept of international copyright.
In discussions and correspondence which have taken place prior to today's
hearing, it has been explained that the Executive Branch of the Government
views the Paris revision in terms of foreign economic assistance and a national
policy commitment to help fulfill certain needs of the developing countries. We
do not agree. The educational budget of a developing country is spent for school
construction, teachers’ salaries, and classroom equipment. The cost of textbooks
generally amounts to less than five percent (5%). Authors’ royalties normally
might represent about ten percent (10%) of this five percent, a fraction of one
percent (1%) of the educational budget, but representing a substantial loss of
income to individual authors—hardly among our most affluent citizens. Thus,
while the loss of potential royalties would be sore deprivation to educational
authors and severely disabling to American educational publishing, the financial
contribution to education in developing countries is illusory.
The revised Universal Copyright Convention does not provide developing
countries with printing presses, nor make any effort to encourage the development
of indigenous industry and native creative effort in the developing countries. The
fact is that the provisions respecting foreign manufacture of works produced under
the compulsory licenses granted the developing countries under the Paris revisions
will lead to the establishment of publishing consortiums of private wealth operat-
ing on a profit making basis, Serving a safe market protected from American
competition, and not even offering the possibility of employment to citizens of
the developing countries.
Much has been made by the proponents of ratification of the fact that the
concessions are limited “only to teaching scholarship and research.” They point
out that compulsory translation licenses may only be granted for the purposes of
“teaching, scholarship or research”, while compulsory reproduction licenses are
limited to use in connection with “systematic instructional activities.”
The proponents of ratification therefore contend that expropriation of the
rights of American authors and publishers is limited only to all of the textbooks,
audio-visual materials, scientific, technical and reference works, film and micro-
forms, and programmed learning materials of Crowell Collier and Macmillan,
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich and all other American publishers of similar products
and all of the authors who create the works of education, research and scholarship.
Their “modest” demand is that, in the national interest, these companies and
authors must forego their entire market in more than 80 countries.
THE AUTHORS OF EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND RESEARCH WORKS
The authors of educational, scientific and research works are not the highly
publicized personalities who write best sellers and appear on late evening tele-
vision talk shows. Most are practicing teachers. Few become rich as a result of
their writings. They do not have an organization to speak for their interests. The
cooperative relationship between publishers and authors of textbooks, scientific
and technical works is such that traditionally these authors look to their publishers
to protect their interests. Accordingly, although not designated by anyone as
59
their official spokesman, it falls upon us to call their interests and needs to the
attention of this Committee.
To the extent it is possible to describe a “typical textbook author,” he or she
is a member of the faculty of a highly regarded, though probably not Ivy League,
college or university, enjoys an excellent reputation in his or her own field but is
little known outside of it, has an income well under $20,000 a year and counts on
royalties to pay for braces for the children's teeth, a second car for the family, a
vacation or study year abroad or some similar expense. More often than not,
royalties on textbooks, reference works, or professional books are split between
authors. Sole authorship of an educational or reference work usually entails many
thousands of hours over a period of several years doing library and other research,
field-testing and consulting.
Authors’ royalties on school textbooks average about 6.3 percent of the total
selling price; on college and professional works authors' royalties represent an
average of 15.8 percent of sales—in either case a small fraction of one percent of
any nation's total educational expenditures.
THE PUBLISHERS OF EDUCATIONAL SCIENTIFIC AND RESEARCH WORKS
The role of American educational publishers combines many of the functions
of literary expression, artistic design and technical skills in applied research,
packaging, consulting and training as well as manufacture, marketing and
distribution. Except in the case of scientific and technical works, it is rare for an
author to submit a finished work to his publisher. By and large it is the publisher
who discerns educational needs, searches out and selects the author (or, more
commonly, groups of authors) to create the books and materials to Satisfy the
requirements of schools and universities, and directs and Supervises the planning,
design and creation of the works. In the case of innovative materials, the publisher
also provides consultants and conducts workshops to train teachers in the use of
the new teaching tools.
The traditional stock–in–trade of the educational publisher has been the text-
book and the somewhat later developed “Teachers Edition”. Beyond these tra-
ditional learning media, technological progress has created the market and tech-
nique for a variety of innovative materials of the new educational media. Thus,
filmstrips and slides, motion pictures, transparencies, sound recordings, video
cassettes and tapes, microform reprints, computer-assisted learning materials
and similar elements of “multi-media”, “audio-visual” and “programmed”
instruction are finding wide use in the school room. Closed system broadcasting
has created another vehicle for bringing these materials, as well as the more
traditional products of educational publishing, into use. Let no one confuse the
notion of “developing” countries with an inability or disinclination of such coun-
tries to utilize these innovative materials or the vehicle of broadcasting. It was not
academic considerations which led the Paris draftsmen to make specific provisions
for concessions with respect to “audio-visual fixations”, and the Report of the
General Rapporteur of the Paris Conference (UCC) notes that “it was urged
that broadcasting is coming to play a more and more important part in the
educational programmes of developing countries . . .” (Report, par. 82).
Very large investments are needed to produce a major instructional program.
It is not at all uncommon, for example, for a publisher to invest more than One
million dollars in prepublication development costs alone for the creation of an
elementary reading program which will take five or ten years to reach the market
and another three to five years to gain acceptance and even to begin to pay off the
investment. It has been estimated that the preliminary investment in plates for
a single high school history textbook, workbook, teachers manual and test com-
bination may exceed one hundred thousand dollars. With the wide acceptance of
the types of innovative educational materials noted above, the investment of time,
effort and money of educational publishers in their products increases multifold.
In many respects publishing exists apart from other businesses. Educational
publishers are in a very real and essential sense engaged in public Service; they
are also engaged in the operation of commercial businesses. To progress, the
educational publisher must anticipate and effectively serve a broad range of
instructional and scholarly needs. To survive, the educational publisher must
make a profit.
Academic Press, a subsidiary of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, is the largest
scientific and technical publisher in the United States and enjoys a large foreign
market for its works. The pressures for scientific and technical progress in the
so-called developing countries are so widely known that for the purpose of this
60
hearing it seems only necessary to state that the Paris revisions will adversely
affect the interests not only of the authors and publishers of scientific and technical
works, but also of American manufacturers of products which find their relevance
in technology. Obviously, the preemption of more than eighty countries as a
market for these publications is a serious erosion of the rights and incentives that
we have traditionally accorded to American citizens.
THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AS A MARKET FOR AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL, scIEN-
TIFIC AND RESEARCH PluſB LISHING
Assisting in the educational progress of developing nations is a matter of urgent
commercial as well as Social interest to American educational publishers. As our
own school age population ceases to grow, they must look overseas for future
market growth. Some 63 percent of the world's school age children live in the de-
veloping countries. The export market for textbooks, which used to be almost en-
tirely British, increasingly is becoming an American market, particularly in
scientific and technical fields. The Macmillan Company, a subsidiary of Crowell
Collier and Macmillan, tells me that the developing countries account for between
37 and 38 percent of its total export.
The developing countries as a market for the products of American publishing
are not limited to original editions of new works. It is generally conceded that the
largest number of translations throughout the world are made of American and
British publications; similarly, the widespread adoption of the English language
has created a great foreign demand for facsimile reprints of prior American works.
A short time ago our office prepared an analysis of the Paris revisions and a set of
charts comparing the provisions of the Stockholm Protocol and the Paris Conven-
tion with respect to the issues that reach the jugular of educational, scientific and
technical publishing. We analyzed the concessions to be accorded to the developing
countries and we concluded that in each instance where Stockholm gave away six,
Paris gives away a half dozen. A distinction in form without difference in sub-
stance. Annexed as Exhibit A is the statement of our analysis and the supporting
charts.
This statement was circulated on behalf of Crowell Collier and Macmillan and
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich among various interested groups and individuals, in-
cluding members of this Committee, other members of the House and Senate, and
the State Department. Many have responded with deep concern for the damage the
Paris revisions will inflict on American authors and publishers and have expressed
support for our position that ratification can only be justified if steps are taken to
insure compensation for such injuries.
In a letter to the Chairman of this Committee, the State Department responded
to our earlier statement and analysis. The Department's response included charts
prepared by the Copyright Office which compared the provisions of the Stockholm
Protocol and the Paris revisions.
We must emphasize in all fairness that nowhere in their response did the De-
partment claim that the Copyright Office charts in any way contradict the charts
prepared by our office. Nor did the State Department in any manner respond to
Our position that monetary compensation must be a Sine qua mom of ratification.
We appreciate that in their official capacity the State Department did not find
it appropriate to express their views on compensation. Perhaps, in the subtleties
of diplomatic correspondence, their failure to comment on our request for com-
pensation may be construed as a silent expression of sympathy.
With respect to ratification, the State Department appears to feel that formal
accession to the demands of the developing countries for free access to American
works is the only alternative to those countries unilaterally obtaining such access.
Threats by foreign countries to expropriate American property are not un-
precedented. However, I do not recall any instance in our history where the
Senate has consented in advance to such expropriation because of fear that Such
threats would be acted upon.
Exhibit B is the letter of the Department of State to Chairman Fulbright.
Exhibit C is our response to the Department's comments.
The accuracy of our analysis of the Paris revisions is supported in an article
entitled “Downgrading the Protection of International Copyright,” by Irwin
Karp, counsel to the Authors League. In this article, annexed as Exhibit D, Mr.
61
Rarp carefully examines the operation of the Paris concessions in the light of the
real facts of publishing life. He concludes that the compulsory licensing system
established by the revised Convention is a “dismal prospect” for authors in both
the developed and developing countries and that “a careful analysis of the effects
and consequences of the two new conventions is imperative, before the Senate
decides what action the United States should take.” I would note that the authors
group represented by Mr. Karp whose interests he sees as “dismally” affected
generally does not include the authors of educational materials, whose futures are
that much dimmer.
Exhibits A, C and D fully explain our position with respect to ratification and
compensation and contain supporting analysis and precedent. At this point, I will
only summarize our conclusions.
"THE REVISED UCC ESTABLISHES A VEHICLE FOR THE EXPROPRIATION OF THE PRIVATE
PROPERTY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS WITHOUT ADEQUATE COMPENSATION
The revised Universal Copyright Convention withdraws property, representing
substantial investments of time, effort and money, from the control of its owner,
substituting a national agency of a developing country and allowing it to deal with
such property as it sees fit in the name of teaching, scholarship and research. What
clearer example can there be of expropriation, defined in the dictionary as “to
dispossess (a person) of ownership”.
There is nothing in this country’s history or experience with foreign nationaliza-
tion of American businesses which would give us any reason to expect that the
developing countries will have a reasonable concept of “adequacy” of compensa-
tion in dealing with the literary property of American authors and publishers.
"THE REVISED UCC EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATES IN EXCESS OF EIGHTY COUNTRIES FROM
A NORMAL AND NEED ED MARIKET OF AMERICAN AUTHORS AND PTJBLISHERS
We have previously described the interests of American authors and publishers
of educational, research and scientific materials in the developing countries as a
market. The provisions of the revised convention will effectively bar these coun-
tries from reach; indeed, certain provisions of the revision will give impetus to
the establishment of foreign publishing enterprises, operating on a profit making
basis and servicing a safe market of developing countries. There can be no legiti-
mate reason for depriving American publishers of the opportunity to serve these
markets, either through export or cooperation in the development of indigenous
publishing. -
American publishers are not insensitive to certain specific needs of the develop-
ing countries; it is an established practice of several American publishers to manu-
facture special editions of their works in foreign countries in order to make in-
expensive copies available to foreign students. However, to make such special
provisions a matter of national economic assistance policy rather than individual
initiative requires that our government either assume the function of providing
the assistance or assume the responsibility of aSSuring compensation to our authors
and publishers for their enforced contributions.
Compared with other businesses of similar size, publishers own very little in
the way of physical plant or manufacturing facilities. Their assets consist of the
copyrights they control. Their ability to invest in the future—that is in the de-
velopment of tomorrow’s educational tools—depends upon the present and pro-
spective income produced by their backlists of copyrighted works produced in
past years to meet current educational needs.
Since 1962, Crowell Collier and Macmillan has invested over $1,750,000 in
the development and continual updating and expansion of the Collier-Macmillan
English program. This program, created primarily for use in teaching English
as a foreign language in the developing countries, is the most extensive of its
kind ever produced by an American company and paid for out of its own resources.
It is used virtually throughout the world. Considering the attitudes expressed
toward educational publishing and embodied in the operation of the revised
Universal Copyright Convention, American publishers would, at the very least,
Have very serious doubts as to the advisability of such an investment today.
83—500–72 5
62
IF THE REVISED UCC Is RATIFIED BY THE SENATE, CONGRESS MUST PASS
LEGISLATION ASSURING DOMIESTIC AIUTHORS AND PTJBLISHERS OF COMPENSA-
TION FOR THEIR ECONOMIC INJURIES
In 1962, Congress passed a Trade Expansion Act designed to make possible
the Kennedy Round of tariff reductions. The Act incorporates a number of ad-
justment assistance provisions designed to assist those workers and industries
injured by lowered tariffs. In sending the preliminary form of this Act to the
House, President Kennedy stated: -"
When considerations of national policy make it desirable to avoid higher
tariffs, those injured by that competition should not be required to bear
the full brunt of the impact. Rather, the burden of economic adjustment
should be borne in part by the Federal Government.
>k :: :k >k >{< :}; +
Just as the Federal Government has assisted in personal readjustments
made necessary by military service, just as the Federal Government met its
obligation to assist industry in adjusting to war production and again to
return to peacetime production, so there is an obligation to render assistance
to those who suffer as a result of national trade policy. [H. Doc. #314, 87th
Cong. 2d. Sess.]
In the debates on the bill, a number of Senators and Representatives reiterated
this principle of governmental responsibility. Thus, Senator Mansfield stated:
These import-affected workers would not be casualties of supply and
demand or any other impersonal economic force. Instead, their unemploy-
ment would be directly attributable to a decision of the Federal Government
taken in the national interest. Certainly, the Federal Government would
owe a special obligation to those injured by such actions.
This philosophy of governmental responsibility to compensate private citizens
injured in the interests of national policy was expressed by many other members
of the House and Senate in the 1962 debates. In that instance there was no agree-
ment by the United States, through tariff reductions, to permit foreign countires
to set their own “adequate” price on American products. The mere threat of de-
creased protection to American industry and labor under the Trade Expansion
Act provoked the strong and justified response of the Administration and Congress
that the Government must compensate for private injury caused by concessions
to public policy.
Obviously, therefore, where American goods and Services—the intellectual
products of American authors and publishers—are concerned, we look forward
with confidence to the reinforcement of the philosophy of the Senate as clearly
expressed in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In concluding our testimony, we recommend that this Committee reject ratifi-
cation of the Paris revision of the Universal Copyright Convention. At the very
least, we urge that this Committee delay any action on ratification of the revised
Universal Copyright Convention until it has made careful study of the effect of
the Paris concessions on American authors and publishers, and after the attitudes
of other developed countries have been expressed by formal action of their
governments. - ... '
Recognizing that the issue of domestic compensation is not within the jurisdic-
tion of this Committee, we urge that in reporting its decision to the Senate this
Committee express its concern for the injury to American authors and publishers
which will accompany ratification and recommend the adoption of appropriate
remedial legislation, as was done in the case of the Trade Expansion Act, in the
event the treaty is ratified.
(Exhibits A through D submitted by Mrs. Linden appear in the
Appendix on p. 83.) -
The CHAIRMAN. The next witness is Mr. Dan Lacy. I think we can
run until 2:00. We are going to have a vote on the pending bill by
2:00 o'clock, but I think we can go through another witness.
Mr. Lacy, is he here?
Mr. LACY. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lacy, will you excuse me? I want to call the
floor and see what the situation is. Just a minute.
Mr. Lacy, will you proceed, sir?
63
STATEMENT OF DAN LACY, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, McGRAW.
HILL BOOK CO., ON BEHALF OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
PUBLISHERS: ACCOMPANIED BY LEO ALBERT, PRESIDENT, PREN-
TICE-HALL INTERNATIONAL; W. BRADFORD WILEY, CHAIRMAN
AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE, JOHN WILEY AND SONS; RICHARD P.
SERNETT, SECRETARY AND GENERAL COUNSEL, SCOTT, FORES-
MAN: AND ROBERT W. FRASE, VICE PRESIDENT, ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERS
Mr. LACY. I am here testifying on behalf of the Association of
American Publishers. I am myself Senior Vice President of the
McGraw-Hill Book Company, which is perhaps the largest publisher
of educational material in the country, certainly one of two or three.
With me here at the table are Mr. Leo Albert, who is the Chairman
of the international Trade Committee of the Association of American
Publishers and President of Prentice-Hall International; Mr. Bradford
Wiley who is the Chairman of John Wiley and Sons, along with
Prentice-Hall and McGraw-Hill one of the largest educational pub-
lishers with a large international stake. Mr. Wiley is past President
of the Association of American Publishers; Mr. Richard Sernett is
Secretary and General Counsel of Scott, Foresman, one of the very
largest educational publishers of the country, and Chairman of the
Copyright Committee of the Association of American Publishers;
Mr. Robert Frase, is Vice President of the Association of American
Publishers in charge of the Washington Office, was the advisor rep-
resenting the publishing industry on the U.S. delegation at the Paris
Conference at which these amendments were adopted.
Mr. Chairman, I find myself in something of a difficulty. We have
heard slightly better than an hour's testimony on behalf of two pub-
lishers. We here are representing some 280 publishers, the organized
industry of the country, and while we don’t want to take up any more
of the committee's time than necessary. We are perfectly willing to
waive the reading of my prepared statement which is offered for the
committee's record. I do hope the committee would find it possible
now or subsequently after adjournment to permit such exploration as
the committee thinks necessary into some of the statements that have
been made earlier today, so as to get the point of view of 85 percent
of the educational book publishers and substantially 100 percent of
other book publishers.
Mr. Chairman, I think it might be useful if we backed off for a
moment from the discussion of technical details and tried to take a
look at the larger, overall picture.
DEVELOPED AND DIEVELOPING COUNTRIES
There has been a great deal of discussion about the vagueness of the
definition of developing countries, and that is certainly true. I think
it is of little practical importance. I think everybody is agreed that,
by and large, what we mean by developing countries for this purpose
is Latin America; Africa, except the Union of South Africa; and Asia.
with the exception of Japan and probably of Taiwan. By developed
countries is meant North America, Europe, South Africa, Japan and
Taiwan. I don’t think there is any real difference on that point.
64
BERNE UNION MEMBERSHIP OF ASIAN AND AFRICAN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
Now, the developing countries of Asia and Africa, all as colonies up
until this generation, were members of the Berne Union as part of
their metropolitan country's membership. When they achieved in-
dependence, most of them automatically took over the international
obligation of their parent countries, and so practically all of the Asian
and African countries became members of the Berne Union without
having really given the matter any great consideration. It was sort of
an automatic affiliation not involving any necessary deep commitment
or loyalty.
COPYRIGHT PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Those countries never really faced copyright problems very much
until the last decade. For one thing, until very recent years, there was
no really serious effort to educate the masses of the people of those
countries; there was no real need to produce educational materials.
What they got were sent to them by their parent countries.
As their own independent efforts to develop education suitable to
their people came up increasingly they realized that it would be neces-
sary for them to produce a great mass of materials, a part of which
they thought would need to be translations or adaptations of Western
materials. Thus for the first time, really, they confronted the copyright
question in their countries.
That confrontation led them to express a good deal of dissatisfaction
with the existing structure and most of them—not all of them but most
of them—took the position that they were quite willing to pay for
whatever they needed to use. -
The one thing that they as sovereign powers responsible for the social
and economic development of their countries were not willing to accept
was a situation in which their access to the advanced science and tech-
nology and medical knowledge of the world embraced in copyrighted
publications in developed countries could be arbitrarily withheld from
them, not because of money but because of indifference or resistance of
another kind.
The CHAIRMAN. From what?
Mr. LACY. I am sorry; could not be withheld from them because of
indifference or resistance of one sort or another.
One of the complaints the developing countries repeatedly made
was that they would apply for permission to translate a work to a
Western publisher and simply never get a reply, and that probably
happened. A fairly small Western publisher would get a letter in
poor English from some publisher in a developing country that he had
never heard of, asking for permission to translate a work into Urdu and
it just never got answered; it never got attended to.
They, I think, attributed much more importance to this copyright
question than it really had—as I don’t think copyright was really
any serious limitation on their educational development—but they
felt it was.
They came to Stockholm in 1967 and managed to persuade the
countries in the Berne Union there to agree to a Stockholm Protocol
that would have sweepingly weakened copyright protection.
65
CONCESSIONS IN 1971 UCC NOT EQUIVALENT TO STOCKHOLM PROTOCOL
Mrs. Linden in her testimony said that the concessions in the 1971
UCC were equivalent to the Stockholm Protocol. That simply is not
so; it is simply a misrepresentation of the fact.
The Stockholm Protocol had no limitation on export of anything
that was done under compulsory license, a compulsory license where
anything could have been taken in 3 years flat. There was a vague
reference to just compensation, but there was no test as to what just
compensation was, as in the revised UCC. And, in addition, a section
of the Stockholm Protocol gave the developing countries the right to
limit in any way they chose the economic rights of authors as they
found it necessary in connection with the educational or Scientific,
cultural development of their countries.
Now, nobody ratified the Stockholm Convention, that is, no major
country. Bulgaria and Senegal did, but nobody else did and it has not
come into effect.
STEPS ENABILING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO LEAVE BERNE UNION
Now, it has been suggested that the developing countries did not
as they threatened they might, resign from the Berne Union when
Stockholm was not ratified. But they set in motion a series of very
calculated steps that would enable them to leave.
Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to be technical on this point but I have
to be to explain it.
The Universal Copyright Convention requires no minimum protec-
tion of the works involved. It does not require that any rights except
translation be respected; it merely says a UCC country has to extend
to books and other works of other countries and authors of other
countries in UCC the same protection it gives its own. If you give
your own authors very low protection, you can give foreign authors
very low protection. Berne has relatively high specified standards of
protection. -
Now, there is also a provision of the present UCC that if you
belong both to Berne and UCC and you leave Berne, you cannot
receive UCC protection in Berne countries.
Now at the present time, as long as a country belongs to both
Berne and UCC, Berne puts a floor under UCC. You have to give
high protection because of Berne. UCC requires you to give the same
Fººtion to everybody; so Berne automatically puts a floor under
Now, if these developing countries could leave Berne and stay with
UCC, they could set their standards of protection as low as they
wished but still as UCC members enjoy the relatively high protection
given to countries of Europe and the United States. That is what in
fact they proposed to do and if anybody believes that was an idle
threat and they didn’t mean to do it, he was just not listening.
It takes ten countries to submit an application to have a revision
conference of UCC. They had well over the ten. They could have
forced this; it was everybody’s understanding and agreement that
this could not be defeated, that UCC would be amended to let a coun-
try remain in UCC after leaving Berne. I think it is perfectly clear
that we were confronting in 1969 a situation in which all the major
66
Asian countries were prepared to leave Berne, and within UCC apply
an extremely low level of protection in the educational field.
STUDY GROUP OF 26 COUNTRIES
This looked like it was going to produce a collapse of international
copyright generally. The United States—the Copyright Office, Mr.
Kaminstein, who was then the Register, and the State Department—
took the initiative to rescue this situation. They, in meetings in Paris
in the spring of 1969, got through an agreement to withhold any UCC
revision action, and instead of going into this precipitate, destructive
conference, to set up a study group of 26 countries, 13 developing, 13
developed, which would meet in private, and informally to study the
whole question. These were experts, not diplomatic representatives.
These experts met in Washington in September and October of
1969. I was there as the representative, as the observer, for the Inter-
national Publishers Association—our international association. The
26 countries in effect, reached agreement to agree, not yet really an
agreement. The developing countries, I think, in all good faith said,
“Look, we will come back; let's try again; let's work something out.
Let us leave Berne if we want to, but let's put a floor in UCC so that
in some regard at least, UCC would give as good protection as Berne.
Then let us put some concessions in both treaties that will meet the
needs of developing countries without really injuring the developed
countries.”
TRANSILATING AGREEMENT TO AGREE INTO CONCRETE TERMS
That was agreed to, and a drafting committee was appointed which
met in Paris and Geneva in the spring of 1970, at which I was also
present, which translated this agreement to agree into concrete terms.
This wasn’t as difficult as it sounded, because on the one hand you
had developed countries that said, “We are not trying to keep our
materials from being used in the developing countries; we want them
used; we only want to be paid.”
You had developing countries who said, “We don’t mind paying
you; we just want to be dead sure we can get the material. We are
Sovereign countries; we are responsible for the education of millions
of our residents and we can’t have a situation where a publisher can
sit in London and say ‘I don’t care if you are willing to pay for it or
not; you can’t publish anything out of this medical book’—that sort
of thing.”
COMPULSORY LICENSES
So it was agreed that there would be a series of compulsory licenses,
carefully graded. The right to translate a work into a local language
such as Hindi or Gujarati is commercially relatively unimportant. It
is very dear to Indians. On that point it was agreed that a compulsory
license could be issued for a relatively brief period, a year plus a
9-month period.
For translation into world languages such as Spanish, French, and
English, commercially important, it would be 3 years plus a 6-month
term; for reproduction in the original language, which is the com-
mercially most important element—for example putting out a cheap
67
photo offset edition in English—a much longer period, running up
to 7 years in the case of literary works.
Now this compulsory license could be issued only if the original
proprietor had after this waiting period—one year, three years, five
years or seven years—either not brought out an inexpensive edition,
marketed in the country or had not authorized a translation into the
language in question. If after that time he got an application he had
another 6 or 9 months to make an arrangement before a compulsory
license could be issued. That is, the compulsory license couldn’t be
issued if the original proprietor had shown any interest in himself
benefiting from the work or if any commercial publisher in the country
itself had realized that there was commercial value here and had made
a voluntary agreement.
Under the compulsory license, moreover, full payment had to be
made, not “just” compensation, not merely payment in terms of what
that country internally thought fair, but at the rate of normal and
freely negotiated contracts between the developed and developing
countries.
Now, of course, this is subject to abuse if it is not carried out in
good faith, but so is the present treaty subject to precisely the same
sort of abuse. Any treaty is.
If any work is expropriated—and the word “expropriation” has
been thrown around very loosely all morning—if any work is ex-
propriated it is not under the terms of this treaty; it is precisely in
violation of this treaty, which guarantees under any compulsory
license the payment of what would have been in comparable cir-
cumstances the full royalty rate of freely negotiated contracts. So the
relatively objective standard here is a good deal higher than the stand-
ards of fair value and just compensation in international law generally.
Moreover, if the educational or other publisher involved finds that
he made a mistake in not having exploited this himself and left it up
to the local country to issue a compulsory license, he can come back
in the market at any time and bring out his own edition. If he feels
he is hurt, wham, that compulsory license is invalidated immediately
as soon as he takes steps to work the thing himself. All it says is that
he can’t be a dog in the manger, neither produce nor license anybody
else to produce it for normal rates.
HDAMAGE UNIDER TREATY AND IF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH DRAW
Now, the world has been described to us this morning as a hob-
goblin that is hardly recognizable to any of us who represent most of
the major publishers in this country, who really live in this world
and make a substantial part of our income in it and deal with it
every day.
Let me say, of course, it is not a perfect treaty. If I would uni-
laterally lay down the law for the world, I would lay down a uni-
lateral law that would serve my unilateral interests.
It is in the nature of agreements that they are never precisely
what either of the contending parties would have preferred as ideal.
Nevertheless, it does seem to me that the damage to us under this
treaty is relatively small. I would like to point out that the damage,
if the developing countries, as I think there is no real doubt most of
them would, would withdraw from the Berne Convention and from
68
an unmodified UCC, is very different from this. Mrs. Linden has
suggested that it didn’t make any difference whether a country stayed
in UCC as modified or got out of international copyright obligations
entirely—which is nonsense. If a country is out of a treaty com-
pletely, not only may its government but any citizen, any outside
person, any Frenchman or German or American who wanted to move
there and start a business, could pirate any book by photo-offset in
any language he wanted. We saw that happen in Taiwan. That is
very different from this very careful regulated series of licenses;
limitation on export; and subject to recall anytime any American
publisher would wish. That is all I have to say, sir.
(Mr. Lacy’s prepared statement follows:)
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. DAN LACY, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, McGRAW-
HILL BOOK Co., ON BEHALF OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERs
Mr. Chairman: My name is Dan Lacy. I am a Senior Vice-President of the
McGraw-Hill Book Company, and am testifying on behalf of the Association of
American Publishers. The Association is the general association of book publishers
of the United States. Its 280 members and subsidiary company are believed to
produce about 80% or more of the dollar volume of books published in this
country. I am grateful for the opportunity granted by the Committee to set forth
the Association’s emphatic support of prompt ratification of the Act of Paris
revising the Universal Copyright Convention.
I have had the opportunity for rather close familiarity with this particular
treaty, with the circumstances of its negotiation and with the underlying inter-
national copyright problems to which it is addressed. For thirteen years (1953–
1966) I was Managing Director of the American Book Publishers Council, one
of the two organizations that joined to form the Association of American Pub-
lishers. Since that time I have been a member of, and for four years chaired, the
book-publishing industry’s Copyright Committee. In the development of this par-
ticular treaty, I served as an observer attached to the United States delegation
to the meetings of the Intergovernmental Committee of the Universal Copyright
Committee and the Permanent Committee of the Berne Union in Paris in Feb-
ruary 1969; as the observer on behalf of the International Publishers Association
at the International Study Group on copyright in Washington in September and
October 1969; as an observer attached to the United States delegation to the
meetings of the drafting committee working on the preliminary draft of the
treaty in Paris and Geneva in May 1970; and as a member of the State Depart-
ment's Advisory Panel on International Copyright.
Mr. Ladd in his testimony on behalf of the State Department has well pre-
sented the content of the treaty and the problems to which it relates. Perhaps,
however, I can add some observations on behalf of private enterprise.
As the Committee is aware, there are two principal international copyright
treaties. The Berne Union is the older one, dating back to 1886, and adhered to
by all major countries except China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. It
requires a basic protection of all the rights of an author for the remainder of his
life and for fifty years thereafter, without requiring any such formalities as notice,
registration, deposit of copies, or domestic manufacture. The Universal Copyright
Convention, drawn up under the auspices of UNESCO in 1952, was frankly in-
tended to provide a means for the United States to join a comprehensive inter-
national copyright treaty. With a minor exception in the case of translations, it
requires no specified minimum protection—only that each member country must
give the works of authors of other member countries the same protection it gives
its own. It permits the requirement of notice and as to term stipulates only that
it must be at least 25 years from the publication of a work. In other words, it
provides a much lower level of protection that the Berne Union. This made it
possible for the United States to adhere, as did most Berne Union members.
To avoid conflict with the Berne Union, the UCC provides that in relations
between countries both or all of which adhere to both treaties, the Berne Treaty
shall govern. It also provides that if an adherent of both treaties leaves the Berne
Union, it must leave the UCC as well. Finally, for all countries that belong to
both treaties, Berne in effect provides a “floor,” a requirement for minimum pro-
tection, for UCC as well. For example, since Berne requires the protection of
69
performance rights, a Berne country, by giving this protection to its own authors
must, under UCC, give it to American authors as well, even though UCC in itself
has no such requirement and though a country, like the United States belonging
only to UCC, is not required to offer that protection unless it chooses to grant it
to its own citizens. -
This rather complex background helps us to understand the importance to the
|United States of the Stockholm Protocol to the Berne Union, which was signed by
representatives of most of the delegations to the Stockholm conference to revise
the Berne Union in 1967—an event of bombshell proportions, even though the
United States does not itself adhere to that treaty and was only an observer at
Stockholm.
At the Stockholm conference the delegation from India, undertaking to speak
for the developing nations generally, denounced in rather inflammatory terms an
international copyright regimen that in their view left the developed countries in a
position unilaterally to decide what of their educational, scientific, and cultural
materials could be made available in the developing countries and on what terms.
They demanded major modifications of the Berne Union as the price of staying in.
The conference responded by drawing up a protocol that gave developing coun-
tries the right three years after the original publication of any work to license
translations of the work into any language, and to export it to any country—all
without the permission of the copyright proprietor—if the proprietor himself had
not arranged for a translation into the language in question or a reproduction in
the original language in the country issuing the license. It required an undefined
“just compensation” to the proprietor if the work were less than ten years old, but
nothing thereafter. Section I(e) in addition gave a sweeping right to limit the rights
of authors in any way required for the use of materials for “teaching, study and
research”—in other words, essentially to ignore copyright entirely.
Though the Stockholm Protocol was signed by most of the members of the
Berne Union attending the conference, there was an outraged response by authors
and publishers in all developed countries, and no major country ratified it.
The developing countries, led by India, were of course deeply disappointed and
offended by the failure to ratify the agreements made at Stockholm. There was an
initial reaction toward renouncing all copyright conventions; but instead the
developing countries demanded a diplomatic conference on the UCC that would
delete the article requiring a nation leaving Berne to leave UCC as well. They had
the necessary signatures to force such a conference. If that objective were ob-
tained, the developing countries would all have dropped out of Berne. Though re-
maining in UCC and enjoying a high level of protection for their works in the
developed countries, they could have set the levels in their own countries as low as
they liked, because the floor would have been pulled out from under UCC.
This produced a real crisis. At a time when the communications links around
the world are growing closer and closer, when the satellites bind us together, when
we need urgently to share our science, our technology, and our cultures—and hence
when a sound international copyright structure was never so desperately needed–
we faced the prospect of a collapse of that whole structure.
At this juncture the United States, which had been forced by its nonmembership
in Berne to sit on the sidelines, assumed leadership, a leadership which the State
Department and the Copyright Office have carried through with remarkable suc-
cess. The United States suggested that a study group be set up consisting of ex-
perts from 26 countries, half developing and half developed, to review the whole
range of international copyright problems. The study group would meet in private,
with no observers except one each from several maior international non-govern-
mental organizations involved, and would work informally. The group was invited
to Washington and convened there in September 1969. A fundamental compro-
mise was reached by the Study Group: governments would be given the right to
withdraw from Berne while remaining in UCC as the developing countires de-
manded, but a floor would be put under the UCC comparable except for length of
term to the minimum requirements of Berne. And concessions to the developing
countries would be worked out that would be more realistic than those of the
Stockholm protocol, which would be incorporated in both Berne and the UCC.
At this stage we had little more than an agreement to agree. All its substance
remained to be worked out. It was provided that the governing committees of
the two treaties would meet in Paris and in Geneva, the following spring to draft
specific provisions to carry out the intent of the Washington agreement and to
arrange for a concurrent diplomatic congress to adopt the necessary revisions of
the two treaties.
Again the United States took the lead. Its delegation came to Paris in May 1970
with a carefully worked out draft that became the basis for the UCC discussions
and, except for technical aspects of the Berne revision, for the discussions of
that treaty as well.
70
This draft contained two basic proposals on which the final settlement was
based. All along, the developing countries indicated that their principal concern
was their freedom to translate materials from the major western languages into
their own national tongues which did not have an adequate representation of
modern scientific knowledge. Authors and publishers of developed countries, on
the other hand, had relatively little concern about translations into languages
peculiar to the developing countries, like Arabic, Bengali, Urdu or Sinhalese.
Their concern was rather with translation into such commercially important
languages as English, French, German, or Spanish, and even more with the pos-
sibility of inexpensive photo-offset reproduction of the original work, which had
been such a plague in Taiwan.
Both these positions could be met by recognizing three different operations:
reproduction in the original language, translation into “world” languages, and
translation into languages used only in the developing countries. Liberal provi-
sions could be offered for the last, with a more restrictive one for translation into
world languages, and much more restrictive provisions for reproduction in the
Original language. This scheme of classification became central to the treaty
provision.
A second area of compromise lay in the fact that the developed countries
expressed no opposition to the availability of their materials in developing coun-
tries; indeed they wanted to encourage that availability in every reasonable way
So long as their authors and publishers were properly recompensed. At the same
time, the developing countries, led by India, took the position that they were
interested only in assuring the availability of materials for educational and cul-
tural uses in their own countries, that they were willing to pay all reasonable
royalties, and that they were not interested in the commercial exploitation of
the material. Their one goal, they asserted, was the right not to have their people
denied access to materials because of a failure of western publishers to respond to
requests, or to approve licenses, or because of prohibitively high royalties.
From these two not very contradictory positions was put together a proposal
that met the needs of both sides reasonably well. Developing countries would
be given the right to issue compulsory licenses to permit the publication of mate-
rials needed in their own countries for specific instructional purposes if the pro-
prietors had not acted within a specified period time to make them available.
This period time, as the treaty was finally worked out, varied from one year in the
case of translations into a developing country language such as Gujerati up to
seven years in the case of the reproduction of a literary work in the original
language. No such license could be issued if the copyright proprietor had during
that time made a translation into the language in question, or in the case of
reproductions, an inexpensive edition in the original language, and made it avail-
able in the country in question. There was no requirement that the proprietor
publish an edition in the country to estop a compulsory language. For example,
an inexpensive American paperback edition, if made available in India, would
bar a compulsory license for an Indian reproduction. Similarly if a Spanish
language edition were brought out under a regular license in Mexico and mar-
keted throughout Latin America, it would bar a compulsory license for a Spanish.
translation in Peru or Colombia. Finally, even after the expiration of the appro-
priate period of 1 to 7 years, a formal request for a license must be made to the
proprietor, who had 6 to 9 months in which to act before a compulsory license
could be issued.
On the other hand, the export of works produced under a compulsory license
was forbidden. And most important, payment of full royalties at the level normal
for freely negotiated international publishing contracts would be required.
There were some modifications of this basic proposal in the final form of the
treaty, notably a provision that two or more developing countries issuing compul-
sory licenses for the same work could produce a single edition that could be
exported to the other country or countries. We regretted this change, as the pro-
vision is subject to possible abuse. However, there are some legitimate ends to be
served—such as a joint project of the Central American republics to produce
elementary school readers. And the right of the proprietor to license his own
edition if any commercial opportunities are apparent may be protection enough.
We are now in a position in which we have before us the possibility of a con-
Structive outcome of what only three years ago appeared a desperate crisis. It is
an outcome largely made possible by American initiatives. If we can consolidate
that outcome through a ratification of the revised Universal Copyright Conven-
tion, we will be in a position to move on to further steps in enlarging the scope and
raising the level of international copyright protection. In this way we can pave the
71
way toward a richer educational and cultural exchange among all countries, and
especially between the developed and developing worlds, to their mutual benefit.
And perhaps we shall be able to move several steps closer toward the day when
Russia and China, the two great powers now having no international copyright
bonds, will want themselves to join UCC. -
But prompt American ratification is essential to this. By its own terms, the Act
of Paris, which is the parallel revised Berne Convention, will not come into effect.
until the United States—along with France, Great Britain, and Spain—ratifies
the revised UCC. But beyond this legal requirement, we are so clearly identified
with this treaty in the eyes of the developing countries that our failure to ratify
would be a tragic disillusionment. For several years now the developing countries
have deferred any other action, relying on the good faith of the developed countries
as embodied in the UCC and Berne Conventions as revised in Paris. If once more
the developed countries fail to ratify an international agreement on this subject,
and this time one drawn to meet the primary objections of the developed countries,
I am satisfied that we will confront a situation in which the principal developing
countries may withdraw from international copyright altogether; and those that
remain will give only a grudging and resentful observance of its requirements.
The result could be catastrophic. We have seen the consequences of having
even a small country like Taiwan free to pirate American books by quick and
inexpensive photocopying. In that case, we had sufficient influence with the
Chinese Nationalist government to persuade it to forbid the export of pirated
editions, which to some degree limited the damage. Countries like India and
Pakistan are far larger, and if embittered toward us on the copyright front they
would have no reason to restrain exports. A flooding of pirated editions could
undercut the markets of all American books and the income of all American
authors and destroy hopes of constructive collaboration in the joint development
of educational materials for the developing nations of Asia, and Africa.
Much concern has been expressed about the erosion of the rights of American
authors and publishers. To a degree we share that concern. Certainly if we could
draft unilaterally a copyright treaty to govern the world it would be different.
But it is inherent in agreements among parties of differing interests that no agree-
ment is exactly what either of the parties desired. This is not a situation, how-
ever, where one party's gain must come at another's loss. Both developed and
developing countries have a vast deal to gain from the continuation of a Sound,
mutually acceptable international copyright structure. Certainly our gain from
the preservation and enlargement of such a structure vastly, indeed incompar-
ably, outweighs any possible loss from the treaty. -
It has also been objected that the proper enforcement of the treaty will depend
on the good faith of the developing countries. That is of course true, but it is
true of the present treaty; it is true of the protection of American property abroad
under all treaties and under international law generally. The negotiations leading
to the treaty revision were conducted with good faith. On both sides. That good
faith can the more confidently be relied on if we now go forward with the ratifica-
tion of this Act. If we reject, it we will seriously damage the grounds for good
faith and cooperation on which we must rely under any legal arrangement.
Mr. Chairman, I am confident that in advising and consenting to the ratifica-
tion of this revised Universal Copyright Convention, the Senate will have achieved
a major and lasting step toward sound international copyright relations and toward
the fruitful cultural and educational relations that require copyright as an in-
dispensable base.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN VIEWS OF WITNESSES REPRESENTING PUBLISHERS
Mr. CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lacy, could you give to one not very deeply
immersed in these matters any reason why there is such a great
difference between your view, representing publishers and
Mrs. Linden’s view, representing publishers? What accounts for
such diametrically opposed views?
Mr. LACY. I wish I knew, Senator. It is not just my view it is the
view of every substantial publisher in the country.
The CHAIRMAN. What?
72
Mr. LACY. It is not just my view, sir; it is the view of every sub-
stantial publisher in the country except the two represented by
Mrs. Linden, and I am at a loss to account for it.
... The CHAIRMAN, Can't you give any suggestion as to why? Do they
have a different kind of business from yours?
Mr. LACY. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Do they cater to a different part of the world?
Is there no difference at all that you can think of?
Mr. LACY. I think it is probably true that companies like Prentice-
Hall and Wiley and McGraw-Hill have a larger stake in the export
business.
The CHAIRMAN. Is what?
Mr. LACY. I expect it is true that companies like McGraw-Hill
and Prentice-Hall and Wiley, for example, all of whom happen to
be represented here, probably have a larger stake in international
publishing than do Crowell Collier, Macmillan and Harcourt, although
their stake is large. We have subsidiary companies in India, for
example, in Mexico and Panama and Singapore, as well as in most
developed countries.
The CHAIRMAN. Will those companies be entitled to have these
compulsory licenses?
Mr. LACY. They could apply for them, but it really wouldn’t
be necessary because we would license them anyway if there were
any interest in producing the materials.
The CHAIRMAN. Could they get a compulsory license on somebody
else's material in India, not just on what you already have in America.
Mr. LACY. If there were a work which the original proprietor did
not want to publish
The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean
Mr. LACY (continuing). And if the Indian Government chose to
issue a compulsory license, the Indian Government could grant that
license to any publisher in India it wished, including one of our
subsidiaries.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PUBLISHERS
The CHAIRMAN. I am not trying to suggest anything because I
am not familiar with the business. But could the difference be that
those two publishers do not have foreign subsidiaries and that you
do? Is that a difference?
Mr. LACY. I think the fact—
The CHAIRMAN. An economic difference?
Mr. LACY. I don’t think it makes any significant economic difference,
Mr. Chairman. I think it may mean that we have had more occasion
to focus on this problem; in general it is more important to us; we
have lived more with it. I don’t think it makes any difference in the
economic interests involved— -
Mr. CHAIRMAN. Do you and your companies do any substantial
business involved with foreign governments? Do you furnish. USIA
and these other people a lot of books?
Mr. LACY. The USTA buys a considerable number of books from
every publisher.
The CHAIRMAN. I mean more from you than from the others rep-
resented by the preceding witness?
73
Mr. LACY. I would guess it probably buys more from Crowell
Collier than from McGraw-Hill, but that would be because those
tºpºnies have much more trade in those departments than McGraw-
111.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there any difference in the emphasis? Are theirs
strictly textbooks and yours more in the field of business and techno-
logical studies of that kind?
Mr. LACY. No, I don’t think, Mr. Chairman, there is any difference
in what the interests are. I suspect the difference is in how the interests
8,I’é SééIl.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean there aren’t any differences actually?
You just view this differently?
Mr. LACY. That is my impression.
The CHAIRMAN. This is not an unusal fact. I find that true in the
Senate. I cannot understand most of my colleagues.—
|Laughter.] -
The CHAIRMAN (continuing). In wanting to spend all our money
for arms, but anyway that difference exists.
Mr. LACY. I don’t want to suggest, Mr. Chairman, that these views
I have expressed are peculiar to me or the company I work for. Perhaps
Mr. Wiley would like to add a word.
Mr. WILEY. Senator, I am glad to be before you again. I was here
one time on a very lively day when we were talking about IMG
(U.S. Informational Media Guaranty Program). I remember with
particular fascination the developments of that discussion.
WITNESS' ExPERIENCE
I am not a lawyer; I am not a copyright expert, but I am a publisher
of educational books, technical and scientific reference books. I have
served the industry in a variety of capacities. I have also been chair-
man of the Government Advisory Committee over in the State
Department. This year alone, as an example of my extensive firsthand
experience, I have been once and a half around the world and I have
just finished a little more than half the year.
U.N. MEMBERSHIP AND TREATIES' MEMBERSHIP MUST NOT
|BF CONFUSED
As a practical matter, to pick up one of the points that got a little
hung up earlier, Senator, we must not confuse the membership of the
U.N. with the membership of treaties. Quite obviously, small countries,
which I have seen, such as Rwanda, have no interest whatsoever in
being a member of any international copyright treaty. There is no
interest, no reason, no purpose served.
The total membership of the UCC, I believe, was cited as being
about 61 which probably represents about the number of countries
now members of the U.N. who would be interested in being party to
an international copyright convention.
EXAMPLE OF JOHN WILEY AND SONS
John Wiley and Sons is an example of a firm which has subsidiaries
in developing countries and in two of them we are publishing books
at the school level. Obviously, we would not take that calculated risk.
74
if we thought we were in jeopardy either under the present UCC or
the one that is before your committee for consideration. In my opinion,
the latter treaty is more than ample for anyone's reasonable purpose.
We also happen to be in partnership in three countries which prob-
ably would be defined as developing countries. We find no problem
there, as Mr. Lacy cited.
WITNESS’ MEETING WITH SINGAPORE OFFICIALS
I had occasion during the winter when I was in Singapore to
meet with some of the officials of that new city-State to discuss the
reasons why they should have a modern copyright statute but, more
important, why they should join the convention which I, with con-
fidence, assumed that the U.S. would soon ratify. This led to an
exchange of letters with the Minister of Culture. I pointed out to
him that Singapore was in prospect of being a very important graphic
arts center. Publishers around the world would produce books there.
Many of us would be in Singapore for one reason or another very
Soon provided we had all possible copyright protection, and this he
accepted as a very reasonable statement. I cited the horrible example
of Taiwan and the good example of Japan.
ROYALTY PAYMENTS FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Royalty payments from developing countries are ephemeral things.
I am afraid there has been a little confusion introduced here this
morning, Mr. Chairman, because for the life of me I can’t imagine
where those great sales would arise in countries which barely are pub-
lishing, which usually have to buy books. They have relatively few
facilities for translating except under heavy subsidy. I really don’t
think the prospect of losing something we don’t already have is
SëT1OllS.
The realities are that royalties are being paid to my company and
to the companies that have been represented here. I believe this will
continue regardless of what
ADVANTAGE OF NEW AGREEMENT
The CHAIRMAN. What is the advantage of this new agreement,
then?
|Mr. WILEY. The biggest advantage, Mr. Chairman, is that the
developing countries will become important. As a realistic publisher
who has traveled the world in this regard for many years, I am con-
vinced that publishing has grown to a point where further growth
will largely come because we will aid and abet the development of
indigenous publishing and by so doing we will serve our own enlight-
ened self-interest. The more literate people there are in the world,
the more books will be sold. Because the U.S. happens to be the most
important, most highly regarded book publishing country in the world,
there is no question that growth of publishing in developing countries
will lead to a greater market for our books. It is going to be a long
time coming. You have to sort of take a pragmatic, idealistic point
of view, if you will, but I can’t see any real danger to a firm such as
ours or members of our association, of which I have just finished two
years as chairman, suffering from this convention. -
75
SIGNERS OF UCC WHICH ARE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The CHAIRMAN. How many of these countries which have signed
the UCC are developing countries, in your opinion?
Mr. WILEY. This is the usual argument, you see.
The CHAIRMAN. What is your opinion?
Mr. WILEY. Well, I wouldn’t call some of them developing. I
certainly would not consider Brazil, where we have a partnership,
a developing country. I find in talking as I wander around the world
and, as I say, do a great deal of this, that if you spoke to a publisher
and suggested that he was in a developing country and therefore he
needed some special concession, he would probably take offense.
I doubt that they will take advantage of any developed countries’
product except by default on the part of the developed country failing
to facilitate access to copyrights. This is a very serious matter which
I am personally familiar with because I pursued this in other countries
where time and again the complaint is, “Well, we never get an answer;
we never get an answer.” The money is inconsequential, even if 10,000
books were sold.
WHY DON'T PUBLISHERS ANSWER LETTERS7
The CHAIRMAN. Why don’t they answer the letters? Why wouldn’t
they get an answer?
Mr. WILEY. Publishers just don’t know and don’t pay any attention.
The CHAIRMAN. I mean, why?
Mr. WILEY. There is very little money involved.
The CHAIRMAN. You mean publishers are more negligent of their
good manners than other people? Most people answer.
Mr. WILEY. Only a small part of the publishers in the U.S. are in
any way actively concerned with the international aspects of
publishing.
The CHAIRMAN. They are just not interested?
Mr. WILEY. Not interested.
The CHAIRMAN. I see.
Mr. WILEY. Of course, you have the further problem that as so
often occurs, the author has an agent and the agent looks it over and
says, “Oh, well, a couple of hundred dollars; why should I bother if
my commission is inconsequential?”
BASE OF ROYALTY PAYMENTS
But I think it is very important in the matter of royalty payments,
Mr. Chairman, to recognize that throughout the world royalty pay-
ments are based not on the prices at which the publisher who issues
the license sells his book, but the price at which the book is sold in the
other country.
The CHAIRMAN. Which is much smaller?
Mr. WILEY. Yes, which is infinitesimal by comparison with dollar
TICOS.
p The CHAIRMAN. Even with the devaluation of the dollar?
Mr. WILEY. Well, I wish that some of the contracts our company
had signed in recent years had provided for payment in local currency;
we would have been a lot happier. Unfortunately, it was not.
Thank you, sir. -
76
WITNESS’s POSITION ON REVISED UCC
Mr. LACY. Mr. Chairman, If I could just take one moment to add
one thing. I did not mean, perhaps in heated statement, to indicate
there is no reason to feel that there are parts of this treaty that in a
perfect world we would not have wanted differently. There are
possibilities that
The CHAIRMAN. I didn’t understand you to mean the revised UCC
was perfect, but on balance you are for it and say it ought to be ratified.
Is there any doubt about that?
Mr. LACY. Not at all, sir, emphatically. The dangers of one or more
language countries leaving copyright completely and being in a
position to have any businessman set up a business there, able to
produce by offset in English any book he wanted and sell it wherever
he could find a buyer, would be catastrophic and it is a risk we can’t
I'UIſl.
EFFECT OF U.S. DECLINING TO RATIFY
Let me say one word further. Under the terms of this treaty neither
the amendments of UCC nor the partial amendment of Berne, which
is not up before the Senate because we are not members of Berne,
can go into effect until four countries, one of whom is the United
States, has ratified. So that if we decline to ratify we will have vetoed.
We will not merely have dealt ourselves out, we will have vetoed for
the whole world an effort to reconstruct and perpetuate the inter-
national copyright structure. The opportunities thereafter to rely on
the good faith of the developing countries, in which I feel considerable
confidence now, will be seriously diminished and any copyright
agreement, whatever it says in the treaty, has to depend on good
faith and loyal reinforcement. Copyright is not a tangible piece of
property, it is something that exists in the law and as it is enforced in
the courts of the countries concerned. Only if we have an international
system, all the members of which agree meets their interests, has
been considerate of their needs, and are prepared to support, can we
really hope to protect our works around the world.
The CHAIRMAN. I am going to have to conclude this. We have gone
on longer than I expected now.
I don’t know what to do about Mr. Lieb.
Mr. Lieb, do you have a short statement that you can submit for
the record?
STATEMENT OF HERMAN FINKELSTEIN, SECTION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION; ACCOMPANIED BY
CHARLES H. LIEB, SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND COPY-
RIGHT LAW, ABA
Mr. FINKELSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, I am Herman Finkelstein. Mr.
Lieb is at my left and we both appear for the American Bar Associa-
tion. It would just take 2 minutes to summarize the statement.
The CHAIRMAN. I have to leave. We have a quorum going and I
have to go right away.
77
ABA CONSIDERATION OF CONVENTION
Mr. FINKELSTEIN. First, I would like to correct the statement that
has been made here that the American Bar Association gave only
skimpy consideration to this convention. There was a very lengthy
report filed with the Committee on International Law which I repre-
sent here and I would like to hand that in for the record, Mr. Chairman.
(See Appendix, p. 126.)
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. FINKELSTEIN. And a very lengthy report filed by the Com-
mittee on Patent—by the Section on Patent, Trademark and Copy-
right Law of the Association, and I would like to hand that in. (See
Appendix, p. 146).
ABA POSITION ON CONVENTION
The CHAIRMAN. Tell me; are you in favor of the convention?
Mr. FINKELSTEIN. We support the convention.
Mr. Chairman, we are in this position: We can’t decide what kind
of a treaty we would like. There are many nations involved here and
we face this fact that the developing countries were able to go to
Stockholm in 1967 and upset the whole pattern of the Berne
The CHAIRMAN. We have had all that testimony. I just want to
know what you think about this convention. -
Mr. FINKELSTEIN. I favor, and the American Bar Association
favors it.
The CHAIRMAN. You favor it. Was your committee which considered
it fairly unanimous about it?
Mr. FINKELSTEIN. Yes, sir. The International Law Council was
unanimous and I will ask Mr. Lieb about the International Patent,
Trademark and Copyright Section.
Mr. LIEB. The Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section was
unanimous in recommending expedited favorable action in the House
of Delegates in its February meeting because of the American Bar
Association’s view of the urgency of speedy ratification.
URGENCY OF RATIFICATION
The CHAIRMAN. What is the urgency?
Mr. LIEB. The urgency is that, in our view, the world is waiting
to see whether the United States will fulfill its commitment to go
along with these revisions because if the United States
The CHAIRMAN. What happens if they don’t? What is your answer
to Mrs. Linden's testimony? Did you hear it?
Mr. LIEB. Well, Mrs. Linden seems to be taking a minority view.
All of the experts with whom I am familiar on the national and on
the international level feel that unless these revised conventions are
adopted, there will be a mass walkout.
The CHAIRMAN. Is she the only one you know that opposes this
treaty? -
Mr. LIEB. The only one I know with the exception of Irwin Karp
whom you heard this morning.
The CHAIRMAN. He opposes it equivocally. He says he disagrees
with it, but he doesn’t really wish us not to approve it.
S3—500—72 6
78
Mr. FINKELSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, if I may point out, I was a
member of the original delegation that went to Geneva in 1952. I
was in Stockholm in 1967, in Paris in July, 1971.
Now, we are faced with this: If this present situation continues,
and this revision is not ratified, then the Stockholm Protocol remains
in the Berne Convention. Now, we do hope to have our domestic
law revised within the next 2 years and when that is revised we
hope to be in a position to join the Berne Convention. We will have
had the term of copyright that we must have to join Berne, life plus
50. We expect to have the manufacturing clause either eliminated or
modified so that we can join the Berne Convention, and we find
that with respect to moral rights that the law in England is about
the same as our own and members of the Berne Convention have no
problem there. But if the Stockholm Protocol remains, then we can’t
join the Berne Convention without adhering to the Protocol, and that
just destroys the whole fabric of copyright.
