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*x . A
QUINTILIAN'S
INSTITUTES OF ORATORY:
OR,
EDUCATION OF AN 0 RATOR.
IN TWELVE BOOKS.
LITERALLY TRANSLATED WITH NOTES.
FY THE
REV. JOHN SELBY WATSON, M.A., M.R.S.L.,
HEAD MASTER OF THE PROPRIETARY GRAMMAR SCHOOL, STOCKWELL.
WOL. I.
- LoN DON:
BELL & DALDY, YORK STREET, COVENT GARDEN.
1873.
LONDON :
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS,
STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CIROSS.
PR E F A C E.
IT was observed by Dr. Drake in his “Literary Hours,”
about fifty years ago, that no version of Quintilian at all
adequate to the merits of the original existed in English, and
that to translate him throughout with energy, spirit, and
fidelity, would prove a task of the most arduous and difficult
kind; such is the beauty of his diction, and such the peculiar
propriety of his epithets.
The difficulties alleged by Dr. Drake are by no means
exaggerated; and since his time no translator has applied him-
self to execute the task. The language of writers extremely
nice in the choice of words and the collocation of phrases, is
always difficult to render satisfactorily. What is graceful in
the original can but seldom be made graceful in a version.
But the present translator, if he has not entirely succeeded,
hopes that he has no great cause to deprecate censure. He will
only request that, should the student think some passages too
freely rendered, he will bear in mind the necessity of endea-
vouring to satisfy the mere English reader; and that, if
the English reader finds some passages too stiff, he will con-
sider the necessity for a certain degree of closeness to answer
the Wants of the student.
Of the two translations which have previously appeared in
English, those of Guthrie and Patsall, neither is complete,
whole chapters being omitted in each. In regard to fidelity,
Patsall is, on the whole, rather to be preferred ; but neither
| 4 G390
b 2
iv. PREFACE.
he nor Guthrie had the requisite scholarship to do justice to
their author. When they could not ascertain the sense of a
passage, they substituted some vague paraphrase or omitted it
altogether.
In the following pages the whole of the original is trans-
lated, and the utmost care has been taken to observe an
exact adherence to the sense. On every obscure or corrupt
passage, illustration is given in a note. The text which has
been used is that of Spalding, from whose valuable commen-
tary much useful matter has been adopted.
J. S. W.
C O N T E N T S.
Quintilian to Trypho, wishing health. tº © e Page 1
QUINTILIAN'S PREFACE.
The object and intention of the work, § 1–3. To whom dedicated, 6.
(CH.
CH.
CH,
CH.
CII.
Unauthorized publications under the name of Quintilian, 7. The
professions of the rhetorician and philosopher were formerly
united, 9–16. The perfect orator, 17. Partition of the work, 21,
22. Further observations on teaching and speaking, 23–27 . 2
BOOK I.
I. Remarks on the capacities of boys in general, § 1–3. Of nurses,
4, 5. Of parents, slaves, and poedagogi, 6–11. Of learning Greek
and Latin, 12–14. Of the proper age for beginning to learn,
15–19. Of the proper method of teaching children, 20–24. Of
learning the alphabet, and of writing, 25–29. Of learning to read,
of subjects for writing, of learning by heart, and of improving the
pronunciation, 30—37 . e , a e
II. Considerations on public and private education; public educa-
tion to be preferred ; alleged corruption of morals in public schools;
equal corruption at home, § 1–8. Reply to the objection that a
pupil receives less attention from a master in a school than from
a domestic tutor, 9–16. Emulation, friendship, incitements to
masters and pupils, and other advantages of public education,
17–31 . & - e - e
III. Disposition and abilities of a pupil to be ascertained, § 1–3.
Precociousness not desirable, 3–5. On the management of pupils,
6, 7. On relaxation and play, 8–13. On corporal punishment,
14–18 . * º jº º 25
IV. Of grammar, $ 1–6. Remarks on certain letters and deriva-
tions of words, 7–12. Changes in words, 13–17. Of the
parts of Speech, 18–21. Some observations on nouns and verbs,
22–29 e º e º e tº . 28
V. Necessity of correctness in speaking and writing, $ 1. On single
words, 2, 3. Choice of words, 4. Barbarisms, 5–10. Barbarisms
in poets and other writers, 11–17. Faults in pronunciation, 17,
18. On the aspiration, 19–21. The accents, 22–24. On ending
a word with an acute accent, 25–30. Legitimate accentuation,
vi
CONTENTS.
CH.
CH.
CH,
| CH.
CH.
ČH -
| CH.
31–33. On the solecism, 34–37. Different kinds of Solecisms,
38–41. No dual number in Latin, 42—44. Solecisms in various
parts of speech, 45–51. Figures of speech, 52–54. On foreign
words, 55–57. Greek words, 58–64. Compound words, 65–70.
Words proper, metaphorical, common, new, 71, 72 . Page 37
VI. Of language, § 1–3. Analogy, 4–11. Departures from it,
12–27. Etymology, 28–33. Abuses of it, 34–38. Old words,
39–41. Authority, 42. Custom, 43–45 . tº . 54
VII. Of orthography, § 1. Distinction of words of doubtful signifi-
cation, 2–6. Composition with prepositions, 7–9. On the letter
k, 10. Orthography subservient to custom ; antique spelling, 11—
27. Difference between spelling and pronunciation, 28, 29, Ne-
cessity of judgment, 30–32. Quintilian defends his remarks on
this subject, 33–35 . ſº - º is . 64
. VIII. Of reading, § 1–4. Authors to be read, Greek and Latin,
"—12.Duty of the grammarian, 13–17. Of lectures on historical
reading, 18–21 º te º & & . 70
IX. Commencement of composition, § 1. AEsop's fables, 2. Sen-
tences, chriſt, ethologiae, 3, 4. Narratives from the poets, 5 - 75
X. Of other studies preliminary to that of rhetoric, § 1. Necessity
of them, 2–8. Authority of the ancients in favour of learn-
ing music, 9–16. Union of music with grammar, 17–21.
