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Dogmatism and Scepticism.

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The Relation of Dogmatism and Scepticism
in the
Philosophical Treatises of Cicero
H523
By
MARGARET YOUNG HENRY
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Philosophy,
Columbia University
Printed at Geneva, New York
W. F. HUMPHREY
1925
878
счо
H 523
Columbian tuis. hibe.
ey
4-30-1926
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION.
Fluctuating popularity of Cicero through the centuries.
1-5
Disparagement of Cicero both as statesman and philosopher in nineteenth
century.
Overemphasis on sources rather than content of his philosophical treatises.
Zeller's charge of philosophical inconsistency and of conflict between dog-
matism and scepticism in the treatises.
William James' Will to Believe, with its defence of dogmatism in moral
matters along with doubt in the theoretical sphere, suggests a line of
defence of Cicero against the criticism of Zeller.
Cicero's tendency even in the speculative dialogue is affirmative, not doubtful.
A. The Speculative Treatises: their affirmative trend.
CHAPTER I. De Finibus...
A rejection of the materialistic pleasure-theory.
A criticism of the ascetic virtue-theory.
A plea for humanism,-the good of the whole man.
Introduction, p. 6–7.
Rejection of Epicurean doctrine, because it offends morality.
Rejection of Stoic doctrine, because its idealism is impractical.
Acceptance of the humanistic doctrine of Antiochus.
a.-Refutation of Epicurean doctrine, 7-12.
1. On the ground of logic, 7–8.
2. On the ground of psychology, 8-9.
Based on appeal to experience.
3. Pleasure not the End, because the soul is divine, 9–10.
4. Pleasure-theory a menace to morality, 10-12.
Need of correct theory as basis for conduct.
Experience in Roman life showed evils of Epicureanism, 11–12.
b. Refutation of Stoic Doctrine, 12–19.
Introduction.
...6–25
Stoic asceticism, like Epicurean materialism, dangerous to practical morality,
13.
Stoic view criticised on ground of
1. Faulty Logic, 13-14.
2. Weakness as basis for action, 14-17.
(a) Syllogistic proof does not inspire will to do, 14.
(b) Stoics regarded virtue as barely attainable, 14–15.
(c) Disregard of natural and bodily impulses denies man's dual nature,
16-17.
Stoics ignore prima naturae.
The Stoic Compromise, 17-19.
In compromising, the Stoics differed only in words from the Peripatetics,
c. Cicero's View, a plea for humanism and for the good of the whole man as
the end, 19-25.
iv
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
Introduction.
Cicero favors the doctrine of Antiochus as set forth by Piso in Book V.19.
Cicero the exemplar of ancient humanism, 20.
1. Material Goods have a place in the Summum Bonum, 20–21.
(a) They have intrinsic worth, 20.
(b) Instinct points to their worth, 20.
(c) Recognition of natural goods and evils as such is required.
(1) for sympathy with suffering, 21.
(2) for encouragement to sufferers, 21.
(d) Such recognition furthers the cause of virtue by maintaining the link
with natural desire and impulse, 21.
2. Virtue has the supreme place in the Summum Bonum, 21-23.
(a) The seeds of virtue are man's by divine gift, 22-23.
(b) Man attains virtue by his own will, 23.
(c) Cicero's humanism shown in
(1) His recognition of man's lower nature
(2) His faith in man's power of achievement, 23.
3. Cicero's criticism of the Antiochean doctrine, 23-25.
Introduced for the sake of literary symmetry, directed
(a) not against truth, but against certainty of proof, 24.
(b) not against the views of virtue and material goods set forth by Piso,
but against the claim that virtue could produce complete happiness in
the presence of pain, 24.
4. Conclusion, 24-25.
Cicero's indifference to place of pleasure among the lesser goods, 24.
Cicero's views of the Academy as a school of investigation, not of negation. 25.
The positive doctrine of De Finibus, 25.
CHAPTER II. The Academica...
A study of the limits of human knowledge.
..26-35.
a. A discussion of the New Academy was necessary in Cicero's general survey
of the philosophical systems, 26.
b. The progress of the New Academy from a beginning in scepticism to an end
in dogmatism. Cicero is identified with the later period, 27–29.
c. Cicero's tendency to positive affirmation, not to doubt and denial, 29–33.
His belief in a truth, 29-30.
His choice of the New Academy as the best road toward the truth, because
1. The New Academy encouraged free thought, 30.
2. The leaders of the New Academy thought in positive, not negative
terms, 31.
3. His contention that the probable was a sufficient guide for active life;
that all men at times act on faith, 31–32.
4. His claim that the New Academy was more practical than the dogmatic
schools; theoretically it withheld assent, while practically it gave
qualified assent to the probable, 32–33.
d. Cicero's aversion to exact and detailed systems of dogma, 33.
e. His emphasis on discord among philosophers as an argument against dog-
matic certitude; there is no seat of authority, 33–35.
Contents
Conclusion. Cicero lays stress, not on his theoretical doubt, but on his prac-
tical knowledge and on his search for the truth, 35.
CHAPTER III. De Natura Deorum..
.36-55.
A study in speculative theology, showing the balance of probability to
be in favor of a Deity related to mankind.
a. Cicero's point of view as shown in the Introduction, 36-40.
Freedom of the Academy in seeking truth, 37.
Study of Deity aids in understanding human soul, 37.
Human virtue, individual and social, depends on view of gods as concerned
with men, 37-38.
Relation of Cicero's view to early function-deities of Rome, 38.
Cicero is independent even of his Academic spokesman, 38.
The Stoic doctrine of Providence is too dogmatic, 39.
b. Refutation of the Epicurean Doctrine, 40–45.
1. Refutation based on logic 41–43,.
Difficulties arise from slavish devotion to words of Epicurus.
2. Refutation based on ethical effect, 43–45.
Gods must have relation to men if they are to be objects of worship.
Pragmatic concept of Deity, 44–45.
c. Criticism of Stoic Doctrine, 45–53.
Over-certainty of the Stoics, 45.
1. General arguments against the Stoic theology.
(a) Pantheism of Stoics attacked, 46.
(b) Argument for evidence of Divine Cause in nature, denied, 46–47.
Cf. Modern pragmatic view, 47.
(c) Doctrine of Providence of Stoics, 48.
Two difficulties raised-
(1) Problem of sin
(2) Problem of pain, 48-49.
Modern pragmatism raises the same question, 50.
(d) How is virtue to be attributed to the gods?, 50.
2. Attack on Superstition in Stoicism, 51-53.
(a) Divination, 51.
(b) Popular theology, 51.
The Stoics compromise with polytheism, 51-53.
(1) By means of allegory, 52.
(2) By meas of etymology, 52.
(3) By means of Euhemerism, 52.
d. Cicero's Point of View, 53-55.
Independence of the Academic spokesman, 53-54.
Opposition to Cotta's indifference to philosophic support for religious faith,
54.
Denial of Epicurean gods; acceptance of Stoic belief in Providence as
probable; insistence on a religion containing more than ritual, 55.
CHAPTER IV. De Divinatione...
A denial of the miraculous together with a confession of theism.
a. Refutation of the doctrine of divination, 56–62.
.56-66.
vi
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
Cicero's denial of the miraculous as an evidence of a God.
His wish to overthrow superstition and yet keep religion, 56.
Danger of basing belief in God on truth of divination, 57.
Belief in Deity not to be used as proof of divination, 57-58.
Panaetius' revolt proves advantage of Academic freedom, 58–59.
Law of causality does not justify belief in divination, 59.
Cicero's scientific temperament and insistence on natural causality, 59-62.
b. Relation of Cicero's refutation of divination to Roman official augury, 62-65.
Augury accepted for its practical value to the State, 62.
Secularization of augury at Rome frees Cicero from charge of dishonesty in
his attitude toward it, 63-65.
c. Divination not to be deduced from divine nature of the human soul, 65–66.
CHAPTER V. De Fato..
•
An argument for Free Will.
a. Dogmatic assertion of freedom, 68–71.
On the ground of moral necessity, 69.
On the ground of inner conviction, 69–70.
James defends freedom on the same two grounds, 70-71.
b. Cicero's Criticism of the Schools, 71-76.
Explanation of the disjunctive judgment, 71–72.
Temporal causality distinguished from eternal causality, 72.
Criticism of the Epicureans, 73.
Cicero rejects their proof of freedom.
His conviction lies deeper than argument.
Emotional element in belief proved, 74.
Criticism of Chrysippus' Compromise, 74.
Impossibility of proving fate by facts of nature, 75.
Praise of the freedom of the Academy to seek the truth, 76.
Conclusion, 76–77.
..67–77.
Freedom asserted on ground on innate conviction and moral need, 76.
Value of concept of freedom for the life of the free state, 77.
B. The Ethical Treatises: their positive assertions.
The use of the supernatural, God and a divine soul as the guarantee and
inspiration of moral conduct.
CHAPTER VI. The Tusculan Disputations.
..78-94.
A Study of virtue as defensive armor in the struggle for the happy life.
Introduction
The Tusculan Disputations a practical treatise, not inconsistent, however,
with the theoretical treatises, 78-79.
a. The non-dogmatic elements in the dialogue, 79-87.
1. Cicero avowedly sets the whole discussion on the plane of the verisimi,
79-81.
2. He treats certain questions in a non-dogmatic manner, 81-87.
(a) The question of immortality, 81-83.
(b) The question of dolor and aegritudo as mala or non mala, 83-85.
(c) The question of vita beata or vita beatissima 85–87.
Contents
vii
b. The dogmatic elements in the treatise, 87-94.
1. The human soul is of divine essence, 88–89.
The doctrine of the divinity of the soul forms a basis for the second dogmatic
element in the treatise, viz.
2. Virtue is the supreme good, 89-90.
Virtue is a corollary of belief in divinity of soul.
Need of dogmatic expression in an ethical treatise.
3. Instinctive knowledge and the consensus gentium, 90–91.
4. The justification for Cicero's dogmatism, 92–94.
CHAPTER VII. De Officiis....
A Study of the basis of duty.
a. Relation of De Officiis to the Speculative Treatises, 95-98.
.95-106.
Cicero here claims to speak as a member of the New Academy and connects
the study of duties with that of the Teos in De Finibus.
b. A Study of Virtue and Duty.
1. Virtue is active and practical, 98–99.
2. Virtue has its field in society, 99–104.
Society has a natural and a supernatural origin, 100.
(a) Duty to men in general, 101–102.
(b) Duty to the State, 103–104.
3. Virtue is harmonious with human nature, 104-106.
Virtue and the virtues are in accord with nature, 104-105.
Only the right is expedient, 106.
CHAPTER VIII. De Re Publica and De Legibus.
...107-117.
A Study of the basis of political morality and the good of the state.
These treatises, written early, are consistent with De Officiis and
with the speculative treatises, 107-109.
a. Virtue is in harmony with human nature, 109–110.
b. Democracy is a corollary of faith in human nature, 110-111.
c. The relation of Deity to society and to law, 111-114.
d. The Consensus gentium on Deity and virtue, 115.
e. The relation of organized religion to the state, 115–117.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bouché-Leclercq, Auguste, Histoire de la divination (Paris, E. Leroux, 1882).
Boissier, Gaston, La réligion romaine¹ (Paris, Hachette, 1892).
Bréhier, Emile, Chrysippe (Paris, Alcan, 1910).
Fowler, W. Warde, The Religious Experience of the Roman People (London,
Macmillan Co., 1911).
Fowler, W. Warde, Roman Ideas of Deity (London, Macmillan Co., 1914).
Goedeckemeyer, Albert, Die Geschichte des Griechischen Skeptizismus (Leipzig,
Dieterich, 1905).
Hirzel, Rudolf, Untersuchungen zu Ciceros Philosophischen Schriften (Leipzig,
S. Hirzel, 1882).
James, William, The Will to Believe and Other Essays (New York, Longmans
Green and Co., 1917).
Krische, August, Die theologischen Lehren der Griechischen Denker (Göttingen,
Dieterich, 1840).
Loercher, Adolphus, Bericht. (Jahresbericht der Klassisches Alterthumswissen-
schaft 161-4, 1913).
Loercher, Adolphus, De Fato, Dissertationes Halenses, Vol. XVII, 1907.
Mommsen, Theodor, Römische Staatsrecht² (Leipzig, S. Hirzel, 1876).
Schmekel, A., Die Philosophie der Mittleren Stoa (Berlin, Weidmann, 1892).
Thiaucourt, C., Essai sur les traités philosophiques de Cicéron (Paris, Hachette,
1885).
Zeller, Eduard, Die Philosophie der Griechen³ (Leipzig, Fues's Verlag, 1880).
Zielinski, Th., Cicero in Wandel der Jahrhunderte³ (Leipzig, Teubner, 1912).
Annotated editions of Cicero's philosophical treatises.
Note: Only those titles are listed here to which repeated reference is made in
this dissertation. Other titles are cited in full as they occur in the footnotes.
DOGMATISM AND SCEPTICISM IN CICERO'S
PHILOSOPHICAL TREATISES
INTRODUCTION
In a report of recent literature dealing with Cicero's philosophical
works Adolphus Loercher speaks¹ of the alternating streams of dis-
like and admiration of which Cicero has been the object. He ex-
plains this fact as due to Cicero's position as a factor of culture with
which all who take literature seriously must reckon. Loercher goes
on to say that the sympathies of the nineteenth century were averse to
Cicero and that in spreading this aversion the investigators of his
philosophical legacy had a share. The bitter attacks of Drumann and
Mommsen on Cicero are too well-known to need more than passing
mention. Their political hostility is ascribed by Boissier³ to the in-
evitable antipathy between the German idea of autocracy and the
idea of democracy. Those who believe in Caesarism cannot look
with friendly understanding upon the blunders of democracy and the
compromises of a republican statesman. Disapproval of Cicero as a
statesman led to disparagement of Cicero as a philosopher. Momm-
sen dismisses his contribution to philosophy with a few contemptuous
words, saying that in that field he failed completely; that he com-
posed with equal peevishness and precipitation in a couple of months
2
4
¹Jahresbericht, 2-Zielinski (1) describes Cicero as "eine Personlichkeit von
denen die nicht nur selber den Geist ihres Zeitalters widerspiegelten, nicht nur
der Kultur der Folgezeit einen augenblicklichen Impuls gaben, sondern sie auch
in steter bald mehr bald wenigen wahrnehmbarer Berührung auf ihren weitern
Entwicklungswegen begleiteten.
"Mommsen, (Geschichte Roms² Berlin, Weidmann, 1857, Vol. V, p. 168)
calls Cicero "notorisch ein politischer achselträger."
9
"Boissier, Cicéron et ses amis, pp 26, 27 (Paris, Hachette, 1892).
4P. Groebe, who in 1899 edited Drumann's Geschichte Roms, says in his
Preface (IV): "Die römische Geschichte beweist, dass republikanische Formen
sich nicht dauernd für die Menschen eignen, wie sie sind. " and congratulates
himself (p. vi) on the opportunity to produce a "Lobschrift auf die Monarchie
denn der Preusse... kann kein anderes politisches Glaubensbekenntniss
haben als ή μουναρχίη κράτιστον.” Cf. for a more sympathetic view, the
statement of Friedrich Leo regarding Cicero. "Wir haben gelernt (was wenigstens
die Engländer nie bezweifelt haben) dass auch der Staatsmann paktieren darf."
(Kultur der Gegenwart, Berlin, Teubner, 1905, Vol. VIII, 332). Sihler in his
estimate of Cicero's importance says:-"Even if we were willing to fall in line
behind Drumann and Mommsen and to deny to the Arpinate the honorable title
of statesman, we could not very well forget that the orator and author staked his
very life and finally died a violent death in his consistent effort to defend or to
re-establish the older order of the commonwealth and in his honorable ambition
to be a leader in that struggle." (Ernst G. Sihler, Cicero of Arpinum, New
Haven, Yale University Press, 1914, p. viii.)
I
2
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
a philosophical library; that he stitched together Epicurean, Stoic,
and Eclectic doctrines, contributing himself only, in each case, the
introduction to his compilation, chosen from a number of prefaces
already written, and some Roman illustrations."
One result of this disparaging estimate has been to concentrate in-
vestigation on the Greek sources from which Cicero derived the
material for his philosophical treatises. It was argued that, if these
treatises had no value as original contributions to thought, they
might at least prove useful in the study of Greek philosophers whose
works were lost, or survived only in fragments. Hence we have an
immense modern literature on the sources of Cicero's works. The
tendency has been not even to credit Cicero with the reading of more
than one philosopher as he prepared his own exposition. Madvig for
example said:"unum fere aliquem sibi elegit ducere quem se-
queretur et exprimeret." Hirzel laid down the law that no inde-
pendence was to be accredited to Cicero unless definite grounds there-
for appeared." Scarcely any discussion of Cicero's philosophical
views has appeared since the time of Madvig without the citation of
one unfortunate sentence of Cicero's from a letter to Atticus, in
which he calls his philosophical works "transcripts."8
"'8 This phrase
from a private letter, which may be merely an urbane disclaimer of
excessive merit, has been taken literally and used seriously to prove
that Cicero expresses no original views in these treatises. It has been
very justly pointed out that whatever weight should be given this
phrase is balanced by the authority of another statement of Cicero's,
in which he claims that his writings do express his views. In the pref-
ace to the De Officiis we read: Sequemur igitur....hac in quaestione
potissimum Stoicos, non ut interpretes, sed ut solemus a fontibus
eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro....hauriemus.10 Not only in this
9
"Mommsen, Geschichte Roms,2 B. V., p. 601-2 (Berlin, Weidmann, 1857).
"Ed. of De Finibus, Introd. p. LXIV (Copenhagen, 1839).
'Hirzel, II. 669.
Ad Att. xxi.52.3. Dices: qui talia conscribis? arbypapa sunt; minore
labore fiunt; verba tantum adfero, quibus abundo. Boissier points out the im-
possibility of judging Cicero by a literal interpretation of his letters. The following
comment may well be applied to the sentence just cited from Cicero: "Ils [Les
savants hostiles] cherchent l'expression de sa pensée dans ces politesses banales
que la société exige et qui n'engagent pas plus ceux qui les font qu'elles ne trom-
pent pas ceux qui les reçoivent. (Cicéron et ses amis, Paris, Hachette, 1892,
p. 20.)
'Loercher, Jahresbericht, 5.
9
1ºDe Offi. 1. 6. Cf. ibid., ii. 60. An extreme example of the method which
concentrates on sources to the utter disregard of the content and trend of thought
is seen in Loercher's own dissertation De Fato (end) in the statement that in
this treatise Cicero has nowhere stated his own view on determinism.
Introduction
3
11
practical treatise, but in the speculative study De Finibus, Cicero
makes a similar claim of independence....tuemur ea quae dicta
sunt ab iis quos probamus, eisque nostrum iudicium. . . . adiungimur.'
We are not bound then to consider Cicero's works mere transla-
tions and compilations; we have his own authority for believing that
he intended while expounding the systems of the Greeks to his
fellow-citizens, to express his own views also. The study of the
sources is a distinct branch of investigation, legitimate and valuable
in enlarging our knowledge of the post-Platonic schools of philos-
ophy; but it in no way supersedes or invalidates a different branch of
criticism, namely, the study of the content, the residuary belief, so to
speak, which Cicero held after balancing the views of the various
schools. In the study we have in view we shall not attempt to discuss
the sources, but shall confine our observations to what seems to be
Cicero's own conclusion on each topic discussed.
The particular phase of Cicero's philosophical position with which
we shall be engaged in this study is the inconsistency with which he
was charged by Zeller. The latter calls attention to the conflict be-
tween Cicero's scepticism in the theoretical sphere and his dogmatism
in the practical or moral sphere. "...As soon as the doubt in the in-
quiries of the Academy has had space to express itself, the highest
good and duties are treated of in the moral discussions in a wholly
dogmatic tone."12 It is clear that Zeller finds fault with this incon-
sistency. "But even his doubt is too shallow to deter him from state-
ments which a member of the New Academy would not have ventured
to advance so explicitly." "As soon as his practical interests come
in conflict with doubt, he makes a retreat and would rather content
himself with a bad expedient (ein schlechter Ausweg) than admit the
inevitable consequences of his own sceptical statements."14 This
censure is tantamount to a criticism of Cicero for not adhering con-
sistently to the doubt professed by the New Academy. The facts are
clearly as Zeller states them. Cicero was not a consistent doubter;
while in the theoretical sphere he denied the possibility of certain
knowledge, in matters touching the foundations of morality he spoke
"De Fin. i. 6. Cf. i. 7. Sed id [ut plane sic veterem Platonem aut Aristotelem]
neque feci adhuc ... Throughout the Academica Cicero stresses the freedom he
has as an Academic to form independent opinions. Cf. pp. 29–33 of this disserta-
tion.
"Zeller, III. 1. 655. Cf. p. 656,"...he reserves to himself the power of making
an exception to this rule (mistrust of human knowledge) in all cases where a
pressing moral or mental necessity demands a more fixed conviction."
1³Ibid., p. 656.
14Ibid., p. 657.
4
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
P
with dogmatic certainty. But the questions may still be asked, does
such a position justify the terms which Zeller uses? Was it a "re-
treat" and "a bad expedient?" Or can the inconsistency be defended?
In his famous essay, The Will to Believe, William James upholds a
similar, or identical, inconsistency. He claims justification for postu-
lating as certainties matters concerning religion for which no proof
can be found in reason or experience.15 The justification consists of
two parts, (a) the impossibility of attaining intellectual certainty in
any field,16 and (b) the vital importance of the issue at stake in
morals.¹ Belief is measured by action, and scepticism regarding re-
ligion means acting as if religion were not true.18 So James counsels
those who desire a moral world (p. 23) to take the risk of believing,
without waiting for coercive proof, "to take a leap in the dark."19
James further strengthens his position by showing that volition and
desire have a definite part in forming all our opinions.20 But where the
choice is not momentous (p. 19), as in matters of scientific truth and
even in human affairs in general, one is not obliged to decide, and in-
tellectual evidence must have the last word.21 "Let us agree—that,
wherever there is no forced option, the dispassionate, judicial in-
tellect with no pet hypothesis-ought to be our ideal."22
This open-minded attitude toward scientific knowledge is charac-
teristic of James and of the moderate pragmatism which he repre-
sents. It has been said by a student and critic of his philosophy;-
"With James the theoretical test is final and authoritative in so
far as it can be applied (the italics are mine ), and no amount of sub-
jective satisfactoriness can overbalance it."23
16 James, The Will to Believe, 1. "I have brought with me . . . a defence of
our right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters, in spite of the fact
that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced."
16 Ibid., 14. "But to hold any one of them (our opinions), . . . as if it never
could be reinterpretable or corrigible I believe to be a tremendously mistaken
attitude... There is but one indefectibly certain truth... that the present
phenomenon of consciousness exists." See also pp. 15, 16, 30.
17Ibid., 22. "Moral questions immediately present themselves as questions
whose solutions cannot wait for sensible proof.' "I myself believe that the re-
ligious hypothesis gives to the world an expression which specifically determines
our actions. page 30, note.
18 Ibid., 29 and note.
19 Ibid., 31.
20Ibid., 19"
ions
we find our passional natreu influencing us in our opin-
Cf. pp. 8, 9.
21Ibid., 20 “
it is better... to... still keep weighing reasons pro et contra
with an indifferent hand."
22 Ibid., 21–22.
23Ralph B. Perry, Present Tendencies in Philosophy (New York, Longmans
Green and Co., 1916), 267.
Introduction
5
It appears to me that this view of William James throws light upon
the position of Cicero. Both deny the possibility of certain knowl-
edge; both claim the right to postulate unprovable dogmas which un-
derlie the concept of a moral universe and which validate moral
action for the individual; both carefully restrict this right of postula-
tion to cases where intellectual evidence is impossible, thus leaving a
free field for the practice of scientific research. If a survey of the
philosophical treatises gives evidence that this actually was Cicero's
point of view, Zeller's charge of inconsistency can certainly be met;
or at least the defence of Cicero will be strengthened by the alliance
of a respected modern philosopher and a recognized modern philo-
sophical attitude.
From a study of the speculative dialogues, made with the special
purpose of determining the extent of Cicero's theoretical scepticism,
I conclude that even here his last word is never one of doubt. He
rejects all unsure proof even for those things which he believes true;
but the whole trend of his thinking is affirmative, not negative. His
spirit is that of a believer, not a sceptic. This opinion of mine can be
justified only by detailed examination of the dialogues.24
24In discussing the philosophical treatises I have classified them as speculative
and practical and treated them under these two main heads. Within each division
however, I have followed the generally accepted chronological order of composition
as given by Teuffel (Geschichte der Römischen Literatur Leipzig, Teubner,
1916, Vol. I, pp. 404-419).


•
CHAPTER I
DE FINIBUS
A CRITICAL Study of Various Theories of the Summum BonUM
INTRODUCTION
Cicero's study of the End in this dialogue results, broadly speaking,
in a compromise. He rejects the Epicurean réλos, Pleasure, be-
cause it is an offence to morality. He accepts the supremacy of
Virtue, the Stoic réλos; but he modifies the impracticable idealism of
the Stoic theory, which had lost touch with the facts of human
nature and the possibilities of human endeavor. He declares for the
doctrine of Antiochus, which assigned to Virtue the first place in the
Téλos, but admitted to a subordinate place the goods of the body and
circumstance.25
But even while defending this reasonable doctrine, that gave just
recognition to both parts of man's dual nature, Cicero raised the
question of its logical consistency. To say that wisdom is sufficient
for happiness and yet to call misfortune an evil is not logical.20
That position of Antiochus needs much defending.27 We shall see that
in De Natura Deorum Cicero questioned the Stoics' complacent theory
of Providence, by raising the insoluble problem of evil. So here, in
the face of the Antiochean doctrine of a Summum Bonum that recog-
nized the dual nature of man, he raises another difficult question, or
rather another phase of the same problem of evil. What of the
genuine suffering that men encounter in their bodies and in the cir-
cumstances of their lot? Si ista mala sunt in quae potest incidere
sapiens, sapientem esse non satis esse ad beate vivendum.28 There was
no plain answer as to the relation of virtue and happiness.29 But in
spite of the logical difficulty, Cicero makes it clear that he accepts
25Thiaucourt, 117. ... Cicéron défend une doctrine moyenne, qui sait se
garder des exagérations d'Epicure et de Zénon et donner la première place à la
vertu sans nier l'importance des biens extérieurs."
26De Fin. v. 86. Quia si mala sunt, is qui erit in eis beatus non erit; si mala
non sunt, iacet omnis ratio Peripateticorum.
27 Ibid., v.
95.
28 Ibid., v. 81.
29All the classical systems assumed the union of the two (Thiaucourt, 64).
Thiaucourt hints at the Christian solution when he says of the pagan schools:
“aucune ne recourut à la ressource commode de le mettre [le bonheur] dans une
autre vie.' Zielinski (64) thinks that the difficult question "führt . . . in den
Wirbelstrom der Entwicklung und mündet in die Unendlichkeit aus . oder
auch in Nichts."
•
6
De Finibus
7
this humanistic doctrine, moral because it exalts virtue, and practical
because it recognizes human instincts and impulses, and also the facts
of experience.30
A. THE REFUTATION OF THE EPICUREAN VIEW
Quod....tamen eiusmodi esse iudico ut nihil homine videatur
indignius. Ad maiora enim quaedam nos natura genuit et confor-
mavit.... (De Fin. i. 23).
Cicero begins as in De Natura Deorum with a refutation of the
Epicurean view. Even so strong a disbeliever in Cicero's independ-
ence as Madvig admits seeing his own hand in this refutation.³¹
He seems always to have thought the Epicurean system an easy one
to combat.32 This school had come to Rome preceded by a bad repu-
tation.33
In the face of Seneca's judgment,34 it cannot always have
been so pernicious in influence as Cicero usually describes it to be,
but at the same time, it is difficult to accept as a complete definition
the modern phrase which describes it as "une philosophie de renon-
cement et une sorte d'ascétisme."35
Cicero rejected the Epicurean view of pleasure as the reλos on
three grounds. Logically the argument was unsound; psychologically
the claim was unfounded; morally the ideal had disastrous conse-
quences. Measured by the theoretical test Epicureanism fails;
measured by the moral test it is shown to be a system that will not
work.
He rejects the logic of the Epicurean argument. He accuses Epi-
curus of lacking logic entirely," a charge which is confirmed by Diog-
enes.37 He criticises Epicurus for confounding two definitions of
3ºDe Fin., v. 34. Deinceps videndum est . . . quae sit hominis natura. Id est
enim de quo quaerimus. Atqui perspicuum est hominem e corpore animoque
constare ..
"Madvig, De Fin., 839 "suo Marte Epicurum refellit.”
32Thiaucourt, (85, note) calls attention to the apparently casual way in which
Cicero wrote against the Epicureans, citing Ad˜Âtt. XIII 38.1. Ante lucem
quum scriberem contra Epicureos de eodem oleo et opera exaravi nescio quid ad te!
"C. Martha, La Poème de Lucrèce, Paris, p. 15.
4
•
•
sancta
"Seneca, De Vita Beata 13.1.-In ea quidem ipsa sententia sum
Epicurum et recta praecipere et si proprius accesseris, tristia:. Cf. R. D. Hicks,
Stoics and Epicureans, New York, Scribner & Co., 1910, p. 174, "The limitation
of desire [in Epicurus' Letter to Menoecus] is seen to involve habituation to an
almost ascetic bodily discipline in order that the wise man may become self-
sufficing
Thiaucourt, p. 85. Cf. page 11 of this chapter. There can be no doubt that
Epicureanism, starting with the noble ideals of its founder, sank, as time went on,
to a lower moral level in the practice of its adherents.
❝De Fin. i. 22. Iam in altera philosophiae parte, quae est quaerendi ac disse.
rendi, quae λoyi dicitur, iste vester plane... inermis ac nudus est. Cf. ii. 18.
Diog. Laert. X 31. τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ὡς παρέλκουσαν ἀποδοκιμάζουσιν.
8
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
pleasure, i. e. kinetic pleasure and static pleasure or freedom from
pain.38 If pleasure is an excitation of the senses, that is one defi-
nition; if it is freedom from pain, that is another and different. If
Epicurus approved both, as he did, he should have combined them
and professed two ultimate goods.39 The confusion of the two con-
ceptions brings Epicurus into difficulties. He defines pleasure in
sensual terms, but does not see that this sort of pleasure is not even
desirable if one possesses the other kind, which is freedom from
pain.40 Again, Epicurus goes back to newborn animals to prove that
they rejoice in pleasure and seek it as a good." But, Cicero replies,
they certainly do not aim at the static form of pleasure, for this has no
driving power. It is kinetic pleasure that furnishes a motive; Epi-
curus admits this and yet claims that the static form of pleasure is the
higher. Hence by Epicurus' own showing the new born animal
does not seek the highest form of the chief good."
42
43
Not only in logical development, but in his appeal to psychology,
Epicurus is wrong. The new born child does not seek pleasure, but
self-preservation.44 As the child grows conscious of the excellence of
both parts of his nature, mind and body, he seeks the first endow-
ments of nature.45 Pleasure may have a place among the prima
naturalia, but to hold that pleasure comprises them all is the height of
stupidity.46
Not only does the study of children disprove Epicurus' claim, but
the study of mature men and their actions shows that pleasure is not
the chief aim of men. A look within shows us that we have many
interests; for example, reading, writing, beautiful scenery, which
cannot be connected with bodily sensation.47 History is full of names
of men who spent their lives in glorious toils, who would not have
38De Fin. ii.16... hanc dulcem "in motu," illam nihil dolentis "in stabilitate...
89Ibid., ii.18.
40 Ibid., ii.29.
41Ibid., ii.31. Cf. i.30 and i.71.
42 Ibid., ii.32.
43
48 Ibid., ii.31.
4Ibid., ii.33. Nec vero ut voluptatem expetat natura movet infantem, sed
tantum ut se ipse diligat ut integrum se salvumque velit.
45As the final good, according to all the ancient schools, must be harmonious
with the first instincts of the human being (See De. Fin. ii.34, Atque ab isto capite
fluere necesse est omnem rationem honorum et malorum), the investigation of
the "prima naturae" acquired great importance. Hutchinson (De Fin. London,
1909, p. XXIX) translates rà πрŵra karà púow, "the earliest objects which
Nature prompts the creature to strive after." He made a collection of the
various translations used by Cicero (1. c. note 3). The phrase itself was Stoic,
not Platonic nor Aristotelian (Madvig 829 and Thiaucourt, 111).
46De Fin. ii.34.
47 Ibid., ii.107.
summae mihi videtur inscitiae.
De Finibus
9
endured to hear pleasure so much as named.48 The two Torquati,
who both condemned their sons to death in the name of the state,
were assuredly not seeking pleasure.49 Pleasure is not an instinctive
motive. Epicurus' own instinct (vis naturae) forces him to shift his
emphasis from sensual pleasure to freedom from pain.50 This same
instinct forces him to say that men cannot live pleasantly without
living morally.51 The honorable conduct of various Epicureans proves
that their instinct for duty is stronger than their evil theory. The
fact of Epicurus' personal goodness and that of his followers is evi-
dence to the superior force of morality.52 They act better than they
speak.53 Pleasure is not the fundamental instinct of man, because
Nature made us for higher things.54 We may well regret with Madvig
that Cicero did not show us in this treatise how the doctrines of the
Téλos held by the various schools were related to the rest of their be-
lief concerning God and the universe. 55 But we find here certain clear
indications that in Cicero's view virtue was harmonious with man's
nature because of the divine character of that nature?
T
In the preface to De Natura Deorum we read that an understanding
of the topic to be discussed there is most helpful to a clear under-
standing of the soul.56 This statement evidently implies a divine
quality in the soul either in the Stoic sense that the soul is divinae
particula aurae or in the Platonic sense of ouoiwois т De@, capa-
bility of attaining likeness to God.57 This kinship with the divine is
implied, though not amplified, in several passages of De Finibus.
In ii.37 it is asserted that the senses cannot judge of good and evil,
but reason only, with the aid of that knowledge of matters human and
divine which is rightly called wisdom.58 In ii.40 Cicero calls man,
48 Ibid., ii.67.
49 Ibid., i.23 and 24.
5º Ibid., ii.28.
51 Ibid., ii.49.
52 Ibid., ii.81. It is an interesting fact that James in his Psychology (Principles
of Psychology, New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1899), assigns a very subordinate
place to pleasure and pain as motives. they are far from being our only
stimuli (II. 550)." "The silliness of the old-fashioned pleasure philosophy
saute aux yeux. And thereupon James proceeds to hold up to ridicule the
reduction of all motives to physical impulses, as seen in Bain's Emotions and
Will. (James, vol. II, 551 note.)
53 De Fin., ii.81.
54 Ibid., i.23.
55 Madvig, Preface p. LXIII, quomodo . . . cum reliqua doctrina de deo et de
mundo cohaereant.
De Nat. Deor. i.i. quae et ad agnitionem animi pulcherrima est.
57 Mayor, De Nat. Deor., Note to i.i (Joseph B. Mayor, De Nat. Deorum,
Cambridge University Press, 1880).
• •
adhibita primum divinarum humanarumque rerum scientia . . .
IO
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
whose destiny is thought and action, a mortal god.59 In ii.114 the
authority of the ancients is invoked to show that the soul has a
heavenly and divine aspect.60 An analogy is drawn between gods
and men when he asks, if the gods are happy without bodily pleasure,
why the wise may not be happy under the same conditions.61 We
find here, then, the hint of a practical application to morals of the
theistic doctrine which is shown in De Natura Deorum to be a
reasonable probability, though not susceptible of complete demon-
stration.
The climax of the refutation of the pleasure-theory is the demon-
stration of its effect on morals. The Epicurean spokesman had
thought to use this pragmatic weapon himself. He had claimed
that the virtues ministered to the motive of pleasure and thus, being
founded on a demand of nature, were more firmly established than
if made an end in themselves.62 He accused the Stoics of making
virtue a vague phantom63 and of being beguiled by the glamour of a
name.64
The rejoinder to this claim is, as we have seen, that virtue is a more
fundamental instinct than pleasure and that virtue loses all her
power if she is not per se desirable. If the virtues are the mere hand-
maids of pleasure,65 it is impossible to uphold or retain virtue.6
Its foundations will be laid in water. 67 Whatever Epicurus may have
to say in favor of a moral life is inconsistent with his theory of pleas-
ure.68 Many times Cicero reverts to this need of correct theory as a
basis for action. The character of Torquatus may produce good
conduct, but the question is, does his philosophical system tend to
do so?69 Epicurus may have been a good man, but his thinking was
wrong.70 The farewell letter from Epicurus to Hermarchus proves
59
9. . .quasi mortalem deum .
6ºAnimis... in quibus doctissimi illi veteres inesse quiddam caeleste ac divinum
putaverunt.
61Ibid., ii.115.
62 Ibid., i.61. Cf. i.42.
63 Ibid.,
•
nescio quam illam umbram quam appellant honestum.
64 Ibid., i.42, splendore nominis capti.
65 Ibid., ii.69.
66 Ibid., ii.71.
Ibid., ii.72, quarum omnia fundamenta . . . in aqua ponitis.
68 Ibid., ii.70, illud quaero, quid ei . . . consentaneum sit dicere.
69 Ibid., ii.80. Non quaeritur autem quid naturae tuae consentaneum sit, sed
quid disciplinae. Cf. Ĝ. K. Chesterton, Heretics, pp. 11-37, on the importance
of a man's philosophy. "The most practical and important thing about a man is
still his view of the universe." p. 15.
7ºL. c. De ingenio eius [Epicuri] . . . non de moribus quaeritur.
De Finibus
II
the discrepancy between his practice and his principles." He de-
clares that his bodily pain is counterbalanced by the joy of remember-
ing his theories and discoveries. 72 But, says Cicero, such joy is not of
the body, but of the mind, though Epicurus' theory was that all
mental pleasures were based on those of the body.73 His provision
for the children of Metrodorus too, was an act of loyalty and duty;
it certainly was not based on bodily pleasures.74
Pleasure, if supreme, dethrones the cardinal virtues.75 If personal
advantage is the motive of conduct, it produces general disorder and
confusion.76 In public life valuable citizens are not produced by such
a doctrine.77 Justice must be founded on nature, not on utility, or
else there can nowhere be found any good man.78 In short, as the
pleasure-theory failed in logic, it fails also in morality. It should be
put down, not by a philosopher, but by the censor.79
Cicero's bitterness regarding the influence of the Epicurean theory
of the End was not unjustified. He says that Epicurus in defending
sensual pleasure appears to be bidding for disciples; the would-be
roué has only to turn philosopher.80 Cicero elsewhere shows how the
Epicurean doctrine was used by certain Romans as an excuse for in-
dulgence. In the oration against Piso he invents a conversation be-
tween this youth and a Greek exponent of the Epicurean doctrine.
Piso, without waiting to hear of any fine-drawn philosophical dis-
tinctions, (distinguere et dividere) seizes on the main point, that bodily
pleasures are the only imaginable good; and therewith he rejoices
that he has found, not a guide to virtuous living, but a warrant for
debauchery.81 The Epicureans at Rome included Caesar and others
71 Ibid., ii.96.
72 L. C.
73 Ibid., ii.98. Cf. i.55.
74 Ibid., ii.98. Cur deinde Metrodori liberos . . . refers?
75 Ibid., ii.117. Maximas vero virtutes iacere omnes necesse est voluptate
dominante.
76 L. c. Ergo in . . . quanta confusio?
77Ibid., ii.116. Lege nostrorum hominum . . . diceretur.
78 Ibid., ii.59. Perspicuum est. . . reperiri It is worth noting that Cicero
felt no division or inconsistency between his speculative and his practical
treatises; for at this point after declaring the natural basis of justice he refers
the reader for fuller discussion of justice to his work, De Re Publica. See my
chapter on De Re Pub. and De Leg., pp. 113–114.
79 Ibid., ii.30. Quae iam oratio non a philosopho aliquo sed a censore opprimenda
est.
80L. c. Hoc loco discipulos... fiant.
8¹In Pisonem 28, 68–9. “A voir la vivacité, la persistance de ses [de Cicéron]
attaques, on est tenté de croire qu'il ne parle pas seulement en philosophe qui
discute ses opinions, mais en homme d'État qui veut épargner à sa patrie des
dangereuses nouveautés." Martha, La Poème de Lucrèce, p. 17.