What we have here is this: In Paris we found a solution that pre-
served the fabric of international copyright and that is why the Inter-
national Association of Societies of Authors and Composers (CISAC)
adopted a resolution supporting adherence to both the Berne and the
UCC because there you have both sets of countries involved, and they
did express this thought that although favoring ratification, including
measures that will aid educational activities of developing countries,
CISAC–that association—regrets that this should be done at the
expense of authors by impairing their rights in the field of translation
and reproduction rather than providing the financial subsidies at the
expense of developed states. But, of course, there is no hope of getting
that subsidy and in order to preserve international copyright the
ratification of the Paris revision of UCC by the U.S. is essential.
º: CHAIRMAN. I thank you, Mr. Finkelstein. Whatever you
wish to
AAP's TAKING OF POSITION ON RATIFICATION
Mr. LIEB. Mr. Chairman, in answer to Mrs. Linden's suggestion
that AAP, to which I am copyright counsel, heedlessly, thougthlessly
and negligently took its position on the ratification of the treaty,
I should like to submit only in answer to that a copy of a memorandum
of June 2 which I wrote, commenting on Mrs. Linden's memorandum,
addressed to Mr. Robert Bernstein, Chairman of the AAP and Mr.
Sanford Cobb, President. (See Appendix, p. 148.)
I should also like to submit, if I may, one of the finest discussions of
the Paris revision which I have read, which is an article by Barbara
Ringer, former Assistant Register of Copyrights, which appeared in
the November, 1971, issue of Publishers Weekly and which I think
would be informative. (See Appendix, p. 149.)
The CHAIRMAN. They will be received and inserted in the record.
Mr. FINKELSTEIN. May I have the resolution of the authors, CISAC,
and h submission of the ASCAP supporting it? (See Appendix, p.
155.
(Prepared statement of Mr. Finkelstein follows:)
79
STATEMENT OF HERMAN FINKELSTEIN SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
CHARLEs H. LIEB SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW on
BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
This is a joint statement by Herman Finkelstein and Charles H. Lieb on behalf
of the American Bar Association in support of ratification of the Paris Revision
of the Universal Copyright Convention. -
Herman Finkelstein is a member of the New York and Connecticut bars residing
in Hilltown Township, Bucks County, Pennsylvania. He is General Counsel of
the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), of One
Lincoln Plaza, New York, N.Y. In that capacity, he was an adviser to the United
States Delegation at the Paris Conferences in July 1971, which resulted in revision
of the Universal Copyright Convention now before this Committee and the revision
of the Berne Convention to which the United States is not a party, but which is
very much involved in the revision of the Universal Copyright Convention as we
shall point out. Mr. Finkelstein is Vice Chairman of the Committee on Interna-
tional Patent, Trademark and Copyright Relations of the Section of International
Law and has been designated by that Section to make this statement.
Charles H. Lieb is a member of the New York and Connecticut bars. He is a
member of the firm of Paskus, Gordon & Hyman, 733. Third Avenue, New York,
N.Y. -
He is Chairman of the Copyright Division of the Section of Patent, Trademark
and Copyright Law and has been designated by that Section to make this state-
ment. He resides in Easton, Connecticut. -
This statement is submitted pursuant to the following resolution adopted by
the American Bar Association on February 7 and 8, 1972, pursuant to the joint
recommendation of the Section of International Law and the Section of Patent,
Trademark and Copyright Law:
“Resolved, That the American Bar Association endorses the ratification by the
TJnited States of the Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on July
24, 1971, and that the Section of International and Comparative Law and the
Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law are authorized to present the
position of the Association in this matter before Congress.”
We are concerned here with a revision of the Universal Copyright Convention
(UCC) to which the United States has been a party since 1954. As will be shown,
this Convention bears a relationship to another and older convention to which
the United States has not thus far adhered, namely, the Berne Convention (Berne).
Although the two conventions are independent of each other, when the UCC was
formulated in 1952 it was agreed that it was not to be used to undermine Berne.
In order to insure this, Article 17 of the UCC provided that the works of a country
that has withdrawn from Berne will not be given protection under the UCC in
other Berne countries. Thus a member of Berne may not leave that convention
and rely upon the UCC to govern its international copyright relations. This is
called the Berne Safeguard Clause and was adopted to insure the continuing high
level as contrasted with the UCC which, until the Paris revision, had no minimum
requirements except recognition of the right of translation and a relatively short
term of copyright.
At the Stockholm Conference to revise the Berne Convention in 1967, the
developing countries were successful in a drive to enable them, within the frame-
work of Berne, to use copyrighted works originating primarily in the developed
countrie without payment when such uses were for educational or cultural
purposes. This modification of the Berne Convention has become known as the
“Stockholm Protocol.” Much to the surprise of the proponents of the Protocol,
the Stockholm revision of the Berne Convention was not ratified by the leading
members of Berne whose works they intended to use, namely, France, Spain and
the United Kingdom. The only developed country which had ratified Stockholm
was Sweden (the host to the Stockholm Conference) whose works were of little
interest to the developing countries.
1 The implications and repercussions of the Stockholm Protocol and analyzed in Lazar, “Developing
Countries and Authors’ Rights in International Copyright,” ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium No.
19 (1) (1971); Schrader, “Armageddon in International Copyright: Review of the Berne Convention, the
Universal Copyright Convention, and the Present Crisis in International Copyright,” (2) Advances in
Librarianship 306 (1971); Ringer, “The Role of the United States in International Copyright,” (56) George-
7 town Law Journal 1050 (1968).
80
As a result of the failure of the Stockholm Protocol, the developing countries
engaged in a move to revise the UCC in two respects: (1) by eliminating the Berne
Safeguard Clause and (2) by transferring the Stockholm Protocol for all practical
purposes from the Berne Convention to the UCC. If this move were successful,
the developing countries would give up their membership in Berne and American
works would in effect be subject to confiscation in the developing countries when
used for educational or cultural purposes. -
In order to find some method of satisfying the legitimate needs of developing
countries and at the same time maintaining the integrity of the international
copyright system, committees representing Berne and the UCC worked together.
with the very active cooperation of the United States to arrive at a basis for
revising both conventions.
As a result, conferences were concluded in Paris on July 24, 1971, revising the
UCC and Berne, and reaching an accommodation between the developed and
developing countries. In addition, certain basic minimum rights were added to the
|UCC which originally provided only for the right of translation. The Paris
Revision changes the UCC in the following respects:
1. The Berne Safeguard Clause is preserved for developed countries but develop-
ing countries may now withdraw from Berne without suffering any penalty.
2. The rights of reproduction, public performance and broadcasting are added
to the right of translation as basic rights to be recognized in countries adhering
to UCC. This will not require a change in our existing law. As the report ac-
companying the convention points out, “No country now meeting the obligations
of the 1952 convention and according basic copyright protection would be re-
quired ; assume new obligations in adhering to the 1971 convention” (Report,
para. 44).
3. Certain exceptions to the right of translation are introduced in favor of
developing countries. Compulsory licenses are permitted where a translation in
the developing country’s language is not available.
4. In addition to compulsory licenses for translations, developing countries
are permitted to authorize the reproduction of works on a compulsory license
basis if copies of a particular edition of a work have not been distributed in the
country to the general public or in connection with systematic instructional
activities. At least three years must elapse before such a license may be issued
in the case of works in the natural and physical Sciences; the period applied to
works of fiction, poetry, drama, music and art books, however, is longer—seven
years. For other works it is five years.
Turning to the Paris revision of Berne, although the United States is not a
party to that Convention, the United States is directly involved because the
Paris revision of Berne does not become operative unless the United States, France,
Spain and the United Kingdom adhere to the Paris revision of the UCC. Conse-
quently, if the United States does not adhere to the UCC Revision the latest
Berne Revision will be the one signed at Stockholm in 1967 which includes the
troublesome Protocol. If this happens the basic purpose of the Paris Revision of
both conventions will have been defeated.
Although the United States is not a party to the Berne Convention our scien-
tific, literary and musical works are protected throughout most foreign markets
under that Convention. We are an exporting country in these fields and our works
secure Berne protection by simultaneous publication in Canada or another Berne
country. It is hoped that when our domestic law is revised we will be in a position
to join the Berne Convention (with some slight modifications in that Convention)
or that we may foster a merger of the two conventions. This will not be possible
if the Stockholm Protocol remains a part of the Berne Convention because not
Only the United States but countries such as the United Kingdom, France and
Spain, among others, will not adhere to the Stockholm revision of Berne so long
as it contains the Protocol.
In the interest of advancing the cause of copyright throughout the world, the
American Bar Association endorses ratification of the Paris revision of the UCC.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Kaminstein, I believe you have already submitted a statement
to the committee. I am sorry that time has run out, but I have to
go because I have to be prepared to vote on this upcoming resolution.
You are in support of this Convention, as I understand it?
81
STATEMENT OF ABRAHAM L. KAMINSTEIN, HONORARY CONSULT-
ANT IN COPYRIGHT, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Mr. KAMINSTEIN. I am, but I would like to take up two questions
that you raised: What are the disadvantages to the U.S. if we do not
ratify? (1) The Countries in the Berne Union are likely to close the
back door to the Berne Convention under which our publishers now
are free to get protection under the Berne Convention. That has
already been raised in Stockholm. (2) We would revert to the situation
20 years ago when the U.S. belonged to no international convention
at all, when we had a series of 51 bilateral agreements under which
in some cases you had to comply with the local law with the danger
of losing all copyright protection. Furthermore, it took us 4 years to
get this thing off the ground and we sweated night and day. If we
don’t ratify it, we will ruin our diplomatic standing in the copyright
world, which is most important. And I see no reason, as you men-
tioned, why we should have two copyright conventions. It is time
the United States amended the old copyright law and put us in the
position of joining the Berne Convention. I would like to See all
countries join in one convention. Thank you.
(Mr. Kaminstein's prepared statement follows:)
STATEMENT OF ABRAHAM L. KAMINSTEIN BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
FoEEIGN RELATIONs, AUGUST 2, 1972
UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION, AS REVISED
My name is Abraham L. Kaminstein, and although I am an Honorary Con-
Sultant in Copyright at the Library of Congress, I must stress that today I repre-
Sent only myself. It is a privilege for me to appear to urge ratification of the
Universal Copyright Convention as Revised at Paris. Prior to my retirement on
August 31, 1971, I spent 23 years in the Copyright Office, the last 11 years as
Register of Copyright.
Following the adoption of the Stockholm Protocol to the Berne Convention,
in 1967, international copyright entered a period of crisis. While the United States
was not a member of the Berne Union, publishers in the United States for example,
relied upon and used the “back door” to Berne protection by publishing simul-
taneously in Great Britain or Canada. The Protocol was a direct threat to the
Standards of protection and to the structure of international copyright which had
evolved over the past one hundred years.
The reaction to the Protocol among authors, publishers, and other copyright
Owners in the United States, Britain, and elsewhere, was very strong. To attempt
to revise the Protocol quickly seemed an impossible task, made even more so by
the suspicion abroad that we were not really interested in raising the level of
copyright protection, so long as we could use the “back door” of Berne. Placing
any doubts to One side, and speaking for the United States delegation in Geneva
in December 1967, I proposed a plan for revising the Protocol, and amending
both Berne and the Universal Copyright Convention. The Universal Copyright
Convention, of which the United States was one of the principal founders, had
not been amended since 1952, when it was negotiated.
The plan was considered by the governing bodies of both conventions and
approved. During the next three years, negotiations, meetings, and conferences
took place. Ordinarily, it takes 20 years to revise an international instrument.
Four years from the Stockholm Conference almost to the month, the Paris revisions
of the Universal Copyright Convention and of Berne Convention were adopted.
In the United States the plan, initiated by the Copyright Office and approved
by the State Department, won the approval of most of the copyright bar and the
groups they represented. My colleagues at the State Department were very
helpful: Bruce Ladd, Deputy Assistant Secretary, who took over just before the
Conference in Paris from his predecessor, Gene Braderman, and especially Harvey
82
Winter, Director, Office of Business Protection, who was always there when we
needed him. In the Copyright Office, we used three attorneys for research, as
needed, and for two years before Paris we had the assistance of Bob Hadl. Barbara
Ringer, Assistant Register of Copyright, conceived the entire plan, and with self-
less dedication, directed, negotiated, drafted, and finally, produced a first draft of
the comprehensive Report of the Paris Convention which has been made a part of
Executive G.
Twenty years ago, our copyright relations with countries in Europe was a
very intricate affair, a complex network of Some 51 agreements, some requiring
compliance with local law, which could result in loss of copyright—a kind of
risky affair! Today, the United States is one of the major exporters of copy-
rightable material—our books, music, dramas, musicals, periodicals, motion pic-
tures, TV go all over the world. We badly need the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion as revised in Paris. If we do not ratify the Paris revisions, it may be only a
matter of time before states in Berne will close the “back door’’ and the entire
fabric of international copyright could come apart.
The Paris revisions are not the complete answer to our problems, but they
overcome the crisis of Stockholm, and pave the way for the future. To have two
international conventions in any field is absurd and it is my hope that in the
future all nations will be parties to one convention.
I strongly urge that the Committee on Foreign Relations approve the Universal
Copyright Convention, as revised at Paris, and recommend that the Senate.
advise and consent to early ratification.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Kaminstein.
The committee is adjourned.
(Whereupon, at 2:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the
call of the Chair.)
A PIP EN DIX
(Exhibits A through D submitted by Mrs. Bella Linden)
EXHIBIT A.
LINDEN & DEUTSCH,
New York, N.Y.
UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT REVISION TO BE SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS FOR RATIFICA-
TION. BY ITS TERMS THE PROPOSED TREATY CALLS FOR PRIOR APPROVAL OF
ExPROPRIATION OF WORKS CREATED BY UNITED STATES CITIZENS
A statement opposing ratification and alternatively, a proposal to mitigate the
economic losses of American Authors and Publishers in the event of ratification of
Paris text of U.C.C.
In July 1971 diplomatic conferences held at Paris proposed revisions to the
Universal and Berne Copyright Conventions. These revisions were principally
designed to reduce the costs to developing countries of using intellectual property
created by authors and publishers in the developed countries. The Paris text
of the Universal Copyright Convention will be submitted shortly to the United
States Senate. Ratification of this treaty by the Senate would reduce the protection
available to American authors and publishers under both the Berne and Universal
Conventions, and would constitute formal approval by the Senate of the expropria-
tion of the private property of American citizens without adequate compensation.
Despite the legitimate needs of underdeveloped countries for machinery, equip-
ment and food, none of these goods and products are given to foreign countries by
the United States simply by consenting in a treaty to the taking of these items
without payment to the American owners of the property. It is not conceivable
that intellectual property created and produced by American citizens would be
treated by the Congress of the United States as less valuable. We urge therefore
that the Senate not approve the Paris revision of the Universal Copyright Con-
vention.
If, however, the Senate feels that the national interest of the United States in
promoting the welfare of the developing countries requires ratification, the Federal
Government should provide compensation to the authors and publishers adversely
affected by such revision, following the precedent established in the Trade Expan-
sion Act of 1962 and other legislation. After discussing the relevant provisions of
the Paris Revisions, there is set forth the pertinent features and legislative history
of the Trade Expansion Act.
1. SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR EFFECTS OF THE PARIS REVISIONS ON THE RIGHTS OF
AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS (IN PARTICULAR OF EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS)*
The Universal and Berne Copyright Conventions are the two treaties which
provide international protection for the rights of authors, publishers and other
copyright owners, in their books and other writings, their audio-visual works,
and their other intellectual property in all media. The United States is a member
of only the Universal Copyright Convention, and therefore only the revision of
that treaty is formally before the Senate. However, American ratification of that
revision will also render effective the Paris revisions of the Berne Convention.
Publishing and other means of dissemination of intellectual property are of
multi-national Scope today, and it is common for works to be published simul-
taneously in the United States and abroad. American authors and other creators
of intellectual works thereby obtain the protection of the Berne Convention.
Recognizing this fact, the Paris revision of the Berne Convention provides that
1 A more detailed statement of the provisions of the Paris revisions is attached as Annex A, together with
Columnar comparisons with the existing Berne Conventions and the Stockholm Protocol.
(83)
84
it will not go into effect unless and until the United States, the United Kingdom,
France and Spain ratify the Paris revision of the Universal Copyright Convention.
This provision also explains why the Paris sessions which produced the revisions
of both treaties were conducted concurrently and the substantive provisions of
the revisions of both texts are almost identical, insofar as they concern developing
countries. Thus, the United States’ decision upon ratification of the Paris revision
of the Universal Copyright Convention is inextricably intertwined with the same
revision of the Berne Convention, and the effects of both treaties must be con-
sidered together.
The foreign market and the involvement therein of American educational pub-
lishers has increased markedly during the last decade and there is every evidence
that the American publishing industry is not only exporting more works but is
investing in foreign publishing. While the concessions of the Paris revision run in
favor only of “developing countries”, that term is so undefined as to allow over
80 countries, including some in Europe, to qualify. Virtually every country out-
side North America and Europe, save only Australia, New Zealand, and Japan,
could be considered “developing”.
The concessions granted to the “developing countries’’ primarily deal with the
rights to translate and reproduce for educational purposes. But the scope of Such
purposes, as is shown below, is so broad that far more than textbooks, reference
works and the usual instructional audio-visual materials may be covered; the
term may be deemed to include, in practice, virtually any work so long as its use
is in any way related to any form of instruction, scholarship, or research. For the
authors and publishers of educational materials, the “educational” exemptions
eliminate over 80 countries from their market.
A. The Compulsory translation and reproduction licenses
The most important provisions of the Paris revisions allow developing countries
to grant licenses without permission of the copyright owners for the translation
and reproduction of works within a short time after their publication. The revisions
state that the copyright owners shall be paid a “just compensation consistent with
standards of royalties normally operating on licenses freely negotiated between
persons in the two countries concerned,” but this is likely to prove an empty
formula.
|Under the terms of the Paris revisions, and by the very nature of such licenses,
they are likely to be granted only after the copyright owners have already rejected
as inadequate the royalties and other licensing terms proposed by the users in the
developing country; the new terms are likely to be even more exiguous. Further-
more, by the very nature of the class of developing countries, there will likely not
be sufficient bilateral relations to establish royalty standards with any definiteness,
and particularly not for the newer forms of educational materials, especially
audio-visual works. The “consistency” to be expected under the Paris standard will
therefore be far below the reasonable minimal expectations of authors and pub-
lishers. Moreover, the standard will be policed only by the national tribunals of
the respective developing countries. In sum, adequacy of compensation appears to
be left, in actuality, to the developing country’s own judgment as to what amount
is “just”.
The compulsory translation license applies to translations into any language
“in general use’’ in a developing country. It may be granted within a short period
after first publication of the original work, if a translation into the national
language has not been published or is out of print. For translations into a language
not in general use in any developed country which is a member of the particular
Convention, the period is one year. If the language is in general use in Such a
developed country, the relevant period is three years; but for languages other
than English, French and Spanish, the period can be reduced by agreement with
the developed country where the language is in general use (e.g., Brazil and
Portugal agreeing to reduce the period for Portuguese one year). Under the
existing Berne Conventions, any country may reserve the right to make transla-
tions into its national languages without compensation, but only beginning ten
years after publication and only if no such translation has been published in any
member of the Convention. Under the existing Universal Copyright Convention,
a member country can grant compulsory licenses for translation into its national
languages beginning seven years after publication of the original work, if the work
has not been translated into such languages or if the translations are out of print.
The compulsory reproduction license of the Paris revisions becomes available
a stated number of years after the first publication of a work, as described below,
if copies have not been distributed or have not been on sale for six months in the
85
licensing State “at a price reasonably related to that normally charged in that
State for comparable works.” Where the publication of such works is subsidized
in any way by a developing State, it will, of course, be impossible for American
publishers to make copies of their own works available at such prices. The stated
periods are three years for works of science, mathematics and technology; seven
years for works of fiction, poetry, drama and music; and five years for other works.
It has frequently been asserted that compulsory licensing under the Paris
revisions will be the exception rather than the rule. The hard fight waged by the
developing countries to obtain the compulsory licensing system, however, indicates
that they themselves expect to make substantial use of the system. The effect
will be both to deprive American authors of compensation and to exclude Amer-
ican publishers from Serving developing countries by any means, including
direct sales or by foreign publishing affiliates.
B. The vague definition of “developing countries”
The Paris revisions, as we have noted above, contain no objective criteria of
what constitutes a “developing country”, nor are there any viable standards
relating the class of countries entitled to invoke the special concessions to the
ends sought to be served by the concessions. A developing country is defined
simply as one which is “regarded as a developing country in conformity with the
established practice” of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Although the
reference to the “established practice” of the United Nations may be considered
to mandate some reference to its practice in the selection of countries entitled to
reduced levels of contributions to U.N. upkeep (based principally on per capital
income statistics) or in granting economic assistance, it is generally understood
that these “standards” fluctuate widely and may turn upon factors—political,
historical or even economic—having little relevance to the legitimate need of any
country for the reservations established by the Paris revisions. There is no central
arbiter nor list of “developing countries” and, in the final analysis, it seems clear
that each country adhering to the revised Convention is able to determine for
itself whether it may invoke the compulsory licensing provisions. It is clear,
further, that a great many countries in South and Central America, Asia, Africa,
the Middle East and even parts of Europe will be able to claim the benefits of
these provisions with sufficient credibility under the Convention standard to
avoid the appearance of an outright rejection of its Convention obligations.
It is not without significance that those countries seeking special concessions at
the Paris conferences steadfastly refused to admit any objective criteria of the
status of a country’s development for the purposes of the revisions, and that the
opinion of the General Rapporteur of the U.C.C. “Concerning the Criteria Gov-
erning ‘Developing Countries’’’ is contained in a document which states the
opinion to be “purely personal . . . [and] although . . . based in part on the
discussion of the question during the Paris Conference, [one which] cannot in any
way be regarded as reflecting the views of other delegates or as constituting a
part of the General Report of the Conference.”
The inadequacy of the definition of a “developing country” as expressed in the
Paris revisions is apparent not only at the stage at which a country may invoke the
special reservations on the rights of translation or reproduction, but also at the
stage at which it may no longer do so—i.e., when it “ceases to be regarded” as a
developing country. The inadequacy of the notion of a “developing country” in the
Paris revisions not only allows an enormous number of countries at various stages
of development to grant compulsory licenses, but also allows them to continue
doing so as their states of development improve, virtually without limit. The only
cutoff point stated in the Paris revisions is the point at which a country “ceases to
be regarded” as a developing country, a phrase for which there are no more objec-
tive criteria than there are for the definition of “developing countries” discussed
above. Thus, any country initially taking the benefit of the compulsory licenses
may well continue to grant such licenses after having achieved a stage of develop-
ment sufficient to enable it to deal with the property of others on a level expected
of other Convention countries.
C. The “educational” limitation
The compulsory license provisions available to developing countries under the
Paris revisions are, as has been repeatedly pointed out by proponents of ratification,
circumscribed by reference to “educational” limitations on the scope of the license.
Thus, compulsory translation licenses may only be granted for the purposes of
“teaching, scholarship or research,” while compulsory reproduction licenses (and
86
translation licenses for non-broadcast use of audio-visual text) are limited to use in
connection with “systematic instructional activities.” In some cases, such limita-
tions serve also to describe the class of works subject to compulsory licensing—
thus, only audio-visual works “prepared and published for the sole purpose of
being used in connection with systematic instructional activities” are subject to
Such licenses. In a similar vein, both broadcasts utilizing compulsory licensed
translations and the permitted export of such translations under certain conditions
are to be devoid of commercial purpose.
For authors and publishers of educational materials, since it is addressed to
eliminate their entire market, such limitations obviously provide no comfort,
and their significance is a negative One. They only serve to underscore a basic
point of these comments—that a particular segment of American enterprise is
being asked (required might be a better word) to devote the product of its private
initiative to the subsidization of the development of foreign countries in a manner
thoroughly inconsistent with our traditional concepts of property and of individual
vs. governmental responsibility.
Assuming that some American authors and publishers do find initial comfort
in the educational limitations on compulsory licensing under the Paris text,
either as a device for insulating them from the effect of such licensing or as a
theoretically satisfactory justification for the need for such reservation, they would
do well to consider how little actual limitation these standards impose. The
Report of the General Rapporteur for the Paris U.C.C. Conference notes the
“understanding” that “scholarship” encompasses not only instruction at grade
and high Schools, colleges and universities, but also a “wide range of organized
educational activities intended for participation at any age level and devoted to
the study of any subject” and that “systematic instructional activities” include
“not only activities connected with the formal and informal curriculum of an
educational institution, but also systematic out-of-school education.” The Report
also notes that the possibility of the general public sale of copies produced under
compulsory licensing was “envisaged” at the Conference. The only palliative offered
for this possibility is that the licensing authority of the State would be “under a
duty to determine that the License would fulfill the need of specified ‘systematic
instructional activities’ [and the license] would necessarily be refused if such
activities were in fact incidental to the actual purpose of the reproduction.”
Observers at the Paris Conference were left with but little doubt that, as we have
indicated above, the countries seeking the benefit of these reservations have a
rather fluid and wide-ranging conception of “scholarship”, “education”, and the
other “limitative” criteria. .
D. Reproduction whder compulsory licenses outside the developing countries
The Paris revisions provide that compulsory licenses are “valid only for publi-
cation” in the territory of the licensing State, but the discussions at the Paris
conference made abundantly clear, as confirmed by governing interpretations in
the Report of the General Rapporteurs, that works may be printed outside a
developing country pursuant to its compulsory license, and joint translation facili-
ties may be employed by several countries under their compulsory licenses. This
interpretation imposes only the following restrictions of substance on foreign
reproduction of compulsory licensed works:
1. The reproduction facilities in the developing country are “incapable for
economic or practical reasons” of reproducing the copies (a standard to be inter-
preted by the developing country itself);
2. The country of reproduction is a Berne or U.C.C. member;
3. All copies reproduced abroad are delivered to the licensee in bulk for dis-
tribution only in the developing country;
4. The reproduction facility is not “specially created” for reproduction under
compulsory licenses. The interpretation also provides that compulsory licensees
may employ translators and editorial personnel in other countries, and that
several compulsory licensees from different countries may use the same transla-
tion; and
5. The reproducing facility guarantees that the work of reproduction is lawful
in its own country.
To illustrate the result—half a dozen or more developing countries may utilize
the same editorial, translation and printing facilities, located in any Berne or
U.C.C. country, to translate and/or reproduce a work to be used pursuant to the
compulsory license provisions of each country. These joint printing facilities need
not even be in a developing country. Given the additional right of a joint transla-
tion, this in fact results in a publishing enterprise servicing a group of developing
‘Countries.
87
There is furthermore no requirement that these foreign translation, editorial,
and printing Operations must not be conducted for profit. In other words, these
may well be profit-making publishing enterprises. The compulsory licenses will
save them most of the initial costs and royalty expenses, which are among the
heaviest expenses of any publishing enterprise. The net result will be to sanction
profit-making publishing operations which will preempt markets from the authors
and publishers of copyrighted materials.
The foregoing is a brief Summary of the provisions of most interest to educa–
tional authors and publishers. Attached as Annex A is a chart that summarizes
in parallel columns the major substantive provisions dealing with translation,
reproduction and other rights under the existing Berne Convention and the
Stockholm Protocol and the Paris revision of that Convention.
Since the concessions to developing countries under the Paris revisions of the
Universal and Berne Conventions are substantially the same, a general summary
of the concessions made by the Paris revision of the Universal Convention is
reflected in the columnar presentation of the Paris revisions to the Berne Con-
ventions. Such significant differences as exist are set forth in footnotes to the chart.
The view has been expressed that the Paris revision of the Berne Convention
is a substantial improvement over the Stockholm Protocol to that Convention.
The Stockholm Protocol, which only five years ago created such a furor, has not
been adopted by the developed countries, because of its broad preemption of the
rights of authors and publishers. For authors and publishers of educational
materials, however broad or narrow that category may be, examination of the
chart attached as Annex A will show that the Paris revision can hardly be deemed
a meaningful improvement for them over the Stockholm Protocol. The changes
in the compulsory license Scheme have been largely procedural, and promise no
substantive relief of any importance. Regardless of the more circuitous formalities
required, the result for educational authors and publishers would be the same—
expropriation.
II. THE PROPR1ETY OF AND PRECEDENT FOR GOVERNMENTAL COMPENSATION IF THE
PARIS REVISION IS RATIFIED
For the reasons above, we urge that the Paris Revision of the Universal Copy-
right Convention should not be ratified. However, if the Senate deems that the
underlying national interests of the United States require such ratification, not-
withstanding the injury to Some of its citizens, we suggest that provision be made
for governmental compensation to those authors and publishers whose interests
would be sacrificed.
United States economic assistance to developing countries has always here-
tofore been a governmental responsibility, discharged by money payments or loans
to developing countries or by governmental purchases of needed materials which
were then supplied directly to the foreign countries. If in this case the United States
Government feels it cannot take that course with respect to intellectual property,
and that economic assistance with respect to such property must become an in-
dividual responsibility of a class of American citizens, then governmental action to
compensate American authors and publishers for this burden is appropriate. The
Senate, and the United States Government in general, has a history of carefully
guarding the rights of United States citizens where the national interest requires
that some private interests of Some citizens be sacrificed in order to make conces-
isions to foreign countries. The Outstanding example is the adjustment assistance
provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
The Trade Expansion Act liberalized United States tariff provisions so as to
make possible what later became known as the Kennedy Round of tariff reduc-
tions. When the Act was proposed and enacted, it was recognized by all concerned
that some firms and workers would be seriously injured by the increase in imports
which the contemplated tariff reductions would allow. Accordingly, the Act in-
cluded provisions under which injured firms could receive assistance consisting
of technical assistance, government loan guarantees, and tax assistance, and
affected workers could receive assistance consisting of a form of unemployment
compensation, training for other jobs, and relocation allowances. These forms of
assistance are paid by the Federal Government and at levels which are uniform
throughout the nation.
The legislative history of the Act makes clear that these provisions embody a
broad general principle. The initial form of the Act was drafted by the Kennedy
Administration and introduced in the House as H.R. 9900 of the 87th Congress.
The President’s message, dated January 25, 1962, accompanying the bill stated
in part:
88
“When considerations of national policy make it desirable to avoid higher
tariffs, those injured by that competition should not be required to bear the full
brunt of the impact. Rather, the burden of economic adjustment should be borne
in part by the Federal Government.
>}: >k >k >}: >}:
“Just as the Federal Government has assisted in personal readjustments made
necessary by military service, just as the Federal Government met its obligation
to assist industry in adjusting to war production and again to return to peacetime
production, so there is an obligation to render assistance to those who suffer as a
result of national trade policy.” (H. Doc. #314, 87th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in
H.R. Ways and Means Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess., “Legislative History of
H.R. 11970, 87th Cong., Trade Expansion Act of 1962” (1967), at pp. 90–91
(hereinafter cited as “Leg. Hist.”).)
Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges made the principal presentation before
the House Ways and Means Committee. Discussing relief for firms and workers
injured by increased imports, he said:
“The Federal Government has a special responsibility to such firms and workers.
For their hardship can be directly traced to a specific action undertaken by the
Government for the good of all—the lowering of trade restrictions in order to
open up new markets for our goods abroad. As the President has said, no industry
or work force should be made a sacrificial victim for the benefit of the national
welfare. No Small group of firms and workers should be made to bear the full
burden of the costs of a program whose great benefits enrich the Nation as a
whole.” (H.R. Ways and Means Committee, 87th Cong. 2d Sess., Hearings on
H.R. 9900, p. 90; Leg. Hist. p. 172.)
The Ways and Means Committee revised the administration’s bill and reported
out the revision as H.R. 11970. In its report, the Committee justified the adjust-
ment assistance provisions in the following language:
“The furnishing of this assistance is fully consistent with our traditional
practice of protecting American commerce and labor from serious injury resulting
from imports. It will enable those firms and workers injured by increased imports
to receive prompt help that is suited to their individual needs.” (H. Rept. No.
1818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 13–14; Leg. Hist., pp. 1077–78)
Representative Hale Boggs was the floor manager of the bill in the House. In
his speech introducing the bill, he supported the adjustment assistance provision
as follows:
“[I]t is based on a very sound fundamental principle: That in the pursuit of a
national objective, we shall give assistance to the businessman who is hurt and
give assistance to the workingman who is hurt. There is nothing new or radical
about this. When we call a lad and say: You must go to serve your country in
the Army or the Navy or the Air Force, we also say to him: Son, when you come
back home, your job will be waiting for you. We assure him of reemployment
rights. If he is hurt, we put him in a veterans’ hospital.
“Throughout the entire history of the United States, we have consistently
recognized the fact that in the pursuit of an overall national policy, we have made
adjustments for those who are injured thereby—whether it be injury to firms or
to workers. That is all this bill does—nothing else. In most instances, it will use
existing machinery which has already been established by law.” (Cong. Rec.
6/27/62, pp. 11,086–87; Leg. Hist. p. 1189.)
Representative Keogh, another member of the Ways and Means Committee,
Subsequently remarked about these provisions:
“Having set up the fences which we now propose to lower or remove, we have
the obligation—in equity and good conscience—to assist these affected firms and
workers in meeting the new situation which the Government will permit to come
about.” (Cong. Rec. 6/27/62, p. 11,111, Leg. Hist. p. 1233.)
Both in the House and in the Senate, objections were raised to the payment of a
uniform amount to workers, rather than the amounts payable under state un-
employment compensation systems, which in most cases were much less. In the
House, representative Conte of Massachusetts argued that this was discriminatory
and offered as a particular example unemployment in his home district caused by
cancellation of a government contract. Representative Mills, then as now Chair-
man of the Ways and Means Committee, answered that in Conte's example the
government was acting like any other contractor, and continued:
“Assistance in the case of removal of tariffs can be justified, because this
condition arises through Government sovereign action, taken in the public
interest, to lower tariffs and thereby take a job away from this man. The sovereign
89
has seen fit to remove a tariff which it placed on an article to protect the job. In
all equity and good conscience it must take steps to make the affected worker’s
adjustment to the new competitive conditions created by its own acts as easy as
possible under the circumstances.” (Cong. Rec. 6/27/62, p. 11,117; Leg. Hist.
pp. 1243–44.) -
In the Senate, two amendments were offered with respect to the adjustment
assistance provisions. The first sought to eliminate the provisions entirely. The
asserted grounds were that the provisions discriminated against those unemployed
for other reasons, that some of these others might have become unemployed
because they had been providing goods and services to the industries forced out
of business by imports, and that there was no essential difference between unem-
ployment caused by imports and unemployment due to changes in government
purchasing. (Remarks of Senator Curtis, Cong. Rec. 9/17/72, p. 18,688; Leg.
Hist. pp. 1702–03.) (Of course, the motive for the amendment was to eliminate
labor support of the Act as a whole and thereby defeat the Act.)
Senator Williams of New Jersey opposed the amendment and defended the
provisions in the bill as follows:
“I strongly support the President's trade program. I think it is vital to our
Nation’s continued growth and prosperity. But I see no reason why the few com-
munities, industries or workers who may possibly suffer some adverse effect from
the reduction of trade barriers must bear the entire burden. If the interests of
the Nation and the interests of our national trade policy cause some injury, the
Nation, and therefore the Federal Government have a clear and unmistakable
obligation to alleviate that injury and facilitate adjustment to new economic
activities.” (Cong. Rec. 9/17/72, p. 18,691; Leg. Hist. p. 1706.) The first amend-
ment was defeated, 58–23.
The second amendment was offered by Senator Byrd of Virginia. It would have
set the level of payments at the rate prevailing under State unemployment com-
pensation programs, rather than at the uniform national level set by the bill. The
arguments in support of the amendment were similar to those for the previous
amendment. In opposition to the amendment and in Support of the pending bill
were the following remarks: -
Senator Smathers: “I, too, believe in States rights. I believe that if an injury
done to a worker results from action taken by a State, the State, rather than the
Federal Government, should provide the proper compensation.
But when this bill goes into effect, the injury will result from Federal action,
from the action of the Federal Government in removing the tariff, thereby allowing
the entrance of imports which will result in damage to an industry and in the loss
of the jobs of the workers in that industry. In view of the fact that the action
would be Federal action, those of us on the committee took the position that the
Federal Government should have the responsibility for making the compensation
payments due to the worker because he lost his job as a result of action taken by
the Federal Government.
I believe that in this instance the Federal Government, acting in what I
regard as the overall interest of the Nation—and I recognize that some workers
will be injured thereby, but there will be overall benefit to American industry and
to the general economy—has the responsibility, under the original concept, to
provide funds for proper and necessary compensation.” (Cong. Rec. 9/17/72,
p. 18,692; Leg. Hist. p. 1712.)
Senator Long: “Mr. President, it is a fair proposal that Federal standards be
used in paying for Federal injury, we provide private relief bills to compensate
Federal injury all the time. If one examines the calendar, he will find more private
relief bills than any other kind. This is a relief bill for those the Federal Govern-
ment chooses to injure in the pursuance of a program in the Overall national in-
terest. On the whole, we anticipate an increase in national income as a result of the
bill. We anticipate an increase in employment overall. We do not want to do that
at the expense of a few and the suffering of an unfairness to a few Americans who
will be injured.” (Cong. Rec. 9/17/72, p. 18,695; Leg. Hist. p. 1714.)
Senator Mansfield: “These import-affected workers would not be casualties
of supply and demand or any other impersonal economic force. Instead, their
unemployment would be directly attributable to a decision of the Federal Govern-
ment taken in the national interest. Certainly, the Federal Government would Owe
a special obligation to those injured by such actions.”
The amendment was defeated, 51–31. The principle was thereby affirmed that
if the Federal Government causes injury to some industry in order to achieve Some
broad goal of foreign policy, it should compensate those who have been injured,
at least in part.
90
Accordingly, it is urged that the precedent of the Trade Expansion Act be
followed and that an appropriate enactment be promulgated to vitiate the economic
damage upon authors and publishers if Congress should determine that it is in
the national best interest to ratify the Paris text of the Universal Copyright
Convention. If, as supporters of the Paris revisions have asserted, the compulsory
licensing provisions will be little used by the developing countries, then the Senate
will have affirmed, at little cost, the Sound principle that a small class of citizens.
is not to be required to bear the burden of furthering the national interests without
compensation. If, as we fear, compulsory licensing will become widespread among
developing countries, then the injury to authors and publishers will be substantial
in terms of the formal dimensions of the publishing industry, and there will be a
serious need for compensation. Measured against the sums which the Congress.
usually appropriates in connection with foreign aid, however, the amount of
compensation would in any event be negligible. -
We suggest that provisions for such compensation would be simpler than those
of the Trade Expansion Act because:
(1.) The Paris texts of both the U.C.C. and the Berne Union include procedures.
for notifications to the copyright owners or proprietors when a developing country
grants a compulsory license on copyrights owned by United States citizens (as.
well as all other countries).
(2.) Under the Adjustment Assistance program of the Trade Expansion Act,
one recurring problem which requires extensive investigations by the Tariff
Commission is to determine whether injuries to particular American industries are
caused by current tariff reductions or other factors, such as general business.
conditions, increasing American costs, prior tariff reductions, etc. Such problems.
are entirely absent here, where the loss of income to authors and publishers is
demonstrated from the use of their literary property by a developing country
(with little compensation or none) under compulsory licenses.
(3.) The uses made of educational materials in the developing countries can,
be measured. Royalties under compulsory licenses, regardless of their rates, will.
normally be measured by such uses, i.e., number of books, records, tapes, etc.
sold, and such numbers should in the ordinary course be reported together with.
the royalty payments, or be obtained by inquiry from the licensees.
(4.) The measure of compensation that could be set forth in the statute would.
be a predetermined percentage of those royalties which publishers and authors.
charge in the normal course of export licenses.
Accordingly it is urged that the Paris Revision of the Universal Copyright.
Convention not be ratified. However, in the event that despite the unwarranted
and unfair distinction made between tangible property and intellectual property
Congress decides that it is in the national interest to ratify the treaty, then it is
urged that an enactment paralleling the Adjustment Assistance provisions of the
Trade Expansion Act be passed to preserve the rights of authors and publishers
in conformity with the traditions of the United States.
B. L. LINDEN.
sº
COMPARISON OF CONCESSIONS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES UNDER THE EXISTING BERNE CONVENTIONS, THE STOCKHOLM PROTOCOL AND THE
- y
* The following tabular summary of the “Paris Revision” relates to the
Paris Revision of the Berne Convention. Substantial differences between
this Revision and the Paris Revision of the Universal Copyright Conven-
JPARIS REVISION +
ANNEX A
Chart I.-Translation Rights
tion are indicated by asterisks and explained by “Notes” appearings at the
conclusion of the tables. Where no “Note” is, indicated, the summary of
the “Paris Revision” serves as a summary of the concessions made to de-
veloping countries in the Universal Copyright Convention.
EXISTING BERNE CONVENTIONS (ROME, 1928
AND BRUSSELS, 1948)
STOCKEIOLMI PROTOCOL
(1967)
RERNE
PARIS REVISION
(1971)
No Concessions:
Despite Convention recognition of ex-
clusive translation rights, any country may
reserve the right to allow translation of
WOrks into its national languages without
authorization Or Compensation if, after ten
years from first publication of the original
WOrk, an authorized translation into Such
language has not been published in a Union
country. Other Convention countries may
not retaliate against Works emanating
from a Country making this reservation.
[Art. 25 (3) |
No Compulsory License.
A developing country may reserve the
right to allow translation. Of Works without
authorization or compensation if, after ten
years from first publication. Of the Original
Work, an authorized translation has not
been published in a Union COuntry in the
language for which protection is claimed.
Developed COuntries may not retaliate
against WorkS emanating from a develop-
ing country making this reservation. [Pro-
tocol, Art. I(b) (i)] (A developed country
making such a reservation under Stockholm
is subject to retaliation [Text, Art. 30 (2)
(b)]).
In addition to allowing free translation
ten years after first publication, a develop-
ing country may subject the right of trans-
lation to compulsory licensing. [Protocol,
Art. I(b)(i)(ii) I
The system of compulsory licensing al-
lows the “competent authority” (not de-
fined) Of a developing country to authorize
the translation of Works, and the publica-
Same as Stockholm Protocol with respect
to translation into languages “in general
use” in the developing country. [AppendiX,
Arts. V (1) (a), I (6) (b) ; Text, Art. 30 (2)] *
* See Note (1).
As an alternative to allowing free trans-
lation ten years after first publication, a
developing country may subject the right Of
translation to compulsory licensing [Ap-
pendix, Art. II, V (1) (C), V (2), I (1) 1.”
The System Of compulsory licensing al-
lows the “competent authority” (not de-
fined) to authorize the translation of
Works, and the publication of the transla-
§
EXISTING BERNE CONVENTIONS (ROME, 1928
AND BRUSSELS, 1948)
STOCKHOLM PROTOCOL
(1967)
tion of the translation, without the au-
thority Of the Owner of translation rights,
On certain terms and Conditions. [Protocol,
Art. I (b)(ii) )
All books, audio-visual Works, and other
Works are subject to compulsory transla-
tion license. [Protocol Art. I(b) ; Text,
Art. II]. NO Special provision is made con-
Cerning application Of the compulsory li-
cense to the textual portions of audio-visual
WorkS.
A compulsory translation license may be
granted With Out restriction as to purpose.
FEERINE
PARIS REVISION
(1971)
tion in printed or analagous forms of re-
production, without the authority of the
Owner of translation rights, on certain
terms and conditions. [Appendix, Art.
II (1), II (2) (A) |. In the case of certain
audio-Visual Works, the license extends to
publication Of the translation in audio-
Visual form. [Appendix, Art. III (7) (6).J.
All Works “published in printed Or anal-
Ogous forms Of reproduction” are subject
to COmpulsory translation licensing. [A])-
pendix, Art. II (1) I
The textual portions Of audio-visual
Works which were “prepared and pub-
lished for the Sole purpose of being used
in COnnection With Systematic instructional
activities” are subject to a compulsory
translation license. [Appendix, Art. II (9)
(c), III (7) (b)]. (The rules governing
translation. Of the textual portions Of audio-
visual Works differ from those governing
printed WOrks. In the former case, the
rules follow those pertaining to the com-
pulsory reproduction license under the
Paris Revision.)
Printed Works: A compulsory license for
translation Of printed Works may be
granted Only for the purpose of “teaching,
Scholarship or research.” (Appendix, Art.
II (5) )
A broadcasting Organization headquar-
tered in a developing country may secure
a COmpulsory license to translate a printed
Work if the translation is Only for use in
§
i
• Q
The Compulsory translation license may
Only be granted for translation into a
“national, official, or regional language”
of the licensing State. [Protocol, Art. I(b)
(iii) I .
broadcasts (live or recorded) to recipients
Within the developing COuntry, Which
broadcasts are intended exclusively for
“teaching or the dissemination. Of the re-
Sults Of Specialized technical Or Scientific
research to expertS in a particular profes-
sion”; and if “all uses made of the trans-
lation are without any COmmercial pur-
pose.” [Appendix, Art. II (9) (a) (b)]
(The compulsory translation license
does not encompass the right to record Or
broadcast the translation. However, COn-
vention recognition of the broadcasting
right allows member Countries to deter-
mine the conditions under which that right
may exist, Subject to COmpensation which
may be fixed by the Competent authority,
and to “determine the regulations for
ephemeral recordings” made by broadcast
Organizations. Text, Art. II bis.)
Audio-Visual Works (Prepared and
Published Solely For Use in Connection
with Systematic Instruction) : Broadcast-
ers may Secure a COmpulsory license to
translate the textual pOrtionS Of Such
Works for the Same purposes as noted in
COnnection with their translation Of
printed Works. [Appendix, Art. II (9) (C)
In Other Cases, a COmpulsory license for
translation of the textual portions of such
Works may be granted only for “use in
Connection with Systematic instructional
activities” [Appendix, Art. III (7) (b),
III (1) I
'The compulsory translation license may
Only be granted for translation into a lan-
guage “in general use” in the licensing
State. [Appendix, Art. II (2) (a), III (7)
(b)]
f
EXISTING BERNE CONVENTIONS (ROME, 1928
AND BRUSSELS, 1948)
STOCKHOLM PROTOCOL
(1967)
BERNE
PARIS REVISION
(1971)
The COmpulsory translation license be-
COmeS available three years after first pub-
lication Of the Original work if a transla-
tion thereof has not then been published
in the licensing State into a national, Offi-
Cial Or regional language Of that State, Or
if all previous editions Of a translation in
Such language in that State are then Out Of
print. (The license will be available for
translation into any Of the national, Official
Or regional languages into Which the Orig-
inal WOrk had not been published Or in
which a translation is Out Of print.) [Pro-
tocol, Art. I (b) (ii) I.
Printed WOrłcs:
The Compulsory translation license be-
COmeS available after a Stated number of
years from first publication of the original
WOrk if a translation thereof has not then
been published anywhere in the language
COncerned, Or if all editions of a transla-
tion into Such language are out of print.
In the Case of translations into a lan-
guage not in general use in any developed
Berne Country the relevant period is One
year. [Appendix, Art. II (3) (a), II (2) (a)]
In the case of translations into a lan-
guage in general use in any developed
Berne Country, the relevant period is three
years. [Appendix, Art. II (2) (a)] (In the
CaSe Of translations into languages Other
than English, French Or Spanish, a lesser
period may be Substituted by agreement
between the developing Country and all de-
Veloped Berne COuntries in which the lan-
guage is in general use. Appendix, Art.
II (3) (b)).
Audio-Visual Worles (Prepared and Pub-
lished Solely For Use in Connection With
Systematic Instruction) :
The COmpulsory translation license be-
COlmes available to broadcasters at the
Same times as govern printed Works. [Ap-
pendix, Art. II (9) (c) (d) T
In Other cases, a compulsory license for
translation Of the textual portions Of Such
Works becomes available (in connection
With a Compulsory license to reproduce the
§
An applicant for a compulsory transla-
tion license must, “in accordance with the
procedure” of the licensing State, estab-
lish either :
(1) “That he has requested, and been
denied, authorization” by the owner of the
translation right [Protocol, Art. I (b)
(ii) l ;
Work) after a stated number of years from
first publication of the Work if copies
thereof have not then been distributed in
the licensing State “at a price reasonably
related to that normally Charged in [that]
Country for comparable Works,” Or no
copies have been On Sale for six months in
that State at “reasonably related” prices.
[Appendix, Art. III (7) (b), III (2) (a) (b)]
The relevant period is : three years for
Works in the area of Science, mathematics
and technology; seven years for Works of
fiction, poetry, drama and music ; five
years in other cases. [Appendix, Art. III
(7) (b), III (3) I
An applicant for a compulsory transla-
tion license must, “in accordance with the
procedure” of the licensing State, estab-
lish either :
(1) “That he has requested, and been
denied, authorization” by the owner of the
translation right [Appendix, Art. IV (1)].
In this CaSe:
—At the time of making his request, the
applicant “shall inform” an information
center designated by the publisher’s COun-
try. [Appendix, Art. IV (1) I ; and
—The license may not be granted until
after the expiration of varying monthly
grace periods from the applicant’s COm-
pliance with the foregoing. If, during these
grace periods, the Owner publishes a trans-
lation anywhere into the relevant language
(or, in the case of audio-visual works,
causes their distribution at “reaSOnably
related” prices in the licensing State), the
license may not be granted. [A])pendix, Art.
II(4) (a)(i), II(4) (b), III (7) (b), III (4)
(a)(i), III(4) (c)]
§
ExISTING BERNE CONVENTIONS (ROME, 1928
AND BRUSSELS, 1948)
STOCKHOLM PROTOCOL
(1967)
BERNE
PARIS REVISION
(1971)
O?”
(2) “That, after due (liligence On his
part, he was unable to find the Owner Of
the right.” [Protocol, Art. I(b)(ii). In this
Cºl Se .
—The applicant must send copies Of his
application to the publisher of the Work
and a representative Of the country of the
Owner [Protocol, Art. I(b) (iii) ) ; and
—The license may not be granted until
after the expiration of two months from
the dispatch Of copies Of the application
[Protocol, Art. I(b) (iii) |
Developing COuntries establishing a sys-
tem. Of COmpulsory translation licenses
must make “due provision” to assure :
(1) a “correct translation” [Protocol,
Art. I(b) (iv) j ; and
(2) a “just compensation” [I d.]
Payment and transmittal of compensa-
tion is “subject to national Currency regu-
lations.” [Protocol, Art. I (b) (iv) I
O7°
(2) “That, after due diligence on his
part, he Was unable to find the Owner of the
right.” [Appendix, Art. IV (1)]. In this
CàSe .
—The applicant must send copies of his
application by registered airmail to the
publisher Of the Work and an information
Center designated by the publisher’s
COuntry [Appendix, Art. IV (2) I ; and
—The license may not be granted until
after the expiration of varying grace pe.
riods from the dispatch of copies of the
application. If, during these grace periods,
the Owner publishes a translation any-
Where into the relevant language (or, in
the case of audio-visual Works, causes
their distribution at “reasonably related”
prices in the licensing State), the license
may not be granted. [Appendix, Art. II (4)
(a) (2), II (4) (b), III (7) (6), III(4) (a)
(ii), III(4) (b), III(4) (c) |
Developing countries establishing a sys-
telm Of compulsory translation licenses
Imust make “due provision” to assure :
(1) a “correct translation” [Appendix,
Art. IV (6) (b)] ; and
(2) a “just compensation that is consist-
ent With Standards of royalties normally
Operating On licenses freely negotiated be-
tWeen perSOInS in the two COuntries GOn-
cerned.” [Appendix, Art. IV (6) (a)(i) I
If national currency regulations hinder
payment and transmittal Of compensation,
the “competent authority” shall use “all
&
The Obligation to pay COmpensation un-
der a COmpulsory translation license ter-
minates after ten years from first publica-
tion of the Original work, if an authorized
translation has not yet been published into
the language in question in a Berne COun-
try. [Protocol, Art. I(b) (viii) I
(A compulsory translation license is gen-
erally “valid. Only for publication in the
territory Of” the licensing State. [Protocol,
Art. I(b) (V) J
HOWever, COpies may be imported and
Sold in Other COuntries allowing such im-
portation and sale. [Protocol, Art. I(b)(V)
(effect of next-to-final sentence as negat-
ing COnditions Of prior sentence) I
efforts” to ensure transmittal in inter-
nationally convertible currency. [Appen-
dix, Art. IV (6) (a) (ii) I
A compulsory translation license gen-
erally “does not extend to the export of
copies” and is “valid only for publication”
in the territory Of the licensing State.
[Appendix, Art. IV (4) (a)] [Copies pub-
lished under a Compulsory translation
must bear a notice that the Copies are
available only for distribution in the li-
censing State. Appendix, Art. IV (5) J (But
the Opportunity to engage in joint transla-
tion and reproduction abroad substantially
equals the consequences of permitted ex-
port. See Chart I pg. 8)
However, in the case of translations into
languages Other than English, French Or
Spanish a public entity Of the licensing
State may export Copies made under a
compulsory translation license to its na-
tionals in Other countries, provided the
copies are used “Only for the purpose Of
teaching, Scholarship or research”, the ex-
port and distribution of the copies is
“without commercial purpose”, and the re-
ceiving Country has agreed to the importa-
tion. [Appendix, Art. IV (4) (c)].
This permissible export is not applicable
to audio-visual works. [See, Appendix, Art.
IV (4) (c) and Art. III (7) (b)]
3
ExISTING BERNE CONVENTIONs (Rom E, 1928
AND BRUSSELS, 1948)
STOCKHOLM PROTOCOL
(1967)
PERINE
PARIS REVISION
(1971)
Copies made under a compulsory transla-
tion license may be reproduced outside of
the territory Of the licensing State. [See
Report, Main Committee II (Stockholm)
par. 14]
Compulsory translation licenses termi-
nate if an authorized translation into the
language in question is published in the
licensing State within ten years from first
publication of the underlying Work. [Pro-
tocol, Art. I(b) (vii) I
Copies made before termination may con-
tinue to be sold. [Id.]
COpies made under a compulsory transla-
tion license may be reproduced in printed
form Outside Of the territory Of the licens-
ing State if the licensing State has no re-
production facilities (Or its facilities are
“incapabie” Of reproducing the copies), all
COpies are returned in bulk to the licensing
State, and the reproducer guarantees that
the Work Of reproduction is lawful in its
country. [General Report On the Paris Con-
ference (Berne) par. 40]
Such reproduction may only take place in
a Berne or Universal Copyright Convention
COuntry, and may not be done by a repro-
duction facility “specifically Greated” for
COmpulsory licensing purposes. [Id.]
The incorporation Of Compulsory-trans-
lated audio-visual texts into audio-visual
Works may be done outside the territory of
the licensing State under the same Condi-
tions. [Id. at par. 41 (a)]
Compulsory licensees may employ trans-
lators and perSOns doing preliminary edi-
torial Work in Other countries. [General
Report par. 42]. A number of compulsory
licensees may use the Same unpublished
translation [Id.].
Compulsory translation licenses termi-
nate if an authorized translation into the
language in question is published at a price
reasonably related to that normally charged
in the licensing State for comparable
Works. [Appendix, Art. II (6) I
Copies made before termination may con-
tinue to be distributed “UIntil their Stock is
exhausted.” [Id.]
$3
Chart I.-Notes
(1) Neither the existing (1952) Universal Copyright Convention nor the
Paris revision of that Convention permits free translation 10 years after
publication. Under article V of both the existing Convention and the Paris
revision, all member countries may establish a system Of Compulsory
licenses for the translation of works if, after the expiration of 7 years
from first publication, a translation has not been published in the “national
language” of (1952 Convention), or a language “in general use in’’ (Paris
revision) in, that state. The compensation due for compulsory licenses
*:::: ºgle V is to be “just and [in conformity with l international
standards.”
Article Vter of the Paris revision of the Universal Convention concedes
to developing countries the right to exercise compulsory translation licens-
ing after only 1 or 3 years from first publication, under conditions substan-
tially identical to those of the Paris revision of the Berne Convention.
3.
COMPARISON OF CONCESSIONS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES UNDER THE EXISTING BERNE CONVENTIONS, THE STOCKHOLM PROTOCOL AND THE
1 The following tabular summary of the “Paris Revision” relates to the
PARIS REVISION
ANNEX A
Chart II.-Reproduction Rights
Paris Revision of the Berne Convention. Substantial differences between the “Paris Revision”
this Revision and the Paris Revision of the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion are indicated by asterisks and explained by “Notes” appearing at the
conclusion of the tables. Where no “Note” is indicated, the summary of
g ion” serves, as a summary of the concessions made to
developing countries in the Universal Copyright Convention.