Utility of music to the orator, 22–30. What sort of music to
be studied, 31–33. Utility of geometry, 34–37. Geometrical
proof, 38–45. Astronomy; examples of the benefit attending a
knowledge of it, 46–49 * ©
XI. Instruction to be received from the actor, § 1–3. He should
correct faults of pronunciation, 4–8. He should give directions as
to look and gesture, 9–11. Passages from plays should be recited
by the pupil, 12, 13. Passages also from speeches, 14. Exercises
of the palaestra to be practised, 15–19 3. o . 88
XII. No fear to be entertained lest boys should be engaged in too
many studies, if judgment be used ; examples of the number of
things to which the human mind can attend at once, § 1–7.
Boys endure study with spirit and patience, 8–11. Abundance of
time for all necessary acquirements, 12–15. Unreasonable pre-
texts for not pursuing study, 16–19 . e * . 91
T3OOK II.
I. Boys are not put under the professor of rhetoric early enough;
reasons why they should begin to receive instruction from him at
an earlier age, $ 1–3. The professions of the grammarian and
teacher of rhetoric should be in some degree united, 4–13 . 96
CONTENTS. vii
CH.
CH.
CH.
CH.
CH.
CH.
CH.
II. Choice of a teacher, § 1–4. How the teacher should conduct
himself towards his pupils, 5–8. How the pupils should behave,
9–13. Some additional observations, 14, 15 . . Page 99
III. A pupil should be put under an eminent teacher at first, not
under an inferior one, § 1–3. Mistakes of parents as to this
point, 3, 4. The best teacher can teach little things best, as well
as great ones, 5–9. The pupils of eminent teachers will afford
better examples to each other, 10–12 º . ... 102
IV. Elementary exercises, § 1. Narratives, or statements of facts,
2—4. Exuberance in early compositions better than sterility, 4–8.
A teacher should not be without imagination, or too much given to
find fault with his pupil’s attempts, 8–14. The pupil's compo-
sitions should be written with great care, 15–17. Exercises in
confirmation and refutation, 18, 19. In commendation and censure
of remarkable men, 20–21. Common places, 22—23. Theses, 24,
25. Reasons, 26. Written preparations for pleadings, 27–32.
Praise and censure of particular laws, 33–40. Declamations on
fictitious subjects a later invention, 41, 42 . • . 105
V. Advantages of reading history and speeches, § 1–3. On what
points in them the professor of rhetoric should lecture, 4–9.
Faulty composition may sometimes be read, to exercise the pupil's
judgment, 10–13. Usefulness of this exercise, 14–17. Best
authors to be read at an early age, 18–20. The pupil should be
cautious of imitating Very ancient or very modern writers,
21—26 * º © s © e . 114
VI. In composition, the pupil should have but moderate assistance,
not too much or too little . º º º . 119
VII. Pupils should not always declaim their own compositiors,
but sometimes passages from eminent Writers . 121
VIII. Variety of talent and disposition in pupils requires variety of
treatment, § 1–5. How far an inclination for any particular
line of study should be encouraged and cultivated, 6–15 . 122
CH.IX. Pupils should regard their tutors as intellectual parents. 125
CH.
CH.
X. Remarks on declamations, $ 1, 2. Injudiciousness in the choice
of subjects has been an obstruction to improvement in eloquence,
3–5. On what sort of subjects pupils may be permitted to
declaim, 6–8. What alterations should be made in the common
practice, 9–15 º º te º e . 126
XI. Some think instruction in oratory unnecessary, § 1, 2. Boasts
and practices of the ignorant, 3–5. Some study only parts of
their speeches ; want of connexion in their matter, 6–7 . 129
viii
CONTIENTS.
CH.
CH.
CH.
CH.
CH.
CH.
CH.
CH.
XII. Why the ignorant often seem to speak with more force than
the learned, § 1–3. They attack more boldly, and are less afraid
of failure, 4, 5. But they cannot choose judiciously, or prove with
effect, 6. Their thoughts sometimes striking, 7. Apparent dis-
advantages of learned polish, 8. Unlearned speakers often
vigorous in delivery, 9, 10. Occasionally too much admired by
teachers of oratory, 11, 12 e e g . Page 131
XIII. Quintilian does not give rules from which there is no de-
parture; pleaders must act according to the requisitions of their
subjects, $ 1–7. What an orator has chiefly to keep in view, and
how far rules should be observed, 8—17 g e . 133
XIV. Of the term rhetoric or oratory, § 1–4. Heads under which
Quintilian considers the art of oratory, 5 . tº . 137
XV. What rhetoric is, $ 1, 2. To call it the power of persuading is
to give an insufficient definition of it, 3–9. To call it the power of
persuading by speech is not sufficient, 10, 11. Other definitions, 12–
23. That of Gorgias in Plato ; that of Plato or Socrates in the
Phaedrus, 24–31. That of Cornelius Celsus. 32. Other defini-
tions more approved by Quintilian, 33–37. Quintilian's own defi- .
nition, 38 e º º º e up . 139
XVI. Oratory said by some to be a pernicious art, because it may
be perverted to bad ends, Š 1–4. We might say the same of other
things that are allowed to be beneficial, 5, 6. Its excellences,
7 — 16. The abundant return that it makes for cultivation,
17–19 147
XVII. Oratory is manifestly an art, Ś l—4. Yet some have denied
that it is, and said that its power is wholly from nature, 5–8.
Examples from other arts, 9, 10. Every one that speaks is not an
orator, 11—13. Opinion of Aristotle, 14. Other charges against
oratory; that it has no peculiar subject or matter, and that it
sometimes deceives, 15–18. Refutation of these charges, J9–21.
Unfairly objected to it that it has no proper end, 22–26. Not
pernicious because it sometimes misleads, 27–29. Another objec-
tion, that it may be exerted on either side of a question, and that
it contradicts itself; answered, 30–36. Oratory is sometimes
ignorant of the truth of what it asserts; but the same is the case
with other arts and sciences, 36-–40. Confirmation of its being
an art, 41–43 o o o º e . 151
XVIII. Arts or sciences are of three kinds; rhetoric is a practical
art or science, $ 1, 2. Partakes of the nature of arts of other
kinds, 3–5 . e & º º e . 159
XIX. Nature and art; nature contributes more to oratory, in
students of moderate ability, than art ; in those of greater talent,
art is of more avail; an example . . º º . 160
CONTENTS. ix
CH.