12
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
who in Cicero's opinion sought the destruction of the existing state,
and also those who were indifferent to politics, ordinarily good men,
but bad citizens, who used their philosophical theories as a convenient
and culpable excuse for shirking their duty to the state. 82 Both these
classes naturally fell under Cicero's ban.
The tone of the Epicurean refutation is undeniably dogmatic.
Except for the Academic formulas of qualification interjected into
positive declarations, 8 the tone of the Second Book is Stoic. 84 The
doctrine of the Téλos ascribed to Carneades, frui principiis natural-
ibus,85 is flatly rejected by Cicero, because it does not include moral
worth.86 The incomparable worth of virtue as the End is asserted
without any qualification.87 The materialism of the Epicureans is
rejected here as it is again in De Natura Deorum. There it is dis-
carded, because it denies a supernatural spiritual force to guarantee
human religion and virtue; here it is rejected, because it makes the
body the criterion of good, so that, if it were true, the good of man
and of the brute would be the same.88
•
B.
REFUTATION OF THE STOIC VIEW
[Stoicorum] doctrine non modesta nec mitis, sed ut mihi
videtur paulo asperior et durior quam aut veritas aut natura pati-
tur. (Pro Murena, 60).
If the Epicureans erred by granting too much to the body, the
Stoics did not make the same mistake. Virtue in their view was, not
82 Thiaucourt, 85-6.
83E. g. ut mihi quidem videtur ii.18; falli igitur possumus i.15; nihil enim
affirmo ii.80.
84The critics generally, except Hirzel, assume a Stoic source for Book ii,
Madvig assuming Chrysippus, Zietzschmann, Panaetius. Hirzel believes Anti-
ochus the source for this book as well as for Books iv and v. He bases his choice,
among other reasons, on Antiochus' leaning to Stoic ethics (II. 641), and on the
milder than Stoic tone of the criticism [vide De Fin ii.119 "tu enim ista lenius,
hic Stoicorum more nos vexat"]. That Cicero might here have been independent,
is an idea he rejects on the ground that as an Academic, Cicero would have been
obliged to take a sceptical tone (II. 635). Yet Cicero reiterated that the New
Academy left its members free to accept what doctrines they approved! Cf. De
Fin. v. 76, "sed nonne meministi . . . dicta."
85 Ibid., ii.35.
86 Ibid., ii.38. Reicietur etiam Carneades nec ulla de summo bono ratio aut
voluptatis non dolendive particeps aut honestatis expers probabitur. Hirzel,
III, 194, n., thinks that Carneades distinguished virtue from happiness, restrict-
ing the latter to enjoyment (frui) of the prima naturae (as in De Fin. v. 20)
while the former was the means of attaining them.
87Zielinski (p. 61) thinks as against the pleasure-theory "die bejahende Sicher-
heit die ihm erst die praktische Vernunft schenken kann, mimnt er schon hier für
des Gebiet der theoretischen in Anspruch.”
88 De Fin. ii.111. Nec tamen . summum pecudis bonum et hominis idem
mihi videri potest. Cf. my chapter on De Natura Deorum, pp. 43-45.
De Finibus
13
only the chief good, but the only good.99 But while the Epicureans
took away the foundations of morality by holding too low an ideal,
the Stoics endangered morality by holding an ideal so high that it
passed altogether beyond mortal attainment. When tried by the
test of helpfulness to morality, asceticism is found wanting, though to
a less degree than materialism.
The supremacy of virtue as the end, Cicero freely admitted. The
only question was whether virtue and the primary objects of natural
desire together formed the Summum Bonum.90 Cicero opposed as
unwarranted by the facts of experience and as dangerous in its effects
on life the austere Stoic view that virtue alone had the right to the
the
title of good.
He therefore criticised the Stoic position, as he had the Epicurean,
from the point of view of theoretical correctness and of practical
value in experience.
1. Faulty Logic
The Stoic View was unwarranted from the viewpoint of logic.
The Stoics, whose attention to logic led them to give it a place among
the virtues,⁹¹ prided themselves on the perfection of their system.
Cicero freely admits their consistency, here and in other places.
But there is a touch of Cicero's irony in the boast of his Stoic spokes-
man about the Stoic system, Quid non sic aliud ex alio nectitur ut si
ullam litteram moveris labent omnia?93 And to this Cicero replied
that consistency was not all. False premises and correct logical de-
velopment lead to false conclusions. 94 The syllogisms on which the
Stoics prided themselves 95 started in some cases from false premises.
For example, the statement, "bonum omne laudabile"96 when used as
a major premise will not be admitted by any of the Peripatetics, 97 and
89 De Fin. iii.10. Quidquid enim praeter id quod honestum sit expetendum esse
dixeris in bonisque numeraveris, et honestum ipsum. . . exstinxeris et virtutem
penitus everteris.
90 Ibid., ii.38. Ita relinquet duas. . . locupletatem videbit.
91 Ibid., iii.72. Ad easque virtutes dialecticam etiam adjungunt.
•
•
·
92 Ibid., iii.2. haec acrior est cum Stoicis parata contentio. Cf. v.83.
93 Ibid., iii.74. Cf. iii.48. "Haec mirabilia . . . dubitandum," where the Stoic
seems to lack conviction and to feel himself caught in the machinery of his own
argument.
94De Fin. iv.53. ... tamen persequi non debemus si a falsis principiis profecta
congruunt ipsa sibi et a proposito non aberrant.
95 Ibid., iii.26. sed consectaria me Stoicorum brevia et acuta delectant. Cf.
iv.48, Nunc venio . . . dicebas. In v.72 Stoics are evidently referred to as
gloriosa quaerentes.
96 Ibid., iv.48.
97 Ibid., iv.49. Aristotles, Xenocrates, tota illa familia non dabit . . .
14
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
so the conclusion, "bonum igitur omne honestum,"98 is not proved.
In other cases the self-evident falsity of the conclusion shows the
premises to be wrong.99 Such conclusions, for example, are the
parity of all sins and of all good deeds, the equal wretchedness of all
the unwise and the equal happiness of all the wise. Against these
common sense and nature and truth herself cry aloud. Here Cicero's
appeal is to consciousness itself as the final test of certain forms of
truth.100 These false conclusions, proved so by the inner witness of
the mind, invalidate the premises from which they were derived.
The Stoics deny gradations in vice on the ground that virtue is abso-
lute.101 But it is certain that vices do differ in degree, whereas it is
not certain that virtue is absolute.102 So the Stoics are trying to
make the uncertain disprove the certain.103 By such an appeal to
consciousness Cicero draws the prop of intellectual certainty from
beneath the Stoic doctrine of the τέλος.
2.
Weakness of the Stoic view as a basis for action
The vaunted Stoic syllogisms fail by the test of usefulness, for they
have not the power to stir enthusiasm for action. They do not touch
the heart, even when they convince the mind; the hearer goes away
no better than he came.104 In a discussion of such supreme import-
ance, the purpose should be to change the life.105 These syllogisms,
with their new terminology, do not help a man to be courageous
under pain.106
The whole rigid austere moral system of the Stoics was open to
criticism as impracticable. The truly wise man could scarcely be
98 Ibid., iv.48. O plumbeum pugionem!
99 Ibid., iv.54. sed ita falsa sunt ea quae consequuntur ut illa e quibus haec
nata sunt vera esse non possint!
100Ibid., iv.55. Sensus enim cuiusque et natura rerum .. nihil interesset.
Such appeals as this to internal certainty furnish ground for Zeller's statement
that Cicero was the first to enunciate distinctly the doctrine of innate knowledge
(III.1.659), not only regarding morality, but philosophy in general (1. c. 661).
On this point Hirzel (III, 531) takes issue with Zeller, claiming that Cicero at
least shared the view with other philosophers.
•
•
101 De Fin. iv.67. Ad virtutis autem. summam accedere nihil potest; ne
vitia quidem.. crescere poterunt.
•
102 L. c. Atqui hoc perspicuum. . . possit accessio.
103 L. c. Dubiis perspicuam conamini tollere.
•
104 De Fin. iv.7. quibus etiam qui assentiuntur nihil commutantur animo et
iidem abeunt qui venerant.
105 Ibid., iv.52.
vitam nostram, consilia, voluntates non verba corrigi.
106 L. c. Haec qui audievit... discedet tamen nihilo firmior ad dolorem ferendum
quam venerat.
De Finibus
15
found.107 The Stoics described even Socrates, Diogenes, and Antis-
thenes as only travellers toward virtue.108 In spite of making progress
toward wisdom (πрокожη), the man who had not actually attained
wisdom, even if a Plato, was not better or happier than any scound-
rel.109 Against these views, as well as against the fundamental
Stoic doctrine that the good consisted in moral worth alone, Cicero
protested that they did not furnish a sound basis for moral action.
"How can we conduct our life?" was a question always present to his
mind.110 To make the End consist in virtue only, does away with the
ordinary duties of life, business, politics, attention to health and
property. The ideal of duty is not a sufficient spur to conduct.112
Virtue itself is lost if we ignore ourselves and our own nature.113
The asceticism that, seeing the beauty of virtue flings away all that it
has seen beside virtue, takes away the very foundation of the beauty
it admires. 114
The ideal of virtue alone as the highest good would not satsify
even a disembodied spirit. 115 For such a being would seek also its own
health, freedom from pain, security, and self-preservation.116 Only
an unimaginable creature, consisting of mind alone, with no other
attribute corresponding to nature (sic ut ea mens nihil haberet in se
quod esset secundum naturam) would accept such a supreme good.117
Chrysippus, while describing man as made of mind and body, yet de-
·
•
107 Ibid., iv.65. Nec tamen ille erat sapiens; quis enim hoc? aut quando? aut
ubi? aut unde? Cf. Seneca, Epist. 42.1. Nam ille. fortasse tanquam
phoenix_semel anno quingentesimo nascitur. Cf. Seneca De Tranquillitate
Animi, 7.2.
108 Diogenes (VII, 91) quotes Posidonius to this effect: Tò yevéσdαɩ év πρокоπ TOνS
περὶ Σωκράτην
In their concept of the Sapiens the Stoics reached the
zenith of idealism. "The virtuous will appears here so completely sundered
from all outward conditions of life . . . that it may be asked, what right has such
a being to call himself a person" Zeller (III, 1.256). Bréhier (217-18) thinks
that the Stoic idea of the Wise Man contained something of Christian sainthood,
superhuman perfection as well as of virtue and that, if one recognizes this union
of qualities, the Stoic picture of the Sapiens and the paradoxes themselves become
more intelligible (p. 217).
109 De Fin. iv.21. Nisi eam plane consecuti essent . . . beatius vixerit.
110 Ibid., iv.69. Admirantes quaeramus... quonam modo vitam agere possimus.
111 Ibid., iv.68. Cum enim quod honestum. officia vitae.
•
112 Ibid., iv. 48. Non enim actionis aut offici ratio impellit ad ea quae secundum
naturam sunt appetenda.
113 Ibid., iv.40. Nam si omnino nos neglegemus. . . obliviscemur
virtuti ipsi principia dederimus.
114 Ibid., iv.42.
sic isti... fundamenta subducere.
• • •
•
•
•
quae
115 Ibid., iv.27. Quod si ... summum bonum quaereremus cuiusdam animan-
tis, id esset nihil nisi animus, . . . tamen illi animo non esset hic vester finis.
116 L. C.
117 Ibid., iv.28. Uno autem modo . . . ut valetudo est.
16
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
fines man's Summum Bonum as if he were mind alone.118 Since we
are men, consisting of soul and body, we are bound to esteem them
both and out of them construct our chief and ultimate good.119
The Stoics were guilty of inconsistency in making virtue the sole
good, since they claimed to base their theory on the impulse of self-
preservation in every newborn animal.120 Their theory was in out-
line as follows: What the infant chooses by instinct, the prima
naturae, or first objects of natural desire, comprise bodily health and
perfection,121 When reason has developed, choice is made of the
things in accordance with nature, (quae sint secundum naturam),122
Man then learns the order and the harmony that should govern con-
duct.123 This harmony he esteems more highly than the prima
naturae which he first sought, and infers that in this harmony con-
sists the chief good of man.124 This duoλoyia is desirable per se,
whereas the prima naturae are not.125 Only when suitable action
(officium or kα0кov) is fully rationalized and made permanent
(constans consentaneaque naturae) does it become virtue.126 When the
officium is performed by a wise man, it becomes rectum or Kαтóρ-
Owμa.127 The Summum Bonum then, or wisdom, is not one of the
primary attractions of nature, but an outgrowth of them (consequens
est enim et post oritur); yet it becomes much dearer to us than the
prima naturae through which we were led to it.128 The glory of virtue
118 L. c. Cum autem hominem . . . praeter animum videretur.
• •
119 Ibid., iv.25. Sumus igitur homines; ex animo constamus et corpore. nosque
oportet... haec diligere constituereque ex his finem illum summi boni atque
ultimi.
120 Ibid., iii.16 and iv.25. Hirzel, (II, 829) holds that the phrase тà πρŵтα
κατὰ φύσιν is not originally Stoic.
121iii.16. They do not comprise virtue nor the seeds of virtue. Cf. Madvig,
p. 832.
122 Ibid., iii.21.
123 L. C.
viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et . . . concordiam.
124L. c. Multo eam pluris aestimavit . . . bonum.
125 L. c. Zeno's phrase for the Summum Bonum was duoλoyovμévws §îv, and to
this Cleanthes added Tŷ púσel (Cited by Rackham, De Fin. Loeb Series, p. 239).
But from De Fin. iv.14 it appears that Antiochus ascribed this doctrine of living
according to nature to Polemo. Madvig remarks sceptically, "How faithfully
Antiochus reported Polemo's words is not certain." (p. 505.)
126 Ibid., iii.20.
•
127 Ibid., iv.15. Rackham's exposition (p. XXI) is "When the same aim
(кaðîкov) is taken by a rational adult with full knowledge of nature's plan and
deliberate intent to conform to it, then the 'appropriate act' is 'perfect' and is a
'right action' or 'success' (κaтópowμa). V. Zeller (III, 1.245), "Under duty
the Stoics understand rational conduct in general, which becomes good conduct,
or kaтóρowμa by being done with right intention.'
кат
128 Ibid., iii.23.
De Finibus
17
annihilates the advantages of the body.129 Such was the attempt of
Stoics to define virtue as the highest good and to link it with man's
natural impulses.130
The essence of Cicero's criticism of the Stoic theory of the End is
that it separates the Chief Good from the natural objects of desire.131
He cites the ancients, Xenocrates and Aristotle, as giving priority to
the virtues of the mind over those of the body,132 but as claiming that
wisdom must guard the whole man, mind and body.133
The insignificance of bodily and external goods in comparison with
virtue does not make them non-existent. Even a penny amidst the
wealth of Croesus is part of that wealth.134 The contribution which
these subordinate goods make to happiness is another question.135
Some are of real and definite importance. Bodily deformity and
agonies of pain are so real that to be freed from them calls forth a
man's deepest gratitude.136
The Stoics themselves felt the need of accommodating their
doctrine to human nature. 137 When they yielded to "nature's pro-
test''138 and modified their theory of the End, they differed only in
•
129 Ibid., iii.45. ... omnis ista rerum corporearum aestimatio splendore virtutis
et magnitudine obscuretur et obruatur atque intereat, necesse est.
130Bréhier (227) points out the difficulty in which the Stoics involved themselves
by the dissociation of the objects of primary impulse and the object of reasonable
choice. le but des Stoiciens, qui est d'appuyer la fin des biens sur une doc-
trine naturaliste, ne serait pas atteint." Their solution was, in his phrase, that
Reason performed an act of generalization. Out of the subordinate goods Reason
formed the notion of good (228). Collatione rationis (analogy) is the phrase used
by the Stoic in De Fin. iii.33. Madvig expresses wonder that Cicero found any
link between the Stoic prima naturae, which comprised only things indifferent (832)
and a Summum Bonum consisting in virtuę alone (835). Yet in De Fin. ii.34
Cicero holds up the Stoics, with other schools, in contrast to the Epicureans,
whom he criticises for not deriving their chief good from natural impulses.
Bréhier considers the Stoic theory of the End an attempted reconciliation between
the naturalistie theories of the Academics who followed Plato, Speusippus, and
Polemo, and the theory of wisdom according to the Cynics (223).
131 De Fin. iv.26. Quonam modo aut quo loco corpus subito deserueritis? Cf.
iv.78, v.17, v.72.
132 Ibid., iv.16. et cum animum. . . anteponebant.
133 Ibid., iv.17.
134 De Fin. iv.31.
•
hoc sapientiae munus esse dicebant ut, cum eum tueretur
qui constaret ex animo et corpore in utroque iuvaret eum
•
135 Ibid., iv.32. ... tum licebit otiose ista quaerere, de magnitudine rerum
136 The whole refutation of the Stoic theory of the End has a humanistic tone,
of which the sympathy with pain here expressed is an illustration.
137Bréhier, p. 222. "Mais les Stoiciens se sont aperçus qu'elle (leur théorie)
était . . . exclusive et dangereuse et qu'elle mettait la philosophie en dehors de
la vie journaliére." Chrysippus allowed the term, bona, to be applied to the
πрonyμéva, or “preferable things" of his system (Plut. De Stoicorum Repug-
nantiis, 30).
138 De Fin. iv.56 natura repugnante.
.
18
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
words from the Old Academy and the Peripatetics. 139 What the
Peripatetics called res bonas, Zeno named aestimabiles et ad naturam
accommodatas. He admitted a difference between Dionysius and
Plato, even though the latter might not be Sapiens. He granted that
there was a difference in the heinousness of sins, and that some of the
so-called foolish might attain wisdom.140
But the Peripatetics rated their bona no more highly than the
Stoics did those things which they denied to be good. They accorded
overwhelming preference to moral worth,141 but regarded moral
worth coupled with health of body as preferable to moral worth
coupled with disease. 142 The superior importance of virtue is not
lessened by admitting the reality of hardships and difficulties. 143
Zeno's new terms for the views he took from Polemo were at first
sight astonishing, and then amusing.144 When he abandoned the
nomenclature that called evils evils and goods goods, he used language
that could not be tolerated in a teacher of ethics. 145 Actually he had
no new views, but used an exoteric and esoteric set of expressions.146
But Panaetius, in his letter on the endurance of pain, does not pre-
tend to deny that it is an evil, and by his opinion convicts his fellow-
Stoics of using foolish language.147 In conclusion, Cicero asserts that
the later attempt of the Stoics to hold that virtue is the sole good and
yet to base it on natural instinct is a failure. For as to hold the first
doctrine brings them to the position of Aristo, who ignored natural
goods,148 so to recognize the natural instinct to seek what is conducive
to life (appetitionem rerum ad vivendum accommodatarum a natura
profectam) brings them to the position of the Peripatetics, from
139Vide iv.3; 9; 10; 12; 13; 15; 57; v.90.
140 De Fin. iv.56. Bréhier thinks the Stoics contemplated a double morality,
an ideal system of κατορθώματα, and a system of καθήκοντα (officia) for ordinary
men. See Zeller, III.1, chap. 9, Die Milderung des sittlichen Idealismus durch die
Rücksicht auf das praktische Bedurfniss, pp. 256–272.
• • •
141 Ibid., iv.59. Omnium .. eorum commodorum praestantissimum esse
quod honestum esset
·
142 L. c.
.. sed si duo honesta proposita sint, alterum cum valetudine, alterum
cum morbo non esse dubium ad utrum eorum natura nos ipsa deductura sit.
143 L. c. Non facile illa dura, difficilia, adversa] quidem [obteri posse] nec
contemnenda esse, quid enim esset in virtute tantum? ...
144 Ibid., iv.61.
145 Ibid., iv.21. Quis enim ferre possit ita loquentem eum qui se auctorem vitae
graviter et sapienter agendae profiteretur?
146 Ibid., iv.22. Quae est igitur ista philosophia quae communi more in foro
loquitur, in libellis suo?
147Ibid., iv.23. Panaetius modified the Stoic doctrines and showed the influence
of Plato and the Peripatetics. See De Fin. iv.79. Of his Platonism Hirzel says
(I, 242) “Die . . . Uebereinstimmung der Lehre des Panätius ... mit der platonis-
chen erstreckt sich... auf das ethische Gebiet.'
148 De Fin. iv.78.
De Finibus
19
whom, indeed, they differ only in terminology.149 The uncompromis-
ing, original Stoic view is refuted by the test of experience and by the
test of value as a basis for action and life; the later modified Stoic
view has no claim to originality save in the valueless novelty of
words. 150
C. THE HUMANISTIC DOCTRINE OF ANTIOCHUS
.vivere ex hominis natura undique perfecta et nihil requir-
ente. (De Fin. v. 26)
Cicero's objections to the Stoic doctrine of the réλos in Book IV
gave a forecast of the view which he himself favored. Early in the
dialogue, he led the reader to look for his own view.151 This view is a
mean between the Epicurean and Stoic extremes. It is usually
agreed that he subscribed to the doctrine of the Summum Bonum
held by Antiochus and set forth by Piso in Book V.152 This view
accorded to virtue the chief place in the Têλos, but admitted bodily
and external goods to a subordinate place.153 It is true that Cicero in
his own person criticises this view. But when one compares this
brief and moderate-toned criticism with his passionate denial of
Epicurean materialism in Book II154 and with his earnest, thorough-
going refutation of Stoic asceticism in Book IV, it appears to be little
more than perfunctory. At its strongest, it is not a rejection of
Piso's affirmations, but an observation on the failure of dialectic to
solve completely the deepest problems of philosophy and life.
This conception of the Summum Bonum as including the good of
the whole man, bodily, sensuous and spiritual, may properly be
called humanistic. A modern author has selected Cicero as the em-
bodiment and exponent of ancient humanism.155 Of humanism he
149 L. C.
150 Ibid., iv.61.
•
151 De Fin. 1.12. non modo quid nobis probaretur, sed etiam quid a singulis
philosophiae disciplinis diceretur. Madvig, in his reluctance to concede any
originality to Cicero, deliberately ignores the words, quid nobis probaretur, and
says, "quod unum illi in philosophia praepositum est, ut quid a singulis philoso-
phiae disciplinis diceretur persequeretur
Praef., p. LIX. However in
Excursus VII, p. 837, he assumes Piso's view to be that of Cicero.
152Goedeckemeyer cites passages from Bk. v as evidence of Cicero's own views
(168, 169); see also Zielinski, 63; Thiaucourt pp. 110, 117; Madvig, 837; Schanz,
353 (Müller's Handbuch der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, Munich, 1909.)
153 Goedeckemeyer, 168-"Berechtigung will er daher nur einer solchen Auffas-
sung des höchsten Gutes zuerkennen die sowohl die Seele als auch den Körper
beachtet."
154 Ibid., 167. Cicero opposed Epicureanism "in höchst wenig akademischer
Weise.
155 Schneidewin, 22. "Die Höhe der Ausbilding und Herrschaft des Princips
der antiken Humanität liegt in der Personlichkeit und den Werken des M.
20
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
gives this interpretation: "Gebrauche deine Vernunft dazu, ein
voller Mensch zu sein'ist....die Grundgedanke der antiken Human-
ität in ihrer Bluthezeit."156 He finds in Cicero the perfect exemplar of
humanism as so interpreted. A study of Books IV and V furnish
abundant proof that Schneidewin judges Cicero truly. The Antio-
chean and Ciceronian view of the End is essentially this: that the
whole nature of man is worthy to be developed and perfected.
1. Material Goods have a place in the Summum Bonum
Cicero admits bodily goods to a share in the réλos because of their
intrinsic worth. Atqui perspicuum est hominum e corpore animoque
constare, cum primae sint animi partes, secundae corporis. 157 Nature
requires that we aim at the health of the body, at its symmetry and
dignity.158 Since we love ourselves, we love both mind and body.
Both are of the highest importance to our general well-being.159
Beauty, health, strength, freedom from pain are all to be desired, not
only for utility, but for their own sakes.160
Natural instinct points to the value of the bodily goods, Men and
even children instinctively fear death.161 Instinct leads men and all
living creatures to things suited to their natures.162 The earliest in-
stinct leads us to secure safety (§ 41). Men naturally try to con-
ceal deformity (§ 46) and to cure it, if at all possible, since they in-
stinctively feel that they are worthy of consideration in all their
parts.163 Nature herself demands what is seemly in carriage and
posture.164
Natural goods must be recognized as goods and natural evils also
Tullius Cicero" (Max Schniedewin, Die Antike Humanität, Berlin, Weidmann,
1897). Irving Babbitt, too, speaks of Cicero as "an admirable humanist" (Litera-
ture and the American College, p. 7).
156 Ibid., p. 23. The author goes on to say that the notion of sin as bound up
with human nature was quite foreign to ancient humanism.
157 De Fin. v.34. Cf. Civ. Dei 19.3 where St. Augustine quotes Varro, another
follower of Antiochus, to the same effect.
158 Ibid., v.35.
159 Ibid., v.37.
160 Ibid., v.47. Hirzel (II, 717) observes that this view of the intrinsic and
independent value of the body, which Piso calls Aristotelian (cf. §14) is not found
in the Nichomachean Ethics. Something very similar, however, is to be found
in Aristotle's Rhet. I 5, 1360b:-ἔστω δὴ εὐδαιμονία εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἢ αὐταρκεία
ζωῆς, ἢ ὁ βίος ὁ μετ' ἀσφαλείας ἥδιστος, ἢ εὐθενία κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως
PuλaktikĤs te KаÌ πрAKTIKĤS TOÚTWV. But in Nich. Ethics I, 9, 1099b, we find a
clear statement of the need of external goods for happiness, viz. évíwv dè tntúµevol
ρυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας, εὐτεκνίας κάλλους . . . . εὐημερίας.
161 Ibid., v.31 and 32.
162 Ibid., v.33.
163 Ibid., v.46.
164 Ibid., v.47.
•
cum omnes natura totos se expetendos putent.
De Finibus
21
must receive their proper names for the sake of human sympathy and
practical helpfulness. Why should philosophers speak a different
language from other men? If they felt sympathy with human ex-
perience, they would use the ordinary terms for it. 165 To call suffer-
ing by its real name gives the sufferer more courage to endure it than
to deny its evil nature.166
Those who deny to natural goods a place in the réλos do virtus it-
self an injury, because they break the link with natural impulse and
thus lose its driving force. It is a serious charge against the logic of
the Stoics, that they based their theory of the Summum Bonum on
the natural instinct for self-preservation, and later abandoned con-
sideration of the body.167 The End should be adapted to our nature;
it should be fitted to arouse instinctive desire.168 But the earliest im-
pulse of desire is not toward virtue, but merely toward a dimly under-
stood self-preservation.169 Desire for virtue develops only with.
maturity. Plato said, "...Blessed is the man who learns wisdom and
true opinion even in old age."170 Therefore those who banish natural
goods from the End forget the first principles of nature which they
themselves have established.171 When they claim that moral worth
alone constitutes the End and ignore the earliest objects of desire,172
they "destroy every motive of rational action and every clue to
right conduct."173
2. Virtue holds the supreme place in the Summum Bonum
The place of natural goods in the réλos is thus indicated by
Cicero, but their importance is never stressed.174 The body is scarcely
once mentioned in this discussion except in conjunction with the
soul.175 The goods of the body are included in the End, because it is a
65Ibid., v.89. "... si homines essent, usitate loquerentur." Madvig (p. 766)
comments on these words: "si non prorsus inhumaniter aliorum rationem negle-
gunt. " i. e., if they had the sympathy for pain that all men should have.
166 Ibid., v.94.
167 Ibid., v.26.
quo loco corpus subito deserueritis? Cf. iv.26, 27, 28.
168 Ibid., v.17. Ut... alliceret appetitum animi quem opμǹv Graeci vocant.
Cf. v.23, Nam cum omnis haec quaestio... ab eo proficiscatur . . . quod... ipsum
per se primum appetatur
• •
169 Ibid., v.41. Nunc vero a primo quidem mirabiliter occulta natura est, nec
perspici nec cognosci potest. Cf. v.43, ... vis naturae quasi per caliginem cernitur,
and v. 24.
170 Ibid., v.58. Virtutis ... serius lumen apparet. See Plato De Leg. II, 653 A.
171Ibid., v.72. . . . obliti mihi videntur quae ipsi fecerint principia naturae.
172 Ibid., v.23.
173 L. c. Rackham's translation in De Fin., Loeb, p. 417. Cicero here makes
the same charge against Erillus, who made knowledge the End.
174E. g., ibid., v.72. ... ut reliqua non illa [secundum naturam] quidem nulla,
sed ita parva sint ut nulla videantur.
175Vide, ibid., iv.16; iv.25; v.34; v.40; v. 44.
22
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
part of man, and because to ignore it breaks the link between man's
earliest impulses and his later and higher aspirations toward moral
worth. But the place of virtue in the Summum Bonum is supreme.
The virtues are the fruit of our will, not of our natural endowment.176
They are the preeminent glory of the mind. 177 While the lower prop-
erties of a being are among the objects of its care, what is spiritual
surpasses the material in value, and the best part of the spirit is the
most precious of all.178 The matchless perfection of the mind (and
this means not the natural gifts of intellect, but the volitional vir-
tues in which moral worth consists)179 surpasses the senses and the
body to an almost inconceivable degree.180 As an element in pro-
ducing happiness, virtue far outbalances bodily satisfaction; if placed
in the scales, it outweighs the earth and the seas.181 All other things
in comparison are imperceptible.182 Bodily goods are to virtue as
starlight to sunlight.183 By such strong comparisons does the author
emphasize his belief in the preeminence of moral worth. It is true.
that pain and annoyance sometimes are present side by side with
virtue. How then is virtue sufficient for happiness? asks an objector.¹
The answer comes quickly, with earnest conviction expressed in the
noble phrase of a skilled rhetorician,. . cum propter virtutis caelestem
quandam et divinam tantamque praestantiam, ut ubi virtus sit. ...
ibi esse miseria et aerumna non possit, tamen labor possit, possit
molestia, non dubitem dicere omnes sapientes semper esse beatos.. 185
184
Instinct leads us toward virtue, though not in the same direct way
as toward the natural goods. The perception of virtue dawns on us
only with advancing maturity.186 But every man has within him the
176 Ibid., v.36. ... earum [virtutum] quae in voluntate positae.
177 Ibid.
•
.quarum est excellens in animorum laude praestantia. Madvig
cites a parallel passage on the voluntary and involuntary virtues from Aristotle's
Magnis Moralibus I.5. Cf. Aristotle, Nich. Eth. III, 1, 1109b, . . . Tò ÊKOúσɩov Kal
τὸ ἀκ ούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορισαι τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσιν.
178 Ibid., v.40. Non necesse est . . . animi... optimam quamque partem carissi-
mam.
179Vide note 176.
180 Ibid., v.60.
possit quid intersit.
181 Ibid., v.92.
tantum praestet mentis excellens perfectio ut vix cogitari
182 Ibid., v.90. ... tantam vim esse virtutis ut omnia si ex altera parte ponantur
ne appareant quidem. . .
183 Ibid., v.71.
184Ibid., v.77. Nam illud vehementer repugnat eundem beatum esse et multis
malis oppressum
185Ibid., v.95. Objective evils (molestia and labor) are contrasted with subjective
suffering (miseria and aerumna). Vide Tusc. Dis., iv.18 for definition of aerumna
as aegritudo laboriosa.
186 Ibid., v.58.
De Finibus
23
seeds of virtue.187 These seeds have a divine origin.188 Man has an
instinctive leaning toward virtue. 189
189 This is seen in the conduct of
children, in their ambition and love of praise and in their gratitude. 190
All men show love of goodness and hate of baseness.191 Non-utili-
tarian virtue always wins applause even from the uneducated.192
The seeds of virtue are ours at birth. But virtue itself is not a gift
of heaven. It is ours to acquire by our own effort and will.193 Zielinski
points out that at this point Cicero and St. Augustine parted com-
pany. It was Pelagius who carried on the Ciceronian tradition of a
self-sufficing virtue. 194
In two phases, then, Cicero is a humanist,-in this sympathetic
and respectful recognition of the rights of the body and in his faith in
the essential worth and potentialities of man's spirit. Where St.
Augustine derived all man's power for good from divine grace (there-
by stripping off all shreds of morality, says Zielinski), 195 Cicero gives
all the credit for virtue achieved to man's own will. The outlook of
humanism is optimistic. Schneidewin's definition of humanism
describes perfectly Cicero's view of man as shown in De Finibus:
“Wenn der Humanitätsgedanke überall als der Gedanke an das
Höhe und Vortreffliche erscheint, was die Natur oder Gottheit mit
dem Menschen in Sinne gehabt hat, und also als eine Selbsterinnerung
empfunden wird an das vor uns stehende Bild dessen was wir wer-
den sollen....”’196
3. Cicero's Criticism of the Antiochean View of the End
The brief criticism which Cicero makes upon Piso's lecture on the
doctrine of Antiochus may have been introduced for the sake of
187 Ibid., v.18. quasi virtutum igniculi et semina. Cf. v.43. virtutum quasi
scintillas ... prima elementa naturae, and v.59; v.61.
•
188 Ibid., v.43. Eas... scintillas . e quibus accendi philosophi ratio debet ut
eum quasi deum ducem subsequens . Cf. v.38. Ratione. qua nihil est in
homine divinius, and v.37, optima... parte hominis quae in nobis divina ducenda
est. Goedeckemeyer (p. 158) speaks of this concept of the seeds of virtue as a
corollary of the divine origin of the soul.
189 Ibid., v.58. Honesta ... ad quorum et cognitionem et usum
praeeunte deducimur.
190 Ibid., v.61.
191 Ibid., v.62.
192 Ibid., v.63. Nemo est igitur... conservatur fides. Cf. §64.
ea laudemus nulla alia re nisi honestate duci.
•
• • •
natura ipsa
..non... cum
consequentia ex-
193 Ibid., v.60. Itaque nostrum est . . . ad ea principia
quirere quoad sit id quod volumus effectum. Cf. De Nat. Deor. iii.86. "No man
owes his virtue to God." See page 104 of this dissertation.
194Zielinski, 127-8. He adds, however, that it was only theoretically that the
Church, with St. Augustine, rejected Cicero's ethics; practically, she took over
his whole system.
195Zielinski, 128.
196Schneidewin, op. cit. 40.
7
24
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
literary symmetry. As he criticised the Epicurean and Stoic ex-
positions, so he will criticise the Peripatetic. This seems reasonable,
especially as De Finibus undoubtedly belongs among the theoretical
dialogues.197 The criticism appears to be a half-hearted and perfunc-
tory undertaking. Cicero expressly states that it is aimed, not
against the truth of the Peripatetic position, but against its dialectic
correctness. 198 He declares himself to be of the school of Piso,199
although he has just stated the dilemma that confronts the latter, 200
and reminds him that his position needs a deal of defending.201
Cicero here appears to point to another criterion for truth than that
of logic, to a truth that may lie deeper than formal argument. There
is a touch of irony in Cicero's bland praise of the Stoic logic.202 The
Stoic view may be incredible,203 but at any rate it is consistent, where
the Peripatetic is self-contradictory.204
The criticism is directed, not against a belief in virtue as the su-
preme Good, but against the universally held ancient view that
virtue and happiness must meet in the Téλos.205 This problem of the
relation of external evil to the inner peace that virtue brings is a
wellnigh insoluble one. The reconciliation has never yet been effect-
ed, says Zielinski, by either Christian or pagan philosophy.206
We find in this dialogue a new proof of Cicero's power to distinguish
between the essential and the non-essential. The exact place of
pleasure (voluptas) among the lesser goods he will not define; it may
or may not add to the sum total of natural goods,207 but in either
197Zielinski, 58, calls De Finibus theoretical and indicative, and therefore open
to Academic discussion, its practical and imperative counterpart being De Officiis.
198 De Fin. v.79. Non quaero iam verumne sit Cf. v.83. Non enim
quaero quid verum sed cuique dicendum sit. In Acad. ii.119 Cicero asserts that
there is a truth beyond human perception. Cf. Acad. ii.134. Et hic metus ne vix
sibi constet.
·
199 Ibid., v.86. .. erit enim mecum si tecum erit.
•
•
200L. c. Quia si mala . . . Peripateticorum. Vide pp. 6 and 7 of this chapter
with notes 26 and 28.
201 Ibid., v.95. Atqui iste locus . . . confirmandus.
202 Ibid., v.83. Et hercle... mirabilis est apud illos contextus rerum
iii.24.
203 Ibid., v.85.
204 L. C.
repugnantia.
n... Cf.
non dubitabunt quin et Stoici convenientia sibi dicant et vos
205 Thiaucourt, 68. Cf. De Fin. v.77 and Acad. II, 134.
206Zielinski, p. 64.
• •
207 De Fin. v.45. Utrum enim sit voluptas in iis rebus quas primas secundum
naturam esse diximus necne nihil interest. According to De Fin. iii.17 the
Stoics denied that voluptas had any place among the natural goods. But Hirzel
(II, 833) observes that Panaetius, the moderate, later Stoic, allowed voluptas a
place among the lesser goods and that this view is attributed to the Stoics by
Aulus Gellius 12.5.8. Goedeckemeyer (p. 168, note 6) calls attention to Cicero's
latest view of pleasure as ... condimenti fortasse nonnihil, utilitatis certe nihil...
(De Off. iii.120).
De Finibus
25
case it does not alter the view of the End as consisting preeminently
in virtue.208
We find too an illuminating comment on what in Cicero's opinion it
meant to be an Academic. To him it was not a school of negation,
but of investigation, and of affirmation based on probability. It
offered an opportunity for the free formation of opinion. Sed nonne
meministi licere mihi ista probare quae sunt a te dicta ?209 is his protest
against the charge of agnosticism. The only view absolutely opposed
by the Academy, he added, was the Stoic claim to infallible perceptual
certainty.210
In this theoretical study of the Summum Bonum, therefore, Cicero
quite clearly advocates a positive doctrine; the supremacy of virtue as
man's chief end, the subordinate though independent place of bodily
and external goods as an end, the divinity in man that produces the
seeds of virtue, and the native power of man's will to achieve moral
worth. Against these affirmations there is only to be reckoned
Cicero's brief observation on the difficulty of the logical proof.
Truth is one thing, he implies; flawless syllogistic proof of it is an-
other.211 But a truth that is essential for conduct and for the inter-
pretation of life may or rather must be accepted and upheld in spite of
the lack of complete and coercive proof.
208 Ibid. ... nihil impedit hanc comprehensionem summi boni.
209 Ibid., v.76.
210L. c. Nihil est . . . dissensio. Madvig (p. 741) calls it mira levitas in Cicero
to claim any harmony between the Academics and the Peripatetics on the topic
of perception. But the platform of the Academy was certainly wide enough to
include many divergent views. It was a favorite declaration of Cicero's that he
was not bound fast to any system of doctrine. See Acad. ii.120, 137; N. D. i.17,
and my chapter on the Academica, pp. 27-31.
21It is further to be remembered that Cicero does not attack in De Fin. v.76–86
the main issue, i. e., the supremacy of virtue; his criticism is concerned with a
slighter, but more difficult question, that is, how much happiness precisely can
virtue secure in the presence of pain?!
CHAPTER II
ACADEMICA
..nostra quidem causa facilior est, qui verum invenire sine ulla
contentione volumus...-(Acad. ii. 7.)
At the same time that Cicero was writing the De Finibus, he had in
hand the Academica.212 We have found in De Finibus evidence of
Cicero's positive belief in virtue as the paramount element in the
Téλos, in the superiority of spirit to body, and the divine origin of the
soul. The Academica is Cicero's defence of the alleged scepticism of
the New Academy against the dogmatists. From the very nature of
its theme this treatise appears to present a real difficulty in the way of
our claim that Cicero's theoretical dialogues have an affirmative
trend. If in De Finibus his point of view was practically dogmatic
while in Academica it was frankly sceptical, reconciliation would be
difficult. But we find nothing in the latter treatise to justify applying
the term sceptic to Cicero.
a. The fact that Cicero devoted a treatise to the New Academy fur-
nishes no proof that he himself cherished a sceptical attitude. His
avowed purpose to present a view of all philosophical schools to his
fellow-Romans213 made it necessary for him to write such a treatise.
This school, even if it were one of scepticism, could not have been
omitted from an encyclopedia of philosophy214 had Cicero himself
been a pronounced dogmatist. In the famous résumé of his philo-
sophical works in De Divinatione ii, Cicero gives as the two claims of
the New Academy to notice (1) that it is a school minime arrogans,
and (2) that it is maxime constans et elegans. That is to say, as a
rhetorician he approved the style of its writers, and as a student of
philosophy he favored its tolerant attitude toward opponents, and
the temperance of its claims.