EXISTING BERNE CONVENTIONS (ROME, 1928
BRUSSELS, 1948)
STOCKEIOLM PROTOCOL
(1967)
BERNE PARIS REVISION
(1971)
NO COnceSSiOnS.
The Rome and Brussels Acts do not ex-
preSSly recognize a general right Of repro-
duction. Whether such a right is implicit in
these Acts has been a matter Of academic
discussion.
NO compulsory license.
The Stockholm Text expressly accords
authors the exclusive right of reproducing
(and recording) their Works. [Text, Art. 9]
The Stockholm text does allow members
to permit reproduction in “Certain Special
cases,” provided that Such reproduction
“does not conflict with normal exploitation
Of the Work and does not prejudice the
legitimate interests of the author.” [Id.]
It is believed that these Conditions a VOid
the reproduction right being Subject to gen-
eral Systems Of compulsory licensing, ex-
cept as permitted to developing Countries.
A developing country may Subject the
right of reproduction to compulsory licens-
ing. [Protocol, Art. I(c) T
The System Of compulsory licensing al-
lows the “competent authority” (not de-
fined) of a developing country to authorize
the reproduction and publication of Works
without the authority Of the Owner of re-
production rights, On Certain terms and Con-
ditions. [Protocol, Art, I (c)]
Same as Stockholm *
Same as Stockholm *
Same as Stockholm [Appendix, Art. III
(1)]
The System Of Compulsory licensing al-
lows the “competent authority” (not de-
fined) of a developing country to authorize
the reproduction. Of Works, and the publica-
tion thereof at prices reasonably related to
those normally charged in the licensing
State for comparable Works, without the
£
* See Note (1).
All Works are subject to compulsory re-
production licensing. [Protocol, Art. I(c)
(i) ; Text, Art. II]. No special provision is
made COncerning application of the com-
pulsory license to audio-visual Works.
A compulsory reproduction may Only be
Obtained to reproduce and publish “for
educational or Cultural purposes.” [Proto-
Col, Art. I (c) (i)]
The COmpulsory reproduction license be-
COmes available three years after first pub-
lication of a Work if it has not then been
published in the licensing State, or if all
previous editions in the licensing State are
Out of print. [Protocol, Art. I(c) (i)]
8 See Note (1).
authority of the owner of reproduction
rights, On certain terms and COnditions.
[Appendix, Art. III (1) (2) (a)]
All Works published in “printed Or analo-
gous forms of reproduction” are Subject to
compulsory reproduction licensing. [Ap-
pendix, Art. III (7) (a)]
Audio-visual Works which were “pre-
pared and published for the Sole purpose
Of being used in Connection. With Systematic
instructional activities” may be reproduced
in audio-visual form, and the textual pOr-
tions thereof may be translatted into a lan-
guage in general use in the licensing State,
under the compulsory reproduction license.
[Appendix, Art. III (7) (b)]
Translations which are not in a language
in general use in the licensing State, or
which were produced without the author-
ity of the Owner of the underlying Work
(including COmpulsory licensed transla-
tions) are not subject to COmpulsory re-
production licensing.
A compulsory reproduction license may
Only be obtained to reproduce and publish
the Work “ſor use in connection with Sys-
tematic instructional activities.” [Appen-
dix, Art. III (2) (a)] *
The COmpulsory reproduction license be-
comes available after a Stated number of
years from first publication of a Work if
COpies thereof have not then been distrib-
uted in the licensing State “at a price rea-
SOnably related to that normally Charged
in that State for Comparable Works,” or
no Copies have been On Sale for Six months
in that State at “reasonably related”
prices. [Appendix, Art. III(2)]
* See Note (2).
ë
ExISTING BERNE CONVENTIONS (ROME, 1928
STOCKHOLM PROTOCOL
BRUSSELS, 1948) (1967)
BERNE PARIS REVISION
(1971)
An applicant for a compulsory reproduc-
tion license must, “in a CCOrdance with the
procedure” of the licensing State, establish
either :
(1) “That he has requested, and been
denied, authorization” by the Owner Of the
reproduction right [Protocol, Art. I (C)
(i)] ;
O7°
(2) “That, after due diligence on his
part, he was unable to find the Owner of the
right.” [Protocol, Art. I(c) (i)]. In this
CaSé .
The relevant period is : three years for
Works in the area. Of Science, mathematics
and technology ; Seven years for Works of
fiction, poetry, drama and music ; five years
in Other cases. [Appendix, Art. III (3)|
An applicant for a compulsory transla-
tion license must, “in accordance With the
procedure” Of the licensing State, establish
either:
(1) “That he has requested, and been
denied, authorization” by the owner of the
reproduction right [Appendix, Art. IV (1)].
In this Case :
—At the time Of making his request, the
applicant “shall inform” an information
center designated by the publisher’s Coun-
try. [Appendix, Art. IV (1) I ; and
—Licenses Obtainable after three years
may not be granted until after the expira-
tion of a six-month grace period from the
applicant’s compliance with the foregoing.
If, during this grace period, the OWner dis-
tributes his work at “reasonably related”
prices in the licensing State, the license
may not be granted. [Appendix, Art. III
(4) (e) (i), III(4) (c)]
O?"
(2) “That, after due diligence on his
part, he was unable to find the Owner Of the
right.” [Appendix, Art. IV (1) I. In this
CàSe :
:
—The applicant must send copies of his
application to the publisher of the Work
and a representative Of the Country Of the
owner [Protocol, Art. I (c) (ii) I ; and
—The license may not be granted until
after the expiration of two months from
the dispatch of copies of the application
[Protocol, Art. I(c) (ii) |
Developing Countries establishing a sys-
tem. Of Compulsory reproduction licenses
must make “due provision” to assure :
(1) an “accurate reproduction” [Proto-
Col. Art. I(c) (iii) l ; and
(2) a “just compensation” [Id.]
Payment and transmittal of compensa-
tion is “subject to national currency regu-
lations.” [Protocol, Art. I(c) (iii) I
(A compulsory reproduction license is
generally “valid. Only for publication in the
territory of” the licensing State. [Protocol,
Art. I (c) (iv) I
—The applicant must send copies of his
application by registered airmail to the
publisher Of the Work and an information
Center designated by the publisher’s coun-
try [Appendix, Art. IV (2) I ; and
—The license may not be granted until
after the expiration of Varying grace pe-
riods from the dispatch Of copies of the
application. If, during this grace period,
the OWner distributes his work at “reason-
ably related” prices in the licensing State,
the license may not be granted. [Appendix,
Art. III(4) (a)(ii), III(4) (b), III(4) (c)]
DeVeloping COuntries establishing a SyS-
tem. Of Compulsory translation licenses
Imust make “due provision” to assure :
(1) an “accurate reproduction” [Appen-
dix, Art. IV (6) (bl; and
(2) a “just Compensation that is consist-
ent With Standards of royalties normally
Operating On licenses freely negotiated be-
tween perSonS in the two countries con-
cerned.” [Appendix, Art. IV (6) (a)(i)]
If national currency regulations hinder
payment and transmittal Of COmpensation,
the “competent authority” Shall use “all
efforts” to ensure transmittal in internal-
tionally COnvertible currency. [Appendix,
Art. IV (6)(a)(ii) I
LA COmpulsory reproduction license gen-
erally “does not extend to the export of
copies” and is “valid only for publication”
in the territory Of the licensing State. [Ap-
pendix, Art. IV (4) (a)] [Copies published
under a COmpulsory translation must bear
a notice that the COpies are available Only
for distribution in the licensing State. [Ap-
pendix, Art. IV (5) T
#
ExISTING BERNE CONVENTIONS (ROME, 1928
BRUSSELS, 1948)
STOCKEIOLM. PROTOCOL
(1967)
BERNE PARIS REVISION
(1971)
However, copies may be imported and
sold in other countries allowing such im-
portation and Sale. [Protocol, Art. I (C)
(iv) (effect of next-to-final sentence as
negating Conditions of prior Sentence) ||
Copies made under a COmpulsory repro-
duction license may be manufactured Out-
side of the territory of the licensing State.
[See Report, Main Committee II (Stock-
holm) par. 14]
(But the Opportunity to engage in joint
translation and reproduction abroad sub-
Stantially equals the consequences of per-
mitted export. See Chart II pg. 5).
Copies made under a compulsory repro-
duction license may be reproduced in
printed form Outside the territory of the
Licensing State if the licensing State has no
reproduction facilities (Or its facilities are
“incapable” of reproducing the copies), all
COpies are returned in bulk to the licensing
State, and the reproducer guarantees that
the Work Of reproduction is lawful in its
Country. [General Report On the Paris
Conference (Berne) par. 40]
Such reproduction may only take place
in a Berne Or Universal Copyright Conven-
tion COuntry, and may not be done by a
reproduction facility “Specifically created”
for COmpulsory licensing purposes. [Id.]
Although the “incorporation of compul-
SOry-translated audio-Visual texts into
audio-Visual Works” may be done Outside
the territory of the licensing State under
the Same COnditions, these provisions may
not apply to all aspects Of the reproduc-
tion in audio-Visual form Of the audio-Vis-
ual Work itself. [See Id. at par. 41 (a), par.
40],
Compulsory licensees may employ per-
SOnS doing preliminary editorial work in
Other countries. [General Report par. 42].
5
Compulsory reproduction licenses ter-
minate if authorized copies Of the WOrk
are published in the licensing State. [Pro-
tocol, Art. I(c) (Vi)]
Copies made before termination may COn-
tinue to be SOld. [Id.]
Chart II.--—NotOS
Compulsory reproduction licenses ter-
minate if authorized copies Of the WOrk
are distributed in the licensing State at a
price reasonably related to that normally
Charged in that State for COmparable
Works. [Appendix, Art. III (6) I
Copies made before termination may Con-
tinue to be distributed “until their Stock is
exhausted.” [Id.]
(1) The existing U.C.C. does not specifically guarantee the exclusive
right of reproduction. This matter is left to the generality of Aritcle I
that each contracting state “undertakes to provide for the adequate and
effective protection of the rights of authors and . . . copyright proprie-
tors . . . .” Article IV bis of the Paris Revision of the U.C.C. takes this
matter somewhat forward as it provides that “the rights referred to in
Article I shall include . . . the exclusive right to authorize reproduction
by any means.” However, the significance of this step is weakened by the
succeeding provisions of Art. IV bis: “However, any Contracting State may,
by its domestic legislation, make exceptions that do not conflict with the
Spirit and provisions of this Convention. . . . Any State whose legislation
SO provides, Shall nevertheless accord a reasonable degree of effective
protection. . . .”
(2) Although the compulsory reproduction license of the Universal Copy-
right Convention specifically allows reproduction “in audio-visual form”
in the case of audio-visual works, printed works produced under compul-
sory license would have to be reproduced “in tangible form . . . from which
[they] can be read or otherwise visually perceived.” (Definition of “Publi-
cation”, Art. VI). A corresponding limitation does not appear in the Berne
Conventions and the precise meaning of “publication”, particularly as
regards reproduction in Sound recorded form, is subject to variation among
Union countries. (Compare the scope of the compulsory translation Ticense
under the Paris Revision of Berne, which refers to “publication in printed
or analagous forms of reproduction” [Appendix, Art. I(b) (ii) I, with that
Of the reproduction license, which refers only to “reproduction and publi-
cation” [Appendix, Art. I(c) 1. “Reproduction” is defined in Art. 9 of the
Paris Text of Berne as including “any sound or visual recording.”)
#
CoMPARIson of CoNCESSIONS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES UNDER THE EXISTING BERNE CONVENTIONs, THE STOCKHOLM. PROTOCOL AND THE
PARIS REVISION "
AIN NEX A.
Chart III.-Other reservations: (A) broadcasting rights, (B) duration of protection, (C) general reservation
1 The following tabular summary of the “Paris Revision” relates to the
Paris Revision of the Berne Convention, Substantial differences between
this Revision and the Paris Revision of the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion are indicated by asterisks and explained by “Notes” appearing at the
ºnclusiºn of the tables. Where no “Note” is indicated, the summary of the
“Paris Revision” serves as a summary of the concessions made to develop-
ing Countries in the Universal Copyright Convention.
ExISTING BERNE CONVENTIONS (ROME, 1928
& BRUSSELS, 1948)
STOCKHOLM PROTOCOL (1967)
BERNE PARIS REVISION (1971)
Article 1.1 bis Of the ROme Convention
guarantees the exclusive right Of broad-
casting. However, all member States are
permitted to “regulate” this right, Subject
to the author’s receiving “an equitable re-
muneration” which may be fixed by the
“competent authority” absent agreement.
Article 1.1 bis Of the Brussels COnvention
extends this right to include Communica-
tion of the Original broadcast to the public
by re-broadcast, wire, loudspeaker or Other
transmission. All member States are per-
mitted to regulate these rightS Subject to
the same Condition of remuneration.
NO COncessionS.
Developed countries are bound by the
Substance Of Art. 11 biS of the Brussels
text.
|Developing COuntries may restrict the
right Of communicating the broadcast to
the public to those communications “made
for profit-making purposes.” Developing
Countries may further regulate this right
Subject to the Condition of remuneration.
[Protocol, Art. I (d).]
[Protocol, Art. I (a)]
Same as Stockholm.”
No Comparable provision.
5
No concessions.
NO GOncessionS.
Developing countries may limit the gen-
eral duration Of protection to the life of
the author and not less than twenty-five
years after his death ; and the duration of
protection of cinematographic, anonymous
Or pseudonym OuS WOrks to not less than
tWenty-five years after it has been made
available to the public. [IDeveloped coun-
tries are bound to fifty year terms in each
Case. Text, Art. 7 (1)–(3) |
Developing Countries may limit the term
Of protection of photographic Works and
WOrks Of applied art to not less than ten
years from the making of such Works.
[Developed countries are bound to protect
Such WOrkS for not less than twenty-five
years from their making. Text, Art. 7 (4) I
[Protocol, Art. I(e) T
Developing countries may restrict the
protection of all rights in any Work, “ex-
clusively for teaching, study and research
in all fields Of education.”
A developing country making such re-
Striction must make “due provision” to
aSSure a COmpensation which “conforms to
Standards Of payment made to national
authors.” Payment and transmittal of such
COmpensation is Subject to national Cur-
renCy regulations.
COpies published under Such restrictions
may be imported and sold for “teaching,
Study and research purposes” in Other de-
Veloping COuntries which have invoked
these restrictions and do not prohibit such
importation and Sale.
No comparable provision.
Not Set forth as Separate provision ;
however, see Charts I and II for effect of
Similar COncessions On the interests Of
authors and publishers of educational
materialS.
#
EXISTING BERNE CONVENTIONS (ROME, 1928
& BRUSSELS, 1948)
STOCKHOLM PROTOCOL (1967)
BERNE PARIS REVISION (1971)
Importation into developed COuntries is
prohibited without the agreement Of the
author Or his SuccessOr.
Chart IIIA.—Broadcasting Rights, Notes
(1) The existing U.C.C. does not specifically guarantee the exclusive
right of broadcasting. This matter is left to the generality of Article I
that each contracting state “undertakes to provide for the adequate and
effective protection of the rights of authors and . . . copyright proprie-
tors. . . .” Article IV bis of the Paris Revision of the U.C.C. takes this
matter somewhat forward as it provides that “the rights referred to in
Article I shall include . . . the exclusive right to authorize . . . broad-
1 See Note (1).
casting.” However, the significance of this step is weakened by the succeed-
ing provisions of Art. IV bis: “However, any Contracting State may, by its
domestic legislation, make exceptions that do not conflict with the spirit
and provisions of this Convention. . . . Any State whose legislation so
provides shall nevertheless accord a reasonable degree of effective pro-
tection. . . .”
109
EXHIBIT B
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
- Washington, D.C., June 21, 1972.
Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN : I am replying to your letter of June 7 in which you
inquire on behalf of Mr. Raymond C. Hagel, Chairman of the Board of Crowell,
Collier and MacMillan, Inc., about certain provisions contained in the Universal
Copyright Convention (UCC) as revised at Paris in July 1971. Representative
Fraser and Senator Case have also written us about Mr. Hagel’s interest and I
have Sent them. Similar replies.
The Executive Branch of the Government, along with the Copyright Office,
believes that ratification Of the revised UCC is in the national interest. As we
See it, there are two basic questions involved in Mr. Hagel’s letter and the legal
presentation attached to it. The first is whether or not the U.S. should ratify
the revised Convention, and the other is whether authors and publishers should
be compensated for any losses which might possibly occur under the provisions
in the revised convention which establish procedures for the translation an
reproduction of copyrighted works in developing countries. g”
I shall limit my comments to the first question. The second question raises the
issue of domestic compensatory legislation and falls more within the Congress’
area. Of COmpetence than Ours. .
I have already Stated that the Department Supports ratification of the UCC.
It is Our COnsidered Opinion that the revised convention is essential to the main-
tenance of the international copyright system as we know it today. Indeed, we
believe that in certain respects, it may strengthen international copyright pro-
tection. At the Same time, it will provide concrete evidence of the concern of the
United States for the legitimate needs of developing countries in the field of
education.
I believe it would be helpful to provide you with some background on this
matter. The revision of the UCC came about largely as a result of a crisis in
international COpyright protection which occurred in 1967. It was at this time
that the Stockholm Protocol, to which Mr. Hagel refers in his letter, was ap-
pended to the Berne Copyright Convention as an integral part of that Conven-
tion. The Berne Convention is the other major international copyright convention.
While the U.S. does not adhere to Berne, many countries belonging to the UCC
also adhere to Berne and the two conventions are closely related.
The developed COuntries party to the Berne Convention found themselves unable
to ratify the Stockholm Protocol. The developing countries, insisting that formal
recognition of their special needs was essential, threatened to withdraw from
Berne. Because of a special clause in the UCC, countries renouncing Berne could
not rely On the UCC for protection in other UCC-Berne countries. The result of
renunciation of Berne would have been the exodus of the developing countries
from both major copyright conventions and a virtual collapse of the international
copyright system as we know it today.
In the face Of this situation, it was decided to revise both the Berne and
|Universal Copyright Conventions in such a way that both developed and de-
Veloping countries could accept their terms. This was the compromise worked
Out in 1971 at the Diplomatic Conference. It was a compromise arrived at through
careful and lengthy negotiations in which over 60 countries participated or had
Observer delegations, including virtually all the major developing and developed
COuntries. It should be noted that the fundamental U.S. negotiating position was
worked out prior to the Conference through numerous consultations with all the
interested copyright groups in the United States. As a matter of fact, most of
these same groups were represented on the U.S. Delegation to the Conference.
The Compromise does not “permit unauthorized and unpaid use by “developing’
nations for ‘educational’ purposes, as Mr. Hagel states. Rather, the revised UCC
provides for the issuance of compulsory licenses for the use of copyrighted ma-
terials for educational purposes when such materials are not made available by
the copyright owners during varying time periods, and states that “due pro-
Vision shall be made at the national level to ensure” that Compulsory licenses
provide for “just compensation that is consistent with standards of royalties
normally Operating in the two countries concerned.”
83—500—72—8
110
The provision for COmpulsory licensing is by no means new, a provision for
COmpulsory licensing for translation rightS has been Contained in the Universal
Copyright Convention since its inception in 1955. As far as we are aware, not
One country has exercised the right to a COmpulsory license under that provision.
Rather, terms have been Worked Out between the parties involved without the
need for recourse to the treaty. It is quite possible that this Will Occur under
the revised treaty, should it go into force.
It is important to note that the developing COuntries have the Option of not
adhering to either the Universal Copyright Convention or the Berne Convention,
Should these conventions not prove Satisfactory to them. In Such a case, they
would also have the option of adopting national legislation which would provide
for the use Of foreign WOrks without any license Or payment whatever Or with
COmpulsory licensing provisions that might prove far more Onerous than those
COntained in the two revised COnventions.
It is the State Department's belief that the revised UCC constitutes a fair and
just COImpromise and that failure On the part Of the U.S. to ratify the Convention
COuld presage a return to the previous State Of chaos in the international copy-
right field. Such a result would, of course, be detrimental to all interests Con-
Cerned and especially to U.S. authors and publishers whose works are so widely
used throughout the World.
In recognition of this fact, the Association of American Publishers, along with
many Other major copyright groups, including the American Bar Association,
have firmly endorsed U.S. ratification of the UCC.
I hope this information Will aid you in responding to Mr. Hagel. I have also
enclosed a chart prepared by the Copyright Office which compares the provisions
for developing Countries contained in the revised conventions to those contained
in the Stockholm Protocol. I believe this study will be of interest to you and
should be helpful if read in conjunction with the study prepared by Mr. Hagel’s
attorneys. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I can be of any further
aSSistance.
Sincerely yours,
DAVID M. ABSHIRE,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.
[Enclosures.]
E
CoLUMNAR CoMPARISON of SPECIAL PROVIsions For DEVELOPING CountRIES IN THE STOCKHOLM. PROTOCOL AND THE PARIS REVISIONs (1971)
OF THE U.C.C. AND BERNE CONVENTIONS
PART I: CRITERIA, DURATION, TIME OF ELECTION
STOCKHOLM PROTOCOL
Criteria.
Article 1, Preamble: “regarded as a de-
Veloping country in conformity with the
established practice Of the General AS-
Sembly Of the United Nations.”
Duration
10 year initial period under Article 1,
Preamble, plus, under Article 3, right to
extend period indefinitely until adherence
to new Act that prohibits reservations;
but, under Article 4, cannot maintain reser-
Vations if no longer regarded as a develop-
ing Country—notification by Director Gen-
eral and reservations cease 6 years there-
after.
Time Of Election
Article 1, Preamble : upon ratification or
accession.
JPARIS REVISION OF THE U.C. C.
Article Vbis (1) : same as the Stockholm
ProtoGOl.
|Article Vbis (2) and (3) : renewable 10
year periods until COuntry becomes de-
veloped ; Cut-Off point at end of current 10
year period or 3 years after country ceases
to be a developing One, whichever expires
later.
Article Vbis (1) : at the time of ratifica-
tion, acceptance, Or accession, Or there-
after.
PARTS REVISION OF BERNE–AIPPENDIX
Article I (1) : same as the Stockholm
Protocol; new member developing COun-
tries may in VOke reservations.
Article I (2) and (3): same as UCC ; re-
newable 10 year periods until COuntry be-
comes developed ; Cut-Off point at end of
Current 10 year period or 3 years after
COuntry Ceases to be a developing One,
Whichever expires later.
Article I (1) : Sakme as UCC ; at the time
Of ratification or accession, Or at any time
thereafter.
É
PART II. TERM OF PROTECTION ; GENERAL ExEMPTION FOR TEACHING, STUDY AND RESEARCH IN EDUCATION
STOCIKEIOLM. PROTOCOL
Term Of Protection
Article 7 of the Convention as modified
by Article 1 (a) Of the Protocol : life plus
25 years, in general.
General Education Exemption
Article 1 (e) : broad reservation permit-
ting limitations on any economic right Of
authors for purposes Of “teaching, Study
and research” in all fields of education,
subject to Compensation that COnforms to
standards Of payment for national authorS.
PARIS REVISION OF THE U.C. C.
NO Special provision ; under Article IV :
life plus 25 years, in general.
Omitted COmpletely.
PARIS REVISION OF BIERNE–APPENDIX
No special provision ; governed by Article
7 Of the Convention : life plus 50 years, in
general.
Omitted Completely.
:
PART III : TRAN SLATION RESERVATION
STOCKHOLM PROTOCOL
PARIS REVISION OF THE U.C.C.
PARIS REVISION OF BERNE–APPENDIX
Article 1 (b) : 3 year period for all lan-
guages; right ceases 10 years from first
publication unless exercised ; 'MO purpose
restriction ; export permitted.
Note: alternative to apply 10 year trans-
lation reservation based on Paris Act of
1896, subject to material reciprocity.
No statement required limiting distribu-
tion to licensing State ; no copyight notice
required.
“Just compensation” for licenses during
3–10 year period ; no compensation after 10
years if author failed to publish transla-
tion.
Article V of the U.C.C., as modified by
Article Viter: essentially, 3% years for
“world languages” and 1% years for “non-
WOrld languages”—paragraphs (1) and
(2) ; all languages subject to “teaching,
Scholarship Or research” restriction—
paragraph (3) ; Export prohibited, subject
to exception for copies sent to nationals in
another Country for teaching, Scholarship,
or research and without commercial pur-
pose (translations in English, French, and
Spanish may not in any case be exported)—
paragraph (4) ; prohibition. On export also
subject to exception where printing within
licensing State not economically Or prac-
tically feasible and under limitations re-
garding place Of printing, Whether printing
lawful, and Copies must be returned in
bulk to the licensee.
Copies in all languages must bear state-
ment that they are Only available for dis-
tribution in State where license applies;
retaining Copyright notice must be given by
licensee if Original WOrk bore U.C.C. no-
tice—paragraph (4).
“Just compensation that is consistent
With Standards Of royalties normally Op-
erating On licenses freely negotiated be-
tWeen perSOnS in the two COUntries COn-
Cerned”—paragraph (5).
Articles II and IV: generally same as
UCC.
Note: irrevocable choice between Article
II reservation and 10 year translation re-
servation based on Paris Act of 1896, with
no material reciprocity ; may elect latter
when developed, subject to material reci-
procity—Article V.
Same as U.C.C., except no copyright no-
tice required.
Same as U.C.C.
H
STOCECHOLM PROTOCOL
PARIS REVISION OF THE U.C.C.
EPARIS REVISION OF BERNE–APPENDIX
Assurance of payment and transmittal
Subject to national Currency regulations.
{Recapture exclusive right by publication
Of translation within 10 years Of first pub-
lication.
No Comparable provision.
NO comparable provision.
ASSurance Of transmittal Of payment; if
national currency regulations intervene
COmpetent authority Shall make all efforts
by use Of international machinery to en-
Sure payment in internationally Converti-
'ble currency—paragraph (5).
Terminate Article Vier license and fore-
close further Article Wter licenses if author-
iZed translation in Same language and With
Substantially the same content is published
at a price reaSOnably related to that nor-
Imally charged for COmparable WOrkS—
paragraph (6).
Note: after 7 years, licensee is free to
Seek new license governed exclusively by
Article V–paragraph (9) of Article Vier;
Article V license available to any national
Of COntracting State Without recapture.
License to tranSlate a WOrk published in
printed Or analogous forms Of reproduc-
tion may be granted to broadcasting Or-
ganizations in developing COuntries if
made for the purpose of broadcasting,
Without any COmmercial purpose, and if
SOle purpose Of broadcast is use for teach-
ing Or dissemination of results Of technical
research, and if broadcasts intended for re-
Ception in Same developing COuntry—para-
graph (8).
|Under Same COnditions as above, license
may also be granted to a broadcasting Or-
ganization for translation of “any text in-
COrpOrated in an audiOVisual fixation
Which Was itself prepared and published
for the Sole purpose of being used in Con-
nection with Systematic instructional ma-
terials”—paragraph (8).
Same as U.C.C.
JRecapture exclusive right at any time if
authorized translation in Same language
and With Substantially the same COntent is
published at a price reasonably related to
that normally Charged for COmparable
WOrkS.
Same as U.C.C.
Same as U.C.C.
:
PART IV . REPRODUCTION RESERVATION
STOCKETOLM PROTOCOL
PARIS REVISION OF THE U.C. C.
PARIS REVISION
OF BERNE–APPENDIX
Article 1 (c) : Compulsory licensing Sys-
tem after 3 years unless right exercised by
reproduction in Original form in COuntry
where license might be SOUght.
Compulsory license to reproduce and
publish for “educational and cultural pur-
poses”.
“Just Compensation” for COmpulsory li-
CellSéS.
Assurance Of payment and transmittal
subject to national Currency regulations.
Export permitted.
Article : V guater: exclusive period 5
years generally ; exceptions :
3 years for Works of the natural and
physical Sciences, including mathematics
and Of technology :
7 years for works of fiction, poetry,
drama and music, and for art bOOkS ; li-
cense available unless authorized copies
generally distributed in that State to pub-
lic Or in COnnection. With Systematic in-
Structional activities at price reasonably
related to that normally charged in State
for comparable WorkS—paragraph (1).
License Only for use in COnnection With
“systematic instructional activities.”
Just Compensation that is COnsistent
With Standards Of l’Oyalties normally Op-
erating On licenses freely negotiated be-
tween perSOns in the two COuntries COn-
cerned—paragraph (2).
Assurance of transmittal of payment; if
national CurrenCy regulations inter Vene,
competent authority shall make all efforts
by use of international machinery to en-
sure payment in internationally convert-
ible currency—paragraph (2).
Export prohibited as a rule—paragraph
(1) ; however, printing abroad and subse-
Quent return of copies in bulk permitted if
printing not possible in licensing State due
to lack of physical facilities or economic
capability, subject to limitations: place of
printing must be U.C.C. Or Berne COuntry,
and the printing must be lawful in that
COuntry.
Articles III and IV: Same as U.C.C.
Same as U.C.C.
Same as U.C.C.
Same as U.C.C.
Same as U.C.C.
E
STOCKHOLM PROTOCOL
PARIS REVISION OF THE U. C. C.
PARIS REVISION OF BERNE–APPENDIX
No comparable provision.
License to reproduce “literary Or artis-
tic WOrk.”
Recapture exclusive right by reproduc-
tion and publication in Country COncerned.
No comparable provision.
No comparable provision.
License to reproduce work “in the Orig-
inal form in which it was created.”
Copies must bear notice Stating avail-
able for distribution Only in State Where
license applies—paragraph (2).
License to reproduce literary Scientific
Or artistic works that have been published
in “printed Or analogous forms Of repro-
duction”—paragraph (3).
Recapture exclusive right by general dis-
tribution to public Or in connection with
Systematic instructional activities at price
reasonably related to charge in State for
Comparable works if Substantially Same
language and content as edition published
by licensee—paragraph (2).
Notice Of COpyright must be printed by
licensee if the Original work bore U.C.C.
notice—paragraph (2).
License to reproduce audioVisual fixa-
tions and translation Of accompanying text
into language in general use in the COUn-
try concerned if “prepared and published
for the Sole intrinsic purpose Of being used
in Connection with Systematic instructional
activities”—paragraph (3).
No compulsory license may issue to re-
produce translation not published by the
proprietor or under his authority nor to re-
produce translation that is not in a lan-
guage that is in general use in State issu-
ing the license—paragraph (1).
Same as U.C.C.
Same as U.C.C. but with general refer-
ence to “Works.”
Same as U.C.C.
NO comparable provision.
Same as U.C.C.
Same as U.C.C.
F
IPART V . BROADCASTING RESERVATION
STOCKHOLM PROTOCOL
Article 1 (d) :
Substitute for Article 11bis (1) and (2)
provisions that essentially COrrespond to
the text of the 1928 Rome Convention. On
the broadcasting right.
National legislation may regulate COndi-
tions, i.e. establish Compulsory licensing
system throughout term Of copyright ;
right of authorizing broadcast and Com-
munication to public Of broadcast if COm-
munication for profit-making purposes ; li-
censes subject to payment of “equitable
remuneration.”
PARIS REVISION OF THE U. C. C.
NO Special provisions for developing
COUIntries.
Article IVb is expressly recognizes the
right to broadcast either in the Original
form or in any form recognizably derived
from the Original.
National legislation may make excep-
tions that do not conflict with the spirit of
the fundamental right ; must accord “rea-
Sonable degree of effective protection.”
PARIS REVISION OF BERNE–APPENDIX
NO Special provisions for developing
COUntries.
Article 11bis Of the COnvention.
118
EXHIBIT C
LINDEN AND DEUTSCH,
New York.
PARIS REVISION OF THE UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION.—A RESPONSE To
COMMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
This statement is in response to comments of the Department of State received
in reply to our prior analysis of the Paris revision of the Universal Copyright
Convention. This response is limited to points directly made by the Department
in its letter of June 21, 1972 to Senator Fulbright. Additional points and amplifi-
Cations are raised in our prior analysis.
The Department of State correctly recognizes that our comments are directed
at two questions. The Department has declined to give any opinion on the Second
of these, namely, whether Congress should provide a means for compensating
American authors and publishers who suffer financial injury by reason of the
concessions granted to developing countries under the revised Universal Copy-
right Convention. Indeed, the Department's letter does not appear to contradict
the likelihood of such injury, except to question the extent to which the developing
Countries will resort to the proposed compulsory licenses and to point to the fact
that such countries might unilaterally impose more burdensome conditions in
their own copyright laws.
We shall return to both of these points below; at this point we would simply
note the Department's conclusion that “ratification of the revised UCC is in the
national interest.” We do not share this view. If, however, after a full examination
of the facts the Senate should decide to ratify the revised Convention, the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 is ample precedent for Congress’ obligation to compensate
º American citizens who will be injured in the interests of our foreign policy
g08.1S.
The first question raised is whether the Senate should ratify the revised Con-
Vention. Although the questions are distinct, the answers cannot be separated.
We do not believe that Congress should decide whether to adopt a course of
action likely to cause economic injury to a class of American citizens without
Considering what devices are available to mitigate such injury.
.The Department notes that “the Association of American Publishers, along
With many other major copyright groups, including the American Bar Association,
have firmly endorsed U.S. ratification of the UCC.” We will concede that, at the
present time, Our position against ratification appears to be a minority one. It
is shared, however, by several other publishers. We daresay that many of those
groups which have endorsed ratification have done so with insufficient considera-
tion of the potential impact of the revisions and might be disposed to modify
their position upon a full examination of the facts. We refer, in this connection, to
a recent article by counsel to the Authors’ League, a copy of which is enclosed,
entitled “Downgrading the Protection of International Copyright” in which
Mr. Karp in essence holds that the Paris Revision of the UCC is the same sellout
of authors and publishers as the notorious Stockholm Protocol. We would also
note that it is one particular group, authors and publishers of educational
materials, who will suffer most of the adverse effects of the revised Convention
º º the viewpoints of this particular group have not been expressed publicly
O Clà,106.
The chart prepared by the Copyright Office and included with the State De-
partment's reply to Senator Fulbright is not inconsistent with the study prepared
by Our Office. Both lead to the conclusion that the “improvements” of the Paris
revision over the terms of the Stockholm Protocol are principally of a procedural
nature, subject to application, interpretation, and implementation by each de-
Veloping country. So far as authors and publishers of textbooks and other educa-
tional material are concerned, any improvements are minimal or illusory. Exam-
ples illustrative of this conclusion are given in our initial analysis of the Paris
I'êVISIOn.
The Department's letter also points to the possible steps which may be taken by
developing countries if not granted the concessions embodied in the revised UCC.
We are not persuaded that the revision will not lead to substantially similar re-
Sults even within the framework of an international convention. Furthermore, a
number of developing countries already are members of either the Berne or Uni-
Versal Copyright Conventions and their willingness to take steps requiring with-
drawal from their existing Convention obligations is likely to be tempered by poli-
119
tical considerations. Even if that were not the case, we cannot accept the notion
that we should allow ourselves to be blackmailed into concessions injurious to the
interests of American citizens. Foreign countries may wish to expropriate the
tangible properties of American citizens situated abroad, but we have never con-
sented to any prior, formal multinational legitimazation of such practices because
of threats that it will be done anyway.
The Department states that, based upon experience with Article V of the
existing UCC, it may be doubted that the compulsory licensing provisions will
be utilized. To begin with, the new translation license of the Paris revision may
become available sooner than is the case with the existing UCC provision; also,
the concessions allowing foreign translation and manufacture facilitate use of the
licenses. More significantly, perhaps, the compulsory license provisions obviously
do not have to be resorted to in Order to have their adverse effect. Their mere
availability is sufficient to deprive international bargaining of any semblance of
free negotiation. Where the requesting party may use a refusal by an owner of
rights as a vehicle to more favorable terms, it becomes difficult for us to under-
stand how “terms [can be] worked out between the parties involved without the
need for recourse to the treaty.” It is equally difficult to understand the Zeal
with which the developing countries sought the compulsory license provisions,
and the piratical consequences the Department feels will enure if such concessions
are not granted, if the provisions are not to be used. -
The Department states that the revised UCC does not permit unpaid use, but
requires that “‘due provision shall be made at the national level to ensure’ that
compulsory licenses provide for “just compensation that is consistent with stand-
ards of royalties normally operating in the two countries concerned.’” It is
obvious that the “due-ness” of the provisions, the “just-ness” of the compensation
and its “consistency” with prior standards are subject to varying interpretations
and considerations among each of the developing countries. It is not unwarranted
to assume that what developing countries may deem “just compensation” to
American authors and publishers will be less than a pittance. Similarly, in the
area of audio-visual works and similar materials of the new educational technology,
any pre-existing standards are illusory if not nonexistent; yet such materials
require a great deal of investment of author and publisher time, expense and
effort. We reiterate our opinion that, in practice, the compensation that actually
would be paid under compulsory licensing can only be described as negligible.
The Department also states that ratification of the revised UCC “will provide
concrete evidence of the concern of the United States for the legitimate needs of
developing countries in the field of education.” These needs are valid. We question,
however, whether it is the function of a class of individual American citizens to
fulfill them upon terms imposed by an international, governmental agreement.
Would not governmental loans abroad or governmental purchases under Constitu-
tional guarantees and resale abroad or some similar means be more appropriate?
The “educational needs” of developing countries also include schoolrooms, con-
struction equipment, and instructional apparatus; to our knowledge, the produc-
ers of such physical properties have not been asked to make the sacrifices now to
be required of owners of intangible property—American authors and publishers.
Should Congress decide, for some reason we cannot now acknowledge, that
the fulfilling of “educational needs” is an individual function, there are the addi-
tional questions of whether the revised UCC is properly constructed to meet that
end with adequate safeguards against appropriation of American property under
circumstances not legitimately related to such needs; and of why the individuals
should not be compensated for injuries occasioned by their contribution.
B. L. Linden
EXHIBIT D
[From Publishers Weekly, Sept. 27, 1971],
DOWNGRADING THE PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT
(By Irwin Karp)
“Developed” and “developing” nations alike will want to study the diminished
degree of international copyright protection which is foreseen in reports of major
copyright revision conferences held in July in Paris.
Revised texts of the 1952 Universal Copyright Convention and Berne Con-
vention were adopted at conferences held in Paris from July 5 to July 24. The pur-
120
pose of the revisions, embodied in identical provisions of both new conventions,
is to allow “developing countries” to diminish copyright protection by granting
compulsory licenses to translate and reproduce books and audio-visual materials
without the copyright owners’ consent.
The 1971 UCC becomes effective when ratified by 12 countries. It must be rati-
fied by the United States to apply to American works. Although the United States
could not accede to the new Paris (Berne) Act until the 1909 Copyright Act is
revised, the Paris Act will not become effective until the United States, France,
Britain, and Spain agree to be bound by the 1971 UCC. A United States delega-
#. participated in the UCC conference and sat as observer at the Berne con-
€I’êIl Cé.
STOCKHOLM PROTOCOL REVISITED
The Paris conferences climaxed four years of maneuvering that began with the
Stockholm revision of the Berne Convention. At Stockholm, developing countries
argued that they must have “freer access” to foreign copyrighted works than the
Berne Convention permitted, to improve their education and culture. “Developing
country,” it should be noted, is an elastic term of formidable reach. It includes
Countries truly in early stages of economic and cultural development, such as
the new African states. It also stretches to embrace Brazil, Yugoslavia, Israel,
India, and many other nations well enough developed to maintain large armed
forces, extensive government bureaucracies, publishing industries, and other
amenities one ordinarily associates with “developed” countries. In fact, under the
definitions in both new conventions, a substantial majority of United Nations
members would qualify as developing countries, entitled to exercise compulsory
licensing privileges.
“Freer access” also is an elusive term. At times it seemed to mean an improve-
ment in communication between developing countries and authors or publishers
in developed countries, so that voluntary licenses could be negotiated more easily.
But ultimately it connoted something more drastic, i.e., the privilege of translating
or reproducing an author’s work without his permission, or at a royalty lower than
he asked for a voluntary license he is willing to grant. ..
A NEW KIND OF “FREE ACCESS’’
A nation outside the copyright conventions can give itself this kind of “free
access.” It can, like the Soviet Union, allow its publishing houses, state or privately
owned, to translate and publish foreign works without their authors’ consent. It
need not pay any royalties; or it can fix whatever rate it chooses. And, like the
USSR, it can make the royalties non-exportable when it chooses to allow them.
However, a country bound by a copyright convention cannot override authors’
rights so easily. It must protect the works of other member countries according
to the standards of its convention. If it wants to appropriate works in violation
of the standards, it must leave the convention. Or it can try to have the convention
amended, downgrading the standards of protection to the point where it is free
to adopt compulsory licensing, preferably while requiring other countries to
continue giving full protection to its authors.
The developing countries of the Berne Union successfully employed this tactic
at Stockholm in 1967. The Stockholm Act made several changes in the Berne
Convention, including the appending of a Protocol to the main text. The Protocol
contained a set of exemptions permitting the developing countries to grant
compulsory translation and reproduction licenses, to “limit” the economic rights
of authors for purposes of teaching and study, and to make other encroachments
on the standards of protection required of member countries in the main text,
When the panic subsided, developed countries realized they almost had surrendered
too much of their authors’ rights. They did not ratify the Protocol, and it never
became applicable to their authors and publishers. The developing countries did
not stalk out of Berne, or the UCC -
But talk of an exodus persisted; and developing countries continued to argue
for “freer access” to copyrighted works of developed countries. In 1969 a joint
TJCC-Berne study group recommended the simultaneous revision of both Con-
ventions. And in 1970 revised texts were drafted for the Revision Conferences by
UCC and Berne committees, each consisting of several developing and developed
countries. The final draft texts were the result of two rounds of negotiations and
preparation in which the developing and developed countries made concessions
and gave up rights to reach a “delicate balance”—a compromise frequently
referred to at the Paris conferences as “the package deal.”
121
The developed countries expected that the draft texts would be adopted without
Substantive changes by the conferences, since they were the result of substantial
compromises and thorough consideration. Their opening speeches emphasized
the need for maintaining the “delicate balance” and not reopening the “package
deal.” But developing countries reopened the “package deal” and made changes,
through amendments of the text and adoption of “interpretations” in the Report.
Since the United States is a member of the UCC and not of Berne, and since the
S2,ID6 §§ changes were made in both conventions, the discussion is keyed to the
1971 UCC.
TEIE BERNE SAFEGUARD CLAUSE
Article XVII of the 1952 UCC and the Appendix Declaration prevented any
country belonging to both conventions from leaving Berne and relying on UCC
for protection, in other Berne-UCC countries. The 1971 UCC eliminates this
condition for developing countries, allowing them to leave Berne and retain
UCC protection in any other country belonging to both conventions.
REPRODUCTION, PERFORMANCE RIGHTS
Article I of the 1952 UCC requires member states to “provide for the adequate
and effective protection of the rights of authors and other copyright proprietors.”
It remains unchanged in the 1971 text, and is supplemented by a new article,
IV bis, which states that the rights mentioned in Article I “include the basic rights
insuring the author's economic interests, including the exclusive right to authorize
reproduction by any means, public performance and broadcasting.”
While some observers see IV as upgrading the level of protection in UCC, it
is doubtful that it adds much to the present obligation of Article I to provide
“adequate and effective protection of the rights of authors.” Moreover, Article IV
bis allows member states to carve exceptions into these “exclusive” rights, de-
claring that any state may “make exceptions that do not conflict with the spirit
and provisions of this Convention, to the rights” of reproduction, public per-
formance and broadcasting, so long as a “reasonable degree of effective protec-
tion” is provided. This could cover a wide range of exceptions which copyright
experts in other countries might devise, particularly since their courts will be the
only effective forums for deciding whether the “exceptions” they legislate comply
with the provisions of IV bis of the UCC.
DEFINITION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY
Article V bis defines a developing country as one so regarded “in conformity
with the established practice of the U.N. General Assembly.” There is no explicit
practice, or list of developing countries. The U.N.'s Committee on Assessments
has considered “developing countries” as those with a per capita income of $300
or less. But the developing countries at Paris strongly resisted the suggestion that
this or any other concrete criteria be approved by the two Conferences. From a
practical viewpoint, every country in both conventions may be free to decide
for itself whether it is a developing country. Practically every South American,
African, Middle Eastern, and Asian nation except Japan could qualify, as well as
some European countries.
A developing country which notifies the Director General of UNESCO that it
wishes to exercise the compulsory licensing provisions of the UCC may do so for
ten years after the Convention comes into force and may renew the privilege for
further ten-year periods.
THE PRESENT TRAN SLATION IICENSE
Article V of the 1952 UCC guarantees the author's exclusive right of translation
of his work for seven years following initial publication. Thereafter, if an author-
ized translation has not appeared in any country’s national language or if the
authorized translation is out of print, the country may grant its nationals non-
exclusive licenses to translate and publish the work in its language. The applicant
must have requested and been denied authorization by the owner of the transia-
tion right, or given notice to the publisher and designated diplomatic officials or
organizations, if the owner cannot be found. The Article applies to all members
of the Convention.
Article V requires assurance of just compensation, payment, and transmittal; a
correct translation, and the title and owner's name printed on every copy. Very
few compulsory licenses have been granted under Article V, perhaps because of
the seven-year requirement.
122
THE NEW TRANSLATION LICENSE
The 1971 UCC retains Article V, with a few insubstantial changes. But it also
adds a new Article V ter which permits developing countries—for purposes of
“teaching, scholarships or research”—to grant compulsory licenses three years
after publication, instead of seven, for translation into languages that are in
general use in developed countries; and to grant licenses one year after initial
publication for translation into languages not generally used in developed coun-
tries. Thus, a South American developing country could grant a license to translate
an American novel into Spanish three years after it was first published in the
United States, while India could grant a license to translate it into Kashmiri or
Bengali one year after publication—if an authorized translation had not been
published in that language or, if published, had gone out of print. These com-
pulsory licenses are subject to the conditions of Article V and additional con-
ditions of V ter, discussed below.
THE REPRODUCTION LICENSE
The 1971 UCC would also permit developing countries to grant non-exclusive
compulsory licenses to reproduce Works for “use in connection with systematic
instructional activities.” The license would permit reprinting of books in their
original language and the reprinting of translations authorized by the owner,
provided the language was in general use in the country granting the license.
The license can be granted if, within a specified period of time following initial
publication of an edition, the owner has not distributed copies in the country “to
the general public or in connection with Systematic instructional activities at a
price reasonably related to that normally charged in the State for comparable
works. . . .” The grace period for fiction, poetry, drama, music, and art books is
seven years from publication; for scientific and technological books, three years;
and for others, five years. Reproduction licenses may also be granted if, during
a six-month period, no authorized copies are on Sale to the public or for sys–
tematic instructional materials at a “reasonably related” price.
WORKS SU BJECT TO LICEN SES
Reproduction licenses under V quater apply only to literary, scientific, or artistic
works published in printed Or analogous form, and to those audio-visual works,
including incorporated text, which were prepared and published for the sole
purpose of being used in connection with Systematic instructional activities.
Translation licenses under V ter apply to “writings” and permit “publication”
of the translation. “Publication” means reproduction and distribution of copies
which can be read or otherwise visually perceived; and, according to Article I of
the UCC, a “writing” is a separate category of work, distinct from “musical,
dramatic and cinematographic works, and paintings, engravings and sculpture.
However, licenses to translate works composed mainly of illustrations may also
authorize the reproduction of the illustrations, subject to the conditions of V
quater. The Conference agreed that the lyrics of songs were not subject to the
translation license.
Article V ter also allows developing countries to license broadcasting organiza-
tions to translate published works for use in non-commercial broadcasts intended
for teaching or disseminating the results of research, or in recordings used for such
broadcasts; the license may also cover texts of audio-visual works which were
prepared for use in systematic instructional activities. -
Developing countries which grant compulsory licenses are protected from
retaliation. Thus no developed country can reduce the level of protection which it
is obliged to give to works from such developing countries.
CONDITIONS OF COMPULSORY LICENSES
Articles V ter and V quater impose substantially similar conditions for the
granting of compulsory translation and reproduction licenses. The applicant for
the license must have requested and been denied authorization by the owner of
the particular right, and must inform a designated information center of his
request. If the owner cannot be found, copies of the license application must be
sent to the publisher and a designated information center. A translation license
cannot be granted until a further six months (for 3-year licenses) or nine months
(for 1-year licenses) after the applicant requests a license from the owner or sends
his application to the publisher. No license can be granted if an authorized trans-
123
lation is published during this period. There is a similar six-month grace period
for reproduction licenses, but it is concurrent. The grace period for translation
begins after expiration of the one- or three-year period.
Translation and reproduction licenses are not transferable; do “not extend to
the export of copies,” and are “valid only for publication in the territory” of
the licensing country. Copies must bear a notice that they are for distribution
only in the licensing state, the UCC copyright notice where required, the title,
and the author's name. Translations must be “correct,” reproductions must be
“accurate.”
Due provision must be made “at the national level” to insure that licenses
provide “just compensation” consistent with normal royalty standards for
“freely negotiated” licenses between persons of the two countries, and payment
and transmittal. However, if currency regulations interfere (implying they may),
“all efforts” should be made to insure transmittal in international convertibié
currency “or its equivalent.”
TERMINATION OF COMPULSORY LTCENSES
A compulsory translation license under V ter is terminated if a translation is
published in the developing country by the Owner (or with his authorization)
with substantially the same content as the edition for which the license was
granted, at a price reasonably related to that normally charged in the country for
comparable works. A compulsory reproduction license is also terminated by
distribution of authorized copies of the edition in the country, at “reasonably
related” prices, to the general public or in connection with systematic instrug-
tional activities. In either case any copies made before the license is terminated can
continue to be distributed. Translation and reproduction licenses cannot be
granted when the author has withdrawn all copies from circulation.
These provisions were essentially the provisions of V ter and V quater, as set
forth in the draft texts submitted to the UCC and Berne revision conferences—
the “package deal.” However, the “package” was opened and its contents con-
siderably changed by adding further provisions to the text and by adopting
“interpretations” which could influence the application of the license provisions
as effectively as formal amendments. These are Some of the changes.
(1) The right of translation was extended to include broadcasting.
(2) While compulsory licenses to translate into languages in general use in
developing countries were only to be granted three years after publication,
V ter was amended at the conferences to permit a developing country to grant
such licenses after one year if all developed countries using the language agree.
Thus, Brazil, by agreement with Portugal, will be free to translate American
novels and other works into Portuguese, Brazil's national language, one year
(plus nine months) after publication in the United States. The three-year limit
cannot be reduced for compulsory license translations into English, French, or
Spanish.
How BROAD is “scHOLARSHIP”?
(3) The one- and three-year compulsory translation licenses were supposed to
be used, according to V_ter, “only for the purpose of teaching, scholarship or
research.” However, the Report of the UCC conference states that “scholarship”
refers not only to instructional activities in schools and colleges “but also to a
wide range of organized educational activities intended for participation at any
age level and devoted to the study of any subject.” Delegates from developing
countries made it clear that they understood the area of use to be extremely
broad, and that it included the sale of copies to the public. Similarly, the com-
pulsory reproduction license, according to V quater, was supposed to be used for
the publication of editions “for use in connection with systematic instructional
activities.” However, the Report states that “this term is intended to include
not only activities in connection with the formal and informal curriculum of an
educational institution, but also systematic out-of-school education.” And some
delegates again indicated their view that sale of copies to the public was per-
mitted. Discussion at the conference reflected broad, loose interpretation of
educational and instructional activities that could easily encompass the translation
or reproduction—and general sale—of novels and other trade books on optional
reading lists of schools, adult education centers, radio Or television lecture series,
correspondence courses, and the like. Some delegates indicated their belief that
any use that promoted “culture” served an educational purpose. .
(4) A basic premise of the “package deal” was that copies produced under
compulsory licenses could not be exported; and licenses were to be “valid only
124
for publication in the territory” of the developing country which grants the license.
However, the developing countries succeeded in amending V ter to allow a licensing
country to export copies of translations produced under compulsory license, in
any language except French, English or Spanish, to its nationals in other countries,
for “teaching, scholarship or research.”
(5) A fundamental question is whether the holder of a compulsory license can
have the copies printed in another country. If a developing South American,
African or Asian country grants one of its nationals a license to translate or re-
produce an American biography, novel or textbook, may he have the edition
printed in Taiwan, or East Germany, or Czechoslovakia? May he hire a transla–
tor in another country? And may nationals of several countries, all granted
compulsory licenses for the same American work, use the same translator and
have their copies produced abroad by the same printer? Developing countries
strongly resisted an explicit requirement that printing be done in the country
granting the compulsory license. They argued that some countries did not have
the facilities to print translations or reproductions.
It was also argued, incorrectly, that this imposed a “manufacturing clause.”
But the manufacturing clause requires an American author to print his books
in the U.S. as a condition for securing U.S. copyright. The printing limit pro-
posed by Argentina and Great Britain was a limit on developing countries that
grant compulsory licenses, to protect the author against an expanded use of
those licenses. The limit would not restrict the author's right to have his book
printed where he chooses. If he grants a voluntary license to a publisher in a
developing country, the limit would not apply.
Actually, the limitation was already inherent in the provisions of V ter and
W quater which prohibited the export of copies made under compulsory licenses
and prescribed that the licenses “be valid only for publication” in the licensing
country. Artilce VI of the UCC defines “publication” as “the reproduction in
tangible form and distribution to the public of copies of a work . . .”
After much discussion, a formal “interpretation” of Articles V ter and quater,
and the corresponding Articles in the Berne Convention, was prepared by a joint
drafting committee of Berne and UCC countries for insertion in the reports of both
conferences. The interpretation has essentially the same effect as an amendment
of the texts. It declares that the provisions prohibiting “export” of copies and
making compulsory licenses “valid only for publication” in the country granting
the license “are considered as prohibiting a licensee from having copies reproduced
outside” that country. However, it then declares that the prohibition does not
apply where the licensing state does not have printing or reproduction facilities, or
its facilities “are incapable for economic or practical reasons of reproducing the
copies”; the copies are reproduced in a Berne or UCC country; they are returned
in bulk to the licensee; the reproduction is lawful where done; and it is not done in
a plant especially created for reproducing works covered by compulsory licenses.
The interpretation also states that V ter and V quater do not prohibit a compulsory
licensee from employing a foreign translator, or several licensees in different
countries from using the same unpublished translation. The interpretation States
that no compulsory license should be used for commercial purposes.
EFFECT ON AUTHORS’ RIGHTS
How adversely these last minute changes will affect authors’ rights needs more
careful consideration than the delegates could give, and a better knowledge of
publishing than many of them possessed. The chairman of the Conference, in
his closing remarks, observed that the system of compulsory licenses would not
satisfy “the world of authors” in the developed and developing countries. He
hoped that compulsory licenses would be an exception, as they had been since
1952. And a principal reassurance offered authors by the architects of the 1971
revisions is that few licenses will be issued. But if that is so, then there is no
need to adopt these new provisions which sharply downgrade the level of pro-
tection in UCC and Berne. A more realistic forecast may be a substantial increase
in compulsory licenses: because the time period for translation is reduced from
Seven years to one year, or three years; because compulsory reproduction licenses
are expressly sanctioned; and because the last minute changes on “outside”
translation and printing make compulsory licenses cheap and easy to use.
WHY AUTHORS ARE UNIHAPPY
Some architects of the 1971 revisions assume it contains reasonable safeguards
for authors. But, as the chairman noted, their views are not likely to Satisfy
125
the “world of authors,” and with good reason. First, the architects cite the
“limited” purpose of compulsory licenses. But “education,” “scholarship” and
“systematic instructional activities” have been broadly interpreted in the Report,
and by delegates from several developing countries, so there is no real obstacle
to the compulsory translation or reproduction of books for Sale, in large part,
to a general reading audience. Moreover, there is no practical way for an author
to stop the improper issuance or misuse of a license.
Second, the architects assume that authors and publishers can prevent com-
pulsory translation licenses by having authorized translations published. But
translations cost money to prepare and to publish. And they must be kept in print,
since a six-month lapse would still open the door for compulsory licensing. Actually
few authors or publishers could afford the expense of issuing translations of a
book into several languages as insurance against compulsory licenses. They need
some hope of an audience, and market, for the translation; and it is precisely that
which the compulsory license system may deny them. The architects also suggest
that authors can prevent compulsory licenses by issuing a translation in the six-
or nine-month grace period after the request for a license is received. But even
assuming translations could be made and published so quickly, this is totally
unrealistic. The applicant is not obliged to exercise his compulsory license within
a specified time, or to use it at all. Once he gets it, he can just sit with it. Therefore,
an author or publisher could not know whether he was spending money for a
translation to defeat a compulsory license that never would be used. Furthermore,
while publication of an authorized translation, anywhere, would prevent a com-
pulsory translation license for that language, it exposes the translation to a
compulsory reproduction license. -
If the 1971 UCC comes into effect, American authors and publishers will be faced
with these problems for the thousands of works already in print that have not been
translated into French, Spanish, Portuguese, or other languages used in developing
countries.