CH.
CH.
CH.
CH.
CH.
ń. II. Of the origin of oratory, § 1, 2, Nature and art, 3. Objec-
XX. Whether rhetoric be a virtue, as some call it, $ 1–4. Proofs
of this according to the philosophers, 5–7. Other proofs,
8–10 . Y. gº g * g Page 161
XXI. Opinions as to the subject of rhetoric, $ 1–4, That of Quin-
tilian, which agrees with those of Plato and Cicero, 5, 6. Objections
to it noticed, 7–11. No dispute between rhetoric and philosophy
about their respective subjects, 12, 13. The Orator not obliged to
know everything, 14, 15. He will often speak better on arts than
the artists themselves, 16–19. The opinion of Quintilian sup-
ported by those of other authors, 20–23 . e . 165
BOOK III.
I. Quintilian proposes to consider the various branches and precepts
of oratory more fully than they are generally set forth in treatises
on the art ; a part of his work more desirable for students than
agreeable to them, Š 1–4. Diversities of opinions and methods,
5–7. Various writers on the art; the Greeks, 8–15. Followers
of Hermagoras, Apollodorus, Theodorus, 16–18. The Romans,
19—21. Quintilian will give his own opinion on matters as they
occur, 22 © & * º g wº • 170
tion to Cicero's notion, 4 176
. III. Divisions of the art of Oratory, Ś i–3. Various opinions
respecting them, 4, 5. Cicero's not always the same, 6, 7.
Opinions of some Greek writers, 8, 9. Of the order of the division
or parts, 10. Whether they should be called parts, or works, or
elements, 11 . & e e g te . .177
IV. Whether there are three sorts of oratory, or more, § 1–3.
Quintilian adheres to the old opinion that there are but three ; his
reasons, 4–8. Opinions of Anaximenes, Plato, Isocrates, 9–11.
Quintilian's own method, 12–15. He does not assign particular
subjects to each kind, 16 . . . e º . 180
V. Division into things and words; other divisions, Š 1–3. Ques-
tions concerning what is ‘written and what is motº written, 4.
Definite and indefinite questions, 5–7. Species of indefinite ones,
8—11. Questions on general subjects not useless, 12–16. De-
finition of a cause, 17, 18 § wº • g . 183
VI. Of the status or State of a cause, $ 1–4. What it is, 5–12.
From whom the State proceeds, the accuser or defendant, 13–21.
How many states there are ; the ten categories of Aristotle, 22–24.
Others make nine, others seven, 25–28. As to the number of
states, some make one only, 29, 30. Others two, as Archidemus,
Pamphilus, Apollodorus, Theodorus, Posidonius, Cornelius Celsus,
CONTENTS.
2°
…”
e”
CH.
31–38. Another mode of making two States, 40–43. Most
authors make three, as Cicero, Patrocles, Marcus Antonius,
Virginius, 44–46. Athenaeus, Caecilius, and Theon make four,
45–48. The quadripartite methods of Aristotle and Cicero, 49,
50. Some have made five, six, seven, eight states, 51–54. Dis-
tinction of Status rationales, quaestiones legales, 55–57. Cicero
Speaks of a status negotialis, 58, 59. Hermagoras first introduced
eacception, 60. Legal questions; Albutius, 61, 62. Quintilian
departs in some degree from the method which he formerly
adopted, 63–67. His opinion of eacception ; remarks upon it,
68–79. In every cause there are three points to be ascertained,
80–82. A fourfold division, useful to learners, 83–85. These
four points included under two genera, the rationale and the
legale, 86, 87. Resemblances in the genus legale spring from the
three points above-mentioned, 88–90. In every simple cause
there is but one state, 91–93. In complex causes there are
several states, either of the same or of different kinds; examples,
94–104 . g g tº g g . Page 188
VII. O panegyric or laudatory eloquence ; not wholly distinct from
practical discussion, § 1, 2. An orator does not always speak on
doubtful points, 3, 4. Panegyric sometimes requires proof and
defence, and very frequently amplification, 5, 6. Praise of the
gods, 7–9. Praise of men more varied, 10, 11. Men extolled
for personal endowments and fortunate circumstances, 12–14.
For mental qualifications, 15, 16. For memorials which they
leave of themselves, 17, 18. In censure the case is reversed, 19—
21. On praise of the living, 22. It makes a difference where a
panegyric is delivered, 23, 24. Advantage may be taken by the
Orator of the proximity of certain virtues to certain vices, 25.
Praise of cities, places, public works, 26, 27. What state most
prevailed in this department of oratory, 28 . . tº . 218
CH. VIII. Deliberative oratory not confined to questions of utility, Ś 1.
Whether nothing is useful but what is honourable, 2,3. Deliberative
Oratory not concerned wholly with the state of quality, 4, 5. What
kind of exordium requisite in it, 6–9. Statement of facts, 10, 11.
The passions to be moved, 12, 13. Whether it solely concerns
affairs of government, 14. That a thing can be done, is either
certain or uncertain, 17–21. The three topics of persuasion,
22–26. Some do not distinguish topics from divisions of topics,
27, 28. The pleasing, the useful, and the honourable, 29–35.
Use of examples, 36, 37. How things that are honourable may
be recommended, and sometimes such as are at variance with
honour, 38–47. Authority of the speaker, 48. Prosopopeiae, 49
—5!. In the schools deliberative subjects have a great resem-
blance to controversies, 52–57. An error into which declaimers
fall, 58–66. Advantage of reading history, 67–70 . . 224
CH. IX. Of judicial oratory, the departments of it often injudiciously
increased ; the proper number is five, § 1–6. The order to be
observed in Speaking and writing, 7–9 tº «, . 240
CONTENTS. xi
CH. X. A cause rests either on one point of controversy, or on several ;
on points of the same or of different kinds, Š, 1, 2. Comparison,
3, 4. We must first settle the kind of cause; what points are to
be considered next, 5 º o o . Page 242
CH. XI. Hermagoras's method of proceeding; the question, § 1–3. The
mode of defence, 4–6. The point for decision, 7, 8. The ground
or substance of the cause, 9. The question and the point for
decision may be conjoined or separate, according to the nature of
the cause, 10–17. Opinions of Cicero, 18–20. Hermagoras too
fond of nice subdivisions, 21–25. Method of Theodorus, 26, 27.