212Madvig (Preface to De Fin., p. LX), thinks that the "duo magna ovvтáyµara”
mentioned in the Letters (Ad. Att. XII 45.1) refer to De Finibus and Academica.
Reid (Edition of Academica, London, Macmillan Co., 1885, Introd., p. 30),
thinks that the first edition of the Academica was completed before De Finibus
was finished. There can be no doubt that Cicero worked on both treatises at
one time. On May 1st, B. C. 45, he wrote to Atticus (Ad. Att. XIII 12.3) an-
nouncing the dedication of De Finibus to Brutus and the proposed dedication of
the Academica to Varro.
213 De Div. ii.4. . . . ut . . . nullum philosophiae locum esse pateremur qui non
Latinis litteris illustratus pateret.
Cf. Acad. i.11; i.18; De Fin. i.10; Tusc. Dis. i.5; and Goedeckemeyer, 137.
214 Vide J. S. Reid Introd. to Ed. of Academica, London, Macmillan Co., 1885,
pp. 20–24, on Cicero's purpose to cover the whole field of philosophy.
I
1
26
The Academica
27
b. To say that Cicero was an adherent of the New Academy is
not to say that he was a sceptic. The New Academy had a history
that carried it all the way from the scepticism of Arcesilas to the
dogmatism of Antiochus.215 The scepticism of Arcesilas was indis-
tinguishable from that of Pyrrho.216 Carneades introduced the ele-
ment of probability and taught that, though certitude is unattain-
able, various degrees of probability are within our reach.217 Philo,
Cicero's teacher, began his career as a member of Clitomachus'
school,218 but late in life adopted a more positive view.219 Cicero in
Acad. ii. 11 notes the astonishment and anger with which Antiochus
received the views of Philo's change of attitude. Zeller claims that
Philo inclined to positivism in order to find a sound basis for right
conduct;220 that his interest in systematic teaching, even if at first
only in the practical field, must have strengthened his belief in the
possibility of knowledge and weakened the hold of scepticism upon
him. Philo, however, was a true a sceptic as Carneades in rejecting
the Stoic criterion221 and the Stoic faith in sense-impressions.222
He seems to have asserted that scepticism was a valid weapon against
the Stoic claims, that it was intended only to combat the unreasonable
doctrine of the infallible criterion (KαTαληTTÓV).223 Further, he is
said to have asserted that things in themselves are not unknowable,224
and to have distinguished the exoteric from the esoteric doctrines of
the New Academy.225 Philo is thought by Zeller to have gone beyond
215 Cf. R. D. Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean, New York, Scribner, 1910, p. 162.
216 Reid, Preface, p. 55. Goedeckemeyer, 32, 33; Zeller III, 1.490 and note 2.
Cicero (Acad. i.44-5) describes the exclusively negative views of Arcesilas.
217Reid, Preface, p. 55. Zeller believes that the trend toward probabilism began
with Metrodorus and cites St. Augustine Contra Acad. 3.18.41, where Augustine
was probably quoting from the lost part of Cicero's Academica. (Zeller, III i.526,
note 2).
218Goedeckemeyer, 103, Schmekel, 385, and Reid, 57.
219Zeller III. 1.590, n. 1. Cf. Acad. ii.11.
220Zeller III, 1.590.
¹Ibid., p. 591 and 593. Cf. Acad. ii.18. Cum enim . . . posset.
222Zeller, ibid., 592.
223 Reid, 58; Zeller, 593; Goedeckemeyer, 112.
224Zeller 593, quoting Sextus, Pyrrh. Instit. i.236. . . . ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει
τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν καταληπτά.
225 Reid, p. 59; Zeller, ibid., p. 593-4. There are one or two references in the
Academica to the esoteric teachings of the New Academy, viz., ii.60. Quae
sunt tandem ista mysteria aut cur celatis . . . sententiam vestram? Cf. Frag. 35
of the Academica (Reid's Ed.). Numenius (in Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica
XIV, 8, §§12, 14), speaks of the dogmatism of Carneades, and a suggestion is
made in Acad. ii.139 that he held certain positive dogmas, at least in ethics.
It was claimed by Sextus (Pyrrh. Instit. 1.232–4) that Arcesilas secretly held
affirmative doctrines, and even Pyrrho was accredited with the same by Numenius
(Diog. 9.68).
28
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
Carneades in his leaning toward dogmatism,226 to have believed, in
fact, in an immediate or innate knowledge such as figured also in
Cicero's own views. 227 Reid speaks with caution of the views of Philo,
but holds that they constituted a real concession to dogmatism.228
This philosopher then, who leaned so far toward affirmative teach-
ing, was the teacher of Cicero. When the latter is called a member of
the New Academy, it is necessary to remember, as stated above, that
that school had a progressive history, that in it a sequence can be
traced from the Pyrrhonian scepticism of Arcesilas to the outright
dogmatism of Antiochus. In point of time, Cicero belongs to the
later period. We have seen in the study of De Finibus that at
least regarding the réλos, Cicero attached himself to Antiochus; if he
also attached himself to Philo, his type of Academicism is very remote
from outright scepticism. In this treatise, however, Cicero appears as
the defender of the Carneadean doctrine of the probable. Philo's
later dogmatic views are ignored.229 But the trend of thought in the
Academy was toward positivism; and, since so many shades of thought
followed each other in this school, as time passed by, there is not the
slightest warrant for classifying Cicero as a sceptic unless his own
statements prove him to be such.
To Cicero the New Academy was not a school of negation, but of
truthseeking, untrammelled by the bonds of dogma.230 Members of
other schools had been caught young and through the influence of
some friend or teacher bound to some system imperfectly understood,
which they felt thereafter bound to defend with all their might.231
The New Academy as a school of free investigation claimed the
loyalty of Cicero throughout his life, with the exception of one short
period of apostasy. This is the view of Goedeckemeyer,232 who sees in
226 Zeller, III, i.596.
227 Ibid., p. 595. Zeller distinguishes the "knowledge" of Philo from the "prob-
able" of Carneades as Augenscheinlichkeit versus Wahrscheinlichkeit. As compared
with the perceptio of the Stoics he calls Philo's degree of certainty perspicuitas
(p. 595, note 1). He thinks that reference is made to Philo in Acad. ii.34 where
perspicua are distinguished from percepta. C. F. Hermann (De Philone Larissaeo,
II.13, Gottingen, 1851), goes so far as to claim that Philo attributed as much
certainty to his kowledge as Plato did to his Ideas. This view is disapproved
by Reid (p. 58) and Zeller (p. 596, note 1). Such a view of Philo's theory of
knowledge would seem to separate him entirely from the New Academy.
229 Acad. ii.12. Cf. Hirzel III, 281, note; Reid, p. 46.
230Acad. ii.8. Hoc autem liberiores et solutiores sumus, quod integra nobis est
iudicandi potestas. Cf. Acad. ii.65; Tusc. iv.7; De Fin. v.76.
228 Reid, p. 59.
231 Acad. ii.8 and 9. Cf. De Nat. Deor. i.66.
232 Goedeckemeyer (p. 143–4) believes that Cicero abandoned the New Academy
for the Old at the time he wrote De Re Publica and De Legibus. He cites Ad.
Fam. XV, 4.16, written at the end of B. C. 51 or the beginning of 50. · philoso-
phiam ... in forum... deduximus as a reference to the Old Academy. Cf. p. 109
of my chapter on De Re Publica and De Legibus.
•
The Academica
29
this school, as Cicero did, positive rather than negative features, viz:
earnest but dispassionate investigation of the truth, free from all
hampering predilections, tolerance of the views of other schools even
when unworthy of acceptance, willingness to accept the views of
others when they approved themselves and to abandon its own if
shown to be false, "in ihren leidenschaftlosen, aber tiefen Streben
nach Wahrheit.'"233 This picture of the New Academy as a positive
force for the discovery of truth, as a school, not of sceptical dogmas,
but of scientific methods of ascertaining the truth,Goedeckemeyer
bases on the evidence of Cicero.234
c. Apart from what we know of the increasingly affirmative tone.
of the New Academy after the time of Arcesilas, we have evidence in
the Academica of Cicero's own tendency to believe even where he
cannot prove. In this treatise he asserts in unqualified terms his be-
lief in truth. He "burns" with a passion for learning the truth and be-
lieves the doctrine which he professes.235 Not from vain glory nor
from contentiousness, but from just this love of truth he has attached
himself to the Academy.236 He denies that the Academy abolishes
truth.237 The search for truth in the realm of science is ennobling and
pleasurable.238 The discovery of what looks like truth is a cause for
delight.239 If one were tempted to accept a Summum Bonum con-
sisting of morality linked with pleasure, Truth and Reason would
haunt him.240 Truth here is obviously identical with Virtue; for in a
parallel phrase Cicero says that Virtue would recall a man who leaned
toward the views of Epicurus.241 "There can be but one truth and no
more, so that [ultimately] many famous schools will be of necessity
overthrown."'242 So Cicero looks toward some ideal world where the
233 Goedeckemeyer, 145. On the last point, Cƒ Tusc. ii.5.
234 See notes 1-4 on page 145, Goedeckemeyer.
235 Acad. ii.65.
236 L. c.
237 Acad. ii.111. Id ita esset si nos verum omnino tolleremus. Non facimus..
Cf. ii.119.
"
238 Ibid., ii.127. Cf. James, Will to Believe, 17: . . '. . . when . . . we give up
the doctrine of objective certitude, we do not thereby give up the quest or hope
of truth itself.”
239 L. C.
240 Acad. ii.139. Sed si ipsum velim sequi, nonne . . . veritas et gravis et recta
ratio mihi obversetur?
241 L. C.
·
•
242 Ibid., ii.147. . . . ut cum plus uno verum esse non possit, iacere necesse sit
tot tam nobilis disciplinas.. Cf. §115. Plura enim vera discrepantia esse non
possunt. Cf. De Orât. 2.30 and De Nat. Deor. 1.5. I find a parallel thought on
the ultimately verified truth in James, (Pragmatism, p. 207-8). "But all this
points to direct face-to-face verification somewhere, without which the fabric of
truth collapses like a financial system with no cash basis whatever. . . The ab-
30
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
truth to which man can only approximate now shall be verified and
known.
Cicero regarded the Academy as the best way of access to the truth
or the approximate truth.243 "We are the men who wish to discover
the truth," he says,244 "and our discussions have no other purpose than
to force to the surface (eliciant et tamquem exprimant) the truth or
what most nearly approaches it."245
1. The Academy offered the best approach to the truth because of
the freedom it gave its adherents to judge for themselves without the
weight of authority or the shackles of systems.246 Cicero glories in
this freedom.247 The Stoic must accept all the doctrines of his school,
the obscure as well as the obvious. Even in the face of Aristotle's
opposition, he must defend his chosen system like his own life and
reputation.248 Authority is a deathblow to progress of thought.249
Elsewhere250 Cicero cites Pythagoras as a warning example of the
evil effects of authority in philosophy. Yet there are some who urge,
absurdly enough, that one should attach himself to some leader and
system, no matter which, rather than reserve decision.251
2. Using the freedom allowed by the New Academy to its adher-
ents, its leaders, in Cicero's view, thought positively, not negatively.252
solutely true . . . is that ideal vanishing point toward which we imagine that all
our temporary truths will some day converge. It runs on all fours with the
perfectly wise man and with the absolutely complete experience; and, if these
ideals are ever realized, they will all be realized together.
248 See note 235 and pp. 28 and 29.
244 Acad. ii.7.
•
qui verum invenire . . . volumus.
245 L. c. Cf. Tusc. i.7; ii.9; v.11. Zeller denies that this purpose had a legitimate
place in the system of the New Academy. (III, 1.653).
246 Vide note 230. Cf. also De Nat. Deor. i.17; Tusc. iv.47; Acad. ii.9 and ii.137.
247 Acad. ii.120. . quanti libertas ipsa aestimanda est ... Cf. De Leg. i.36.
tua libertas disserendi ...
•
248 Acad. ii.119.
sicut caput et faman tuam defendere necesse erit
Cf. ii.58, where the Dogmatist says, ab hac [regula] mihi non licet... disce-
dere.
• •
249 Reid (Introd., p. 12) refers to Cicero's insistence on the right of free specula-
tion. Bernard Shaw in the preface to Saint Joan (p. LIV) recommends to the
Church that she give the widest possible liberty for free thinking within her pale,
since only so can thought and truth be advanced. As philosophy was a guide to
the ancients in moral matters, the parallel with the modern church is not out of
place. So H. E. Fosdick calls authority "one of the historic curses of religion."
(Christianity and Progress, F. H. Revell Co., 1922, p. 157). Cf. p. 37 of this
dissertation.
250 De Nat. Deor. i.10 and 1.66.
251 Acad. ii.132. modo ne quis... respondeat "quemlibet, modo aliquem."
Nihil potest dici inconsideratius.
252 Cicero claims that Empedocles, even, when he declared that the senses had
little power of judging, did not rob us of our eyes and other senses (Acad. ii.74)
It was, however, usual for the sceptics to claim Empedocles as one of themselves
(Reid, p. 262, note).
The Academica
31.
Though he does not in this treatise defend the advanced positive
views of Philo,253 and contents himself with defending the position of
Carneades, he maintains that this position was constructive. In the
doctrine of Carneades, as Cicero learns it from the works of Clito-
machus,254 though no appearances lead to perception, (perceptio)
there are many that lead to approval (probatio).255 The charge had
been made by the dogmatist that to deny certainty in knowledge
destroys all activity of life.256 This was a deadly thrust at Cicero, and
he was at great pains to refute the accusation. For to him the prac-
tical use of philosophy constituted its only value. His boast, "We are
the first to bring Philosophy into the Forum"257 is often reiterated.258
He could not conceivably have attached himself to a school whose
teachings tended to obstruct activity.259 But he denied the charge.
The "probable" of the New Academy, the
asserted to be a sufficient guide for life.
would indeed be an eversio omnis vitae.260
what seems probable, providing nothing appears contradictory to the
probability,261 and so keeps in a straight course his whole life.262
Many important matters must be undertaken even by the Sapiens of
the dogmatists on mere probability.263 Does he know for a certainty
10 avóv of Carneades, he
The lack of a "probable"
But the wise man accepts
253 See Goedeckemeyer, 146; Hirzel III, 281, Anm. Cf. p. 28 of this dissertation.
254 Acad. ii.98.
255 Ibid., ii.99.
probatio, multa.
256
56 Ibid., ii.31.
tale visum nullum esse ut perceptio consequeretur, ut autem
Ergo si qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi haec ipsa
eripiunt vel instrumenta vel ornamenta vitae . . .
257 Ad Fam. xv.1.6.
258 E. g., De Leg. i.5; De Off. i.153; De Re Pub. i.30 and frag. 4; Tusc. ii.11;
De Nat. Deor. i.7. See also Brutus, 322, philosophiam... matrem omnium bene
factorum beneque dictorum . .
•
259"The debate on this topic [possibility of action without certainty] amounted
to nothing but assertion and denial." Reid, p. 56. Reid quotes Hume's admission
as follows, he, i. e., the Pyrrhonian sceptic, must acknowledge . . . that all
human life must perish were his principles universally and steadily to prevail."
260Acad. ii.99. Cf. §109. end. . . quasi nullum sapiens aliud decretum habeat
et sine decretis vitam agere possit! Here Cicero seems to elevate to the dignity
of a decretum, or dogma, knowledge which is merely probable (See Reid, p. 305,
note).
261 L. c. Cf. §101 beg. and §105. According to Acad. ii.33 it was Carneades who
added the clause "quae non impediatur." Sextus (Adv. Math. 166) mentions
the three degrees of probability which Carneades differentiated, viz. (1) míðavý;
(2) πιθανὴ καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος (3) π· καὶ ἀ· καὶ διεξωδευμένη. The last term is trans-
lated in §35 by ex circumspectione aliqua; in §99 only the seond degree of
probability is mentioned. The modern pragmatic definition of truth bears a
curious resemblance to the Carneadean definition. "Truth lives in fact on a
credit-system. Our thoughts and beliefs "pass" so long as nothing challenges them
<the italics are mine>, just as bank notes pass so long as nobody refuses them.'
James, Pragmatism, 207.
262 Acad. ii.99.
263 L. C.
32
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
before boarding a ship that his voyage will be prosperous ?264 This
faith, or willingness to act on mere probability is needed in agriculture,
in marriage, in rearing children.265 In questions of physical science
the Wise Man will declare his ignorance, but in regard to duty and
those matters in which he has had experience, he will not.266
The New Academy, in Cicero's opinion, was more practical than
the dogmatic schools. The impossible idealism of the Stoic definition
of the Sapiens, in accordance with which men in general were branded
as madmen and slaves,267 was impracticable; so also was the Stoic
definition of knowledge.268 It would exclude the knowledge that
underlies the arts. 269 But the knowledge that underlay the work of
Zeuxis, Phidias, and Polyclitus, whatever its nature, was a real
knowledge (scientia.)270 The practical value of the Academic prin-
ciple is shown in the legal custom of qualifying sworn statements by
such phrases as "ex sui animi sententia" and "arbitrari." So the
law recognizes the ignorance that besets human experience.271
There is a knowledge, then, sufficient for life. The only subject of
dispute is the definition of knowledge. The crux of the argument con-
cerns the Stoic definition of the perfect perception, Kαтáλnyis.2 272
Cicero explains this term by the elaborate figure of the closed and
covered fist.273
K
While the New Academic always refuses absolute assent, thus deny-
ing the possibility of karáλŋyıs, he gives qualified assent. The re-
fusal to assent (érox) is for theoretical and logical correctness; the
qualified assent is for practical life.274 Having no infallible sign of
264 Ibid., ii.100.
265 Ibid., ii.109.
266 Ibid., ii.110. So James distinguishes the same two classes. "The attitude
of sceptical balance [as to facts of nature] is therefore the absolutely wise one if
we would escape mistakes (The Will to Believe, 20)."
"Moral questions
immediately present themselves as questions whose solution cannot wait for
sensible proof." 22.
267 Acad. ii.144.
268 L. c. 144-5. Cf. De Divin. ii.61.
269 Ibid., ii.146. This is the refutation of the charge made in Acad. ii.22.
270 Ibid., ii.146.
271 L. C.
272 Reid and Arnold explain the word as referring to the process by which the
mind seizes on the external object; thus contradicting the view of Zeller, who
interprets it as referring to the process by which the impression from without seizes
on the mind. Reid, (Acad. p. 152-3, note 10), Edward V. Arnold, (Roman
Stoicism, Cam. Univ. Press, 1911, p. 133).
273 Acad. ii.145. In spite of the overweening arrogance of this claim to certainty,
the dogmatists maintained that even such karáλnyis, if it arises in the mind of
one not a Sapiens, does not constitute real knowledge, (run); the percipient
in order to possess the latter, must already be wise. (Cf. Sextus Adv. Math. 7.153).
274 Acad. ii.104. Alterum placere, ut numquam adsentiatur; alterum tenere,
ut sequens probabilitatem... aut "etiam" aut "non" respondere possit. Reid
(Translation of Acad., p. 72–3) renders placere "holds as a dogma" and tenere
"carries out in practice.'
The Academica
33
truth, the wise man avails himself of probabilities. 275 Practically, the
position of the Academic does not differ from that of other people;
it is only because he denies the possibility of perfect certainty, that
his position differs from that of others.276
d. We find in the Academica the same aversion on Cicero's part to
an elaborate and detailed system of dogma that we remark in De
Natura Deorum.277 Dogmatism is by its very nature detailed and
exact.278 As for minute and exact directions for life, Cicero will have
none of them. This is evidently the meaning of his comparison of the
Cynosure with the Bear as a guide to mariners.279 Those who follow
the former, "quae cursu interiore, brevi convertitur orbe," guide their
course within a narrow radius under more minute and exact direction.
Cicero, however, guides his thoughts by larger considerations (ra-
tiones latiore specid), not by those minutely polished (non ad tenue
elimatas), and so he has a wider range and a larger freedom (eo fit ut
errem et vager latius). So in De Finibus (v.45) we found him refus-
ing to express an opinion as to the non-essential question of the exact
place of pleasure among the lesser goods.280
e. To refute the claims of the dogmatists, Cicero employs common-
places of sceptical argument,281 but he lays greater emphasis upon the
disagreement among the leaders of the schools. He promises that all
future discussions on these topics shall deal with that disagreement,
rather than with the fallacies of the senses and of logic.282 We have
seen that Cicero decried the evil influences of authority as hampering
the free progress of thought. He also denies that there is any author-
ity to follow, since the leaders of thought cannot agree. Aut cur
cogimur eos sequi qui inter se dissident?283 The philosophers differ
275 Ibid., ii.110. Quam [notam] quoniam non habet, utitur probabilibus. Cf.
§§71, 84, 85. Both the Stoics and the Epicureans placed the sole, ultimate
standard of truth in the postulated infallibility of the wise man. Reid, p. 271,
note. In Cicero's view there is no such infallibility; the wise man doubts theo-
retically, but practically follows the probable.
276 Ibid., ii.8. Nec inter nos et eos qui se scire arbitrantur, quicquami nterest
nisi quod illi non dubitant . . . nos probabilia multa habemus quae sequi facile
adfirmare vix possumus.
277Vide De Nat. Deor. iii.27 and 28 where he reject the exact dogmatic state-
ments of the Stoic theology. Cf. pp. 46 and 47 of this dissertation.
278Hirzel III, 181.
279 Acad. ii.66.
280Vide p. 24 of my Chapter on De Fin. and pp. 82-85 of chapter on Tusc. Dis
281 Reid, p. 52.
282 Acad. ii.147. V. Goedeckemeyer, p. 146, Zeller, III, 1.652.
283 Ibid., ii.143. "For what a contradictory array of opinions have objective
evidence and absolute certitude been claimed! The world is rational .. its
existence is an ultimate brute fact; there is a personal God,—a personal God is in-
conceivable; there is indeed nothing which someone has not thought absolutely
true while his neighbor deemed it absolutely false, and not an absolutist among
34
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
on questions of physical nature,284 on ethical problems,285 and on
dialectic.286 Strato, for example, does not need the gods to account for
the construction of the world.287 Cicero will not assent wholly to his
view; now Strato's view, now that of the dogmatists seems to him
more probable.288 It must be remembered that Cicero is here dealing
with the subject of certainty and proof. He is not expressing an
agnostic, much less an atheistical view; what he denies is merely
what most moderns would deny too, i.e. absolute logical proof of
divine creatorship.289 Zeno and Antiochus differ as to whether virtue
alone is sufficient for happiness.290 Again Cicero is in doubt,-"Tum
hoc mihi probabilius, tum illud videtur.291 But there is a point be-
yond which Cicero's doubt cannot pass; either Zeno or Antiochus
must be right; else virtue falls. Et tamen nisi alterutrum sit, virtu-
tem iacere plane puto.292 But even where Zeno and Antiochus agree,
Cicero cannot necessarily assent. When, for example, they both deny
the rights of emotion, they are at variance with the Old Academy,
whose leaders taught that emotions have a sound basis in nature.293
Thus authority fails the seeker after absolute certitude. The
senses carry no infallible sign;294 dialectic often unravels its own web.295
Yet truth remains, and Cicero with other members of the New
Academy desires eagerly to discover it.296 The certain attainment of
the truth is far beyond the range of men. The greatest human in-
tellect, the Sapiens, can attain nothing beyond probability, and so,
theoretically, must always withhold assent. Practically, however, he
follows the probable, which gives a basis sufficient for conduct.
them seems ever to have considered that . . . the intellect, even with truth di-
rectly in its grasp, may have no infallible signal for knowing whether it be truth
or no. James, Will to Believe, 16.
11
284Acad. ii.117. Sed sit ingenio divino, quem unum a physicis probabit?
285 Ibid., ii.129. Quid habemus in rebus bonis et malis explorati?
re est igitur inter summos viros maior dissensio?
• •
qua de
286 Ibid., ii.143. In hoc ipso quod in elementis . . . verum falsumne sit. .
quanta contentio est!
287 Ibid., ii.121.
288 L. c., end.
89 Cf. James (Will to Believe, 94), "Now in such questions as God, immortality,
absolute morality, and free will, no non-papal believer at the present day pretends
his faith to be of an essentially different complexion <i. e., than a working
hypothesis>; he can always doubt his creed."
290Acad. ii.134. Cf. De Fin. v.71 and 81.
291 Ibid., ii.134.
292 L. C.
293 Ibid., ii.135. Atque illi . . . utiliter permotiones . . . datas.
294 Ibid., ii.79–90.
→
• • •
295 Ibid., ii.95. Quid quod eadem illa ars, quasi Penelope telam retexens, tollit
ad extremum superiora.
296 Ibid., ii.7. ... Nostra quidem causa facilis est, qui verum invenire sine ulla
contentione volumus.
The Academica
35
The distinction between his view and that of the dogmatist is purely
theoretical. Such was Cicero's defence of the New Academy.
The stress in Cicero's presentation is on the affirmative side, on his
desire to learn the truth, on the freedom given by the Academy to
search out the truth, on the right of the seeker to adopt the probable
and follow it in the conduct of his life. This is a very different em-
phasis from that attributed by Cicero to Arcesilas..neque hoc
quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et perceptioni adsensionem
approbationeque praecurrere.297 To Cicero a more shameful thing
would have been to hold no views on which to base virtuous action.
297 Ibid., i.44-5.
CHAPTER III
DE NATURA DEORUM
A CRITICISM OF SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY
Remque mea sententia minime dubiam argumentando
dubiam facis. (De Nat. Deor. iii. 10)
The treatise, De Natura Deorum, seemed a riddle to Boissier, be-
cause in it alone of all his philosophical works Cicero appears to throw
doubt on the existence of the gods.298 One finds an answer to the rid-
dle by considering the work as a study in speculative philosophy,
where no absolute certainty is attainable by the path of dialectic.299
This was the point of view which Zielinski took. 300 There is sufficient
evidence in the dialogue that the author did not wish to overthrow
belief in the gods. The quotation at the head of this chapter sum-
marizes Cicero's view. The existence of the gods is certain (minime
dubiam), but the case for the gods is only weakened when men offer
in defence of it arguments which are open to doubt.
A. THE POINT OF VIEW TAKEN BY CICERO IN THE INTRODUCTION
In the introduction Cicero emphasizes both the difficulty and the
vital importance of the question.301 Its difficulty appears in the lack
of agreement among learned men.302 There is approximate agree-
ment that gods exist,303 but great disagreement as to what is the most
essential element of the question (quod vero maxime rem causamque
continet), namely, whether the gods are idle and free from interest in
the world, or whether they once created it and still control it.304
Defence of the Academic Viewpoint
The difficulty of this question and the general ignorance in which
philosophy starts justify the position of the New Academy.305 If all
298G. Boissier, Vol. i, 55 and 57.
299De Nat. Deor. iii.95, ut . . . mihi Balbi (disputatio) ad veritatis similitudinem
videretur esse propensior.
300Zielinski, 42, Wissen soll er [der Weise] dass er durch kein Mittel, auf keinen
Gebiete Weisheit, Gewissheit der Erkenntnis erlangen kann.
301 De Nat. Deor. i.1.
303 Ibid., i.2.
302 L. C.
304 Krische (p. 8) notes that Cicero does not traverse the whole field of specula-
tion about the gods, but limits the question to this, of active or inactive gods.
305Ibid., i.1. ... ut magno argumento esse debeat causam . . . philosophiae esse
inscientiam, prudenterque Academicos a rebus incertis adsensionem cohibuisse.
J. S. Reid (cited by J. Mayor, Ed. of De Nat. Deor., 1880, Vol. I, p. 68), inter-
prets as follows: "The true theory of philosophy is that which denies Tiothun,
in other words, that which the Academics oppose to the Stoics."
36
De Natura Deorum
37
philosophers agreed on a truth or if anyone appeared to have discov-
ered undeniable truth, the Academy would be open to censure.306 The
Academy saves men from the undignified position of asserting that
which is not thoroughly understood and clearly known (quod non
satis explorate perceptum sit et cognitum).307 The Academy does not
deny truth, but only the infallible sign which might enable us to tell
truth from error.308 Carneades indeed argued against the Stoics in
order to stir men up to a desire for pursuing the truth.309
The aim, then, of the Academy is positive, the attainment of truth;
only the method is negative. The freedom afforded by the Academy
is a great assistance in the search for truth. Authority is a handicap
in that search, for it prevents the student from using his own judg-
ment (ratione).310 Cicero comes to this discussion with his judgment
free, not pledged to maintain any view.311
The freedom of the Academy enjoins upon its members the attain-
ment of wide learning. Instead of acquiring one system the Academic
must study them all, if he is to argue for and against all.³12
A Pragmatic View of the Gods
Not only is the question of the gods difficult; it is of supreme im-
portance. The investigation will give us a noble understanding of the
soul's nature313 and is essential for the regulation of religion.314 The
Epicurean view of the gods, which dissociates them from human life,
takes away all basis for duty toward both gods and men. For if
pietas, sanctitas, religio are destroyed, probably loyalty, human co-
operation (societas), and justice will go too.315 Thus in Cicero's view,
306 De Nat. Deor. i.13 . . mihi procax Academica . . . invenerit.
807Ibid., i.1. The two verbs are used to render karaλaµßáveola (Mayor,
I, p. 68).
Cf. p. 32 of this dissertation.
308 Ibid., i.12.
309 Ibid., i.4.
310Ibid., i.10. Cf. the devotion of Epicureans to their system, ibid., 1.66 and
p. 30 of this dissertation.
311 Ibid., i.17.
312 Ibid., i.11. Wm. James describes Pragmatism as a method "unstiffening all
our theories" (Pragmatism, p. 53) and as "a corridor" out of which innumerable
chambers open (p. 54).
313 ³Ibid., i.1. Krische (p. 7, note) remarks that Cicero here repeats the idea of
the Tusculan Disputations that the soul, having no elemental material of its own,
has a divine origin. Cf. Minucius Felix 17, nisi divinitatis rationem diligenter
excusseris, nescias humanitatis. Schōmann notes that agnitio, used in this
passage, implies a deeper knowledge than cognitio (Opuscula iii, p. 292, Be:lin,
1858).
314 Ibid., i.l.
315 It appears that Cicero intended pietas, sanctitas, religio (i.3) to refer to man's
relation to God; the corresponding human relations (fides, societas humani
generis, justitia, i.4) are represented as depending upon the former. The doubtful
Academic form of the assertion does not weaken the obviously dogmatic thought.
38
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
J
not only religion, but the human virtues depend on the existence of
gods who care for human beings. This is a very important passage, as
it plainly states that the only basis for ethical conduct is to be found
in a spiritually directed universe. The same idea is expressed in
many other passages,316 but it is specially significant as standing here
in the introduction to a supposedly sceptical treatise.
This exclusive interest in gods who care for men as against abstract-
ly conceived divinities bears certain marks of relation to the early
Roman religion before it came under the influence of Greek myth-
ology. The names of the primitive gods given in the Indigitamenta
are all the names of functions, not of persons, e.g., Educa, Cuba,
Abeona, Adeona.317 These functions all have relation to men.
318
Distantly related to this crudely pragmatic view of deity is the
Ciceronian conception. The latter disdains the idle gods of Epicurus
and finds the only importance of the gods in their relation to men, as
the source of the human spirit and the guarantors of human morality.
So the modern pragmatist, James, disdains an Absolute that has no
link to men. The only God that he will recognize is one who validates
moral conduct and responds to men:-"A power not ourselves, which
not only makes for righteousness, but which means it and recognizes
US. "'319
The pious observances of religion must rest on a real connection
between gods and men; they cannot be empty forms unsupported by
spiritual truth.320 Here Cicero detaches himself from his Academic
spokesman, Cotta, who later in the dialogue indicates his entire satis-
faction with the mere forms of religion.321 His formalism was charac-
teristic of the Roman religion at all times.322 When Stilo and Varro
· •
316 De Leg. ii.15. ... dominos esse omnium rerum deos eosdemque
optime de genere hominum mereri et qualis quisque sit, quid agat . . . intueri, .
His enim rebus inbutae mentes haud sane abhorrebunt ab utili et a vera sententia.
Tusc. Dis. i.72. Nam qui se humanis vitiis contaminavissent . . . iis devium
quoddam iter esse, seclusum a concilio deorum. Qui autem essent... in
corporibus humanis vitam imitati deorum, his ad illos a quibus essent profecti,
reditum facilem patere. Cf. Tusc. v.70; De Re Pub. vi.18; De Off. i.153, iii.23,
iii.28.
•
5
317 Cf. Boissier, Vol. I, p. 5, Walter Pater, Marius the Epicurean, Vol. I, 10,
(London, 1921) and Fowler, Rel. Ex. pp. 161–164.
318 Boissier, l. c. "Tout ce qu'on sait d'eux, c'est qu'il faut les prier à un certain
moment et qu'ils peuvent alors rendre service. Ce moment passe; on les oublie.”
19 James, Will to Believe, p. 122.
320De Nat. Deor. i.3. In specie autem fictae simulationis, sicut reliquae virtutes,
ita pietas inesse non potest
82ī Ibid., iii.5. Quumque omnis populi Romani religio in sacra et in auspicia
divisa sit.
$22 Boissier, Vol. i, p. 12. “La réligion telle qu'ils [les pontifes] l'ont faite se
reduit au culte."
De Natura Deorum
39
attempted to arrest the decay of the old religion, they did so by re-
search into its history, but without faith in its bases. 323 They could only
recommend the observance of religious practices. 324 Varro, as quoted
by St. Augustine,325 admitted that, if he were to found the state anew,
he would name the gods differently, but that on account of their an-
tiquity he sought the respect, and not the contempt, of the multitude
for them. We also learn from St. Augustine that Varro feared that the
gods would perish, not from attacks from without, but through the
negligence of the citizens.326 Boissier's terse summary of the cause
which brought about the downfall of the old faith is:-"Les rites qui
ne disent rien à l'esprit ni à l'àme cessent bientôt d'être regulièrement
accomplis."327 Cicero shows himself here opposed to such formalism.
He seeks to reconcile the forms of the state religion with the conclu-
sions of philosophy, to vitalize the ritual and give a living content to
the shell of religion. When he says that he alone brought philosophy
into the Forum,328 he means not into the forum of politics only, but
into all fields of practical life.329
The Stoic Doctrine of Providence
As to the Stoic doctrine of Providence, with which he was in much
greater sympathy than with the Epicurean view, Cicero in the Intro-
duction makes only one brief criticism in contrast to the warm protest
we have noted against the idle gods of Epicurus. He remarks in mild
reproof of those philosophers (magni atque nobiles) who maintain the
doctrine of Providence and the minute care of the gods for men, that
in their view "the very gods seem to have been created for the sake of
men. ''330 While Cicero is sure of the gods as guarantors of morality
in the universe, he will not allow too confident assurance as to the
methods by which they work, nor a materialistic and utilitarian view
of their beneficence.
We find, then, in the introduction to the treatise on the nature of
323 Ibid., p. 48.
324 Ibid., p. 49.
325Civ. Dei iv.31 (Ed. B. Dombart, Teubner, 1877, p. 185).
326Civ. Dei vi.2 (Ed. B. Dombart, Teubner, 1877, p. 248).
827 Boissier, Vol. i, p. 62.
328 Ad Fam. xv.1.6.
329 Cf. his description of Socrates' practical philosophy in Tusc. Dis. iii.4. It is
evident that Cicero in De Nat. Deor. did not intend to have his point of view
identified with that of Cotta. He represents himself as present at the conversa-
tion, a fourth party, not an assistant to Cotta, but a hearer with judgment un-
biassed (i.17).
330De Nat. Deor. i.4. Ut ei ipsi dei... videantur. The reading, ei ipsi, occurs
in the Codex Leidensis and was evidently accepted by Boissier (Vol. I, 57). The
other Mss. have ea ipsa, a very weak reading. There would seem to be no point
in saying what is quite obvious, viz.: that a strict view of providence would
make it seem that the gods had created ea ipsa for the use of men.
40
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
the gods, (1) a defence of the Academic method which searches for
truth, untrammelled by authority or consistency; (2) a passionate
rejection of any conception of Deity that separates it from human life,
on the ground that such separation takes away the guarantee for all
that elevates human society; (3) at least a hint that Cicero will not be
identified with the pontiff, Cotta, in the latter's indifference to any
phase of religion other than the state ritual. The rest of the dialogue
falls into four parts: (a) the statement of the Epicurean view; (b) its
refutation; (c) the statement of the Stoic view; (d) its refutation.
‚B. REFUTATION OF THE EPICUREAN DOCTRINE
Cicero gives a dramatic form to his preference for the Academic
method by contrasting the courtesy of Cotta with the crude violence
of Velleius, the Epicurean. The latter, by way of historical criticism,
ridiculed as absurdities all opinions opposed to the Epicurean idea of
God.331 He was free in the use of opprobrious terms for his oppo-
nents.332 Cotta, on the other hand, began his reply with a compliment
for Velleius' eminence in his own school and for his clearness and
elegance of exposition.333 The rudeness of the Epicurean manner is
allied to the assertiveness of their mental attitude.334 Velleius spoke,
said Cicero, as if he came direct from the councils of the gods.335 It was
this cocksureness, Boissier thinks, that drove Cicero to the negative,
almost atheistical views which he allowed Cotta to express.
336 In
contrast to the arrogant dogmatism of the Epicurean speaker, Cotta's
hesitation and moderation seem like the attitude of a mature mind
over against the naive certainty of youth. He admits that it is easier
to detect error than to discover truth.337 The story of Simonides is
told to show the hesitation, not irreverent, of a serious mind before
the great question, "quid aut quale sit deus?''338
The refutation of the Epicureans falls into two parts, representing
the two sides, positive and negative, of pragmatic criticism. Cicero,
on the one hand, assails their arrogant assumption of certainty and on
the other hand, their belief in a Deity separate from human life and
valueless to it. His view, in brief, is that there is no certain knowledge
331 See Mayor, op. cit., Vol. i, p. 101.
332 He spoke of Zeno as “quasi delirans." i.37.
333 Ibid., i.58.
334 Hirzel, Vol. I, p. 28.
335 De Nat. Deor. i.18, tanquam modo ex deorum concilio et ex Epicuri inter-
mundiis descendisset.
336 Boissier, i.57. For the same view see Thiaucourt, 219.
337 De Nat. Deor. i.57. Cf. §§60 and 91.
338 Ibid., i.60.
De Natura Deorum
41
about God except in His relation to mankind, and that the only
significant concept of Deity is one that relates it to human conduct.
1. The dogmatism of the Epicureans about details will
not stand against argument.
Cotta would like to have the existence of the gods proved beyond a
peradventure, but there are many arguments that seem to disprove
their existence.339 The argument from the consensus gentium does not
hold, for no one can learn all the particulars from which to make the
generalization.340 The Epicurean had based the consensus gentium on
πρόληψις and claimed the authority of πρόληψις not only for the
existence of the gods,341 but for their eternity, happiness, and human
form.342 Cotta replies that it is custom that gives us the picture of the
gods in human form;343 the painters, poets, and sculptors have accus-
tomed us to such presentations.344 Instinct too, by which nature sub-
dues us to her own ends, makes us all find our own species most
beautiful.345 The assumption that reason can coexist only with the
human form is purely gratuitous.346 Why may not the divine form
surpass ours as the divine mind surpasses our reason?347 The very
consensus gentium, to which Velleius appealed, denies his anthropo-
morphism, for many philosophers have denied the gods a human
body.348 And the Egyptians worship the crocodile, the ibis, and the
cat.349 Anthropomorphism is frivolous and trifling. 350 The true re-
339 Ibid., i.61.
340
40Ibid., i.62. Schömann (De Nat. Deor., Boston, 1885, p. 206) calls attention
to the fact that Cicero expresses the opposite view in De Leg. i.24. Cf. also
Tusc. Bk. I and my chapter on Tusc., pp. 91 and 92.
341 Ibil., i.43–46. Zeller (III, 1.389, n. 2) thinks that Cicero is not correct in
defining the Epicurean concept of póλnys as anteceptam animo rei quandam
informationem (De Nat. Deor. i.43). He cites a definition of póλns from
Diogenes X 33, in which it is based on sense_impressions (µvýμnv toû toλλákis
ěžWOEV PAVÉVTOS). Mayor, (De Nat. Deor. Vol. I, p. 118), does not admit that
Cicero here means any sort of a priori, innate idea. "All that is implied,
he says, "is that our religious ideas are not arbitrarily imposed upon us from
without, but grow up within us as a natural and necessary result of experience."