CAN AUTHORS PROTECT THEMSELVES”
Third, the architects assume that authors can protect themselves against
compulsory reproduction licenses, and terminate translation and reproduction
licenses that have been granted, by distributing copies of an authorized edition
in the developing country which issued the license. But this requires not only
distribution, but distribution at a “price reasonably related” to the price “nor-
mally” charged there “for comparable works.” Finding a distributor in some
countries can itself be a problem. Finding one who will sell an authorized edition
in competition with the compulsory-license edition may be more of a problem;
even when the license terminates, the backlog can be sold off. The difficulties may
multiply where the developing country owns or controls its publishing facilities.
Will a state-owned publishing house distribute the author's authorized edition
if that terminates its compulsory license to issue the work, or prevents it from
obtaining a compulsory reproduction license at a low royalty? Even if the author
or publisher can find a distributor, can their authorized edition meet the second
requirement; can it be sold at a “price reasonably related to that normally charged”
for comparable works, if the comparable works are sold at a narrow mark-up, or
at cost, or below cost, by a state-owned or subsidized publisher, or acquired
cheaply (or free) from a foreign state under the “outside printing” interpretation?
Fourth, the architects note that a compulsory license cannot be granted until
the owner's authorization has been requested and denied. But what choices face
the author or publisher who receives a request for authorization to translate or
reproduce a work? As noted, he cannot afford to rush a translation into print
each time. He can accept, reject, or bargain for better terms than the applicant
offers. If the royalty offered him is unsatisfactory, his chances of increasing it
by bargaining are as slight as his bargaining power. He is under the gun. If he
rejects the royalty offered him, the applicant will receive a compulsory license,
with the royalty rate fixed by authorities in the developing country. And with
this alternative, it is unlikely that those requesting his authorization will offer
him generous terms.
No minimum royalty is specified in the 1971 UCC. It requires only that com-
pensation be “consistent with standards of royalties normally operating in the
case of licenses freely negotiated between persons in the two countries concerned.”
If the author is not satisfied with the rate fixed by the authorities of the developing
country, under this broad mandate, he could challenge it only in the courts of
the developing country. In fact, all objections to the issuance of licenses would
have to be made there. That requires a considerable investment for every license,
83—500—72—9
126
with not too promising a chance of success. The 1971 UCC provides no other
forum for authors of publishers aggrieved by their treatment in developing
countries. -
Even allowing for a substantial discounting of these possible dangers, a com-
pulsory licensing system is a dismal prospect for the “world of authors” in devel-
oped and developing countries. It becomes more dismal if several developing
countries can issue compulsory licenses for the same work, use one translator to
translate it, and have the translation printed in quantity in one plant in another
country; or have a large quantity of copies run off in the plant under reproduction
licenses issued by all of them. Mass production is possible. And compulsory
licensing becomes an even more attractive alternative to voluntary arrangements
between the author and developing countries that want to use his work. It also
offers some developed countries an inexpensive means of extending aid to under-
developed countries, i.e. printing cheap, mass paperback editions of books by
authors from other developed countries. Under the “outside printing” interpre-
tation, each developing country will decide whether its own printing facilities
“are incapable for economic or practical reasons of reproducing the copies” of
foreign works for which it issues compulsory licenses. -
As the chairman of the UCC conference suggested, compulsory licensing should
not be the ordinary means of providing for publication in developing countries.
It should be the rare exception, used only where voluntary negotiations cannot
secure for a developing country the right to publish a book it truly needs for
educational purposes, and then with fair compensation for the author. Authors
are entitled to ask for a rigorous analysis of the compulsory licensing system
created at both Paris conferences, in the texts and by the interpretations, to de-
termine whether it is likely to produce only a few compulsory licenses or to en-
courage their use as a fundamental means of acquiring translation and publish-
ing rights. For if the latter result develops, authors will, in effect, be compelled
to subsidize “developing” countries, including some well able to pay normal
royalties. This is a sacrifice not asked of manufacturers of soft drinks, industrial
equipment, automobiles or other products—including those purchased by de-
Veloping countries for the construction or operation of Schools. Nor is it a sacrifice
likely to be asked of translators who will translate under compulsory licenses,
or publishers who will be granted those licenses in developing countries. If sub-
sidies are required to aid education in developing countries, they would more
appropriately come from the governments of developed countries, including
funds to pay royalties on copies translated or reproduced in developing countries
under voluntary licenses.
Ultimately the Senate will have to decide if the United States ratifies the 1971
UCC. If it does not, the United States would remain a party to the 1952 UCC,
and the new compulsory licensing provisions would not apply to American works.
Moreover, the Paris Act of the Berne Convention would not become effective.
Developing countries might leave Berne or the UCC. They would then be free
to institute compulsory licensing systems of their own devising, or deny any
protection to foreign works. But their works would not be entitled, under the
Conventions, to protection in other countries. Retaliation in the long run, if not
the short, might persuade them to remain in the UCC or rejoin it.
Ratification would freeze a compulsory license system into both Berne and
UCC for decades to come, available to a majority of the members of the U.N. for
an unpredictable period of time. When, for example, will Brazil or Yugoslavia or
India decide they have become developed countries? If Brazil or Yugoslavia. Or
Israel are still developing countries, how long will it take for less developed
developing countries to become developed? These are some of the questions left
unanswered by the Paris conferences. And in the shadow of these questions, a
careful analysis of the effects and consequences of the two new conventions is
imperative, before the Senate decides what action the United States should take.
AMERICAN BAR Association, CoMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL PATENT, TRADE-
MARK, AND COPYRIGHT RELATIONS OF THE SECTION ON INTERNATIONAL LAW-
COPYRIGHTs, PARIS REVISION OF UNIVERSAL AND BERNE COPYRIGHT CON-
VENTIONS—JULY 1971
INTRODUCTION
As our last report pointed out, the authors and publishers of the “developed”
countries were shocked four years ago when a Revision Conference of the Berne
Convention met at Stockholm and adopted a Protocol which was designed to give
127
the “developing” countries relatively free access to copyrighted works for most
purposes (see further details at pages 4-5 of this report). Much to the surprise of
the developing countries, none of the leading developed countries adhered to the
Stockholm revision and there is no substantial likelihood of their ever doing so.
The United States representatives to the Stockholm Conference made it clear
that if the Stockholm Protocol became a fixed part of the Berne Convention it
would be impossible for the United States to adhere to Berne at any time in the
future. Recognizing that the developing countries are entitled to some assistance
in obtaining the right to use foreign works for educational purposes consistent with
the principles of international copyright, efforts have been made in the United
States and abroad to meet those needs while at the same time preserving the basic
structure of international copyright. With this in view, diplomatic conferences to
revise both the Universal Copyright Convention (hereafter, UCC) and the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (hereafter, Berne
Convention), were scheduled for meetings in Paris last July. At those meetings
both Conventions were modified to accomplish substantially the objects set forth
in our last report. -
THE PARIS CONFERENCES OF JULY 5–24, 1971
Delegations of seventy-five countries participated in three weeks of intensive
deliberations at Paris from July 5–24, 1971, to revise the two Conventions. Twenty-
six countries, including the United States, signed the revised UCC, and twenty-
eight countries signed the revised Berne Convention.
Both Conventions now await ratification by the signatory States,' and accession
by the non-signatory States in accordance with their constitutional procedures.
For the UCC, the appropriate instrument is to be deposited with the Director-
General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO). For the Berne Convention, the appropriate instrument is to be de-
º the Director-General of the World Intellectual Property Organization
The United States Delegation to the Paris Conferences was headed by Bruce D.
Ladd, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Commercial Affairs and Business
Activities and Abraham L. Kaminstein, then Register of Copyrights. The advisers
to the United States Delegation included three members of the Subcommittee on
Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Judiciary Committee of the United
States House of Representatives—Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman of that
Subcommittee and Edward G. Biester, Jr., and Abner J. Mikva, members of the
Subcommittee; Herbert Fuchs of the Judiciary Committee Staff, Barbara Ringer
and Robert Hadl of the Copyright Office, and Robert Evans, Herman Finkel-
stein, Sidney Kaye, Irwin Karp, Bella Linden, Melville Nimmer and Sidney
Schreiber, members of the State Department Copyright Panel.
ACTION OF THE AMERICAN BAR, ASSOCIATION IN 1970—INTER-EELATION OF
D OMESTIC AND INTERNATION AL COPYRIGHT LEGISTATION
Early this year the American Bar Association approved the following resolution
*; by the Association’s Section on Patents, Trademarks and Copyright Law
in 1970:
“Resolved, in order that the United States may participate in a meaningful
manner in the diplomatic conferences scheduled for May and June of 1971 for the
revision of the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions and without affecting
or withdrawing from the position taken by the Section of Patent, Trademark
and Copyright Law in 1965 and by the American Bar Association in 1966, that the
Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law favors in principle the prompt
enactment of legislation amending The Copyright Law of the United States,
Title 17, United States Code, to embody at least the following: (1) A single Federal
System of copyright; (2) A basic term consisting of the life of the author, plus
fifty years after his death, with an extension of subsisting copyrights, and for
works made for hire, the term of seventy-five years from publication; (3) a relaxa-
tion of formalities as to notice consistent with reasonable notice and equitable
treatment in the case of failure to comply; and (4) No limitation of copyright by
Way of a manufacturing clause.”
1 The UCC was open for signature until November 21, 1971, by States party to the 1952 text of the Con-
.# º Berne Convention will remain open for signature until January 31, 1972 by any country mem-
er of the Union.
128
THE STOCKHOLM PROTOCOL OF 1967
The Stockholm Protocol included the following concessions to developing
countries, members of the Berne Union: the right to reduce the term of copyright
from “life plus fifty years” to “life plus twenty-five years”; to allow compulsory
licenses for translation into national, official, or regional languages, if, within
three years of first publication, such action had not been taken or authorized by
the copyright owner; to allow compulsory licenses for reproduction of works under
similar conditions; to limit the exclusive right to broadcast “for profit-making
purposes”; and to restrict the protection of literary and artistic works for “teach-
ing, study and research in all fields of education.” The possible economic benefits
from all of these privileges were further enhanced by exceptionally loose pro-
visions concerning the export of copies made under compulsory licenses and
royalty payments.
So much has been written on the subject that detailed comment is not necessary
in this report.”
CHANGES IN THE UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION
The only right which the original UCC required member states to safeguard
was the right of translation. The Paris Revision provides for additional rights
and authorized certain limitations on the right of translation as applied to devel-
oping Countries. º
ARTICLE IV BIS OF THE PARIS REVISION.—RIGHTS OF REPRODUCTION, PUBLIC
PERFORMANCE AND BEO A.D CASTING
This Article is one of the new articles included in the revised UCC. It is divided
into two paragraphs. Paragraph 1 adds the basic rights of reproduction, public
performance, and broadcasting. As adopted by the Conference, these basic rights
are defined as “exclusive” rights and apply to works protected under the Con-
vention “either in their original form or in any form recognizably derived from
the original.” -
Paragraph 2 provides that any Contracting State may make exceptions to the
rights mentioned in paragraph 1 that “do not conflict with the spirit and provi-
sions of this Convention.” However, States must “accord a reasonable degree
of effective protection to each of the rights to which exception has been made.”
One of the fundamental premises of the revised UCC is that no State, now
party to the UCC, that respects the fundamental rights of authors should be
required to make any changes in its domestic law as a condition for ratifying or
adhering to the 1971 text. Thus, “no country now meeting the obligations of the
1952 Convention and according basic copyright protection would be required to
assume new obligations in order to adhere to the 1971 Convention” (Report,
para. 44). Otherwise ratifications might be delayed and the purpose of the revision
Conferences—to meet the immediate needs of developing countries—might be
thwarted.
The provision in paragraph 2 permitting exceptions to the specified rights is
necessarily couched in terms of broad generality. This provision must allow for
the wide variety of exceptions now existing in the laws of many different countries.
The United States, for example, recognizes the fairly broad exceptions inherent
in the doctrine of fair use, subjects the right of public performance of music to
the jukebox exemption and the for-profit limitation, and subjects the recording
right in music to a compulsory license. The copyright revision bill (currently
S. 644, 92nd Congress) would provide for a number of specific exceptions and
limitations on the rights of copyright owners.
The broad provision for exceptions in paragraph 2 has given rise to the argument
in Some quarters that the Specification in paragraph 1 of the basic rights of repro-
duction, public performance, and broadcasting is rendered meaningless. Your
Committee does not agree with that view. Paragraph 2 qualifies its allowance for
exceptions by requiring every State to accord “a reasonable degree of effective
2 Lazar, “Developing Countries and Authors’ Rights in International Copyright,” ASCAP Copyright
Law Symposium Number Nineteen 1 (1971); Schrader, “Armageddon in International Copyright: Review of
the Berne Convention, the Universal Copyright Convention, and the Present Crisis in International
Copyright,” 2 Advances in Librarianship 306 (1971); Ringer, “The Role of the United States in International
Copyright,” 56 Georgetown Law Journal 1050 (1968); Desbois, “The Diplomatic Conference for the Revision
of the Berne and Geneva Conventions,” 68 Revue Internationale Du Droit D’Auteur 2 (1971); Ulmer, “The
Draft Texts for the Revisions of the Copyright Conventions,” 125B European Broadcasting Union Review
47 (1971); See also Ulmer, EBU Review, Nos.120B, p.48 and 122B, p. 40.
For a detailed history of the preparatory steps leading to the Protocol, see Johnson “The Origins of the
Stockholm Protocol,” 18 Bull, Cr. Soc. 91 (1970); see also, Schrader, “Analysis of the Protocol Regarding
Developing Countries,” 17 Bull. Cr. Soc. 160, 161–66 (1970); Ringer, Supra mote 4.
129
protection to each of the rights to which exception has been made.” As stated by
the Rapporteur-General, “where exceptions are made, they must have a logical
basis and must not be applied arbitrarily, and the protection offered must be
effectively enforced by the laws of the Contracting State” (Report, para. 46(4)).
There has been much concern about whether a developed country may, under
paragraph 2, institute a “general system of compulsory licensing for the publica-
tion of literary, scientific or artistic works” along the lines permitted developing
countries under Articles Wter and Wouater. The Report gives assurance to the
contrary. Specifically it states that “the inclusion in the Convention of special
provisions allowing developing countries to publish certain works and transla–
tions under compulsory licenses, means a contrario that, except as provided in
Article V, there could be no question of developed countries instituting a general
system of compulsory licensing for the publication of literary, scientific or artistic
works.” (Report, para. 46(2)).
ARTICLE VBIs—“DEVELOPING COUNTRIES”
This Article is another new article in the revised UCC. It regulates the procedure
for determining which countries are developing countries and the periods during
which developing countries may apply the exceptions contained in new Articles
Vter and Voluater.
ARTICLE VTER—EXCEPTIONS TO THE RIGHT OF TRANSI/ATION
The provisions of this Article are new and concern the exceptions that develop-
ing countries may make to the right of translation. They are related to Article
V which now governs the right of translation for all countries. Under Article V
all States must recognize the translation right for a period of seven years from the
date of first publication. After that time, and failing publication in a language in
general use to the particular country, the translation right may be subjected to a
compulsory license, with compensation required, until the term of copyright
€X]).]]^62S.
*ile Vter permits developing countries to substitute for the seven-year
period of Article V, the period of three years or longer, where the translation is
into a language in general use in one or more developed countries (“world lan-
guages”). They may substitute the period of one year where the translation is
into a language not in general use in one or more developed countries (“non-world
languages”). It was clearly understood at the Conference that English, French
and Spanish would be considered “world languages”. Thus, a compulsory license
to translate into one of these languages in a developing country cannot be con-
sidered until at least three years have elapsed from the date of first publication.
In the case of “world languages” other than English, French and Spanish, a
special exception is recognized if the developing country where the language is
in general use obtains the agreement of all the developed countries speaking the
same language. Under these circumstances, the three-year period may be reduced
to one year. This special exception was introduced mainly to resolve a difficulty
that had arisen with respect to Portuguese and which involved Portugal and
Brazil. &.
Article Wter also contains numerous conditions affecting the ability of develop-
ing countries to issue compulsory licenses. First, a compulsory license to publish
a translation may only be granted if the applicant establishes either that he has
requested and been denied authorization by the owner of the right of translation,
or that after due diligence on his part he was unable to find the owner of the right.
In addition, at the same time as he makes his request, he must inform the inter-
national copyright information center established by UNESCO of the request,
or any national or regional information center which may have been designated
in a notification to UNESCO by the State in which the publisher is believed to
have his principal place of business.
If the owner of the right of translation cannot be found, the applicant must
send copies of his application to the publisher whose name appears on the work
and to any national or regional information center. If no such center has been
designated, he must then send a copy to the UNESCO information center.
Second, in the case of translations into “nonworld languages” there is a further
period of nine months, and in the case of “world languages” there is a further
period of six months, before the license may issue. These periods run either from
the date of the request for permission to translate, or, if the owner of the right of
translation is not known, from the date of the dispatch of copies of the application.
83—500—72—10
130
Third, any compulsory license to translate may only be granted for the purpose
of teaching, Scholarship or research.
Fourth, no copies made under a compulsory license may be exported from the
particular developing country, and all copies must bear a notice stating that
they are available for distribution only in the Contracting State granting the
license. A limited exception to the export ban is recognized in the case where
certain developing countries may wish to supply communities of their nationals
living in other countries with translations prepared under Article Vter.
Fifth, due provision must be made at the national level to assure that the
license provides for just compensation that is consistent with standards of royalties
normally operating on licenses freely negotiated between persons in the two
Countries concerned. Payment and transmittal are also required, but if national
Currency regulations intervene, the competent authority must make all efforts,
by the use of international machinery, to ensure transmittal in internationally
convertible currency or its equivalent.
Finally, a compulsory license to translate is to be terminated at any time if a
translation of the work in the same language and with substantially the same
content is published in the country by the owner of the right of translation, or
with his permission, at a price reasonably related to that normally charged in the
State for comparable works.
Subject to all the above conditions, Article Vter also provides for compulsory
licenses to broadcasting Organizations in developing countries to translate works
in printed Or analogous forms of reproduction within the same time periods for
use in broadcasts. These broadcasts must be intended exclusively for teaching
Or for the dissemination of the results of specialized technical or scientific research
to experts in a particular profession. All uses of the translation must be without
any commercial purpose. Further, the license cannot convey any rights of adapta-
tion, including adaptation of a non-dramatic work to dramatic form, or use in
cinematographic works, and it does not of itself sanction the broadcasting of the
translation or the making of “ephemeral” or other recordings (Report, para. 85).
The same criteria and conditions apply to the translation by a broadcasting
Organization of the text incorporated in an audio-visual fixation, if the audio-visual
fixation was itself prepared and published for the sole purpose of being used in
connection with systematic instructional activities.
ARTICLE VOIJATER—COMPULSORY LICENSES TO REPRODUCE WORKS
The provisions of this Article are new and regulate the conditions under which
developing countries may reproduce works under compulsory licenses. The scope
of the Article is limited to works published in printed or analogous forms of
reproduction, but also includes audio-visual works and the translation of any
incorporated text, provided the work was prepared and published for the sole
intrinsic purpose of being used in connection with systematic instructional
activities. .
If copies of a particular edition of a work have not been distributed in a particu-
lar developing country, to the general public or in connection with systematic
instructional activities, at a price reasonably related to that charged in the State
for comparable works, by the owner of the right of reproduction or with his authori-
zation, then the competent authority in the developing country may issue a
compulsory license to one of its nationals to reproduce and publish the work. The
general minimum time period before which a reproduction can be made is five
years, although a shorter period of three years is recognized for works of the natural
and physical sciences. A longer period of seven years is recognized for works of
fiction, poetry, drama, music and art books.
Like Article Vter, Article Voluater also contains numerous conditions affecting
the issuance of a compulsory license. The procedure for obtaining a compulsory
license is essentially the same: the prospective licensee must have made efforts in
good faith to negotiate a license or to find the owner of the right. In all cases the
license is restricted to use in connection with systematic instructional activities.
In addition, the export ban and royalty payment provisions of Article Vter are
applicable to reproductions. Further the compulsory license is to be terminated
if the owner of the right of reproduction or his authorized representative distributes
in the particular country, copies of an edition substantially the same in content as
the edition published under the license and at a price reasonably related to that
normally charged in the country for comparable works.
Article Voluater also contains a special provision concerning the ability of de-
veloping countries to issue a compulsory license to reproduce a translation of a
131
work. Such licenses may only be granted where the reproduction is of a transla-
tion published by the owner of the right of translation or with his authorization,
and where the translation is in a language in general use in the State with power
to grant the license.
ARTICLE IX—RELATION BETWEEN STATES NOT AD HERING TO PARIS REVISION AND
STATES THAT AD HERE TO REVISION
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article IX are new. They attempt to regulate the prob-
lem posed by the fact that once the revised Convention enters into force, the
TJCC will exist in two versions and that some States may only be a party to one
of these two versions.
As a first step in Solving the problem, paragraph 3 provides that any State that
becomes a party to the revised Convention and that is not a party to the 1952
Convention, automatically becomes a party to the 1952 Convention. Further-
more, once the revised Convention comes into force, no State may accede solely
to the 1952 Convention. In this way, new members and old members (whether
or not the old members have ratified or adhered to the new text) are assured of
having a common text between them—the 1952 Convention.
Paragraph 4 then provides that relations between States party to the 1971
Convention and States that are party only to the 1952 Convention are governed
by the 1952 Convention. However, any State party only to the 1952 Convention
may, by a notification deposited with UNESCO, state that it will permit the
application of the 1971 Convention to works of its nationals or works first pub-
lished in its territory, by all States party to the 1971 Convention. For the United
States this means that until such time as it ratifies the revised Convention or de-
posits a notification in accordance with paragraph 4, no developing country may
avail itself of the special exceptions for such countries contained in the 1971 Con-
vention as against works of nationals of the United States or works first published
in the United States.
Article XVII and the Appendix Declaration contain the so-called “Berne safe-
guard clause”. Under paragraph (a) of the Appendix Declaration, works which
have as their country of origin a country that has withdrawn from the Berne
Union will not be given protection under the UCC in other Berne countries.
Under new paragraph (b) a developing country may now withdraw from the
* Convention and not be subject to the Sanctions contained if paragraph
8, ).
BERNE CONVENTION
1. Separation of Stockholm Protocol from Berne Convention. The Conference
decided that the best method of separating the Stockholm Protocol from the
Berne Convention was to draft an entirely new text of the Berne Convention.
Under this new text, known as the Paris Act, Articles 1–20 and 22–26 of the
Stockholm Act were repeated verbatim. The Protocol was replaced by new
reservations for developing countries contained in an “Appendix” that forms an
integral part of the Convention (Article 21).
2. Adherence by France, Spain, United Kingdom and United States to Revised
UCC as Conditions for Revision of Berne. The developing countries insisted
that the Stockholm Protocol remain intact unless the major developed countries
accepted the special concessions for developing countries in the new text of the
UCC. They wanted some assurance that the Stockholm experience would not be
repeated. -
º adopted by the Conference, the Paris Act of the Berne Convention will only
enter force after both of the following two conditions are fulfilled: (1) at least
five countries members of the Berne Union have ratified or acceded to the Paris
Act including the Appendix, and (2) France, Spain, the United Kingdom and
the United States have become bound by the revised text of the UCC.
The inclusion of the United States, a non-Berne country, in the group of four
developed countries whose ratification of the UCC is a condition precedent for
the entry into force of the Berne revision, caused much discussion at the Confer-
ence. In effect, the failure of the United States to ratify the revised text of the
UCC will operate as a veto of the revised Berne text. Some Berne countries felt
that a non-Berne country should not have this power. The developing countries,
however, maintained the position taken in the Washington Recommendation to
include the United States as one of the four countries. -
3. Appendix to Berne Union adopted in place of Stockholm Protocol. The
“Appendix” to the Paris Act forms an integral part of the Berne Convention.
132
Article I of the Appendix corresponds to Article Vbis of the UCC. It establishes
the criteria for determining “developing country” status, governs the duration
of the reservations, loss of developing Country status, and applicability to terri-
tories. It provides that the special privileges are open to developing countries
whether or not they are presently members of the Berne Union. In the preparatory
meetings the United States supported Such an open-ended provision to preserve
the balance between the Berne Convention and the UCC and to assure the orderly
future development of the Berne Convention.
Article II of the Appendix corresponds to Article Wter of the UCC on trans-
lations and Article III of the Appendix corresponds to Article Voluater of the
UCC on reproductions.
Article IV of the Appendix groups together the provisions relating to the for-
malities and conditions for obtaining licenses that are common to the translation
and reproduction reservations.
Article V of the Appendix adds the special option for the ten-year translation
system of the existing Berne Convention.
Article VI of the Appendix has no counterpart in the UCC. It provides for
the early applicability of the reservations and is similar to Article 5 of the
Stockholm Protocol.
There are several major points of divergence between the Berne Convention
and the UCC in their treatment of the provisions for developing countries.
One major difference relates to the term of copyright. During the preparatory
meetings for revision of the Berne Convention, the developing countries abandoned
their demand for a reduction in the copyright term. Consequently, there is no
special provision for developing countries in the Berne Convention on this subject.
The usual Berne system of life of the author plus fifty years will apply, whereas
in the UCC the term for developed and developing countries is essentially life
plus twenty-five years or twenty-five years from first publication. -
Another principal difference between the UCC and Berne Convention concerns
the translation reservation. Under the Berne Convention, there is an exclusive
right of translation for the full term of copyright, but certain countries, already
members of the Union, may restrict the right to a priod of ten years. If no trans-
lation is made in the particular country within ten years, the work may be
translated without payment or other conditions attached. This restriction to the
right of translation may also be elected by new members who adhere to the
Berne Convention, but in either case, it is subject to material reciprocity (that is,
the possibility that other countries may similarly lower the level of protection
they give to works of the country in question).
In attempting to reconcile the ten-year System with the new system of compul-
sory licensing provided in Article II of the Appendix, the Conference adopted a
provision whereby developing countries would be given an irrevocable choice
between the ten-year system and the compulsory licensing system. For a develop-
ing country that opts for the ten-year System, the provision on material reciprocity
will not apply.
The practical consequences of this scheme for the United States are two-fold.
First, it is doubtful whether many developing countries will choose the ten-year
system because of their immediate needs for current educational and instructional
materials. This will probably mean that most developing countries that are mem-
bers of the Berne Convention or that become members of Berne in the future will
choose the compulsory licensing system provided in Article II of the Appendix.
Second, the Berne scheme will continue to encourage simultaneous publication
of United States works in Berne countries. Under the Berne Scheme, any United
States work simultaneously published in a Berne country will enjoy, even in those
developing countries members of the Berne Convention that have adopted compul-
sory licensing provisions, the benefits of the Berne provisions for the duration of
copyright. Such a work will not be subject to the more liberal licensing provisions
possible in the UCC under Article V after the seven-year period has expired.
INTERPRETATION OF PROHIBITION AGAINST EXPORT
During one of the meetings of the Main Commission of the Berne Convention, a
proposal was put forward by four African States, to permit developing countries
having a common language to obtain a joint compulsory license for translation or
reproduction. When the proposal was discussed, it became apparent that a fun-
damental question was whether the holder of a compulsory license could have copies
of the work printed in another country. Since these problems were common to
133
both the UCC and the Berne Convention, a Joint Working Group of the two Con-
ventions was created. As a result, both Conferences agreed that an interpretation
should be included in the report of each Conference. It may be summarized as
follows (Report, paras. 114–115):
The prohibition against export applies equally to printing outside the territory
of the State granting the compulsory license except if the following conditions are
met: the licensee State does not have printing or reproduction facilities, or its
facilities “are incapable for economic or practical reasons of reproducing the
copies”; the copies are reproduced in a Berne or UCC country; they are returned
in bulk to the licensee; the reproduction is lawful where done; and it is not done in a
plant especially created for reproducing works covered by compulsory licenses. The
interpretation also states that Articles Wter and Voluater of the new UCC and the
comparable Berne provisions do not prohibit a compulsory licensee from employ-
ing a foreign translator, or several licensees in different countries from using the
Same translation, assuming, of course, that the translation has not already been
published.
Your Committee believes that there is a general public interest in preserving the
structure of international copyright and in the availability, encouragement, pro-
tection and interchange of intellectural creations of all nations. Those who would
discount the probable impairment of the international copyright structure by the
non-ratification of the United States appear to us to run grave risks.
Your Committee takes the view that the present situation in international
copyright cannot be viewed in a vacuum, but must take account of the Stockholm
Conference and the efforts of the past four years to bring order from the chaos
produced by the Stockholm Protocol. We believe that the present revisions of the
UCC and the Berne Convention are substantial improvements over the provisions
contained in the Stockholm Protocol.
We also believe that the danger posed for international copyright by the
Stockholm failure was a real one and that another failure may have the effect of
encouraging many developing countries to denounce one or both Conventions.
CONCLUSION
The members of your Committee approve, in principle, the Universal Copy-
right Convention and the Berne Convention as revised in Paris on July 24, 1971.
Appreciating that there had to be some compromises and obviously some ambigu-
ities, and considering the difficult task of seventy-five nations reaching agreement
upon two highly technical instruments by way of open debate in various languages
On each phrase, your Committee is of the view that, on balance, the Paris Confer-
ence achieved a notable result of meeting the needs of developing countries while
preserving the structure and basic protection of international copyright.
Accordingly, your Committee recommends adoption of the following resolution
for submission to the House of Delegates at the mid-Winter meeting to be held
in New Orleans in February, 1972:
Resolved, That the American Bar Association endorses the ratification by
the United States of the Universal Copyright Convention as revised at
Paris on July 24, 1971, and that the Section of International and Compara-
tive Law and the Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law are
authorized to present the position of the Association in this matter before
Congress.
The Committee wishes to express its appreciation to Robert Hadl of the Copy-
right Office for a draft report prepared by him which has largely served as a basis
for the preparation of this report and the report of Committee 302 of the Patent,
Trademark and Copyright Section. The use of Mr. Hadl's draft in preparation
of the report of both committees will facilitate a joint presentation of the attached
resolution to the House of Delegates.
RESOLUTION
Resolved, That the American Bar Association endorses the ratification by the
United States of the Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on
July 24, 1971, and that the Section of International and Comparative Law and
the Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law are authorized to present
the position of the Association in this matter before Congress.
134
SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAw
REPORT of CoMMITTEE No. 302—INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT TREATIES AND LAws
Scope of Committee.—Problems arising out of differences in the copyright laws of
various countries. Specifically the fields of major concern at the present time are:
(1) the right of United States citizens to obtain copyright in other countries, the
right of foreign authors to obtain copyright in the United States; (2) the laws of
foreign countries relative to the rights of exportation and importation of copy-
righted works, the laws of the United States relative to the rights of exportation
and importation of copyrighted works; (3) the several conventions and treaties
involving copyright; and (4) the protection afforded copyright works of United
States citizens under the local laws of the various foreign countries.
This committee cooperates with other Sections and Committees of the A.B.A.
such as the Section of International and Comparative Law, where opportunity
permits.
SUBJECT 2. UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION, As REVISED, 1971
NO PROPOSED RESOLUTION
Past Action.—At the Mid-Winter meeting of the Section at Rancho Bernardo,
California, the Section, taking action on a special report Submitted by this com-
mittee, adopted the following resolution, as recommended:
Resolved, That the Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law endorses
the ratification by the United States of the Universal Copyright Convention as
revised at Paris on July 24, 1971.
Thereafter, at the Mid-Winter meeting at New Orleans of the House of Dele-
gates, acting upon a joint report of the Section together with the Section of
International and Comparative Law, the Association adopted the following
resolution:
Resolved, That the American Bar Association endorses the ratification by the
TJnited States of the Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on
July 24, 1971, and that the Section of International and Comparative Law and
the Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law are authorized to present
the position of the Association in this matter before Congress.
On March 15, 1972 the President of the United States transmitted to the Senate,
with a view of receiving its advice and consent to ratification, the revised Universal
Copyright Convention, together with a report of the Acting Secretary of State
in which it was noted that “Favorable action on the Convention has been taken
by the American Bar Association.” (Senate Executive G, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess.)
Discussion.—There are set forth below the special report of Committee 302,
presented to the Section at its Mid-Winter meeting, and the joint report of the
Section with the Section of International and Comparative Law, presented to the
House of Delegates at the Mid-Winter meeting at New Orleans.
Respectfully submitted.
: . SIDNEY SCHREIBER, Chairman.
SAUL N. RITTENBERG, Co-Chairman.
Members Approving the Report:
ANGELO F. ADDONA STEPHEN A. KAHN
ROBERT ASTI ERNEST. S. MEYERS
JOSEPH. W. BAILEY STEPHENS MITCHELL
HARRY BUCHMAN PAUL B. MOROFSKY
RICHARD COLBY |KELSEY M. MOTT
HEINZ DAWID MAxwell, OKUN
DIxoN Q. DERN ROBERT PINCUS
JOSEPH S. DUBIN SAUL N. R.ITTENBERG
ALBERT H. Dwy ER ADOLPH SCHIMEL
WILLIAM H. DYCZKO SIDNEY SCHREIBER
ZACHARY S. FLAx BERNARD R. SORKIN
MICHAEL H. GERBER EDWARD S. YAMBRUSIC 4
ROBERT D. HADL
1 Approves “in principle.”
135
SPECIAL REPORT OF COMMITTEE 302 (PRESENTED TO THE SECTION AT ITS
MIDWINTER MEETING)
PROPOSED RESOLUTION
Resolved, That the Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law endorses
the ratification by the United States of the Universal Copyright Convention as
revised at Paris on July 24, 1971.
Past Action.—In 1954 the Association, in amendment of a Resolution adopted
by the Section in 1953, adopted the following Resolution:
Resolved, That the American Bar Association endorses the ratification by the
United States of the Universal Copyright Convention signed at Geneva, Switzer-
land on the 6th day of September 1952, with such implementing legislation to be
enacted by the Congress of the United States prior to depositing the United States
instrument of ratification as will effectuate the purposes of the Convention; and
That the Section of International and Comparative Law and the Section of
Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law are authorized to present the position of
this Association in this matter before the Congress.
In 1968 the Section adopted a Resolution (1968S.P.86), the text of which is
Set forth subsequently herein (see p. 172).
In February, 1971 the Association approved a Resolution adopted by the
Section at the Annual Meeting in St. Louis (1970S.P.101), the text of which is
Set forth subsequently herein (see p. 173).
No Resolution presented here is inconsistent with any existing action of the
Section.
INTROD UCTION
Delegations of seventy-five countries participated in three weeks of intensive
deliberations at Paris from July 5–24, 1971, to revise the Universal Copyright
Convention (hereafter, UCC) and the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works (hereinafter, Berne Convention). Twenty-six coun-
tries, including the United States, signed the revised UCC, and twenty-eight
countries signed the revised Berne Convention.
Both Conventions now await ratification by the signatory States," and accession
by the non-signatory States in accordance with their constitutional procedures.
For the UCC, the appropriate instrument is to be deposited with the Director-
General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO). For the Berne Convention, the appropriate instrument is to be
deposited with the Director-General of the World Intellectual Property Organi-
zation (WIPO). -
On September 17, 1971, Abraham L. Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights,
and Bruce C. Ladd, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Commercial
Affairs and Business Activities, Co-Chairman of the United States Delegation to
the Paris Conference, submitted their report to the Secretary of State.
At the time of the preparation of this special report by your Committee, the
revised UCC has not yet been submitted by President Nixon for ratification by
the United States Senate.
The revised UCC is not self-executing. It requires each Contracting State to
be in a position under its domestic law to give effect to the term of the Convention
at the time its instrument of ratification, acceptance or accession is deposited
(Article X). However, it does not appear that the changes made in the 1952
Convention will require any change in the domestic legislation of the United
States before ratification may take place.” Accordingly, enabling legislation is
not envisaged.
It is the view of your Committee that this special report should serve: (1) to give
the background leading to the Paris Conferences; (2) to analyze the revised
Conventions for the Section; and (3) to evaluate the impact of the revised Con-
ventions on United States interests, including on the information thus far avail-
able to the Committee, the advantages for the United States claimed by the
revised Conventions as well as such criticisms as may have come to the Com-
mittee's attention.
In general, the members of your Committee approve the revision of the UCC
and the revision of the Berne Convention adopted in Paris on July 24, 1971. Con-
sidering the difficult tasks facing the revision Conferences, the highly charged
1 The UCC will remain open for signature until November 21, 1971, by States party to the 1952 text of the
Convention. The Berne Convention Will remain open for signature until January 31, 1972 by any country
member of the Union. -
2 See the discussion infra, under heading “Universal Copyright Convention—Article IVbis”
136
controversy between developing and developed countries generated by the Stock-
holm Protocol of 1967, and the necessity of reconciling delicate technical questions
in the three languages among delegates representing over half of the nations of the
world, it is remarkable that any agreement was reached at all. Obviously there had
to be some compromises and some ambiguities. On balance, your Committee is
of the view that the Conferences were successful in finding a solution to the difficult
problem of meeting the needs of developing countries and of preserving the
structure and basic protection of international copyright. For these reasons, your
Committee believes that it is in the interest of the United States to be a party to
the revised UCC as adopted at Paris on July 24, 1971.
BACKGROUND
Extensive documentation is available on the background leading to the Paris
Conferences. This includes reports prepared by UNESCO and WIPO as part of
the preconference series of documents 3 as well as articles in journals appearing
in the United States 4 and around the world.” No analysis of the Paris Confer-
ences and the results achieved, however, can be made without some knowledge of
the Stockholm Conference of 1967 and its aftermath. Accordingly, your Committee
offers the following summary of the events leading to the Paris Conferences to
help place in proper perspective the international copyright situation as it existed
On the eve of the Paris Conferences.
International copyright was plunged into crisis in 1967 at the Stockholm In-
tellectual Property Conference. One of the objectives of this Conference was the
revision of the Berne Convention, including special provisions for the benefit of
developing countries. These provisions were annexed to the draft text of the
Convention as a Protocol Regarding Developing Countries (hereafter, “Protocol,”
or “Stockhom Protocol”). During the Conference, however, the developing
countrie were able to obtain much greater concessions than those proposed in the
draft text. As a result, the final text of the Protocol adopted by the Conference
gave developing countries very broad and virtually uncontrolled privileges with
respect to works copyrighted in Berne Union countries.”
Shortly after the Stockholm Conference, it became apparent that an impasse
had developed between the developed and developing countries that threatened
to destroy the structure of international copyright. Under the Stockholm Act of
the Berne Convention no developed country could be bound by the Protocol un-
less it formally agreed to accept it. Following Stockholm, no developed country
except Sweden accepted the Protocol.
Faced with this refusal by the developed countries to accept the Stockholm
Protocol, the developing countries had several options. They could denounce
their international copyright obligations completely by withdrawing from the
UCC and the Berne Convention, or they could attempt to alter their member–
ship in the two Conventions by resigning from one but maintaining their mem-
bership in the other. At this point, the existence of two different copyright con-
ventions with different levels of production and a large overlap in membership
added complexities to the crisis produced by the Stockholm Protocol.
The UCC, to which the United States is a party, is characterized by the princi-
ple of national treatment, but even if a country’s domestic legislation provides
for relatively low-level protection, it can still belong to the UCC. The Berne
3 INLA/UCC 4; B/DC/3 and B/DC/4.
4 Lazar, “Developing Countries and Authors’ Rights in International Copyright,” ASCAP Copyright
Law Symposium Number Nineteen 1 (1971); Schrader, “Armageddon in International Copyright: Review
of the Berne Convention, the Universal Copyright Convention, and the Present Crisis in International
Copyright,” 2 Advances in Librarianship 306 (1971); Ringer, “The Role of the United States in International
Copyright,” 56 Georgetown Law Journal 1050 (1968).
5 Desbois, “The Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the Berne and Geneva Conventions,” 68.
Revue Internationale Du Droit D'Auteur 2 (1971); Ulmer, “The Draft Texts for the Revisions of the Copy-
right Conventions,” 125B European Broadcasting Union Review 47 (1971); See also, Ulmer EBU Review,
Nos. 120B, p. 48 and 122B, p. 40.
6 For a detailed history of the preparatory steps leading to the Protocol, see Johnson, “The Origins of the
Stockholm Protocol,” 18 Bull. Cr. Soc. 91 (1970); See also, Schrader, “Analysis of the Protocol Regarding
Developing Countries,” 17 Bull. Cr. Soc. 180, 161–66 (1970); Ringer, supra note 4.
7 The privileges won by “developing countries” included the right to reduce the term of copyright from.
“life plus fifty years” to “life plus twenty-five years”; to allow compulsory licenses for translation into
national, official, or regional languages, if, within three years of first publication, such action had not been
taken or authorized by the copyright owner; to allow compulsory licenses for reproduction of works under
similar conditions; to limit the exclusive right to broadcast “for profit-making purposes”, and to restrict
the protection of literary and artistic works for “teaching, study and research in all fields of education.” The
possible economic benefits from all of these privileges were further enhanced by exceptionally loose provisions
concerning the export of copies made under compulsory licenses and royalty payments.
137
Convention, in addition to requiring national treatment, requires its parties to
provide a specified minimum of copyright protection for other Berne works in
their domestic legislation. The standards set by the minimum provide a high level
of copyright protection.
The situation is complicated by the fact that the original Berne Convention
of 1886 has been revised a number of times and there are, as a result, several
different “Berne texts”, each providing for different standards of protection.
Protection in Berne Convention countries will vary depending upon which text
the particular country has accepted. Moreover, some of the texts permit reserva-
tions on particular points, and others do not. In addition, the UCC contains the
so-called “Berne safeguard clause”—Article XVII and its Appendix Declara-
tion—, a provision prohibiting a Berne Convention country from denouncing
Berne and relying on the UCC for protection of its works in other Berne Union
countries. Thus, under this clause, a country resigning from the Berne Union
but remaining in the UCC would continue to have obligations under the UCC,
but would have no protection for its own works in other Berne Union countries
under either Convention.8
Under these circumstances, the developing countries wishing to alter their
membership by leaving the Berne Convention for the lower level UCC were
frustrated by the existence of the “Berne Safeguard clause”. To remove this
obstacle, they submitted a proposal designed to Suspend the Sanctions imposed by
the “Berne Safeguard clause” for developing countrics.”
It was against this background that the Register of Copyrights announced to a
meeting of the governing bodies of the UCC and the Berne Convention in Decem-
ber, 1967, that it would be impossible for the United States to join the Berne
Convention if it had to accept the Stockholm Protocol, and that he viewed with
very great concern the confusion and erosion in standards of international copy-
right protection resulting from the Stockholm Conference. He urged that the
representatives of both developed and developing countries join together to study
the whole international copyright situation, including practical ways of meeting
the needs of developing countries." #
The program outlined by the Register was accepted in 1969 by the governing
bodies of the two Conventions. They agreed to establish an International Copy-
right Joint Study Group, and, upon the invitation of the United States, agreed that
the Joint Study Group would meet in Washington in September, 1969.
In 1968, in response to the Register's statement, and in anticipation of the meet-
ing of the Joint Study Group, the Section adopted the following resolution
(1968S.P.85):
Resolved, That the Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law approves
the position with respect to uses of copyrighted works by developing countries as
stated by the Register of Copyrights at the meeting of the Intergovernmental
Copyright Committee of the Universal Copyright Convention in Geneva in
December 1967.
Specifically, the Section approves the decision of the Intergovernmental Copy-
right Committee and the Berne Permanent Committee to set up a joint study
group to analyze the relationship of the two Conventions (Berne Convention and
Universal Copyright Convention) and any revisions of the substantive provisions
of the UCC with the understanding that both groups are planning to determine
the real needs of developing countries, and to consider how best these needs can
be met without injuring adequate and effective copyright protection.
At the meeting of the Joint Study Group, a proposal to end the international
copyright crisis was presented and adopted. Dubbed the “Washington Recom-
mendation”,” this proposal called for the simultaneous revision of both the UCC
and the Berne Convention to achieve the following objectives:
(1) In the UCC the level of protection would be improved by the specification
of certain minimum rights. These would include the rights of reproduction, public
performance, and broadcasting. At the same time, special provisions would be
included in the UCC for the benefit of developing countries. Finally, the “Berne
Safeguard clause” would be suspended to permit developing countries to leave the
Berne Convention without penalty under the UCC.
8 For a general discussion of the “Berne safeguard clause” see Mott, “The Relationship Between the
Herne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention,” 11 IDEA 306, 309–25 (1967).
9 Tunisia and France were sponsors of a resolution adopted for this purpose. See UNESCO Res. Noz
5.122 reprinted in 3 Copyright 72 (1967) See also Ringer, Supra note 4 at 1068–69; Johnson sºpra note 6 at 18:
10 “Statement by the Register for the United States Delegation at Geneva,” 15 Bull. Cr. Soc. 157 (1968)-
11 “International Copyright Joint Study Group,” 5 Copyright 214, 227 (1969). The Study Group also
adopted a report urging the establishment within UNESCO of an Information Center to assist the develop:
ing countries in acquiring desired information with respect to the ownership, availability and process for
obtaining reprint or translation rights on copyrighted material. Id at 226–27. The new Information Center
commenced operation in January, 1971.
138
(2) In the Berne Convention, the Protocol would be separated from the Stock-
holm Act and, in turn, the developing countries would be able to substitute the
special provisions included for their benefit in the UCC. This would mean that
the developing countries could remain in the Berne Convention and would not.
be forced to exercise the option provided by the suspension of the “Berne safe-
guard clause”. As a protective measure for the developing countries, it was pro-
vided that the Stockholm Protocol could not be separated from the Stockholm
text until such time as France, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States
had ratified the revised text of the UCC.” Furthermore, developing countries.
would be relieved of the obligation to pay assessments to the Berne Union if they
continued their membership after the new revision.”
The Washington Recommendation won the general support of all the countries
that attended the meeting of the Joint Study Group.” The question for the
meetings that followed was whether it could be successfully implemented.
As contrasted with the trend represented by the Stockholm Protocol, the meet-
ings following the Joint Study Group saw the developing countries abandon Several
important demands. These included the privileges respecting the term of copy-
right, the “for profit” limitation on the right of broadcasting, and the broad right
to restrict the protection of literary and artistic works for “teaching, study and
research in all fields of education”. Thus, on the eve of the Paris Conferences, the
special privileges for developing countries had been limited to compulsory licenses
for translation and reproduction.
During all these preliminary stages, your Committee was kept fully informed of
developments and was invited to assist and cooperate with the Government. A
number of members of your Committee, as well as its Chairman, were members of
a special panel constituted by the Department of State to follow developments in
international copyright and to assist the Government in its continuing study and
review of the matter. In addition, other members of government agencies, in-
dividuals selected from various industries and groups, and bar association com-
mittees concerned with copyright participated in the work of the panel.
The United States Delegation to the Paris Conferences included representative
of the State Department, Commerce Department and Copyright Office, as well
as three Congressional advisers: Honorable Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman of
the Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee that deals with copyright;
Edward G. Biester, Jr., member of the same Subcommittee; and Abner J. Mikva,
also a member of the Subcommittee. Herbert Fuchs, member of the staff of the
Judiciary Committee, also attended.
Other advisers to the delegation were: Robert Evans, Herman Finkelstein,
Sidney Kaye, Irwin Karp, Bella Linden, Melville Nimmer and Sidney Schreiber,
all of whom have been most active in copyright activities and are members of the
Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law.
To make clear its position concerning the Paris Conferences, the Association,
just prior to their commencement, approved the following resolution adopted by
the Section in 1970:
Resolved, in order that the United States may participate in a meaningful
manner in the diplomatic conferences scheduled for May and June of 1971 for the
revision of the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions and without affecting
or withdrawing from the position taken by the Section of Patent, Trademark and
Copyright Law in 1965 and by the American Bar Association in 1966, that the
Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law favors in principle the prompt
enactment of legislation amending The Copyright Law of the United States, Title
17, United States Code, to embody at least the following: (1) A single Federal
system of copyright; (2) A basic term consisting of the life of the author, plus
fifty years after his death, with an extension of subsisting copyrights, and for
works made for hire, the term of seventy-five years from publication; (3) A relaxa-
tion of formalities as to notice consistent with reasonable notice and equitable
treatment in the case of failure to comply; and (4) No limitation of copyright by
way of a manufacturing clause.
12 The purpose of this recommendation was to make ratification of or accession to the revised text of the
TJ CC (containing the new concessions for developing countries) by the four named countries the quid pro
quo for separation of the Stockholm Protocol from the Berne Convention.
13 This recommendation was included largely upon the initiative of the Berne Secretariat. It was aban-
doned in May 1970, when it became apparent that some developed countries believed that it Would be
grounds for limiting the voting rights of developing countries in the Berne Union.
14 France reserved its position on two parts of the proposal.
139
PARIS CONFERENCES
This special report cannot begin to match the very thorough, illuminating and
highly praised account of the UCC Conference contained in the report of the
Rapporteur-General, Abraham L. Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights and Co-
Chairman of the United States Delegation. Mr. Kaminstein's report, to which
Miss Barbara A. Ringer, Assistant Register of Copyrights and Alternate Delegate
of the United States Delegation, gave invaluable assistance, appears as Annex A
to this document (hereafter, Report). The summary minutes of the proceedings in
the plenary sessions and the Main Commission will be published at a later date.
In reviewing the text of the revised Conventions, your Committee believes that
it should direct its attention to those articles that have the greatest impact on
the United States.
UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION
ARTICLE IVBIS
This Article is one of the new articles of the revised UCC. Paragraph 1 embodies
the proposal contained in the Washington Recommendation to add the basic
rights of reproduction, public performance, and broadcasting to the UCC. As
adopted by the Conference, these basic rights are defined as “exclusive” rights and
apply to works protected under the Convention “either in their original form or
in any form recognizably derived from the original.”
Paragraph 2 provides that any Contracting State may make exceptions to the
rights mentioned in paragraph 1 that “do not conflict with the Spirit and provi-
sions of this Convention.” However, States must “accord a reasonable degree of
effective protection to each of the rights to which exception has been made.”
One of the fundamental premises of the revised UCC is that no State, now
party to the UCC, that respects the fundamental rights of authors should be
required to make any changes in its domestic law as a condition for ratifying or
adhering to the 1971 text. Thus, “no country now meeting the obligations of the
1952 Convention and according basic copyright protection would be required to
assume new obligations in order to adhere to the 1971 Convention” (Report,
para. 44). Otherwise ratifications might be delayed and the purpose of the revision
Conferences—to meet the immediate needs of developing countries—might be
thwarted.
The provision in paragraph 2 permitting exceptions to the specified rights is
necessarily couched in terms of broad generality. This provision must allow for the
wide variety of exceptions, mostly of relatively minor significance, now existing
in the laws of many different countries. The United States, for example, recognizes
the fairly broad exceptions inherent in the doctrine of fair use, subjects the right
of public performance of music to the jukebox exemption and the for-profit
limitations, and subjects the recording right in music to a compulsory license.
The copyright revision bill (currently S. 644, 92nd Congress) would provide for a
number of specific exceptions and limitations on the rights of copyright owners.
The broad provision for exceptions in paragraph 2 has given rise to the argument
in some quarters that the specification in paragraph 1 of the basic rights of re-
production, public performance, and broadcasting is rendered meaningless. Your
Committee does not agree with that view. Paragraph 2 qualifies the provision
for exceptions by requiring every State to accord “a reasonable degree of effective
protection to each of the rights to which exception has been made.” As stated
by the Rapporteur-General, “where exceptions are made, they must have a
logical basis and must not be applied arbitrarily, and the protection offered must
be effectively enforced by the laws of the Contracting State” (Report, para. 46(4)).
A second fundamental premise embodied in Article IVbis is the “a contrario
principle”. It concerns the relation between the exceptions contained in paragraph
2 and the special exceptions for developing countries contained in Articles Vier
and Vduater. Its effect is that no developed country may, under paragraph 2,
institute a “general system of compulsory licensing for the publication of literary,
scientific or artistic works” along the lines permitted developing countries under
Article Vter and Vgwater. It is understood that the phrase “general system” means
either “a system applying to a specific type of work with respect to all forms of
uses, or to a system applying to all types of Works with respect to a particular
form of use” (Report, para. 46(2)). It should be noted that the prohibition applies
140
to the “publication of literary, scientific, or artistic works” and does not affect
limitations which might be imposed on the rights of public performance or broad-
Casting.
In light of the broad description of the term “general system” your Committee
does not view any of the present proposals for limitations on exclusive rights
contained in the proposed revision of the United States copyright law (S. 644,
92nd Cong., 1st Sess.) as inconsistent with or barred by the provisions of the
revised Convention.
ARTICLE WEIS
This Article is another new article in the revised UCC. It regulates the pro-
Cedure for determining which countries are developing countries and the periods
during which developing countries may apply the exceptions contained in new
Articles Vter and Vguater. The definition of a developing country is the same as
that used in the Stockholm Protocol (“Any contracting State that is regarded as
a developing country in conformity with the established practice of the General
Assembly of the United Nations * * *) but, unlike the Protocol, the exceptions
are limited to Successive periods of ten years each. In addition, developing countries
need not indicate their intention to avail themselves of praticular exceptions at
the time of ratification or accession, but may make such notification at a subse-
quent time. Further, the ten year period is uniform for all States and runs from
the date of entry into force of the revised Convention.
While the formula for determining those countries that may be considered
developing countries was accepted without much discussion, the Rapporteur-
General was asked to formulate his views on the question. When the matter arose
at the final plenary Session, the views of the Rapporteur-General proved too
Controversial to be considered as the views of the Conference. They are appended,
however, as a personal statement to his report and, in view of your Committee,
represent a reasoned approach to the criteria for determining a “developing
country”. He concluded: * * * the best criterion is that of United Nations
assessments based on per capita income, but it cannot be applied automatically.
In doubtful or borderline cases, United Nations aid can also be considered, and
there may be a few special cases where the only realistic ceritria are those of
Common Sense and world opinion.
ARTICLE VTER
The provisions of this Article are new and concern the exceptions that develop-
ing countries may make to the right of translation. They are related to Article
V which now governs the right of translation for all countries. Under Article V
all States must recognize the translation right for a period of seven years from the
date of first publication. After that time, and failing publication in a language in
general use of the particular country, the translation right may be subjected to a
compulsory license, with compensation required, until the term of copyright
expires.
Article Vier permits developing countries to substitute for the seven-year
period of Article V, the period of three years or longer, where the translation is
into a language in general use in one or more developed countries, (“world lan-
guages”). They may substitute the period of one year where the translation is
into a language not in general use in one or more developed countries (“non-world
languages”). It was clearly understood at the Conference that English, French
and Spanish would be considered “world languages”. Thus, a compulsory license
to translate into one of these languages in a developing country cannot be con-
sidered until at least three years have elapsed from the date of first publication.
In the case of “world languages” other than English, French and Spanish, a
Special exception is recognized if the developing country where the language is
in general use obtains the agreement of all the developed countries speaking the
Same language. Under these circumstances, the three-year period may be reduced
to One year. This special exception was introduced mainly to resolve a difficulty
#. had arisen with respect to Portuguese and which involved Portugal and
razil.
Article Vier also contains numerous conditions affecting the ability of develop-
ing countries to issue compulsory licenses. First, a compulsory license to publish
a translation may only be granted if the applicant establishes either that he has
requested and been denied authorization by the owner of the right of translation,
or that after due diligence on his part he was unable to find the owner of the right.
In addition, at the same time as he makes his request, he must inform the inter-
national copyright information center established by UNESCO of the request,
141
or any national or regional information center which may have been designated
in a notification to UNESCO by the State in which the publisher is believed to
have his principal place of business.
If the owner of the right of translation cannot be found, the applicant must send
copies of his application to the publishcr whose name appears on the work and to
any national or regional information center. If no such center has been designated,
he must then send a copy to the UNESCO information center.
Second, in the case of translations into “non-world languages” there is a further
period of nine months, and in the case of “world languages” there is a further
period of six months, before the license may issue. These periods run either from
the date of the request for permission to translate, Or, if the owner of the right of
translation is not known, from the date of the dispatch of copies of the application.