Conclusion, 28 e 6. º - sº . 244
BOOK IV.
INTRODUCTION.
The grandsons of the sister of Domitian committed to the tuition of
Quintilian ; a new motive for care in composing his work. He
proceeds to speak of the exordium of a speech, the statement of
facts, the proof, the refutation of adverse allegations, and the
peroration º o e & º e . 251
CH. I. Etymology of the word proem, Š l—3. An erroneous practice in
the Schools and in the forum, 4. Object of the proem or exordium,
5. How the good will and attention of the judge may be gained by
allusion to different characters concerned in the cause, 6—19.
Farther observations on the same subject, 20 –27. Difference
between the exordium and the conclusion, 28, 29. Matters con-
nected with the characters and the cause to be considered, 30–32.
Solicitude to be shown by the pleader; brevity to be promised ;
accurate division of matter to be made, 33–36. To conciliate
the judge must be the pleader's constant object throughout his
speech, 37–39. Five kinds of causes, 40–41. Some make two
purposes of a proem, proposition and insinuation ; the latter more
easy for the advocate than for his client, 42—49. An unnecessary
rule of the Apollodoreans, 50, 51. Points to be regarded in the
exordium, 52–60. The speaker's memory must not fail him in
it, 61. Its length must be proportioned to the cause, 62. Whether
apostrophe, and other figures of speech, may be used in it, 63–71.
Whether a formal exordium is always necessary, 72–75. Mode of
transition to the statement of facts, 76–79 . º . 253
CII. II. Of the statement of facts; some make too nice distinctions
respecting it, § 1–3. A formal statement not always necessary, 4–
8. Those are mistaken who suppose that a statement is never neces-
sary on the part of an accused person who denies the charge, 9–19.
What the judge already knows may sometimes be stated, 20–23.
The statement need not always immediately follow the exordium,
24–27. The practice of the schools injudiciously transferred to
the forum, 28–30. The statements should be clear, brief, and
xii
CONTENTS.
CH.
CH.
credible, 31–35. Of clearness, 36–39. Of brevity, 40–47. Of
credibility, 48–53. The statement of facts should prepare the
judge for the proof of them, 54–260. Certain qualities have in-
judiciously been made peculiar to the statement, 61–65. A
ridiculous direction that the statement should be omitted in a
cause which is unfavourable to us, 66. Difficult points must be
variously managed, according to the nature of the case, 67–74.
In a conjectural cause we must make a statement, but with art
and care, 75–81. We must sometimes divide our statement, and
invert the order of occurrences, 82–87. Of fictitious statements,
88–93. Complexion of a statement, 94–100. How we must
act if the facts be partly for us and partly against us, 101, 102.
Apostrophe and other figures absurdly excluded from the state-
ment, 103 — 115. The statement should be embellished with
every grace of language, 116–124. Of authority in the pleader,
125–127. Of repetition, 128. Of the commencement and con-
clusion of the statement, 129–132 . & . Page 272
III. Of digressions or excursions immediately after the statement,
§ 1–3. Not always unreasonable, 4–8. Some preparation often
necessary before proceeding to proof, 9–11. Digressions may be
made in any part of a speech, but those in the middle should be
short, 12–17 . 3. º e º º . 301
IV. Of propositions preparatory to proof; not always necessary,
§ 1, 2. Sometimes very useful, 3, 4. Various kinds of propositions,
and remarks on them, 5–9 . e e & . 304
CH. V. Partition of our matter generally useful, § 1–3. When it should
be omitted, 4–9. Examples from Cicero, 10–12. As to states of
conjecture and quality, 13–17. Artifices that may be used,
18–21. Utility of partition, and the proper qualities of it,
22–28 e o te & º e - 307
BOOK W.
INTRODUCTION.
Some rhetoricians have thought that the only duty of an orator is to
CH.
CH.
CH.
CH.
teach ; others have called this his chief duty. The necessity for
this book g * & º . 313
I. Inartificial proofs. Eloquence not inefficient in regard to
them te º * º p . 314
II. Previous judgments. The authority of those whe deliver them
to be considered. Similitude in cases; how to be refuted . 315
III. Of public report . tº - e . 317
IV. Of evidence exacted by torture . o • . 317
CONTENTS. xiii
CH. W. Of the refutation of written testimony e . Page 318
CH. VI. On offering to take an oath, and receiving that of the opposite
party, Ś 1, 2. Arguments on the subject, 3–5. Judgment of the
experienced respecting it, 6 . e e © . 318
CH. VII. Written evidence; how to be refuted, § 1, 2. Modes of pro-
ceeding with regard to witnesses that appear in person, 3–6. An
intimate knowledge of the cause necessary, 7, 8. How voluntary
witnesses should be produced, 9–11. Caution requisite in respect
to them, 12–14. How a pleader must act with regard to a wit-
ness whom he knows to be adverse or favourable to the accused,
15–19. How he must act in regard to one whose disposition he
does not know, 20, 21. Of the interrogation of witnesses, 22–32.
Of the collision between written and oral testimony, 32–34. Of
Supernatural testimony, 35–37 * * tº , 320
CH. VIII. Artificial proofs too much neglected, § 1–3. There are
certain particulars common to all kinds of proofs, 4–7 . 328
* ...” A
CH. IX. Difference of signs, indications, or circumstantial evidence,
from proofs, Š 1, 2. Of conclusive signs or indications, 3—7.
Inconclusive signs are of weight when supported by others, 8–11.