But all the phrases used by Cicero in §§43 and 44, if interpreted naturally, indicate
that Cicero, at least, thought the póλnis was an idea prior to all sense-experi-
ence. Cicero's theory of innate or instinctive knowledge is the subject of much
dispute. It is probable that he himself confused the Platonic doctrine of reminis-
cence, the Stoic Kovai ěvvolaι and the Epicurean poλnes. See note 795 in
my chapter on the Tusc. Dis.
342 Ibid., i.45. Quae enim nobis natura informationem ipsorum deorum dedit;
eadem insculpsit in mentibus ut eos aeternos et beatos haberemus. Cf. §46.
343 Ibid., i.83.
344 Ibid., i.77. Cf. §81.
345 Ibid., i.77.
347 Ibid., i.96.
349 Ibid., i.82.
346 Ibid., i.89.
848 Ibid., i.92.
850 Ibid., i.94. ... vix digna lucubratione anicularum.
42
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
semblance of man to God is not in physical form, but in virtue.351
With this statement Cicero shifts the topic from the field of specula-
tion to that of ethics.
The atomic theory, by which the Epicureans explained the creation
of the world and the existence of the gods,352 is not universally ac-
cepted. The arguments of the physicists who deny the existence of a
void seem to the Academic more probable.353 The Epicureans are in-
consistent in denying Plato's created, yet eternal, world and claiming
immortality for their own created gods.354
The fault of the Epicurean argument is reliance on words and verbal
distinctions. This habit is due to their slavish dependence on the
dicta of their master. When they find it difficult to explain the body
of the gods, they escape "into a thicket" (in dumeta I 68) by using the
phrase, quasi corpus, unintelligible even to Epicureans.355 When one
does not understand, it is better to yield. the point and say one does
not know than to keep on quoting Epicurus' folly against one's own
better judgment.356 The Epicureans retreat from one difficult posi-
tion to another still more preposterous as they invent the swerve of
the atoms to prove free will,357 and refuse to admit the disjunctive
judgment lest they should thereby admit necessity;358 so they retreat
from saying the gods have a body to saying that the body is tamquam
corpus, tanquam sanguinem (§71). They use phrases that they them-
selves do not understand, as when they speak of the continually flow-
ing visions,359 and invent the law of ioovouia by which to prove the
eternity of the gods.360
All such unsound assertions are due to their lack of freedom and to
their narrow conformity to the words of Epicurus.361 Those who early
51 Ibid., i.96. Ad similitudinem enim deorum propius accedebat humana virtus
quam figura.
352 Ibid., i.54.
353 Ibid., 1.66. Mayor quotes Aristotle, Phys. iv.9, 217b, oửr' åπokekpiµévov
κενόν ἐστιν, οὔθ᾽ ἁπλῶς, οὔτ᾽ ἐν τῷ μανῷ, οὐτὲ δυνάμει.
354 Ibid., 1.68. Cf. i.18-20 for Epicurean criticism of Plato.
55 Ibid., 1.71. Schömann (Opuscula, Berlin, Weidmann, 1871, IV, 348) con-
siders this ridicule of the quasi corpora unjust. These bodies, he explains, made
of finer atoms than human bodies, were visible to the spirit, because they cor-
responded to its finer atoms.
366 Ibid., i.84.
357 Ibid., i.69. Cf. De Fato 46.
358 Ibid., 1.70. Cf. De Fato 18.
369 Ibid., i.109
360L. c. According to Mayor (Vol. i, p. 149) Cicero is the only authority who
formally assigned this law to Epicurus. But Hirzel (I, 85) noted that Lucretius
expressed the same idea in ii.529ff., and Schömann (Opusc. iv. pp. 344-5) in his
determination to see justice done to Epicurus remarks that loovoula is no more
absurd that the "evidences" of some modern theologians!
361 Ibid., i.72.
De Natura Deorum
43
attach themselves to a school feel bound to maintain its dogmas.362
Thus Cicero points indirectly to the freedom of the Academy, freedom
from the bonds of consistency with a master's dogmas, which drive
men into atrocities of statement (§66).
2. The Epicureans destroy religion when they make
the gods inactive.
The great defect of the Epicurean idea of deity is the detachment
of the gods from human life. Cicero's whole refutation of Epicurean-
ism, in the opinion of some scholars,363 is derived from Stoic sources.
Even those who with Hirzel364 believe that an Academic source was
used admit the Stoic tone of Cotta's whole refutation,365 and note
in particular that he, in true Stoic tone, resents the separation of gods
and men.366 He rejects the concept of idle, indifferent gods, whose
very blessedness consists in their idleness (§§51, 52), and claims that
blessedness, on the other hand, consists in virtue and that virtue is
full of activity.367 The Epicurean view of a blessed god eternally con-
templating his own beauty or goodness is unthinkable.368 Such an
idea of God furnishes a bad example for men.
369
Any adequate idea of God ascribes activity to him. Even the ig-
norant do better than the Epicureans, in that they picture the gods as
using their limbs and their weapons ($101). The Stoics, though they
make errors (aberrant a coniectura), do still better, when they attribute
the creation and government of the world to the gods.370
But activity in the gods must take the form of relation to the world
of men. Cicero does not actually say this, but he implies it in every
reference to the activity of the gods. Though Epicurus write on re-
ligion like a high priest, yet he destroys the temples of the gods by his
362 Ibid., i.66. Zeller (iii.1, p. 379) notes the rigid dogmatism of this school.
wagten sie [die Schuler] sich auf keinem Punkte von ihm [Epikur] zu
entfernen." Hirzel, however, has a chapter on the differences in the Epicurean
school and quotes Dünning (De Metrodori Ep. vita et scriptis, p. 18) who main-
tained that uniformity was characteristic of the later (post-Augustan) school;
that the cases of Zeno, Philodemus, and Lucretius prove that there was greater
freedom in the earlier school (Hirzel I.99). But Lucretius declared himself a
follower in the very footsteps of Epicurus (iii.3-4).
363 Notably P. Schwemme, Neue Jahrb. für Phil. 1879, p. 65. Teuffel, I 415
thinks, however, that Clitomachus as well as Posidonius and Antiochus was a
source.
364 Hirzel, Vol. I 45. Cf. Schōmann, De Nat. Deor., Boston 1885, Introd., p. 16.
365 Hirzel, I 33.
366 Hirzel, I 43 on §§115 and 121. Cf. De Nat. Deor. ii.164 for the Stoic view.
367 Ibid., i.110.
368 Ibid., i.114.
369 Ibid., i.102. Haec oratio... homines inertis efficit . . .
$70 Ibid., i.100.
44
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
reasoning as truly as Xerxes did by his marauding bands when he
denies that the gods love or care for man.371 No statement about the
superlative excellence of the nature of godhead can draw forth human
love and worship so long as the divine nature has no link with man-
kind.372 Piety, which is justice toward God, cannot exist without
intercourse between men and God;373 holiness, which is the knowledge
of the service of God, is destroyed if we have no reason to thank the
gods nor hope for favour from them.374
This relation is not, however, a cold exchange of heavenly favours.
and human worship. Cicero points out that in ascribing an excellent
nature to the gods, the Epicureans left out the peculiar property of
an excellent nature, kindness, and beneficence. These lacking, no
man is dear to God, nor God to any man.375 The bond between good
men is a natural affection (caritas naturalis), free, not mercenary.
Even more spontaneous should be the friendship between god and
gods, and gods and men.376 Here we evidently have a reference to the
familiar Stoic idea of the universal commonwealth,377 and also to the
relation of the human spirit to the Divine, implied in De Nat. Deor.
i. 1.378
It is quite in the tone of modern pragmatism that Cicero claims that
Epicurus has taken away the gods by detaching them from human
relations.379 A God unconcerned with human affairs is no God for
human beings to worship. In James' phrase, names are worthless
until we get out of them "the actual cash-value."380 Of his God as
over against the Absolute of the rationalists he says:-"His menial
services are needed in the dust of our human trials even more than his
dignity is needed in the empyrean.''381
371 Ibid., i.115. Cf. i.121, Epicurus vero gratiam sustulit.
•
372 Ibid.,
116, 117. The Epicureans claimed worship for their gods on account
of their surpassing character (i.56). But Fowler observes that it was "not natural
for the Romans to meditate on God" (Roman Ideas of Deity, p. 12), and that
the great weakness of Epicureanism was that it gave no religious consecration of
morality; further, that the gods were superfluous even for the atomic theory on
which the system was pivoted. (Rel. Exp. p. 359). The really religious element
in their system, Fowler finds in their love and worship of Epicurus (ibid., p. 361).
Picavet thinks the Epicurean gods served as models for human conduct. (Théo-
logies et philosophies médiévales, p. 144 (Paris, Felix Alcan, 1913). Cf. Lucret.,
vi.76-8 for what describes, apparently, a direct relation between the gods and men.
373 Ibid., i.116.
874 L. C.
These definitions of pietas and sanctitas are known to be Stoic, from
Stobaeus, Ecl. II, 124.
376 Ibid., i.122.
377 De Leg., i.23. Civitas communis deorum atque hominum. Cf. De Off. iii.28.
378 Cf. p. 37 of this dissertation.
375 Ibid., i.121. Qua cum carere hominem carum
•
•
•
379 De Nat. Deor., i.123. ... Epicurus re tollit, oratione relinquit deos.
380 James, Pragmatism, 53.
381 Ibid., 72.
De Natura Deorum
45
If there be such a god as Epicurus states, let him go! says the ob-
jector 382 Whether this objector be Cotta the Academic, or Posido-
nius the Stoic, we are sure he is Cicero. The Epicurean gods, anthro-
pomorphic, formed of the finest atoms, shadowy, useless, seem trivial
enough, measured by the fundamental qualities that Cicero thought
necessary for an adequate Deity,-activity and sympathy with men.
The earnest tone of the refutation is scarcely disguised by the
Academic formulae,383 which may have been introduced for dramatic
purposes. If we find that this pragmatic demand for serviceable gods,
made here in a form approximately dogmatic, is not overthrown by
Cotta in Book III, we shall be justified in believing that Cicero, even
in this speculative treatise, has gone far on the road that led the New
Academy from the probable to the certain.
C. CRITICISM OF THE STOIC DOCTRINE OF THE GODS
The third book of the treatise on the Nature of the Gods, contain-
ing a criticism of the Stoic doctrines, begins with a statement of
respect for the Stoic method. Balbus is a more formidable opponent,
says Cotta, than Velleius, for his arguments are more logical and inter-
related (apta inter se atque cohaerentia).384 The book ends with the
statement by Cicero himself that he finds the argument of Balbus, the
Stoic, more convincing than that of the Academic Cotta.385 Since we
have seen that he rejected the Epicurean doctrine peremptorily,386
the net result of the whole study is that Cicero found the balance of
probability to be in favor of the Stoics. There was room, however,
for criticism of the Stoics on account of their over-positiveness in
doubtful matters and their anxiety to justify the popular polytheism
and belief in divination.387 Stoicism was a "closed system" of the
sort to which all pragmatism is fundamentally opposed.388 The very
valeat!
382 De Nat. Deor., i.124. ... deinde si maxime talis est deus,
388 Cf. ibid., i.66, vera an falsa nescio; i.91, utinam tam facile vera invenire
possim quam falsa convincere! Paul Schwenke (Neue Jahr. für Phil. 1879, p. 65)
says of these formulae,-"aber sie stehen in so starkem contrast zu den sie
umgebendem dogmatischen Sätzen dass man unwillkurlich auf die Vermutung
kommt Cicero habe sie eingeschoben um seinen Akademiker nicht allzusehr aus
der Rolle fallen zu lassen."
384 De Nat. Deor., iii.4. Zeno made logic a distinct branch of philosophy and
used the curt and unadorned logical style which Chrysippus developed. (Zeller,
iii.i, 57).
385Ibid., iii.95, mihi Balbi ad veritatis similitudinem videretur esse propensior.
386 Ibid., i.124.
387 Mayor, Vol. iii, p. x.
388
88 Cf. James, Will to Believe, 13.
"A system, to be a system at all, must
come as a closed system, reversible in this or that detail perchance, but in its es-
sential features, never!" To such a philosophical method James declares his
opposition (p. 14).
46
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
fact that the Stoics used many arguments to prove the existence of the
gods was a proof that they felt unsure of their ground.389 By argu-
ment they made the certain uncertain.390 Cotta declares that he
takes his religious faith on authority.391 If the Stoics base theirs on
reason, they challenge the opposition of other reasoners.392 So Cotta
proceeds to balance sceptical arguments against Stoic arguments,
matching syllogism against syllogism and sorites against sorites. His
attempt is to show that the truth of the universe cannot all be per-
fectly expressed in the terms of formal logic, nor so neatly analyzed
and tabulated as to defy all questioning.
1. Attack on the Stoic Arguments for the Gods
The pantheistic views of the Stoic are criticized by the Academic.393
Zeno proved the divinity of the world by a syllogism: Quod ratione
utitur id melius est quam id quod ratione non utitur.394 But this
proves too much,395 one can extend its force to the point of absurdity.
Quod litteratum est, id est melius quam quod non est litteratum;
nihil autem mundo melius; litteratus est igitur mundus.396 One could
by the same method prove the world a mathematician, a musician, a
philosopher.397
Cicero will not admit theology as a substitute for natural science.
To ascribe divinity to objects of nature is to encroach on the proper
scientific study of nature. We see here, as we shall see in De Divina-
tione, Cicero's eagerness to reconcile religion and science.398 The
regular motions of the stars do not indicate God any more than they
do nature.399 Otherwise one would have to allow the same for tides
and for intermittent fevers:400 A reason must be sought for all such
things. One must not flee to God as to an altar instead of seeking a
natural explanation.401 Man is quite right in thinking himself superior
389De Nat. Deor., iii.9. Sed quia non confidebas. . . voluisti.
•
•
390 Ibid., iii.10. rem . . . minime dubiam argumentando dubiam facis.
391Ibid., iii.9. Mihi . . . sat erat . . . tradidisse.
392L. c. Sed tu . . . ratione pugnas. Patere . . . rationem me meam cum tua
ratione contendere.
393Zeller (iii.1, p. 146), "schon heraus ergibt sich nun, dass die Stoiker auch
keinen Wesenunterschied zwischen Gott und der Welt zugeben konnten, dass ihr
System ein Streng pantheistisches sein musste." Cf. De Nat. Deor., ii.34 and
ii.45.
29¹Ibid., ii.22. Cf. iii.46. Cf. Diog., vii.142.
395 Ibid., iii.21.
397 L. C.
396 Ibid., iii.23.
398 Mayor (Vol. III, p. XII) says:-"We find both writers [Lucretius and Cicero]
agreed as to the fact that the Divine existence is not inconsistent with the scientific
theory of nature.
399 De Nat. Deor., iii.24. Cf. ii §§43, 54, 80.
401 L. C.
De Natura Deorum
47
to Orion or Canicula since he has reason and sensation, and they have
not.402
402 The Stoics claim heat or fire as the divine element.403 But this
is no more essential to life than any of the other elements. 404 More-
over, fire is not self-existent; without fuel it goes out, and so it cannot
be immortal in its nature. 405 If it causes feeling in man, it contains in
itself the elements of feeling and, if so, is subject to destruction.406 It
may be observed that the Academic arguments thus far advanced are
valid against an identification of God and the material world, not
against a belief in a God transcending that world and governing it.4
Cicero says later in De Divinatione that the order and beauty of the
world forces us to confess that there is some divine force worthy of our
regard and admiration.408
407
But the Academic critic speaks more boldly when he denies that the
order of the world or even the spirit of man implies a divine creator.
Naturae ista sunt, Balbe, . . . omnia cientis et cogitantis motibus . . .
suis, he replies of the origin of the soul;409 of the harmony of nature he
says, Illa vero cohaerent et permanent naturae viribus, non deorum.410
But the Stoic had carefully distinguished his own definition of nature,
vim participem rationis atque ordinis from the Epicurean, vim quan-
dam sine ratione cientem motus.411 When Cotta here deliberately
echoes a word of the Epicurean definition, cientis (iii 27), it would
appear that he meant to indicate non-conscious nature, as the Epi-
curean did, and so to rule out all mental causality from the phenomena
of nature. Here we venture to assume that Cicero would differ from
his Academic speaker, asserting the independence that he claimed in
1.17 (. . . tu autem nolo existimes me adiutorem huic venisse, sed
auditorem....) He states his faith in the cosmological argument in
the passage just cited from De Divinatione ii. 148.412
This denial, however, that the universe as we see it is a proof posi-
tive of a Deity is in accordance with the views of the modern prag-
matists. "It makes not a single jot of difference, so far as the past of
the world goes, whether we deem it to have been the work of matter
402 Ibid., iii.26.
403 Ibid., iii.35. Cf. ii, §§23–32.
405 Ibid., iii.37.
407 Mayor, vol. iii, p. xxii.
404 Ibid., iii.35.
06 Ibid., iii.36. Cf. §33.
408 De Divin., ii.148. . . . et esse praestantem aliquam naturam, et eam suspi-
ciendam admirandamque hominum generi, pulchritudo mundi ordoque rerum
caelestium cogit confiteri.
409 De Nat. Deor., iii.27.
411 Ibid., ii.81.
412
410 Ibid., iii.28. Cf. ii.19.
et esse praestantem aliquam aeternamque naturam. . . confiteri. Zeller
(III, 1.661 n.) cites Tusc. i.62, 1.30, and iii.95 as evidence that Cotta does not
in De Nat. Deor. represent Cicero's views. See also Zeller, l. c., 666 n. 5.
48
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
or whether we think a divine spirit was its author."'413 "Matter and
God in that event [if future possibilities are not to be considered]
mean exactly the same thing, the power namely, neither more nor
less, that could make just this completed world."'414
We have seen that Cicero rejected the Epicurean theology, because
it separated the gods from human life. The Stoic system, on the other
hand, laid great emphasis on their connection with men, not only with
mankind, but with individuals. 415 God's care for man is the culminat-
ing point of the general Stoic argument for Providence. The adapta-
tion of means to end, proving a reasonable cause (naturae ratio
intellegentis) is seen in all nature, vegetable, animal, human.416 But
the world was made for rational beings, gods and men.417 With
laborious detail the Stoics worked out the adaptation of the world to
man's needs. The pig is useful for food, and so life (anima) was given
to it to keep its flesh from spoiling,418 sheep exist to furnish clothing
from their wool; dogs, for the purpose of watching and for their
assistance in hunting.419
The gift of reason to men is to the Stoics the crowning proof of
God's providential care. He who cannot see providence therein lacks
the gift himself. Not even in God himself is there anything superior
to reason. 420 In criticism of this claim the Academic raises the ques-
tion that challenges any optimistic or complacent philosophy, namely
the problem of evil in its double form of sin and pain. In particular
he challenged the Stoic doctrine of a God who has all foreknowledge
and a Fate that ordained from the beginning whatever comes to pass.
Of such difficulties as this Mayor says:-"But none except the ex-
tremest partisans could pretend that the Academic difficulties were
entirely cleared up by such considerations as were available on the
other side. ''421
Reason is not a benefit, argues the Academic, for it is the source of
414
14Ibid., p. 99.
413James, Pragmatism, 96.
415Zeller, iii.1, pp. 163, 4. De Nat. Deor., ii.164, Nec vero universo generi
hominum solum, sed etiam singulis a dis immortalibus consuli et provideri solet.
416 Ibid., ii. 120.
417 Ibid., ii.133 and ii.154.
418 Ibid., ii.160.
19Ibid., ii.158. "So" says Zeller (III, 1.172) "they not infrequently fell into
the ridiculous and the pedantic in their endeavors to trace the special end for
which each thing exists.' The Academic comment on this argument in De Nat.
Deor. is lost; but Carneades' comment, found in Porphyrion, De Abstinentia
III, 20, looks at the matter from the viewpoint of the pig. "That which attains the
end for which it was created is benefited. So the pig, born to be killed and eaten,
is thereby benefited!" James has a similar comment on the argument from
adaptation, Pragmatism, 110–111.
420De Nat. Deor., ii.147.
421 Mayor, Vol. iii, p. xxiv.
De Natura Deorum
49
all wickedness. 422 If God gave good reason, he gave it only to a few,
and this is contrary to the view that he gave it to mankind.423 The
rejoinder that God gave reason, but that men abuse it,424 is not valid,
for according to the Stoic doctrine of divine foreknowledge, Provi-
dence must have foreseen this abuse and so is to blame for the gift.425
Providence should have made all men wise and good.426 But accord-
ing to the views of all philosophers, no one attains wisdom.427 In this
reference to the familiar Stoic emphasis on the difficulty of attaining
wisdom the Academic convicts his opponents of utter inconsistency.
Not only does the fact of sin conflict with the doctrine of Provi-
dence, but the problem of suffering. Why do the virtuous suffer, and
the vicious prosper and triumph ?428 If no distinction exists between
the good and the wicked, there is no divine government in theworld.42
This problem cannot be solved by saying that the gods do not look
after details; there are disasters that cannot be considered unim-
portant details. 430 If God does not care for individuals, how can it be
proved that he cares for states or nations ?431 The material conditions
of a happy life are just the blessings God could bestow with just dis-
crimination; for virtue man owes to his own efforts. 432 If the reply is
made that the sins of the fathers are visited on the children, our own
human conception of justice is outraged.4
433
429
422 De Nat. Deor. iii.69. Videturne summa improbitate usus non sine summa
ratione? pestifera est multis, admodum paucis salutaris . . .
•
423 Ibid., iii.70.
424 L. C.
425 Ibid., iii.78. Nisi forte dictis eam [Providentia] nescisse. Utinam quidem!
Sed non audebitis. Non enim ignoro quanti eius nomen putetis.
426 Ibid., iii.79.
427 For the rarity of wisdom according to the Stoics see Plut. Sto. Rep. 31.5
quoted by Zeller II1, i.269, n. i. Zeller (iii, i.252, 268–9) believes that the Stoics
held the two classes, wise and unwise, to be mutually exclusive, with no grada-
tions between them. Hirzel (II, 271–2) asserts a shift in the Stoic position; the
earlier Stoics flattered themselves that the ideal could be attained; the latter
school, taught by experience, gave up the hope; still later, it turned back to the
early "childish dream.'
428 De Nat. Deor. iii.80. Dies deficiat si velim numerare quibus bonis male
evenerit nec minus si commemorem quibus improbis optime.
429 Ibid., iii.85.
430 Ibid., iii.86. Quasi ego... de fundo . . . sim questus, non de amissa salute.
431
¹Ibid., iii.93. The Stoic had said that Providence cared, not only for mankind,
but for individuals (ii.164); he had also said that the gods care for magna, not
parva (ii.167). . . . The apparent inconsistency is explained by Zeller (iii.1.162)
thus: "Es ist desshalb auch nicht das Einzelne als solches auf das sich die göttliche
Vorschung hier begieht, sondern das Einzelne immer nur in seinem Zusammen-
hang mit dem Ganzen."
432 Ibid., iii.87. Num quis quod bonus vir esset, gratias dis egit unquam? The
theme enunciated here and in §86 of the self-sufficiency of human virtue is re-
echoed in De Fin., v.36 and 38, and was a vivid feature of Cicero's humanism.
See Zielinski, 63-4. and page 23 of this dissertation.
33 Ibid., iii.90. O miram aequitatem deorum! Ferretne civitas ulla latorem
istius modi legis?
50
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
Similar objections are raised by the modern pragmatist against the
self-satisfied conclusions of those who employ the argument from
design.
"There was a time" says James, "when .
stall-fed officials of
an established church could prove by the valves of the heart and
the round ligature of the hip-joint the existence of a 'Moral and In-
telligent Contriver of the world'
Truly, all we know of
good and duty proceeds from nature, but none the less so, all we
know of evil
If there be a divine Spirit of the universe,
nature, such as we know her, cannot possibly be its ultimate word
to man.
''434
The presence of pain in the world seems to James a matter not
easily explained away. He notes the "ghastly satisfaction" with.
which Leibnitz the rationalist explained the immense number of
damned souls to be in harmony with divine justice. 435 Then he turns.
on the modern rationalists who coolly argue matters concerning human
agony and tragedy. He quotes Professor Royce, "The very presence
of ill in the temporal order is the condition of the perfection of the
eternal order.' "The Absolute is the richer for every discord and
for all the diversity which it embraces," says F. H. Bradley.437 Such
views James calls "the airy and shallow optimism of current religious
philosophy."'438
''436
Another difficult question raised by Cicero is,-in what sense is
virtue to be ascribed to the gods? All human virtues have to do with
human conditions. How can we predicate temperance of the gods,
since temperance means renunciation of sensual pleasure? What of
justice, which arises from the needs of human social life? What of
reason and intelligence, which have to do with the learning of obscure
things by means of known things? But to God nothing is obscure.439
These are the criticisms with which the Academic seeks out the vul-
nerable points in the elaborate and authoritative Stoic doctrine of
Providence.
434 James, Will to Believe, 43–4.
436 Ibid., 29.
438 Ibid., 28.
435 James, Pragmatism, 23–4.
437 Ibid., 30.
349 Ibid., iii.38. This is the answer to Balbus' assertion (ii.79) that the gods
have the same virtues as men, only in larger degree. Fortitudo, however, and
iustitia are not mentioned in Balbus' list. Aristotle denied the propriety of
ascribing virtue to God. (Nich. Eth. X., 8.7). The Christian Fathers, according
to Mayor, (Vol. III, p. 99) were divided on the subject. Mayor himself thinks
that the attributes, "holy," "loving," "just," and "wise," are properly applied to
Deity, but not "courageous" or "temperate." His grounds are the same as
Cotta's. Cicero's own view was that virtue is the same in God and man. (De
Leg., i.25).
¡.
De Natura Deorum
51
2. Attack on Superstition in Stoic Theology
We have mentioned that one of Cicero's objects in writing on the
nature of the gods was the destruction of superstition. It was not
difficult for the Epicureans to overthrow superstition when they also
overthrew religion. But Cicero set himself a nobler task,—to keep
religion, and yet free it from superstition.440 The study of theology
was needed, he said, to control religious observances (ad moderandum
religionem).441
As against the Stoics he pursues along two roads his object of up-
rooting superstition. He criticises their claim for divination,442 and
upbraids them for their compromise with the popular mythology. As
to divination, he dismisses it briefly, no doubt having already in mind
the elaborate refutation he was to publish in De Divinatione. He
says merely that the Stoics were inconsistent in denying divine care
for individuals while claiming that the gods sent dreams to individual
men.443
But he speaks at length of the sanction given by the Stoics to the
popular gods. They felt obliged to come to terms with the popular
religion444 although no feature of their theology can with certainty be
traced to that religion.445 They found justification for polytheism,
however, in the idea of one god manifesting himself under different
names. 446
The Stoics, like Cicero, were anxious to uproot supersti-
tion,447 but they were quite vague as to the limits to be observed in
deification. Men who had done great public service were to be dei-
fied;4
.448 so, too, anything that was of great service to men.449 While
440 De Nat. Deor., i.§§117, 121. Cf. De Divin., ii.148.
441 Ibid., i.l.
442 Ibid., ii.162–3. Est enim . . . divinatio . . . data.
443 Ibid., iii.93.
444 Arnold, Roman Stoicism, p. 229. (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1911). "The
whole atmosphere of Stoic religion was alien to that in which the gods of the
Greek and Roman mythology had taken root . . . The nominal absorption of
these gods in the Stoic system. .
... was a work of political adaptation."
445Zeller, iii, i. 311.
•
446 De Nat. Deor., ii.71. . . . deus pertinens per naturam cuiusque rei,
poterunt [dei] intellegi . . . quoque eos nomine consuetudo nuncupaverit, hoc eos
et venerari et colere debemus. Bussell (Marcus Aurelius and later Stoics, p. 42)
interprets thus: "All names will suit God as He is everything. Partial names of
special Deities are all His." Fowler (Rel. Exp. 366) thinks the concreteness of
special names might have had the advantage of saving the Stoic pantheistic
idea from disappearing. Boissier observes (Rel. romaine, II.145) that there was
great difference between the feeling of the Stoic and that of the ordinary worship-
per. The latter, when praying to Minerva or Juno, addressed a distinct divine
person; the former, an emanation of the one God in one of his special functions.
447 De Nat. Deor., ii.70.
448 Ibid., ii.62.
449 Ibid., ii.60.
52
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
they granted that the fables of poets had packed human life full of
superstition,450 they were not averse to finding germs of truth, espe-
cially physical truth, hidden in these fables. 451 Allegory and etymology
were the two methods employed by the Stoics to justify the popular
gods. A difficulty arose as to the fixing of the limits of this method.
The Academic critic here says that the Stoics were no whit better than
the vulgar multitude with their host of gods. 452 Even if one were to
accept the deity of the universe and the heavenly bodies, how could
he accept the deification of food and drink as in the case of Ceres and
Bacchus ?453 How can one allow the personification of abstract quali-
ties, such as Love, Fear, etc. ?454
The sorites, as applied by Carneades, showed the absurdities to
which the Stoic method led.455 If one allows some of these minor
deities, e.g., the five Venuses and the three Cupids, why not the
Nymphs, the Pans, and the Satyrs ?456 If there are deities who are of
divine origin on the father's side only, why not those whose mothers
are goddesses ?457 If Natio, the divinity of childbirth, is a goddess,
then divinity must be conceded to every phantom of our imagina-
tion.458 Even bad qualities, Febris, Orbona, Mala Fortuna, have
actually obtained altars. 459 The derivation of divine names is so fan-
tastic as to excite pity.460 If one can derive Neptune from nando, one
can derive any name from one letter.4 In short, this system of
allegorical and etymological interpretation is merely calling natural
facts by the names of gods. 462
461
The Roman pantheon contained also many apotheosized heroes.
These deities, too, were recognized in the Stoic compromise.463 The
450 Ibid., ii.63 and Zeller iii.1.314.
452 Ibid., iii.40.
451 Ibid., ii.64.
453 Ibid iii.41. Cf. ii.60 for Stoic view,-Quidquid enim magnam utilitatem
arbitrantur.
454 Ibid., iii.44. In De Leg. ii.28 Cicero recommends the personification of good
qualities as tending to produce these qualities in the worshipper.
455 Mayor, Vol. III, p. LVIII. Though the sorites was developed by the Stoics
(Zeller, iii.1.115), it became the favorite weapon of Carneades against the Stoic
school. Cf. Acad. ii.92 and 93.
456 I am following the arrangement of Mayor, who placed iii§43 after §60 and
amended "si di sunt" §43 to "si di sunt isti.”
457 Ibid., iii.45.
458 Ibid., iii.47. . . omniaque quae cogitatione nobismet ipsi possumus fingere.
459 Ibid., iii.63.
460 Ibid., iii.62
461 L. C.
462 Ibid., iii.63. ... confitemini . . . eos enim qui di appellantur, rerum naturas
esse Hirzel believes that the allegorizing tendency of the Stoic school stopped
with Chrysippus, and he attributed this charge to the influence of Carneades'
criticism (Vol. I, 224, note).
463 Euhemerism had an origin distinct from Stoicism. Boissier (Vol. II.125)
points out the antithesis between the original Stoic concept of Deity and that
De Natura Deorum
53
deification of Romulus and Hercules is mentioned by Balbus with ap-
proval.464 Again applying the chain-argument, the Academic asks,—
If we deify those who did great service to their country, why not
Erechtheus and Codrus and many others who died for their country ?465
The real reason, says the practical politician Cotta, for such deifica-
tion, is to inspire courage and patriotism in others. 466 The Academic
sums up the whole discussion of mythology in a plea for the purifica-
tion of the idea of Deity. Omnis igitur talis a philosophia pellatur
error ut con de dis immortalibus disputemus, dicamus indigna iis.467
Thus, in Mayor's phrase, did Cicero try to “purify the religious idea
from its incrustations.
1468
D. CICERO'S POINT OF VIEW
It is noteworthy that Cicero in this treatise plays himself a minor,
but distinct rôle. He will not be identified with the Academic pontiff,
Cotta,469 and claims for himself the freedom of an Academic. He uses
this freedom, as appears from the conclusion, in order to differ even
from another Academic. For in the end, Cicero casts his vote for the
Stoic argument, in comparison, not with the Epicurean, but with the
Academic.470 The Epicurean view was cast out of court early in the
discussion. "Valeat!" was the verdict on the Epicurean Deity (i.124).
The confusion of the two rôles, that of Cotta and that of Cicero, was
pointed out by Krische, as likely to cause bewilderment471 as to
Cicero's real views. But there can be no real doubt as to Cicero's
opinion, in face of the plain statement of iii. 95, repeated later in De
Divinatione, that Cicero found the Stoic argument more convincing
than the Academic. Krische justly points out that the New Academy
was not sceptical as to man's ability to find a position in philosophy
and that Cicero, applying the Academic principle of search for truth
and choice of belief, came near to the Stoic view of the subject of this
treatise.472
of Euhemerism. Pauly-Wissowa (6.1, p. 970, J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart 1907),
traces Euhemerism to the system of the Sophist, Critias. It was easily fitted
into the scheme by which the Stoics compromised with the popular religion.
Zeller (III.1, 317) ". . . und sie selbst hatten gegen diesen Kultus nichts einzuwen-
den."
464 De Nat. Deor. ii.62. . . . rite di sunt habiti . . .
465 Ibid., iii.49.
466 Ibid., iii.50. Cf. De Leg. ii.28 and p. 116 of this dissertation.
467 Ibid., iii.64.
468 Mayor (Vol. III, p. viii).
470 Ibid., iii.94. Cf. De Div. i.9.
472 Krische, 10.
469 De Nat. Deor. i.17.
471 Krische, 9.
54
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
473
We have seen that the arguments presented by Cotta against the
Epicureans were all Stoic, i.e., dogmatic, in tone if not in origin; Cotta
admitted that opposition to Balbus was more difficult to maintain¹7
than opposition to Velleius, because the Stoic arguments were well-
organized;474 in conclusion, Cicero approved the Stoic view, in the
main, in spite of the Academic criticism.
It is tempting to believe that Cicero's detachment from the position
of Cotta here is due partly to Cotta's attitude as pontiff. Cotta
asserts repeatedly his belief in the gods,475 but he bases this belief on
the authority of his ancestors.476 In the case of religion he prefers the
word of the great Roman pontiffs, and of the augur, Laelius, to that
of any Stoic philosopher.477 The Roman religion, he asserts, consists
in sacra and auspicia and in predictions based on portenta and monstra.
Since the state grew great under this religion, one may infer that it was
not without divine approval.478
May not Cicero's view of religion have diverged from that of Cotta
at this very point, where Cotta felt no need for any philosophic sup-
port for his theology? Cicero was a man seeking after God and made
sensitive and emotional through sorrow.479 In his attempt to bring
philosophy into the Forum,480 he would have her give religion what
support she could, even though it were only that of probable truth.
This probable truth lay with the Stoics, in Cicero's view. The two
salient dogmas of Stoic theology were (a) that the Universe shows the
work of reason or mind481 (a view that the Stoics supported, it is true,
largely enough by cold and formal syllogistic argument), and (b) that
man alone in all the universe shares with God the full possession of
reason. 482
This Stoic view became the true religion of the educated
classes,483 relating man to the power that manifests itself in the uni-
verse, and deriving from that relation a binding principle of conduct
and duty.484
It is the opinion of Mayor that Cicero in this treatise was seeking
a rational foundation for religion485 against superstition on the one
hand, and atheism on the other.486 In Epicureanism, he attacked a
473 De Nat. Deor. iii.3.
474 Ibid., iii.4.
•
•
multa dicta . . . tamen apta inter se et cohaerentia.
475 Ibid., i.62; iii.5; iii.44.
476 Ibid., iii.5.
477 L. c.
478 L. C.
479 Fowler, Roman Ideas of Deity, 4. 480Ad Fam. xv.1.6.
481 Fowler, Rel. Ex., 365.
482 Ibid., p. 367-8. Cf. De Nat. Deor. ii.153 and De Leg. i.22.
483 Lecky, History of European Morals, Vol. I, 225 (London, 1899).
484 Fowler, Rel. Ex., 362.
485 Mayor, Vol. III, p. XIII.
86 Ibid., p. V.
De Natura Deorum
55
7°
tendency to atheism; in Stoicism he attacked the peril of superstition.
The charge of pretence in religion (in specie... fictae simulationis),487
aimed at the Epicureans, applies equally to Cotta,488 but to Cotta,
the pontiff, rather than to Cotta, the Academic disputant. The pontiff
did not concern himself with any philosophic grounds for a belief in
deity. On the other hand, Cicero bespoke for religion whatever support
philosophy could give her.489
The net conclusion, then, for Cicero in this study of the gods, is a
balance of probability for the Stoic, i.e., dogmatic view, for a belief in
a supernatural Power linked to humanity. The strongest note of
denial is for the meaningless gods of the Epicureans, who at no point
touch human life. The gods of the Stoics, kinsmen and protectors of
men, are the more probable, though to base one's belief in them on
dialectic, weakens the case; and to apply one's belief in dogmatically
stated detail leads to folly and absurdity." 490
488 Mayor, Vol. III, p. XV.
487 De Nat. Deor. i.3.
489Heinrich Ritter (Geschichte der Philosophie, Hamburg, Perthes, 1839, Vol.
IV, p. 124) says of Cicero:-"Aber er sieht auch ein dass ohne das Theoretische,
das Praktische sich gar nicht erhalten könne.'
490 Krische (p. 11) thinks that Cicero abandoned the Stoics when the latter
went into superstition, divination, fate, allegory, and rejected the Stoic proof for
doctrines which in themselves he approved.
CHAPTER IV
DE DIVINATIONE
Divinatio enim perspicue tollitur; deos esse retinendum est.
De Divinatione ii. 41.
A. DENIAL OF DIVINATION
The quotation at the head of this chapter summarizes the conclu-
sions of Cicero in this treatise. It contains a dogmatic denial of
divination and an equally dogmatic assertion of the existence of the
gods. It rejects a popular piece of "evidence" for theism while hold-
ing fast to theism. It rejects the miraculous as a proof of a spiritual
order in the universe while keeping a faith in that spiritual order.
Although Cicero uses the Academic formulae of doubt both at the
beginning and at the end of his refutation, 491 yet the tone of the whole
argument is positive and not sceptical.492 In a satirical thrust at the
diviners he says, Si enim aliquid certi haberem quod dicerem, ego ipse
divinarem, qui esse divinationem nego.493 Here the certainty ex-
pressed in the last clause of the sentence belies the doubting tone of
the first clause.
In the survey of his philosophical works which Cicero gives in De
Divinatione ii, 1-3 he speaks of this work as forming with DeNatura
Deorum and De Fato a trilogy, as it were, on one general subject.
What he refers to with some vagueness as toti huic quaestioni (§3)
must evidently be the Divine and its relation to the world. The
particular division of the topic treated here is the Stoic claim that the
doctrine of the gods and the doctrine that future events are super-
naturally revealed to men are indissolubly bound together. The
defender of divination had said,—si sint ea genera divinandi vera.
esse deos; vicissimque si di sint, esse qui divinent.494 This belief
Cicero, in his reply, calls the very citadel of the Stoics.495
In refuting divination, Cicero takes particular pains to emphasize
the fact that he does not wish to overthrow religion. Referring back
491 De Div. ii.8 and ii.150.
492 Hirzel (I.241, note 4) remarks the vigor, not quite consistent, with which
the Academics often attacked the Stoic teaching.
493 De Div. ii.8. Vide ii.131.
494 Ibid., i.9.
95Ibid., i.10. Mommsen had charged (Röm. Gesch 11, 417) that Posidonius
accepted Roman official augury for the sake of the prestige it brought the Stoic
School. But Schmekel (323, note 3), refutes this statement, showing that divina-
tion was taught by Zeno. Zeller (III, 1.336) ascribes the teaching of the doctrine
to Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus. Cf. De Div. i.6.