Third, any compulsory license to translate may be granted only for the purpose
of teaching, scholarship or research.
Fourth, no copies made under a compulsory license may be exported from the
developing country, and all copies must bear a notice Stating that they are avail-
able for distribution only in the Contracting State granting the license. A limited
exception to the export ban is recognized in the case where certain developing
countries may wish to Supply communities of their nationals living in other
countries with translations prepared under Article Vier.
Fifth, due provision must be made at the national level to assure that the
license provides for just compensation that is consistent with standards of royalties
normally operating on licenses freely negotiated between persons in the two
countries concerned. Payment and transmittal are also required, but if national
currency regulations intervene, the competent authority must make all efforts
by the use of international machinery, to ensure transmittal in internationally
convertible currency or its equivalent.
Finally, a compulsory license to translate is to be terminated at any time if a
translation of the work in the same language and with substantially the same
content is published in the country by the owner of the right of translation, or
with his permission, at a price reasonably related to that normally charged in the
State for comparable works.
Subject to all the above conditions, Article Vier also provides for compulsory
licenses to broadcasting organizations in developing countries to translate works
in printed or analogous forms of reproduction within the same time periods for
use in broadcasts. These broadcasts must be intended exclusively for teaching or
for the dissemination of the results of Specialized technical or scientific research
to experts in a particular profession. All uses of the translation must be without
any commercial purpose. Further, the license cannot convey any rights of adapta-
tion, including adaptation of a non-dramatic work to dramatic form, or use in
cinematographic works, and it does not of itself sanction the broadcasting of the
translation or the making of “ephemeral” or other recordings (Report, para. 86).
The same criteria and conditions apply to the translation by a broadcasting
organization of the text incorporated in an audio-visual fixation, if the audio-visual
fixation was itself prepared and published for the sole purpose of being used in
connection with systematic instructional activities.
ARTICLE V QUATER
The provisions of this Article are new and regulate the conditions under which
developing countries may reproduce works under compulsory licenses. The scope
of the Article is limited to works published in printed or analogous forms of
reproduction, but also includes audio-visual works, and the translation of any
incorporated text, provided the work was prepared and published for the sole
intrinsic purpose of being used in connection with systematic instructional
activities. -
If copies of a particular edition of a work have not been distributed in a par-
ticular diveloping county, to the general public or in connection with systematic
instructional activities, at a price reasonably related to that charged in the
State for comparable works, by the owner of the right of reproduction or with
his authorization, then the competent authority in the developing country may
issue a compulsory license to One of its nationals to reproduce and publish the
work. The general minimum time period before which a reproduction can be
made is five years, although a shorter period of three years is recognized for
works of the natural and physical sciences. A longer period of seven years is
recognized for works of fiction, poetry, drama, music and art books.
142
Like Article Vier, Article Vauater also contains numerous conditions affecting
the issuance of a compulsory license. The procedure for obtaining a Compulsory
license is essentially the same: the prospective licensee must have made efforts
in good faith to negotiate a license or to find the owner of the right. In all cases
the ligense is restricted to use in connection with systematic instructional activities.
In addition, the export ban and royalty payment provisions of Article Vier are
applicable to reproductions. Further the compulsory license is to be terminated
if the owner of the right of reproduction or his authorized representative distributes
in the particular country, copies of an edition substantially the same in content
as the edition published under the license and at a price reasonably related to that
normally charged in the country for comparable works.
Article Vguater also contains a special provision concerning the ability of
developing Countries to issue a compulsory license to reproduce a translation of a
Work. Such licenses may only be granted where the reproduction is of a translation
published by the owner of the right of translation of with his authorization, and
Where the translation is in a language in general use in the State with power to
grant the license,
ARTICLE IX
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article IX are new. They attempt to regulate the problem
posed by the fact that once the revised Convention enters into force, the UCC will
exist in two versions and that some States may only be a party to one of these two
VeTS10}].S.
As a first step in solving the problem paragraph 3 provides that any State that
becomes a party to the revised Convention and that is not a party to the 1952
Convention, automatically becomes a party to the 1952 Convention. Furthermore,
once the revised Convention comes into force, no State may accede solely to the
1952 Convention. In this way, new members and old members (whether or not
the old members have ratified or adhered to the new text) are assured of having a
common text between them—the 1952 Convention.
Paragraph 4 then provides that relations between States party to the 1971
Convention and States that are party only to the 1952 Convention are governed
by the 1952 Convention. However, any State party only to the 1952 Convention
may, by a notification deposited with UNESCO, state that it will permit the
application of the 1971 Convention to works of its nationals or works first pub-
lished in its territory, by all States party to the 1971 Convention. For the United
States this means that until such time as it ratifies the revised Convention or
deposits a notification in accordance with paragraph 4, no developing country
may avail itself of the special exceptions for such countries contained in the 1971
Convention as against works of nationals of the United States or works first
published in the United States.
Article XVII and the Appendix Declaration contain the so-called “Berne
Safeguard clause”. Under paragraph (a) of the Appendix Declaration, works which
have as their country of origin a country that has withdrawn from the Berne
Union will not be given protection under the UCC in other Berne countries. Under
new paragraph (b) a developing country may now withdraw from the Berne
Convention and not be subject to the Sanctions contained in paragraph (a).
While this suspension of the “Berne safeguard clause” in favor of developing
countries was the focal point for the early efforts to revise the UCC, the Washing-
ton Recommendation offered developing countries substantially the same con-
cessions in the Berne Convention as under the UCC. For these reasons, your
Committee believes that developing countries will have no need to avail themselves
of the opportunity which the suspension provides and will remain members of
both the Berne Convention and the UCC.
BERNE CONVENTION
The three points of the Washington Recommendation relating to the Berne
Convention were all implemented at the Paris Conference.
The first point of the Washington Recommendation was to separate the
Stockholm Protocal from the main text of the Stockholm Act of the Berne Con-
vention. The Conference decided that the best method of achieving this objective
was to draft an entirely new text of the Berne Convention. Under this new text,
known as the Paris Act, Articles 1–20 and 22–26 of the Stockholm Act were re-
peated verbatim. The Protocol was replaced by new reservations for developing
countries contained in an “Appendix” that forms an integral part of the Convention
(Article 21).
143
The second point of the Washington Recommendation was to condition the
entry into force of the revised Berne Convention upon the ratification of, or
accession to, or acceptance of the new text of the UCC by France, Spain, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. The reason for this proposal was to
provide the developing countries with some guarantee that the major developed
countries would accept the Special concessions for developing countries in the new
texts before the Protocol was eliminated. They wanted some assurance that the
Stockholm experience would not be repeated.
As adopted by the Conference, the Paris Act of the Berne Convention will
only enter into force after both of the following two conditions are fulfilled: (1)
at least five countries members of the Berne Union have ratified or acceded to
the Paris Act including the Appendix, and (2) France, Spain, the United Kingdom
and the United States have become bound by the revised text of the UCC.
The inclusion of the United States, a non-Berne country, in the group of four
developed countries whose ratification of the UCC is a condition precedent for
the entry into force of the Berne revision, caused much discussion at the Confer-
ence. In effect, the failure of the United States to ratify the revised text of the
UCC will operate as a veto of the revised Berne text. Some Berne countries felt
that a non-Berne country should not have this power. The developing countries,
however, maintained the position taken in the Washington Recommendation to
include the United States as one of the four countries.
The third point of the Washington Recommendation gave developing countries
the option of remaining in the Berne Convention and, at the same time, applying
the exceptions that would be included in the revised UCC. Because of opposition
from France, this recommendation was modified during the preparatory meetings
by eliminating the reference in the Berne Convention to the exceptions detailed
in the UCC. Instead, the same concessions for developing countries as had been
agreed upon for the revision of the UCC were specified in Berne. These concessions
are included in a new “Appendix” to the Paris Act that forms an integral part of
the Convention. A brief analysis of the Appendix follows.
Article I of the Appendix corresponds to Article Vb is of the UCC. It establishes
the criteria for determining “developing country” status, governs the duration
of the reservations, loss of developing country status, and applicability to terri-
tories. It provides that the Special privileges are open to developing countries
whether or not they are presently members of the Berne Union. In the preparatory
meetings the United States Supported such an open-ended provision to preserve
the balance between the Berne Convention and the UCC and to assure the orderly
future development of the Berne Convention.
Article II of the Appendix corresponds to Article Vter of the UCC on translations
and Article III of the Appendix corresponds to Article Vguater of the UCC on
reproductions.
Article IV of the Appendix groups together the provisions relating to the
formalities and conditions for obtaining licenses that are common to the translation
and reproduction reservations.
Article V of the Appendix adds the special option for the ten-year translation
system of the existing Berne Convention.
Article VI of the Appendix has no counterpart in the UCC. It provides for
the early applicability of the reservations and is similar to Article 5 of the
Stockholm Protocol.
There are several major points of divergence between the Berne Convention
and the UCC in their treatment of the provisions for developing countries.
One major difference relates to the term of copyright. During the preparatory
meetings for revision of the Berne Convention, the developing countries abandoned
their demand for a reduction in the copyright term. Consequently, there is no
special provision for developing countries in the Berne Convention on this subject.
The usual Berne system of life of the author plus fifty years will apply, whereas
in the UCC the term for developed and developing countries is essentially life
plus twenty-five years or twenty-five years from first publication.
Another principal difference between the UCC and the Berne Convention con-
cerns the translation reservation. Under the Berne Convention, there is an exclusive
right of translation for the full term of copyright, but certain countries, already
members of the Union, may restrict the right to a period of ten years. If no trans-
lation is made in the particular country within ten years, the work may be trans-
lated without payment or other conditions attached. This restriction to the right
of translation may also be elected by new members who adhere to the Berne
Convention, but in either case, it is subject to material reciprocity (that is, the
possibility that other countries may similarly lower the level of protection they
give to works of the country in question).
144
In attempting to reconcile the ten-year System with the new system of com-
pulsory licensing provided in Article II of the Appendix, the Conference adopted
a provision whereby developing countries would be given an irrevocable choice
between the ten-year system and the compulsory licensing System. For a develop-
ing country that opts for the ten-year system, the provision on material reciprocity
will not apply.
The practical consequences of this scheme for the United States are two-fold.
First, it is doubtful whether many developing countries will choose the ten-year
system because of their immediate needs for current educational and instructional
materials. This will probably mean that most developing countries that are mem-
bers of the Berne Convention or that become members of Berne in the future will
choose the compulsory licensing system provided in Article II of the Appendix.
Second, the Berne scheme will continue to encourage simultaneous publication
of United States works in Berne countries. Under the Berne scheme, any United
States work simultaneously published in a Berne country will enjoy, even in those
developing countries members of the Berne Convention that have adopted com-
pulsory licensing provisions, the benefits of the Berne provisions for the duration
of copyright. Such a work will not be subject to the more liberal licensing provisions
possible in the UCC under Article W after the Seven-year period has expired.
INTERPRETATION OF PROHIBITION AGAINST EXPORT
During one of the meetings of the Main Commission of the Berne Convention, a
proposal was put forward by four African States, to permit developing countries
having a common language to obtain a joint compulsory license for translation or
reproduction. When the proposal was discussed, it became apparent that a funda–
mental question was whether the holder of a compulsory license could have copies
of the work printed in another country. Since these problems were common to both
the UCC and the Berne Convention, a Joint Working Group of the two Conven-
tions were created. As a result, both Conferences agreed that an interpretation
should be included in the report of each Conference. It may be summarized as
follows (Report, paras. 115–116):
The prohibition against export applies equally to printing outside the territory
of the State granting the compulsory license except if the following conditions are
met: the licensee State does not have printing or reproduction facilities, or its
facilities “are incapable for economic or practical reasons of reproducing the
copies”; the copies are reproduced in a Berne or UCC country; they are returned
in bulk to the licensee; the reproduction is lawful where done; and it is not done in
a plant especially created for reproducing works covered by compulsory licenses.
The interpretation also states that Articles Wter and Vduater of the new UCC and
the comparable Berne provisions do not prohibit a compulsory licensee from em-
ploying a foreign translator, or several licensees in different countries from using
the same translation, assuming, of course, that the translation has not already
been published.
IMPACT ON UNITED STATES INTERESTS
If the United States ratifies the revised text of the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion, the principal impact on United States authors and copyright owners will be
in the dissemination and marketing of their works in developing countries. Your
Committee does not believe that the revised Convention will have any significant
impact on the dissemination and marketing of works within the United States. The
reasons are twofold.
First, as previously indicated, one of the fundamental premises of the revised
UCC is that no State now party to the UCC that respects the fundamental rights
of authors is required to make any changes in its domestic law as a condition for
ratifying or adhering to the 1971 text. Since the present copyright law of the
United States does respect the fundamental rights of authors, no change is required
in domestic law before ratification may take place. Thus, the present domestic
position of owners and users of copyrighted works will not be changed by the
revised Convention. -
Second, while the revised UCC allows special exceptions for developing coun-
tries, and thereby implies that developed countries may not create similar excep-
tions for users of copyrighted works in their domestic laws, the Conference was
careful to stipulate that such an implied prohibition only applies to a “general
system of compulsory licensing for the publication of literary, scientific or artistic
works” along the lines permitted developing countries under Articles Wter and
Vgwater (Report, para. 46 (2)). -
145
Your Committee believes that this implied prohibition would not prevent the
adoption of any proposal now pending regarding restrictions on the rights of
copyright owners contained in the current bill for revision of the copyright law
of the United States (S. 644, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.). Your Committee also believes
that the prohibition would not prevent the consideration of future proposals for
legislation that would be consistent with a reasonable balance between the rights
of copyright owners and limitations on those rights to facilitate dissemination and
use of copyrighted work. In any event, it should be noted that the prohibition is
applicable to works of foreign origin and would not necessarily prevent a different
standard from being imposed on works of domestic origin.
In view of the above considerations, your Committee believes that the principal
impact of the revised UCC on United States authors and copyright owners is in
the dissemination and marketing of their works in developing countries. It is not
surprising, therefore, that such criticism as your Committee has thus far en-
countered is directed toward the economic impact on the marketing of United
States works in developing countries that may result if the revised Conventions
enter into force. For example, it is argued that the revised Conventions give
developing countries virtually unrestricted powers with respect to the use of works
created by United States authors, and that the safeguards contained in the revised
Conventions are too vague and general to be meaningful. It is also argued that a
refusal by the United States to ratify the revised UCC will not result in a break-
down in international copyright relations and that developing countries will
remain members of both the UCC and the Berne Convention.
Your Committee does not share these views. Our analysis of the provisions of
the revised Conventions convinces us that the procedural and substantive restric-
tions on the issuance of compulsory licenses are substantial, and, under the cir-
cumstances, reasonably protect the interests of United States citizens. We also
believe that developing countries will honor their international treaty obligations
and will apply the compulsory license provisions correctly and with a view toward
the Spirit underlying their enactment. Of course, if the contrary proves to be true,
the United States would not be powerless to take countervailing measures.
Moreover, the history of compulsory licensing provisions, both domestic and
international, demonstrates that their effect often is to encourage the negotiation
of voluntary agreements by the parties. Such agreements, containing their own
terms and conditions, would not suffer from any of the infirmities allegedly seen
under the revised Conventions.
Even assuming, however, that compulsory licenses may become prevalent if
the revised Conventions enter into force, your Committee does not believe that
they will have a seriously adverse economic impact on the United States authors
and copyright owners. In our view, developing countries represent largely un-
developed markets for the sale of works created by United States citizens, and
the careful cultivation of these markets will ultimately inure to the benefit of the
United States and other developed countries. Even if a reduction in potential
royalties may result in some instances, such reductions must be weighed against
the total royalties from developing countries that may be projected in the future
as the markets expand or the greater loss that would invariably result if develop-
ing countries do not remain members of the UCC and the Berne Convention.
In any event, apart from the economic interest of United States authors and
copyright owners in the revised Conventions, your Committee believes that there
is a general public interest in preserving the structure of international copyright
and in the availability, encouragement, protection and interchange of intellectual
creations of all nations. Those who would discount the probable impairment of
the international copyright structure as a result of non-ratification by the United
States appear to us unjustifiably optimistic.
Your Committee takes the view that the present situation in international
copyright cannot be viewed in a vacuum, but must take account of the Stockholm
Conference and the efforts of the past four years to bring order from the chaos
produced by the Stockholm Protocol. We believe that the present revisions of
the UCC and the Berne Convention are substantial improvements over the
provisions contained in the Stockholm Protocol.
We also believe that the danger posed for international copyright by the
Stockholm failure was a real one and that another failure may have the effect of
encouraging many developing countries to denounce one or both Conventions.
We do not think it is an answer to suggest that the fear of retaliation against au–
thors in developing countries will deter the governments of those countries from
taking such action. To the contrary, if authors’ groups in developing countries
have enough power to prevent their countries’ withdrawal from international
83–500–72 11
146
copyright conventions, they clearly have enough power to prevent the excessive
or unfair use of compulsory licensing systems envisaged by the revised Conven-
tions. Those developing countries that restrict the rights of authors in implement-
ing the provisions of the Conventions in their domestic laws must, under the
principle of national treatment, apply the same restrictions to their own nationals.
Finally, non-ratification of the revised UCC will bar the coming into force of
the revised Berne Convention. Following the Stockholm failure, we believe that
this result would adversely affect the orderly future development of the Berne
Convention and, particularly, the ability of the Convention to attract new mem-
bers. The history of the Berne Convention has demonstrated its salutary effect on
raising the standards of copyright protection around the world. In our view, this
role will be greatly diminshed if the Paris Act does not enter into force. Further,
if the Berne Convention were to lose its world-wide appeal, or if it were to become
a Convention restricted, as a practical matter, to developed countries, the possi-
bility of the United States joining the Convention, should that be deemed to be
desirable, might be adversely affected.
CON CLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, your Committee approves, in principle, the Universal
Copyright Convention and the Berne Convention as revised in Paris on July 24,
1971. Appreciating that there had to be some compromises and obviously some
ambiguities, and considering the difficult task of seventy-five nations reaching
agreement upon two highly technical instruments by way of Open debate in various
languages on each phrase, your Committee is of the view that, on balance, the
Paris Conference achieved a notable result of meeting the needs of developing
countries while preserving the structure and basic protection of international
copyright.
Accordingly, your Committee recommends that the Council take favorable
action on the recommendation proposed and that the same recommendation be
submitted to the House of Delegates for approval at the Mid-Winter meeting to
be held in February 1972.
Respectfully submitted.
SIDNEY SCHREIBER, Chairman.
SAUL N. RITTENBERG, Co-Chairman.
Members approving Report:
ANGELO F. ADDONA STEPHEN A. KAHN
ROBERT ASTI CHARLES H. LIEB
JOSEPH W. BAILEY ERNEST. S. MEYERS
HARRY BUCHIMAN STEPHENS MITCHELL
RICHARD COLBY PAUL B. MoROFSKY
DIxon Q. DERN KELSEY M. MOTT
JOSEPH S. DUBIN 1 MAXWELL OKUN
ALBERT H. DWYER ROBERT PINCUS
WILLIAM. H. DYCZKO SAUL N. RITTENBERG
ZACHARY S. FLAX ADOLPH SCHIMEL
MICHAEL H. GERBER SIDNEY SCHREIBER
ROBERT D. HADL BERNARD R. SORKIN
HEINZ DAWID
Members disapproving Report:
IEDwARD S. YAMBRUSIC
JoſNT REPORT OF SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW AND
SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAw
RECOMMENDATION
The Section of International and Comparative Law and the Section of Patent,
Trademark and Copyright Law jointly recommend adoption of the following
resolution by the American Bar Association:
Resolved, That the American Bar Association endorses the ratification by the
|United States of the Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on
July 24, 1971, and that the Section of International and Comparative Law and
1 Mr. Dubin states that his approval of raiſictation of the revised Convention is in principle and should
not be taken to extend to teach element of the Convention.
147
the Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law are authorized to present
the position of the Association in this matter before Congress.
REPORT
There are two basic conventions that govern International Copyright relations:
the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) to which the United States has been
a party since 1954 and the older Berne Convention (Berne) to which the United
States has not thus far adhered. The two conventions have been independent of
each other except that when the UCC was formulated in 1952 it was agreed that
it was not to be used to undermine Berne. In order to insure this, Article 17 of
the UCC provided that the works of a country that has withdrawn from Berne
will not be given protection under the UCC in other Berne countries. Thus a
member of Berne may not leave that convention and rely upon the UCC to
govern its international copyright relations. This is called the Berne Safeguard
Clause and was adopted to insure the continuing high level of copyright protection
under the Berne Convention as contrasted with the UCC which, until the Paris
revision, had no minimum requirements except recognition of the right of trans-
lation and a relatively short term of copyright. -
At the Stockholm Conference to revise the Berne Convention in 1967, the
developing countries were successful in a drive to enable them, within the frame-
work of Berne, to use copyrighted Works originating primarily in the developed
countries without payment when such uses were for educational or cultural
purposes. This modification of the Berne Convention has become known as the
“Stockholm Protocol”. Much to the surprise of the proponents of the Protocol,
the Stockholm revision of the Berne Convention was not ratified by the leading
members of Berne whose works they intended to use, namely France, Spain and
the United Kingdom. The only developed country which had ratified Stockholm
was Sweden (the host to the Stockholm Conference) whose works were of little
interest to the developing countries.
As a result of the failure of the Stockholm Protocol, the developing countires
engaged in a move to revise the UCC in two respects: (1) by eliminating the Berne
Safeguard Clause and (2) by transferring the Stockholm Protocol for all practical
purposes from the Berne Convention to the UCC. If this move were successful,
the developing countries would give up their membership in Berne and American
works would in effect be subject to confiscation in the developing countires when
used for education or cultural purposes.
In order to find some method of satisfying the legitimate needs of developing
countries and at the same time maintaining the integrity of the international
copyright system, committees representing Berne and the UCC worked together
with the very active cooperation of the United States to find a basis for revising
both conventions at conferences to be held in Paris in July 1971.
Those conferences were concluded on July 24, 1971, with revisions of the UCC
and Berne that resulted in an agreed accommodation between the developed and
developing countries. In addition, certain basic minimum rights were added to
the UCC which originally provided only for the right of translation. The Paris
Revision changes the UCC in the following respects:
1. The Berne Safeguard Clause is preserved for development countries but
developing countries may now withdraw from Berne without suffering any penalty.
2. The rights of reproduction, public performance and broadcasting are added
to the right of translation as basic rights to be recognized in countries adhering to
UCC. This will not require a change in our existing law. As the report accompany-
ing the convention points out, “No country now meeting the obligations of the
1952 convention and according basic copyright protection would be required to
assume new obligations in adhering to the 1971 convention” (Report, para. 44).
3. Certain exceptions to the right of translation are introduced in favor of
developing countries. Compulsory licenses are permitted where a translation in
the developing country’s language is not available.
4. In addition to compulsory licenses for translations, developing countries are
permitted to authorize the reproduction of works on a compulsory license basis if
copies of a particular edition of a work have not been distributed in the country to
the general public or in connection with systematic instructional activities. At
1 The implications and repercussions of the Stockholm Protocol are analyzed in Lazar, “Developing
‘Countries and Authors’ Rights in International Copyright,” ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium Number
Nineteen 1 (1971); Schrader, “Armageddon in International Copyright: Review of the Berne Convention,
the Universal Copyright Convention, and the Present Crisis in International Copyright,” 2 Advances in
Librarianship 306 (1971); Ringer, “The Role of the United States in International Copyright,” 56 George-
town Law Jourmal 1050 (1968). .
148
least three years must elapse before such a license may be issued in the case of
works in the natural and physical sciences; the period applied to works of fiction,
poetry, drama, music and art books, however, is longer—Seven years. For other
works it is five years.
Turning to the Paris revision of Berne, although the United States is not a party
to that Convention, the United States is directly involved because the Paris
revision of Berne does not become operative unless the United States, France,
Spain and the United Kingdom adhere to the Paris revision of the UCC. Con-
Sequently, if the United States does not adhere to the UCC Revision the latest
Berne Revision will be the one signed at Stockholm in 1967 which includes the
troublesome Protocol. If this happens the basic purpose of the Paris Revision
of both conventions will have been defeated.
Although the United States is not a party to the Berne Convention our scien-
tific, literary and musical works are protected throughout most foreign markets
under that Convention. We are an exporting country in these fields and our works
secure Berne protection by simultaneous publication in Canada or another Berne
country. It is hoped that when our domestic law is revised we will be in a position
to join the Berne Convention (with some slight modifications in that convention)
or that we may foster a merger of the two conventions. This will not be possible
if the Stockholm Protocol remains a part of the Berne Convention because not
only the United States but countries such as the United Kingdom, France and
Spain, among others, will not adhere to the Stockholm revision of Berne so long
as it contains the Protocol.
In the interest of advancing the cause of copyright throughout the world, the
revisions of the UCC and Berne should become a reality. This is very much in the
interest of the United States.
Accordingly, we urge that the American Bar Association adopt a resolution
endorsing ratification by the United States of the UCC as revised at Paris on
July 24, 1971.
Respectfully submitted.
HARRY A. INMAN,
Chairman, Section of International and Comparative Law.
DONALD W. BANNER,
Chairman, Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law.
FEBRUARY, 1972.
PASKUs, GORDON & HYMAN,
New York, N.Y., June 2, 1972.
MEMORAND UM
Re CCM and Harcourt Brace opposition to ratification of Paris UCC Treaty.
Mr. ROBERT L. BERNSTEIN.
Mr. SANFORD COBB.
Bella Linden’s memorandum, copies of which were circulated by Bob Frase on
March 27, has apparently been submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee in support of CCM and Harcourt Brace opposition to ratification. The
memorandum is two-pronged. It opposes ratification as “expropriation of the
private property of American citizens without adequate compensation,” and sug-
gests that in the event of ratification, Congress should provide for compensation
to the authors and publishers who would be adversely affected.
As To “ExPROPRIATION”
1. In all important respects except one, the Treaty follows the lines of the
United States proposals which were adopted at the 1969 Berne and UCC Com-
mittee meetings and at the Washington Joint Study Group meeting with the
active support of American publishers and others interested in international
copyright.
The one principal difference lies in the interpretation of prohibitions against
publication and distribution of compulsory licensed works outside of the ter-
ritory for which the compulsory license has been granted. Generally speaking, the
prohibition against extra-territorial activity will not apply if the developing
country in question either has no printing or reproducing facilities within its
own territory or if its facilities are inadequate for economic or practical reasons.
Mrs. Linden fears that groups of developing countries might combine to utilize.
the same foreign translation and printing facilities to produce American works and
149
thereby pre-empt by collusion markets which American authors and publishers
would otherwise enjoy.
These limited extra-territorial rights do present problems. They could reduce
the cost of production and it is theoretically possible, as Mrs. Linden suggests,
that certain developing countries may decide to act in concert to violate the spirit
of the Treaty.
However, these factors are offset by the following considerations:
(a) The Treaty provides for the settlement of disputes by the International
Court of Justice unless another forum is agreed upon and it already has been
Suggested that WIPO and UNESCO establish a Commission of Appeal for this
purpose.
(b) There is no reason to believe that developing nations, with the capability to
i. SO, will not want to locally produce the works for which they grant compulsory
1 Cé]]|SéS.
(c) Mrs. Linden complains that the developing nations will themselves interpret
and enforce the Treaty and that it is doubtful their views will coincide with those
of the developed countries. The appellate procedure referred to above, if estab-
lished, would be the forum to which appeal could be made in any such instance.
More importantly, however, by the very nature of the existing systems of national
Copyright protection, American authors’ and publishers’ rights depend today
upon the fair enforcement by local authorities of their local copyright law, and the
Paris Treaty makes no change in this respect.
(d) Even more basic, however, is the underlying dilemma that if the United
States does not ratify the Treaty which it sponsored, developing nations may
withdraw from the international conventions and, in effect, go it alone, refusing
to recognize foreign copyright whenever they believe their interests so require.
Mrs. Linden does not discuss this point presumably because she believes that
developing nations are bluffing and will not withdraw. This is not the judgment,
however, of either the State Department or of the Copyright Office or of inter-
national experts such as Professor Ulmer of the Max Planck Institut, nor is it
the judgment of those who have followed international copyright within AAP
and within the British and continental publishing associations.
AS TO GOVERNMENT COMPENSATION
2. Mrs. Linden suggests that if the Treaty is to be ratified, compensation to
authors and publishers who might be adversely affected should be provided for
under legislation modelled along the lines of the trade Extension Act of 1962.
This would not seem appropriate, at least at the present time, for the following
TG3. SOIAS .
(a) Assuming immediate United States ratification, the first compulsory
licenses are not likely to be granted for some time. Only then can it be determined
if American publishers and authors are being injured and if they are, that would
be the time to determine what action, if any, should be taken to prevent further
Injury.
(b) Government assistance to publishers and authors who claim to be injured
might lead to censorship standards for the determination of works eligible for such
assistance. A program such as this might in the long run be more harmful than
beneficial.
CON CLUSION
Ratification of the Paris Treaty will strengthen and not dilute international
Copyright protection. AAP supported the State Department and the Copyright
Office in bringing about the drafting and signature of the Treaty and the State
Department did not forward the Treaty to the Senate for ratification until it
first knew that ratification had been approved by AAP, the American Bar Associa-
tion and by other associations representing the copyright community. It would
be inappropriate and inadvisable for AAP to now take any action inconsistent
with its prior approval.
[From International Copyright, Nov. 8, 1971]
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT TURNS ANOTHER CORNER
(By Barbara Ringer)
Miss Ringer is Assistant Register of Copyrights and was alternate
delegate of the United States to the Paris Conferences. The views
150
expressed are personal with the author, and do not reflect official
Government policy.
On Bastille Day, July 14, 1967, a depressed and nervous group of delegates:
attended the final ceremony of the Stockholm Intellectual Property Conference
to sign, or watch others sign, the text of the newest revision of the Berne Copy-
right Convention, The jittery, gloomy atmosphere at the Swedish Ministry of
Justice was caused by one thing: the now-famous Stockholm Protocol Regarding
Developing Countries. The compromises incorporated in the Protocol had been
achieved at the last moment and with the utmost difficulty, after five weeks of
private acrimony and bitter public forensics, but the problems of the conference
were not the reason for the prevailing anxiety. Whether from developing or
developed countries, everyone was wondering the same things. Would the Protocol
come into effect? If so, how seriously would copyright protection throughout the
world be undermined? If not, would it mean the distinegration of the Berne Union.
and massive piracy in developing countries? S.
As it happened, the fourth anniversary of that unhappy Saturday occurred in.
the middle of twin diplomatic conferences, held in Paris in July, 1971, for the basic
purpose of undoing the mistakes of Stockholm. No One mentioned the painful
anniversary, and Bastille Day, 1971, was notable mainly for the novelty of seeing
a few women marching in the French military parade. Ten days later, revised texts.
of the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions were signed at UNESCO House
in a general atmosphere of good will and optimism. The locomotive that had been
derailed at Stockholm was hauled back onto track at Paris and, while somewhat
battered, is now in running condition.
A profoundly serious crisis can cause amnesia, and there does appear to be some
tendency deliberately to forget or ignore the situation created by the Stockholm
Protocol and its aftermath, and to pretend that we are dealing with international
copyright as it existed in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Although this attitude can
perhaps be attributed to wishful thinking or the demands of advocacy, it is wrong
and it is dangerous to the interests of American authors, publishers, and copyright
owners generally.
Let no one be misled: the new Paris Copyright Conventions have successfully
Overcome the crisis brought on by the Stockholm Protocol. They have strengthened
rather than weakened international copyright protection; and they have laid the
groundwork for a truly worldwide system of protection that should eventually
include the more than sixty countries now outside any multilateral copyright
treaty. To have brought this about in four years is not a negligible accomplishment,
and perhaps even more important for the future is the genuine Spirit of cooperation
and good will built up during those four years and prevailing at the Paris.
Conferences.
The minutes of the Stockholm Conference, which have recently been published,
bear out this writer's personal observations of the course of events. The developing
countries were well-organized, fiercely committed to a definite program, and
were supported to varying degrees by some developed countries. The Only program.
of the major developed countries was unorganized negativism; the tactics such as
they were, involved a great deal of lip-service to the educational needs and fiscal
problems of the developing countries, together with unqualified though irresolute
opposition to the specific proposals for concessions under the Berne Convention.
The lack of organized leadership and definite counterproposals put the developed
countries in the position of opposing everything, thus pushing the developing
countries to make broader and broader demands. In a highly charged political
atmosphere, the developed countries were forced to retreat from entrenched posi-
tion to entrenched position, and at the end of the conference the developing.
countries had, in fact, gained more on paper than they had originally sought. The
lessons to be drawn from this catastrophe were not lost upon delegates from coun-
tries in various stages of development.
POST-STOCKHOLM REACTION
For a number of months after Stockholm, however, the general feeling in the
developing countries was a curious combination of angry frustration and helpless
resignation. The excesses of the Protocol were deplored, but at the same time it
was assumed that sooner or later the Protocol would come into effect and attract a
substantial number of ratifications. As time went On, it became apparent that an
impasse was developing, and that this was almost as dangerous to international
copyright protection as the Protocol itself.
151
Various proposals for breaking the stalemate were advanced, but for the most
part they involved either full acceptance of the Protocol or deliberately driving
the developing countries out of the Berne Union. In this writer's opinion, the most
significant proposal was that of Abraham L. Kaminstein, the U.S. Register of
Copyrights. At a meeting in December, 1967, he said in effect: “Let us admit that
the Stockholm Protocol was a mistake and that some countries, including the
United States, will not ratify it. Rather than cursing the gods or each other, let us
join together to adopt a positive program aimed at meeting the needs of develop-
ing countries without endangering the rights of authors. Let us start at once by
convening a conference to study the whole problem and to recommend solutions.”
With many ups and downs along the way, this is precisely what was done: a Joint
Study Group met in Washington in September, 1969, and produced the “Wash-
ington Recommendation,” a compromise proposal that is the cornerstone of the
1971 Paris Conventions. n
Following the Washington meeting, there was a further series of preparatory
meetings at short intervals, and these produced additional compromises, re-
finements, and draft texts. These texts, which were the basic working documents
of the two Paris Conferences (one for revision of the Universal Convention
and the other mainly for revision of the Stockholm Protocol), were reasonably
simple considering the formidable subject matter. They embodied compro-
mises on both sides, but no objective observer of the entire preparatory process
can fail to see that the developing countries yielded to the developed countries
on a number of points. The developed countries were satisfied with the texts as
they emerged from the last preparatory meeting, and their effort was to preserve
as much as possible of the “package deal” (as it was called ad nauseam). Realistic
veterans of earlier diplomatic conferences in the intellectual property field knew
well, however, that changes were certain to be made to them the goal was to
preserve the framework and fundamentals of the compromise in the face of
proposals for change by delegates from countries not represented during the
earlier preparatory work.
In the opinion of this writer, the basic goal was fully achieved. In its essentials
the “package deal” held together, and the changes from the draft texts, while
mainly favoring the developing countries, were not of fundamental importance.
If there are reasons for regret as to the outcome of the Paris Conferences, they
stem, first, from the complicated drafting forced on the delegates by the ex-
igencies of time, and Second, from the demand to include special provisions
dealing with matters other than translation and reproduction of text matter (e.g.
audiovisual fixations; translation for educational broadcasting). The awakening
of representatives of developing countries to the possibility of skipping entirely
over the use of textbooks and going directly to audiovisual procedures in the
development of some of their educational systems made special provisions dealing
with the latter nearly inevitable by the time of the 1971 conferences. Even so,
these special provisions are so carefully circumscribed that they cannot be re-
garded as a serious departure from the earlier compromise.
IMPACT FOR THE U.S.
In trying to grasp what happened at Paris, One must compare three things:
(1) the situation before the Stockholm Protocol in 1967; (2) the Protocol and its
relation to the Universal Convention; and (3) the Paris revisions of both the
Berne and Universal Conventions. Then, in evaluating what the position of the
United States Government on the Paris Conventions should be, we should try
to make a more detailed analysis of their provisions, considering their impact
if the United States ratifies the revised U.C.C. and if it does not. This sounds
formidable, and it is, but what follows will attempt to present the Salient points
as simply, clearly, and accurately as possible.
The highwater mark in international copyright protection so far was the
Brussels text of the Berne Convention, adopted in 1948 and widely ratified among
developed and transitional nations, as well as some former colonial dependencies.
Even at Brussels, the impact of the new technology, specifically broadcasting
media, made itself felt in limitations on protection, but on the whole the philosophy
behind the Brussels text was “the more required protection the better.” The Uni-
versal Copyright Convention of 1952 was quite a different matter: Its modest
purpose was to get the United States and other non-Berne members into a multi-
lateral convention on terms they could accept. This mainly involved concessions
by U.C.C. countries with respect to the formalities required for protection of
152.
foreign works, the most notorious of which was the manufacturing clause. In the
area of exclusive rights, the Universal Convention's only minimum requirement
was that the copyright owner have the control over the right to translate his
work into another language for seven years, after which the right was subject
to compulsory licensing.
In the mid-1960s, the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions both had
about 50 members, with a substantial overlap. The United States will be unable
to consider joining the Berne Union until we change our domestic law or the
|Union lowers its standards, neither a particularly strong bet in the immediate
future. Another big power, Soviet Russia, has never belonged to a multilateral
copyright convention.
Meanwhile, beginning in the mid-1950s, country after country gained inde-
pendence from colonial authority of one sort or another. Some of these new states
joined the Berne Union, others adhered to the U.C.C., but the majority has yet
to take either plunge. As the newly-independent governments came to grips with
the problems of illiteracy, scientific and technical instruction, and currency
exchange, they began to feel the pinch of their copyright obligations. Those
developing countries that are members of the Berne Union mounted an all-out
effort to obtain concessions in their favor at the Stockholm Conference in 1967.
At the same time, as either an adjunct or alternative to this approach, it was
proposed that the Universal Convention be amended to allow developing countries
that are members of the Berne Union to leave the Union and still rely fully on the
U.C.C. for protection of their own works.
The revised text of the Berne Convention as signed at Stockholm on July 14,
1967, contained, as an integral part, the Protocol Regarding Developing Countries,
which was destined to become a household work in some households. Reduced
to its barest essentials, the Stockholm Protocol would permit “any country
regarded as a developing country in conformity with the established practice of
the United Nations” to declare that, instead of the obligations imposed by the
Convention proper, it would impose any or all of the following five limitations:
STOCKHOLM’s LIMITATIONS
(!) Reduce the basic term of protection to life-plus-25 years;
(2) Reduce the scope of broadcasting rights somewhat;
(3) Reduce the scope of translation rights as follows:
(a) The right of translation into a particular language would “cease to exist”
if an authorized translation into that language had not been published within
ten years;
(b) If, within three years of publication, an authorized translation into a
particular language had not been published in the developing country using
that language, a compulsory license would be granted upon compliance with
certain formalities. The same licensing procedure could be followed if the author-
ized translation is allowed to go out of print in the country. However, the copy-
right owner could terminate the license by publishing his own authorized trans-
lation in the country within ten years of first publication of the work.
(c) Copies made under the compulsory license could be exported under very
liberal terms, and the provisions concerning payment are similarly loose.
(4) Reduce the scope of the right to reproduce the work in the same language
for “educational or cultural purposes,” as follows:
(a) If, within three years of first publication, an authorized edition has not
been published, in the developing country, a compulsory license could be granted
upon compliance with certain formalities. The same licensing procedure would be
followed if the work is allowed to go out of print.
(b) The same provisions concerning termination of the license, export, and
transfer of royalties as those applicable to translations would apply to works
reproduced under a compulsory license.
(5) On top of all this, Article 1(e) of the Protocol would allow a developing coun-
try, “exclusively for teaching, study and research in all fields of education,” to
restrict the protection of literary and artistic works, provided there was some com-
pensation. However, royalties could be blocked entirely and, although the ability
to export would be somewhat more limited under this catch-all article then in the
case of standard translation and reproduction licenses, export of copies would be
allowed.
ATUTHORS WHXRE DISTURBED
Obviously, authors and publishers in the countries that are exporters of cultural
goods were deeply disturbed by this entire program, and were particularly incensed
153
by the loose export provisions under which control over geographical marketing
arrangements could be irretrievably lost. However, the lighted match in the tinder
barrel was Article 1 (e); a product of frantic last-minute drafting, it was aptly
called the “coach-and-horses” provision because one could readily drive the same
through it. It was unlimited as to subject matter; and, as long as the purpose was
for “teaching, study and research,” any use, including performance, broadcasting
and adaptation, would be permitted without even the formalities governing com-
pulsory licensing.
The impasse produced by the Stockholm Protocol caused a revival of the
proposal to amend the U.C.C. in a way that would induce developing countries
to leave the Berne Union or never to adhere to it, and to rely upon or adhere to
the Universal Copyright Convention instead. Had this effort succeeded, the
balance between the two conventions would have been disturbed if not destroyed,
with the scales of power ultimately tipping in favor of the U.C.C. with its lower
level of protection. Incredible as it still seems to this writer, there were among
the advocates of the highest level of copyright protection those who would have
preferred to see the Berne Union purged of developing countries and left to a
small group of rich exporting countries. The sad history of the United States in
international copyright affairs is enough of an example to prove how short-sighted
this attitude was, but in an era of instantaneous global and extra-global com-
munications, the myopia seems more like blindness.
The difficult period of negotiations that went on continuously during 1968,
1969, and 1970 produced a compromise proposal which, in turn, formed the basis
for the Paris Conventions of 1971. Again, in oversimplified form, the Paris
revisions of the Berne and Universal Conventions can be summarized as follows:
(1) The provision preventing states from denouncing the Berne Convention,
and relying upon the U.C.C. in their relations with Berne Union members, was
made inapplicable to developing countries. However, since the obligations imposed
on developing countries under both the revised U.C.C. and the new text of
Berne are about the same, there would be little incentive for present Berne
members to leave the Union, and the chances seem good that many countries
will join both conventions.
(2) The substantive articles of the Stockholm Act, including the Protocol
Regarding Developing Countries, will become a dead letter as soon as the Paris
Act replacing them takes effect. The basic substantive articles, minus the Protocol,
will be resurrected as part of the Paris Act, however.
(3) For the first time, real minimum rights have been written into the Universal
Copyright Convention, and this is a genuine and meaningful improvement in the
international protection of authors. As adopted, the Paris text of the Universal
Copyright Convention requires contracting states to grant “the basic rights
ensuring the author's economic interests, including the exclusive right to authorize
reproduction by any means, public performance and broadcasting.” The General
Report of the Conference makes clear that the word “including” in this key
phrase is “not to be interpreted as limitative or exhaustive.”
(4) If the requirement for granting these minimum rights had been completely
unqualified, a number of countries now parties to the U.C.C. would be unable to
ratify the new text. The most prominent example is the United States, with its
jukebox exemption, limitations against control of CATV transmissions, and
similar oddities. The Paris revision of the Universal Convention, therefore, pro-
vides that, as long as a country accords “a reasonable degree of effective protection”
to each of the exclusive rights, it can make exceptions “that do not conflict with
the spirit and provisions of this convention.” The General Report of this provision
confirms a point frequently made at the conference and eventually dubbed the
“a contrario principle”; that, since the revised convention elsewhere allows
developing countries to make special limitations in the form of compulsory licens-
ing provisions, these or similar exceptions will not be available to developed
countries. In any case, the report states, “no State would be entitled to withhold
entirely all rights with respect to reproduction, public performance, or broad-
casting, that where exceptions are made they must not be applied arbitrarily, and
that the protection offered must be effectively enforced.”
NEEDS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(5) The basic purpose of the revisions of both the Universal and the Berne
Conventions was to afford parallel concessions applicable to developing countries
that would meet the genuine needs of those countries, would not force them out
or exclude them from the international copyright community, but that would not
154
damage or impair the rights of authors and other copyright owners. Because the
two conventions are so different in Origins and content, this proved an immensely
difficult technical task, but in the opinion of this writer the basic purpose was
achieved.
The Stockholm Protocol contained provisions allowing developing countries to
limit rights as to broadcasting and the duration of protection. These concessions
were dropped entirely in both new revisions. More important, the “coach-and-
horses” provision of Article 1(e) of the Protocol also vanished completely. The
concessions to developing countries in the Paris texts of both the Berne Conven-
tion and the U.C.C. are confined exclusively to the rights of translation and
reproduction. -
(7) A provision in the Paris Act of the Berne Convention conditions its entry
into force upon the ratification of the new Universal Convention by four countries:
France, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Thus, unless the
United States ratifies the Paris text of the Universal Convention, the parallel
revision of the Berne Convention will fail, and the Stockholm Protocol will spring
back to life.
r NO RETURN TO 20 YEARS A GO
It is easy enough to carp about minor ambiguities and obscurities in any treaty,
or in any statute or contract for that matter, and to mount an attack based on
the assumption that no concessions or compromises needed to have been made.
It is doubtful, however, that authors, publishers, and copyright owners in the
United States can afford this luxury. What we must confront is, first, that unless
the 1948 Berne and 1952 Universal Conventions are revised in a reasonable way,
the outcome will not be reasonable. It is pointless to talk about downgrading
international copyright protection as it existed twenty years ago. What we must
consider is the possibility of upgrading protection from the dangers of the Stock-
holm Protocol of 1967 or, worse, of worldwide piracy, remembering that in 1971
more than half of the countries of the world belong to no copyright convention
and that each is a potential Taiwan.
The translation and reproduction provisions of the Paris revisions of the Uni-
versal and Berne Conventions are, from the viewpoint of copyright owners, an
extraordinary improvement over the Stockholm Protocol. These improvements
and safeguards are too large in number and too technically complex to explain
in detail here, but the following is a summary of some of the main ones:
(1) The bête noire of Stockholm, Article 1(e) of the Protocol, under which a
developing country could have justified any restriction on copyright in the name
of “teaching, study and research,” has been suppressed entirely.
(2) Under the Stockholm Protocol, a compulsory translation license could be
granted for any purpose, and the only restriction on reproduction licenses was
that the purpose be “educational or cultural purposes,” a barn-door limitation
if there ever was one. Under Paris, translation licenses are permitted only for
purposes of “teaching, scholarship or research,” and reproduction licenses only
for “systematic instructional activities.”
(3) Export of copies made under a compulsory license was practically unre-
stricted under the Stockholm Protocol. It is forbidden under the Paris texts. A
specific exception allowing export to nationals of the licensing country who are
living abroad is so hedged with safeguards as to preclude any possibility of abuse.
More controversial was an interpretation, adopted by the conferences and written
into the General Reports, that would allow a developing country lacking any
publishing and printing facilities capable of doing the work to grant a license
allowing the licensee to go abroad to have the editorial and reproduction processes
done for him. However, all copies must be returned in bulk, for distribution
solely in the developing country, and the Reports make clear that, in all other
cases, the printing and editorial preparation must be done in the licensing country.
The moving force behind this proposal came from five French-speaking countries
in West Africa, and its impact on American authors and publishers seems minimal
at most. Indeed, the United States was the only developed country seriously
contesting the interpretation, which was accepted by the French delegation, and
it is hard to understand the controversy this minor matter aroused among One
or two representatives of U.S. interests at Paris.
(4) Under the Stockholm Protocol, the right of translation into a particular
language could be lost after ten years unless a translation into the language had
been published. This provision was dropped in the Paris revision.
(5) The granting of compulsory licenses under the Paris revisions is anything
but automatic, and in the opinion of this writer will be rare, Serving as a last re-
155
Sort rather than a regular practice. There is a waiting period in all cases, ranging
from one year and nine months (for translation into non-world languages) to
seven years (for reproduction of works of belles-lettres). There must be a bona fide
effort to contact the copyright owner to obtain a negotiated license; if the owner
is found, the compulsory license can be invoked only if he refuses to grant a
negotiated license. If he cannot be found, the revised conventions contain elaborate
machinery requiring the sending out of notices. A compulsory license can be cut
off, either before or after it is issued, by the publication of an authorized translation
or reproduction.
WHERE SHOULD THE U.S. STAND 2
The United States can ratify the Universal Convention as revised at Paris
without any change in its domestic law. The procedure involves affirmative action
by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. Is ratification in
the best interests of U.S. authors and other copyright owners?
The answer must be an unqualified and emphatic yes. Ratification of the Paris
revision of the U.C.C. will substantially help in restoring stability in international
copyright and will materially strengthen both the Berne and Universal Conven-
tions. Copyright protection as between developed countries will be enhanced,
and developing countries will be induced to join one or both of the new conventions.
The results of our failure to ratify are obvious: revival of the Stockholm Protocol,
denunciations of one or both existing conventions, weakening of both Berne and
of the U.C.C., and a substantial increase in piracy on a global scale. With these
alternatives before us, what choice can there be?
TExT OF STATEMENT OF ExECUTIVE BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION
OF SOCIETIES OF AUTHORS AND COMPOSERs (CISAC), END ORSING RATIFICA-
TION OF 1971 PARIS REVISION OF BERNE AND UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CON-
VENTIONS.
The Executive Bureau of CISAC meeting in New York on September 30 and
October 1, 1971
Having examined the texts of the Berne Convention and the Universal Copy-
right Convention revised in Paris last July.
Notes that these texts include unquestionable improvements over the Protocol
adopted in Stockholm in 1967 and bring about a positive contribution to the
Overall evolution of international copyright;
Consequently favors the ratification of these revised instruments.
Although favoring ratification, including measures that will aid the educational
activities of developing countries, it regrets that this should be done at the expense
of authors, by impairing their rights in the field of translation and reproduction,
rather than by providing a financial subsidy at the expense of the developed States.
ExCERPT FROM THE MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF COMPOSERs, AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS, HELD ON
JANUARY 27, 1972
Counsel advised the Board that the State Department (through Bruce D. Ladd,
Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Commercial Affairs and Business
Practices and co-Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Paris Con-
ferences) informs us that the President of the United States will shortly submit
to the United States Senate for ratification, the 1971 Paris Revision of the Uni-
versal Copyright Convention.
The Paris Revisions of the Universal and Berne Conventions were designed
primarily to resolve an impasse between the “developing” countries and the
“developed” countries resulting from the Stockholm revision of the Berne Con-
vention in 1967. The Stockholm Protocol adopted at that time would make it
impossible for the United States to join the Berne Convention in the future because
of the erosion of copyright protection in important areas. This would not affect
existing members of the Berne Union because they are not bound by the Stockholm
revision unless they ratify it. On the other hand, countries such as the United
States that are not now members of Berne, could not in the future adhere to the
Convention as it stood prior to the Stockhom Revision. This would leave the
|Universal Copyright Convention as the only worldwide Convention available to
the United States as a practical matter—and there was a threat that the develop-
156
*
ing countries would succeed in transferring the substance of the Stockholm
Protocol to the Universal Copyright Convention.
The Paris Revisions of the two Conventions, which sought to reconcile the
positions of the developing and developed countries, have accomplished their
purpose. The Revision of the Berne Convention eliminates the Stockholm Proto-
col. It will not become effective, however, unless the United States, the United
Kingdom, France and Spain ratify the Paris revision of the Universal Copyright
Convention.
The changes in both Conventions were reviewed by the Executive Bureau of
CISAC last fall and it recommended ratification of both Conventions. ASCAP
joined in that recommendation, a copy of which is attached to these minutes.
After this explanation of Counsel, the following resolution was unanimously
adopted in support of ratification by the United States of the Paris Revision of
the Universal Copyright Convention:
Resolved, That the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers on
behalf of its 17,000 composer-author–and publisher members, endorses the ratifi-
cation by the United States of the Universal Copyright Convention as revised at
Paris on July 24, 1971.
THE AUTHORS LEAGUE OF AMERICA, INC.,
New York, N.Y., August 3, 1972.
Hon. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: When I testified before the Committee yesterday
on the 1971 Universal Copyright Convention, I mentioned a report of the Ameri-
can Bar Association, in connection with the ABA's resolution endorsing ratifica-
tion. Subsequently, Mr. Herman Finkelstein, testifying for the ABA, handed the
Committee two reports.
To avoid any confusion on the record, I would like to submit to the Committee.
a copy (enclosed) of the American Bar Association Report I referred to, and ask
that it be included in the record of the hearings, along with this letter.
The enclosure is a four page document captioned: “AMERICAN BAR, AS-
SOCIATION_JOINT REPORT OF SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW AND SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK AND
COPYRIGHT LAW.”
I understand this document was submitted to the ABA’s House of Delegates.
The portion of this Report I referred to is Par. 3 on page 3 which described the
compulsory license provisions as follows: “Certain exceptions to the right of
translation are introduced in favor of developing countries. Compulsory licenses
are permitted where a translation in the developing country’s language is not
available.”
Respectfully yours,
IRWIN KARP, Counsel.
AMERICAN BAR Associ ATION.—JoJNT REPORT OF SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE LAW AND SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPY-
RIGHT LAW.
RECOMMEND ATTON
The Section of International and Comparative Law and the Section of Patent,
Trademark and Copyright Law jointly recommend adoption of the following
resolution by the American Bar Association:
“Resolved, That the American Bar Association endorses the ratification by the
|United States of the Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on
July 24, 1971, and that the Section of International and Comparative Law and
the Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law are authorized to present
the position of the Association in this matter before Congress.”
REPORT
There are two basic conventions that govern International Copyright relations:
the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) to which the United States has been
a party since 1954 and the older Berne Convention (Berne) to which the United
States has not thus far adhered. The two conventions have been independent of
157
each other except that when the UCC was formulated in 1952 it was agreed that
it was not to be used to undermine Berne. In order to insure this, Article 17 of
the UCC provided that the works of a country that has withdrawn from Berne
will not be given protection under the UCC in other Berne countries. Thus a
member of Berne may not leave that convention and rely upon the UCC to govern
its international copyright relations. This is called the Berne Safeguard Clause
and was adopted to insure the continuing high level of copyright protection under
the Berne Convention as contrasted with the UCC which, until the Paris revision
nad no minimum requirements except recognition of the right of translation and
a relatively short term of copyright.
At the Stockholm Conference to revise the Berne Convention in 1967, the
developing countries were successful in a drive to enable them, within the frame-
work of Berne, to use copyrighted works originating primarily in the developed
countries without payment when such uses were for educational or cultural
purposes. This modification of the Berne Convention has become known as the
“Stockholm Protocol”. Much to the surprise of the proponents of the Protocol,
the Stockholm revision of the Berne Convention was not ratified by the leading
members of Berne whose works they intended to use, namely France, Spain and
the United Kingdom. The only developed country which had ratified Stockholm
was Sweden (the host to the Stockholm Conference) whose works were of little
interest to the developing countries.
As a result of the failure of the Stockholm Protocol, the developing countries
engaged in a move to revise the UCC in two respects: (1) by eliminating the
Berne Safeguard Clause and (2) by transferring the Stockholm Protocol for all
practical purposes fron, the Berne Convention to the UCC. If this move were
successful, the developing countries would give up their membership in Berne and
American works would in effect be subject to confiscation in the developing coun-
tries when used for educational or cultural purposes.
In order to find some method of satisfying the legitimate needs of developing
countries and at the same time maintaining the integrity of the international
copyright system, committees representing Berne and the UCC worked together
with the very active cooperation of the United States to find a basis for revising
both conventions at conferences to be held in Paris in July 1971.
Those conferences were concluded on July 24, 1971, with revisions of the UCC
and Berne that resulted in an agreed accommodation between the developed and
developing countries. In addition, certain basic minimum rights were added to the
UCC which originally provided only for the right of translation. The Paris
Revision changes the UCC in the following respects:
1. The Berne Safeguard Clause is preserved for developed countries but develop-
ing countries may now withdraw from Berne without suffering any penalty.
2. The rights of reproduction, public performance and broadcasting are added
to the right of translation as basic rights to be recognized in countries adhering
to UCC. This will not require a change in our existing law. As the report accom-
panying the convention points out, “No country now meeting the obligations of
the 1952 convention and according basic copyright protection would be required
to assume new obligations in adhering to the 1971 convention” (Report, para. 44).
3. Certain exceptions to the right of translation are introduced in favor of
developing countries. Compulsory licenses are permitted where a translation in
the developing country’s language is not available.
4. In addition to compulsory licenses for translations, developing countries are
permitted to authorize the reproduction of works on a compulsory license basis if
copies of a particular edition of a work have not been distributed in the country
to the general public or in connection with systematic instructional activities. At
least three years must elapse before such a license may be issued in the case of
works in the natural and physical sciences; the period applied to works of fiction,
poetry, drama, music and art books, however, is longer—seven years. For other
works it is five years.