Of mere appearances, 12–14. Of prognostics, 15, 16 . 330
CH. X. Of the different names given to arguments among the Greeks
and Latins, Š 1–8. Various significations of the word argument,
9–11. In every cause there must be something that does not
require proof, 12–14. Of credibilities, 15–19. Of sources from
which arguments are drawn, 20–22. From the character of
individuals, 23–31. From circumstances, as motives, place,’
time, manner, 32–48. Opportunities and means, 49–52. Argu-
ments from definition, 53--61. Remarks on Cicero's method;
argument and definition assisted by division, 62–70. Arguments
from commencement, increase, and event, 71, 72. From dissi-
militude, opposition, consequentiality, 73–79. From causes and
effects, 80–85. From comparison, 86–89. Too many sub-
divisions under this head, 90–94. Arguments from supposition,
95–99. Precepts not to be followed too superstitiously; ex-
armples, 100–108. An orator must take care what he proposes
to be proved; an example, 109—118. Utility of rules, 119–121.
Necessity and advantages of study and practice, 122–125 . 334
CH. XI. Of examples and instances, § 1–5. Of the efficiency, and various
Species, of examples, 6–16. Of examples from the fables of the
poets, 17, 18. From the fables of AEsop, and proverbs, 19–21.
Comparison, 22–25. Caution necessary with respect to it, 26–
29. Too much sub-division in it, 30, 31. Comparison of points
of law, 32, 33. Analogy, 34, 35. Authority, 36–41. Authority
of the gods, 42. Of the judge, and of the adverse party, 43.
Examples and authority not to be numbered among inartificial
proofs, 44 & º º o ſº * , 362
xiv
CONTIENTS.
CH. XII. How far we may use doubtful grounds of argument, $ 1–3.
CH.
Some arguments to be urged in a body, Some singly, 4, 5. Some to
be carefully supported, and referred to particular points in our case,
6, 7. Not to be too numerous, 8. Arguments from the charac-
ters of persons, 9–13. In what order arguments should be
advanced, 14. Quintilian states summarily what others have
given at greater length, 15–17. Argument too much neglected
in the exercises of the schools, 17–23 gº . Page 373
XIII. Refeation twofold, § 1. Why it is more difficult to defend
than to accuse, 2, 3. Deprecation not to be adopted without some
ground of defence, 4–6. Nothing to be gained by silence in regard
to matters that cannot be defended, 7–11. We may attack some of
our adversary's arguments in a body, some singly, 12–14. What
arguments may be easily refuted, 15, 16. What arguments of
our adversary may be turned to our advantage, 17, 18. Many
will fall under conjecture, definition, quality, 19—21. Some of
the adversary’s arguments may be treated as unworthy of notice,
22. Precedents, which he assumes to be applicable to his case,
we must endeavour to prove inapplicable, 23, 24. We may repeat
the statements of the adversary so as to weaken them, 25–27.
We may sometimes expose the whole charge, sometimes particular
parts of it, 28. How we make arguments common to both sides
adverse to us; how discrepancies in the pleading of the adversary
are to be exposed, 29–33. Some faults easily shown, 34, 35.
Not to neglect arguments of our adversary, and not to be too
anxious to refute them all, 36, 37. How far we should spare our
adversary personally, 38–44. Some pleaders, in endeavouring to
expose their adversaries, give occasion against themselves, 45–48.
Sometimes, however, we may represent that there are contradic-
tions in his statements, 49, 50. A pleader ought to appear con-
fident of the justice of his cause, 51, 52. Order which we must
observe in supporting our own arguments and refuting those of
the opposite party, 53–55. We must support our proofs and
refutations by the power of eloquence, 56–58. Foolish dispute
between Theodorus and Apollodorus, 59, 60 e . 379
CH. XIV. Of the enthymeme and its parts, $ 1–4. Of the epicheirema
and its parts, 5–9. Not always of the same form, 10–13. The epi-
cheirema of the orators is the syllogism of the philosophers, 14–
16. All the parts of it not always necessary to be specified, 17–
19. Three modes of opposing this form of argument, 20–23.
How the enthymeme differs from the syllogism, 24–26. We must
not crowd our speech with rhetorical forms of argument, 27–32.
We must not leave our arguments unembellished, 33–35 . 394
BOOK WI.
INTRODUCTION.
Quintilian laments that his son, whose improvement, in conjunction with
that of the sons of Marcellus and Caesar, he had had in view iu
CONTENTS. XV
the composition of this work, had been carried off by death, $ 1,
2. He had previously lost, during the composition of another
work, a younger son, as well as his wife, 3–6. Abilities of which
his children gave indications, 7–9. His grief; he intreats indul-
gence if, in consequence of it, he pursues his work with less spirit,
! 0—16 . tº te © g e . Page 403
CH. I. Peroration of a speech; the objects of it; some think that it should
CH.
CH.
consist wholly of recapitulation, Š 1–8. Appeals to the feelings
may be made by the accuser and the advocate alike, 9. What
the exordium and the peroration have in common, and in what
respects they differ, 10–14. The accuser excites the feelings
either by showing the heinousness of the charge which he makes,
or the pitiable condition of the party for whom he seeks redress,
15–20. What qualities excite feeling in favour of an accused
person, 21, 22. Solicitations for pity may have great effect, but
should not be long, 23–28. Modes of exciting pity, 29–36.
How persons who are introduced to move pity at the conclusion
of a speech, should behave themselves, 37–43. No orator must
attempt to draw tears from the judges unless he be a man of
great ability, 44, 45. It is the part of the peroration to dispel
compassionate emotions, as well as to excite them, 46–49. Pero-
rations sometimes of a very mild character, 50. Appeals to the
feelings may be made in other parts of a speech as well as in th:
peroration, 51–55 . g e & e . 407
II. Necessity of studying how to work on the minds of the judges,
§ 1, 2. This department of oratory requires great ability, 3–7. Of
Trá0og and j60c, 8–24. If we would move others, we must feel
moved ourselves, 25–28. Of presenting images to the imagination
of our hearers, 29–35. Pupils should be exercised in this in the
schools, 36 te º te & ge o . 420
III. Of the power of exciting laughter in an audience, § 1. There
was little of it in Demosthenes; perhaps a superabundance of it in
Cicero, 2–5. Causes of laughter not sufficiently explained, 6, 7.