56
De Divinatione
57
to De Natura Deorum, he disclaims for Cotta, the Academic repre-
sentative in that treatise, any intention of destroying men's religion.496
His own purpose, he asserts,497 is to free men from oppressive super-
stition, but not to destroy their religion. His object then, in one
respect, was that of Lucretius. 498 But unlike the latter, who identified
religion and superstition, 499 Cicero draws a sharp contrast between
them. Just as religion is to be spread abroad, so are all the roots of
superstition to be destroyed.500 What is the religio for which he con-
tends? He defines it in this very connection; on the practical side it
consists in maintaining the sacred rites and institutions of the fore-
fathers; on the contemplative side, in acknowledging the supernatural
Being who orders the universe.501 In so far, then, as this treatise goes,
Cicero acknowledges a superhuman force in the world, worthy of
human veneration.502
Thus it is clear that Cicero agrees with the Stoics in accepting a
truth for which, however, he is not willing to accept the Stoic argu-
ment. To him the belief in God is too precious a possession to be im-
perilled by founding it on false dialectic. Cur igitur vos induitis in
eas captiones quas numquam explicetis? . . . Vide quam temere com-
mittant ut si nulla sit divinatio, nulli sint di. 503 It would be too easy
to reverse the argument and say,—“But there is no divination; there-
fore there are no gods.'’504
He exposes the flimsiness of the argument by which Chrysippus
and other Stoics proved the truth of divination by the existence of the
496 De Div. i.8.
497 Ibid., ii.148. Nec vero (id enim diligenter intellegi volo) superstitione
tollenda, religion tollitur.
498 Cf. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura i.62-5. Humana . . . instans.
499 L. C.
But cf. Lucret. vi.76-8, where he speaks of impressions made on the
minds of men emanating from the gods. This surely implies religion in its
contemplative form.
500 De Div. ii.149. A. S. Pease (Ed. of De Divinatione in University of Illinois
Studies in Language and Literature, Vol. VI 1920, p. 168) says "Cicero .
perhaps welcomes the opportunity of making a sharper distinction between
superstitious belief in divination and legitimate religion.
501 De Div. ii.148. Nam et maiorum . . . confiteri.
502 Pease (op. cit., 169) says that Cicero's attack on divination was needed, be-
cause, as genuine faith declined, superstitution increased among the populace;
and reaction and bigotry and antiquarian study of magic increased among the
intellectual classes.
5 De Div. ii.41. Cf. Cleanthes' reason for belief in the Gods, De Nat. Deor. ii.13.
Primam [causam] posuit de qua modo dixi, quae orta esset ex praesensione rerum
futurarum.
504 L. c. So the Modernists in the Church of today ascribe much of the prevalent
religious doubt to the artificial adhesion between real religious experience and
outworn forms of thought, viz., miracles, demons, fiat creation, etc. Cf. H. E.
Fosdick, The Modern Use of the Bible, p. 5.
58
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
gods.505 O acutos homines! quam paucis verbis negotium confectum
putant 1506 Their fault is that they draw proofs from premises that are
not granted. Cf this fault even Epicurus was not guilty in his argu-
ment for the infinity of the universe.507 Every one of the Stoic assump-
tions is open to question. Videsne igitur quae dubia sint ea sumi pro
certis atque concessis ?508 As it is most dangerous to base belief in
God on the foundation of divination, so it is not legitimate to base an
argument for divination on the existence of God.509 It seems fair to
infer that Cicero's own belief in God was postulated for a special
purpose not here stated. He has asserted this belief, but he will not
allow it to be used as a premise in a syllogistic argument. If, as we
hope to show,510 Cicero postulated the existence of Deity for its
moral value, his refusal to make it the basis of inferences that have
no moral value (e.g. divination), is precisely like that of Kant when he
warned against the impossibility of transferring the moral postulates
into the realm of pure reason.511 That which itself admits no theoreti-
cal proof cannot be used as the basis for theoretical deductions.
In his refutation of divination Cicero took evident satisfaction in
using against the Stoics the arguments of the great Stoic, Panaetius. 512
The latter alone of his school rejected astrology absolutely, 513 and cast
doubt upon all divination.514 This defection of Panaetius from the
orthodox Stoic position illustrates the effect of Academic criticism
upon the Stoics.515 Cicero utilizes Panaetius' rejection of this charac-
505De Divin. ii.101-2. Si sunt di . . . est igitur divinatio.
506 Ibid., ii.103.
507Ibid., iii.103-4. Videsne Epicurum . . . quod velitis.
E08 Ibid., ii.106.
509L. c. "Sunt autem di:" quod ipsum non ab omnibus conceditur. "Significant
ergo.
Ne id quidem sequitur; possunt enim non significare et tamen esse di.
510 Cf. Chapters VII and VIII.
511Emmanuel Kant, Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft, (ed. J. H. Kirchmann,
Berlin, 1869, p. 162). man kann . . . gar nichts über sie [the ideas of God,
Freedom, Immortality] synthetisch vertheilen, noch die Anwendung derselben
theoretisch bestimmen, mithin von ihnen gar keinen theoretischen Gebrauch der
Vernunft machen..
"
·
512 De Div. ii.87-97. Zeller and Wachsmuth agree that these arguments are
taken over from Panaetius. (Zeller III, 1.340, n. 1). Pease (op. cit. 184) refers
to "the impressiveness of refuting Stoic views by the arguments of leaders of the
Stoic school."
513 De Divin. ii.88. Cf. Franz Cumont, After life in Roman Paganism, Yale
Univ. Press, 1922, p. 28.
514 Ibid., i.6.
515 Hirzel I, p. 240) cites the fact that Panaetius borrowed an argument from
Carneades against divination (i.12) and also notes that his phrase of doubt
(1.6) bears the Academic stamp. Schmekel (320), also calls attention to the
influence of Carneades on Panaetius. Hirzel (II.882, note 1), remarks the wide
prevalence of scepticism regarding divination among the Stoics who followed
Panaetius.
De Divinatione
59
teristic Stoic doctrine to magnify the superiority of the Academic
method. Panaetius, a Stoic, denied a doctrine which seemed clearer
than day to the rest of his school; and shall not Cicero have the
privilege of disagreeing with the Stoics in other matters ?516 In
Panaetius' stand for freedom of judgment, justification is found for
the Academic viewpoint. Sed haec quidem laus Academiae prae-
stantissimi philosophi iudicio et testimonio comprobata est.517
The Stoics based their belief in divination not only on the existence
of the gods, but on the doctrine of fate, i.e. the causal nexus that
bound into one all the facts of the world.518 If, in their view, any
mortal could know the innermost truth of this nexus of causes, he
would have all knowledge of future events. Since no one but God has
this knowledge, mortals must be content to learn the signs that
presage the future. For nothing new springs into existence; the
future is only the uncoiling of a rope.519 All future events are in
existence, though absent in time.520 Divination does not mean learn-
ing the causes, but learning the signs of the causes.521 It differs from
ordinary knowledge in this, that the spirit acquires it only when
separated from the body either in ecstasy or in dreams. 522
Before replying to this argument, Cicero disposes of the possibility
of divination when events are fortuitous. Disregarding the care-
fully limited Stoic definition of divination in Book I, "quae est
earum rerum quae fortuitae putantur praedictio,"523 he substitutes
these words, "quae essent fortuitae,"'524 and declares that such events,
516 De Div. i.6.
517 Ibid., i.7.
518 De Div. i.125 ... deinde de facto . . . vis omnis divinandi ratioque repetenda
Fatum autem id appello . . . ordinem seriemque causarum cum causa causae
nexa rem ex se gignat. Cumont, (After Life in Roman Paganism, p. 117) re-
verses the order: "Fatalism" he says, "was the chief dogma imposed by astrology
on the Roman world."
Ibid., i.127 . . . est quasi rudentis explicato . . .
20 Ibid., i.128. Sunt enim omnia, sed tempore absunt. This expression sug-
gests the timelessness of a monistically conceived world. James, in his plea for
indeterminism (Will to Believe, 181 note 1), states that any reconciliation of
Providence and Freedom presupposes that "the creative mind is subject to
the law of time." Otherwise, chance is excluded from the world.
521 De Divin. i.127.
522 Ibid., i.113.
corpore.
. . nisi cum ita solutus est et vacuus ut ei plane nihil sit cum
523 Ibid., i.9.
524 Ibid., ii.13. Hartfelder thinks that this was the definition of Antipater,
who weakened the uncompromising fatalism of Chrysippus. A. S. Pease (op. cit.
226), thinks that the confusion in the definitions of divination is due to a difference
in the sources used by Cicero, one source employing the phrase "quae fortuitae
putantur," the other, "quae essent fortuitae." Hartfelder cannot be right in
claiming that the whole argument of Bk. II is directed against divination defined
in the latter way. Bk. ii.19-25 combats divination of fatally fixed events, not of
chance happenings. Vide K. Hartfelder, Die Quellen von Cicero's zwei Büchen,
De Divinatione, Program Freiburg, 1878, p. 19–20.
60
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
having no cause in existence, cannot be foreseen.525 He calls on the
friends of divination to alter their definition,526 if they wish to argue
on the basis of a fixed order in nature. On that basis he replies that
prediction of events fixed by fate is unprofitable; 527 prediction of un-
avoidable coming misfortune is of no advantage. 528 The practical
bearing of any argument is always close to Cicero's thought.
In accepting the law of causality and the uniformity of nature,
Cicero is more thorough-going and consistent than the Stoics them-
selves. He shows the scientific temper. We shall see in De Fato
that he asked but a single exception to the law of uniformity,—the
free will of man. For that he asked the status of an original cause,
springing from the nature of the soul itself. He based this demand on
a moral need. But where the matters involved are not moral, he in-
sists on explaining facts, even obscure ones, by natural, physical
causes, and he refuses to take refuge in the supernatural.
He points out that in matters concerning the senses, the arts,
philosophy, politics, there is no room for divination.529 In all prac-
tical matters, we resort to experts, not to diviners.530 It is the phil-
osopher's business to inquire into causes. 531 To attribute events to
divine intervention instead of inquiring into their natural causes is
the height of stupidity.532
All events have their natural causes. The Stoics themselves have a
physical explanation of winds and thunder and lightning.533 The so-
called cmens of bloody rain and rivers, and of sweating statues all
have a natural explanation, unless indeed they are the figments of
frightened and excited imaginations. The causes are often ob-
scure. The moon and the tides and many other apparently unre-
lated things have a real connection.535 Many familiar happenings
have obscure causes, but we notice only the unusual events.536 The
general principle always holds true, that whatever happens has a
natural cause.537 Nothing that can happen is a miracle. 538
525 De Divin. ii. 17. Qui potest provideri quicquam futurum esse quod neque
causam habet ullam neque notam cur futurum sit?
muta definitionem divinationis . .
Quid ergo adiuvat divinatio?
526 Ibid., ii.19.
527 Ibid., ii.20.
528 Ibid., ii.24.
530 Ibid., ii.13.
529 Ibid., ii.12.
531 Ibid., ii.46.
Quodsi . . . intellego.
Quasi... quaerere.
532 Ibid., ii.55.
Magna stultitia est
•
•
causas rerum non quaerere.
533 Ibid., ii.44.
Placet enim Stoicis . . . fulmen.
534 Ibid., ii.58.
535Ibid., ii.34.
536 Ibid., ii.49.
Ibid., ii.60.
necesse est.
I ut distantium rerum cognatio naturalis appareat.
Causarum enim ignoratio in re nova mirationem facit . . .
Quicquid enim oritur, qualecumque est, causam habeat a natura
538 Ibid., ii.62. . . . nihil habendum esse portentum quod fieri possit.
De Divinatione
61
As Cicero thus banishes the miraculous from the realm of nature, he
convicts the Stoics, those students of nature, of inconsistency.
Quid igitur minus a physicis dici debet quam quicquam certi signifi-
cari rebus incertis ?539 The physicists, the proper defenders of natural
causality, should be ashamed to claim a connection between such
unrelated facts as the appearance of the exta in a sacrifice and an in-
crease of wealth in the worshipper.540
When the Stoic is asked how the worshipper is guided to a victim
whose entrails will show suitable omens, he replies that the divine
power pervading the universe guides him to the choice of the right
animal; or he may say that during the act of sacrifice a change takes
place in the body of the victim.541 In support of such a view the
Stoic can only appeal to the almighty power of God.542 When this
appeal is made, says Zeller, 543 the deduction of omens from natural
causes is at an end. The inconsistency of the Stoics is obvious when
one compares this view of miraculous intervention with the state-
ment expressly made by their representative in Book I, that the gods
do not intervene in specific cases; that such a performance would be
unworthy of their dignity; that the world was so organized from the
beginning that fixed signs should precede fixed events. 544
To the Stoic defenders of divination, thus convicted, Cicero makes
the reproach:-Urbem philosophiae, mihi crede, proditis dum cas-
tella defenditis; nam dum haruspicinam veram esse vultis, physiol-
ogiam totam pervertitis.545 If soothsaying is an outer fort erected to
protect the city of philosophy, how foolish to guard the former (which
has no value in itself), 546 by surrendering the law of natural causation
on which all science rests!
In the same scientific temper Cicero replies to the claims of the
astrologers that the character, health, career, and fortunes of men
are influenced by the conjunction of stars under which they are
born.547 This claim, which he calls deliratio incredibilis,548 he refutes
by pointing out that there can be no real conjunction of the moon and
the stars. The distance that separates them makes it impossible.
539 Ibid., ii.43.
541 Ibid., i.118 and ii.35.
542 Ibid., ii.35.
•
540 Ibid., ii.33.
deorum enim numini parere omnia.
543Zeller, III, 1.341. Zeller believes that the inconsistency of the Stoics "dis-
closed a misgiving that the science of divination, which had put on so bold a face,
was not in itself sufficient, but needed support from the traditions of religion and
from a belief in divine revelations’(345).
544 De Divin. i.118.
545 Ibid., ii.37.
547 Ibid., ii.89.
546 Ibid., ii.20.
548 Ibid., ii.90.
62
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
What appears to be a conjunction is caused oculorum fallacissimo
sensu.549 The astrologers claim that all those born at the same time
suffer the same astral influence.550 Cicero replies that the same con-
ditions of the heavens and the heavenly bodies do not prevail over
all the earth at the same time.551 With far more probability might one
say that the geography of one's native land affected one's body and
soul. 552 But the source of children's characteristics lies deeper still,-
in heredity 553 And yet even the natural faults can be corrected.
A slight surgical operation cures the tongue-tied; Demosthenes
learned to pronounce the letter, rho. Such changes could not be
made if the stars implanted the natural qualities. 554 Enough has been
cited to show that Cicero demanded the widest possible application of
science and scientific methods. The whole effort of Book II is to
rule out the supernatural from the physical world.
B.
·
THE RELATION OF CICERO'S REFUTATION OF DIVINATION TO
ROMAN OFFICIAL AUGURY
Cicero was obliged to reconcile his categorical denial of divination
with his acceptance of the official augury maintained by the Roman
government. He deliberately faced this question by allowing his
Stoic speaker to say: Quid de auguribus loquar? Tuae partes sunt:
tuum, inquam, auspiciorum patrocinium debet esse. 555 Cicero had
himself called augury an essential element of the constitution. 556
His solution is to accept state augury for its practical value to the
nation and to general religion.557 Quoting from the Book of the
Augurs, Iove tonante, fulgurante, comitia populi habere nefas, he
makes the comment that this command was probably given for the
good of the state.558 In the private and therefore frank559 conversa-
549 Ibid., ii.91.
550 Ibid., ii.92. Cumont (After Life in Roman Paganism, p. 96) states that the
idea that the psychic essence is the same as the fire of the heavenly bodies is at
the root of all oriental astrology.
551 Ibid., ii.93. .. qui potest eadem vis esse nascentium cum caeli tanta sit
dissimilitudo?
552 Ibid., ii.96. Cf. De Fato, 7.
553 Ibid., ii.94. Quis enim non videt . . . a parentibus liberos?
554 In De Fato, 10-11, the same argument is used to prove the freedom of men
from fate. There the emphasis is on moral faults.
555 De Divin. i.105.
556 De Re Pub. ii.17. ... haec egregia duo firmamenta rei publicae . . . auspicia
et senatum
557De Divin. ii.28. Haruspicina quam ego rei publicae causa communisque religi-
onis colendam censeo. Cf. De Leg. ii.32 and 33 and p. 116 of this dissertation.
558 Ibid., ii.43.
559 Ibid., ii.28. Sed soli sumus...Thiaucourt (p. 276), "Le De Divinatione..
'était déstiné qu'a l'élite de la societé romaine. Cf. A. S. Pease, op. cit., 171.
De Divinatione
63
tion between his brother, Quintus, and himself, Cicero, however,
shows that he discredits utterly the claims of the haruspices. They do
not agree among themselves (§28). There is no imaginable con-
nection between the rerum natura and the exta of a sacrifice (§29).
Cicero permits himself a sneer at the wonders to which he referred
with such enthusiasm in his third speech against Catiline.560 He
expressly denies that he and his fellow augurs pretend to foretell the
future by birds or other signs.561 If Romulus believed that to be
possible, it was the error of a primitive age (errabat enim multis in re-
bus antiquitas).562 The institution is preserved for the opinion of the
common people and for the advantage of the state. 563 Therefore the
consuls who defied the auspices deserved the fate they met. At the
same time, the fate of Paullus at the battle of Cannae proves that
obedience to the auspices is no guarantee of material safety (§71).
The use of augury should be strictly limited. The Sibylline Books
are well kept in hiding. The fathers were wise in ordaining that they
be not read except by order of the Senate. Neither gods nor men at
Rome would tolerate a prophecy of a king, even though it purported
to come from those books (§112).
Here we see the governing idea of Cicero's position. The needs of
the state are the final standard; any so-called supernatural message
that threatens the free government must for that very reason be re-
jected. "It is the part of a wise man," says Cicero in his summary,
"to guard the customs of our ancestors by maintaining rites and
ceremonies."'564 But the purpose of the preservation is the good of the
state, not, as the Stoic defenders of divination thought, the proving
of the existence of Divine Beings.
The question necessarily arises as to Cicero's intellectual honesty in
defending the practice of State augury while denying the truth of its
claims. His position seemed clear and logical to Boissier, who
summarized it as follows:-"Le dernier [De Divinatione] est net,
ferme, précis, sans hesitation ni sousentendu...La divination en soi
n'est qu'un chimère, mais dans des mains habiles elle put empêcher
une assemblée populaire de commettre quelques sottises. . . . Nous ne
trouvons donc rien qui nous embarrasse dans le traité
1565
560 De Divin. ii.47. Et tu scilicet mavis numine deorum id factum quam casu
arbitrari? Cf. In Catilinam, III, §§18 and 19.
561Bouché-Leclercq, IV.777, note 55, “Cicéron ne perd pas une occasion de dire
que les auspices ne sont à aucun degré des prophéties."
562 De Div. ii.70.
... ad opinionem vulgi et . . . rei publicae. For the same declaration
563 L. c.
see ii.74 and 75.
564 Ibid., ii.148.
565 Boissier, La réligion romaine, I.55.
64
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
In justification of Cicero's apparent inconsistency it may be said
that official augury at Rome had lost whatever religious character it
had had and was become an entirely political institution.566 Many
proofs could be given of the legalistic character of the state auspices.
Like the state religion in general, it consisted in form rather than in
spirit. Even in the time of the older Cato the farm-steward was for-
bidden to offer sacrifice. That was the part of the master.567 The
ritual silence at a sacrifice entailed silence of thought as well as of
word. 568 Thus the spirit of prayer was rather forbidden than en-
couraged.
Augury was strictly limited by law. The augurs were only assist-
ants to the magistrate; he alone had the authority and the respon-
sibility; thus the government of Rome was marked as primarily a
lay government, not a priestly one.569 Various enactments modifying
the use of augury prove its purely practical character. The augurs
had the right of nuntiatio, or report of unfavorable signs in the heavens
that made the postponement of the comitia necessary570. But the
magistrate had the right of obnuntiatio, by which he might prevent a
fellow magistrate from holding a meeting.571 The augurs might
announce only natural signs; the magistrates might look for signs.572
This right to look for signs was regulated by the laws Aelia and Fufia,
and thus it became a political instrument, of which scandalous use
was often made. 573 The phrase, servare de caelo, came to mean to see
the lightning which would prevent the holding of the assembly.
Magistrates often threatened that they would look for lightning.5
The law of Clodius in 58 B. C., abrogated the right of obnuntiatio,
but, nevertheless, that right remained in actual force. In 54 B. C.
Cicero expressed his delight at the continued obnuntiatio which pre-
vented the holding of the comitia.575 That which delighted Cicero,
observes Bouché-Leclercq, was in its essence "anarchy established
and become venerable."576
574
566 Fowler (Rel. Exp., 305), "The auspices had become a matter of law, not
religion; they were completely secularized." Cf. Bouché-Leclercq (IV.178), “La
divination romaine, . . . ne gardant sur le terrain de théologie qu'une racine morte
pour s'implanter plus vigoreuse sur le terrain du droit
567 Cato, De Re Rustica, V.4.
569 Fowler, Rel. Exp., 302.
571 Bouché-Leclercq IV.253.
568Quintilian, Declamationes 265.
570Bouché-Leclercq IV.252.
572 These two kinds of signs were called respectively auspicia oblativa and
impetrativa.
573 Bouché-Leclercq, IV.255. Cf. Mommsen, I.109.
574 Mommsen, I.79.
575Ad Q. Frat. III, 3.2.
576 May not Cicero's defence of augury be justified also on the ground that
justified religious observances in the eyes of Herbert Spencer, namely, that such
ነ
De Divinatione
65
From these few references to the elaborate science and history of
Roman augury it is obvious how entirely secular an institution it was
in the eyes of Cicero and all those for whom he wrote. Though he
was sceptical as to the truth of its original claims and as to the ex-
tended and exaggerated claims made for it by the Stoics, he felt justi-
fied in maintaining it as a practical political institution.
But as a means of forecasting the future, the best augury, Cicero
thought, was based on observation of men, on history and philosophy,
and on political experience.577 In a letter to Caecina he humorously
tells his correspondent that he is relying, not on the customary augural
signs, but on the character of Caesar and of the political situation.578
For matters of right and wrong there was to Cicero a deeper witness
than augural signs. When Deiotarus followed the fortune of Pom-
pey, he followed the auspices of his own virtue, quae vetat spectare
fortunam, dum praestetur fides.579
C. DIVINATION CANNOT BE DEDUCED FROM THE NATURE OF THE
SOUL
We have seen that Cicero, while he held firmly to a belief in Deity,
refused to admit divination as an inference from the existence of the
gods. So, too, he rejects the argument that deduces divination from
the divine nature of the soul. The Stoic theory of dreams was that in
sleep the divine soul, departing from the body, 580 meets the multi-
tude of similar spirits that fill the universe and so obtains knowledge
of future events. 581 Cicero flatly rejects this theory.582 He speaks a
disrespectful word of Plato in this connection (perhaps the unique
instance), because Plato, like Pythagoras, advised a certain regimen
in order that the spirit might have clear and accurate visions.583
Cicero in his refutation gives a thoroughly rationalistic explanation of
ritual serves as a “protective envelope” for the kernel of truth within? (See
H. Spencer, First Principles, Appleton 1894, p. 99). The same thought is ex-
pressed by J. H. Shorthouse in "John Inglesant" (New York, 1891, Macmillan
& Co., p. 32). "He did not conceal from him ... the soundness of that fear
which hesitates to overthrow the popular forms of truth, time-honored and
revealed, which have become in the eyes of the majority, however imperfect they
may really be, the truth itself."
577Ad Fam. VI, 6.3.
579 De Divin. ii.79.
578 Ibid., §§7 and 8.
580 This dualism of soul and body was not an originally Stoic idea, but an ele-
ment of Neo-Stoicism introduced by Panaetius and Posidonius under the in-
fluence of Plato and Pythagoras. Fowler, Rel. Exp., 382.
581 De Divin. i.129 and ii.119.
2Ibid., ii.119. Similis est error in somniis.
583 L. c. Sed nescio quo modo nihil tam absurde dici potest quod non dicatur ab
aliquo philosophorum.
66
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
dreams.584 He presses home the point that the Stoics, according to
their own definition, regard man as akin to God only when man is at
his best i.e. sapiens,585 not somnians.
Without reviewing in detail the argument against dream-revela-
tion we note that Cicero again declines to allow a speculative argu-
ment to be built on a moral postulate. Divination is not to be in-
ferred from the kinship of the human spirit to the unseen spiritual
world. Yet a belief in such kinship is the very foundation of his
ethics. The discussion of the ethical treatises will show more about
this belief. For the moment one or two examples will suffice. In
discussing the virtues, in De Officiis i.153, Cicero puts first the social
duties (ea officia quae ex communitate. . . . . . ducantur). These
duties are based on the highest form of wisdom, a knowledge of
things human and divine, in which is bound up the relation and bond
between gods and men (...rerum est divinarum et humanarum
scientia in qua continetur deorum et hominum communitas et so-
cietas inter ipsos.) In the first book of De Legibus the very existence
of law is shown to be based on the sense of justice which is the com-
mon possession of men and gods, fellow-citizens of the universal
commonwealth.586 But since the doctrine of divination has no value
for morals and is a mere infringement on the legitimate province of
scientific investigation and of natural law, Cicero refuses to accept it
as a deduction from the moral postulate of a godlike human soul.
584 Ibid., ii.128, 139, 140.
585 Ibid., ii. 129. Stoici autem tui negant quemquam nisi sapientem divinum
esse posse.
586 De Leg. i.23. . . . ut iam universus hic mundus una civitas sit communis
deorum atque hominum existimanda. Cf. my chapter on De Officiis, p. 100 and
on De Re Publica and De Legibus, pp. 109, 111–2.
ร
CHAPTER V
DE FATO
A STUDY OF FREE WILL
Est autem aliquid in nostra potestate (De Fato, 31)
In the treatise De Fato, Cicero discusses the problem of freedom,
"the bridge," as Zielinski called it, "between the physical and the
moral realm."587 The undoubted difficulties in this work, due to the
nature of the topic and the fragmentary condition in which the work
has come down, have made it a fruitful field for modern criticism re-
garding sources. While Schmekel considers it to be drawn entirely
from a work of Carneades, 588 Loercher and Hoyer insist that Anti-
ochus was the source. 589 Loercher, in his exclusive emphasis on the
sources, goes so far as to deny, apparently, that Cicero anywhere in
this essay expresses his own opinion. "Cicero propriam [senten-
tiam] non profitetur" is his statement.590 If by the adjective, pro-
priam, he means "original," he is no doubt correct; if he means that
the reader of the treatise is not made aware what Cicero believes
about moral freedom, it would appear that too close a scrutiny of the
trees had kept the critic from seeing the forest. Loercher's con-
clusion is: "Nomen igitur et universam disciplinam Antiochi sec-
tatus est, quem senserat cum doctrina Academicorum congruere
negantium fatum esse: quibus de causis et qua ratione id esse ne-
garet, Ciceroni magnae curae non erat: satis habebat negare aut
dubitare, ut Academicus videretur."591
No one can definitely controvert such a statement; but it would
seem that an unprejudiced reader, reading this essay for the sake of
the subject-matter and not for the sake of its origins, would finish his
study with a very definite impression that Cicero believed in the
freedom of the will. Certainly it so appeared to St. Augustine, who
in his argument for the foreknowledge of God, combats Cicero as the
very protagonist of human freedom. But even in his indignation, he
admits that Cicero's purpose in upholding this doctrine was for the
sake of human conduct.592 Zielinski too, Cicero's modern apologist,
587Zielinski 50.
588 Schmekel, 184, et passim.
589 Loercher, De Fato, 375, and Hoyer, Rhein. Mus. 53, 1898, p. 65.
590 Loercher, ibid., 384.
591 L. C.
592 De Civitate Dei V.9. ... vitae humanae plurimum ac peritissime consulens
elegit liberum voluntatis arbitrium. Schmekel (163), pionts out the evident
dependence of St. Auguxtine V.9 on Cicero's De Fato.
•
67
68
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
in summarizing his sketch of De Fato says "So ist...dem Kausalge-
sitz gegenüber, die Freiheit des Willens gewahrt. Und damit is für
die Ethik die notwendige Grundlage geschaffen."593
The positive ground on which Cicero maintains the existence of
freedom is moral. His negative argument disputes, on the one hand,
the assertions of the Stoics as to the universal working of fate and on
the other, the arguments by which the Epicureans sought to uphold.
the doctrine of freedom, as well as the futile attempts of Chrysippus to
steer a middle course. Cicero gives no dialectic proof of freedom.
His belief in it is intuitive, and is justified because freedom alone.
validates an ethical conception of life.
A. CICERO'S DOGMATIC ASSERTION OF FREEDOM
The will of man must be free if there is to be such a thing as good or
bad conduct,-Quia pertinet ad mores...explicanda vis et ratio
enuntiationum quae Graeci ağıάμaтa vocant.
απ
The prooemium,
usually regarded as fragmentary, begins with these words. One
editor,594 following the Codex Harleianus, prints explicanda for
explicandaque of the other manuscripts, and regards these words as
the original opening of the treatise. If he is correct, the keynote of
the essay is given in the very beginning. When the ağıμαтα con-
cern the future and its possibilities they form the vexed question of
the philosophers Tepi duvar v.595 Thus the topic is placed in its
περὶ δυνατῶν.
proper category as a matter concerning ethics. The essential ele-
ment of the problem is stated-namely, are there genuine possi-
bilities in the future! Or does the future contain only that which is
already fixed from all eternity by the causal nexus?
Chrysippus used the argument of the contagio naturae to prove
that a single causal nexus bound the universe together.596 One phase
of this universal sympathy was the effect of climate on national and
personal character.597 Cicero, acknowledging that natural causes,
climatic and others (causae naturales et antecedentes), give men a
tendency in one direction or another,598 declares that men are never-
593Zielinski, 57.
594 Henry Allen, Editor of De Divinatione et De Fato p. 141, note, (London,
1839).
595 De Fato 1.
596 E. Bréhier, Chrysippe, 186. Le principe de sympathie est déstiné à montrer,
soit l'action reciproque universelle de toutes choses, soit l'influence de causes
éloignées et en apparence négligeables.
597 De Fato 7. Hirzel II, 892, says that Polybius derived from the Stoics his
tendency to emphasize the effects of geography and climate on character.
598 De Fato 9. Nunc vero fatemur, acuti hebetesne, valentes inbellicine simus,
non esse id in nobis.
De Fato
69
theless able to perform specific acts independent of these tendencies.599
As specific acts are in a man's own power, so [by a succession of these
acts] he may build a character quite at variance with his natural dis-
position. This is illustrated in the case of Stilpo and of Socrates, who
overcame evil tendencies by will, desire, and training.600 Such in---
spiring possibilities are all removed if fate and certainty as to the
future are established.601
This argument from morality, which Cicero presents with an
appeal to experience and with concrete illustrations in §§10 and 11, is
repeated with an appeal to the ancient philosophers in §§39 and 40.
There Cicero recalls that the old division was between those who be-
lieved without qualification in fate and those who wished to except.
from its rule the actions of the human spirit.602 The argument of the
latter group was again the moral argument. If fate controls all, then
it controls desires (adpetitus) and assent (adsensiones). If neither
assent nor act is within our power, then neither praise, blame, honor,
nor punishment is just. Quod cum vitiosum sit, probabiliter concludi
putant non omnia fato fieri quaecumque fiant.603
Cicero defends freedom also on the ground of inner conviction,
which is a different matter from its moral necessity. It seems to him a
strong argument against external causality for our wills and desires,
to say,-Nam nihil esset in nostra potestate si ita se (res) haberet.604
He quotes with approval the words which he attributes to Carne-
ades, Est autem aliquid in nostra potestate.605 This passage is cited
99 Ibid., 8. quid enim loci natura adferre potest ut in porticu Pompei
potius quam in campo ambulemus . . .? Cf., ibid 9.
600 Ibid., 11. Sed haec ex naturalibus causis vitia nasci possunt; exstirpari
autem et funditus tolli voluntate, studio, disciplina.
601 L. C.
Quae tolluntur omnia si vis et natura fati ex divinationis ratione
firmabitur.
602 Ibid., 39.
voluntarii.
•
quibus viderentur sine ullo fato esse animorum motus
03 Ibid., 40. Cf. Acad. ii.39. Ubi igitur virtus si nihil situm est in nobis ipsis?
604 Ibid., 9.
605 Ibid., 31. The value of the inner witness in distinction from logical proof
has received respectful recognition from modern writers on ethics. Thomas H.
Green (Prolegmena to Ethics² Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1889) in his analysis of
the moral action (p. 106) says, “. . . the Ego identifies itself with some desire and
sets itself to bring into real existence the ideal object, of which the consciousness
is involved in the desire. This constitutes an act of will, which is thus always free,
not in the sense of being undetermined by a motive, but in the sense that the
motive lies in the man himself, that he makes it and is aware of doing so and
hence, however he may excuse himself, imputes to himself the act .
He
justifies the study of moral action on the inner side, since there is no other source
of knowledge regarding it. "We know what it is in relation to us, the agents,—
what it is as our expression. Only thus indeed do we know it at all. In knowledge
so derived . . . our judgments are incapable of verification in the ordinary sense
Cf. also James Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory,2 New York, Macmillan
Co., 1886, Vol. I, Preface, p. xvii, and William James (cited in notes 614, 620–
623 of this chapter).
70
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
608
by Zeller as an illustration of Cicero's belief in innate knowledge.606
Hirzel very properly comments that it does not prove that such a
belief was exclusively Cicero's. It was obviously the belief of Car-
neades also; and, as Chrysippus was at such pains to reconcile607 his
doctrine of fate with a belief in freedom, he too must have acted from
a conviction that certain things lie within the power of man.
Certainly the dogmatic statement, . . . est autem aliquid in nostra
potestate, is not in the style we associate with the Academic Car-
neades, the father of the Tiðaνóv.609 If he made the statement in this
dogmatic form, it is true, as Cicero says, that in this case he laid
aside his mischievous trickery of debate.610 Possibly Carneades him-
self would have added the formulaic probabiliter as in § 40.611 Either,
then, in agreement with Carneades or independently, Cicero asserts.
dogmatically that the will is free. The dogmatic tone of the essay,
De Fato, as a whole, is a proof in the eyes of R. Hoyer that Antiochus
and not Carneades (or Clitomachus) was Cicero's source. 612 In the
present discussion however, the point for us is that, whoever was
Cicero's authority, Cicero speaks in his own person in a clearly dog-
matic tone.
Freedom then to Cicero is a postulate, based on the consciousness
of power over one's own choices and actions, and on the need of
freedom as the foundation of a moral life. William James treats the
subject of free-will from a very similar view-point. Freedom, "the
pivotal question of metaphysics, "613 marking the antithesis between a
materialistic and a spiritual view of the universe, is improvable;
if it is to be held, it must be on other than scientific grounds.6
James bases his belief in freedom on its ethical value.615 making thus
"a moral postulate about the universe, the postulate that what
606 Zeller, III, 1.661.
608 Hirzel, III.531.
•
•
"
607 De Fato 41.
614
6c9Reid, ed. Acad., page 216, note, .. miðavov, the Carneadean phrase."
610De Fato 31. neque ullam adhibebat calumniam.
611Zeller, III, 1.517, n. 3, quotes Geffers, (De Arcesilai Successoribus, Göttingen,
1845, p. 20) as holding that Carneades assumed a special source of conviction in
the mind in moral matters. Zeller believes that Carneades' advocacy of freedom
was assumed chiefly to oppose the Stoic doctrine of necessity and that he held it
at best only as probable (512).
612R. Hoyer, Rhein. Mus. no. 53, 1898, p. 65. But Hirzel, I.241, has a note on
the vigour, not quite consistent, with which the Academics often attacked the
Stoic teaching. Bréhier (190), speaks of "les critiques passionnées de Carnéade.
613 James, Psychology, Henry Holt, 1899, Vol. I.448. Cf. T. H. Green, who
traces the origin, not only of moral action, but of knowledge, to man's character
as “a free cause," in which is reproduced the eternal consciousness (op. cit. Bk. I,
Chapter III, Bk. II, Chapter I, especially pp. 82, 151.
614 James, Psych. I.454. ˜Cf. IÍ.572. 615 Ibid., I.454.
De Fato
71
ought to be, can be, and that bad acts cannot be fated, but that good
ones must be possible in their place."616 The modern psychologist
gives the ancient discussion Tepì duvarŵv its only real significance,
i.e. the power of the human will to make good or bad choices. 617
Both Cicero and James were interested in disproving the causal
nexus, only for the human will. "Volitions are the only ambiguous
things we are tempted to believe in," says the modern writer.618
The reproach that Cicero brings against the rigid fatalists is just this,
ii mentem hominis voluntate libera spoliatam necessitate fati de-
vinciunt.619
The consciousness of freedom which, as we have seen, Cicero and
Carneades thought an ultimate and indisputable fact, James, though
speaking cautiously, considered worthy of attention. He believed
that the feeling of effort of which we are conscious in fixing attention,
(and this attention is the essential element of volition), 620 should not
be ignored, as it is by the rigid determinists. 621 It is a striking feature
of the phenomenon, and to disregard it utterly is at least unscien-
tific. 622
The feeling of effort and consent is an ultimate category of
thinking. 623 So a recognized authority in modern psychology gives
justification for the position of Cicero in defending freedom by the
fact of our consciousness of freedom. Est autem aliquid in nostra
potestate.
B. CICERO'S CRITICSM OF THE SCHOOLS
Although Cicero departed in this treatise from his usual custom of
presenting all sides of the question through different speakers,624 he
himself here criticises the views of both Stoics and Epicureans. Be-
sides making a general defence against fatalism by the appeal to
ethics and to inner conviction, as we have noticed, Cicero discusses in
detail certain of the arguments pro et contra.
From the proposition "Every judgment is either true or false,"
616Ibid., II.573. James claims the same right to make moral postulates as to
make mechanical or scientific ones. The ideas of causality and uniformity are
postulates, according to his view, quite as much as is free will. The moral demand
of the heart, he claims, has as much right to satisfaction as the demand for uni-
formity. (Will to Believe, 147).
617Arnold (Roman Stoicism, p. 211) thinks the word, "possibility" is funda-
mentally subjective,—an abstraction from "what man can do.”
618 James, Will to Believe, 155. The essay quoted, The Dilemma of Determin-
ism, contains a detailed discussion of the pessimistic or immoral consequence of a
belief in determinism.
619De Fato 20.
621 Psych. I.454.
623 Ibid., II.569.
620 Psych. I.448, II.556, 559.
622 L. C.
624 De Fato 1.
72
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
Chrysippus had inferred causality and therefore fate.625 The Epi-
cureans, on the other hand, feared to admit this proposition, lest they
should thereby admit fate. Cicero clears up this difficulty, as Zielin-
ski says, by taking it out of the field of metaphysics and into that of
philology, where it belongs. 626 Events may be true from all eternity
and yet not caused from all eternity. Et ea non esse nexa causis
aeternis et a fati necessitate esse libera.627 Such events, though true,
are not predictable even by a god unless their causes already exist.
Quid enim spectans deus ipse diceret Marcellum.....in mari esse
periturum? Erat hoc quidem verum ex aeternitate, sed causas id
efficientes non habebat.628
Cicero will not deny the law of causality.629 But there is a dis-
tinction to be made between causes that arise in time and the eternal
nexus of causes.680 The cause is not that which precedes (antecedat)
but that which precedes with effective power (efficienter antecedat)¸631
Even outside the realm of the will and its original power, this dis-
tinction can be clearly seen. There was no cause in nature why
Philoctetes should be left in Lemnos, until the sting of the serpent.
poisoned him.632 The attempt to apply the theory of the eternal
nexus consistently, results in a forced and highly artificial connec-
tion between events and other events antecedent to them. Cicero
cites instances of successive events between which, however, there is
no causal connection. Hecuba, because she was the mother of Paris,
was not therefore the cause of the Trojan war; nor was the woe of
Medea caused by the tree that was felled on Mount Pelius to make
the Argo.633
625 De Fato, 20, end. Bréhier, 188, says "Chrysippe en tire [de cette proposition]
par l'intermédiaire du principe de causalité, la thèse du destin, c'est-à-dire,
de l'enchaînement des événements. Cf. De Nat. Deor. i.40, where Chrysippus
identifies Iovem, necessitatem fatalem, and aeternam rerum veritatem.
626Zielinski, 56.
627 De Fato 38. Cf. §§19 and 32.
629 Ibid., 25.
•
628 Ibid., 33.
ne omnibus a physicis irrideamur si dicamus quicquam fieri
sine causa. Cf. pp. 60 and 61 of this dissertation.
630 Bréhier, 185, points out that the ancients before Chrysippus accepted causes
"comme des êtres pactifs, en une certaine mesure indépendants les uns des autres
et qui venaient jouer leur rôle sur le scène du monde. .
621 De Fato 34. Cf. 19. Sed interest inter causas fortuito antegressas et inter
causas cohibentes in se efficientiam naturalem.