Turning to the Paris revision of Berne, although the United States is not a
party to that Convention, the United States is directly involved because the
Paris revision of Berne does not become operative unless the United States,
France, Spain and the United Kingdom adhere to the Paris revision of the UCC.
1 The implications and repercussions of the Stockholm. Protocol are analyzed in Lazar,
“Developing Countries and Authors’ Rights in International Copyright,” ASCAP Copyright
Law Symposium. Number Ninteen 1 (1971) ; Schrader, “Armageddon in International Copy-
right : Review of the Berne Convention, the Universal Copyright Convention, and the Pres-
ent Crisis in International Copyright,” 2 Advances in Librarianship 306 (1971) ; Ringer,
Gº” the United States in International Copyright,” 56 Georgetown Law Journal 1050
1968).
158
Consequently, if the United States does not adhere to the UCC Revision the
latest Berne Revision will be the one signed at Stockholm in 1967 which includes
the troublesome Protocol. If this happens the basic purpose of the Paris Revision
of both conventions will have been defeated.
Although the United States is not a party to the Berne Convention our scientific,
literary and musical works are protected throughout most foreign markets under
that Convention. We are an exporting country in these fields and our works.
secure Berne protection by simultaneous publication in Canada or another Berne
country. It is hoped that when our domestic law is revised we will be in a position,
to join the Berne Convention (with some slight modifications in that Convention)
or that we may foster a merger of the two conventions. This will not be possible
if the Stockholm Protocol remains a part of the Berne Convention because not
only the United States but countries such as the United Kingdom, France and
Spain, among others, will not adhere to the Stockholm revision of Berne so long
as it contains the Protocol.
In the interest of advancing the cause of copyright throughout the world, the
revisions of the UCC and Berne should become a reality. This is very much in the
interest of the United States.
Accordingly, we urge that the American Bar Association adopt a resolution
endorsing ratification by the United States of the UCC as revised at Paris on
July 24, 1971.
Respectfully submitted.
HARRY A. INMAN, .
Chairman, Section of International and Comparative Law.
DONALD W. BANNER,
Chairman, Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law.
FEBRUARY, 1972.
O
/o 3 7
SHRIMP AGREEMENT WITH BRAZIL
NORTHWEST ATLANTIC FISHERIES CONVENTION
PROTOCOL
SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA CONVENTION AMENDMENTS
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON -
OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
EXECUTIVE P, 92D CONGRESS, 2D SESSION
AGREEMENT WITH BRAZIL CONCERNING SEIRIMP
EXECUTIVE C, 92D CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION
PROTOCOL TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE
NORTHWEST ATLANTIC FISHERIES RELATING TO AMEND-
MENTS TO THE CONVENTION
ExECUTIVE O, 92D CONGRESS, 2D SESSION
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF
LIFE AT SEA, 1960
SEPTEMBER. 28, 1972
§
Printed for the use of the Committee On Foreign Relations
TJ.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
84–955 O WASHINGTON : 1972
}}}:Post-rºry Fºx, *H tº
ū ſº jº §. i.) § TATE S. ( ; ;: /* F. '; ;"
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
J. W. FDLBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois
WILLIAM B. SPON G, JR., Virginia
CARL MARCY, Chief of Staff
ARTHUR M. KUHL, Chief Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island, Chairman
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
WILLIAM B. SPON G, JR., Virginia HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
(II)
C O N T E N T S
tatements by:
McKernan, Hon. Donald L., Ambassador, Coordinator of Ocean
Affairs, Department of State, accompanied by William Terry,
Director of International Affairs for NOAA, Department of Com-
Rea, Rear Adm. William F., Chief, Office of Merchant Marine Safety,
U.S. Coast Guard, accompanied by Lt. Cmdr. Robert Fenton,
ºº: Operations and Communications Division, U.S. Coast
Lla,I’
Reynolds, James J., president, American Institute of Merchant
Shipping, accompanied by Rear Adm. Roderick Y. Edwards,
Chairman, IMCO Council
Page
16
69
73
sertions for the record:
Text of Executive P, 92d Congress, second session, Agreement with
Brazil concerning shrimp-------------------------------------
Value of U.S. shrimp fishery off Brazil_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Value of U.S. shrimp fishery off Mexico_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Question of creeping jurisdiction in agreement with Brazil concerning
shrimp-----------------------------------------------------
stºº of the National Shrimp Congress, Inc._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Text of Executive C, 92d Congress, first session, Protocol to the
International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
relating to amendments to the convention-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Text of Executive O, 92d Congress, second session, Amendments to
the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Adherence to IMCO standards by People's Republic of China, North
FCorea and People's Republic of Germany
Statement of American Institute of Merchant Shipping
(III)
23
23
24
29
31
52
72
74
SHRIMP AGREEMENT WITH BRAZIL
NORTHWEST ATLANTIC FISHERIES CONVENTION
PROTOCOL
SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA CONVENTION
AMENDMENTS
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1972
UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS AND
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE
CoMMITTEE on FoEEIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
221, New Senate Office Building, Senator Claiborne Pell (chairman
f the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senator Pell.
Senator PELL. The subcommittee will come to order.
OPENING STATEMENT
This morning the Subcommittee on Oceans and International
nvironment will hear testimony on the following items:
1. The agreement with Brazil concerning shrimp, Ex. P, 92–2;
, the Protocol to the International Convention for the Northwest
tlantic Fisheries (ICNAF), Ex. C, 92–1; and 3, the amendments to
he Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960, Ex. O, 92–2.
Fisheries disputes between the United States and certain countries
f Latin America have been a disturbing element in our relations with
he hemisphere for almost 20 years. These disputes arise from dif-
erences regarding the breadth of the territorial sea and coastal
tate rights over the resources of the waters adjacent to their coasts.
he United States recognizes a 3-mile territorial sea and, by statute
Public Law 89–658), claims a 9-mile contiguous zone of exclusive
urisdiction over fisheries. On the other hand, 10 Latin American
ountries claim fishing rights or territorial jurisdiction over 200 miles
f their coastal seas.
Over the years these claims have come into conflict with the interests
f the U.S.-distant-water fishing fleets. Subsequently, the United
tates has been involved for over a decade in an effort to peacefully
egotiate some mutually acceptable solution to this problem.
(1)

2
The first item on the agenda—the United States and Braziliar
Shrimp Agreement—is thought to be a reasonable solution to thi
rather difficult and sensitive problem. The State Department hope
that this agreement will provide a useful precedent for resolvin
similar but more volatile situations on the west coast of Latin Americ
(The agreement referred to follows:)
92D CONGRESS EXECUTIVE
2d Session } SENATE { P
AGREEMENT WITH BRAZIL CONCERNING SHRIMP
MESSAGE
FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING
THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERN-
MENT OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL CON-
CERNING SHRIMP, TOGETHER WITH AN AGREED MINUTE
AND WITH A RELATED EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONCERN-
ING COMPENSATION, SIGNED AT BRASILIA ON MAY 9, 1972;
AND A RELATED EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONCERNING IN-
TERIM UNDERTAKINGS
JULY 28, 1972.-Agreement was read the first time and, together
with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee
on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed
for use of the Senate
|U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1972


LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
THE WHITE House, July 28, 1972.
To the Senate of the United States: -
With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to
ratification, I transmit here with the Agreement Between the Govern.
ment of the United States of America and the Government of the
Federative Republic of Brazil Concerning Shrimp, together with ar
Agreed Minute and with a related exchange of notes concerning com:
pensation, signed at Brasilia on May 9, 1972. I transmit also, for the
information of the Senate, a related exchange of notes concerning in.
terim undertakings, signed at Brasilia on May 9, 1972, and transla.
tions of the Brazilian notes. |
The Agreement establishes a basis for regulating the conduct of
shrimp fishing in a defined area off the coast of Brazil. Such regula
tion will help to conserve shrimp resources and will provide an interim
solution for problems which have arisen concerning jurisdiction ove
those resources.
The measures prescribed in the Agreement will safeguard the eco
nomic interests of the shrimp industries of both Parties and protec
from prejudice their respective legal positions on the extent of coasta
state jurisdiction over ocean fisheries under international law. Th
interim nature of the Agreement reflects the expectation that this
underlying question may in the near future be settled by general inter.
national agreement on the law of the sea.
A fuller explanation of the Agreement is contained in the report
from the Department of State, which is transmitted herewith for the
information of the Senate. -
This Agreement will contribute to maintaining and strengthening
the friendship and cooperation which have long characterized relations
between the United States and Brazil. I recommend that the Senate
give it early and favorable consideration.
RICHARD NIxoN.
(Enclosures: (1) Report of the Department of State; and (2)
Agreement concerning shrimp, with Agreed Minute and two exchanges
of notes relating thereto, and translations of Brazilian notes.)
(III)
Ex. Doc. 92—P



LETTER OF SUBMITTAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 23, 1972.
THE PRESIDENT,
The White House : -
I have the honor to submit to you, with a recommendation for trans-
mission to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, the
greement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil Concerning
Shrimp, together with an Agreed Minute and with a related exchange
of notes concerning compensation, signed at Brasilia on May 9, 1972.
There are also transmitted, for the information of the Senate, a re-
ated exchange of notes concerning interim undertakings, signed at
Brasilia on May 9, 1972, and translations of the Brazilian notes.
The necessity for this Agreement arose when Brazil, in 1970, as-
Serted a claim to a territorial sea extending 200 miles from its coast
and subsequently promulgated regulations purporting to control fish-
ing by foreign flag vessels within the claimed territorial sea. This juris-
dictional claim, which was not recognized by the United States, en-
Ompassed important shrimp resources that had been exploited for
everal years by a large number of United States flag vessels in waters
ying entirely beyond 12 nautical miles from the coast and therefore,
in the view of the United States, not subject to the exclusive fishery
iurisdiction of Brazil.
The Agreement provides for the conservation of shrimp resources
in which the United States and Brazil have a mutual interest and is
lso designed to forestall problems which might arise because of the
lifference in the views of the Governments concerning jurisdiction
ver those resources. The Agreement seeks to accomplish this objective
without prejudice to the legal position maintained by either Govern-
ment with respect to the breadth of the territorial sea or fisheries
iurisdiction under international law.
The major provisions of the Agreement are as follows. The United
tates, in recognition of the lack of adequate information concerning
he potential productivity of shrimp resources off the coast of north-
astern Brazil, agrees to limit the number of its vessels participating
n the exploitation of those resources to 325. The area within which
his limitation will apply is defined as delimited by the 30-meter iso-
Dath, the latitude of 1 degree north and the meridian of 47 degrees
0 minutes west longitude. The United States will limit fishing for
hrimp by its vessels within the area of the Agreement to the period
from March 1 through November 30. In the most southern part of
(V)
Ex. DOC. 92–P
84-955 O – 72 – 2


















VI
the area, southeast of a bearing of 240 degrees to the Ponta do º
radiobeacon, United States vessels will fish for shrimp during th
period March 1 to July 1. Not more than 160 of the vessels authorize
by the United States to fish under the Agreement will operate withi
the area at any one time. Wessels fishing under the Agreement wi
keep records of their operations, and the Parties will exchange info
mation concerning conditions in the fishery. The vessels to be authol
ized by the United States, and the fishing gear and methods whic
they will use, will be essentially the same as those commonly employe
in the fishery hitherto. Under the Agreement, Brazilian shrimp fisher
men will also be under certain specified limitations of types appr
priate to the stage of development of the Brazilian shrimp industr
The Agreement assigns responsibility for enforcement of its term
to the Government of Brazil, for reasons of convenience and economy
and provides that the United States shall pay Brazil $200,000 annuall
for the expenses resulting from enforcement functions, as well as
specified fee for any unusual expenses which Brazil might incur i
carrying out these functions. United States vessels which may b
apprehended by Brazilian authorities in violation of any provisio
of the Agreement are to be turned over promptly to United State
authorities for investigation and for punishment if found guilty.
The Agreement will terminate on January 1, 1974, unless extende
by the Parties. -
The Departments of Commerce and Defense concurred in the sig
nature of the Agreement. Representatives of the United States shrim
fishing industry participated as advisers in the negotiation of th
Agreement, and a broader Sampling of industry opinion subsequentl
has indicated general satisfaction with its terms. The shrimp fishin
industry sectors affected understand that it is the intention of th
Executive Departments concerned to seek legislation to implemen
the Agreement, including a licensing system to be administered b
the Secretary of Commerce by which the major portion of the expens
to the Government under the Agreement will be recovered from th
fishermen. -
I believe that this Agreement will contribute to the conservatio
of the shrimp resources, benefit the United States fishing industr
and prevent disruption of our relations with Brazil, without prejudic
to the position of the United States regarding the breadth of th
territorial Sea or fisheries jurisdiction under international law.
Respectfully submitted.
WILLIAM P. ROGERs.
(Enclosures: Agreement concerning shrimp, with Agreed Minut
and two exchanges of notes relating thereto, and translations o
Brazilian notes.)



GREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL CON-
CERNING SHRIMP . - -
The Parties to this Agreement, . . . . .
Note the position of the Government of the Federative Republic of
razil, . . .
that it considers its territorial sea to extend to a distance of 200 nau-
ical miles from Brazil’s coast, .
that the exploitation of crustaceans and other living resources, which
re closely dependent on the seabed under the Brazilian territorial Sea,
s reserved to Brazilian fishing vessels, and
that exceptions to this provision can only be granted through in-
ernational agreements, * *
Note also the position of the Government of the United States of
merica that it does not consider itself obligated under international
aw to recognize territorial sea claims of more than 3 nautical miles
nor fisheries jurisdiction of more than 12 nautical miles, beyond which
one of jurisdiction all nations have the right to fish freely, and that
t does not consider that all crustaceans are living organisms belonging
o sedentary species as defined in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
'ontinental Shelf, and further -
Recognizing that the difference in the respective juridical positions
f the Parties has given rise to certain problems relating to the conduct
f shrimp fisheries,
Considering the tradition of both Parties for resolving international
ifferences by having recourse to negotiation, &
Believing it is desirable to arrive at an interim solution for the con-
uct of shrimp fisheries without prejudice to either Party's juridical
osition concerning the extent of territorial seas or fisheries jurisdic-
ion under international law,
Concluding that, while general international solutions to issues of
aritime jurisdiction are being sought and until more adequate in-
ormation regarding the shrimp fisheries is available, it is desirable to
onclude an interim agreement which takes into account their mutual
nterest in the conservation of the shrimp resources of the area of this
greement,
Have Agreed as Follows:
ARTICLE I
This Agreement shall apply to the fishery for shrimp (Penaeus (M.)
'uorarum notialis, Penaeus braziliensis and Penaeus (M.) aztecus sub-
iſis) in an area of the broader region in which the shrimp fisheries
f the Parties are conducted, hereinafter referred to as the “area of













, (1)
2
agreement” and defined as follows: the waters off the coast of Brazil
having the isobath of thirty (30) meters as the south-west limit and
the latitude 1° north as the southern limit and 47°30' west longitude
as the eastern limit. -
ARTICLE II
1. Taking into account their common concern with preventing the
depletion of the shrimp stocks in the area of agreement and the sub-
stantial difference in the stages of development of their respective fish-
ing fleets, which results correspondingly in different kinds of impact
on the resources, the two Parties agree that, during the term of this
Agreement, the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil is
to apply the measures set forth in Annex I to this Agreement and the
Government of the United States of America is to apply the measures
Set forth in Annex II to this Agreement.
2. The measures set forth in Annexes may be changed by agreement
of the Parties through consultation pursuant to Article X. -
ARTICLE III
1. Information on catch and effort and biological data relating to
shrimp fisheries in the area of agreement shall be collected and ex-
changed, as appropriate, by the Parties. Unless the Parties decide
otherwise, such exchange of information shall be made in accordance
with the procedure described in this Article.
2. Each vessel fishing under this Agreement shall maintain a fishin
log, according to a commonly agreed model. Such fishing logs shall
be delivered quarterly to the appropriate Party which shall use the
data therein contained, and other information it obtains about th
area of agreement, to prepare reports on the fishing conditions in tha
area, which shall be transmitted periodically to the other Party a
appropriate.
3. Duly appointed organizations from both Parties shall meet in du
time to exchange scientific data, publications and knowledge acquired
On the shrimp fisheries in the area of agreement.
ARTICLE IV
1. The Party which under Article V has the responsibility for en
forcing observance of the terms of the Agreement by vessels of the
other Party's flag shall receive from the latter Party the information
necessary for identification and other enforcement functions, includ
ing name, port of registry, port where operations are usually based
general description with photograph in profile, radio-frequencies by
which communications may be established, main engine horsepowe
and speed, length, and fishing method and gear employed.
2. Such information shall be assembled and organized by the fla
Government and communications relating to such information shal
be carried out each year between the appropriate authorities of th
Parties. -
3. The Party which receives such information shall verify whethe
it is complete and in good order, and shall inform the other Part.

















3
about the vessels found to comply with the requirements of paragraph
1 of this Article, as well as about those which would, for Some reason,
require further consultation among the Parties. -
4. Each of those vessels found in order shall receive and display an
identification sign, agreed between the Parties.
ARTICLE V
1. In view of the fact that Brazilian authorities can carry out an
effective enforcement presence in the area of agreement, it shall be
incumbent on the Government of Brazil to ensure that the conduct
of shrimp fisheries conforms with the provisions of this Agreement.
2. A duly authorized official of Brazil, in exercising the responsi-
bility described in paragraph 1 of this Article may, if he has reason-
able cause to believe that any provision of this Agreement has been
violated, board and search a shrimp fishing vessel. Such action shall
not unduly hinder fishing operations. When, after boarding or board-
ing and searching a vessel, the official continues to have reasonable
cause to believe that any provision of this Agreement has been violated,
he may seize and detain such vessel. In the case of a boarding or seizure
and detention of a United States vessel, the Government of Brazil
shall promptly inform the Government of the United States of its
action.
3. After satisfaction of the terms of Article VI as referred to in
paragraph 4 of this Article, a United States vessel seized and detained
under the terms of this Agreement shall, as Soon as practicable, be
lelivered to an authorized official of the United States at the nearest
port to the place of seizure, or any other place which is mutually
acceptable to the competent authorities of both Parties. The Govern-
ment of Brazil shall, after delivering such vessel to an authorized
official of the United States, provide a certified copy of the full report
of the violation and the circumstances of the seizure and detention.
4. If the reason for seizure and detention falls within the terms of
Article II or Article IV, paragraph 4 of this Agreement, a United
States vessel seized and detained shall be delivered to an authorized
official of the United States, after satisfaction of the terms of Article
WIrelating to unusual expenses.
5. If the nature of the violation warrants it, and after carrying out
the provision of Article X, vessels may also suffer forfeiture of that
part of the catch determined to be taken illegally and forfeiture of the
fishing gear.
6. In the case of vessels delivered to an authorized official of the
United States under paragraphs 3 or 4 of this Article, the Government
of Brazil will be informed of the institution and disposition of any
case by the United States.
ARTICLE VI
In connection with the enforcement arrangements specified in Arti-
cle V, including in particular any unusual expenses incurred in carry-
ing out the seizure and detention of a United States vessel under the
terms of paragraph 4 of Article V, and taking into account Brazil’s
regulation of its flag vessels in the area of agreement, the Government







10
4
of Brazil will be compensated in an amount determined and confirmed
in an exchange of notes between the Parties. The amount of compen-
sation shall be related to the level of fishing by United States nationals
in the area of agreement and to the total enforcement activities to b
undertaken by the Government of Brazil pursuant to the terms of thi
Agreement. - -
ARTICLE VII
The implementation of this Agreement may be reviewed at the re
Quest of either Party six months after the date on which this Agree
ment becomes effective, in order to deal with administrative issue
arising in connection with this Agreement.
ARTICLE VIII
The Parties shall examine the possibilities of cooperating in the
development of their fishing industries; the expansion of the interna:
tional trade of fishery products; the improvement of storage, trans
portation and marketing of fishery products; and the encouragement
of joint ventures between the fishing industries of the two Parties.
ARTICLE IX
Nothing contained in this Agreement shall be interpreted as preju
dicing the position of either Party regarding the matter of territoria
Seas or fisheries jurisdiction under international law.
ARTICLE X
Problems concerning the interpretation and implementation of thi
Agreement shall be resolved through diplomatic channels.
ARTICLE XI
This Agreement shall enter into force on a date to be mutually
agreed by exchange of notes, upon completion of the internal pro
cedures of both Parties, and shall remain in force until January 1, 1974
unless the Parties agree to extend it. -
IN witness whDREOF the undersigned Representatives have signeſ
the present Agreement and affixed thereto their seals.
DONE in duplicate, this ninth day of May, 1972, in the English an
Portuguese languages, both texts being equally authoritative.
For the United States of America:
WILLIAM M. ROUNTREE
For the Federative Republic of Brazil:
MARIO GIBSON BARBOZA
11
Annex I
(a) Prohibition of shrimp fishing activities, for conservation pur-
boses, in spawning and breeding areas;
(b) Prohibition of the use of chemical, toxic or explosive substances
in or near fishing areas;
(c) Registry of all fishing vessels with the Maritime Port Author-
ity (Capitania dos Portos) and with SUDEPE;
(d) Payment of fees and taxes for periodical inspections;
(e) Use of the SUDEPE fishing logs to be returned after each
trip or weekly;
(f) Prohibition of the use of fishing gear and of other equipment
onsidered by SUDEPE to have destructive effects on the stocks;
(g) Prohibition of discharging oil and organic waste.
Annex II
(a) Not more than 325 vessels flying the United States flag shall
fish for shrimp in the area of agreement and the United States Govern-
ment undertakes to maintain a presence of no more than 160 of those
ressels in the area at any one time. Such vessels shall be of the same
type and have the same gear as those commonly employed in this
shery in the past, noting that electric equipment for fishing purposes
as not been commonly employed by boats in this fishery in the past.
(b) Shrimp fishing in the area of agreement shall be limited to
he period from March 1 to November 30.
(c) Shrimp fishing in that part of the area of agreement south-
ast of a bearing of 240° from Ponta do Ceu radio-beacon shall be
imited to the period March 1 to July 1.
(d) Transshipment of catch may be made only between vessels
uthorized under this Agreement to fish in the area of agreement.
(5)








12
AGREED MINUTE RELATING TO THE AGREEMENT BE-
TWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDER-
ATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL CONCERNING SHRIMP
The Delegations of the Government of the United States of Ameri-
ca and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil consider
it desirable to record the points set out below relating to the Agreement
between the two Governments concerning shrimp signed on this ninth
day of May, 1972:
The Brazilian Delegation informed the United States Delegation
that the portion of the area of agreement between the true bearing of
240° and 225°, drawn from the Ponta do Ceu radio-beacon, has a spe-
cial interest to the Brazilian shrimp vessels, in view of its vicinity to
both the port and the industries existing in Belem, State of Para.
Under these circumstances, the Brazilian Delegation informed the
United States Delegation that it was not the intention of the Brazil-
ian Government to re-include such region in agreements it might con-
clude after 1973. -
The United States Delegation stated its view to the Brazilian Dele-
gation that the area of the Agreement between the true bearing of 240°
and 225°, drawn from the Ponta do Ceu radio-beacon, lies on the high
seas and is thus open to fishing by all nations. -
Both the United States and the Brazilian Delegations agreed that,
based on the available information, the expression “of the same type”,
included in item a of Annex II in relation to United States vessels that
have in the past fished in the area of the Agreement, means vessels hav-
ing a length up to approximately eighty-five feet.
With respect to item a of Annex II, both Delegations agreed that an
excess of up to 15 vessels in the area of agreement over the figure
of 160 shall constitute, during the first fishing season of the Agree-
ment, a situation requiring consultations between the Parties within
the scope of Article X with a view toward arriving at as promptly as
possible the agreed figure. In view of the special nature of the arrange-
ments contained in item a of Annex II, both Delegations understand
that consultations referred to in paragraph 2, Article II will be held
as soon after the close of the current fishing season as possible, to
examine the operation of this provision with a view toward revising,
if necessary, the measures outlined in item a of Annex II or revising
the procedures necessary to achieve better compliance with them.
DONE in duplicate, this ninth day of May, 1972, in the English and
Portuguese languages, both texts being equally authoritative.
For the United States of America:
WILLIAM M. Rount REE
For the Federative Republic of Brazil:
MARIO GIBSON BARBOZA
(7)
13
8
EMBAssy. OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Brasilia, May 9, 1972.
No. 150.
His Excellency MARIO GIBSON BARBOZA,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Brasilia.
ExCELLENCY : I have the honor to refer to the Agreement on Shrimp
signed today by the Governments of the Federative Republic of
Brazil and the United States of America and to confirm, on behalf
of my Government, the following:
(a) The Government of the United States of America shall, after
the appropriation of funds by Congress, compensate the Government
of Brazil in an annual amount of U.S. $200,000 (two hundred thou-
sand dollars) pursuant to the terms of Article VI;
(b) The Government of the United States of America shall, after
the appropriation of funds by Congress, further compensate the Gov-
ernment of Brazil in the amount of U.S. $100.00 (one hundred
dollars) for each day a United States flag shrimp fishing vessel is
under the control of Brazilian enforcement authorities pursuant to
the terms of paragraph 2 of Article V.
I have the honor to propose that this Note and Your Excellency’s
reply confirming the above points of understanding on behalf of your
Government shall be regarded as constituting Satisfaction of the terms
of Article VI of the aforementioned Agreement between the two
Governments.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest
consideration.
WILLIAM M. RouxTREE.
[Translation]
DPB/D.AI/DAS/67/562.8(22)
MAY 9, 1972.
His Excellency WILLIAM MANNING ROUNTREE,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotenţiary of the United States
of America.
MR. Axip.Ass ADOR : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of
Your Excellency’s Note dated today, the text of which, translated into
Portuguese, reads as follows:
[The Portuguese translation of Note No. 150 agrees in all substantive
respects with the original English text.]
In reply, I wish to confirm, in the name of the Brazilian Govern-
ment, that the points of understanding mentioned above be considered
as fulfilling the terms of Article VI of the Agreement on Shrimp
signed today by the two Governments.
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the
assurances of my highest consideration.
(S) MARIO GIBSON BARBOzA.
No. 151
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compli-
ments to the Ministry of External Relations of the Federative Repub-
lic of Brazil, and with reference to the Agreement Concerning Shrimp
84–955 O – 72 - 3
14
9
signed on this date, as well as the accompanying exchange of Notes
related to Article VI of that Agreement, has the honor to inform the
Ministry of the following:
Pending the entering into force of the Agreement as provided for in
Article Eleven, the Government of the United States of America is
prepared to make every effort to encourage the voluntary compliance
by its industry of the provisions of the Agreement So as to ensure that
events in the interim period do not prejudice the successful imple-
mentation of those provisions. It is the understanding of the Govern-
ment of the United States of America that the Government of the
Federative Republic of Brazil intends also to abide by the spirit of
the proposed interim Agreement.
Following the entering into force of the Agreement as provided for
in Article Eleven, but prior to the passage of enabling legislation, the
Government of the United States of America proposes to continue its
efforts to encourage voluntary compliance.
In the period between the completion of internal procedures as
noted in Article Eleven and the entering into force of the Agreemen
the Government of the United States of America will seek, inter alia,
with the voluntary cooperation of U.S. flag vessel owners,
1. To achieve the objectives of Article II
2. To institute appropriate Article III procedures
3. To achieve the intent of Articles IV and V.
In stating its willingness to encourage the voluntary compliance
with appropriate provisions of the Agreement so that the intent of
the accord may be achieved while awaiting its entering into force, it
is the understanding of the Government of the United States of Amer-
ica that the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil agrees
that in this same interim period both Parties should have as their ob-
jective the achievement of the intent of the Agreement.
With specific reference to Article III, paragraph 2, the Government
of the United States of America shall treat the information obtained
from individual fishing logs as confidential.
The Embassy takes the opportunity to renew to the Ministry the
assurance of its highest consideration.
W. M. R.
Embassy of the United States of America
Brasilia, May 9, 1972
[Translation]
DPB/DAI/DAS/68/562.8(22)
BRASILIA, May 9, 1972.
The Ministry of Foreign Relations presents its compliments to the
Embassy of the United States of America and has the honor to ac,
knowledge the receipt of the Embassy’s noted dated today, the text of
which, translated into Portuguese, reads as follows:
[The Portuguese translation of Note No. 151 agrees in all substan
tive respects with the original English text.]
2. In reply, the Ministry of Foreign Relations wishes to confirm tha
the understanding, referred to in the penultimate paragraph of th
Embassy’s note, is also that of the Brazilian Government. i


15
10
3. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Relations wishes to declare
that, while awaiting the entry into force of the Agreement, it is the in-
tention of the Brazilian Government to apply its provisions, insofar
as possible, beginning today, So as to ensure that the events in the
interim period do not prejudice the successful implementation of those
provisions. &
4. With specific reference to Article 3, paragraph 2, the Govern-
ment of the Federated Republic of Brazil will treat as confidential the
information obtained from the individual fishing logs.
GIBSON.

16
Senator PELL. Our first witness, Ambassador Donald L. McKernan,
is Coordinator of Ocean Affairs and Special Assistant to the Secretary
of State for Fisheries and Wildlife. He has long been associated with
international fishery affairs and will be testifying on the first two
items on the agenda. He is known to the chairman of this subcommittee
as an exceptionally competent, able and fine man.
Ambassador McKernan.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD L. McKERNAN, AMBASSADOR, CO-
ORDINATOR OF OCEAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AC-
COMPANIED BY WILLIAM TERRY, DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS FOR NOAA, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Mr. McKERNAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pell.
It is certainly a great privilege to appear before you and this com-
mittee this morning on this subject.
My name is Donald L. McKernan. As you have stated, I am
Coordinator of Ocean Affairs in the Department of State and Special
Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Secretary of State.
Also in the room, Mr. Chairman, is Mr. William Terry, who is
Director of International Affairs for NOAA in the Department of
Commerce and who was on the delegation during these negotiations.
For specific questions I am sure he will be pleased to participate in
the questioning, if that appears desirable to the committee.
It is a pleasure to be here today and a privilege to have this op-
portunity of testifying concerning the shrimp agreement with Brazil,
the more so as I had the honor of heading the United States delega-
tion which negotiated the agreement. That delegation included lawyers
from the Departments of State and Defense, technical experts from
the Department of Commerce, and advisers from the shrimp industry.
INCREASING COMPETITION FOR oc EAN’s PROTEIN RESOURCES
The past 2 or 3 decades have been a period of rapidly intensifying
use of the living resources of the sea. Certain of the developed indus-
trial countries, particularly Japan and the Soviet Union, have greatly
expanded their distant-water fishing fleets and have extended the
intensive operations of these fleets to waters off the coasts of many
other nations. At the same time, many of the developing coastal
countries have conceived the ambition to share in the harvest of the
resources lying off their shores and some of them have achieved the
capability to do so. During this period the world production of fish
and other products of living marine resources has risen steadily at a
high rate. Unfortunately, during this same period a number of im-
portant fishery resources have been overexploited and their produc-
º has been seriously impaired, in some cases apparently perma-
nently.
RELATED DEVELOPMENTS IN LAW AND POLITICS OF OCEAN FISHERIES
Against this background of increasing competition for the protein
resources of the ocean, there have been related developments in the
law and politics of ocean fisheries, developments which in Some cases
17
have given rise to serious problems in the relations between nations.
Many coastal countries, including the United States, have attempted
to defend their special interests in the conservation and utilization
of the fishery resources off their coasts by unilaterally claiming juris-
diction over fisheries in adjacent waters beyond the traditional 3-mile
territorial sea.
The breadth of these claims varies widely, however. The trend
toward extensive claims has been particularly pronounced in Latin
America where, beginning with Chile and Peru in 1947, there have
been successive assertions of fishery jurisdiction and full territorial
seas to a distance of 200 nautical miles from shore. At the present
time in South America, only the countries of the north coast—
Colombia, Venezuela, and the Guianas—are still adhering to a more
conservative limit. In addition, five West African countries have
made territorial sea or fisheries jurisdiction claims beyond 12 miles
in the past year and a half.
CONFLICTS BETWEEN COASTAL COUNTRIES AND MARITIME COUNTRIES
These broad extensions of claimed jurisdiction in Latin America
and in other regions of the world have given rise to many conflicts
between the coastal countries and the nations with distant-water
fishing fleets. In general, the maritime nations have not accepted the
broad jurisdictional claims of the coastal countries, not only because
of the economic interests that would be directly affected by the coastal
state's jurisdiction over fishing, but also because of a fear that recog-
nition of that type of jurisdiction would lead to assertions of coastal
state control over other types of activities and eventually to drastic
restrictions on the exercise of traditional high seas freedoms.
By and large, the maritime countries have been willing to try to
resolve these problems by the negotiation of agreements intended to
meet the conservation concerns of the coastal countries. They have
also been willing, though generally somewhat less so, to try to ac-
commodate the real or anticipated problems of coastal states with
developing fisheries in having to compete with Organized modern
distant-water fleets. The coastal states that have made extended
jurisdictional claims have, for the most part, been reluctant to con-
clude negotiated solutions, which they fear may compromise their
national sovereignty.
International fishery disputes of this kind, even when the economic
interests involved are relatively minor, can have serious repercussions
on other, more weighty interests simply because the highly sensitive
issue of sovereignty is in the contest. An example which comes to
mind is the recently renewed cod war between the United Kingdom
and Iceland, which places two NATO allies in postures of conflict.
An even more notorious example is the perennial tuna war between
the United States and Ecuador and Peru, which in the past 20 years
has resulted in the seizure of more than 100 U.S. tuna clippers and
the payment by the U.S. fishermen of nearly $4 million in fines and
fees, eventually repaid by the U.S. Treasury under the Fisherman's
Protective Act.
18
Attempts to deal with this problem by legislation have resulted
in various constraints on our ability to cooperate in economic develop-
ment and defense activities with Ecuador and Peru, have made us
the target of accusations of political and economic coercion, and have
from time to time cast shadows over the future of other American
interests in those countries. Although numerous attempts to negotiate
a settlement of that problem, commencing in 1953, have so far been
unsuccessful, we are still continuing to seek a basis for negotiation
because we see no other satisfactory way out of the impasse in the
near future.
Meanwhile, in the Seabeds Committee of the United Nations, we
are engaged with most of the other nations of the world in prepara-
tions for a general conference on the international law of the sea,
presently scheduled to be held in 1973. It is our hope that the con-
ference will result in general worldwide agreement on the extent of
coastal state jurisdiction over fisheries and other important questions
of the law of the sea which are unsettled and controversial at the
present time. Until such agreement is achieved, we continue to face
the necessity of finding interim bilateral solutions to our foreign
relations problems in this area.
BRAZIL’s CLAIM OF 200-MILE TERRITORIAL SEA
In 1970, this problem in our relations with Latin America suddenly
acquired a new dimension when Brazil, the largest country of South
America and a country with which the United States has long enjoyed
close and friendly relations, joined the regional trend toward extended
jurisdiction in its most extreme form by claiming a territorial sea of
200 miles. It happened that there had been for about 10 years a
thriving shrimp fishery carried on by a large fleet of U.S.-flag vessels,
based on U.S.-owned shrimp processing plants in the Guianas,
Trinidad, and for a time in Barbados, and operating on the high seas
along the shoulder of northeastern South America as far as the mouth
of the Amazon.
The processing and exporting industry based on this fishery repre-
sents a considerable investment of U.S. capital and an important
Source of local employment in Guyana, Surinam, and French Guiana;
and the annual value of the catch to the U.S. vessel operators is in the
neighborhood of $30 million.
The part of the fishing grounds which lies off Brazil is entirely
within 200 miles of the coast and thus in the territorial sea by Brazilian
reckoning and entirely beyond 12 miles from shore and, therefore,
On the free, high seas, according to the U.S. view.
In 1971, the Government of Brazil issued a fishery decree to regulate
fishing within the claimed 200-mile territorial sea. The decree is
Severely exclusive as regards operations of non-Brazilian vessels,
and the penalty provided for violations appeared to be incarceration
rather than the monetary penalties for which the Fishermen's Protec-
tive Act had provided a remedy in the Pacific tuna fishery situation.
Active patroling of the fishing grounds by the Brazilian Navy
began in the summer of 1971, and the stage seemed set for a shrimp
19
war potentially even more damaging to our foreign relations than our
troubles in the tuna fishery. Our Congress began to look with an eye to
reprisal at legislation affecting Brazil's interests.
PROBLEMS FA CING U.S. AND BIFAZILIAN DELEGATIONS
Fortunately, both Governments had from the beginning of the
problem shown a willingness to get together to discuss its effects and
possible solutions, and the Brazilian fishery decree itself contained
the saving clause that any of its provisions could be set aside by
international agreement.
When the delegations of the two Governments met at Brasilia in
October 1971, to begin their search for a way of avoiding a con-
frontation over the issue, we were faced with two general problems:
We had to find a formula that would not harm the juridical positions
of the Governments on jurisdiction, which were of great importance
to each of them, and which likewise would not weaken the negotiating
position of either Government in the preparations for the 1973 Law
of the Sea Conference.
Within these constraints, practical answers had to be found to the
very real and present concerns of both sides in the shrimp fishery
situation. From the U.S. point of view, it was important to maintain
access on reasonable terms for our fishermen to a resource which
they had developed and to protect indirectly the right of Americans
to engage in other high seas fisheries. A failure to protect this American
economic interest would inevitably have domestic political con-
sequences detrimental to our relations with Brazil and with Latin
America generally.
From the Brazilian point of view, the problem seemed to be one of
insuring that a resource of interest to the Brazilian fishing industry,
which the Government of Brazil was strongly committed to develop,
would not be overexploited and destroyed, and that the competition
for the harvest from that resource would not be so overwhelmingly
competitive that the fledgling Brazilian shrimp industry could never
get firmly on its feet.
The agreement signed at Brasilia on May 9 of this year and which
we are considering, is the result of the joint search by the two Govern-
ments for a formula which would meet the needs described above. I
believe that it satisfactorily protects the fishery interests of both coun-
tries in the particular situation of the shrimp fishery off northeastern
Brazil, and that it also successfully avoids prejudice, both in form and
and in fact, to the juridical positions of both parties.
PREAMBLE OF A GREEMENT
Although the agreement is rather complex in organization, consist-
ing, in addition to the body of the agreement, two annexes, an agreed
minute, and two exchanges of diplomatic notes, its content can be
summarized simply as follows: The preamble briefly sets forth the
differing positions of the parties on jurisdiction, notes their desire to
find an interim solution without prejudice to those positions, and refers
20
to their mutual interest in the conservation of the shrimp resources in
the area of the agreement. That interest is the basis for most of what
follows, for this is essentially a conservation agreement. The reserva-
tion of juridical positions is made again specifically in article 9 and at
other appropriate points in the documents which make up the agree-
ment.
CONSERVATION: SPECIES, AREA, AND MEASURES
As a conservation agreement, the instrument identifies the species
to be conserved, the area within which conservation measures are to
apply, and, in the annexes, the specific conservation measures which
each country will apply to its fishermen.
The area is defined so as to include all of the major grounds fished
by U.S. vessels and in a way which does not coincide with jurisdic-
tional limits as they would be drawn by either side. It will be noted
that the conservation measures to be applied by the two Governments
are of a different nature. The reason for this difference lies in the dif-
ferent state of development of the two countries’ shrimp fisheries, the
Brazilian shrimp fleet being in an incipient stage of development in
which its foreseeable growth during the term of the agreement seems
to pose no threat of overexploitation of the shrimp resource.
The United States, which has the potential of introducing hundreds
of additional trawlers to the fishery, undertakes to restrict the number
of its vessels and to authorize only vessels of the traditional size and
type to engage in the fishery. The United States also undertakes to
authorize its vessels to fish in the area only during a specified open
S68,SOIl.
As is appropriate in an agreement of this kind, the parties agree
to collect and exchange information on shrimp fishing and biological
data on shrimp in the area and, specifically, to have their fishermen
keep operational logbooks according to an agreed form. The agreement
also provides for meetings between appropriate organizations of the
two Governments to exchange Scientific data and information on the
shrimp fishery.
ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS
The provisions concerned with the enforcement of the agreement
have received prominent treatment for reasons which should be
apparent. The enforcement function—including patrol, inspection,
boarding, and searching—is assigned to Brazil for the reason that
Brazil is the only party which has suitable vessels and officials in the
area at all times.
In order to facilitate the execution of this function by Brazilian
authorities, the United States undertakes to furnish pertinent infor-
mation for the identification of U.S. vessels which have been author-
ized by the United States to fish in the area of the agreement and to
have such vessels carry an agreed identification sign. If a duly author-
ized Brazilian enforcement officer finds a U.S. vessel in violation of
the agreement, he may seize and detain the vessel, in which case the
vessel shall be delivered as soon as practicable to an authorized
official of the United States at the nearest port or other mutually
21
agreed place. The United States must inform the Government of
Brazil of the disposition which it makes of any such case of a violation
of the agreement.
The agreement provides that the United States shall pay Brazil
the sum of $200,000 annually toward the costs of the enforcement
functions which Brazil will perform with respect to U.S. vessels.
In addition, in case of seizure and detention of a violator, there will
be a special payment of $100 per day to defray the unusual expenses
while the vessel is in Brazilian custody. It is expected that a major
portion of this cost to the United States can be covered by license fees
to be paid to the United States by the vessel operators, in the event
that the Congress enacts legislation now being drafted to establish
a licensing system for the U.S. high-seas shrimp fishery in the area
of agreement.
VOLUNTARY COOPERATION BY FISHING INDUSTRY
In one of the diplomatic notes which form part of the agreement,
the United States undertakes to enlist the cooperation of the fishing
industry in order to place certain provisions of the agreement in
operation on a voluntary basis pending ratification and the enactment
of implementing legislation. This voluntary cooperation by the
industry is already well underway. More than 170 shrimp boats
have been issued provisional identification numbers for display, and
their owners have furnished the identifying information called for by
the agreement for transmission to the Government of Brazil.
An even more concrete indication of the industry’s willingness to
operate under the terms of the agreement is seen in the fact that the
operators of these vessels have posted substantial financial deposits in
special accounts earmarked for payment of eventual United States
license fees.
BRIEF TERM OF A GREEMENT
The agreement is to enter into force on an agreed date after ratifica-
tion by both parties and is to remain in force until January 1, 1974,
unless the parties agree to extend it. This brief term bespeaks the
interim nature of the agreement and reflects the parties’ understanding
of the fact, which is noted in the preamble, that general international
solutions to issues of maritime jurisdiction are being actively sought
at the present time.
BENEFICIAL EFFECTS DEMONSTRATED BY AGREEMENT
In the months since it was signed, with the voluntary cooperation
of the shrimp fishing industry, the agreement has already demonstrated
beneficial effects. The fishermen are enjoying trouble free access to
their accustomed fishing grounds and the jurisdictional issue has not
disturbed relations between the United States and Brazil. Further-
more, in my estimation, the satisfactory resolution of this bilateral
issue has contributed to an improved negotiating atmosphere in the
preparations for the Law of the Sea Conference. I hope that the com-
84-955 O – 72 – 4
22
mittee will decide to recommend that the Senate advise and consent
to the ratification of the agreement, not only because of its demon-
strated value for assisting our relations with Brazil without adversely
affecting other important United States interests, but also because I
believe that this agreement can serve as a model for developing
practical interim solutions to similar international fishery problems
ºn coastal and distant-water fishing nations elsewhere in the
WOI’IOI.
I thank you for having given me the opportunity to testify on this
agreement. -
I will be glad to answer any questions.
Senator PELL. Thank you very much indeed. I don’t think I have
ever looked forward to a day of hearings as much as this one with the
Northwestern Atlantic fisheries involved, and then my alma mater, the
Coast Guard.
I think we ought to keep these different problems divided up; so I
will go through the shrimp fishery one first and then move on into the
part that interests me particularly, the waters off Rhode Island,
which are covered by the next agreement.
WHY SHRIMP ARE NOT CONSIDERED CRIEATURES OF SHIELF
To clear my own thinking, shrimp are not considered creatures of
the Continental Shelf; is that correct? -
Mr. McKERNAN. That is correct.
Senator PELL. Because they hop and skip through the water they
are considered as fish. .
Mr. McKERNAN. Yes; in fact, these crustaceans frequently swi
in the water and spend considerable time off the bottom; a sub
stantial amount of their every day in the waters is off the bottom.
Senator PELL. But a portion of their life cycle is spent for a tim
on the bottom.
Mr. McKERNAN. The early part of their life cycle, of course, i
as part of the plankton when they are larvae. As they grow older the
spend perhaps more and more time on the bottom, but even in th
latter stages of their life they are found considerably—in considerabl
portions of the day, feeding above the bottom. In fact, it is our belie
that these stocks of shrimp, Senator, migrate rather large distances
migrate to the north and west as they grow older, so that this fisher
starts off the coast, pretty much off the Amazon River or just nort
of it, well offshore, when the shrimp are small and then the shrimp
this body of shrimp—seems to migrate north and west along the coas
later in the year, when the fishery operates primarily off Guyana
Senator PELL. What is the greatest distance above the shelf tha
shrimp have been found free swimming?
Mr. McKERNAN. I think occasionally shrimp are found very nea
the surface and sometimes these bodies of shrimp, to the best of my
knowledge, are found perhaps even 10 or 20 fathoms above the bottom
Senator PELL. Thank you.



















23
AGREEMENT'S EFFECT ON AQUACULTURE
Eventually, I am sure you will agree with me, we will farm fish,
particularly shrimp. Instead of hunting them we will grow them, just
as we don’t get our game for eating purposes through hunting licenses;
but through farming. This kind of an agreement would then become
academic.
Do you feel that this agreement in any way is pushing our industry
in the wrong direction of concentration of hunting fish instead of
doing what we should be doing under my Sea Grant College Act,
where we are trying to develop fields of shrimp, feeding them, and
increasing their productivity maybe fiftyfold in a hectare of water
space?
Mr. McKERNAN. No; I don’t see that this will inhibit the develop-
ment of aquaculture in shrimp along the lines you have long advocated
and along the lines the Sea Grant Program is now implementing.
Senator PELL. You have a good program in Miami?
Mr. McKERNAN. Right. There has even been some test marketing
of shrimp. They are still very expensive and some of these natural
beds of shrimp will probably continue to produce economically for a
considerable time, but shrimp is a good example of a species that
obviously lends itself to aquaculture since it tends to be almost a
gourmet type of food and undoubtedly shrimp farming will come into
greater and greater prominence as the years go by.
Senator PELL. We have so many questions, but I will be as brief
as I can. -
VALUE OF SHRIMP FISHERIES
The value of the shrimp fishery off Brazil is how much, again? You
mentioned it before.
Mr. McKERNAN. About $30 million.
(The following information was subsequently supplied:)
VALUE OF U.S. SHRIMP FISHERY OFF BRAZIL
(Supplied by Department of State)
The value of the whole fishery off the Guianas and Brazil is about $30 million,
of which we estimate from one-half to two-thirds is taken off Brazil.
Senator PELL. How much off Mexico?
Mr. McKERNAN. I think that the shrimp fishery off Mexico by
the United States is smaller. If you will permit me, I will try to get
the specific figure and insert it for the record.
(The information referred to follows:)
VALUE OF U.S. SHRIMP FISHERY OFF MExico
(Supplied by Department of State)
It is estimated at about $10 million.
AGREEMENT WITH MEXICO
Senator PELL. Has there been any thought given to a similar
agreement with Mexico?...Why isn't one being negotiated there?
That is even closer to our interest?
24
Mr. McKERNAN. We have a bilateral agreement with Mexico, not
precisely of the same nature, because Mexico has not asserted the
broad jurisdiction off its coast as has Brazil; but there is a bilateral
agreement with Mexico which, incidentally, expires at the end of
this year. It has been in effect for 5 years and it has provided for
quite good cooperation between ourselves and Mexico and the resolu-
tion .# a problem which, while not so acute as the problem off Brazil,
could have been rather serious in our relations with Mexico.
QUESTION OF CREEPING JURISDICTION
Senator PELL. What is the position of our Navy on this question?
I have always understood and agreed with the Navy’s view that the
territorial limits and the control over the waters, the seabeds, and
the water columns above, should be as narrow as possible. The ques-
tion of creeping jurisdiction is one which, as you know, is a very real
danger. - -
What is the view of the Navy on this agreement?
Mr. McKERNAN. The Department of Defense has agreed and has
approved this agreement. In fact, there were two Department of
Defense members of the delegation that negotiated this agreement,
and they were active in its negotiation and very cooperative and
helpful. I think the Department of Defense has wanted to make
certain, as we did, that we did not prejudice our law-of-the-sea
position. At the same time, of course, they see the advantage in
resolving these kinds of issues so that we can perhaps more closely
cooperate with Latin American countries in the law-of-the-sea issues.
Senator PELL. Would you submit for the record a memo from the
executive branch as to why the Defense Department does not feel
that this goes against its position concerning creeping jurisdiction?
Mr. McKERNAN. Yes; I will submit it.
Senator PELL. Thank you. I don’t expect you to draft it, obviously.
It should be a DOD memo.
(The information referred to follows:)
QUESTION of CREEPING JURISDICTION IN AGREEMENT WITH BRAZIL
CoNCERNING SHRIMP
(Supplied by Department of Defense)
The Department of Defense participated actively in the negotiations which led
up to the Agreement, and is confident that the text ultimately signed protects its
juridical position in the law of the sea matters and does not prejudice the US
negotiating positions with respect to the forthcoming law of the sea conference.
In addition to the fact that the Agreement itself contains expressed reserva-
tions preserving differing juridical positions, the form and substance of the balance
# the Agreement precludes its characterization as an example of creeping juris-
iction. -
The Agreement is, first of all, a conservation agreement imposing bilateral
regulation on the exploitation of a high seas fishery. It applies only to an area of
the high seas which is not coterminous with Brazil’s claimed 200-mile territorial
ºrhus. no recognition of Brazil’s territorial claims is either expressed or im-
p11ed.
Other features of the Agreement support the same interpretation. For reasons
of economy and convenience, some enforcement functions under the Agreement
are delegated by the United States to Brazil, and the stipulated financial re-
25
muneration to be paid to Brazil is in the nature of compensation for additional
expenses incurred by Brazil in the exercise of these delegated enforcement func-
tions. The Agreement does not subject US vessels to domestic Brazilian fisheries
regulations, and sanctions will be imposed on US flag vessels for violation of the
terms of the Agreement only pursuant to US administrative or judicial proceed-
IngS.
The Agreement further provides for the collection and exchange of catch and
effort data regarding the fishery with a view toward facilitating the efficient
management thereof. Finally, the fishing seasons and level of fishing effort per-
missible for US flag vessels under the Agreement correspond closely to past and
present practices of US fishermen in the exploitation of this fishery.
LIMITATION OF FISHING BOATS
Senator PELL. In connection with the limitation of the boats, why
do you do it only by numbers? I would think the next step would be
that we will someday build larger fishing boats than we do now, either
by getting rid of that 1790 law that you can only buy boats within
the United States, or with some kind of Government subsidy. We
would then be able to violate the intent of the agreement by doing as
the Soviets do, sort of vacuuming these areas.
Mr. McKERNAN. There are two points about that. In the first place,
the agreement does provide that the vessels fishing in the area will be
the type that have been fishing; in other words, the United States
cannot under the terms of the agreement introduce entirely new
kinds of vessels or sizes of vessels; they must
Senator PELL. Is the length specified?
Mr. McKERNAN. The length, the general length, the upper limit is
specified; it is generally understood that the vessels will be the same
length that had been operating in the area; and, secondly, of course, it
is a relatively short-term agreement; it is for 2 years.
Senator PELL. I didn’t read the agreement as carefully as I should,
but my recollection is that the overall length is not specified in the
provisions of the agreement.
Mr. McKERNAN. I think the overall length is specified. I think
perhaps I can read this, if I can find it in my notes.
The size of the vessel—it is specified I am told by my colleague,
Mr. Van Campen—is specified as 85 feet.
Senator PELL. It is actually written within the terms of the agree-
ment?
Mr. McKERNAN. Yes.
NONREFEREAL OF MEXICAN AGREEMENT TO SENATE
Senator PELL. Incidentally, returning to the Mexican agreement
for a moment, I don’t recall that it was referred to the Senate for
advice and consent. I am delighted that this agreement is being
referred for advice and consent of the Senate. Why was the Mexican
agreement not referred to the Senate for advice and consent, if it was
a similar agreement?
Mr. McKERNAN. It is not that similar, Senator; this agreement does
require implementing legislation and appropriations from Congress;
and, after consultation with members of this committee and staff
26
members, the counsel of this committee, the executive department
decided that it would be wise to bring the United States-Brazil agree-
ment up for your consideration for advice and consent.
WISDOM OF REFERRING RENEGOTIATED MEXICAN AGREEMENT
TO SENATE
Senator PELL. Do you think it would be wise also to bring the
renegotiated Mexican agreement, which expires this year, up to us
for advice and consent?
Mr. McKERNAN. If it requires implementing legislation. By the
way, it did not require additional implementing legislation; and in
the judgment of our legal officer, it was more of the type normally
considered to be an executive agreement than this one. But if we
renegotiate that agreement, and it also requires implementing legisla-
. why, it seems to me, that it would be wise to bring it before you
8,1SO.
Senator PELL. My own view, as an individual Member of this body,
is that whether an agreement should be referred to the Senate for
advice and consent is not determined by whether enabling legislation
is needed, but by whether it involves the foreign relations of the
United States. But this would be up to subsequent discussions.
Mr. McKERNAN. I understand there is a running disagreement
between the executive and the legislative branches.
Senator PELL. My own view would be that the Mexican agreement
should come to us for probably not a very arduous hearing, but
should come to us for advice and consent.
Mr. McKERNAN. I will make certain those views are made known
to our department, Senator.
Senator PELL. Thank you.
DEFINITION OF COASTAL STOCK
How does the United States define coastal stock? In other words,
are the shrimp off the northern coast of Brazil coastal stock? How far
are they from the shoreline when found?
Mr. McKERNAN. We would think in the first place that shrimp
themselves, except perhaps some unusual pelagic species, are a species
of marine animal which do inhabit the coastal areas, the Continental
Shelf areas, the shallow areas lying off the coastal countries; and the
productive areas of the world for shrimp are relatively shallow, coastal
areas, and so shrimp clearly is one of the species that is indentified
with coastal areas of the planet.
Senator PELL. But my question is, how far is the maximum offshore?
Mr. McKERNAN. Well, as far as the Continental Shelf extends,
really, and, of course, in the case of the Patagonian Shelf, this extends
very great distances, even well beyond 200 miles.
In the case of Brazil, the shrimp are found in substantial quantities,
economic quantities, apparently at depths on the order of 15 or 20
fathoms and perhaps from 40, 50 miles offshore to perhaps 100 miles
offshore. -
27
OTHER FLAG FISHING WIESSELS OFF BRAZIL
Senator PELL. What flag fishing vessels are there off Brazil other
than our own? Are the Japanese active?
Mr. McKERNAN. The Japanese have vessels in the area.
Senator PELL. Do they have an agreement with Brazil?
Mr. McKERNAN. They are—I am not certain of the stage of their
negotiations; I think they are planning on or attempting to negotiate
an agreement. There are also vessels from Trinidad-Tobago, Surinam,
French Guiana, and Guyana—flag vessels of those countries.
T.S. PORTION OF FOREIGN SHIFIMP FISHING FLEET
Senator PELL. What portion of the foreign shrimp fishing fleet is
made up of American-flag vessels?
Mr. McKERNAN. In the order of, perhaps, 80 percent or so.
Senator PELL. It is that large?
Mr. McKERNAN. A very large percentage; yes.
Senator PELL. I can see the merits of this agreement.
AGREEMENT's CONSISTENCY WITH U.S. SPECIES APPROACH
Doesn’t this agreement also run against, however, the species ap-
proach that we are trying to push in the Law of the Sea Conference?
Mr. McKERNAN. No; we think it is quite consistent with our ap-
proach and in the case of developing fisheries we expect to provide
some preference for the State and here there are some preferences, as I
stated in my statement, which do reflect our willingness to allow the
development of fisheries in developing country situations.
ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENT
Senator PELL. In view of the relatively small size of the Brazilian
Navy and the large size of the area covered by this Agreement, how do
we expect it to really be enforced?
Mr. McKERNAN. The shrimp grounds tend to be concentrated,
Senator; so there are, perhaps, a half dozen or so favorite areas of high
productivity of shrimp where the shrimp tend to congregate, perhaps
for reasons of the productivity of these areas, and so it is not impossible
for the Brazilians with the patrol vessels available to them to keep a
reasonable control. -
The United States through its planned licensing system in coopera-
tion with its industry will do its best to cooperate and make certain
that violations of the Agreement do not occur.
EFFECT OF A GREEMENT ON OTHER NATIONS
Senator PELL. Do you think that the Agreement will act as an incen-
tive for other nations to extend their territorial fisheries jurisdiction to
200 miles and to establish licensing fees?
Mr. McKERNAN. No; this was one of the problems, of course, in
negotiating such an agreement, but it is our feeling that this Agreement
28
is beneficial to both sides and, perhaps, even will act as an inhibitor to
other nations, since it does provide a resolution of Brazil's problems to
Some extent as well as our own—that is, it does allow for an increase of
the Small developing fisheries of Brazil. There are arguments on both
sides, but on balance, in my judgment, it would not have that effect.
Senator PELL. You don’t think it would give heart to Peru when
it kidnaps our tuna fishing boats there?
Mr. McKERNAN. No; quite the contrary. We would hope that the
west coast Latin American countries would examine this type of
agreement carefully and that it might provide a basis for some resolu-
tion of that problem as well.
POSSIBILITY OF FEE PAID TO BEAZIL. GOING UP
Senator PELL. The agreement requires us to pay Brazil about
$200,000 a year and terminates in 1974. If the Law of the Sea Con-
ference, which is scheduled for 1974, slops over into 1975, as it looks
as if it is going to do now, do you assume on a temporary basis the
fee would go up?
Mr. McKERNAN. Well, I hope it wouldn’t go up and, furthermore,
I hope that the Law of the Sea Conference will at least be concluded
by the end of 1974, but in any case, obviously, there will be negotia-
tions on the terms of this Agreement and I would hope that we would
have built up a solid basis for cooperation with Brazil which will have
proven to be beneficial to both nations. I think this is possible and I
am certainly hopeful of it.
ENABLING LIEGISLATION ISSUES AND WIOLATION PIENALITIES
Senator PELL. Finally, with what issues will the enabling legisla-
tion, which you mentioned earlier as being necessary, deal; and what
are the penalties considered for violation of that Agreement?
Mr. McKERNAN. The penalties that will be considered will be
consistent with the penalties assessed against violators of other
fishery agreements and domestic legislation and, of course, as you have
intimated, the enabling legislation does take up the question of penal-
ties and violations and actions by U.S. courts in the cases of violations
of this Agreement.
The other major two points that are covered by the implementing
legislation involve the U.S. licensing of these vessels so we can have
control over the vessels entering the Agreement area.
Finally, of course, is that the Agreement does have a large element of
conservation in it and this provides for insisting that adequate infor-
mation and data are gathered and given to the U.S. Government so
we can exchange it with the Brazilian Government. Thus, both sides
will know what is going on and we would be able to assess the effect
of both fisheries, fisheries by Brazil as well as the United States, on
the stocks within the area. We will be able to contribute greatly to the
knowledge of these stocks which, by the way, in our judgment, Brazil
29
had very little knowledge of before and so did we for that matter, but
we had more than they did.
SUBMISSION OF IMPLEMENTING LIEGISLATION
Senator PELL. When do you expect this implementing legislation
to be submitted?
Mr. McKERNAN. I believe it is about ready for submission at the
present time. It is still within the executive branch, but it is just about
ready to come before Congress.
Senator PELL. Good.
All right; thank you very much. That concludes the questions on the
shrimp fisheries.
STATEMENT OF NATIONAL SHRIMP CONGRESS, INC.
Before we proceed to the next item on the agenda, I will insert in
the record at this point a statement from the National Shrimp Con-
gress, Inc., dated September 22, 1972.
(The information referred to follows:)
STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL SHRIMP Con GRESS, INC.
STATEMENT FOR THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE,
|UNITED STATES-BFAZIL. SHRIMP TREATY
The United States shrimp industry, represented by the National Shrimp
Congress, urges favorable action by the Senate leading to ratification of the
proposed agreement between United States of America and Brazil covering the
shrimp fishery in the waters adjacent to the Brazilian coast in the Atlantic Ocean.
It was the shrimp industry that requested the Department of State to enter
into negotiations with the Brazilian Government seeking a resolution to a fishery
problem that might otherwise have deteriorated into a situation greatly adverse
to the interests of United States fishermen. During the course of negotiations the
shrimp industry was represented on the U.S. delegation on a day to day basis
and it is believed that the results attained were the best possible under the unusual
circumstances of the different positions of the two countries with regard to their
juridical interpretation of the Territorial Sea. This entailed very careful treatment
of the international legal questions presented, not only because of the matters
pending between these two countries but also because of impending meetings
under auspices of United Nations of committees seeking to program a new
conference on Law of the Sea which was originally scheduled for the year 1973 and
which now seems likely to occur in 1974.
The shrimp fishery of the Gulf of Mexico and South Atlantic is an integrated
and complex fishery. There exists a certain percentage of smaller vessels which
harvest shrimp close to their home ports and which generally are not capable of
making extended voyages. The larger investment in vessels is in the type which is
more far ranging and which vessels have the option of fishing domestic waters
during the height of the season or of deploying to distant waters when the local
supply is reduced. Mobility is the essence of success, as, for example, the Season
off the coast of Texas is generally from June to November, whereas the season
off the Tortugas in Florida is generally from December to May.
To maintain a fishery in the Guianas it also occurs that for a part of the year
shrimp are plentiful, while during another part of the year they are mostly to be
found off the coast of Brazil. Thus, for these detached vessels to be economically
and usefully employed it is almost essential that they be able to harvest shrimp
for some eleven months out of the year, as a vessel tied up to the wharf is not
only nonproductive, but is costly to maintain. It can be said that without the use
of the “Brazilian” fishery it would not be economically feasible to maintain the
U.S. shrimp fishing fleet which operates from Guyana, Surinam, Trinidad, Tobago
and French Guiana, etc.
84-955 O - 72 - 5
30
The extensive pink fishery off the north coast of South America was first dis-
covered by a United States Government vessel, the OREGON. Subsequently a
few adventurous Americans started shrimp fishing operations with primitive boat
and supply facilities in the Guianas. The respective governments of the Guianas
were happy and are still happy to receive the U.S. vessels as the development of
the shrimp fishery led to the building of permanent supply and processing facilities
in those nations, giving employment to many of their people and assisting their
economies. Thereafter, as the fisheries grew, vessels ranging from those ports
found additional beds of shrimp well off the Brazilian coast, apparently having
the benefit of an ecology caused by the Amazon River emptying into the Atlantic.
The U.S. shrimp fleet built up to about 350 vessels and there are also in the area.
other shrimping vessels under the Japanese and Cuban flags. The U.S. effort was
thus competitive and from the beginning and even at the present time the U.S.
vessels have maintained high production ratios and have survived the competition.
When Brazil declared a 200 mile limit there was great apprehension among the
U.S. shrimp fishing fleet in that area because it was understood that the domestic
law of Brazil contained severe punishments for vessels and their crews who might
violate such domestic laws. For a while, Brazilian Naval vessels hovered near
United States shrimp vessels and it did appear that there was a great risk of
international incidents which would certainly be detrimental to both nations.
This was the incentive that spurred the talks between United States and Brazil
to ease a potentially irritating situation by entering into a treaty.
Commercial fishing vessels have rather rude facilities and few college gradu-
ates as masters so that except for the exploratory trips of the USS OREGON
and some fragmentary information, the potential of this fishery was not really
known. One of the requests made by the Brazilians was the keeping of suitable
log books to determine, as nearly as possible, the effort required to harvest the
shrimp and the particular areas which were most productive, month by month.
Such facts are the minimum required for a proper management of a fishery and
the request was quite reasonable and was agreed to.
Another matter negotiated was the proper identification of U.S. vessels, as it
appears that there is a great deal of Smuggling going on in the area, although our
shrimp vessels are not accused of participating in this activity. -
The most reasonable enforcement agreement is also contained in this proposed
treaty. It would cost a huge amount to maintain U.S. enforcement vessels in the
area and it is reasonable for Brazil to have the enforcement responsibility and
for the United States to make a contribution toward the cost of such enforce-
ment. The American fisherman is protected by the agreement to deliver the
fisherman, if apprehended in violation of the treaty, to U.S. authorities and we
hope that the enabling legislation which would follow the ratification of this
proposed treaty would contain suitable penalty provisions to deal with Such
violators.
It is noted in passing that it has not been possible to reach any reasonable agree-
ments with those nations on the west coast of South America with whom our tuna
fleet has had recurrent problems. We have been able to reach working agreements
with Mexico, for example, and since the friction that can be created in such mat-
ters is of such nature that serious consequences can flow therefrom it is considered
that where nations in good faith are able to iron out differences and make accomo-
dations we should earnestly seek to abide by such agreements and live at peace
with our neighbors.
For the foregoing and many other reasons it is urged that the committee’s re-
port be favorable and that it thereafter should assert such leadership in the Senate
as to obtain the proper ratification at an early date, as worldwide international
fishery matters are now under critical discussion and review.
WILLIAM R. NEBLETT,
Eacecutive Director.
Senator PELL. Now, if you could move on to the protocol to the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention.
(The protocol referred to follows:)
31
92D CONGRESS EXECUTIVE
1st Session } SENATE { C
PROTOCOL TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
FOR THE NORTHWEST ATLANTIC FISHERIES
RELATING TO AMENDMENTS TO
THE CONVENTION
MESSAGE
FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING
THE PROTOCOL TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONVEN-
TION FOR THE NORTHWEST ATLANTIC FISHERIES
RELATING TO AMENDMENTS TO THE CONVENTION,
DATED OCTOBER 6, 1970
MAY 11, 1971.-Protocol was read the first time and, together with
the message and accompanying papers, was referred to the
Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be
printed for use of the Senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1971

32
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
THE WHITE Hous E, May 11, 1971.
To the Senate of the United States:
With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to
ratification, I transmit herewith a certified copy of the Protocol
to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Relating to Amendments to the Convention, dated October 6, 1970.
I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report by
the Secretary of State with respect to the Protocol.
The 1949 International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries contains no provisions for its amendment. Nevertheless, it
has been found necessary to amend the Convention six times during
the past 16 years and other amendments have been considered.
Though every amendment adopted by the Commission which was
established by the Convention has eventually entered into force, with
the exception of one that is pending, these changes have generally
been accomplished by means of treaties requiring approval by all
parties to the Convention. -
A more expeditious method of amending the Convention was
considered desirable, and the United States, as Depositary Govern-
ment, was requested in 1969 to examine this matter. Accordingly,
the United States prepared a draft Protocol and submitted it to the
1970 Annual Meeting of the Commission. The Commission amended
this proposal to simplify its procedures, which are described in the
report by the Secretary of State, and adopted it without opposition.
It is hoped that this Protocol would overcome problems which have
been encountered in securing ratification from Governments which
have not objected to amendments but which for one reason or another
have been slow in taking action on them.
Since a significant proportion of the area to which the Convention
applies lies off our coast, and because it is important to our fishermen
and to the entire nation that the International Convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries operate as effectively as possible, I
recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration
to the ratification of this Protocol.
RICHARD NIxoN.
(Enclosures: (1) Report of the Secretary of State. (2) Protocol to
the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Relating to Amendments to the Convention.)
(III)
Ex. Rept. 92–C
33
LETTER OF SUBMITTAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
- Washington, March 23, 1971.
The PRESIDENT
The White House.
THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you a certified
copy of the Protocol to the International Convention for the North-
west Atlantic Fisheries Relating to Amendments to the Convention.
The Protocol is dated October 6, 1970 and was open for signature at
Washington from October 6, 1970 through October 20, 1970 on behalf
of the 15 Governments parties to the 1949 International Convention
for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (1 UST 477; TIAS 2089).
During that period it was signed by all of those Governments, in-
cluding the Government of the United States of America, except
the Governments of Canada and Japan. The latter Governments
may adhere to the Protocol.
I recommend that the Protocol be transmitted to the Senate for
advice and consent to ratification. -
The 1949 Convention has as its purpose the investigation, protec-
tion, and conservation of the fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic
Ocean. It establishes the International Commission for the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries, in which each Contracting Government has one
vote and to which each Contracting Government may appoint not
more than three Commissioners. The Northwest Atlantic area to
which the Convention applies is divided into five subareas established
more or less on the basis of geographical and biological considerations,
the boundaries of which are defined in the Annex to the Convention.
In addition, there is a Panel for seals which is not delineated geo-
graphically. Each subarea has a special panel of Commissioners from
countries which participate in the fisheries of the subarea concerned
or which are geographically adjacent thereto and a similar panel
for seals.
Numerous conservation measures have been adopted over the
years. Future measures are under consideration and are expected to
be proposed at subsequent Annual Meetings of the Commission.
Virtually all major fisheries in the Convention area are now subject
to regulation and others are expected to be brought under regulation
in the near future. Many of the fisheries in the Convention area are
of substantial importance to the American fishing industry in New
England and to this nation. Accordingly, it is important to the United
States to ensure that the Convention is up-to-date at all times so
that appropriate measures can be taken to conserve the fisheries of
º Northwest Atlantic Ocean and to protect American interest
thereln. ~,
The Convention, as formulated in 1949 and as it exists today,
contains no provision for amendment. Nevertheless, amendments
(W)
Ex. Rept. 92–C
34
VI
have been found to be necessary by the Commission and were proposed
at the 1955, 1958, 1961, 1963, 1964 and 1969 Annual Meetings.
All of these amendments have now entered into force except the one
proposed at the 1969 Annual Meeting which is still pending. All of the
amendments were accomplished by means of treaties requiring affirma-
tive action by all of the Contracting Governments. At the 1969
Annual Meeting the view was expressed that a more expeditious
manner of amending the Convention was desirable and the United
States, as Depositary Government, was requested to look into the
matter. After thorough study, the United States proposed a Protocol,
which, with a few changes, was adopted by the Commission at its
Annual Meeting of June 1970, and was subsequently opened for
signature. . .
Under the procedure set forth in the Protocol, proposed amend-
ments to the Convention would be adopted by the Commission and
would be submitted to Contracting Governments for approval.
Amendments would enter into force for all Contracting Governments
120 days following the date on the notification by the Depositary
Government of receipt of written notification by three-fourths of all
Contracting Governments, unless any other Contracting Govern-
ment notified its objection within ninety days of the date on the
notification from the Depositary Government. In addition to giving
notification of objection for substantive reasons, a Government
might find it would be necessary to object, as an interim measure, if
its constitutional processes for approval had not been completed.
If further formal action is not required by the constitutional proc-
esses of the remaining one-fourth of the Contracting Parties after
three-fourths of them have approved the amendment, the entry into
force of amendments would be speeded up considerably. This would
be to our advantage in view of our prime interest in the fisheries in
the Convention area. In the event of an objection, a proposed amend-
ment would take effect only upon withdrawal of the objection. This
procedure for entry into force of proposed amendments is somewhat
similar to the procedure for entry into force of conservation regula-
tions proposed by the Commission, which was introduced into the
Convention by the 1964 Protocol.
Under the subject Protocol, it would be the duty of the Secretary
of State to register an objection to any proposed amendment if, upon
approval of it by three-fourths of the Contracting Governments, ap-
proval of the proposed amendment had not been completed in ac-
cordance with United States constitutional processes.
The parties to the Convention are Canada, Denmark, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
It is hoped that the Protocol will be given early and favorable
consideration by the Senate.
Respectfully submitted.
- WILLIAM P. ROGERs.
(Enclosure: Protocol to the International Convention for the North-
west Atlantic Fisheries Relating to Amendments to the Convention.)
Ex. Rept. 92–C
35
PROTOCOL TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR
THE NORTHWEST ATLANTIC FISHERIES RELATING
TO AMENDMENTS TO THE CONVENTION
The Governments parties to the International Convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries signed at Washington under date of
February 8, 1949, which Convention, as amended, is hereinafter
referred to as the Convention, desiring to facilitate the entry into
force of amendments to the Convention, agree as follows:
ARTICLE I
Article XVII of the Convention is renumbered “Article XVIII”
and a new Article XVII is inserted to read as follows:
“ARTICLE XVII
“1. Any Contracting Government or the Commission may propose
amendments to this Convention to be considered and acted upon by
a regular meeting of the Commission or by a special meeting of the
Commission called in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6
of Article II of the Convention. Any such proposed amendment shall
be sent to the Executive Secretary at least ninety days prior to the
meeting at which it is proposed to be acted upon, and he shall immedi-
ately transmit the proposal to all Contracting Governments and to
all Commissioners.
“2. A proposed amendment to the Convention shall be adopted by
the Commission by a three-fourths majority of the votes of all Con-
tracting Governments. The text of any proposed amendment so
adopted shall be transmitted by the Depositary Government to all
Contracting Governments.
“3. Any amendment shall take effect for all Contracting Govern-
ments one hundred and twenty days following the date on the notifica-
tion by the Depositary Government of receipt of written notification
of approval by three-fourths of all Contracting Governments unless
any other Contracting Government notifies the Depositary Govern-
ment that it objects to the amendment, within ninety days of the date
on the notification by the Depositary Government of such receipt, in
which case the amendment shall not take effect for any Contracting
Government. Any Contracting Government which has objected to an
amendment may at any time withdraw that objection. If all objec-
tions to an amendment are withdrawn, the amendment shall take
effect for all Contracting Governments one hundred and twenty days
following the date on the notification by the Depositary Government
of receipt of the last withdrawal.
“4. Any Government which becomes a party to the Convention
after an amendment has been adopted in accordance with paragraph 2
of this Article shall be deemed to have approved the said amendment.
Ex. Rept. 92–C
(1)
36
2
“5. The Depositary Government shall promptly notify all Contract-
ing Governments of the receipt of notifications of approval of amend-
ments, the receipt of notifications of objection or withdrawal of
objections, and the entry into force of amendments.”
ARTICLE II
1. This Protocol shall be open for signature and ratification or
approval or for adherence on behalf of any Government party to the
Convention.
2. This Protocol shall enter into force on the date on which instru-
ments of ratification or approval have been deposited with, or written
notices of adherence have been received by, the Government of the
United States of America, on behalf of all Governments parties to the
Convention.
3. Any Government which becomes a party to the Convention
after this Protocol has been opened for signature shall at the same time
adhere to this Protocol.
4. The Government of the United States of America shall inform
all Governments signatory or adhering to the Convention of all ratifica-
tions and approvals deposited and adherences received and of the
date this Protocol enters into force.
5. Any Protocol amending the Convention which has been signed
but which has not entered into force at the date of entry into force
of the present Protocol shall thereafter enter into force in accordance
with the provisions of the present Protocol; provided, however, that,
if instruments of ratification or approval or notices of adherence with
respect to such Protocol have been received by the Depositary Govern-
ment from three-fourths of all Contracting Governments at the time
of entry into force of the present Protocol, the date on which the ninety,
and one hundred and twenty, day periods specified in the first sentence
of paragraph 3 of Article XVII shall commence with regard to such
amendment shall be the date of entry into force of the present Protocol.
ARTICLE III
1. The original of this Protocol shall be deposited with the Govern-
ment of the United States of America, which Government shall com-
municate certified copies thereof to all the Governments signatory or
adhering to the Convention.
2. This Protocol shall bear the date on which it is opened for signa-
ture and shall remain open for signature for a period of fourteen days
thereafter, following which period it shall be open for adherence.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, having deposited their
respective full powers, have signed this Protocol.
DoNE at Washington this sixth day of October 1970, in the English
language.
For Canada:
For Denmark:
TORBEN RøNNE
Oct. 16, 1970
For France:
CHARLEs LUCET
Oct. 12th 1970
Ex. Rept. 92–C
37
3
For the Federal Republic of Germany:
ROLF PAULS
Oct. 9, 1970
For Iceland:
MAGNús V. MAGNússon
Oct. 6, 1970
For Italy:
EGIDIo ORTONA
Oct. 16—1970
For Japan:
For Norway:
ARNE GUNNENG
October 6, 1970
For Poland:
JERZY MICHALOWSKI
October 20th 1970
For Portugal:
WASCO WIEIRA GARIN
October 20th 1970
For Romania:
CoRNELIU BogDAN
Oct. 19, 1970
For Spain:
JAIME ARGUELLES
19–Octubre—1970
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
YULY M. VORONTSOv
[Romanization]
20.10.70
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
JOHN FREEMAN
Oct. 15. 1970
For the United States of America:
BURDICK H. BRITTIN
Oct 6, 1970
I CERTIFY THAT the foregoing is a true copy of the Protocol to the
International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries relat-
ing to Amendments to the Convention, which Protocol was signed at
Washington under date of October 6, 1970 in the English language, the
signed original of which is deposited in the archives of the Government
of the United States of America.
IN TESTIMONY whereo F, I, WILLIAM P. RogFRs, Secretary of State
of the United States of America have hereunto caused the seal of the
Department of State to be affixed and my name subscribed by the
Authentication Officer of the said Department, at the city of Washing-
ton, in the District of Columbia, this sixteenth day of November, 1970.
|SEAL WILLIAM P. RogFRS,
Secretary of State.
By BARBARA WARTMAN,
Authentication Officer,
Department of State.
84-955 O - 72 - 6
Ex. Rept. 92–C
38
Mr. McKERNAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am here to testify in favor of the Senate giving its advice and
consent to the ratification of the protocol to the International Conven-
tion for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Relating to Amendments to
the Convention, as recommended by the President in his letter of
transmittal of May 11, 1971.
The original convention, first drafted in 1949, contained no amend-
ment procedure. It has been necessary, however, to amend the con-
vention six times in the intervening years. These amendments were
accomplished by means of separate treaties in the form of protocols
embodying these amendments. All of these amendments have now
entered into force.
ESTABLISHING MORE EXPEDITIOUS MANNER OF AMENDING CONVENTION
In the 1969 annual meeting of the International Commission for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF), established pursuant to the
convention, the commission expressed a desire to establish a more
expeditious manner of amending the convention if and when further
amendments are found to be necessary or desirable in the future.
The commission requested the United States, as depositary govern-
ment, to investigate this matter. The United States, after studying
the question, proposed a protocol to the convention which would
incorporate therein a procedure for amending the convention in the
future. That protocol was subsequently adopted by the commission at
its annual meeting of June 1970, after the U.S. draft had been simpli-
fied. The protocol was opened for signature on October 6, 1970.
PARTIES RATIFYING OF ADFHERING TO PROTOCOL
To date, the protocol has been ratified or adhered to by 12 of the
present 16 parties to the convention, including the Governments of
Canada and Japan, which did not sign the protocol when it was open
for signature, and the Government of Bulgaria which recently adhered
to the 1949 convention. The United States is one of the four remaining
governments which has not yet acted on the protocol. We have no
information which would indicate that the other three governments—
Portugal, Rumania and Spain—will not approve the protocol in due
COUII’Se.
AMENDMENT PROCEDUFE ESTABLISHED BY PROTOCOL
The protocol establishes a procedure under which a proposed
amendment to the convention would be adopted by the commission
by a three-fourths extraordinary majority and submitted to the
contracting governments for approval. After approval by three-
fourths of the contracting governments, the proposed amendment
would enter into force for all contracting governments 120 days
following the date on the notification by the depository government
unless any other contracting government notified its objection within
90 days. In that event, the proposed amendment would take effect
only upon withdrawal of the objection.
39
This objection procedure should establish whether a contracting
government had not approved a proposed amendment for substantive
reasons, in which case the Commission might be able to institute
action to overcome these reasons, or simply whether the necessary
actions under the constitutional processes of the objecting government
have not yet been completed. If further action was not deemed neces-
sary under the constitutional processes of a government which had
not yet approved the proposed amendment but which did not disfavor
it, the protocol would permit the amendment to take effect without
further positive action by that government.
In the case of the United States, under our constitutional require-
ments, it would be the duty of the Secretary of State to register an
objection to a proposed amendment if, upon approval of it by three-
fourths of the contracting governments, our appoval had not been
completed as required by the Constitution.
RATIFICATION IS lin U.S. INTERESTS
We believe, Mr. Chairman, that ratification of the protocol is in the
interests of the United States. Establishment of this procedure, which,
hopefully, will simplify the process of adopting necessary substantive
amendments to the convention in the future, will help to keep the con-
vention as up to date as possible in terms of changes in fisheries mat-
ters. A significant portion of the convention area lies off our New
England coast and, as long as fisheries in this area are managed under
the convention, it is in our interest to insure that the convention is as
viable as we can make it. The protocol will serve to strengthen that
viability.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your attention. I would be pleased
to attempt to answer any questions the committee has concerning
the protocol.
Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Ambassador McKernan.
STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING
In your statement you declare that, “It would be the duty of the
Secretary of State to register an objection to a proposed amendment
if, upon approval of it by three-fourths of the contracting govern-
ments, our approval had not been completed as required by the Con-
stitution.”
In your opinion, would the State Department have any objection
to a statement of understanding embodying this language?
Mr. McKERNAN. None whatsoever.
Senator PELL. That is good. Thank you.
Now, this agreement is of particular interest, as I say, in my part
of the country, New England. -
VALUE OF NORTHWEST ATLANTIC FISHERIES CATCH
First, as to the value of the catches that are involved, what is your
estimate of the value in American terms of the catch of the Northwest
Atlantic fisheries?
40
Mr. McKERNAN. I am making a guess, but I think it is probably on
the order of $100 million per year.
Senator PELL. To us? - -
Mr. McKERNAN. To us. -
Senator PELL. What would you think would be the total value
to all the other nations participating? Would it be on the order of
half a billion dollars a year?
Mr. McKERNAN. It would probably be a billion dollars or so. Our
catch is relatively small in terms of Northwest Atlantic catches.
Senator PELL. We are about 10 percent of the total?
Mr. McKERNAN. A little less.
VALUE OF U.S. CATCH IN OTHER AREAS
Senator PELL. If the total catch that we have in Northwest Atlantic
fisheries from our viewpoint is a hundred million dollars, what would
be the total catch from the viewpoint of the United States in those
areas where we want to fish off other people's shelves, or not neces-
sarily off other people's shelves but near neighboring nations as is
the case in South America? -
Mr. McKERNAN. No more than twice that for the shrimp and tuna
fisheries, at best. Probably less. -
Senator PELL. Shrimp, tuna, and sardines? -
Mr. McKERNAN. Tuna fisheries off the west coast of the United
States, off South and Central America and the shrimp fishing off the
Caribbean and South America, roughly, would be in the area
Senator PELL. Roughly, including anchovy?
Mr. McKERNAN. We do not fish anchovy off the coast of any other
Country.
Senator PELL. We do not? I understood we did. We do not?
Mr. McKERNAN. No.
Senator PELL. Thank you very much.
Mr. McKERNAN. I should perhaps elaborate a bit on that. Under
license from Mexico and perhaps other Central and South American
countries, we take some tuna bait. We have a small tuna bait fleet,
a fleet of bait boats remaining in the U.S. tuna fleet, and they take
Some anchovy off the coast of these countries, but it is only for bait.
We do not have any large sardine fishery off any other country.
PROBLEMS OF LOBSTERMEN AND FISHERMEN OFF NEW ENGLAND
Senator PELL. As you know, off New England we really have had
very acute, sharp problems, problems where the lobster fishermen have
had their pots deranged by the Soviets and by other fishing vessels,
sometimes our own. The situation is rather reminiscent of our own
range wars. It has caused tremendously tense feeling and concern for
those of us who represent our fishermen, who find their catches and
their equipment being molested and being wrecked.
In addition to that we see, because of the increased subsidy or
efficiency or size or whatever the reason is, that the foreign flag vessels
41
seem to be much better equipped for fishing and are able to vacuum
up products, whereas we with our archaic regulations concerning the
purchase of fishing boats and the smaller size of our vessels are not
able to compete with them. Even if we could we would then find that
we would have completely exhausted the species that are there.
Do you feel that this treaty that we are talking about is sufficient to
be able to cope with these dual problems?
Mr. McKERNAN. No. The Northwest Atlantic Commission and
Convention is not adequate to deal fully with these problems. We
recognize this. The fishermen of your area, Senator, are well aware and
have brought this to our attention, your attention and ours, many
times. This essentially conservation convention was satisfactory at
the time it was negotiated. It has been, in my judgment, an effective
mechanism up until recent years, when the fishing effort by all nations
increased to a point where it is quite obvious that now it is inadequate
to take into account the problems that you have described and that
you have talked to me about many times outside this committee room.
U.S. EFFORT TO COUNTER FOREIGN FISHING EFFORT
The United States, of course, is doing a number of things to try to
counter this tremendous foreign fishing effort. I am not here to claim
that we are wholly successful in this, but we are doing a number of
things to try to improve the situation from the standpoint of American
fishermen in response to requests from knowledgeable and responsible
Senators and Congressmen who have asked us to look into it.
In the first place, we have modified the Northwest Atlantic Conven-
tion—through an amendment to the convention, by the way—to
provide a different way of handling regulations under the convention,
and this particular procedure that we are suggesting here, of course,
will make the amendments proposed by the Commission come into
effect more expeditiously. This is another move to try to make the
convention more effective. Under the last amendment I referred to,
the Northwest Convention can be used to set up quotas and poundage
limits for various nations, and this year we were successful in getting
quotas established for most of the species of great economic importance
to the U.S. fishermen in the New England area. -
Unfortunately, these quotas will not go into effect until the begin-
ning of 1973, and so our fishermen are still not benefiting from that
particular action. But more is needed. We need some limitation of
foreign fishing efforts off our coasts. The convention will allow that and
in cooperation with U.S. Commissioners and the Department of Com-
merce we intend to take this matter up with the Commission and
attempt to get some limitation on effort, which will help the conflict
between gear to some extent, and perhaps will limit the overwhelming
number of these very large fishing vessels.
The second thing we have done is to try, through bilateral means
further to the south, south of the Northwest Atlantic Convention
area to resolve these issues with the Soviet Union and Poland, for
example, and we have been discussing the problem with Rumania
more recently. In each of these cases, in fact, within the convention
42
itself and within these bilaterals, we have attempted, with some
success, to get preferences for the U.S. coastal fishermen. Since we
do operate relatively small vessels, and we are under a handicap, as
you have pointed out many times, we are attempting to get these
distant water nations to leave the fish of economic importance to us
and, especially those in limited supply, alone, leave them alone so
that they will be available only for U.S. fishermen.
Our fishermen have pointed out, and are pointing out at the present
time, that even this is inadequate, that the very presence of so many
of these foreign vessels makes it very difficult if not impossible for
them to operate and make their living. So the problem is not solved,
by any means, but the Government, through cooperation with the
Congress, is attempting to take a number of steps to try to alleviate
the very severe economic problems of the fishermen of the New
England area.
WHY NOT CLAIM 200-MILE FISHING JIURISDICTION?
Senator PELL. If you were sitting in my place and were asked by
your constituents, as I am, why do we not just claim fishing rights,
as a zone of economic exploitation, for 200 miles and regulate the
foreign fishing fleets out there, chase them away if they come in in
exactly the same way as the countries on the west coast of South
America do, what would be your reply?
Mr. McKERNAN. Well, fortunately for me, I am not in the very
difficult position that you are, Senator. [Laughter.] I think that the
problem with this proposal is that we are dealing with some very
large nations with whom we have a great many relations. On both
coasts, for example, our primary competitors are Japan and the Soviet
Union. These nations will not accept a unilateral extension of juris-
diction by the United States at this time; so we are immediately at
odds with them if we should try to extend jurisdiction. There are two
courses of action we could take if we did unilaterally extend fishing
jurisdiction. One is to send gunboats out there to try to chase them
away. I do not think this Government would do that and I do not
believe you think that it would either.
Second, we would sit down and negotiate with them. We are doing
the second thing right now. We are trying to negotiate with them
preferences for U.S. fishermen in areas where we have the major
problems at the present time.
TJ.S. ACCEPTANCE OF LATIN AMERICAN JURISDICTIONAL CLAIMS
QUESTIONED
Senator PELL. The problem I face, though, is the inequity of the
fact that we permit Peru and Chile to do this to us. Then we com-
pensate our fishermen by saying, “OK, we American taxpayers will
pay your fines.” But we do not protect them at all and permit them
to be fined. It seems to me it is a very uneven scale of justice here.
I see the merits in what you are saying about not going out to 200
miles unilaterally. Then why do we accept it off the South American
coast?
43
I realize the problems, but I wanted to ventilate them publicly
because they need public ventilation. It is very incomprehensible from
the point of view of a fishing captain in my State as to why the foreign
fleets can come in and vacuum away his fish, but his west coast fishing
brother is not permitted to go within 200 miles of Peru or if he does
he is fined and his fine is paid for by Uncle Sam, that is, you and me.
Mr. McKERNAN. There is a good deal of misunderstanding about
this, but I think the point is that the United States does not accept
these jurisdictional claims by Latin America and, in fact, our vessels
do operate there without licenses. If they are harassed and arrested by
these nations, the United States pays the fines because it is unwilling
to take more direct action against these small nations which, in our
judgment, unfairly and illegally arrest our vessels. We are really
protecting the U.S. flag by our actions and we are not accepting their
jurisdiction to 200 miles.
I know this is widely misunderstood by our fishermen, but the fact
is we do not accept their jurisdiction. Since we are unable to and
unwilling to force our point of view against these nations at the same
time they are forcing their points of view against our individual
fishermen, then obviously it is in the national interest to protect the
position of the United States that no nation should unilaterally extend
its jurisdiction beyond 12 miles. We think this is a matter of inter-
national law.
TRUMAN DECLARATION REGARDING CONTINENTAL SHELF
Senator PELL. This is a more subjective question. I am curious
about your view of my theory that the whole Pandora's box was
opened by the Truman declaration in regard to the Continental Shelf
after World War II and this set off this series of, to use that awful
word, dominoes that has resulted in the present situation.
Mr. McKERNAN. I think that had a great deal to do with it. But
even in that instance, of course, it seemed to be so clearly the way the
world was moving with respect to shelf resources. Second, of course, we
did not unilaterally apply it against anybody. We did not arrest any-
body as a result of that doctrine, and I suspect that had anybody
objected and attempted to come in we would have negotiated with
them rather than sending a gunboat out.
SUGGESTION THAT UNITED STATES AND CANADA CLAIM JOINT
JURISDICTION
Senator PELL. In my State, I was rather struck by the fact that
the former Secretary of the Navy made a suggestion that the United
States and Canada should claim joint jurisdiction over their fisheries
in the Northern Atlantic and promulgate rules and regulations for
that area for our own two nations on a bilateral basis.
I was wondering what your thought would be with regard to such
a suggestion. I realize it would go rather counter to the Navy's
position, but be that as it may, what is your position?
44
Mr. McKERNAN. The U.S. position at the present time is that these
issues should be decided on a multilateral basis, and we are now
engaged in preparations for a multilateral conference on the Law of
the Sea. We hope that this conference will decide on the issues of
the territorial sea and fishery jurisdiction. In all likelihood the United
States will accept the decision of this conference arrived at through
multilateral means. In the conference we will have an opportunity
to try to develop our views which do provide for coastal State prefer-
ence over coastal resources. In our judgment, this would, if it was in
effect today, resolve these problems of your fishermen off our coasts.
I realize, however, there is this interim period until this new con-
vention is achieved of a very serious problem to our fishermen.
Senator PELL. Would the implementation at this point of this
idea of the United States and Canada making a bilateral agreement be
effective in your view? -
Mr. McKERNAN. I question whether it would. I have not really
seen the proposal itself so I am not really prepared to say.
Senator PELL. I will send it up to the State Department for analysis
and comment. -
Mr. McKERNAN. I see. -
Once again, the question is whether the large distance water fishing
nations would accept a unilateral extension or bilateral extension
of jºietion by the United States and Canada. I personally would
doubt it. - --
Senator PELL. What effect would the United States and Canadian
claim have on any prospects for a successful Law of the Sea Conference?
Mr. McKERNAN. Well, it would depend on the nature of the claim,
I would assume.
Senator PELL. The claim of controlling the activities and catches
of the Canadian and American vessels.
Mr. McKERNAN. I cannot really foresee what effect this would have
if it applied only to United States and Canadian vessels. If the United
States makes unilateral claims for jurisdiction which would apply to
vessels of other nations, I suppose that other nations would believe
that they could do the same, and this might cause these nations to
make such unilateral claims. But, in terms of the conference itself
and its ultimate success, once again, what we are doing is seeking
multilateral agreement on these issues. -
Senator PELL. But that is a rather long answer. Would it help or
hamper a successful Law of the Sea Conference? •
Mr. McKERNAN. I suppose on balance there would be a tendency
to hamper it if such a move affected the vessels of third parties.
Senator PELL. What would be the consequences of such an agree-
ment in terms of our own American security interests?
Mr. McKERNAN. I question whether there would be too much effect
on that, but, on the other hand, to the extent there would be some
hindrance in reaching agreement of a multilateral nature on the Law
of the Sea, there might be some effect. I probably am not very well
qualified to answer that.
45
Senator PELL. As I say, I would be glad to send it up to you for
analysis and comment. The subcommittee would be interested in
knowing your reactions.
ARE LOBSTERS CREATURES OF THE SHELF?
In regard to deep sea offshore lobsters, I understand under inter-
national law we can claim jurisdiction under the Truman declaration
if the lobsters are determined to be a creature of the shelf. The State
Department has been studying this question for some time now
as to whether it is or is not a creature of the shelf. Have you reached
a determination in this regard?
Mr. McKERNAN. The technical determination of that has been
left to the Department of Commerce, and I know that they have had
this under very active review.
Senator PELL. For how many years?
MºMcKansas. Well, under active review only for the past several
months. -
Senator PELL. I remember talking about this a couple of years ago,
it seems to me.
Mr. McKERNAN. I think our original position was that the lobsters
were not creatures of the shelf.
Senator PELL. Right. f
Mr. McKERNAN. Because of the interest by you and others and
fishermen in the area, we have undertaken another review and are
looking at it again. The problem is not simple because it does affect
another species of lobster, the spiny lobster, taken by U.S. fishermen
near the coasts of other Caribbean countries. Thus the study must en-
compass the effect of any U.S. action on these other animals and on
our fisheries in other areas.
OUTCOME OF NATIONAL QUOTAS SET AT 1972 ICNAF MEETING
Senator PELL. What would be your view as to the outcome of the
1972 meeting of ICNAF at which for the first time national quotas were
set for the various species of fish, 19 species?
Mr. McKERNAN. I think this was a very great move ahead and it
was along the lines of our Law of the Sea position on fisheries. It
provided a guarantee to the U.S. fishermen to achieve a certain level
of catch on many important species, such as yellowtail flounder taken
by fishermen from your area and some other species as well. In fact,
it is just too bad we did not have these quotas in effect 10 years ago,
for we could have prevented the depletion of haddock, for example, and
yellowtail flounder as well, by foreign fleets.
WISDOM OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM ICNAF
Senator PELL. In view of really the pretty successful outcome of that
meeting, do you consider it wise for the United States to withdraw now
from ICNAF to go on this do-it-alone with Canada or bilateral route
that has been suggested?
46
Mr. McKERNAN. No; I am against the withdrawal of the United
States from the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Commission.
Senator PELL. If we went the bilateral route with Canada, that is a
de facto withdrawal; is it not?
Mr. McKERNAN. Well, I am not sure about that. I would have to
look into the legalities. Once again, I have not seen any such proposal
and I do not know how it deals with this problem. It would not
necessarily mean withdrawal. It might exempt the ICNAF area, for
example. -
PROPOSED BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH CANADA
Senator PELL. I was struck with the proposal. It seemed meritorious
on the surface, but as you looked into it it seemed to go against the
direction we were trying to go in the Law of the Sea Conference and
against the direction of ICNAF. The oddest thing about it was that
it went very much counter to the position of the Navy, even though
the plan for a bilateral agreement with Canada was suggested by the
most recent Secretary of the Navy. So I will send it up to you anyway
for comment because it seems to have in it these contradictions and I
would be appreciative of your views.
ICNAF's PROTECTION AND CONSERVATION OF NORTHWEST ATLANTIC
FISHERIES
In your opinion, do you feel that in general ICNAF has been success-
ful in protecting and conserving the Northwest Atlantic fisheries?
Mr. McKERNAN. I think in the early years it was successful and,
depending upon the interpretation of the term successful, I would say
it has been partly successful. In recent years it has not prevented
the depletion of very important stocks of fish to American fishermen.
Haddock is perhaps the best example, and now more recently there
obviously has been overfishing of Atlantic herring stocks, and Atlantic
yellowtail stocks, and there is some indication that certain other
important stocks of fish are declining at an alarming rate.
But, on the other hand, if ICNAF had not been there, I think
that this decline would have been much greater. If one said that if,
instead of ICNAF, we had some sort of preference or jurisdiction
over the waters of Georges Bank, for example, why then, I would
think that we would have better control, but I am not confident we
could gain that kind of control. I think there might be almost anarchy
on these fishing grounds if it were not for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Convention. -
So, on balance, I think that while it has been very imperfect and
needs improvement badly, and it has not prevented the depletion
of some stocks important to American fishermen, it has been far
better than nothing, and I do not know of any viable alternative at
the present time.
Senator PELL. Except as we move into the Law of the Sea Con-
ference.
47
SLIPPAGE IN DEVELOPING LAW OF THE SEA SUGGESTED
I want to touch a little off the subject here. Because of the exigencies
of my own problems of survival at home, I have not been following
the law of the sea as closely as I did. But it seems to me we are slipping
in this conference away from the ideas expressed in the Stratton
report and my own concepts. It seems from the reports I received
from Geneva during the last meeting, which I was very disappointed
not to have attended, that they are really not only standing still but
going backward in terms of trying to develop a true law of the sea.
Mr. McKERNAN. I am afraid I would have to disagree with you.
Senator PELL. I am delighted.
Mr. McKERNAN. I think progress was made and negotiations really
started toward drafting a seabed regime. In terms of fisheries, I
believe our own position has become more clear.
Senator PELL. This is the species approach?
Mr. McKERNAN. The species approach is more accepted by th
U.S. fishermen as a whole, and better understood by the other nations
of the world.
In terms of other issues, of course, it is still too early to tell, but I
personally do not believe that we have lost ground and we are still in
the early stages of negotiations. I have, of course, great hopes that we
will be able to negotiate successfully fundamental U.S. objectives in
the territorial seas, navigation, passage through straits, and fisheries,
in addition to such things as reasonable freedom of research.
Senator PELL. You see, what I hope comes out of this eventually is a
regime of law with its own enforcement agency, the international sea
guard and some kind of an international body controlling the resources
of the seabeds, the waters above, perhaps separate from the United
Nations.
Mr. McKERNAN. Our proposal suggested the organization of a
Seabed agency with limited authority.
Senator PELL. An excellent proposal and one, I think, on which
President Nixon should be hugely congratulated. But I feel there has
been slippage since, thanks to the oil interests, petroleum interests,
and other interests.
Mr. McKERNAN. Well, I am not sure there has been slippage. It is
obvious that through negotiation one must find a common ground,
and we are doing our very best to find common ground, still holding, I
believe, to our fundamental objectives. So I do not see too much in the
way of slippage. Coming back to your original question, I cannot see
at the present time how much authority the international agency or
international regimes might have. There is still wide disagreement
internationally and, in fact, substantial disagreement nationally
as to the amount of authority such international bodies might assume.
Senator PELL. I notice also that whereas it was felt the National
Petroleum Council and the oil interests were providing the principal
blockage, that their cudgels have now been taken up by many of the
little nations around the world and they are fighting their battle for
them. This is why I had felt it was slippage. I did not know if this
was an area in which you wanted to comment.
48
Mr. McKERNAN. I am not sure. If you are talking about the
moratorium that is being suggested on the development of the deep
Seabed, it seems to me that the U.S. position is pretty clear in that
we are opposed to a moratorium. We do not believe that our industry
should be prevented from developing, and using its technology in
developing, deep sea resources such as mining the manganese nodules
and, of course, progress has proceeded very rapidly in terms of the
state of the art.
Senator PELL. You do not see a real danger, though, of this moving
along with the five-nation approach so we have a division of the sea-
beds there? - w
Mr. McKERNAN. Well, I hope not. I think that there is a pretty
good chance for us to negotiate a position that is substantially akin to
that generally pursued by the President in his earlier statements in
1970. It seems to me that we are not deviating from these general
objectives at the present time.
OTHER APPROACH TO SURVIVAL OF NORTHWEST ATLANTIC FISHERIES
Senator PELL. I realize you are here for the Department of State'
but you represent the whole executive branch. During the spring
meetings of ICNAF the Commerce Department representative, Mr.
Lynn, said that, “We in the United States are convinced that fisheries
in the Northwest Atlantic can survive only if there is a well-nigh
revolutionary change within the commission equalling the revolu-
tionary change in fishing, or alternatively, if the commission and the
international cooperative approach which it symbolizes are abandoned
in favor of another approach.”
What is this other approach?
Mr. McKERNAN. I think that Secretary Lynn was really expressing
the view of the United States that there had to be a greater preference
for the coastal States and ultimately more control by the coastal
States. I think he undoubtedly had in mind—at least I did when I
read that portion of his statement—the U.S. position that we have
advocated in the law of the sea meetings, that is, greater coastal State
responsibility in the conservation of the resources and coastal State
preference for coastal resources.
Senator PELL. I think this concept is one with which all of us in
this area agree. The Stratton Commission worked at it one way.
The White House position, which is excellent, does just the reverse
but still gives that certain control to the adjacent nation, which is
only fair.
Mr. McKERNAN. Yes.
Senator PELL. And this will continue to be, I would hope, our
policy and would give some protection to our fishermen off of New
England and the other areas who need a certain extra protection just
as the fishermen off the coast of Mexico or Brazil need a certain extra
protection in view of the fact that it is their own country that is
involved.
Mr. McKERNAN. Yes.
49
JURIDICAL CHANGES ACCEPTABLE TO UNITED STATES
Senator PELL. Lynn was also quoted as saying that the United
States is ready to accept another solution involving juridical changes
before it will tolerate the destruction of U.S. fisheries. Do these
juridical changes include the creation of an exclusive fisheries zone?
Mr. McKERNAN. Our position at the present time is in favor of a
species approach rather than an exclusive economic zone or exclusive
fishery Zone. We are advocating essentially a nonexclusive zone, and
that is our position at the present time.
WOULD BILATERAL TREATIES BE BETTER THAN ICNAF AGREEMENT’’
Senator PELL. I understand the bilateral fishery agreement signed
with Poland and Russia has been reasonably successful. In view of
this, do you think a series of bilateral treaties would be better than .
the ICNAF agreement? - . º
Mr. McKERNAN. It is hard for me to see how we could negotiate
with 16 nations or more. In fact, there are one or two nations fishing
off the coast who are not even members of ICNAF. I cannot see any
other way than a multilateral agreement at the present time, with
our present interpretation of international law.
NATIONALITY OF WESSELS RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGE TO LOBSTER POTS
Senator PELL. But from the viewpoint of my lobster fishermen and
the damage done to their pots, could you hazard a guess as to the
nationality of the vessels that have been responsible for the damage?
What percentage are Russian, what percentage American, what per-
centage Polish, Canadian?
Mr. McKERNAN. I cannot tell you the damage by American trawl-
ers. I do not know how much damage there has been done to the
lobster pots by American trawlers because that has not been brought
to my attention. I think that the major complaints have been against
Soviet vessels, but there have been complaints against Polish vessels
and at least one against Japanese vessels in the area. I think it is
roughly related to the size of the fleets.
The Soviet fleet is by far the largest and so, of course, most of the
complaints have been against Soviet interference with our fixed gear.
It is my opinion that we have helped this situation and that the
amount of interference is substantially less than it was. There is a
tremendous amount of fixed gear out there. There are a lot of com-
plaints by the foreign fleets—operating in what they consider to be
the high seas—of the fact that we have spotted fixed gear all over the
place and essentially usurped the fishing grounds, grounds where they
fished in past years.
Frankly, this does not bother the U.S. Government. This is a legal
way to operate; it is off our own coasts and we are delighted that
our fishermen who have been hurt in so many ways can find lobsters
as an economic way of making their living in view of the fact that
i. of the other species have been depleted by these same foreign
eetS. -
50
COMPARATIVE NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS
Senator PELL. Do the conditions seem better in the past few months
than they were a year ago? Do you get less complaints, about the same,
or more?
Mr. McKERNAN. I think we have fewer complaints at the present
time. -
COMPLAINTS IN LAST 3 MONTHS
Senator PELL. For the sake of argument, how many complaints have
you had in the last arbitrary period, say, 3 months roughly?
Mr. McKERNAN. I do not think we have had any in the last month.
I think the last complaints we have had were last spring.
COAST GUARD VESSEL ON STATION
Senator PELL. Does the Coast Guard still keep a vessel or cutter on
station?
Mr. McKERNAN. Yes, the Coast Guard has been extremely co-
operative in this. They have, in my judgment, done everything possible
to cooperate with the fishermen and with our department and the
National Marine Fishery Service. With the number of vessels and
funds and equipment available, I personally think that a very good job
is being done by the Coast Guard.
AGGRAVATION AND FRUSTRATION OF CONSTITUENCY
Senator PELL. I think the aggravation and frustration of my own
constituents is tremendous—and this is not your fault—because of
their equipment. When they go out there in their old fishing boats,
some of them still side trawlers, and see these really tremendous
operations outsweeping us, our men are very, very disturbed, as are
we who have the responsibility for representing them in this regard.
We see an industry that has been a noble one with a long heritage in
our part of the country really being throttled and young men no longer
as desirous of going into it. -
We started a program in our university, the University of Rhode
Island, for training fishermen, and it is proving harder to get recruits.
There are still enough, but there is still a tendency not to want to go
into the business because of its arduousness and its lack of reward, and
the feeling that we are being swept off the seas.
ICELAND’s ExTENSION OF HER TERRITORIAL WATERS
In connection with Iceland, I notice that Iceland and Great Britain
are both members of ICNAF. Will Iceland’s extension of her territorial
waters to 50 miles create problems within the framework of ICNAF2
Also, have we taken any action with regard to Iceland and her claims?
Mr. McKERNAN. We, of course, have let the Icelandic Government
know that we prefer actions of that type to be done by multilateral
agreement rather than by unilateral actions. At the same time, of
course, we are sympathetic toward Iceland's view that she has a
51
special interest in the stocks of essentially coastal species off her coasts,
such as cod. We have tried to encourage Iceland to take the same
approach we have; that is, to push for the acceptance of the U.S.
proposal in the law of the sea, which we think would take care of the
real problems that Iceland has.
I am not privy to all of the immediate problems that Iceland has
but, of course, Iceland's point is that, “Well, this is going to take some
time and we cannot wait.” That has brought about this action, which
is unfortunate in terms of our efforts in the law of the sea.
As to the first part of your question, I really do not see that this will
have any particular effect on the operations of ICNAF.
STEPS TO PRESERVE DEPLETED HADDOCK STOCKS
Senator PELL. During the spring meeting of ICNAF an agreement
was reached to phase out the high seas fishing of Atlantic salmon, but,
as you know, the haddock are pretty well gone in our part of the world.
What steps are being taken to preserve the depleted stocks of haddock?
Mr. McKERNAN. The regulations on haddock are really quite severe.
We have limited both the area of fishing, that is, we have some closed
areas, and the catch through a very, very small quota—a quota So
small that indeed the only significant fishing on haddock at the present
time is by the United States and Canada. The other nations have
really refrained from fishing haddock stocks since they are in very,
very low abundance.
Now what we need is essentially a gift from God, a successful year
class of haddock—successful spawning of the depleted stocks. To the
best of my knowledge, this has not occurred yet, but at least the catch
has been reduced very substantially indeed. There is no real fishery
on the haddock stocks except by United States and Canada at the
present time.
Senator PELL. Thank you.
MERCURY CONTENT OF SWORDFISH
This is somewhat off the subject, but you are, I guess, the most
informed man in Government in the general field of fishery. I noticed
with some interest an article in the press some time ago that they had
found a stuffed swordfish in the Smithsonian which had just as much
mercury content as the ones today. I wondered about it as a matter
of very personal concern. Do you ever personally eat swordfish too,
or not?
Mr. McKERNAN. I would if I could get ahold of some.
Senator PELL. So would I. I thank you very much indeed for
coming here. As you know, I have enjoyed this hearing very much
indeed. Excuse the detailed questions, but they are of great interest
to the subcommittee.
Mr. McKERNAN. Thank you.
Senator PELL. Our next subject for discussion are the amendments
to the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention).
(The amendments referred to follow:)
52
92D CONGRESS * EXECUTIVE
2d Session } SENATE { O
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONVENTION FOR THE
SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, 1960
MESSAGE
FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING
ELEVEN AMENDMENTS TO THE CONVENTION FOR
THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, 1960 (INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL MARITIME CONSULTATIVE ORGANIZATION
(IMCO) RESOLUTIONS A.146 (ES.IV) AND A.174 (VI); .
ADOPTED IN 1968 AND 1969)
JULY 24, 1972.-Amendments were read the first time and, together
with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee
on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed
- for use of the Senate
U.S. GovKRNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1972

53
LETTER OF THANSMITTAL
THE WHITE HOUSE, July 24, 1972.
To the Senate of the United States:
I herewith transmit for the advice and consent of the Senate eleven
amendments to the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960.
Three of these amendments were adopted on November 26, 1968
by the Assembly of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO) at its fourth extraordinary session held in
London November 26–28, 1968 and are annexed to the enclosed
certified copy of Resolution A.146 (ES.IV). The other eight amend-
ments were adopted on October 15–29, 1969 and are annexed to the
enclosed certified copy of Resolution A.174 (VI).
The three amendments adopted in 1968 are the outcome of studies
undertaken by IMCO in 1967 following the Torrey Canyon tragedy.
They are preventive measures designed to avoid the repetition of such
disasters by requiring that specified navigational equipment be
carried aboard certain vessels, specifying conditions of operation that
must be met by vessels using automatic pilot, and requiring that all
ships subject to the Convention carry adequate and up-to-date nauti-
cal publications. t
The 1969 amendments are designed to improve requirements for
firemen’s outfits and personal equipment in cargo ships as well as
requirements for lifebuoys, lifejackets, radio installations and ship-
borne navigational equipment.
For the information of the Senate, I am also transmitting the report
of the Department of State with respect to the amendments.
I recommend that the Senate give swift and favorable consideration
to all of these amendments.
RICHARD NIxoN.
(Enclosures: (1) Report of the Department of State. (2) Certified
copies of IMCO Resolution A.146 (ES.IV), and Resolution A.
174 (VI), annexing amendments to the 1960 Safety of Life at Sea
Convention.)
- (III)
54
LETTER OF SUBMITTAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., May 16, 1972.
The PRESIDENT,
The White House.
The PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you eleven amend-
ments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,
1960, which are intended to improve the standard of safety provided
by the Convention. Three of these amendments were adopted on
November 26, 1968 by the Assembly of the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) at its fourth extraor-
dinary session held in London November 26–28, 1968 and are
annexed to the enclosed certified copy of Resolution A.146 (ES.IV).
The other eight amendments were adopted on October 21, 1969 by
the Assembly at its sixth session held in London October 15–29, 1969
and are annexed to the enclosed certified copy of Resolution A.174
(VI). I recommend that the amendments be transmitted to the Senate
for advice and consent to their acceptance.