Is of great effect, 8–10. Depends far more on nature and
favourable circumstances than on art, 11—13. No instructions
given in exciting laughtér, 14–16. Various names for jocularity
or wit, 17–21. Depends partly on matter, partly on words;
Subjects of it, 22–24. Laughter may be excited by Some act, or
look, or gesture, 25–27. What is becoming to the orator, 28–32.
What to be avoided by him, 33–35. Topics for jesting, and modes
of it, 36–46. Ambiguity in words, 47–56. The best jests are
taken from things, not from words; of similarity, 57–62. Of dis-
similarity, 63, 64. From all forms of argument arise occasions for
jesting, 65, 66. Jests in the form of tropes and figures, 67–70.
Of jocular refutation, 71–78. Of eluding a charge; of pretended
confession, 79–81. Some kinds of jests are beneath an orator,
82, 83. Of deceiving expectation, 84–87. Of jocular imitation,
88. Of attributing thoughts to ourselves or others; and of irony,
xvi
CONTENTS.
89–92. The least offensive jokes are the best, 93–95. Quota-
tions from poets, proverbs, and anecdotes, 96–98. Apparent
absurdities, 99, 100. Domitius Marsus confounds politeness with
humour, 101–107. His distinctions, 108–112 . Page 430
CH. IV. Remarks on altercation, or discussion, § 1–5. Too much neg-
lected by some pleaders, 6, 7. Qualifications requisite for success
in it ; acuteness, knowledge of the case, good temper, attention to
the main question, 8–13. Further observations, 14–16. We may
dissemble our strength, in order to mislead our adversary, 17, 18.
Disposition of the judge to be observed, 19, 20. The student
should exercise himself in this department, 21. Order of proofs
is important, 22 • & e 456
CH. W. Of judgment and Sagacity; their importance, § 1–6. Examples
—h.
from Demosthenes, 7, 8. From Cicero, 9, 10. Conclusion of the
book, 11 º * * = ... • e o . 462
QUINTILIAN
ON THE
v CATION OF AN 0 RATOR.
QUINTILIAN TO TRYPHO,”
WISHING HEALTH.
You have prevailed on me, by your daily importunity,+ to pro-
ceed at once to publish the books on the Education of an Orator,
which I had addressed to my friend Marcellus; for, for my
own part, I thought that they were not yet sufficiently advanced
towards perfection. On the composition of them, as you
know, I spent little more than two years, while distracted by
so many other occupations; $ and this time was devoted, not
so much to the labour of writing, as to that of research for the
almost boundless work which I had undertaken, and to the
perusal of authors, who are innumerable. Following, besides, the
advice of Horace, who, in his Art of Poetry, recommends that
publication should not be hurried, and that a work should be
retained till the ninth year, I allowed time for re-considering
them, in order that, when the ardour of invention had cooled,
I might judge of them, on a more careful re-perusal, as a
mere reader. Yet if they are so much demanded, as you
say, let us give our sails to the winds, and pray for success
* An eminent bookseller at Rome, mentioned by Martial, iv. 72;
xiii. 3.
+ Convicio..] This word is not used here in a reproachful, but in a
friendly sense; as in Cicero, Ep. ad Q. Fratr. ii. 10 : Epistolam hanc
convicio efflagitárunt codicilli tuft. See also Cic, ad Div. xii. 25, and
|Pro Cluent. c. 27, where convicium maſcimum fecit is, as Spalding
observes, for maximOpere contendit, poposcit. “By convictwm he means
acerrimae preces.” Rollin.
f Satis—matwrwisse.] Nondum satis sunt expoliti. Regius.
§ Tot alloqui negotiis districtus.] “Distracted otherwise by so many
occupations.” He had not only to work at his book, but to attend to
other men's affairs. Two manuscripts, says Burmann, have altorum.
instead of alioqui.
B
2 QUINTILIAN. [PREFACE.
as we loose our cable.” But much also depends on your
faithfulness and care, that they may come into the hands of
the public in as correct a state as possible.
PREF A C E,
ADDRESSED TO
MARCELLUS WICTORIUS.
The object and intention of the work, § 1–3. To whom dedicated, 6.
Unauthorized publications under the name of Quintilian, 7. The
professions of the rhetorician and philosopher were formerly
united, 9–16. The perfect orator, 17. Partition of the work, 21,
22. Further observations on teaching and speaking, 23–27.
WHEN certain persons, after I had secured rest from my
labours, which for twenty years I had devoted to the instruction
of youth, requested of me, in a friendly manner, to write some-
thing on the art of speaking, I certainly resisted their solicita-
tions for a long time; because I was not ignorant that authors
of the greatest celebrity in both languagest had bequeathed to
posterity many treatises having reference to this subject,
written with the greatest care. 2. But by the very plea on
which I thought that excuse for my refusal would be more
readily admitted, my friends were rendered still more urgent;
“since,” they said, “amidst the various opinions of former
writers, some of them contradicting each other, choice was
difficult;” so that they appeared, not unjustifiably, to press
upon me the task, if not of inventing new precepts, at least
of pronouncing judgment concerning the old. 3. Although
however it was not so much the confidence of accomplishing
what was required of me, as the shame of refusing, that
prevailed with me, yet, as the subject opened itself more
widely, I voluntarily undertook a heavier duty than was laid
* Oram solventibus.] That the word Ora means fun is nauticus is
apparent from Livy, xxii. 19 ; xxviii. 36, on which passages the reader
may consult Drakenborch’s edition. Quintilian also uses the word in
the same sense in iv. 2, 41. It is aptly observed by Gesner, in his
Thesaurus, that the word in this signification seems to have been
peculiar to the common people and sailors, and is consequently but
rare among writers. Spalding.
+ Latin and Greek. Docte sermones wiriusque lingwa. Hor.
PREFACE.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 3
upon me, not only that I might oblige my best friends by
fuller compliance, but also that, while pursuing a common road,
I might not tread merely * in other men's footsteps.