632 De Fato 36. The Stoic insistence on the eternal chain of causes was a
corollary of their monistic system. Zeller says, "The Stoic doctrine of necessity
was the direct consequence of the Stoic pantheism" (III, 1.162, 163). So James
says, "It [determinism] professes that the part we call the present is com-
patible with only one totality... The whole is in each and every part, and welds
it with the rest into an absolute unity." (Will to Believe, 150).
633 De Fato 34 and 35.
•
A
De Fato
73
On the subject of free-will Cicero had the rare experience of agree-
ing with the Epicureans. But, while he shared their conclusion, he
rejected the arguments by which they tried to prove it. They re-
jected the proposition, "Every judgment is either true or false,"
fearing lest by accepting it they should admit fate.634 They adopted
the doctrine of the swerving atoms in order to account for freedom.635
Cicero combats both of these views. The latter, the doctrine of the
swerve, he rejects, because it contradicts the scientific doctrine of
causality. Quam declinationem sine causa fieri, si minus verbis, re
cogitur confiteri.636 A second reason for rejecting it is that those who
can oppose the doctrine of fate only by resorting to an imaginary
swerve of the atoms (commenticias declinationes), really confirm the
doctrine of fate and destroy the free movement of the spirit;637
that is to say, they invent a material cause to explain a spiritual fact.
It were far better-Cicero here quotes Carneades-for the Epicureans
to fall back on the postulate of moral freedom. 638
The freedom of the will was to Cicero so essential a doctrine that
his faith in it lay deeper than any mere argument. He had rather
accept the most distasteful dogmas of Epicurus than give up a be-
lief in freedom. Rather would he accept the doctrine of swerving
atoms639 and deny that every proposition is either false or true than
lose this faith. For such a loss would be unbearable. Illa enim
sententia aliquid habet disputationis, haec vero non est tolerabilis.640
Such a loss would be intolerable for deeper reasons than those of
logic, for, as we have seen, to Cicero freedom lay at the base of
morals 641
634 Ibid., 19.
635 Ibid., 18. Cf. De Nat. Deor. i.69. Democritus, from whom Epicurus took
the atomic theory, had felt no such need to explain the working of the will. The
emphasis on the will versus the intellect belonged to a later period than his.
Probably Epicurus was led to it through the influence of the Peripatetics. Hirzel
I, 163-4.
636 De Fato, 22. Cf. §47.
637 Ibid., 48.
638 Ibid., 23. animi motum voluntarium, id fuit defendi melius quam intro-
ducere declinationem.
639 Ibid., 21. The word, plagam, must here mean the impact of the atom which
Epicurus taught depended on the clinamen (Cf. Lucretius II, 225-229, 243–4).
For the dependence of free-will on the clinamen, see Lucretius II, 251–293.
640 L. C.
641 So J. H. Robinson (The Mind in the Making, p. 41-2) says that we rationalize
to find "good" reasons for beliefs we already hold; the "real" reasons lie deeper,
concealed from ourselves and others. Cf. James Martineau, op. cit., Vol. I,
Preface, p. viii: "Intellectual pride and self-ignorance alone can blind us to the
fact that systems of philosophical opinion grow from the mind's instinctive effort
to unify by sufficient reason and justify by intelligible pleas its deepest affections
and admirations."
74
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
α
It is worth observing that this emotional element in the discussion
of freewill was not peculiar to Cicero. It was fear of being entrapped
into the doctrine of fate that held Epicurus to his belief in the swerve,
(§21); and fear that he might lose the doctrine of fate, held Chry-
sippus to the doctrine that every ȧğíwµa is either true or false (§§ 21,
22). Thus Chrysippus strains every muscle (contendit omnis nervos)
to prove that proposition. But since another feeling prompts
Chrysippus to make room in his scheme for moral responsibility, he
involves himself in laborious difficulties to effect a compromise. 642
St. Augustine, too, who bitterly opposed Cicero because he denied
the foreknowledge of God,643 a doctrine of paramount importance to
St. Augustine, shows how his wish and temperamental need, deeper
than all logic, underlay his defence of his favorite dogma. He has no
respect for astrology (res ipsa inaniter asseritur);644 yet even that be-
lief is more endurable to him than a denial of foreknowledge.645
The great compromise which Chrysippus tried to make between
fate and freedom was in Cicero's judgment unsuccessful.646 Chry-
sippus thought he had solved the question when he distinguished be-
tween the external force that pushes the cylinder and the internal
character (volubilitas §43), that keeps it in motion; the former, he
says, is in the nexus of fate, the latter in our own power (§ 41). From
without comes the stimulus (visum objectum); from within comes the
consent (§ 43).647
To the student of modern determinism the question naturally
occurs, where does the cylinder get its shape? What determines the
character of the man so that he gives or withholds assent to the outer
stimulus? This question is not fully answered in De Fato.648 But in
a fragment of Chrysippus, preserved by Gellius, 649 the assertion is
made: ingenia tamen ipsa mentium nostrarum proinde sunt fato
642 Aestuans_laboransque . . . intricatur (Aulus Gellius N. A. VII (VI) 2.15).
642 De Civ. Dei 5.9, plus eum quam Stoici detestamur.
644 Ibid., V.9. Cf. ibid., V.2.
645 Ibid., V.9. Multo sunt autem tolerabiliores qui vel siderea fata constituunt
quam iste qui tollit praescientiam futurorum.
646 De Fato 39. ... delabitur
delabitur . . . invitus.
647Bréhier, p. 195. "Chrysippe cherche en un mot à affirmer simultanément les
deux termes du dilemme.' In Chrysippus' solution of the difficulty the position
of the human will was called μidovλeía by Oenomaus (Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet.
Frag. Leipzig, Teubner, 1903, Vol. II, no. 978).
648 Arnold (Roman Stoicism, 213) says,-"Into the further question, whether a
man is responsible for his own nature, our authorities do not enter." Bréhier
(195) says, "Du point de vue de notre déterminisme cette objection serait
facile que
la volubilité du cylindre est un événement qui d'après le principe
du destin doit être déterminé aussi par des causes antérieurs."
649 Aul. Cell. N. A. vii (VI) 2.7–8.
•
De Fato
75
obnoxia ut proprietas eorum est ipsa et gratitas. Men are by nature
either of good or evil constitution and so either in harmony with the
outer stimuli sent by fate, or certain to rush into sin and error with
little or no occasion offered by fate (parvo nullo fatalis incommodi
conflictu § 8).650 Surely if Cicero had these words before him, he was
justified in drawing the conclusion that Chrysippus, even against his
will, proved the power of fate651 and the helplessness of man.
A subordinate argument used casually by Cicero deserves a word.
In discussing examples of contagio naturae cited from Posidonius, 652
Cicero asks:-"...if there were no such word as fate, would all
things, or most things turn out any differently from what they do
now? Why drag in fate?" This query seemed to Loercher a proof of
incredible frivolity.653 But as a matter of fact, Cicero's meaning is
just that expressed by James when he denies that the order of our
experience gives us our idea of uniformity. The order of experience, he
says, is crude. The idea of uniformity proceeds from our desire to
cast the world into a more rational shape than that in which experi-
ence presents it to us. 654 He quotes from Sigwart, 655 "From the point
of view of strict experience, nothing exists but the sum of particular
perceptions with their coincidences on the one hand, their con-
tradictions on the other." James cites two possible universes, one in
which he went home by Street A, the other in which he went home by
Street B. "Either universe after the fact and once there would to our
name of observation and understanding appear just as rational as the
other. There would be absolutely no criterion by which we might
judge one necessary and the other a matter of chance."656 Far from
being a frivolous trifling with a serious subject, Cicero's comment,
like that of James, is merely a way of stating that there is nothing in
650 Cf. Alexander Aphrodisiensie, De Fato 34.106. τὰ μὲν [τῶν ζῴων] ἁμαρτήσετα
τὰ δὲ κατορθώσει· ταῦτα γὰρ τούτοις κατὰ φύσιν.
Pierre Bayle (Dictionaire,¹ II 171), commenting on the fragment of Aulus Gellius,
concludes: "De sorte qui, reconnaissant d'ailleurs une Providence divine, il fallait
qu'en bien raisonnant il [Chrysippe] regardât Dieu comme la cause de tous les
crimes."
651 De Fato 39. Delabitur in eas difficultates ut necessitatem fato confirmet
invitus.
652 Ibid., 6. Loercher (De Fato, 346), makes it clear that the excerpt from
Posidonius, lost from the opening of Chapter 3, dealt with contagic naturae and
not with astrology.
653 Loercher (l. c. 384) calls it "sententiam autem vulgi... vel levissimi cuiusque
hominis."
654 Will to Believe, 147.
655Christoph Sigwart, Logik,2 (Freiburg, Mohr 1893), 2.382.
656 Will to Believe, 156.
76
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
the mere events of experience to justify the dogma of fate, nothing to
prove a fixed and predetermined order of nature.
In this treatise Cicero several times expresses the satisfaction he
feels at not being hampered by the restrictions of any particular
school of thought. The Stoics who believe in fate must, he says, to
be consistent, admit oracles and divination; those who admit only
eternal truth, not eternal causality, are not so shackled.657 Chry-
sippus, through his anxiety for consistency, is to be described as
aestuans laboransque;658 he must maintain the doctrines of his school
and yet justify the freedom in which he wishes to believe. As for the
Epicureans, when they resort to the "imaginary swerve" in order to
explain freedom, they destroy thereby the very thing they wish to
prove. 659
By inventing a material cause i.e. the swerve, for moral
freedom, they draw the latter into the field of physics, the very field
where uniform causality reigns. Cicero's freedom, however, is
freedom not to doubt, but to seek the truth, untrammelled by tenets
or by the need of consistency. The method he follows, that of the
Aristotelian dialogue, has for its end the attainment of the most
probable truth.660
It seems clear that in this treatise Cicero displays the genuine
pragmatic attitude of mind. He postulates, on the ground of its
need, a belief for which dialectic can give no proof. On the negative
side, he attacks the arguments of the rigid determinists, rejects the
unsafe proofs of the indeterminists, criticises the vulnerable dialectic of
Chrysippus in his attempted compromise between freedom and
necessity. On the positive side, he declares for a belief in freedom,
not because of any logical proof, but on the ground of its necessity as a
basis for a moral universe and on the ground of its correspondence to
an instinct of the human spirit. For Cicero, it has been said, "le
plus impérieux des besoins fut le libre possession de lui-même."661
Foremost among practical applications of philosophy were, to his
mind, those that touched the state. It is suggested by Thiaucourt662
that the main attack of this essay is directed against the Stoic doc-
trine rather than against the Epicurean, because Cicero felt that that
657 De Fato, 33. Hi [Stoici] enim urgentur angustius; illorum soluta ac libera
est.
658 Aulus Gellius, N. A. VII (VI) 2.15.
659 De Fato, 48. Nec vero quisquam magis confirmare mihi videtur-fatum...
sustulisseque motus animi voluntarios quam hic. .
.
•
660 Ibid., 1, quo facilius id . . . probaretur quod probabile videretur.
661V. Duruy, Revue des Deux Mondes; 15 mai 1889, 343.
662 Thiaucourt, 288.
De Fato
77
way lay the chief peril to political freedom. "Fatalism is a doctrine
favorable to despotism," says Thiaucourt, "and every defence of
freewill is an effort for liberty." De Fato was written by a convinced
believer in the Republic to take away excuses from those who were too
ready to submit to all events as inevitable and fatally caused.663
663 L. C.
CHAPTER VI
THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS
A STUDY OF VIRTUE AS DEFENSIVE ARMOR IN THE STRUGGLE FOR
THE HAPPY LIFE
Libri Tusculanorum disputationum res ad beate vivendum maxime
necessarias aperuerunt (De Div. ii. 2).
Volumus enim eum qui beatus sit tutum esse, inexpugnabilem,
saeptum atque munitum. (Tusc. Dis. V. 41).
The Tusculan Disputations are declared by Cicero to belong to the
practical sphere. "Res ad beate vivendum maxime necessarias.
aperuerunt" is his claim for these five discourses. 664 The first four
aim at freeing man from (a) fear of death, (b) bondage to pain, (c)
bondage to grief, (d) all other mental disturbances, 665 while the fifth
takes up the most vital topic of philosophy,-viz., that virtue suffices
for the happy life.666 Goedeckemeyer's claim that Cicero's philos-
ophy is an harmonious unit, conceived in its entirety before he began
to write, 667 is borne out by the evidence which we find in this treatise.
Cicero wrote, it appears, in full consciousness of his position as a
member of the New Academy. Not only does he avow that he
speaks on the plane of the verisimile, not of the verum, but he leaves.
two questions to which a dogmatist would give a definite answer,
undetermined. A serious claim has been made that Cicero used as a
source for the work, the writings of the New Academic, Philo.668
We have seen that in each of the theoretical treatises Cicero in-
clined to the acceptance of some one view, even though he admitted
the lack of complete logical proof. In De Fato he defended the
doctrine of freedom though the only argument in its favor is a moral
one; in De Divinatione he defended theism, though he rejected super-
stitious arguments for it; in De Natura Deorum he upheld belief in a
Deity related to mankind though he found only a balance of prob-
664 De Div. ii.2.
666 Tusc. v.1.
665 Tusc. ii.2; ii.66; iii.21; iv.8.
667Goedeckemeyer, 139, n. 1. Reid, in defining Cicero's philosophical position
claims that all that was distinctive of the New Academy was its dialectic (11);
that it had no particular doctrines to inculcate and left its adherents absolutely
free to accept whatever tenets they chose (14); that Cicero accordingly felt it
quite possible for him to acquiesce in the ethical opinions of Antiochus (15) and
even went beyond Antiochus is his sympathy with the Stoic ethics (17).
668 Hirzel III, 548-9. Cf. pp. 27-8 of my chapter on the Academica, for reference
to the positive side of Philo's doctrine.
78
The Tusculan Disputations
79
ability on the side of that belief; in De Finibus he declared for the
supremacy of virtue, but with due regard for the lesser goods; in the
Academica, while he denied the Stoic claim to certain knowledge
(Karáλnis), he affirmed that truth existed and would one day be
apprehended and that man could even now grasp the verisimile.
He stressed, not doubt of the verum, but assurance of the verisimile.
A. THE NON-DOGMATIC ELEMENTS IN THE TREATISE
In this practical treatise, the Tusculan Disputations, Cicero does
not abandon the viewpoint of the New Academy. The whole dis-
cussion is set within the framework of the verisimile. But in accord-
ance with the practical purpose of the work, greater space and em-
phasis is given to the application of the accepted truth than to the
lack of coercive proof, or to the conflicting opinions of the schools.
Certain truths essential to ethics are here stated in terms of unqualified
dogmatism. The importance of this interpretation of the treatise
lies in the fact that Cicero's dogmatism regarding the ground-work of
ethics is not in blind and unthinking contradiction to his theoretical
doubt, as Zeller's criticism implied. 669 On the contrary, Cicero in full
consciousness that theoretical certainty is impossible, at the same
time postulates those truths that underlie his ethical views.670 The
evidence for this interpretation of the Tusculan Disputations follows.
1. Cicero sets the whole discussion upon the level of the verisimile.
Cicero in so many words links this treatise with his theoretical
studies. After glorifying the freedom of the New Academy to seek
the probable,671 he makes this assertion.—Quod cum saepe alias, tum
nuper in Tusculano studiose egimus. 672 He follows the old Socratic
way of reaching the veri simillimum by arguing against a propo-
sition.673 He will not speak like the Pythian Apollo, but like an
ordinary man, following what is probable; he will not go beyond the
veri similia.674 Of certain propositions only a god can decide the
truth.675 He admits the possible truth of the Epicurean doctrine of
spiritual annihilation,676 but contends that the contrary view of
669 Cf. Introduction to this dissertation, p. 3.
670In De Off. iii.33, Cicero demands the right to postulate the supremacy of
virtue as a mathematician postulates his axioms.
671 Tusc. iv.7.
672L. c. Cf. Tusc. v.11. Quem morem . . . disputaremus.
673 Tusc. i.8.
674 Ibid., i.17. Cf. iv.47 and Acad. i.45–6 and ii.32.
875 Ibid., i.23.
76Ibid., i.49. Quod ut ita sit, (nihil enim pugno) .
•
80
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
Plato and Pythagoras is equally possible since (and here he applies
Carneades' criterion of the verisimile),677 no objection arises in his
mind against it.678 He restates the Academic position, its freedom
to adopt the probable, 679 its willingness to confute or to be confuted in
argument. 680
He declares that the only possibility of introducing
philosophy among the Romans depends on freedom from fixed
systems and on liberty of discussion.681 He quotes Aristotle, who
called his predecessors stultissimi or gloriosissimi in thinking they had
perfected philosophical inquiry.682 The best thinkers confess their
ignorance and need to learn many things.683 The human mind does
not have full powers of comprehension, but must use such as it has.684
The soul in studying its own nature is blinded, like a man who gazes
at the setting sun; so Cicero's discourse must move cautiously, in
doubt and hesitation, like a bark upon an unfathomed sea.685 One is
often obliged to give up a belief that has been keenly reasoned out.
We slip in even easier subjects than that of immortality, which is in
itself obscure.686
In Cicero's argument that virtus and aegritudo are incompatible, it
is significant that, although he claims to employ Stoic syllogisms,687 he
uses the expression verisimile of that which he proves.688 He shows a
certain disparagement of these Stoic forms in such phrases as con-
tortius 689 and Stoici...qui contortulis quibusdam et minutis con-
clusionunculis nec ad sensus permanentibus effici volunt.690
A certain inconsistency between Cicero's views as expressed in this
treatise and in the fourth book of De Finibus is pointed out by the
Auditor. 691
Cicero admits the inconsistency and justifies it on the
677 Acad. ii.33. Cf. Sextus Adv. Math. 7.166.
678 Tusc. i.49.
9Ibid., ii.5.
680 Ibid., ii.5.
explicetur?
681 Ibid., ii.5.
viguisset.
682 Ibid., iii.69.
Nec tamen mihi . . . sententia. Cf. i.55, nisi quid habes ad haec.
Cf. v.83 and Acad. ii.8.
...et refellere sine pertinacia et refelli. Cf. iii.46. Cupio refelli
Philosophia nascatur
•
parati sumus. Cf. ii.4. Sed tamen ...
683 L. C. Ex ceteris. discenda. Cf. the process by which James Martineau
changed his philosophical point of view. (Types of Ethical Theory, New York,
1886, pp. viii to xvii). "I have always been a teacher; I have not ceased to be
a learner; in the one capacity I must tell the little I know; in the other I must
strive after some glimpse of the immeasurable light beyond."
684 Tusc. i.67.
685 Ibid., i.73. Kühner (Ed. of Tusc., p. 128), remarks that Cicero is here
following Plato closely. Cf. Phaedo, 85 D.
686 Tusc. i.78.
688 Ibid., iii.14 and iii.16.
687 Ibid., iii.13.
689 Ibid., iii.22. Cf. iii.13. In iv.33 the Stoic forms are called scrupulosae cotes,
in reference to their crabbed style.
690 Ibid., ii.42.
691 Ibid v. 32. Cf. Reid, Acad. Introd., p. 12.
The Tusculan Disputations
81
ground of the freedom he enjoyed as an Academic "to live from day to
day and to express whatever views he favored at the time."692
2. Cicero treats particular questions in a non-dogmatic manner.
Not only did Cicero in this treatise declare his position to be that of
a New Academic; but he dealt with certain questions which seemed to
him inferior in importance to his main theme, in a manner which,
though not sceptical, is at least not dogmatic. When Hirzel calls the
tone of Book I "prevailingly sceptical''693 and claims that Cicero is
"consistently sceptical" throughout the work,694 he is clearly using
the word in its technical, not in its popular sense. The general im-
pression left by the work, viewed as a whole, is unquestionably one of
affirmation, not of denial. The source of Book I seemed to Zeller to
be Posidonius and Crantor; of the second, Panaetius; of the fourth,
Posidonius or Antiochus,695 all Stoics or at any rate dogmatists.
The impression gained from a reading of Book I is that Cicero him-
self believed in immortality,696 but that, whether that belief were true
or not, he felt the main thesis to be indisputable, viz., that death is
not an evil. But in his plea against the fear of death he will not de-
clare dogmatically for personal immortality; he repudiates the fear of
death whether this fear be studied from the point of view of the bẹ-
liever in a future life or of the believer in annihilation. 697 In Hirzel's
phrase, "he tried to make the victory over the feelings free from all
doctrinal connections."'698
The alternative to immortality is stated in Tusc. i. 25, Quae [mors]
aut beatos efficiet, animis manentibus, aut non miseros, sensu caren-
tes. After adducing arguments for immortality,.Cicero warns his
hearer against too great confidence, and bids him be armed even
though his hope be not justified.699 If the soul perishes, then it loses
perception and capacity for pain, nor does it exist anywhere. There-
fore it suffers no evil. This is the essence of the argument by which
Cicero combats fear of death on the supposition that the soul is
mortal.700 The arguments for and against immortality are not pre-
692 Ibid., v.33. Nos in diem vivimus . . . soli sumus liberi.
693 Hirzel, III, 343, note.
694
94Ibid., III.382. "... bleibt er in den Tusculanen sich in seinem Skepticismus
consequent."
695Zeller III, 1.651, note 1. Cf. Corssen P., Rhein. Mus. Vol. 36, 1881,506
696 Thiaucourt, 134, Zeller III, 1.668, Goedeckemeyer, 73.
697 Goedeckemeyer, 157, note 9.
698 Hirzel, III, 459. Cf. Zeller III, 1.668.
699Tusc. i.78. Id igitur si acciderit, simus armati.
700 Ibid., i.82. Fac enim sic animum interire ut corpus
est? Cf. i.91. In quo quid potest esse mali . . .? and i.111.
•
•
Ubi igitur malum
82
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
sented with equal prominence. Book I from § 25 to § 81 is occupied
with arguments for immortality. From § 62 to § 94 the thesis is
maintained, not that souls perish, but that, even if they do, death is
no evil. 701
Cicero shows in this argument against the fear of death the same
indifference to non-essential details and the same refusal to dogmatize
about them that we have found to be characteristic of his point of
view in other treatises.702 In order to convince even Epicurean.
hearers that death is no evil, he will entertain (though briefly and
without sympathy) their doctrine of annihilation. 703 As to matters of
less importance, he will not decide. He feels that in order to conquer
the fear of death it is not necessary to decide as to the exact com-
position of the soul. 704 He is unwilling to admit that it is made of
atoms, or is part of the heart, brain, or blood; but whether it is of
ether or of fire is a matter of no concern to him. If he could assert
anything specific about so mysterious a subject, he would swear that
the soul is divine. 705 In another passage, 706 he is willing to believe
that the soul may be either ethereal or fiery or numerical or of that
fifth substance which Aristotle considered the material of mind.707
The essential point for Cicero is that the soul is akin to God. If God
is ether or fire, the soul of man is the same. 708 But if there be a fifth
substance, then he believes God and the soul to be of that substance.709
The form and location of the soul in man have nothing to do with the
main issue. As one knows God without knowing his form or habi-
tation, just so one knows the soul. 710 If one cannot know the ma-
•
•
701Ibid., i.82. Sed fac spe beatioris vitae. The same alternative was
presented by Plato in Apol. 40 C ff., a passage translated by Cicero in Tusc. i.97–9.
Necesse est enim sit alterum de duobus ut aut sensus omnino omnes mors auferat
aut in alium quendam locum ex his locis morte migretur (§97).
702 Cf. Academica ii.66 and page 33 of this dissertation; also De Fin. v.45 and
p. 24 of this dissertation, and De Nat. Deor. iii.27 and 28 and p. 46 of this disserta-
tion.
703 Tusc. i.23. Efficiet enim ratio ut quaecumque vera sit earum sententiarum
mors aut malum non sit aut sit bonum potius. V. Thiaucourt, (134), Hirzel III,
382.
704 Ibid., i.60 and 1.70. Zeller III, 1.668 notes that Cicero decidedly bars out the
coarser bodily materials as possible soul-stuff.
705 Ibid., i.60 and i.70.
706 Ibid., i.40 and 41.
707 Ibid., i.22. Quintam quandem naturam e qua sit mens.
•
•
·
708 Ibid., i.65. Si deus aut anima aut ignis, idem est animus hominis. Cf. v.38.
709 L. c. Sin autem est quinta . . . natura. haec et deorum est et animorum.
Zeller III, 1.666 observes that detailed study of the nature of the Godhead does
not interest Cicero.
710 Ibid., i.70. Illud modo videto, ut deum noris etsi ignores et locum et faciem,
sic animum tibi tuum notum esse oportere etiam si ignores et locum et formam.
The Tusculan Disputations
83
terial of the soul, one can at least know its quality; or, if not even
that, then certainly its greatness. 711
Hirzel cites this refusal of Cicero to dogmatize on the composition
of the soul as an illustration of his general procedure, viz.: to leave
undecided all questions an answer to which is not demanded by the
proposition in hand712 and to consider that, while the existence of an
object may be undeniable, the more exact description of its relations
and qualities must always be in doubt. 713 Thus, while asserting the
existence of God, he refuses to dogmatize about His qualities. 714
Cicero's view, therefore, of the soul may be described as non-
dogmatic in two ways; he is willing to consider the possibility of the
death of the soul, and he refuses to make any exact statement to its
substance. This non-dogmatic attitude, however, does not prevent
Cicero from making very clear and emphatic declarations of belief in
God and the divine nature of the human soul.
(b) Another question which Cicero never answers dogmatically is
whether pain is or is not an evil. 715 The Stoics by their ratiunculae
prove it to be no evil, as though the name and not the fact were the
main concern.716 Cicero, however, is content if his hearer will con-
cede that pain is not so great an evil as shame.717 The essential
matter is to strengthen man's spirit to meet the pain.718 Better
than the Stoic view is that which declares that anything contrary to
nature is a malum.719 But verbal disputes should be eschewed, since
the important point is that virtue infinitely surpasses all goods of
body and fortune. Conversely, no other malum, nor even all mala
together are comparable to the evil of moral disgrace.720 Let the
Stoics see to it whether dolor be an evil or not. Cicero is assured
that, whatever dolor is, it is not so important as it seems. All pain
can be endured. 721
We saw in De Finibus that Cicero's humane feeling led him to
711 Ibid., i.60. Si quid sit hoc non vides, at quale sit vides; si ne id quidem, at
quantum sit profecto vides.
712 Hirzel III.383.
7:4 Ibid., 385 and 387. Cf. De Nat.
715 Tusc. .29.
717L. c. Quare satis mihi dedisti
dedecus quam dolorem.
718 L. C.
713 Ibid., III.386.
Deor. ii.12 and Tusc. i.70.
716 Tusc. ii.28.
cum respondisti maius tibi videri malum
firmandus animus ad dolorem ferendum.
719Ibid., ii.30. Cf. ii.66, . . . si quicquid asperum alienumque naturae sit, id
appellari placeat malum. and De Fin. v.89.
720 Ibid., ii.30. Ne malum... ullum . . . cum turpitudinis malo comparanda.
Cf. v.45.
•
721【bid., ii.42. Ego illud quicquid sit tantum esse quantum videatur non puto
doloremque omnem esse tolerabilem.
84
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
sympathize with the reality of pain.722 So here we find that he takes a
practical view of dolor. Sit fortis in perferendo; ut laetetur etiam,
non postulo.723 "Pain is a drear thing, bitter, contrary to nature,
difficult to bear and endure."724 The example of Marius under the
surgeon's knife shows that the sting of pain is sharp.725 Zeno's dogma
that pain is no evil does not remove the pain.726 Pain is real; other-
wise, what need is there of courage?727 But if one has the arms of
Vulcan, that is, courage, he must resist pain. 728 Pain of body may
continue, but it can be silenced, while pain of mind can be checked. 729
The weakness of the uncompromising Stoic denial that dolor is an
evil in hinted at in the story of Dionysius, who lost faith in philos-
ophy, because he found pain so real.730 The same story is told in De
Fin v. 94, where the superior practicality of the Peripatetic view is
pointed out. 731
In Book iii Cicero treats the subject of grief in much the same way
as he does pain in Book ii.732 Aegritudo is either no evil or a very
slight one. 733
To the wise man there is either no evil apart from
wrong-doing, or so little that wisdom overwhelms it.734 The sting of
grief and the shrinking of the spirit will still be there, since they have a
natural cause, but the grief which is incompatible with wisdom must
be removed. 735 To regard sorrows as mala, however, does not pre-
vent one from bearing them calmly. 736 Conversely, one may use the
term bona of bodily and material advantages without exaggerating
their importance.737 The clear-cut Stoic view of bona and mala, the
722 De Fin. iv.23; iv.59; v.47; v.89; v.94. Cf. De Off. ii.37.
723 Tusc. ii.18.
724 L. C.
725 Ibid., ii.53
726 Ibid., ii.29. Illud enim quod me angebat non eximis.
727 Ibid., ii.33. Non ego dolorem dolorem esse nego; cur enim fortitudo
desideraretur?
729 Ibid., ii.50.
728 L.-C.
ºIbid., ii.60. Zeller (III, 1.664) notes the Stoic inconsistency which denied
the quality of evil to dolor although the latter is contrary to nature. The austerity
of the Stoic dogma, too advanced for ordinary men, turned Cicero toward the
Peripatetic view (Vide Zeller IlI. 1.663 and Hirzel III 412). Cicero's refusal to
pronounce dolor either malum or non malum is used by Hirzel as an argument
for a sceptical source for the treatise. (III 412, 413). For our purpose it is
sufficient and proper to consider it evidence of Cicero's own non-dogmatic attitude.
731 De Fin. v.94. Hic si Peripateticus fuisset, permansisset, credo, in sententia.
732 Tusc. iii.77. Hirzel (III.454) calls attention to the exactly similar choice
given in Books ii and iii as to the Stoic and the Peripatetic teaching on Goods
and Evils.
733 Ibid., iii.77.
734 Ibid., iii.80.
735 Ibid., iii.83.
736 Ibid., iv.60.
737 Ibid., iv.66.
. . aut ita parvum . . . ut obruatur sapientia.
Morsus tamen . . . nullo modo possit.
Quod quidem solet . . . arbitrantur.
Sint sane ista bona . . . laetitia turpis est.
4.
The Tusculan Disputations
85
best view ideally, (quae maxime probatur...)738 is easy to use in
argument; but, now he is using words in their ordinary interpreta-
tion.739 Various, practical means of curing griefs and errors must be
employed with various classes of sufferers. 740
741
(c) Another question upon which Cicero gives no definite de-
cision is the relation between the vita beata and the vita beatissima.
Is virtue sufficient for the former only, or for the latter? The last of
the Tusculan Disputations had for its theme, virtutem ad beate
vivendum se ipsa esse contentam, a theme difficult to prove, on
account of the many and varied blows of fortune. 742 Cicero in this
discussion rejects as inconsistent with itself743 the view of Antiochus
that virtue produces the vita beata, but not the vita beatissima,744
and that an object may take its name from its predominating qual-
ity." 745 He will not concede to any philosopher that the Wise Man is
beatus if external ills are mala.746
He departs definitely from the Peripatetic position when he de-
clares that the Wise Man is not only beatus, but beatissimus747 i.e.
that virtue produces the vita beatissima. He expressly rejects the
Peripatetic view in v. 47, and invokes the authority of Socrates in
confirmation. 748 But the statements he quotes from Socrates are
far from proving that the life of the Sapiens is beatissima rather than
beata; they relate only to the link between character, words, and
action in the good man. 749 From this vagueness it appears that Cicero
in this treatise used the words, beatus and beatissimus in a very
popular and loose sense. Abandoning the exact phraseology of De
Finibus, he uses the term, beatissimus, to mean "very happy" or
"happiest within human possibility" rather than "perfectly happy."
Another example of this looseness of terminology is seen in his
manner of using the metaphor of the scales. In De Fin v. 91-2 he
738 L. c. Hirzel (III 446 and 448) admits the Stoic trend of Book iii and explains
it on the ground of the various degrees of scepticism within the New Academy
and especially by the Stoic tendencies of Philo (p. 236, n. 2) whom, he claims,
Cicero followed in the Tusc. Dis.
739 L. c. Sed loquimur nunc more communi.
740 Ibid., iv.65.
alia ad alium motum curatio sit adhibenda. Vide De Fin.
v.89; v.94; iv.21, 22, for a defence of the Peripatetic view of bona and mala on
the ground of practical helpfulness.
741 Tusc. v.1. Cf. v.12.
742 Ibid., v.1. Quod etsi difficile . . . fortunae.
743 Ibid., v.23.
744 Ibid., v.22.
745L. c. Cf. De Fin. v.91 and 92. This view Cicero had in the main accepted
in De Fin. v. Vide my chapter on De Fin., pp. 19–23.
746 Tusc. v.30.
748
Ibid., v.34. Nos tamen teneamus ut sit idem [sapiens] beatissimus. Cf. V.40.
hi autem ... Socratica illa conclusione confirmatur.
749 Ibid., v.47. Sic enim princeps. . . concluditur.
86
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
grants the applicability of the term, bona, to external goods (§ 91)
and yet claims that, if virtue is balanced in the scales against them all,
it will outweigh the earth and the seas (§ 92). But in this treatise,
employing the same figure,750 and substituting only the phrase
animi bonum for virtus, he inquires,-Quid ergo hunc [Critolaus, the
author of the metaphor] prohibet...exaggerantem tanto opere
virtutem, extenuantem cetera et abicientem, in virtute non beatam
modo vitam sed etiam beatissimam ponere?751 Thus the figure
used in De Fin. to prove the upright life to be the vita beata, is used
in the Tusculan Disputations to prove it to be beatissima. This
gives a basis for such claims as that of Hirzel, that Cicero, like
Carneades, was quite indifferent as to the views of philosophers on
the exact relation of virtue and the vita beata.752
Further Cicero specifically announces his purpose to ally all
schools of thought to this fundamental dogma of the sufficiency of
virtue. 753
To aid this purpose and secure adherents for the doctrine
of virtue as the End, he turns from the Stoic view which he appeared
just now to champion,754 and grants the possibility of the Peripatetic
position. External goods may be admitted to the class of bona
provided they keep their proper humble station, while the other, the
spiritual goods, spread far and wide, and soar to the sky.755 If this
comparative value is observed, why need the man who possesses the
greater goods be called beatus only and not beatissimus ?756 When
asked how the Peripatetics can logically call the virtuous life beatis-
sima,757 he explains how it is beata. The word, beatissima, is not used
once from § 82 to the end of the book. Cicero is willing that the
philosophers of the opposing schools shall settle whether external
goods are to be called bona or commoda; he himself rejoices that they
all express an opinion worthy of philosophy about the power of the
Wise Man to live well.758 But perfect knowledge of the Ends of
750 Ibid., v.51. Cf. De Off. iii.11.
เ
751 Ibid., v.51.
752 Hirzel, III.459–460. ... der Gleichgültigkeit... behandelte." Hirzel cites
Tusc. v.83, et quoniam videris hoc velle, ut, quaecumque dissentientium philo-
sophorum sententia sit de finibus, tamen virtus satis habeat ad vitam beatam
praesidi nos illud quidem cum pace agemus. Cf. also Tusc. v.84.
•
753 Ibid., v.84.
•
•
ut hoc praeclarum quasi decretum beatae vitae possit omnium
sententiis et disciplinis convenire. The use of decretum marks this statement as
flatly dogmatic.
754 Ibid., v.30, and v.82. Stoicorum quidem . . . verissime.
755 Ibid., v.76. Cf. Acad. ii.134, where doubt as to the minor point is checked
when the main question, the preservation of virtue, is reached.
756 L. C.
757 Ibid., v.82.
758 Ibid., v.120. ... mihi tamen gratum est
mihi tamen gratum est . . . profitentur.
The Tusculan Disputations
87
good and evil is not in the power of man. 759 This statement forms a
link between this practical treatise on the means of reaching the End
and the theoretical discussion of the nature of the End, in De Fin V,
where the difficulty in Antiochus' doctrine is pointed out and never
solved.760
There is abundant evidence that Cicero in the Tusculan Disputa-
tions considered himself a consistent member of the New Academy.
Not only does he plainly say so in such passages as I have cited,761
but on the questions, Does virtue avail for the happy life or for the
perfectly happy life? Are grief and pain to be considered as mala
or not? Is the soul mortal or immortal? his attitude is that of a New
Academic. He tolerates diverse views on these subordinate topics,
because he wishes to unite adherents of all sects on a more funda-
mental thesis, viz., that the wise or virtuous man is armed against all
the ills of life.
B. CICERO MAINTAINS TWO FUNDAMENTAL DOGMAS
However tolerant Cicero may have been of differences of opinion in
the schools on minor matters, we find him in this treatise upholding
with unwavering firmness two fundamental dogmas. It seems as if,
boring through non-essential details of scholastic dispute, through
arrogantly precise statements about theories held by their adherents
to be of fundamental importance, he came at last to the bed-rock of
ethics and here took his stand. The two dogmas which to Cicero
admitted of no question were (1) that the human soul is of divine
essence and (2) that virtue, the good of the soul, is the Supreme Good.
We have found these dogmatic views inextricably interwoven in this
treatise with the non-dogmatic elements to which we have been re-
ferring. Though personal immortality be a matter open to question,
the divine nature of the soul is indubitable.762 Though the exact
classification of pain and grief as mala or incommoda is a matter of
indifference, the infinite gulf that separates them from moral evil is
beyond question.763 Though the precise degree of happiness which
virtue secures is indeterminable; and the words, beatus and beatis-
simus, are used almost interchangeably, the supremacy of virtue as
759 Ibid., iv.82.
malorum finibus .
cognitis quoad possunt ab homine cognosci bonorum et
76º De Fin. v.85 and v.95; also p. 24 of my chapter on De Finibus.
761 Tusc. iv.7 and v.11. Cf. pp. 79 and 80 of this chapter.
762 Cf. pp. 82 and 83 of this chapter with references given there.
763 Cf. pp. 83-4 of this chapter with references given there.
88
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
the End of man is asserted by Cicero without a suggestion of doubt.764
The only dogmas to which Cicero will subscribe are those which in
broad outline, not in detail, furnish direction for the ethical life.
As he declared in the Academica, 765 he is guided by considerations of
larger aspect, by stars of wider orbit, and so has a greater freedom of
action.
1. The soul is of divine essence
The question of the divinity of the soul is not the same as that of
its immortality. But one argument for immortality is the divine
nature of the soul.766 The discussion of immortality and of divinity
are blended in one.
Cicero invokes for immortality the authority of Plato, who first
gave a reason for his faith. 767 The very weight of Plato's authority is
enough for Cicero.768 Indeed he and his hearers agree that they had
rather be wrong with Plato than right with his opponents.769 The
implication is that, even if Plato is mistaken in his faith in immortal-
ity, if in the long run that belief shall prove to have been unfounded,
yet in the interim it is a better belief, richer in the elements of happi-
ness and in value for human life. Immortality cannot be proved;
neither can annihilation be proved. Therefore belief in one or
in the other is a matter of will and choice. Cicero makes his
choice, preferring to stand with Plato, that "prince of philosophers"
rather than with the apostles of materialism. If this is a correct
interpretation of Cicero's declaration, it has a parallel in James'
argument for the right to choose the religious hypothesis in spite
of the impossibility of proof. "Dupery for dupery," he says, "what
proof is there that dupery through hope is so much worse than
dupery through fear?........ If religion be true and the evidence for
it be still insufficient, I do not wish by putting your extinguisher
upon my nature (which feels to me as if it had after all some business
in this matter) to forfeit my sole chance in life of getting upon the
764 Cf. pp. 85-87 of this chapter with references given there.
765 Acad. ii.66. Cf. p. 33, chapter on the Academica.
766 Vide Corssen, Rhein. Mus. Vol. 36, 1881, p. 516. Tusc. i.56 . . . illa tandem
num leviora censes, quae declarant inesse in animis hominis divina quaedam?
Cf. ibid, i.66 and R. M.Wenley (Stoicism, Boston, Marshall Jones Co., 1924, p. 93)
"Others like Cicero. deemed the soul divine and therefore necessarily eternal.
767Tusc. i.39. Cf. ibid., i.24.
768 Ibid., i.49.
769 Ibid., i.39–40.
•
ut enim... auctoritate me frangeret.
Errare mehercule malo cum Platone quam cum istis vera
sentire. . . ego enim ipse cum eodem ipso non invitus erraverim.