1968 AMENDMENTS
The 1968 amendments consist of the replacement of Regulation 12
by a new Regulation and the addition of Regulations 19 and 20 to
Chapter V of the Regulations annexed to the Convention. Replace-
ment Regulation 12 requires the fitting of radar, radio direction finding
apparatus, gyro compass, and echo Sounding devices aboard certain
vessels. New Regulation 19 specifies conditions of operation that must
be met by vessels using automatic pilot. New Regulation 20 requires
that all ships subject to the convention shall carry adequate and
up-to-date charts, sailing directions, lists of lights, notice to mariners,
tide tables, and other nautical publications necessary for the intended
voyage. -
After the disastrous Torrey Canyon foundering on March 18, 1967,
the United Kingdom, supported by the United States and others,
proposed that a study of the casualty be undertaken by IMCO at
the earliest possible date with a view to avoiding the hazards presented
by the carriage of oil or other noxious or hazardous cargoes. The first
meeting of IMCO on the subject was arranged for May 1967, after the
one month’s notice to the participants as required by IMCO Conven-
tion. At the outset of these deliberations IMCO recognized that the
study would fall into three main categories: preventive measures,
measures to minimize damage and legal questions. These last two
categories were considered by the International Legal Conference on
Marine Pollution Damage, 1969, convened at Brussels under the
auspices of IMCO. The two conventions signed at that Conference on
November 29––the International Convention Relating to Intervention
(V)
55
VI
on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties and the Inter-
national Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage—
were transmitted to the Senate by the President on May 20, 1970
(Senate Executive G., 91st Congress, 2d Session). The subject of
preventive measures was dealt with by calling an extraordinary session
of the IMCO Assembly in November 1968 to consider the adoption of
amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life
at Sea. This extraordinary session of the Assembly culminated in the
unanimous adoption of Resolution 146 by the 42 member nations
attending the session. -
The United States Delegation consulted with the American mari-
time industry, interested agencies of the Executive Branch and other
interested parties concerning these 1968 amendments in preparation
for all stages of IMCO consideration, i.e., before the meetings of the
IMCO Subcommittees on Safety of Navigation, Oil Pollution, Radio-
communications and the Maritime Safety Committee. The Coast
Guard is not aware of any objections to any of the amendments as
they were adopted by the Assembly and are now presented. The
impact on United States merchant vessels will not be great because
nearly all of our vessels of the tonnage indicated have the required
equipment on board at the present time. These amendments will
represent a significant improvement in ship safety standards when
they become applicable to vessels of many flags.
1969 AMENDMENTS
The first five of the 1969 amendments (Annexes I through V to
Resolution A.174(VI)) will represent a significant improvement in
ship safety and deal primarily with items of safety equipment to be
carried on certain vessels. The present Regulation 65 of Chapter II
only requires that at least one fireman's outfit shall be carried by a
cargo ship, whereas the amendment to that Regulation (Annex I)
requires that at least two such outfits shall be carried on cargo ships
and that Administrations may require additional sets of personal
equipment in large ships and additional firemen’s outfits in tankers
and special ships such as factory ships. The second of the amendments
provides for improved lighting of lifebuoys and better specifications
for lifejackets (Annex II). The third, fourth and fifth amendments
are designed to provide more effective radiotelegraph and radio-
telephone service aboard vessels (Annexes III-V). The sixth amend-
ment (Annex VI) will require certain vessels to carry the new Inter-
national Code of Signals on board. Amendments seven and eight
(Annexes VII and VIII) provide for initial and periodic survey of
these new items of equipment and for the appropriate equipment to
be listed on ships' safety certificates.
The 1969 amendments were the subject of recommendations unani-
mously adopted by the IMCO Maritime Safety Committee at its
Seventeenth and nineteenth sessions after development in Subcom-
mittee. The United States participated fully in all stages of develop-
ment of the amendments after consultation with the American
maritime industry and other interested parties. The amendments
adequately reflect the views of the United States and there is no
known opposition to ratification in the form adopted by IMCO. The
amendments are supported by the United States Coast Guard.
56
VII
It is understood that in the application of the Communications Act
of 1934, as amended, the words “Radio equipment for homing” as
used in the above-mentioned amendments is “radio” within the
meaning of Section 303(r) of that Act and is “radio direction finding
apparatus” within the meaning of Sections 351(a)(2) and 355(i); and
that “radar” as used in the amendments is “radio” within the meaning
of Section 303(r) of that Act as amended.
Under the provisions of Article IX of the Convention the amend-
ments will come into force twelve months after the date on which they
are accepted by two-thirds of the Contracting Governments including
two-thirds of the Governments represented on the IMCO Maritime
Safety Committee.
It is hoped that the amendments will be given favorable considera-
tion by the Senate.
Respectfully submitted.
WILLIAM P. RogFRs.
(Enclosures: Certified copies of IMCO Resolution A.146(ES. TV),
and Resolution A.174(VI), annexing amendments to the 1960 Safety
of Life at Sea Convention.)
57
AMENDMENTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
FOR THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, 1960
RESOLUTION A.146(ES. IV) adopted on 26 November 1968
The Assembly,
Recognizing the need to improve safety of life at sea,
Noting Article 16(i) of the Convention on the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization, concerning the functions of the
Assembly with regard to regulations relating to maritime safety,
Noting further that Article IX of the International Convention for
the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960 in paragraphs (b), (d), (e), (g) and (h),
provides for procedures of amendment involving participation of the
Organization,
Having considered certain amendments to the International Con-
vention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960, forming the subject of a
recommendation adopted by the Maritime Safety Committee at its
Seventeenth session, and directed towards improvement of safety of
navigation,
Adopts the following amendment to Chapter V of the Regulations
annexed to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea, 1960, which shall be communicated for acceptance to Contracting
Governments in accordance with Article IX(d) of the Convention:
“The replacement of Regulation 12 by a new Regulation and the
addition of new Regulations 19 and 20. The text of this amendment
appears in the Annex to this Resolution,”
Requests the Secretary-General of the Organization, in conformity
with Article IX(b)(i), to communicate for purposes of acceptance,
certified copies of this Resolution and the Annex, to all Contracting
Governments of the International Convention for the Safety of Life
at Sea, 1960, together with copies to all Members of the Organization,
and
Invites all Governments concerned to accept the amendment at the
earliest possible date. .
ANNEX
Regulation 12—Shipborne Navigational Equipment
(a) All ships of 1,600 tons gross tonnage and upwards shall be fitted
with a radar of a type approved by the Administration. Facilities for
plotting radar readings shall be provided on the bridge in those ships.
(b) All ships of 1,600 tons gross tonnage and upwards, when engaged
on international voyages, shall be fitted with radio direction-finding
apparatus complying with the provisions of Regulation 11 of Chapter IV.
The Administration may, in areas where it considers it unreasonable
or unnecessary for such apparatus to be carried, exempt any ship
under 5,000 tons gross tonnage from this requirement, due regard
being had to the fact that radio direction-finding apparatus is of value
(1)
58
2
both as a navigational instrument and as an aid to locating ships,
aircraft or survival craft.
(c) All ships of 1,600 tons gross tonnage and upwards, when engaged
on international voyages, shall be fitted with a gyro-compass in addi-
tion to the magnetic compass. The Administration, if it considers it
unreasonable or unnecessary to require a gyro-compass, may exempt
any ship under 5,000 tons gross tonnage from this requirement.
(d) All new ships of 500 tons gross tonnage and upwards, when en-
gaged on international voyages, shall be fitted with an echo-sounding
device. - - a
(e) Whilst all reasonable steps shall be taken to maintain the ap-
paratus in an efficient condition, malfunction of the radar equipment,
the gyro-compass or the echo-sounding device shall not be considered
as making the ship unseaworthy or as a reason for delaying the ship in
ports where repair facilities are not readily available.
Regulation 19–Use of the automatic pilot
(a) In areas of high traffic density, in conditions of restricted visi-
bility and in all other hazardous navigational situations where the
automatic pilot is used, it shall be possible to establish human control
of the ship's steering immediately.
(b) In circumstances as above, it shall be possible for the officer of
the watch to have available without delay the services of a qualified
helmsman who shall be ready at all times to take over steering control.
(c) The changeover from automatic to manual steering and vice
versa shall be made by or under the supervision of a responsible officer.
Regulation 30–Nautical Publications
All ships shall carry adequate and up-to-date charts, sailing direc-
tions, lists of lights, notices to mariners, tide tables and all other
nautical publications necessary for the intended voyage.
Certified a true copy of the English and French text of Resolution
A.146(ES.TV) adopted by the Assembly of the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization on 26 November 1968 and of the
English and French texts of the Annex thereto comprising an amend-
ment to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,
done in London on 17 June 1960, which amendment was recommended
and adopted in conformity with Article IX(b)(i) of the aforesaid
Convention, the original of which is deposited with the Inter-Govern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization.
|SEAL) THOMAS MENSAH,
Secretary-General of the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization.
London, 31 December 1968.
59
3
AMENDMENTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE
SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, 1960
RESOLUTION A.174(VT) ADOPTED ON 21 October 1969
The Assembly, -
Recognizing the need to improve safety of life at Sea, -
Noting Article 16(i) of the Convention on the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization, concerning the functions of the
Assembly with regard to regulations relating to maritime safety,
Noting further that Article IX of the International Convention for
the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960, in paragraphs (b), (d), (e), (g) and (h),
provides for procedures of amendment involving participation of the
Organization, 4.
Having considered certain amendments to the International Con-
vention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960, forming the subject of
recommendations adopted by the Maritime Safety Committee at its
seventeenth and nineteenth sessions in accordance with Article IX
of that Convention, and directed towards improvement of require-
ments for fireman's outfits and personal equipment in cargo ships,
or the specification of a lifebuoy and or lifejackets, for radio installa-
tions and shipborne navigational equipment,
Adopts the following eight amendments to the Regulations and
Safety Certificates annexed to the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea, 1960, each of which amendments shall be com-
municated for acceptance to Contracting Governments in accordance
with Article IX(d) of the Convention: -
(a) The replacement of Regulation 65(j) of Chapter II by a new
Regulation, the text of which is at Annex I to this Resolution;
(b) the replacement of Regulation 21(f) of Chapter III by a new
Regulation, together with a footnote to that Regulation, and the
replacement of Regulation 22 of Chapter III by a new Regulation.
The text of this amendment is at Annex II to this Resolution;
(c) the replacement of Regulation 2(c) of Chapter IV by a new
Regulation, the text of which is at Annex III to this Resolution;
(d) the replacement of Regulations 9(e), 9(h)(i), 13(c), 13(f), 15(a),
15(b), 15(f) and 15(g) of Chapter IV by new Regulations. The text of
this amendment is at Annex IV to this Resolution; -
(e) the renumbering of existing paragraphs (a)–(g) of Regulation 11
of Chapter TV to (a)(i)–(a)(vii), and the addition of a new paragraph
(b) to this Regulation, and the addition of a new paragraph (f) to
Regulation 12 of Chapter W. The text of this amendment is at Annex
V to this Resolution; -
(f) the addition of a new Regulation 21 of Chapter V, the text of
which is at Annex VI to this Resolution;
(g) the replacement of sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) of paragraph (b)
of Regulation 7 of Chapter I by new sub-paragraphs, and the replace-
ment of Regulations 8 and 9 of Chapter I by new Regulations. The
text of this amendment is at Annex VII to this Resolution;
(h) the replacement of Parts VI and VIII of the Passenger Ship
Safety Certificate, Part V of the Cargo Ship Safety Equipment
Certificate, Part I of the Cargo Ship Safety Radiotelegraphy Certifi-
cate, Parts VII and IX of the Núclear Passenger Ship Safety. Certifi-
cate and Parts VII and IX of the Nuclear Cargo Ship Safety Certifi-
60
4
cate by new Parts. The text of this amendment is at Annex VIII to
this Resolution,
Requests the Secretary-General of the Organization, in conformity
with Article IX(b)(i), to communicate, for purposes of acceptance,
certified copies of this Resolution and its Annexes, to all Contracting
Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life
at jº. 1960, together with copies to all Members of the Organization,
a]] (
Invites all Governments concerned to accept each of the amend-
ments at the earliest possible date.
Amºner /
AMEND MENT TO HEGULATION 65 OF CHAPTER II OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, 1960
Regulation 65
Paragraph (j) is replaced by the following:
(j) Fireman’s Outfits and Personal Equipment:
(i) A cargo ship, whether new or existing, shall carry at least two
fireman's outfits complying with the requirements of Regulation 63 of
this Chapter. Furthermore, Administrations may require in large
cargo ships additional sets of personal equipment and in tankers and
Special ships such as factory ships additional fireman's outfits.
(ii) For each fireman's outfit which includes a self-contained breath-
ing apparatus as provided in Regulation 63(b) of this Chapter, spare
charges shall be carried on a scale approved by the Administration.
(iii) The fireman's outfits and personal equipment shall be stored so
as to be easily accessible and ready for use and, where more than one
fireman's outfit and set of personal equipment are carried, they shal
be stored in widely separated positions.
Amner II
A MEND MENTS TO CHAPTER III OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
FOR THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, 1960
I’egituation 21
Paragraph (f) is replaced by the following text and footnote:
(f) The self-igniting lights required by paragraph (e) of this Regula-
tion shall be such that they cannot be extinguished by water. They
shall be capable of burning for not less than 45 minutes and shall have
a luminous intensity of not less than 2 candelas in all directions of
the upper hemisphere. The lights shall be kept near the lifebuoys to
which they belong, with the necessary means of attachment. Self-
igniting lights used in tankers shall be of an approved electric battery
type.
*The following ranges of visibilities of the light might he expected in given atmospheric
COnditions :
61
5
Meteorological Range of
range Of visibility of
visibility the light
(nautical (nautical
Atmospheric transmissivity factor miles) Imiles)
93-------------------------------------------------------------- 2.4 0.96
94-------------------------------------------------------------- 3. 3 1.05
9.6-------------------------------------------------------------- 4.3 1.15
0.6-------------------------------------------------------------- 5.8 1. 24
0.7-------------------------------------------------------------- 8.4 1. 34
08-------------------------------------------------------------- 13.4 1.45
99-------------------------------------------------------------- 28.9 1. 57
Regulation 22
Regulation 22 is replaced by the following:
(a) Ships shall carry for every person on board a lifejacket of an
approved type and, in addition, unless these lifejackets can be adapted
for use by children, a sufficient number of lifejackets suitable for
children. Each lifejacket shall be suitably marked showing that it has
been approved by the Administration.
(b) In addition to the lifejackets required by paragraph (a) there
shall be carried on passenger ships lifejackets for 5 per cent of the
total number of persons on board. These lifejackets shall be stowed
in a conspicuous place on deck. - º
(c) An approved lifejacket shall comply with the following require-
ments:
(i) It shall be constructed with proper workmanship and materials.
(ii) It shall be so constructed as to eliminate so far as possible all
risk of its being put on incorrectly, except that it shall be capable of
being worn inside out.
(iii) It shall be capable of lifting the face of an exhausted or un-
conscious person out of the water and holding it above the water
with the body inclined backwards from its vertical position.
(iv) It shall be capable of turning the body in the water from any
position to a safe floating position with the body inclined backwards
from its vertical position.
(v) It shall not be adversely affected by oil or oil products.
(vi) It shall be of a highly visible colour.
(vii) It shall be fitted with an approved whistle, firmly secured by
a cord.
(viii) The buoyancy of the lifejacket required to provide the fore-
going performance shall not be reduced by more than 5 per cent
after 24 hours submergence in fresh water.
(d) A lifejacket, the buoyancy of which depends on inflation, may
be permitted for use by the crews of all ships except passenger ships
and tankers provided that:
(i) It has two separate inflatable compartments;
(ii) It is capable of being inflated both mechanically and by mouth;
and
(iii) It complies with the requirements of paragraph (c) with either
compartment inflated separately.
(e) Lifejackets shall be so placed as to be readily accessible and
their position shall be plainly indicated.
62
6
Ammer III
A M END MENT TO REGULATION 2 OF CHAPTER IV OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, 1960
I’egulation 2 g
Paragraph (c) is replaced by the following:
(c) “Radio Officer” means a person holding at least a first or
second class radiotelegraph operator's certificate, or a radiocommuni-
cation operator's general certificate for the maritime mobile service,
complying with the provisions of the Radio Regulations, who is
employed in the radiotelegraph station of a ship which is provided
with such a station in compliance with the provisions of Regulation 3
or Regulation 4 of this Chapter.
Amnea. IV
AMENDAIENTS TO REGULATIONS 9, 13 AND 15 OF CHAPTER IV OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, 1960
Regulation 9
Paragraphs (e) and (h)(i) are replaced by the following:
(e) The main and reserve transmitters shall be capable of trans-
mitting on the radiotelegraph distress frequency using a class of
emission assigned by the Radio Regulations for that frequency. In
addition, the main transmitter shall be capable of transmitting on
at least two working frequencies in the authorized bands between 405
kc/s and 535 kc/s, using classes of emission assigned by the Radio
Regulations for these frequencies. The reserve transmitter may consist
of a ship's emergency transmitter, as defined in and limited in use
by the Radio Regulations.
(h)(i) The main and reserve receivers shall be capable of receiving
the radiotelegraph distress frequency and the classes of emission
assigned by the Radio Regulations for that frequency. -
Regulation 13
Paragraphs (c) and (f) are replaced by the following:
(c) The transmitter shall be capable of transmitting on the radio-
telegraph distress frequency using a class of emission assigned by the
Radio Regulations for that frequency, and, in the bands between
4,000 kc/s and 27,500 kc/s, of transmitting on the radiotelegraph
frequency, and of using a class of emission, assigned by the Radio
Regulations for survival craft. However, the Administration may
permit the transmitter to be capable of transmitting on the radio-
telephone distress frequency, and of using a class of emission, assigned
by the Radio Regulations for that frequency, as an alternative or in
addition to transmission on the radiotelegraph frequency assigned
by the Radio Regulations for survival craft in the bands between
4,000 kc/s and 27,500 kc/s.
(f) The receiver shall be capable of receiving the radiotelegraph
distress frequency and the classes of emission assigned by the Radio
Regulations for that frequency. If the transmitter is capable of trans-
mitting on the radiotelephone distress frequency the receiver shall
also be capable of receiving that frequency and a class of emission
assigned by the Radio Regulations for that frequency.
63
7
Regulation 15
Paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (g) are replaced by the following:
(a) The radiotelephone installation shall include transmitting and
receiving equipment and appropriate sources of energy (referred to in
the following paragraphs as “the transmitter”, “the receiver” and
“the source of energy” respectively).
(b) The transmitter shall be capable of transmitting on the radio-
telephone distress frequency and on at least one other frequency in the
bands between 1,605 kc/s and 2,850 kc/s, using the classes of emission
assigned by the Radio Regulations for these frequencies. In normal
operation a double sideband transmission or a single sideband trans-
mission with full carrier (i.e. A3H) shall have a depth of modulation of
at least 70 percent at peak intensity. Modulation of a single sideband
transmission with reduced or suppressed carrier (A3A, A3J) shall be
such that the intermodulation products shall not exceed the values
given in the Radio Regulations.
(f) The receiver required by paragraph (a) of this Regulation shall
be capable of receiving the radiotelephone distress frequency and at
least one other frequency available for maritime radiotelephone
stations in the bands between 1,605 kc/s and 2,850 kc/s, using the
classes of emission assigned by the Radio Regulations for these
frequencies. In addition the receiver shall permit the reception of such
other frequencies, using the classes of emission assigned by the Radio
Regulations, as are used for the transmission by radiotelephony of
meteorological messages and such other communications relating to
the safety of navigation as may be considered necessary by the
Administration. The receiver shall have sufficient sensitivity to pro-
duce signals by means of a loudspeaker when the receiver input is as
low as 50 microvolts.
(g) The receiver used for maintaining watch on the radiotelephone
distress frequency shall be preset to this frequency, or so arranged that
Setting to the frequency may be carried out in a rapid and precise
manner and that, when set to this frequency, the receiver shall not
easily be detuned accidentally. The use of a separate single channel
watch receiver for the radiotelephone distress frequency fulfills this
requirement.
Amnea V
AMENDMENTS TO REGUIATION 11 OF CHAPTER IV AND REGULATION 12
OF CHAPTER V OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY
OF LIFE AT SEA, 1960
Iregulation 11 of Chapter IV
Existing paragraphs (a)-(g) are renumbered (a)(i)-(a)(vii) and a
new paragraph (b) is added as follows:
(b)(i) Radio equipment for homing on the radiotelephone distress
frequency shall be capable of taking direction-finding bearings on that
frequency without ambiguity of sense within an arc of 30 degrees on
either side of the bow.
(ii) When installing and testing the equipment referred to in this
paragraph due regard should be given to the relevant recommenda-
tion of the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR).
64
8
(iii) All reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure the homing capa-
bility required by this paragraph. In cases where due to technical
difficulties the homing capability cannot be achieved, Administra-
tions may grant to individual ships exemptions from the requirements
of this paragraph.
Regulation 12 of Chapter V (as amended by Resolution A.146(ES.IV))
A new paragraph (f) is added as follows:
(f) All ships of 1,600 tons gross tonnage and upwards, the keel of
which is laid on or after the date of coming into force of this paragraph,
when engaged on international voyages, shall be fitted with radio
equipment for homing on the radiotelephone distress frequency com-
plying with the relevant provisions of Regulation 11, paragraph (b)
of Chapter IV.
Annea VI
AMENDMENT TO CHAPTER V OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR
THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, 1960
A new Regulation is added as follows:
Regulation 21—International Code of Signals
All ships which in accordance with the present Convention are re-
quired to carry a radiotelegraph or a radiotelephone installation shall
carry the International Code of Signals. This publication shall also be
carried by any other ship which in the opinion of the Administration
has a need to use it.
Amner VII
AMENDMENTS TO REGULATIONs 7, 8, AND 9 OF CHAPTER I OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, 1960
Regulation 7
Paragraphs (b)(i) and (b)(ii) are replaced by the following:
(b)(i) The survey before the ship is put in service shall include a
complete inspection of its structure, machinery and equipments, in-
cluding the outside of the ship's bottom and the inside and outside of
the boilers. This survey shall be such as to ensure that the arrange-
ments, material, and scantlings of the structure, boilers and other
pressure vessels and their appurtenances, main and auxiliary machin-
ery, electrical installation, radio installation, radiotelegraph installa-
tions in motor lifeboats, portable radio apparatus for survival craft,
life-saving appliances, fire detecting and extinguishing appliances,
radar, echo-sounding device, gyro-compass, pilot ladders and other
equipments, fully comply with the requirements of the present Con-
vention, and of the laws, decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
as a result thereof by the Administration for ships of the service for
which it is intended. The survey shall also be such as to ensure that
the workmanship of all parts of the ship and its equipments is in all
respects satisfactory, and that the ship is provided with the lights,
means of making sound signals and distress signals as required by the
provisions of the present Convention and the International Collision
Regulations. -
(b)(ii) The periodical survey shall include an inspection of the
structure, boilers and other pressure vessels, machinery and equip-
65
9
ments, including the outside of the ship's bottom. The survey shall
be such as to ensure that the ship, as regards the structure, boilers
and other pressure vessels and their appurtenances, main and auxiliary
machinery, electrical installation, radio installation, radiotelegraph
installations in motor lifeboats, portable radio apparatus for survival
craft, life-saving appliances, fire detecting and extinguishing appli-
ances, radar, echo-sounding device, gyro-compass, pilot ladders and
other equipments, is in satisfactory condition and fit for the service
for which it is intended, and that it complies with the requirements of
the present Convention, and of the laws, decrees, orders and regula-
tions promulgated as a result thereof by the Administration. The
lights and means of making sound signals and the distress signals
carried by the ship shall also be subject to the above-mentioned
survey for the purpose of ensuring that they comply with the require-
ments of the present Convention and of the International Collision
Regulations.
The existing text of Regulation 8 is replaced by the following:
Regulation 8—Surveys of Life-Saving Appliances and Other Equipment of
Cargo Ships
The life-saving appliances, except a radiotelegraph installation in a
motor lifeboat or a portable radio apparatus for survival craft, the
echo-sounding device, the gyro-compass, and the fire extinguishing
appliances of cargo ships to which Chapters II, III and V of the present
Regulations apply shall be subject to initial and subsequent surveys
as provided for passenger ships in Regulation 7 of this Chapter with
the substitution of 24 months for 12 months in sub-paragraph (a)(ii)
of that Regulation. The fire control plans in new ships and the pilot
ladders, lights and means of making sound signals carried by new and
existing ships shall be included in the surveys for the purpose of
ensuring that they comply fully with the requirements of the present
Convention and, where applicable, the International Collision.
Regulations.
The existing text of Regulation 9 is replaced by the following:
Regulation 9—Surveys of Radio and Radar Installations of Cargo Ships
The radio and radar installations of cargo ships to which Chapters
TV and V of the present Regulations apply and any radiotelegraph
installation in a motor lifeboat or portable radio apparatus for survival
craft which is carried in compliance with the requirements of Chapter
III of the present Regulations shall be subject to initial and subsequent
surveys as provided for passenger ships in Regulation 7 of this Chapter.
Amnea. VIII
AMENDMENTS TO CERTAIN SAFETY CERTIFICATES APPENDED TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, 1960
Passenger Ship Safety Certificate
Parts VI and VIII are replaced by the following:
VI. That the ship complied with the requirements of the Regulations
as regards radiotelegraph installations, viz.:
66
10
Requirements Actual
of regulation provision
Hours of listening by Operator--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Operators----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether auto alarm fitted------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether reserve installation fitted-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether main and reserve transmitters electrically separated Or Combined-----------------------------------------
Whether direction-finder and/or radio equipment for homing On the radiotelephone
distress frequency fitted-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether radar fitted----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -
Number of passengers for which certificated--------------------------------------------------------------------
VIII. That the ship complied with the requirements of the Regula-
tions as regards fire-detecting and fire-extinguishing appliances, radar,
echo-sounding device and gyro-compass and was provided with naviga-
tion lights and shapes, pilot ladder, and means of making sound signals,
and distress signals in accordance with the provisions of the Regula-
tions and also the International Collision Regulations.
CARGO SHIP SAFETY EQUIPMENT CERTIFICATE
Part V is replaced by the following:
V. That the inspection showed that the ship complied with the
requirements of the said Convention as regards fire-extinguishing
appliances and fire control plans, echo-sounding device and gyro-
compass and was provided with navigation lights and shapes, pilot
ladder, and means of making Sound signals and distress signals, in
accordance with the provisions of the Regulations and the Interna-
tional Collision Regulations.
CARGO SHIP SAFETY RADIOTELEGRAPHY CERTIFICATE
Part I is replaced by the following: -
I. That the above-mentioned ship complies with the provisions of
the Regulations annexed to the Convention referred to above as
regards radiotelegraphy and radar:
Requirements Actual
of regulations provision "
Hours of listening by Operator--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Operators----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether auto alarm fitted------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether main installation fitted-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether reserve installation fitted-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether main and reserve transmitters electrically separated Or Combined-----------------------------------------
Whether direction-finder and/or radio equipment for homing on the radiotelephone dis-
tress frequency fitted--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether radar fitted-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear Passenger Ship Safety Certificate
Parts VII and IX are replaced by the following:
VII. That the ship complied with the requirements of the Regula-
tions as regards radiotelegraph installations, viz.:
67
11
Requirements Actual
of regulations provision
Hours of listening by Operator--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Operators----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether auto alarm fitted.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether main installation fitted.-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether reserve installation fitted-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether main and reserve transmitters electrically separated or combined-----------------------------------------
Whether direction-finder and/or radio equipment for homing on the radiotelephone
distress frequency fitted.--------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether radar fitted-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of passengers for which certificated.--------------------------------------------------------------------
IX. That the ship complied with the requirements of the Regula-
tions as regards fire-detecting and fire-extinguishing appliances, radar
echo-sounding device and gyro-compass and was provided with naviga-
tion lights and shapes, pilot ladder, and means of making sound signals
and distress signals in accordance with the provisions of the Regula-
tions and also the International Collision Regulations.
Nuclear Cargo Ship Safety Certificate
Parts VII and IX are replaced by the following: -
VII. That the ship complied with the requirements of the Regula-
tions as regards radiotelegraph installations viz.: -
Requirements Actual
of regulations provision
Hours of listening by operator--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of operators---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether auto alarm fitted.-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether main installation fitted.---------------------------------------------------------------.…..I.
Whether reserve installation fitted.----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether main and reserve transmitters electrically separated or combined-------------------------------------------
Whether direction-finder and/or radio equipment for homing on the radiotelephone
distress frequency fitted------------------------------------------------------------"- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Whether radar fitted.-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IX. That the inspection showed that the ship complied with the
requirements of the said Convention as regards fire-extinguishing
appliances, radar, echo-sounding device and gyro-compass and was
provided with navigation lights and shapes, pilot ladder, and means of
making sound signals and distress signals in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Regulations and the International Collision Regulations.
Certified a true copy of the English and French text of Resolution
A.174(VI) adopted by the Assembly of the Inter-Governmental Mari-
time Consultative Organization on 21 October 1969 and of the English
and French texts of Annexes I to VIII thereto comprising eight amend-
68
12
ments to the international Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,
done in London on 17 June 1960, which were recommended and
adopted in conformity with Article IX (b)(i) of the aforesaid Conven-
tion, the original of which is deposited with the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization.
|SEAL) THOMAS MENSAH,
Head of Legal Division
London, 15 January 1970
(For the Secretary-General of the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization).
69
Senator PELL. Rear Admiral Rea of the Coast Guard, Chief of
the Office of American Marine Safety, will be our first witness; and
as, I guess the only Active Reserve officer of the Coast Guard in the
Congress now, I particularly welcome you. I feel there is no conflict
of interest, even though the columnist Jack Anderson feels there is. So
I welcome you here very much, indeed. º
Admiral REA. Good morning, Senator Pell.
Senator PELL. Right, Admiral. Proceed as you will,
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. WILLIAM F. REA, CHIEF, OFFICE OF
MERCHANT MARINE SAFETY, U.S. COAST GUARD; ACCOMPANIED
BY LT. COMDR, ROBERT FENTON, OFFICE OF OPERATIONS AND
COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION, U.S. COAST GUARD
Admiral REA. Mr. Chairman, I am Rear Adm. William F. Rea, the
Third Chief of the Office of Merchant Marine Safety, Coast Guard
Headquarters in Washington. It is a pleasure to be able to appear
today to express Department of Transportation support for U.S.
jºion of 11 amendments to the Safety of Life at Sea Convention
Of 1960.
AMENDMENTS TO SOLAS CONVENTION
The Torrey Canyon disaster in 1967 was carefully studied by the
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), and
as a result of that study, the fourth extraordinary session of the
IMCO Assembly adopted three amendments to the SOLAS Conven-
tion. These amendments are intended to decrease vessel casualties by
insuring that vessels over a minimum size have on board radar, gyro
compass, echo sounding device, adequate charts and nautical publica-
tions, and by regulating the use of automatic pilots.
The Sixth IMCO Assembly adopted eight amendments covering
various aspects of safety of life at sea. They are the results of improved
technology or of demonstrated shortcomings in the existing conven-
tion. The first two amendments deal primarily with safety equipment
carried on vessels. The first provides for additional fireman's outfits
and personal equipment. The second provides for better lighting of
life buoys and improved specification for lifejackets.
The third, fourth, and fifth amendments provide for increased
Safety through more effective radiotelegraph and radiotelephone
service aboard vessels. The sixth amendment also provides for better
communication by requiring vessels to carry the new international
code of signals.
The seventh and eighth amendments provide requirements for
inspections and for the recording of certain equipment on the ship's
Safety certificate.
U.S. PARTICIPATION IN FORMULATION AND ADOPTION OF AMENDMENTS
The United States participated in the formulation and eventual
adoption of all such amendments after full consultation with American
maritime interests, including management, labor, and other Govern-
70
ment and non-Government offices. This consultation was very ex-
tensive and involved working groups in the various technical areas.
The Shipping Coordinating Committee which advises the Department
of State on U.S. positions prior to meetings such as the IMCO AS-
sembly, also participated in the development of the matters before
you. The United States fully supported all of these amendments at
the IMCO Assembly meetings, at which the Coast Guard was fully
represented along with the Department of State.
U.S. RATIFICATION RECOMMENDED
The Department of Transportation supports all of these amend-
ments and strongly recommends ratification by the United States.
This concludes my prepared statement, and I am prepared to
answer any questions.
Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Admiral Rea.
SOURCE OF IMCO CONVENTION
The IMCO Convention in this regard came out of the Committee
of the Safety of Life at Sea set up under IMCO; didn’t it?
Admiral REA. That is correct.
Senator PELL. Right. I remember. I think one of the most important
jobs being done by any of the specialized international agencies is
being done by IMCO.
FCC OBJECTIONS TO AMENDMENT CONCERNING RAIDIO HOMING DEVICES
The FCC, Federal Communications Commission, apparently had
objections to the wording of the amendment dealing with radio homing
devices. What were their objections?
Admiral REA. Senator, I have a communications officer with me,
and I would like him to respond. He is Lieutenant Commander
Fenton. -
Senator PELL. Certainly.
Commander FENTON. Lt. Comdr. Robert Fenton of the Office of
Operations and Communications Division, Coast Guard Headquarters,
Washington; and if I may
Senator PELL. Certainly. What was the FCC objection?
Commander FENTON. Senator, I think it was a matter of interpre-
tation as to what the Commission's authority was to act in behalf of
radio. As you know, the Communications Act of 1934 enables the
FCC to regulate radio, and their worry was that the interpretation of
the word “homing” would not be regarded as radio, and it was a Coast
Guard’s interpretation, I think, international interpretation, that it is
a radio device and therefore subject to Commission interpretation.
Senator PELL. Right; thank you.
INCREASING ATUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF IMCO
As I understand it, IMCO has gradually come to have, as is quite
correct, authority over all these areas of safety of life at sea
Admiral REA. Yes, sir.
71
Senator PELL (continuing). And an increasing area of responsibility.
One of the experiences I enjoyed most in my life was when President
Eisenhower appointed me a delegate to the initial meeting of IMCO.
I saw this little agency start out and then saw it become a very effective
and very unsung one. Probably IMCO has had more impact on the
world, with less words and less publicity, than any other specialized
agency, which is the way the Coast Guard operates.
The Coast Guard does a very effective job and does it very quietly
and without publicity. IMCO is an extension of that and one more
example of how we will get sometime some kind of international Sea
uard.
g Admiral REA. Thank you.
IS DOMESTIC ENABLING LEGISLATION NEEDED?
Senator PELL. The amendments that are being proposed will
establish new standards and regulations. Will we have to have domestic
enabling legislation?
Admiral REA. Senator, once these have been ratified we can proceed
on most of these just by regulation changes. Some of these proposed
IMCO amendments are already in our body of regulations. For the
others there may be need for legislative authority. For the most part,
there is already existing authority by which to promulgate the reg-
ulations, but we have been reluctant to do so until we have at least
gotten the advice and consent of the Senate in this regard. g
VESSELS WITH FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE
Senator PELL. What about the vessels with flags of convenience;
the Panamanian, Colombian, Dominican, Liberian and others? Will
they be covered by these regulations?
Admiral REA. Yes, sir; once the amendments go into effect—Pan-
ama, Liberia are among the contracting governments—and once these
amendments go into effect they can be enforced. These would be
required internationally. In the meantime all governments are urged not
to wait for the final deposit or final coming into effect, and once the
United States has been deposited we will be in a much stronger position
to urge other nations to go ahead and bring about the early coming in
force of these particular changes. -
EASTERN ETJROPEAN AND SOVIET PARTICIPATION
Senator PELL. Are any Eastern European nations participants in
these agreements? The Soviets belong.
Admiral REA. The U.S.S.R. is one of the strong participants in
the Maritime Safety Committee, a technical group under IMCO,
and the U.S.S.R. is a full participant in this technical committee.
TJ. S. POSITION ON MAINLAND CHINA BELONGING TO IMCO
Senator PELL. Do we still adhere to the position that mainland
China, with a fourth of the world's people, should not belong to
IMCO?
72
Admiral REA. I think we have changed our position on that. Mr.
Chairman, Rear Admiral Edwards, who is here and I think perhaps
will appear with Mr. Reynolds, is presently the chairman of the
IMCO Council; that is an intermediate body and they have been
wrestling with that situation, and he could speak to that issue. It
has been raised there and they have been allowed to participate.
NONMEMBER GOVERNMENTS’ ADHERENCE TO IMCO STANDARDS
Senator PELL. But do the mainland Chinese vessels adhere to
the IMCO codes about the safety regulations?
Admiral REA. I don't know whether they are one of the contracting.
governments or not. I don’t think they are one of the contracting
governments.
Senator PELL. They are not a contracting government. I wondered
if there is any informal arrangement so the vessels of the Chinese
or the North Koreans, who are not members either, and the East
Germans, who have somewhat of a merchant marine of their own,
adhere to the IMCO standards. e
Admiral REA. I don’t know, but I would think for the most part
they do, but I would have to furnish this.
Senator PELL. Could you furnish it for the record?
Admiral REA. Yes, we can.
Senator PELL. Thank you very much.
(The information referred to follows. See also p. 76.)
ADHERENCE TO IMCO STANDARDS BY PEOPLE's REPUBLIC OF CHINA, NORTH
KoREA AND PEOPLE's REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
(Supplied by U.S. Coast Guard)
The U.S. Coast Guard has no information as to whether or not the People’s
Republic of China, North Korea, or the People's Republic of Germany presently
adhere to the IMCO standards or those of the United States. To my knowledge,
there are no informal arrangements to this effect. It would seem apparent that
vessels of these three countries are adhering to the present Convention on the
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1960. As you know,
North Korea and the People's Republic of Germany are not members of IMCO.,
nor are they signatory to its conventions. With regard to the People’s Republic of
China, IMCO is now actively taking steps to assure they become a member. When
this happens, it is felt they would quickly become signatory to the more important
IMCO conventions, such as the International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea, 1960; The International Convention on Load Lines, 1966, and the recently
completed Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions
at Sea, 1972. In so doing, they would assuredly have their vessels at least meet the
minimum safety standards of the conventions signed.
PREEMPTION OF EXISTING STANDARDS OR REGULATIONS
Senator PELL. Will the regulations that you will have to put out
to enforce these new standards preempt any existing Federal or
State standards or regulations?
Admiral REA. Yes, because these will all be Federal regulations
and they apply to vessels in the international trade. The States would
not regulate in this area.
73
STRINGENCY OF REGULATIONS
Senator PELL. In general they are more stringent than the present
regulations; isn’t that correct?
Admiral REA. So far as American flag vessels they will not have
much impact because they do have radar and gyro compass and that
will impact primarily on the foreign vessels which will be in competi-
tion with our own fleet.
Senator PELL. But American vessels, for instance, don’t have to
have two firemen outfits now; do they?
Admiral REA. Yes, sir, they do. The regulations require that. That
was one of the regulations we implemented quite early.
Senator PELL. Thank you. I stand corrected. Thank you very much,
indeed, Admiral Rea, and thank you very much Commander Fenton.
Admiral REA. Thank you. .
Senator PELL. The next and final witness is a very personal friend,
Mr. Jim Reynolds, representing the American Merchant Marine,
American Institute of Merchant Shipping.
STATEMENT OF JAMES J. REYNOLDS, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN IN-
STITUTE OF MERCHANT SHIPPING; ACCOMPANIED BY REAR
ADM, RODERICK Y, EDWARDS, CHAIRMAN, IMCO COUNCIL
Mr. REYNoLDs. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I am taking the
liberty of bringing to the table my associate at the American Institute
of Merchant Shipping, Rear Adm. Roderick Y. Edwards, who also is
the ºtent chairman of the IMCO Council, as Admiral Rea has just
stated.
I have a very brief statement, Senator Pell and, in fact, I will make
it briefer as I read it. .
To identify myself, I am James J. Reynolds, I am president of the
American Institute of Merchant Shipping which is a national trade
association composed of 37 U.S. companies which own and operate
over 400 oceangoing vessels of all types registered under the U.S. flag.
These vessels aggregate in excess of 8 million deadweight tons and are
engaged in the domestic and foreign trades of the United States. These
vessels operated by our member companies constitute over 65 percent
of the privately owned active U.S. merchant fleet.
Mr. Chairman, we are most appreciative of the opportunity afforded
us of presenting this statement of our views and recommendations
with respect to the 11 proposed amendments of the International
Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, 1960 (SOLAS) adopted by the
Assembly of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organiza-
tion (IMCO) which the President transmitted to the Senate in July
of this year with a recommendation that “the Senate give swift and
favorable consideration to all of these amendments.” The text of these
amendments is contained in Senate Document Executive O dated
July 24, 1972.
Mr. Chairman, AIMS, which is the acronym for the American
Institute of Merchant Shipping, and its member companies are vitally
74
interested in promoting safety of life and property at sea. As a result
of this interest and a most cooperative working relationship with the
U.S. Coast Guard, the design, construction, equipment, and operational
standards of U.S.-flag vessels are the highest in the world. AIMS and
its member company experts on our operations, technical, telecom-
munications and other committees are in constant communication and
discussion with the Coast Guard and its respective working groups of
government-industry representatives concerning the position that
should be taken by the United States relative to proposals under
consideration by subcommittees of IMCO relating to the design, con-
struction, equipment, operation of U.S. vessels, and training of ship-
board personnel for oceangoing vessels. These proposals are intended
to increase safety of navigation and reduce to the lowest possible
minimum collisions and groundings and resultant pollution of the
marine environment. Through our participation in meetings with the
Coast Guard and its working groups and our representation in an
advisory capacity on U.S. delegations to meetings of IMCO subcom-
mittees, the Maritime Safety Committee, Council, and Assembly,
AIMS assisted in the development of the 11 amendments to the
SOLAS Convention now before you. The ratification and coming into
force on an international basis of the additional safety requirements
contained in these important amendments will have the effect of
raising the safety standards of foreign-flag vessels nearer to those high
standards which now prevail on U.S.-flag vessels.
RECOMMENDATION FOR PROMPT RATIFICATION TJRGED
Mr. Chairman, I will not intrude on your patience to list all of
these amendments. Admiral Rea has already done that most com-
petently. I would merely reiterate that the American Institute of
Merchant Shipping strongly, most respectfully, urges the Committee
on Foreign Relations to recommend to the Senate for ratification as
promptly as practicable the 11 proposed amendments of the Interna-
tional Convention for Safety of Life at Sea 1960, adopted by the IMCO
Assembly. -
It is a real pleasure and a source of pride to me as president of this
group, Mr. Chairman, to join with this great organization, the Coast
Guard, in support of the adoption of these amendments. I am proud of
the fact that the U.S. industry is prepared to do this and does it most
willingly and most enthusiastically.
Thank you, sir.
(The prepared statement of Mr. Reynolds follows:)
STATEMENT OF AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF MERCHANT SHIPPING
My name is James J. Reynolds. I am President of the American Institute of
Merchant Shipping. AIMS is a national trade association composed of thirty-
Seven United States companies which own and operate over 400 ocean-going ves-
Sels of all types registered under the U.S.-flag. These vessels aggregate in excess of
8,000,000 deadweight tons and are engaged in the domestic and foreign trades of
the United States. These vessels operated by our member companies constitute
Over 65% of the privately-owned active U.S. merchant fleet.
We very much appreciate the opportunity afforded us of presenting this state-
ment of our views and recommendations with respect to the eleven proposed
75
amendments of the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, 1960
(SOLAS) adopted by the Assembly of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consulta-
tive Organization (IMCO) which the President transmitted to the Senate in July
of this year with a recommendation that “the Senate give swift and favorable con-
sideration to all of these amendments.” The text of these amendments is con-
tained in Senate Document Executive O dated July 24, 1972.
AIMS and its member companies are vitally interested in promoting safety of
life and property at Sea. As the result of this interest and a most cooperative work-
ing relationship with the U.S. Coast Guard, the design, construction, equipment
and operational standards of U.S.-flag vessels are the highest in the world. AIMS
and its member company experts on our operations, technical, telecommunica-
tions and other committees are in constant communication and discussion with the
Coast Guard and its respective working groups of government-industry repre-
sentatives concerning the position that should be taken by the U.S. relative to pro-
posals under consideration by subcommittees of IMCO relating to the design, con-
struction, equipment, operation of U.S. vessels and training of shipboard personnel
for oceangoing vessels. These proposals are intended to increase safety of naviga-
tion and reduce to the lowest possible minimum collisions and groundings and re-
Sultant pollution of the marine environment. Through our participation in meet-
ings with the Coast Guard and its working groups and our representation in an
advisory capacity on U.S. delegations to meetings of IMCO subcommittees, the
Maritime Safety Committee, Council and Assembly, AIMS assisted in the de-
velopment of the eleven amendments to the SOLAS Convention now before you.
The ratification and coming into force on an international basis of the additional
safety requirements contained in these important amendments will have the effect
of raising the safety standards of foreign-flag vessels nearer to those high standards
which now prevail on U.S.-flag vessels. - -
The following three amendments of the SOLAS Convention were adopted by the
IMCO Assembly in November, 1968:
Amendment of Regulation 12 of Chapter V to require radar, radio direction-
finding equipment and gyro-compass on ships of 1,600 gross tons and over engaged
on international voyages and installation of echo-sounding device on new ships
of 500 gross tons and over engaged on international voyages.
New Regulation 19 requiring that a ship's steering gear shall be capable of
immediate changeover from automatic to manual control.
New Regulation 20 which requires all ships to carry adequate and up-to-date
navigation charts, sailing directions, light lists, notices to mariners, tide tables, etc.
The following eight amendments of the SOLAS Convention were adopted by
the IMCO Assembly in October, 1969:
Amendment of Regulation 65 of Chapter II requires that at least two firemen's
Outfits shall be carried on cargo vessels and that national administrations may
require additional sets of such equipment on large cargo ships and on tankers.
Amendment of Regulation 21 of Chapter III to require that self-igniting lights
for life buoys shall be constructed so that they cannot be extinguished by water.
Amendment of Regulation 22 of Chapter III requiring that life jackets shall be
constructed in accordance with improved specifications.
Amendments of Regulations 2, 9, 11, and 15 of Chapter IV provide for more
effective radiotelegraph and radiotelephone service on board vessels.
New subsection (f) of Regulation 12 of Chapter W would require all new vessels
of 1,600 gross tons and over engaged on international voyages to be fitted with
radio equipment for homing on the radiotelephone distress frequency complying
with provisions of new subsection (b) of Regulation 11 of Chapter IV.
New subsection (b) of Regulation 11 of Chapter IV requires that the above
equipment shall be capable of taking direction-finding bearings on the radio-
telephone distress frequency within an arc of 30° on either side of the bow.
New Regulation 21 in Chapter V provides that all ships required to be equipped
with radiotelegraph or radiotelephone installation shall carry the International
Code of Signals. -
Amendments of Regulations 7, 8, and 9 of Chapter I provide for initial and
periodic surveys of new equipment required by above amendments namely, radar,
echo-sounding device and gyro-compass.
The American Institute of Merchant Shipping strongly urges the Committee
on Foreign Relations to recommend to the Senate for ratification as promptly as
practicable, the eleven proposed amendments of the International Convention for
Safety of Life at Sea, 1960 adopted by the IMCO Assembly.
76
Senator PELL. I am delighted and it is wonderful when you find a
Government agency and the industry involved both supporting a
common position. I think great credit goes to both groups involved.
PARTICIPATION OF MAINLAND CHINA
Maybe the admiral can answer the question I mentioned earlier
about participation by Mainland China, in any of these various
safety of life at sea conventions.
Admiral EDWARDS. Well, sir, at the last meeting of the Council—
the Council, as you know, operates and runs the organization during
the periods the Assembly does not meet—the Council took the action
of admitting Red China and, at the same time, expelling Taiwan.
The Secretary General was instructed immediately to make known
to the Red Chinese authorities this action which stemmed from the
United Nations’ action as a body. I believe he received an invitation
to visit Peking, and I may be wrong but I think he might be in Peking
as we sit here today, negotiating for the admittance of the Red
Chinese. All I can say is every indication is that the Red Chinese are
moving very quickly to become signatories to all of the conventions
for which IMCO is the depository and to bring their ships in alinement
with the current conventions.
CONTINUED AD HERENCE OF TAIWANESE WESSELS
Senator PELL. Will the Taiwanese vessels continue to adhere to
the principles of IMCO even though, in my view, they have been
kicked out. I don’t like this fact, but it is a fact. Even though they
are no longer members, will they continue to adhere or would they
feel no compulsion to adhere? -
Admiral EDWARDS. No; I would rather suspect that on the record,
based on what has gone on in the past, that we could expect that the
Taiwanese would continue to adhere to the convention because there
is nothing in these conventions that is onerous, and when I use the
word onerous, I mean that any reasonable shipowner who has
some respect for his investment would continue to comply with the
convention.
Senator PELL. Thank you.
MARINE POLLUTION CONFERENCE
I understand that IMCO will be convening a marine pollution
conference sometime next year. When will that conference be and
what can the Senate expect from the conference?
Admiral EDWARDs. That conference is scheduled for October of
1973, and it will be held in a building you are fairly familiar with:
namely, Church House in London, and what we can expect I would
hesitate to speculate on. I do know, and you are well aware of, the
hard position which I had the honor to attempt to negotiate both at
the CCMS (Committee on Challenges to Modern Society) in NATO
and subsequently to introduce into IMCO.
77
The current U.S. position is one which I think will make a major
contribution in eliminating deliberate pollution of the seas by oil.
I think that it will go even beyond this.
Senator PELL. Just out of pure personal curiosity, what week in
October do you happen to recall?
Admiral EDWARDs. Sir, could I furnish that to you personally at a
subsequent date? I do have it in the office.
Senator PELL. Fine.
Will the objectives be as stringent, and I hope they are, as the
NATO pollution objectives? 8
Admiral EDWARDs. Sir, the assembly at its last meeting—
Senator PELL. Which assembly, NATO or IMCO2
Admiral EDWARDs. IMCO assembly at its last meeting. One of the
resolutions states that the purpose of this convention should be the
complete elimination of the willful discharge of oil into the sea. That
seems to me to set the tone for what one can expect to come out of
this convention.
NATO ASSEMBLY OBJECTIVE
Senator PELL. What is the NATO Assembly objective?
Admiral EDWARDs. The NATO Assembly objective is the very same
thing. The language is precisely the same.
Senator PELL. I thought it went further.
Admiral EDw ARDs. Sir? -
Senator PELL. I thought the NATO objective went further.
Admiral EDWARDs. No; I think they are synonymous. There is one
little difference and that is the term discharge as harmful within the
context of the NATO resolution whereas the word “harmful” does
not appear in that which came out of the IMCO resolution.
Senator PELL. That is a big difference. w
Admiral EDWARDs. I heartily agree it is a big difference because
that lends itself to definition. However, there was a wide variance of
opinion among the scientific types at that CCMS conference, and
it was also circulated widely at the IMCO assembly. However, we did
achieve a pretty big objective to getting the rest of the world to even
indicate this was the direction they were going.
MERCHANT MARINE INDUSTRY'S VIEW OF NATO AND IMCO objECTIVES
Senator PELL. I don’t mean to embarrass Mr. Reynolds, but what
would be the viewpoint of the merchant marine industry about
attaining these objectives? -*-
Mr. REYNOLDs. Our tanker industry has cooperated to a very great
degree in the formulation of an approach to the implementation of the
NATO resolution which would be consistent with the objectives of
preserving the marine ecology and yet serving the needs of the world
with an insatiable appetite for energy. They do take exception, for
instance, to the statement that there shall be no discharge of oil into
the seas, because they believe there is a minimum which just has to be
inevitably discharged when you are transporting great quantities of
crude oil over thousands and thousands of miles. But they quite agree
78
that any discharge of petroleum into the sea should be under very
rigidly controlled conditions while the vessel is underway and the
maximum permissible amount be minuscule per million parts of water
So that it would be an amount which would be very easily tolerated by
the marine ecology.
Senator PELL. Then you would support the IMCO position but not
the NATO position?
Mr. REYNoLDs. That is correct. The NATO position, I think,
quite frankly, was developed to get us off dead center and is a very
worthwhile objective to avoid the discharge into the seas of any
petroleum hopefully by 1975 if we could do it. But what IMCO is
doing and has done is to assign to the various nation members of
IMCO the responsibility of developing studies in depth of all aspects
of this and then reporting back to TMCO at the meeting next October.
So that we can come up with a real practical approach to this, so
that we will, indeed, improve the marine ecology and yet go on with
the business of life in this world, because unless we take the collective
wisdom of the world and change the priorities of life and say that
light and heat and all the other niceties of life to which we are ac-
customed and that arise out of the energy from petroleum ought to be
discarded then there has to be developed a really practical approach
to this. In saying this I don’t want to leave any impression, Senator
Pell, that I am weaseling on behalf of the industry. It is wholeheartedly
and genuinely behind this move.
POLLUTION REGULATIONS NIEEDED FOR FIUTURE
Senator PELL. Looking ahead also, we can see where there will be
many more of these offshore oil rigs being built. My own view is that
the airports of the future will have to be built out at sea to handle the
SST's of the future. There will be superports and nuclear power-
plants all in the sea. Have IMCO and the United States conducted
any studies of the pollution regulations needed for the offshore—
What do they call them—manmade islands?
Mr. REYNoLDs. Deep water island ports.
Senator PELL. This will involve new things in international law.
Obviously, if you build an airport 25 miles out from New York as
you could on the Continental Shelf, pumping out the water and having
huge dikes 150 feet high or having floating—both are in the state of
the art; both will be here before the century ends. But in moving ahead
in these areas, has IMCO conducted any studies on the legal con-
sequences of the pollution regulations needed?
Mr. REYNoLDs. I think, if I may just say something here, and I am
sure Admiral Edwards can answer more competently, that this will
be an appropriate subject of the Law of the Seas Conference that you
have alluded to several times. -
Senator PELL. I question that because I have been a delegate or an
advisºr to all of the meetings in the past and I am not sure that is a
thought which that group has been seized with particularly. It should
be, but I am not sure that it has been as yet.
Mr. REYNoLDs. Admiral, do you have any statement?
79
Admiral EDWARDS. Mr. Chairman, you are aware of the interna-
tional dispute. TMCO has not conducted studies such as the one you
have questioned. However, they have been involved in the operation
of offshore platforms in the oil industry without necessarily having
any jurisdiction to do this. I am sure you are familiar with the fact
that the Stockholm conference spoke to this aspect of the thing and,
for instance, ocean dumping is right now up for grabs. It is my under-
standing that the plenipotentiary meeting in London, which will take
place in October, will perhaps assign part of the ocean dumping prob-
lem to IMCO for some action as well as to the TOC (Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission) and I would strongly suspect that once
this jurisdictional hassle takes place it is entirely possible that IMCO
would become involved with the type of problem that you speak of, to
a limited degree.
Senator PELL. Right. I think there is going to be a tremendous area
of dispute in the years to come because we really have not faced up
to that and the problems will be immense.
That concludes the hearings on these three conventions on the
agenda today and you will know we are prepared to move right along
probably until the end of the session of Congress.
Mr. REYNOLDs. Thank you.
Senator PELL. Is there anything else? .
Mr. REYNoLDs. Pardon me, Senator Pell. - - -
Admiral EDWARDS. I would just like to make this observation, if
T may, I hope it is not too presumptious. . .
Senator PELL. Not at all.
RATIFICATION OF CIVIL LIABILITY AND FUNDING CONVENTIONS
Admiral EDWARDs. There is a great interest worldwide in the
ratification of the international monetary fund so far as the civil
liability Brussels Convention is concerned and I think that in the
interests of preventing pollution or at least of affording people who
are affected by pollution some relief, the passage or the ratification of
these two conventions would be helpful.
Senator PELL. Which two conventions?
Admiral EDWARDs. The TMCO convention on civil liability associ-
ated with oil pollution, and the creation of an international monetary
fund to assist in defraying the expenses.
Senator PELL. I can interrupt there because I am well aware of the
problem. It is a little bit fouled up at this point because there is a
question about domestic jurisdiction involved as we move ahead
with it. In all frankness, and I think the executive branch should make
their plans accordingly, it does not look as if the Senate will give its
consent to these treaties in this Congress. I regret this. We have had
it on the calendar for some time, but it has had a condition on it and
to get it through now would take several days of in-depth hearings
in these declining days. I share your thoughts, but I must give you
that sad news.
80
Mr. REYNoLDs. I would say, Senator, that here again, as a reflec-
tion of the attitude of the tanker industry of the United States, that
at the appropriate time we are prepared to urge ratification of those,
too. - -
Senator PELL. Right. The problem, as you know, is one of the
international treaties not being as stringent as American law and the
question of which will prevail. Some of my colleagues feel very strongly
on this matter. We can’t ratify the one without ratifying the other
and both of them will probably not be ratified this session. I am sorry.
This concludes this meeting of the subcommittee. -
(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the subcommittee adjourned, subject
to the call of the Chair.) -
O
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