4. Other authors, who have committed to writing the art of
oratory, have in general commenced in such a manner, as
if they were to put the last hand of eloquencef to those who
were accomplished in every other kind of learning; whether
from despising the branches of knowledge which we previously
learn, as insignificant, or from supposing that they did not fall
under their province, the duties of the professions being
distinct; or, what is more probable, from expecting no credit
to their ability in treating of subjects, which, however
necessary, are yet far removed from display; as the pinnacles
of buildings are seen, while the foundations are hid. 5. For
myself, as I consider that nothing is unnecessary to the art of
oratory, without which it must be confessed that an orator
cannot be formed, and that there is no possibility of arriving
at the summit of any thing without previous initiatory efforts;
I shall not shrink from stooping to those lesser matters, the
neglect of which leaves no place for greater ; ; and shall
proceed to regulate the studies of the orator from his infancy,
just as if he were entrusted to me to be brought up.
6. This work, Marcellus Victorius, I dedicate to you, whom,
as being most friendly to me, and animated with an extra-
ordinary love of letters, I deemed most worthy of such a
pledge of our mutual affection; and not indeed on these
considerations alone, though these are of great weight, but
because my treatise $ seemed likely to be of use for the
instruction of your son, whose early age shows his way clear to
the full splendour of genius;| a treatise which I have resolved
* Demºwm.] Evidently put for tantum, the notion of time being set
aside or forgotten. The word is often thus used in Quintilian and
other writers of the same age. So Paulus Diaconus says, from Festus,
“Alii demum pro dumtazat posuerunt.” See also Ruhnken on Rutilius
Lupus, p. 67. Spalding.
+ Perfectis—summam eloquentiae manum.] The word eloquentiae is to
be taken as as a genitive, not as a dative ; the dative is perfectis.
Spalding. Burmann's edition, and others prior to Gesner's, have sum-
nam in eloquentić manum.
† Quae si negligas, non sit majoribus locus.] “Which if you neglect,
there is no place for greater.”
§ Libré.] These twelve books on the education of an orator. e
|| 4d ingenii lumen.] Mosellanus cites Cicero, Brut. c. 15, Ut enitº
A
B 2
4 QUINTILIAN. [PREFACE.
to conduct, from the very cradle as it were of oratory, through
all the studies which can at all assist the future speaker, to the
summit of that art. 7. This I the rather designed, because
two books on the Art of Rhetoric were already in circulation
under my name, though neither published by me nor composed
for that object; for, after holding two days' discourse with me,
Some youths, to whom that time was devoted, had caught up
the first by heart; the other, which was learned indeed in a
greater number of days (as far as they could learn by taking
Inotes), Some of my young pupils, of excellent disposition, but
of too great fondness for me, had made known through the in-
discreet honour of publication. 8. In these books, accordingly,
there will be some things the same, many altered, very many
added, but all better arranged,” and rendered, as far as I shall
be able, complete.
9. We are to form, then, the perfect orator, who cannot
exist unless as a good man;t and we require in him, there-
fore, not only consummate ability in speaking, but every
excellence of mind. 10. For I cannot admit that the prin-
ciples of moral and honourable conduct are, as some have
thought, to be left to the philosophers; since the man who can
duly sustain his character as a citizen, who is qualified for the
management of public and private affairs, and who can govern
communities by his counsels, settle them by means of laws,
and improve them by judicial enactments, can certainly be
nothing else but an orator. 11. Although I acknowledge,
therefore, that I shall adopt some precepts which are contained
in the writings of the philosophers, yet I shall maintain, with
justice and truth, that they belong to my subject, and have
a peculiar relation to the art of oratory. 12. If we have
constantly occasion to discourse of justice, fortitude, temper-
ance, and other similar topics, so that a cause can scarce be
found in which some such discussion does not occur,i and if
hominis decus ingenium, sic ingenič ipsius lumen est eloquentia.
“Quintilian may be thought to have had those words of Cicero in his
mind, if the reading of the text be but sound.” Spalding.
* Compositiora.] Magis ordinata; in unam compagem commissa.
Spalding.
* See this point discussed at length, b. xii. c. 1.
£ In quam non aliqua quastio eſc his incidat.] “On which some ques-
tion of these (questions) does not fall.”
PREFACE.] RDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 5
all such subjects are to be illustrated by invention * and
elocution, can it be doubted that, wherever power of intel-
lect and copiousness of language are required, the art of the
orator is to be there pre-eminently exerted ? 13. These two
accomplishments, as Cicero very plainly proves,t were, as
they are joined by nature, so also united in practice, so that
the same persons were thought at once wise and eloquent.
Subsequently, the study divided itself, and, through want of
art, it came to pass that the arts were considered to be
diverse; for, as soon as the tongue became an instrument of
gain, and it was made a practice to abuse the gifts of elo-
quence, those who were esteemed as eloquent abandoned the
care of morals, which, when thus neglected, became as it were
the prize of the less robust intellects.|| 14. Some, dis-
liking the toil of cultivating eloquence, afterwards returned to
the discipline of the mind and the establishment of rules
of life, retaining to themselves the better part, if it could
be divided into two; but assuming, at the same time, the
most presumptuous of titles," so as to be called the only
cultivators of wisdom ; a distinction which neither the most
eminent commanders, nor men who were engaged with the
utmost distinction in the direction of the greatest affairs, and
in the management of whole commonwealths, ever ventured
to claim for themselves; for they preferred rather to practise
excellence of conduct than to profess it. 15. That many of
the ancient professors of wisdom, indeed, both delivered
virtuous precepts, and even lived as they directed others to
* Inventione.] The faculty of finding out arguments, and all that
COIlC61. In S 2, C3, U1Se.
+ Ut Cicero apertissimé colligit.] See Cic. Orat. c. 15. “Colligere est
argumentis—concludere et comprobare.” Regius.
i It was in the time of Socrates that eloquence was first separated
from philosophy; for Socrates; setting at nought and throwing discredit
upon rhetoric, devoted himself wholly to philosophical discussion.
Turnebws. See Cic. de Orat. iii. 19; Menag. ad Laërt. i. 12. Alme-
loveen.