-
The Tusculan Disputations
89
winning side."770 "Dupery through hope" is the modern equivalent
of Cicero's "errare cum Platone."
Cicero invariably ascribes divinity to the soul.771 Its godlike char-
772 its
acter and powers are a proof of its divine origin; its memory,
powers of research and meditation, 773 its creative powers, 774-these
essential characteristics of the gods are all to be found in the human
spirit.775 God can be conceived only as pure and free mind; the hu-
man spirit is of the same nature.776 The supreme worth of the human
soul rests on this kinship with the divine.777 Belief in a non-material
God who created, or at least rules the universe, 778 and in a human
spirit of like essence is belief in a spiritual universe.
2. Virtue is the supreme good
Closely related to belief in the divinity of the human soul is the
second dogma which Cicero asserts without qualification,—that vir-
tue is man's supreme good. The good of the divine spirit in man is
the highest good; and this is virtue, reason in its perfect develop-
ment, a thing wholly of the mind, utterly separate from the goods of
body or of fortune. 779 Virtue is man's defensive armor against all the
ills of life. 780 There can be no vita beata where mental disturbances
exist.781 Securitas is an essential of the happy life;782 virtue procures
our freedom from these disturbances.783 Most questions of life and
conduct are related to virtue. 784 The search for happiness, then, and
the law of conduct are linked with belief in a spiritual universe.
70James, Will to Believe, p. 27. Cf. ibid., p. 109.
771 Hirzel, III.391.
773 Ibid., i.61 (end).
772 Tusc. i.60. Cf. §65.
774 Ibid., i.62. Quorum conversiones... in caelo. §63 Nam cum Archimedes
imitari. Green (Prolegomena to Ethics,2 82) says that we conceive of the
activity of God in the universe by the analogy of our own mental processes in
knowledge.
775 Tusc. i.65. Quae autem divina . . . idem est animus hominis.
776 Ibid., i.66-7. Nec vero deus. est humana mens.
777 See Zeller, III, 1.667.
•
778 Tusc. i.70. vel effector . . . vel . . . moderator. Cf. ibid., i.63, quod si in
hoc mundo. imitari.
779Tusc. iv.34. Quamquam
dici potest. Cf. ibid., v.67, 107, 111, 113, 114,
120, 121, and Aristotle, Nich. Ethics X.7.1177a: ELTE dǹ voûs Toûto, eľte ďλλo TI,
ὁ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι εἴτε θεῖον ὃν καὶ αὐτο εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ
•
θειότατον, ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία.
780Tusc. v.41. Cf. ibid., v.2 and De Off. ii.38. In the latter passage it is said
to be justice that sets men free from perturbations of mind. The essential theme
of the Tusculan Disputations is the protective aspect of virtue (Cf. Tusc. ii.2;
iv.37 and 38; v.17, 42, 48); whereas in De Officiis the theme, broadly speaking,
is virtue in action. Cf. De Off. i.4.
781 Ibid., v.15.
783 Ibid., v.4; v.41; iv.35.
782 Ibid., v.42.
784 Ibid., iv.34.
90
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
For the supreme importance of virtue Cicero invokes the authority
of Socrates. He quotes Socrates as saying of the two fates, his own
and that of his accusers: Utrum autem est melius di immortales
sciunt; hominem quidem scire arbitror neminem.785 Cicero's comment
is, quod praeter deos negat scire quemquam, id scit ipse utrum sit
melius,..sed suum illud nihil ut affirmet tenet ad extremum. 786
Here, as often, Cicero claims Socrates as the founder of the Academic
method;787 yet the word, scit, is used of Socrates' conviction that to
die with a virtuous record gave promise of the best destiny. Socrates
had stated the same alternative that constitutes the theme of Book I
of the Tusculan Disputations, i.e. that death is either a migration to a
better world, or annihilation. 788 The whole quotation from the
Apology (Tusc. I Chapter 41) follows Cicero's presentation of the
possibility of annihilation. Therefore Socrates' conviction (and
Cicero's) that he who dies the death of the righteous is better off than
he who lives in wrongdoing is stated even in face of the hypothesis
that there is no immortal life. It seems clear enough from the tenor
of the whole of Book I that Cicero's personal conviction was for im-
mortality;789 he cannot believe that man was created in vain, that the
Mysterious Power made and nurtured him only to let him fall at
last into the unending evil of death;790 yet even if there be no future
life, the worth of virtue would be unassailed. It is clear that it was
not Cicero's main purpose to prove immortality. This purpose was
to secure the blessed life by arming men against all disturbances of
mind, including the fear of death.791 The hope of immortality is the
main argument against this fear. But the defensive armor against all
the ills of life is such virtue as that of Socrates.
3. Instinctive knowledge and the consensus gentium
Plato and Socrates represent the best of men, and for that reason
their beliefs carried weight with Cicero. Nature must be judged by
her best; therefore the opinions of the best men are the criterion of
785 Tusc. i.99. Cicero is here translating Plato's Apology 40C ff.
786 L. C.
787 Cf. e. g., De Fin. ii.2; v.88; Tusc. v.11.
788 Tusc. i.97. Necesse est enim sit alterum de duobus ..
789Vide Goedeckemeyer, p. 173 and p. 81 with note 696 of this chapter.
790Tusc. i.118.
4
in mortis malum sempiternum. Raphael Kühner (Tusc.
Dis., Jena, 1853, p. 178) quotes the comment of F. H. Kern on this passage,
viz., that God after creating mankind for eternal life would defeat His own purpose
if man perished in death; and such a defeat is unthinkable.
791 Ibid., iv.82. Scire autem. maius est. Cf. i.76 and Goedeckemeyer 179;
also Corssen, Rhein. Mus. 1881,
p. 570.
•
"
↓
The Tusculan Disputations
91
what nature teaches. 792 Thus Cicero uses the fact that good men de-
vote themselves to labors for other men and other generations and
offer themselves up for their country, first, as an argument for im-
mortality 793 and second, as a proof of the worth of virtue and high-
mindedness even if the soul be mortal.794
This voice of nature, speaking in the best men, speaks also in the
consensus gentium.795 It is commonly stated that Cicero bases his
few dogmatic beliefs on the consensus gentium and on the cognitiones
innatae from which the former arises.796 It is quite true that Cicero
uses the fact of instinctive beliefs797 to reinforce his other argu-
ments.798 The elements of virtue are ours by nature;799 knowledge of
God is inborn;800 freedom is matter of instinctive belief;801 immortal-
ity is attested by the inner witness and by common agreement. 802
Num dubitas . . . quaque natura?
792 Ibid., i.32.
793 Ibid., i.32.
Cf. Goedeckemeyer, 149.
794 Ibid., i.91.
moliri
Quare licet etiam mortalem esse animum indicantem aeterna
•
795 Ibid., i.30.
omnes tamen esse lex naturae putanda est. Cf. i.35,
beginning. Zielinski (p. 212) makes a point of the fact that to Cicero the whole
force of the consensus gentium is derived from the primarily important cognitio
innata. What is universally accepted depends upon instinctive knowledge.
796 Vide Goedeckemeyer, pp. 148, 157; Thiaucourt, pp. 123-4. Zeller declares
that on innate knowledge is based Cicero's belief in God (III, 1.665); in the divine
origin of the soul (667); in immortality (668). Zeller claims, indeed, that all
Cicero's philosophy as well as all his ethics is based upon immediate knowledge
(III, 1.661).
797 The relation of Cicero's doctrine of innate knowledge to Plato's doctrine of
reminiscence and to the Stoic theory of koival ěvvocaι is a topic of much
dispute. Zeller (III, 1.659) wishes to use the term Wissen of Cicero's innate
knowledge and claims that Nature gives, not only sittliche Anlage, but sittliche
Grundbegriffe. Hirzel on the other hand (III.525-6) stresses the vagueness of
the objects of this knowledge, citing the words, parvas notitias of De Fin. v.59.
He will not allow that innatus (e. g., Tusc. iii.2) necessarily means "inborn," but
claims that it may, like the Greek čupuros mean "growing up naturally in the
soul." It is certain that there are inconsistencies in Cicero's use of the theory.
In Tusc. i.57 he apparently identifies innate knowledge with the Platonic aváµ-
vnois; but in such passages as Tusc. v.39 and 71, where he speaks of the need
of training in order to develop perfect reason or virtue, the innate knowledge is
evidently considered rudimentary, perhaps merely a disposition toward virtue.
Cf. n. 1081.
798 Cf. Goedeckemeyer, 148.
799De Fin. v.59. Cf. pp. 22 and 23 and note 187.
800 Tusc. i.36; De Leg. i.24.
801 De Fato 31 and pp. 69 and 70 of my chapter on De Fato. We find modern
justification for Cicero's assumption of instinctive knowledge on moral subjects
in the words of James Martineau (Types of Ethical Theory, 1886, p. xvii).
Speaking of his own theory he says: "Unless he [the reader] can accept his
inward assurance of free-will and of a Divine authority in right, the whole
organism of deduced rules lies in ruins . . ." He goes on to say that these essential
positions must be accepted as postulates.
802 Tusc. i.35.
92
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
4. Justification of Cicero's dogmatism
Cicero's concept of a spiritual universe is unprovable; the best
knowledge man can attain is the verisimile; even the consensus
gentium which corroborates elemental moral views is unreliable
since it is so often corrupted by false custom and education.803 But
on account of the supreme importance of belief in God, the divine
soul, and virtue, Cicero postulates or asserts the soul's knowledge of
her own existence and activity, 804 although from the point of view of
dialectic proof he has previously denied certainty regarding both.805
His dogmatic treatment of these beliefs is justified in the eyes of all
who hold that philosophy may be made the basis for ethical action.
Action cannot be based upon doubt or speculation. "Scepticism in
moral matters is an active ally of immorality."806 "Doubt itself is a
decision of the widest practical reach, if only because we may miss by
doubting, what goods we might be gaining by espousing the winning
side."807
If reflection is the "middle stage" of the mental process,
and action the "final stage,” as James thought; and, if "perception
and thinking are only there for behavior's sake,"808 then Cicero, to
whom the practical function of philosophy was all-important, was
justified in passing on from speculative treatises to practical treatises,
and in making the leap from probability to certainty in beliefs that
underlie conduct.
"If we are empiricists, if we believe that no bell in us tolls to let us
know for certain when truth is in our grasp, then it seems a piece of
idle fantasticality to preach so solemnly our duty of waiting for the
bell. Indeed we may wait if we will...but, if we do so, we do so at
our own peril as much as if we believed."809 Cicero did not wait for
this bell of coercive proof to ring, a bell which he knew could ring
only in some possible far-distant future, 810 but exercised the right to
choose and adopt beliefs that made a moral foundation for living.
The general Stoic tone of the Tusculan Disputations is in harmony
with this dogmatic position of Cicero. It is due also, no doubt, to the
803 Tusc. i.30.
804 Tusc. i.53.
805 Acad. ii.124.
Л
Cf. De Nat. Deor. i.62.
Sed si qualis sit animus
nesciet. . . ne esse quidem sciet?
806 James, Will to Believe, 109.
808 L. C.
807 L. C.
09Ibid., p. 30. Thus Martineau (op. cit., p. XVIII) justifies his use of ethical
postulates, because "in the connection of truth with truth on any line of knowledge
you come to the end of your tether at some point so that no 'verification'
remains possible except the reciprocal security of an equilibrated system of
faiths.
•
810 Cf. Acad. ii.147 and p. 29 and note 242 of my chapter on the Academica.
1
-
The Tusculan Disputations
93
increasingly practical trend in Stoicism811 and to Cicero's greater
sympathy with that school812 as a result of this trend. The psychol-
ogy of an ethical treatise demands a strong dogmatic expression of the
truth to be inculcated. If one urges men to rise superior to pain and
grief, one must stress the comparative insignificance of dolor and
aegritudo, not their actual power. 813 If one wishes to teach men that
virtue is supremely sufficient for life, one must ignore or minimize
the positive values of external goods and ills. 814 He who teaches ethics
is, to a certain extent, a special pleader. The Stoics, with their clear
and downright statements, furnish the best material for ethical
teaching. They may be the only philosophers after all, Cicero con-
cludes, after citing their definition of fortitudo.815 Yet this very un-
compromising clearness and virility of Stoicism had to be combined
with gentler arguments, since all classes of sufferers were to be
reached. 816
The Tusculan Disputations were written by Cicero with full con-
sciousness of his earlier non-dogmatic expressions of opinion, and
they are entirely harmonious with his often reiterated claim that he, a
member of the New Academy, seeks the probable truth where he can.
find it and applies that probable to action and to life. He sets this
dialogue in the frame of the verisimile by many verbal statements to
that effect, and, consistently, he treats three problems by a non-
dogmatic method. He considers alternative possibilities as to im-
mortality, as to the precise nature of pain and grief, as to the exact
contribution of virtue and external goods to the happy life. But on
two fundamental questions, the divine origin and nature of the soul
and the supremacy of virtue as the End, he is uncompromisingly
dogmatic. Argument proves these beliefs to be veri similia; cog-
nitio innata and the consensus gentium add force to one's acceptance
of them; the moral life cannot exist without them. To call virtue the
Summum Bonum is to believe in an ethical world; this fundamental
principle of ethics can be justified only by believing that soul is more
811R. M. Wenley (Stoicism, Boston, Marshall Jones Co., 1924, pp. 99, 100)
says: "And at last the Stoicism destined to join the main stream of Western
culture was no helpless counsel of perfection, but the one pagan mood which...
enabled and emboldened [men] to live on the higher levels within their own
world."
812 Goedeckemeyer (p. 150) cites Tusc. v.83, Quod quidem Carneadem.
agemus, as proof of the end of the strife between the Stoa and the New Academy.
813 Tusc. ii.28; ii.42. tantum esse quantum videatur non puto.
814Ibid., ii.30, end.
815 Ibid., iv.53. Cf. v.19; iv.66, iii.22; De Off. iii.105. Cf. De Off. iii.20. Tamen
splendidius haec ab eis [Stoicis] disseruntur.
816 Tusc. iv.65. Cf. note 740.
94
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
than body i.e. divine. Therefore Cicero dogmatizes on what is the
bare minimum of non-materialistic ethics; he discards all details of
belief and leaves them to the schools to settle. No ethical system
could be reduced to simpler terms; it suggests a modern statement of
the minimum of religious belief:-"The best things are the more
eternal things.... we are better off even now if we believe her
[religion's] first affirmation to be true."817 Like Cicero, the modern
writer adds; "an affirmation which obviously cannot yet be verified
scientifically at all."818 But since the moral question presses for an
answer, Cicero answers it confidently, from an inner knowledge like
that of Socrates, 819 and affirms that one day spent in virtuous living,
following the precepts of wisdom, is better than an eternity of sin.820
817 James, Will to Believe, 25, 26. Cf. Aristotle, Nich. Ethics I, 8, 1098b.
τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθά, ibid., I, 10.1100b, ὑπάρξει
δὴ τὸ ζητούμενον τῷ εὐδαίμονι καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου τοιοῦτος.
818James, op. cit., p. 25.
819 Cf. note 786 and Tusc. i.99.
820 Tusc. v.5. Est autem unus dies bene
anteponendus.
•
•
actus peccanti immortalitati
CHAPTER VII
DE OFFICIIS
A STUDY OF PERSONAL AND POLITICAL ETHICS
Alia est illa, cum veritas ipsa limatur in disputatione, subtilitas,
alia cum ad opinionem communem omnis accommodatur oratio.
(De Off. ii. 35).
A.
RELATION OF DE OFFICIIS TO THE SPECULATIVE TREATISES
Zielinski thinks it Cicero's most original contribution to philosophy
that he, in the field of duty 821 freed the practical from the theoretical
reason. 822 He recognizes, however, that Cicero linked his study of
duty in De Officiis with his study of the réλos in De Finibus. But
this link seems to Zielinski a weak one. 823 The weakness of the bond is
a matter of opinion; the fact remains that in discussing duties, Cicero
did not ignore his speculative views. As in the Tusculan Disputa-
tions, so in De Officiis, he sets the whole discussion on the plane of the
probable. 824 When charged with inconsistency, he claims that he
uses the term "probable" where others claim certainty;825 that he is
justified in following what seems to him probable;826 that the Aca-
demic method of arguing against propositions is the only way to dis-
cover the truth, 827 and he refers by name to the treatise of the Aca-
demica for a discussion of the whole subject of the search for truth. 828
Cicero appears to find no break between his discussion of the End in
De Finibus and his discussion of practical duty. He refers here to De
Finibus as containing a proper explanation of the Summum Bonum
on which to base a doctrine of duty. 829 Theories of the End which
leave virtue out of the reckoning pervert duty. 830 He who measures
the End by personal advantage (commodis) and not by moral worth
(honestate), can show neither justice, generosity, nor friendship, un-
less his natural instinct for good is stronger than his logic. 831 But a
822 Ibid., p. 66–7.
821 Zielinski, p. 65.
823 Ibid., p. 85.
824 See my chapter on Tusc. pp. 81-87.
825 De Off. ii.7. Nos autem alia probabilia contra alia dicimus.
826 Ibid., ii.8. Quid est igitur
• •
•
•
827 L. c. Contra autem omnia . . .
sequi . . . ?
contentio.
828 L. c. Sed haec explanata sunt in Academicis nostris satis, ut arbitror, dili-
genter. See Acad. ii.20, and 60.
829 De Off. i.6. Quae quamquam [de summo bono] . . . alio loco disputata.
830 Ibid., i.5. quae. officium omne pervertant.
•
•
•
•
831 L. c. Nam qui . nec liberalitatem. This passage is significant, because
it refers to the communis notio of good, (. . . si . . . non interdum naturae bonitate
95
об
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
doctrine of duty naturally follows from the views of the Stoics, Peri-
patetics, and Academics on the Summum Bonum.832 De Finibus.
strongly emphasized the substantial agreement of the Stoics with
the two other schools 833 on the subject of the reλos. We have seen
that Cicero in that treatise accepted the view which gave virtue the
supreme place in the Téλos, while assigning a certain value to material
goods.834 He felt, then, no inconsistency in basing a practical study of
duty on a speculative study of the Summum Bonum which gave the
place of major importance in that good to virtue.
Cicero further asserts in this treatise his right as an Academic to
follow whatever views approve themselves to him. 835 His Academic
feeling appears in his warning against the danger of taking the un-
known for the known,836 and of wasting time on obscure, difficult,
and non-essential topics. 837 He will not insist on minute precision in
defining terms. Moral disgrace may be the only evil or the greatest
evil;838 virtue may be the only good or the chief good. Either view is
satisfactory to Cicero; he himself hesitates between the two, but no
other view has any claim to belief. 839 The Stoic view that virtue is the
only good and the Peripatetic view that it is the chief good both allow
the more essential proposition that the virtuous act and the expedient
never clash.840 Cicero asks of his reader such a privilege as is ac-
corded to geometers, that of postulating the supremacy of virtue. 841
In the comparison of this proposition to an axiom of mathematics is
vincatur) inborn and stronger than theory, and also to the need for theoretical
correctness and consistency (si sibi ipse consentiat) so far as attainable. Cf. my
chapter on De Nat. Deor. p. 37 for the importance of a correct view of the Divine
Nature.
832 De Off. i.6. Ita propria est . . . Peripateticorum
833 De Fin. iv.3; v.74. The view which Cicero rejects in De Off. i.5 is that which
excludes virtue (ut nihil habeat cum virtute coniunctum); he does not insist
that virtus be made the solum bonum.
834V. pp. 20–21 of my chapter on De Finibus.
835 De Off. iii.20. Nobis autem nostra Academia . . . liceat defendere.
836 Ibid., i.18. Unum [vitium] ne incognita . . . assentiamus.
837 Ibid., i.19. Alterum est vitium . . . non necessarias.
838 Ibid., iii.106. Itaque nervosius . . . id quod turpe sit . . . non dubitant sum-
mum malum dicere.
839 Ibid., iii.33. Nihil praeter id . . . expetendum. Mihi utrum vis satis est, et
tum hoc tum illud probabilius videtur, nec praeterea quicquam probabile. Cf.
my chapter on Tusc., pp. 85-86 for similar indifference as to the vita beata and
the vita beatissima.
840 De Off. iii.11. Nam sive honestum . . . contendere. Cf. iii.35. Itemque si
ad honestatem . . . id utile.
841 Ibid., iii.33.
•
ut geometrae solent . . . postulare ut quaedam sibi con-
nihil praeter id quod
honestum sit propter se esse expetendum. Cf. De Leg. i.21 and p. 111 for a similar
postulate of Divine world-government.
cedantur . . . sic ego a te postulo . . . ut mihi concedas
We mishandled
437
De Officiis
97
implied (1) that it is fundamental, and (2) that it is self-evident, and
therefore to be asserted dogmatically.
Cicero exercises his freedom of choice as a New Academic to follow
the Stoics in his discussion of duties. But he will choose from their
teachings according to his own decision and judgment.842 He ex-
plains his choice of the Stoic form of treatment. While the Peri-
patetic and Academic doctrines are in harmony with the Stoic view on
the relation of the honestum and the utile, yet the Stoics present their
view more impressively (splendidius haec ab eis disseruntur). 843
In a paraenetic treatise, designed for instruction rather than dis-
cussion, the vigorous, positive expression of the Stoic school suits his
purpose better then the reflective weighing of values by the other
schools. 844
Cicero here shows his customary downright antagonism to the
hedonistic schools. One must fight with all one's forces (viris equis-
que, ut dicitur) against the Epicureans and the Cyrenaics, if one is to
preserve virtue. 845 For if voluptas is the réλos, the virtues all fall,
prudentia, fortitudo, temperantia (§117), justitia, and all the social
virtues (§118).846 Epicurus may speak nobly about pain, but he is not,
in so doing, consistent. 847 Such systems as his cannot in consistency
speak of duty at all. 848 Wrong views of the Summum Bonum distort
views of duty.849 If members of such schools do not ignore all the
virtues, it is because the good instincts of nature are more forceful
than their theories. 850 The chief argument against Epicureanism,
then, is its incompatibility with ethics. 851 It is clear that Cicero in-
sists on correct theory so far as it is attainable, as a basis for conduct
and he also reverts to the inborn seeds of v rtue mentioned in De
Finibus, 852 when he expresses faith in the invincible good of human
nature, which in certain Epicureans rises superior to their evil theory.
Having shown that he felt no break between his previous dis-
842 Ibid., i.6. Sequimur igitur . . . hauriemus. Cf. ii.60 et hic... Panaetius . . .
non interpretatus.
843 Ibid., iii.20. Erit autem haec ... non honestum. Cf. ibid., ii.35 cited at the
head of this chapter.
844 Cf. my chapter on Tusc., p. 92.
845Off. iii.116. Atqui ab Aristippo... decertandum est.
846 Ibid., iii.118. Justitia vacillat . .
·
•
referantur.
847 Ibid., iii.117. Quamvis enim mala, dolore. Cf. De Fin. ii.84; ii.100.
848 Ibid., i.6. Hae disciplinae . . . queant dicere ...
849 Ibid., i.5. Cf. notes 829-832.
850 L. c. Cf. De Fin. ii.99 of Epicurus, . . . indicat innatam esse homini probita-
tem gratuitam .
351Cf. other instances of the same argument discussed in my chapter on De
Finibus pp. 10-12 and on De Nat. Deor. p. 43–45.
852
2Cf. De Fin. v.18; 43; 59; 61.
98
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
cussions of speculative truth and his present discussion of duty, and
having asserted his freedom to adopt the Stoic view of duty, Cicero
proceeds to discuss his subject in a practical, dogmatic way.
B.
A STUDY OF VIRTUE AND DUTY
1. Virtue is active and practical
Duty, says Cicero, may be treated either theoretically or prac-
tically; in the former sense it is related to the finis bonorum; in the
latter, to the precepts of conduct. 853 Although the latter also are re-
lated to the finis bonorum, yet their relation is less obvious, because
their emphasis is laid on action. These precepts are to form the sub-
ject of De Officiis. 854 Cicero based the first two books of this treatise
on Panaetius τὰ περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος. 855 Τὸ καθῆκον was the term
used of proper and reasonable acts of duty to which ordinary men
might attain. Ideal virtue went by the name of Tò KaTорОшμα.856
The treatise then is for ordinary men; the duties discussed are omni
hominum generi communia. 857 Even the best of the old Romans are
not to be considered ideally wise. 858 There is an ideal virtue (vere
honestum), but this treatise concerns those who through their observ-
ance of duty are considered good men. The virtue under dis-
cussion is not perfect, but the similitude of virtue. 860 In it progress is
possible, and we are under obligation to attain and keep whatever
degree thereof we can. By these characterizations Cicero makes it
evident that the virtue of ordinary human beings is meant, not that of
the Stoic Sapiens, whose virtue admitted of no degree. 862
861
853 De Off. i.7. Omnis de officio . . . possit.
859
854 L. c. Quorum autem officiorum his libris explicandum.
855 Ad Att. XVI, ii.4.
856 In De Off. i.8, Cicero translates karópowμa by perfectum officium or rectum;
кałĥкоν by medium officium. In iii.14 he states that the media officia form the
topic of De Officiis. (i. e., the duties which lie within the reach of all and are in
contrast with that perfect duty which only the wise may attain.) Professor
Knapp makes it clear (A. J. P. Vol. 28, 1907, p. 63-4) that medium officium of De
Off.iii.14 and 15 refers not to actions half-way between good and evil, (a view sup-
ported by several editors) but to that in medio positum, i. e., within the reach of
all men. Thiaucourt (p. 315-16) defines the subject of the work both of Panaetius
and of Cicero as "non pas les devoirs parfaits dont le sage seul est capable, mais les
devoirs moyens qui s'imposent à tous les hommes."
857 De Off. iii.15.
•
858 Ibid., iii.16. Nemo . . . intelligi.
.
859 Ibid., iii.17. Sed haec quidem de eis qui . . . existinantur boni. Cf. i.46.
860 Ibid., iii.16. ex mediorum officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam
gerebant speciemque sapientium. The imperfect virtue of the non-wise is called
similitudo, just as the truth that ordinary men may attain is called verisimile
(Cf. Acad. ii.32; Tusc. i.8; i.17; v.11).
861 De Off. iii.17. . . tamque if honestum progressio.
•
•
•
862V. Zeller on the early Stoic dogma (III, i.246), "man kann sie [die Tugend]
nicht blos theilweise haben, sondern nur haben oder nicht haben... die Tugend
ist keiner Steigerung und keiner Verminderung fähig, und zwischen Tugend und
Schlechtigkeit liegt nichts in der Mitte."
De Officiis
99
868
The most useful philosophy is that which inculcates principles of
duty.863 This treatise must employ ordinary language; and, though
virtue may really be indivisible, it must here, for purposes of ex-
planation, be divided into parts. 864 The study of moral philosophy
is a delight in itself, 865 but we are justified only in giving to it our
leisure time. 866 Study must result in action; otherwise it is incom-
plete. 867 Marcus is exhorted not to return empty-handed from the
great storehouse of Athens; he is reminded that he has his father's
work, honor, and name to carry on. "Old men for counsel, young
men for war," (and civic duty) is the division of labor assigned in
i.122, 123.869 The old are warned against the temptation to inac-
tivity and idleness, and are urged to use their wisdom for the assis-
tance of friends, youth, and the state. 870 Only very exceptional cir-
cumstances excuse men from public service; remarkable genius for
learning, ill health, or some other grave cause. 871 Yet Cicero admits
that speculative wisdom may have its uses for life. 872 For thinkers.
make other men better citizens, as was the case with Plato and, as
Cicero hopes, may be the case with himself. 873 Wisdom handed down
in literature has influence after the thinkers themselves are dead.874
2. Active virtue has its field in human society
The normal sphere for virtuous action is human society. Society
has both a natural and a supernatural origin. Men are created for
the sake of each other. 875 Men have an instinct for society, both for
863 De Off. i.4. Cf. ii.1 and iii.25.
864 Ibid., ii.35.
865 Ibid., ii.6. Nam sive oblectatio . . . vivendum.
866 Ibid., ii.4. Cui cum multum . . . temporibus. Cf. ibid., i.19; i.70.
•
867 Ibid., i.153. Etenim cognitio rerum consequatur. This description of
study as "incomplete" (inchoata), if not applied in life, has a curious resemblance
to Wm. James' conception of thought as the "middle stage" of the mental process,
which to be completed must culminate in action. V. James, Will to Believe, 123-4,
868 Ibid., iii.6. Quod cum omnibus . . . et magistri?
869 Ibid., i.122.
.
ut eorum [iuvenum] et in bellicis et in civilibus officiis
vigeat industria. §123. Senibus autem . . . danda . . . opera ut . . . maxime rem
publicam consilio adiuvent.
•
•
870 Ibid., i.123. Cf. i.28 and 29; i.154. In ii.4 Cicero declares that during his
own public life he gave to study only his leisure time. Cf. Pro Archia 6.13.
Cf. pp. 112-113 of my chapter on De Re Publica and De Legibus.
871 İbid., i.71. Quapropter concederent.
• • •
872 Ibid., i.155. Atque illi . recesserunt.
•
873 L. c. Nam et erudiverunt . . . accessimus. Matthew Arnold, in his essay on
The Literary Influence of Academies (Essays in Criticism, First Series), urges
the value to the general advance of the human spirit, of such institutions as the
French Academy. The latter, he says, not only sets standards for literary style,
but creates an atmosphere in which the best ideas of the time are made attainable
by the finer spirits of the time (page 64).
874 Ibid.. i.156. Neque solum vivi . . . assequuntur.
875 Ibid., i.22. homines autem hominum causa esse generatos. Cf. iii.22.
100
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
general human intercourse and for family life. Cicero links these
two social bonds and gives them equal importance. 876
As instinct brings bees together in swarms, so instinct brings men
into society. The honeycomb is not the result of a conscious will,
but of the swarming instinct; so the social organization is not the
object of social intercourse, but the result of the gregarious instinct in
man.877 But it is not any instinct than men have in common with
beasts that draws them together. Rather it is what differentiates
them from beasts that forms the bond, viz., reason and speech,878
and this bond is fundamental.879 By a law of nature the interests of
the individual and of society coincide. 880 Men cause each other the
greatest injuries881 and the greatest blessings. 882
Society is not only of natural, but of supernatural origin. He who
sins against society sins against the gods who constituted it.883
Social duties take precedence of all others. 884 Wisdom is the knowl-
edge of things human and divine and of the bond between men and
gods.885 As this true wisdom is the chief of the virtues (ea si maxima
est, ut est certe), then the duty derived therefrom is the chief duty.886
This duty, pertaining to communitas and societas, is justice. So
justice, the bond that holds human society together, is founded on the
community of nature and interests between man and God.887
887 This
idea is wholly in keeping with what Cicero had to say in earlier
treatises, of the divine in human nature. 888
876 Ibid., i.12 entire. Cf. De Fin. v.65 and 66.
877 Ibid., i.157. Atque ut apium . . . sollertiam. Cf. De Fin. ii.45 and iii.66.
78Ibid., i.50. Eius autem vinculum est ratio et oratio. Cf. i.11. Sed inter
hominem et beluam ... futurum.
879 Ibid., i.50. Est enim primum . . . societate. Cf. ii.73.
congregabantur homines.
880 Ibid., iii.26.
881 Ibid., ii.12.
arbitrantur.
882 L. C.
•
•
. . . duce natura
ut eadem sit utilitas unius cuiusque et universorum
iis [deis] exceptis homines hominibus obesse plurimum
pleraque sunt . . . uteremur.
Quae qui tollunt . . . adversus deos . impii iudicandi sunt.
Placet igitur aptiora . . . ducantur. Cf. §160. Quare hoc.
Quibus rebus . . . antiquius.
·
883 Ibid., iii.28.
884 4Ibid., i.153.
societate; §155.
885 Ibid., i.153. deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos.
Gerland and Baiter took it on themselves to delete without any Mss authority
the words, "deorum et," from this passage. V. Holden's De Off., Cambridge
1899, p. 55. Hirzel refers to this unwarranted liberty as an example of the "Voreil-
igkeiten" of criticism (II, 723, n. 4). Cf. ii.5. Sapientia causarumque..
886 De Off. i.153 quod a communitate ducatur officium . . . maximum.
887 Hirzel (II.535) claims that Posidonius was the first of the Stoics to link ethics
with religion in this way. While the elder Stoics called the soul in general,
divine, Posidonius called only the highest part of the soul so,-or rather he called
it, not divine, but God. Zeller (III, 1.200, note 2) quotes Marcus Aurelius, XII.26,
who calls voûs, Ocós,. Seneca (Ep. 31.11) calls the animus rectus bonus magnus,
"Deus in corpore humano hospitans."
·
888 Cf. De Nat. Deor. 1.1; De Fin. ii.37; ii.40; ii.114; v.43; v.57.
De Officiis
ΙΟΙ
The proposition that justice or social duty is the chief duty has
various applications. Cicero deduces from it certain lessons as to
one's treatment of men in general, constituting society in the larger
sense, and as to one's duty to the State, which is a concrete and prac-
tical unit of society.
(a) Duty to men in general
It is a duty to labor for the preservation of the universal human
bond.889 Society is bound together by the twin virtues of justice and
kindness.890 These virtues distinguish man from the brutes and are
the fruit of reason and speech. 891 Both the best of men and the others
are to be treated respectfully.892 Not only is justice to be done them,
but sympathetic respect is due to their peculiarities. 893 Respect for
our own individualities follows logically;894 but with this restriction,
that always the development of our own personalities must be limited
by the larger demands of our common human nature. 895
Zielinski finds in Cicero's exposition of the virtues a centripetal
force, i.e. justice, socializing and unifying humanity, and a centri-
fugal force, individualizing and differentiating men. The latter force
includes curiosity (veri inquisitio De Off. i.13); ambition for leader-
ship (adpetitio principatus §13); desire for perfection (pulchritudo,
constantia, ordo, §14). Cicero, Zielinski thinks, extols the social
virtue, justice, because society must form the frame within which the
individual may develop; but the glory of De Officiis, he finds in its
individualism. Whoever preached individualism later learned it
directly or indirectly from Cicero. 896
The common brotherhood of man and the social duty derived from
it demand justice to slaves. They must be required to do their work,
but just treatment must be rendered them. 897 The same principle im-
poses certain restrictions on the foreign policy of nations. Wars are
to be waged only to end war. 898 Needless war has something in it
889De Off. i.149. Ad summam . . . debemus.
890 Ibid., i.20. Ea ratio . . . cuius partes duae; justitia . . . et huic coniuncta
beneficentia..
891 Ibid., i.50.
892 Ibid., i.99. Adhibenda... adversus homines et optimi cuiusque et reliquorum.
893 L. c. Justitiae partes . . . non violare . . ., verecundiae, non offendere.
.
894 Ibid., i.107. Intellegendum . . . tributa. Cf. §110.
cuique propria.
•
• •
·
895 Ibid., i.110. Sic enim est faciendum . . . sequamur
896 Zielinski, 73.
.. tenenda sunt sua
897 De Off. i.41. Est autem infima condicio . . . praebenda.
898 Ibid., i.35. Qua re suscipienda . . . ut in pace vivatur. Cf. i.80.
I02
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
savage and beastly;899 it is to be waged only under necessity and to
avoid servitude and disgrace.900 Arbitration is a man's way of settl-
ing disputes; force is the way of beasts. One should resort to the
latter only when the former is impossible. 901 The word, hostis,
Cicero reminds us, originally meant "foreigner," and it was evidently
the intent of the elder Romans to mitigate the grimness of the fact by
using the gentler word. 902 According to ancient Roman custom,
mercy was due to the conquered foe.903 Apology for wrongdoing is
probably all that should be required of those who have injured us.
There are limits set to revenge. 904 Cicero regrets that the Romans
destroyed Corinth. 905 If wars are waged for the glory of the empire,
they must be less fiercely fought than those fought for safety. 906
Promises made to an enemy are to be kept, as Regulus kept his to the
Carthaginians. 907
The spirit of humanity should inspire respect and kindness also to
Rome's allies and dependents. The evils of plunder and extortion
had grown, he complains, to the point that the Romans of his time
were strong through the feebleness of other states, not through their
own virtue. 908 Making gain out of public office is not only disgrace-
ful, but criminal.909
Charity, Cicero thought, was to be bestowed upon the neediest,
other things being equal, though this was contrary to the common self-
seeking practice of men. 910
99 Ibid., i.81.
900 L. C.
•
•
•
sed cum tempus
anteponenda. Cicero (ibid., ii.16) quotes
Dicaearchus as to the overwhelming loss of life caused by wars and uprisings in
comparison with all other causes.
901 Ibid., i.34. Nam cum sint duo .. non licet superiore.
•
902 Ibid., i.37. . . quod . . . is hostis vocaretur . . . mitigatam.
Et cum eis. more maiorum.
•
903 Ibid., i.35.
904 Ibid., 1.33.
Sunt autem quaedam
nollem Corinthum
905 Ibid., 1.35.
·
•
•
tardiores.
906 Ibid., i.38. S. Spitzer (Festschrift für Th. Gomperz, Vienna, 1902, p. 208)
traces what he considers to be evolution in Cicero's views from an aggressive
imperialism in his earlier days to a more humane and international view in his
later life.
907 Ibid., i.39.
908 Ibid., ii.75.
•
tanta sublatis legibus . . . non nostra virtute valeamus.
909 Ibid., ii.77. Habere .. nefarium. Professor Tyrrell (The Correspondence
of M. Tullius Cicero,2 R. Y. Tyrrell & L. C. Purser, London, 1914, Vol. 3, p. XX)
says on Cicero's own provincial governorship,-"... his conduct, compared with
that of his predecessor, made his term of office seem to the natives like an angel's
visit." Cicero sets forth in detail his views on proper provincial government in
a letter to his brother (Ad Quint. Frat. i.i) which illustrates how honestly Cicero
applied his humanitarianism to practical problems. Cf. my own paper on Cicero
and the Great Society in the Classical Weekly 17, 1923-4, p. 70-71.
·
910
¹ºIbid., i.49. ... si cetera paria sunt a plerisque. Cf. i.59. Sed in his . . .
non possit.
De Officiis
103
(b) Duty to the State
Of the various forms of human society the state is supremely im-
portant. 911 Our duty to it surpasses in importance even that we owe
to our parents. 912 The state is a close human brotherhood. 913 Its
citizens are bound by many common precious associations. 914 The
statesman must work for its good regardless of his own interests, 915
and for the good of the whole state, not of any part. 916 The duty of
service to the state takes precedence of all other duties. 917 The good
private citizen lives at peace with his fellows, neither abjectly nor
boastfully, and works for peace and honor in the state. 918 The states-
man must remember that he represents the state (se gerere personam
civitatis) and that its dignity, honor, laws, and constitution are en-
trusted to his good faith. 919 It is a duty for those properly qualified
to bear office. 920 There is a negative injustice which consists in
merely refraining from public service. 921
922
The balance between the good of the state and the good of the indi-
vidual has at times to be carefully adjusted. Justice requires that we
use what is common property as common and what is private property
as our own. Private property is not a natural institution; 923but
(here the practical, conservative statesman speaks), since men have
taken as their own what was by nature common property, let each
one keep what he has obtained; only let him not seek more, and so
offend the law of human society. 924 In general, what nature has
omnium societatem . . . cuique nostrum.
911 Ibid., i.57.
•
912 L. c. Cari sunt parentes ... sit profuturus?
913 Ibid., i.53.
914 L. C.
enim
•
interius etiam est eiusdem esse civitatis
•
multa enim sunt civibus . . . contractae. Cf. iii.69. Societas est
eiusdem civitatis.
915 Ibid., i.85. Omnino qui rei publicae
•
•
suorum . .
916 L. C.
alterum ut totum corpus rei publicae curent. Cf. §86. ... totamque
eam sic tuebitur ut omnibus consulat.
917 Ibid., i.57. . . . sed omnes
complexa est
•
Cf. i.160. · · prima dis
immortalibus, secunda patriae. Cicero's emphasis in the place of service to the
state in the scale of duties has a parallel in Lucilius' definition of virtue:
commoda praeterea patriae prima putare,
deinde parentum, tertia iam postremaque nostra.
(11. 1337-8. C. Lucilii Carmina, Fr. Marx, Leipzig, Teubner, 1904).
8Ibid., i.124. Privatum . . . honesta sint.
919L. c. Cicero dwells on the greater usefulness of the statesmen than of the
soldier in De Off. i.74 to 79.
Ibid., i.72. Sed his qui habent... res publica est. Cf. §71.
vitio dandum puto.
921 Ibid., i.23. Sed iniustitiae genera duo sunt ... deserat.
922 Ibid., i.20. Sed iustitiae . . . privatis ut suis.
923 Ibid., i.21. Sunt autem privata nulla natura..
•
. . verum etiam
924 L. c. Thiaucourt (p. 319) make the unfair charge that "aux yeux de Cicéron
les hommes de bien sont surtout ceux qui ont du bien." In view of Cicero's
rebuke to those who give gifts in hope of a return (De Off. i.49) this charge seems
undeserved.
104
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
produced for the common use of man ought to be socialized.925
Water, fire, honest counsel are to be given, 926 and whatever else is
needed is to be contributed to the common good, with this single
limitation, that the giver must not impoverish himself. 927
3. Virtue is in Harmony with Man's Nature
These admonitions to duty toward all men in general and toward
the State in particular derive their force from the fact that virtue
is natural to man. It was declared in De Finibus that the virtues
spring from reason, which is the divinest element in man,
928 but yet at
birth we have only the seeds of virtue;929 the full attainment of virtue
is for our own achievement; only voluntary virtue has the right to
bear the name. 930 Man's inherent power to achieve virtue, the dogma
on which St. Augustine broke with the Ciceronian tradition, 931 is a
recurrent theme in De Officiis and links it with the theoretical con-
clusions of De Finibus.
Virtue has its origin in human nature. 932 Justice and kindness
spring from reason and speech and distinguish men from brutes. 933
Reason is man's essential characteristic, 934 and it must rule the rest of
his nature if harmony is to prevail. 935 The law of reason, which is
human and divine law, forbids injustice. 936 Nature has given us a
part to play that demands the social virtues and every sort of honor-
able conduct. 937 Though circumstances may bar a man from certain
definite activities, the attainment of virtue is in his own power. 938
To have any value, virtue must be voluntary,939
939 Since virtue is re-
925 De Off. i.51, in qua omnium rerum ... communitas.
926 Ibid., i.52.
927L. c. Cf. i.44. Alter locus erat cautionis, ne benignitas maior esset quam
facultates... Zielinski, (69) notes that Cicero had not reached the heroic ethics
of Christian charity, but that his attitude had its reason in civic ethics.
928 De Fin. v.38. virtutes voluntariae... divinius. . . virtus. . . quae rationis
absolutio definitur.
929 Ibid., v.43.
930 Ibid., v.38.
• •
sunt prima elementa . . . efficitur.
•
•
animique virtutes non voluntarias vincant virtutes voluntarias
quae proprie virtutes appellantur . .
•
•
931 Zielinski, p. 128. V. my chapter on De Fin. p. 23.
932 De Off. i.103. Neque enim ita generati...maiora. Cf. i.105. Sed... ante-
cedat; §106 atque etiam sobrie; §107. Intellegendum . . . trahitur
•
•
•
ii.32. illos in quibus . . . cogimur.
933 Ibid., i.50. ... ferarum . . . expertes.
934 Ibid., i.11. Homo autem quod rationis est particeps.
Cf. i.107.
+
•
;
935Ibid., i.102. Efficiendum... moderatio. Cƒ. §§132, 141; also ii.18, alterum
motus
•
936 Ibid., iii.23.
937 Ibid., i.98.
938 Ibid., i.121.
939 Ibid., i.28.
rationi.
• •
Atque hoc . . .humana.
nobis autem cum a natura . . . virtutis.
si natura non feret . . . temperantiam . . .
Aequius autem . . . voluntarium.
voluntarium. Cf. De Fin. v.38.
De Officiis
105
lated to reason and speech, it is of the spirit, not of the body.940
Cicero asserts the natural tendency of man not only toward Virtue,
but toward specific virtues. Philanthropy is more natural (secun-
dum naturam), even when accompanied by annoyances, than a life of
self-indulgence. 941 To wrong another for one's own advantage does
more violence to nature than death or poverty or pain or any other
evil of body or estate; for it destroys human intercourse and society. 942
The virtue of temperance befits man's nature. 943 Love of truth and
independence are natural.944 Love of propriety is natural. 945 From
the love of natural beauty and symmetry man by analogy, perceives
the beauty of inward and moral seemliness. 946 Cruelty is contrary to
nature. 947
It is unnatural to prey upon the ignorance of others.948
It is a natural deduction from the principle of the essentially vir-
tuous character of man that there can be no conflict between the
honestum and the utile. He who tries to separate them tries to sunder
what nature has united. 949 Conversely, nothing can be really ad-
vantageous which lacks virtue. 950 Tyranny is a crime; therefore it is
not expedient. 951
By various practical examples Cicero proves that virtue really wins
940 Ibid., i.79. Omnino illud honestum . . . animi efficitur, non corporis viribus.
941 Ibid., iii.25. Itemque magis est . . et viribus. Cf. iii.24. Etenim multo
magis est
quam divitiae.
•
942 Ibid., iii.21. Detrahere igitur . . . societatem. It is clear from the comparison
of injustice with death and other personal afflictions that Cicero is using "nature"
not as a vague and general term, but in the sense of human, individual nature.
Cf. iii.30, Nam si quid . . . contraque naturae legem. John Stuart Mill, in his
essay on Nature, combats any such optimistic view of human nature as Cicero
upheld. "It is only in an highly artificialized condition of human nature that
the notion grew up... that goodness was natural, because only after a long course
of artificial education did good sentiments become so habitual and so predominant
over bad as to rise unprompted when occasion called for them" (Three Essays on
Religion, New York, Henry Holt and Co., p. 46. Written between 1850 and 1858).
943 De Off. i.96. Deorum differat.
944 Ibid., i.13. Ex quo intellegitur . . . contemptio.
945 Ibid., i.14. .. quid sit ordo . . . qui modus.
Sed maxima vis decori
946 L. c. Quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens
cogitet. Cf. ibid., i.98. . . ut enim pluchritudo . . . factorum, and §100.
accommodati sunt. This notion of transfer and
analogy in learning virtue is parallel with the idea of the derivation of virtuous
aspiration from desire for the prima natura. Vide, e. g., De Fin., v.18.
•
•
947 Ibid., iii.46. Sed nihil quod crudele . . . crudelitas.
948 Ibid., iii.72. Ex quo intelligitur . . . praedetur inscitia.
•
•
•
949
19Ibid., iii.75. Sic enim cogitans res a natura copulatas audebit errore
divellere Cf. iii.35; 75; 83; 96; 114.
•
950Ibid., iii.40. Itaque utilitas valuit . . . potuisset. Cf. iii.64. Numquam
est utile . . . turpe; and iii.81. Sed omnium ... utile; Cf. §§85, 87, 110.
•
951 Ibid., iii.83. Qui autem fatetur ... avellere. Zielinski finds in such passages
as this and ii.23-4 and iii.32 a reference to Caesar. "The red mantle of the
dictator appears in the background of De Officiis." (p. 64).
тоб
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
its reward in this life. Relief of the poor wins gratitude. 952 Justice
procures admiration and friendship. 953 Love is the best means of
attaining influence. 954 Justice and kindness raised the Roman em-
pire to the heights of glory; 955 it began to decline through the practice
of injustice. 956
But expediency is not the End. Justice is expedient, but it must be
followed for its own sake.957 The virtues of justice, courage, and
temperance have as one legitimate object the procuring of material
advantages, but they shine with a brighter light in the conduct of
men who despise such advantages. 958
It appears to be a safe conclusion that in De Officiis Cicero em-
ployed the same principles for which he found a reasonable probabil-
ity in his speculative studies. In those studies, we have seen, Cicero
inclined to a belief that there is a divine power in the universe, 959
that man from his birth possesses the divine seeds of virtue, that
man's will is free to achieve virtue and that virtue is man's chief end. 960
In De Officiis, "the breviary of the honorable Roman," as Thiaucourt
calls it, 961 written for the benefit of office-holding citizens in the Roman
republic, he employs these principles for their practical bearing on
ethics. The speculative study is finished; the probable conclusions
are to be applied to life. Application to life does not consist in further
argument; the dogma must be assumed as true. Cicero assumes, then,
that there is Deity in the universe, that man's soul is related to
Deity, that virtue is man's chief good. He builds on this concept of a
spiritual universe a theory of society as the work of human instinct
and divine sanction, and a code of conduct toward humanity and the
state.
iustitia conficit. . . admirationem.
952 Ibid., ii.62. Cf. ii.70.
953 Ibid., ii.38.
954 Ibid., ii.23.
retineatur.
955 Ibid., ii.26.
956 Ibid., ii.29.
amisimus.
957 Ibid., ii.42.
iustitia non esset
•
Omnium . . . timeri. Cf. §24. Quod igitur latissime . . . caritas
Verum tamen . . . tenebatur ... Cf. iii.88.
Itaque parietes modo urbis stant . . . rem vero publicam penitus
Omni igitur ratione colenda . . . cum ipsa per sese . . . nam aliter
958 Ibid., 1.17. Reliquis autem tribus virtutibus... tum multo magis in his
ipsis despiciendis eluceat. R. Kühner (op. cit., p. 245) says, “Cicero consistently
taught that the honestum was not to be judged by its returns."
959
59Cf. my chapters on De Divinatione and De Natura Deorum.
960 Cf. my chapters on De Fato and De Finibus.
961 Thiaucourt, p. 316.
CHAPTER VIII
THE POLITICAL DIALOGUES, DE RE PUBLICA AND DE
LEGIBUS
Usus autem eius [virtutis] est maximus civitatis gubernatio...(De
Re Publica 1.2)
Something remains to be said of De Re Publica and De Legibus,
and of Cicero's application of philosophy to politics. Both these
dialogues were begun before the cycle of philosophical treatises.
De Re Publica was written in 54 B. C. and published before Cicero
went to Cilicia in 51.962 Cicero includes it in his catalogue of philo-
sophical works, 963 and stresses the importance of its theme in phil-
osophy. 964
De Legibus was probably begun just after the completion of De Re
Publica, between 52 and 48, resumed in 46, but never finished or
edited by Cicero. It is never mentioned in the letters as completed, 965
nor is it included in the catalogue of De Divinatione ii.1-3. From a
letter Ad Fam. ix.2.5, it is probable that Cicero was working on this
dialogue in 46.966 A passage in the first book 967 would seem further to
indicate that he was writing that part of De Legibus either at the
same time, as De Finibus i.e. early in 45,968 or just before that time.
After asserting that virtue must be sought for itself alone. 969 Cicero
points out that a discussion on this topic leads to one on the Summum
Bonum,970 and that on that matter the Old Academy and Zeno
differed in words, not in fact. 971 This is precisely the theme of Books
IV and V of De Finibus. 972 "On that you would agree with Anti-
ochus," says Atticus; and Cicero replies, "Whether I agree with him
on all points, I shall see presently."973 The question of the Summum
Bonum is a difficult one, but it must be decided sometime. 974
962 W. S. Teuffel, Geschichte Rom. Lit., Vol. I, p. 404.
963 De Divin. ii.3. Atque his libris adnumerandi sunt sex De Re Publica.
964 L. c. Magnus locus philosophiaeque proprius . . .
965Teuffel, op. cit., p. 405.
966 et scribere et legere woλircías . . . et de moribus ac legibus quaerere.
967 De Leg. i.52 to i.55.
968 Teuffel, op. cit., p. 409.
969 De Leg. i.52.
970 L. C.
quin labebar longius nisi me retinuissem. . . ad finem bonorum . . .
971 Ibid., i.55.* Ex hac autem non rerum sed verborum discordia controversia
est nata de finibus... Cf. i.38.
972V. De Fin. iv.3; v. 74 and pp. 17 and 18 of my Chapter on De Finibus.
973 De Leg. i.54. Ergo adsentiris Antiocho . . . Cui tamen ego adsentiar in omni-
bus necne, mox videro.
974 Ibid., i.52. Controversam rem . . . sed aliquando iam iudicandam.
107
108
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
This passage is significant not only for its bearing on the date of De
Legibus, but for the evidence it gives that Cicero felt no impassible
cleavage between his theoretical and practical studies. He announces
his intention of following the Stoics in the discussion about the Laws. 975
Upon being taunted with losing his liberty of discussion, 976 he replies
that he does not always follow authority, but that on a topic so vital as
that of government he fears to lose the support of the schools that
call virtue the highest good (§37) i.e. the Old Academy, the Peripa-
tetics, the Stoics (§38). He will have the Epicureans retire to their
own gardens even if their doctrine is true, and withdraw from any
share in the state. 977 The New Academy he entreats to be silent;
she has her place, but it is not in the discussion of statecraft.978
The time for the application of doctrine to active life is not the time
for speculation.
De Re Publica represents Cicero's views as a statesman, written as
it was when he was still in the midst of political life.979 On his own
word we must accept it as part of his final message. 980 De Legibus
represents his views of the same period. If he continued to write it in
46 and 45, it is fair to conclude that it too is representative of his final
philosophical view-point.
We find in these political essays precisely the same ideas presented
as a basis for political wisdom and morality, which he advocated in
the speculative treatises on the ground that the balance of proof
was in their favor. The existence of gods, the divinity in man,
virtue the chief good, all these views reappear in the political treatises
as the basis of statecraft.
We have seen in the Academica that Cicero insisted on the positive
temper of the Academic school; in the Tusculan Disputations and in
De Officiis he defended his right to choose what seemed to him true
and apply it to life. In De Re Publica and De Legibus he applies his
chosen views specifically to political life. Between these, his earliest
treatises, and De Officiis, his last, there seems to be no inconsistency
except in the eyes of those who prefer their own conception of the New
Academy as a school of scepticism to that so often expounded by
975 Ibid., i.36. . . sed eorum . . . disputarint.
976 L. C.
sed... vides.
•
•
tu is es qui . . . auctoritati aliorum pareas. Non semper, Tite;
977 De Leg. i.39. Sibi autem indulgentis. . . rogemus.
978L. c. Perturbatricem autem harum omnium rerum Academiam. . . exoremus
ut sileat . . . quam quidem placare cupio; summoveo non audeo. Cf. p. 28, n. 232
of my chapter on the Academica.
979 De Div. ii.3. .. cum gubernacula rei publicae tenebamus.
98⁰L. c. Atque his libris adnumerandi sunt sex de re publica .
Cicero.
De Re Publica and De Legibus
109
Goedeckemeyer, indeed, claims that Cicero wrote these
political essays under the influence of the Old Academy, 981 when as a
patriot he felt the need of absolute standards of value. 982 But he
adds that Cicero soon learned the needlessness of such a defection
from the New Academy 983 on account of the entire freedom accorded
its adherents by the latter, to adopt whatever views appealed to
them. 984
A. VIRTUE IS IN HARMONY WITH HUMAN NATURE
In these treatises we find the idea emphasized that virtue is natural
to man at his best. Virtue is a stronger motive than pleasure. 985
All the virtues proceed from nature, not from expediency.986 Virtue
thus carries its own reward. 987 The good man thinks his rewards
divine, while external gains are merely human. 988 Virtue is due to
the divine element in man, and is innate. 989 Cicero makes a sharp
distinction between man's physical and spiritual natures.990 The
distinguishing mark of reason makes man superior to all physical
nature.991 Reason unites man to God. 992 He who recalls his own
origin knows God. 993 Right reason, which is law, is common to
men and gods. 994 Virtue is the same in man and God. 995 Man's
likeness to God shows his kinship to Him. 996 The natural excellence of
981Goedeckemeyer (144, n. 1), quotes Ad Fam. v.4.16. philosophiam
veram et antiquam . . . in Forum et in rem publicam . . . deduximus, as evidence
of Cicero's shift to the Old Academy and of his writing De Re Publica and De
Legibus from its viewpoint.
982 Goedeckemeyer, 143.
983 Ibid., 144.
985 De Re Pub. i.1.
984 Ibid., 145.
•
tantam esse necessitatem virtutis generi hominum a
natura . . . ut ea vis omnia blandimenta . . . vicerit. Cf. ibid., i.3.
986 Ibid., iii.38. . . nisi aequitas, fides, iustitia proficiscuntur a natura, et si
omnia haec ad utilitatem referantur, virum bonum non posse reperiri. (Quoted
by Cicero in De Fin. ii.59).
987 Ibid., iii.40. Vult... plane virtus honorem, nec est virtutis ulla alia merces.
The reference is to material rewards, since the conclusion to Book VI emphasizes
the heavenly reward.
988L. c. Huic tu viro quas divitias obicies². . . qui ista putat humana, sua
bona divina iudicat.
989 Ibid., iii.1. . . . in quo divinus ignis... Cf. iii.4 and De Leg. i.29.
990 L. c. hominem dicit . . . editum in vitam. Cf. vi.17.
991 Ibid., iii.2. Ita fit ut potestati. Cf. De Leg. i.27 and i.62.
· • ·
992 De Leg. i.23. Est igitur... homini cum deo rationis societas.
993
93 Ibid., 1.25. Ex quo efficitur... agnoscat. Cf. De Nat. Deor. i.1 and De Leg.
i.59.
994 Ibid., i.23. Quae [recta ratio] cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines
cum dis putandi sumus. Cf. De Re Publica iii.33; De Leg. i.45; ii.11.
995 De Leg. i.25. Iam vero virtus eadem in homine ac deo est
• •
996 Ibid., i.25. Est igitur homini cum deo similitudo. Quod cum ita sit, quae
tandem esse potest proprior certiorve cognatio? Cf. ibid., ii.41 on the similar
viewpoint of the good man and the Deity; De Re Pub. vi.26-7 on heaven as
man's home.
IIO
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
man is such that he can go far by his own powers and can perfect his
reason through the elementary intelligence he possesses naturally.997
All men can attain virtue. 998 It is only evil custom that kills the
seeds of virtue, 999 and prevents the absolute similarity of all men to
each other. 1000
B. DEMOCRACY
A belief in the natural excellence of man, due to his kinship with the
Divine, leads to faith in democracy. The intrinsic worth of men
demands respect for their rights. That Res Publica is res populi,
Cicero insists again and again. 1001 The rights of all must be equal,
though their money and their ability cannot be.1002 There is no
liberty unless the supreme power is lodged in the people.1003 There
must be no legislation directed toward individuals.1004 Cicero's
definition of res publica as res populi implies that the government.
must be directly or indirectly democratic; "that even where there is
no provision for the exercise of political powers by a popular assembly,
the monarchic or artistocratic organs are construed as deriving their
authority from the people and exercising their powers in its in-
terest. "'1005
As an experienced statesman, Cicero realized that men are not
equal in ability; thus the democracy he advocated was carefully re-
stricted. Equal honor to highest and lowest is most unjust.1006
Unrestricted liberty produces tyranny as a reaction.1007 In time of
war there must be a dictator;¹
1008 at all times there is need of real
997De Leg. i.27. ipsam per se naturam longius progredi: ex prima et
inchoata intellegentia cognovit ipsa . . . rationem et perficit. Cf. De Leg
i.26; 1.30; i.44; i.59 for other references to the seeds of virtue.
•
•
998 Ibid., i.30. Nec est quisquam gentis ullius qui ducem nactus ad virtutem
pervenire non possit. Cf. i.62.
999 Ibid., 1.33.
tantam autem est corruptelam malae consuetudinis ut ab
ea tamquam igniculi exstinguantur a natura dati... Cf. the fragment in Lactant.
Inst. Div. 5.8.10.
1000 Ibid., i.29. Quodsi depravatio consuetudinum. . . non . . . flecteret, sui nemo
ipse tam similis esset quam omnes essent omnium. Cf. ii.25 on equality of men
before God.
1001 De Re Pub. i.40; i.43; i.48; iii.43.
1002 Ibid., i.49. Si enim pecunias.
1003 De Re Pub. i.47. Cf. ii.43; ii.31.
iura certe paria debent esse.
1004 De Leg. iii.44. In privatos homines leges ferri noluerunt.
1005 Westel Willoughby, Political Theories of the Ancient World, New York,
Longmans Green and Co., 1903, p. 278.
1006 De Re Pub. i.53. Cum enim par habetur honos summis et infimis qui sint
in omni populo necesse est, ipsa aequitas iniquissima est... Cf. ibid., i.42; i.43;
ii.39; iii.45; iii.46; iii.47; iii.37.
1007 De Re Pub. i.68. ex hac nimia licentia . . . nasci tyrannum.
1008 Ibid., i.63.
•
De Re Publica and De Legibus
III
leaders chosen for worth, not for birth or wealth.1009 The Roman
Republic, taken by Cicero as his model in writing De Re Publica,1010
was a balanced government and gave restricted liberty to the people.1011
There must always be an opportunity for good men to rise to power. 1012
Cicero's own plan when consul had been to keep the chief authority in
the hands of the aristocracy.1013 But the success of a mixed govern-
ment, which gives power to the people, but leadership to the senate,
depends on the fitness of the latter for moral leadership.1014 The
ironical comment of Atticus on the character of the existing Roman
senate brings the somewhat wistful answer that Cicero is writing for
future generations and for those who may desire his laws as a mod-
el.1015 Thus the practical question of leadership in government is
linked with that of virtue in the individual.
C. THE RELATION OF DEITY TO SOCIETY AND LAW
Virtue in the individual is based on man's relation to Deity. So
the State and its laws are dependent on the spiritual element in the
universe. In introducing the subject of the laws of the ideal state, 1016
Cicero demands that his hearer grant as a postulate the govern-
ment of the universe by gods. 1017 From this postulate he derives the
1009Ibid., i.51. Quod si liber populus diliget quibus se committat . . . certe in
optimorum consiliis posita est civitatium salus Cf. ibid., vi.1; v.8; v.9; ii.59.
1010
¹ºIbid., i.70; ii.2; ii.3; ii.52; De Leg. i.20; iii.12.
•
1011 De Leg. iii.25. Quae tamen (libertas) . . . cederet. Cf. De Re Publica i.42;
i.45; ii.41; ii.69; ii.62. The balanced form of government, advocated as the best
by Cicero, is the original contribution to political science of Cicero and Polybius,
according to P. Janet. (Histoire de la science politique,¹ p. 278-279). Cicero
preceded Montesquieu in advancing this theory, (Thiaucourt, p. 9). Professor
Dunning notes the fact that Cicero's treatment of the system of check and balance
is similar to that of Polybius, but adds that Cicero's idea was much less mechanical
than that of the Greek. "The equipoise to be sought was rather that of force,
influence, and liberty as principles, than of magistrates, senate, and assemblies
as organs. in the border region where ethics, jurisprudence, and politics meet,
Cicero performed a work which gives him an important place in the history of
political theory." (Wm. A. Dunning, A History of Political Theories, New York,
Macmillan Co., 1916, pp. 121–2).
1012 De Leg. iii.38. Tamen ita libertatem istam largior populo ut auctoritate et
valeant et utantur boni.
1013 Ibid., iii.37.
1014 Ibid., iii.28.
eam optimam . . . in potestate optimorum.
cum potestas in populo . . . Is ordo vitio careto, ceteris
specimen esto. Cf. De Leg. iii.31; iii.41; De Re Pub. v.1 and v.2.
1015 De Leg. iii.29 non enim de hoc senatu-sed de futuris, si qui forte his legibus
parere voluerint...
1016 De Leg. i.20.
1017 Ibid., 1.21. Das igitur hoc nobis . . . deorum immortalium vi . . . naturam
omnem regi. Cf. De Off. iii.33 for a similar postulate of the supremacy of virtue
(see p. 96). Also cf. De Re Pub. i.26 and i.56. In the latter passage Cicero shows
his customary emphasis on simple essentials. “A Jove" of the opening sentence
is interpreted in the last merely as "mente . . ."
II2
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
common possession by gods and men of law, and hence, of the com-
monwealth.1018 This association of gods and men gives honor and
dignity to human society.1019 Man is a world citizen,1020 born for
social life. 1021 The practical form in which society exists for men is the
state. Men cannot be happy except in a good state.1022 This state
should be eternal, unlike the individual man.1023 If it perishes, it is as
though the world perished.1024 Cicero finds no difficulty in applying
the same divine sanction to the wellbeing of the State as he applied to
that of human society in the larger sense. If the treatise, De Re
Publica, is, as Teuffel calls it, "a working over of Platonic state-
theory in Roman Stoic forms,"1025 perhaps Cicero's emphasis on the
concrete state, his national rather than international emphasis, is the
peculiarly Roman development of Greek Stoicism. There is nothing
so dear to the gods as service to the State.1026 The organized state
claims man's first allegiance even more than his native land.1027
Service to the state reaps the noblest reward. While the souls of all
men are immortal, those of brave and good leaders are divine. Thus
the law has apotheosized Hercules and others like him.1028 There is a
sure place reserved in heaven for those who serve the state. 1029 The
chief of virtues is justice and devotion to the state; a life spent in
such service is, especially when accompanied by personal virtue,1030
the road to the skies. 1031
1018 De Leg. i.23. Two words are used for law, lex and ius. Schmekel (47),
points out the priority and the larger significance of lex, which is innate (De Leg.
i.18). Professor Dunning observes that Cicero subordinated ius in both senses of
the word to lex. Ius may mean abstract righteousness or the "rights" of in-
dividuals or of groups. In Cicero's view, the law of nature, or law pure and
simple, is the source and limit of all rights, even the natural rights. Lex is the
sense of a legal enactment by a people has its name only by courtesy and, if it
contravenes natural morality or the lex naturalis, has no claim to the name of lex.
(Dunning, op. cit., pp. 123–4). See De Re Pub. i.19 and vi.20 on the universal
commonwealth.
1019 De Leg. i.23 id in rerum teneantur.
• •
1020De Leg. i.61. Idemque cum ipsam . agnoverit.
•
•
1021 Ibid., 1.62. Quomque se ad civilem societatem natum senserit. ... Cf. De
Re Pub. i.39; i.41.
1022 De Re Pub. v.7.
1023
23Ibid., iii.34. Debet enim constituta sic esse civitas ut aeterna sit. Itaque
nullus interitus est rei publicae naturalis ut hominis . . .
1024 L. c. Civitas autem... concidat.
1025 Teuffel, op. cit., p. 404.
1026 De Re Pub. vi.13. Nihil est enim illi principi deo . . . acceptius quam
concilia coetusque hominum iure sociata quae civitates appellantur. Ibid.,^i.12.
Neque enim ulla res est in qua propius ad deorum numen virtus accedat humana
quam civitates aut condere novas aut conservare iam conditas.
1027 De Leg. ii.5. Sed necesse est . . . civitatis est.
1028 Ibid., ii.27.
1029 De Re Pub. vi.13, omnibus . . . fruantur.
1030 Ibid., vi.29.
•
1031 Ibid., vi.16.
sunt autem optimae . . . revertuntur.
iustitiam cole et pietatem . . . via est in caelum . .
De Re Publica and De Legibus
113
This eternal reward is an inducement and motive for service. He
who wishes to behold the heavenly spheres must follow where virtue
leads.1032 When the younger Scipio avows his intention of serving his
country with even greater zeal in view of the great reward set before
him, 1033 his illustrious ancestor replies (1) by a strong assertion of the
divinity and immortality of the soul1034 and (2) by referring to the
service of the state as a suitably noble employment for the divine soul,
and destined to an immortal reward.1035 Thus the service of the State
is put on the loftiest plane, as a duty paid to the gods, based on our
kinship to them and destined to a reward in heaven.
By the same supernatural guarantee Cicero elevated the study of
law to a plane higher than the merely legal one. The source of law
and justice, he says, is found in the lofty powers of the human mind, in
the duties for which we were born and in the natural bond among
men.1036 Not from edicts nor from the Twelve Tables, but from the
deepest philosophy must the theory of law be derived. 1037 The nature
of law must first be explained and its relation to human nature and the
laws by which nations should be governed. After that, actual
written laws may be discussed.1038 Speaking in a general way, Cicero
established the principle that law is natural, not artificial; elemental,
not the result of a social contract.1039 It is folly to believe that justice
consists in written laws. 1040 There is no justice unless it be founded on
nature.1041 The witness of nature is the test of good and bad laws.¹
If laws are to be of lofty character, they must have a lofty origin.1043
The source of civil law (ius) is in the higher law (lex), fixed in na-
ture. 1044
This supreme law existed centuries before any written
1032 Ibid., vi.25.
1033 Ibid., vi.26.
•
•
si voles . . . ad verum decus...
1042
tanto praemio exposito enitar multo vigilantius.
1034 Ibid., vi.26. . vi.28. Non esse te mortalem... et aeterna est. Thiaucourt
(p. 17) points out the identity of this proof with that of Tusc. i.55 and its source
in Plato's Phaedrus 245 C.
1035 Ibid., vi.29. Hanc tu exerce... pervolabit... Thiaucourt observes (17)
that in making the vision of Scipio a dream, Cicero avoided the reproach which
Epicureans visited upon Plato for his Vision of Er. A dream of the future life
had more dramatic versimilitude than the revelation of one arisen from the dead.
Cf. Macrobius, Comment. in Somn. Scipio, I.i.8.
1036 De Leg. i.16. Nullo in genere . . . inveniri potest. Cf. ibid., ii.10.
1037 Ibid., i.17. Non ergo a praetoris edicto ... putas. Cf. i.20.
1038 L. c. Natura enim iuris. . . iura civilia. Cf. i.15 and 19.
1039Schmekel, p. 51.
"
dass die Menschen von Natur und nicht etwa infolge
eines Vertrages zur Rechtsmitteilung verpflichtet sind."
•
•
1040 De Leg. i.42. Iam vero stultissimum legibus. Cf. De Re Pub. i.3.
1041 De Leg. i.42. Ita fit . . . convellitur. Cf. i.43.
1042 Ibid., i.44.
1043 Ibid., i.63.
1044 Ibid., i.18.
insita in natura.
Non enim erunt . . . amplissima.
• •
proficisci placuit [ius] a lege . . . si lex est ratio summa
Cf. note 1018.
114
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
laws1045 and is the mind of God.1046 The study of law must begin with
Jove.1047 The wisest of men have believed that law was not evolved
by men, but is something eternal, ruling the universe by wisdom. 1048
As Rome grew from a merely national to an imperial power, it be-
comes necessary for her to broaden the principles of jurisprudence.
The imperial jurisconsults made use of the Stoic principles of uni-
versal and divine law. It is clear that Cicero shows a strong tendency
to justify actual Roman laws and base them on the more far-reaching
principles. 1049
It is a pragmatic view which thus applies the doctrines of God and a
divine soul and a supernatural law to the stabilization of human in-
stitutions. A reading of Cicero's letters leaves one in no doubt that
political life was his predominant interest, and the record of his last
battle with Antony justifies those who believe that the absorbing self-
forgetful love of his life was the preservation of the aristocratic re-
public.1050 He applies a belief in spiritual powers, an unprovable
tenet, to the preservation of the Roman state, the best of all possible
governments.1051 In this view of the dependence of free government
on moral and unseen Forces, it is interesting to find Lord Bryce in
accord with Cicero. "It is by a reverence for the Powers unseen that
impose these [moral] sanctions that...the fabric of society has been
held together. The future of democracy, then, is part of two larger
branches of inquiry, the future of religion and the prospects of human
progress.’1052
1045 Ibid., i.19. Constituendi . . . constituta. Cf. i.18.
1046
46 Ibid., ii.8 Ita principem legem . . . omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis
dei, Cf. De Re Pub. iii.33, a passage preserved by Lactantius (Instit. Div. 6.8,
6-9) to show the "voice almost divine" with which Cicero extolled God's law.
1047 De Leg. ii.7. Cf. De Re Pub. i.56.
048 Ibid., ii.8. Hanc igitur video . . . sapientia.
•
•
the
1049 Cf. Dunning (op. cit., p. 127–8) on the work of the Stoic jurists of the Empire.
"The greatest of the jurists were of Stoic tendencies, and hence we find at the
basis of their work the characteristic doctrines of the Stoic philosophy
conception of a universal law and of the brotherhood of man
Firmin
Laferrière gives full credit to Cicero for his share in the broadening of Roman
law, "La philosophie du droit qui n'est exclusivement ni le droit naturel ni l'esprit
des lois positives a eu Cicéron pour fondateur dans l'antiquité romaine. Il l'a
fondée en éstablissant ses principes généraux sur les rapports naturels de Dieu, de
l'homme, de la societé." (L'influence de la stoicisme sur la doctrine des juris-
consultes romains, Mémoires de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques,
Paris 1860, Vol. X, p. 583.)
1050Vide e. g., Tyrell & Purser, The Correspondence of Cicero, London, 1899,
Vol. VI. Introd., p. XXVII.
1051 De Re Pub. i.70. Sic enim decerno . . . reliquerunt.
052 James Bryce, Modern Democracies, London, 1921, Vol. II, p. 606.
D.
De Re Publica and De Legibus
THE CONSENSUS GENTIUM ON DEITY AND VIRTUE
115
The conception of supernatural powers and divine law is not
wholly a matter of probability. The views to which reason attracts.
us are reinforced by inner conviction. Innate ideas, proven by the
consensus gentium give us the same truths. Owing to man's kinship to
God, all men, savage and civilized alike, have an idea of Him. The
details of the concept may be incorrect, but the general notion is
present.1053
Elemental ideas are impressed upon the minds of all
alike. 1054
Men agree on the fundamentals of good and bad con-
duct.1055 Right and wrong are not a matter of opinion, but are es-
tablished by nature. Our views of right and wrong are corrupted by
faulty education and the allurements of pleasure.1056 Even criminals.
by this instinct try to deny or excuse their crimes.1057 The best men,
in whom the consensus gentium is most clearly seen, 1058 love justice for
its own sake. 1059
E.
ORGANIZED RELIGION AND THE STATE
In a subsidiary way, too, Cicero applies the concept of Deity to the
uses of the state. Organized religion is essential to its welfare.1060
Its regulations and ritual are to be observed carefully.1061 For the
good of the state as well as of religion, all religious rites are to be
supervised by the priests.1062 No new gods are to be introduced.1063
Religious fear has a wholesome influence.1064 The presence of temples
in the midst of people is to be encouraged.1065 The sight of the gods
inhabiting the same city with men encourages piety and so is ad-
vantageous to the state. 1066 The effect of ritual is real and valu-
able.1067
1053 De Leg. i.24. Itaque ex tot generibus
Itaque ex tot generibus . . . habendum sciat. Cf. De Nat.
Deor. i.2; Tusc. i.36; De Fin. ii.45; v.61.
1054 De Leg. 1.30. . . . inchoatae intellegentiae similiter in omnibus imprimuntur.
055 Ibid., i.32. Quae autem. . . non odit? Cf. i.45 and i.46. Zeller (IIl, i.659)
asserts that not only a moral trend (Anlage) exists innately according to Cicero,
but elementary moral ideas (Grundebegriffe). He quotes from De Fin. v.59.
ingenuitque sine doctrine notitias parvas rerum maximarum . . .
1056 De Leg. i.47 entire.
1057 Ibid., i.40.
quorum tamen nemo quaereret.
•
1058 Cf. Zielinski, 212 and my chapter on Tusc. Disp., pp. 90 and 91.
1059 De Leg. i.48. Etenim omnes viri boni . . . non sit deligendum.
1060De Re Pub. v.7. Ad vitam sedibus.
1061 De Leg. ii.26–31.
• •
1062
2Ibid., ii.30. Quod sequitur. . . nosset.
1063 Ibid., ii.25. Suosque deos . . . patres.
sed deus ipse . . . videtur.
1064 L. C.
•
1065 Ibid., ii.26. Delubra esse in urbibus censeo...
1066 L. c. Melius Graii . . . civitatibus.
1067 L. C.
•
•
tum maxime et pietatem . . . in mentibus.
116
Dogmatism and Scepticism in Cicero's Philosophy
Augury has great practical importance. 1068 In reply to a question,
Cicero admits that he believes that real divination may have existed
in early times,1069 but he is sure that it no longer exists.1070 Its political
importance is very great; along with the senate it is a pillar of the
state. 1071
The deification of great men is spoken of with approbation.1072
The personification of good qualities, as Mens, Pietas, Virtue, has a
good influence in that it teaches men they may possess these qual-
ities in their own hearts.1073 The mysteries are valuable for their
humanizing influence and their power for achieving a happier life and
a more hopeful death.1074
In spite of Cicero's pragmatic use of the supernatural as a guar-
antee of the State there is no doubt that he gave the supernatural
objective existence. It was not invented for the purposes of the
state. He denies such an implication regarding divination. 1075
The objective existence of the gods is implied in the constant coupling
of the words, dei and homines.1076 Further, the Deity is transcendent,
to Cicero, as well as immanent. The soul of man is called a god,1077
but it is immediately compared to the God who rules the world.1078
The distinction made between the supreme God and the gods leaves no
doubt that Cicero's conception is not pantheistic. Gods and men are
citizens of one commonwealth, because they both obey the will of
the Supreme God.1079 The existence of spiritual forces, outside and
above man, ruling the world, deserving gratitude from men, having
regard for human character and conduct, such is the doctrine which
1068 De Leg. ii.31. Maximum . . . coniunctum. Cf.jiii.27, 43.
1069 Ibid., ii.32. Non video cur esse divinationem negem.
1070
70Ibid., ii.33. Sed dubium non est quin . . . evanuerit . . . neglegentia. Thiau-
court points out (p. 36) that Cicero's justification of augury here is on the ground
of usefulness in state policy. His later refutation of it in De Divinatione (e.g.,
ii.89) was a refutation of the Stoic proofs of it. In his youth Cicero had himself
made a pilgrimage to Delphi (Thiaucourt, 17). Cf.pp. 62-64 of this dissertation.
1071 De Re Pub. ii.17. .. Romulus cum haec egregia duo firmamenta rei
publicae peperisset, auspicia et senatum.
•
.
•
•
Cf.De Re Pub. ii.16.
1072 De Leg. ii.28. Bene vero . .
... conlocatos putent ... But cf. De Nat. Deor.
iii.44 for the Academic criticism on such personification. See p. 53 of this disserta-
tion.
1073 L. C.
1074 Ibid., ii.36. ... tum nihil melius illis mysteriis. . . moriendi.
1075 De Leg. ii.32.
dissertation.
. •
divinationem . . . esse sentio. Cf. pp. 63 and 64 of this
1076 E. g., De Leg. ii.32; i.22; i.23; i.43; De Re Pub. vi.17.
1077 De Re Pub. vi.26.
1078L.
1078 L. c. qui tam regit . . . corpus
• •
•
quam hunc mundum ille princeps deus.
1079 De Leg. i.23. Inter quos. existimanda. Zeller (III, 1.315) explains the
undergods of the Stoic doctrine as created and mortal gods, separate parts and
manifestations of the larger Divine Force operating in the universe.
r
De Re Publica and De Legibus
117
fills the mind with sentiments useful and true. 1080 That which in the
field of pure reason could never be more than verisimile, becomes the
verum in the field of practical reason, because of the inner witness,1081
and because of its indispensable value to a happy and well-ordered
life.
1080 De Leg. ii.15. . . . dominos esse omnium rerum ac moderatores deos.
eosdemque optime de genere hominum mereri et qualis quisque sit, quid agat.
intueri... his enim rebus imbutae mentes haud sane abhorrebunt ab utili aut a
vera sententia.
1081 Cf. p. 91 with notes 795-800.
VITA
I was born in Perth, New York, on September 16, 1876. My
father, the Rev. Andrew Henry, was a minister of the United Presby-
terian Church. I was prepared for college at Packer Collegiate In-
stitute, Brooklyn, N. Y., and entered the sophomore class of Welles-
ley College in 1894. I was graduated from Wellesley in 1897, and two
years later received the degree of A. M. from New York University.
I received the degree of A. M., from Columbia University in 1917.
Since graduation from college I have taught without intermission in
public high schools, and nearly all that time in New York City. At
present I hold the position of Chairman of the Department of Latin
in the Franklin K. Lane High School, Brooklyn. My only publica-
tions are two papers (1), The Ideal Element in the Politics of Cicero,
(The Classical Weekly 16.4.1922), and (2), Cicero and the Great
Society, (The Classical Weekly, 17.9.1923).
Among the teachers of my undergraduate days, I hold in very
grateful remembrance Professors Irvine, Hawes, Jewett and Calkins
of Wellesley College. In recent years I have received more inspira-
tion, kindness and assistance than I can well express, from Professors
Young, Perry, Knapp, Moore and McCrea of the Columbia Faculty.
In particular, I am in the debt of Professor Nelson Glenn McCrea,
who by his suggestions, and illuminating criticism and guidance has
made possible the writing of this dissertation.
July 8, 1925.
MARGARET YOUNG HENRY.

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