§ Inertić factum est ut artes esse plures viderentwr.j Quintilian,
says Spalding, evidently plays upon the words inertiá and artes. By
inertià he seems to mean want of art or judgment to keep the two
sciences or arts, that of rhetoric and that of philosophy, united.
| Infirmioribus ingeniis.] He calls them infirmiora, as being unfit for
public business. Regius. -
* Namely, that of philosophers kar’ #$oxfiv.
6 QUINTILIAN. [PREFACE.
live, I will readily admit; but, in our own times,” the greatest
vices have been hid under this name in many of the professors;
for they did not strive, by virtue and study, to be esteemed
philosophers; but adopted a peculiarity of look, austerity of
demeanour, and a dress different from that of other men, as
cloaks for the vilest immoralities.
16. But those topics, which are claimed as peculiar to
philosophy, we all everywhere discuss; for what person (if he
be not an utterly corrupt charactert) does not sometimes speak
of justice, equity, and goodness? who, even among rustics,
does not make some inquiries about the causes of the operations
of nature ? As to the proper use and distinction of words, it
ought to be common to all, who make their language at all
an object of care. 17. But it will be the orator that will under-
stand and express those matters best, and if he should ever
arrive at perfection, the precepts of virtue would not have to
be sought from the schools of the philosophers. At present it
is necessary to have recourse, at times, to those authors who
have, as I said, adopted the deserted, but pre-eminently better,
part of philosophy, and to reclaim as it were what is our own;
not that we may appropriate their discoveries, but that we may
show them that they have usurped what belonged to others.
18. Let the orator, therefore, be such a man as may be
called truly wise, not blameless in morals $ only (for that, in
* Quintilian seems to have written these observations after the
philosophers were ejected from the city by the edict of Domitian.
Pithaeus. Dodwell thinks that Quintilian’s work was finished before
Domitian's edict, and supposes that he woull not have ventured to
praise philosophy or philosophers at all after such an edict ; but
Domitian, as Spalding observes, wished to be regarded as having pro-
scribed the pretended philosophers of his time on account of the
badness of their characters, not as having conceived a dislike to
philosophy in general. There are some satirical verses on this edict
ascribed to the poetess Sulpicia. On the character of the hypocritical
philosophers of that day, see Juvenal, ii. 3, atque alibi.
+ Modò non et vir pessimus.] For et Burmann would read sit.
“Quintilian reflects on those senseless fellows (of whom there has been
abundance at all times), who cannot even speak decently, but indulge
in ribaldry, without the least regard for their character.” Parews.
# The attentive reader will notice that Quintilian alludes here to
the three chief departments of philosophy, ethics, physics, and dia-
lectics. Gesmer,
§ Moribus.] By this word are properly meant both morals, and
manners, and character in general.
PREFACE.] ED UCATION OF AN ORATOR. 7
, my opinion, though some disagree with me, is not enough),
# but accomplished also in science, and in every qualifica-
§tion for speaking; a character such as, perhaps, no man
# ever was. 19. But we are not the less, for that reason, to aim
at perfection, for which most of the ancients strove ; who,
though they thought that no wise man had yet been found,
mevertheless laid down directions for gaining wisdom. 20.
For the perfection of eloquence is assuredly something,” nor
does the nature of the human mind forbid us to reach it; but
if to reach it be not granted us, yet those who shall strive to
gain the summit will make higher advances than those who,
prematurely conceiving a despair of attaining the point at
which they aim, shall at once sink down at the foot of the
a.SCent.
21. Indulgence will so much the more then be granted me,
if I shall not even pass over those lesser matters, which yet,
are necessary to the work which I have undertaken. The first
book will, therefore, contain those particulars which are ante-
cedent to the duties of the teacher of rhetoric. In the Second
we shall consider the first elements of instruction under the
hands of the professor of rhetoric, and the questions which are
asked concerning the subject of rhetoric itself. 22. The five
next will be devoted to invention (for under this head will also
be included arrangement), and the four following to elocution,
within the scope of which fall memory and pronunciation.
One will be added, in which the Orator himself will be com-
pletely formed by us, since we shall consider, as far as our
weakness shall be able, what his morals Ought to be, what
should be his practice in undertaking, studying, and pleading
causes; what should be his style of eloquence, what termina-
tion f there should be to his pleading, and what may be his
employments after its termination.
23. Among all these discussions shall be introduced, as
occasion shall require, the ART OF SPEAKING, which will not
only instruct students in the knowledge of those things to
* Aliquid..] Something that may actually be attained; not a mere
fiction of the imagination.
+ When he shall leave off pleading causes, and devote himself to
other employment ; for the orator, even when he has ceased to
practise as an orator, is not to consider himself wholly released from
his vocation. Spalding. He may instruct and advise. See Cic. Orat.
i. 45.

8 QUINTILIAN, [PREFACE.
which alone some have given the name of art, and interpret
(so to express myself) the law of rhetoric, but may serve to
nourish the faculty of speech, and strengthen the power of
eloquence; 24. for, in general, those bare treatises on art,”
through too much affectation of subtilty, break and cut down
whatever is noble in eloquence, drink up as it were all the blood
of thought, and lay bare the bones, which, while they ought to
exist, and to be united by their ligaments, ought still to be
covered with flesh. 25. We therefore have not, like most
authors, included in our books that small partſ merely, but
whatever we thought useful for the education of the orator,
explaining every point with brevity; for if we should say, on
every particular, as much as might be said, no end would be
found to our work.
26. It is to be stated, however, in the first place, that precepts
and treatises on art are of no avail without the assistance of
nature; and these instructions, therefore, are not written for
him to whom talent is wanting, any more than treatises on
agriculture for barren ground.
27. There are also certain other natural aids, as power
of voice, a constitution capable of labour, health, courage,
gracefulness; qualities which, if they fall to our lot in a
moderate degree, may be improved by practice, but which are
often so far wanting that their deficiency renders abortive the
benefits of understanding and study; and these very qualities,
likewise, are of no profit in themselves without a skilful
teacher, persevering study, and great and continued exercise
in writing, reading, and speaking.
* Nudae illae artes.] Artes was a name for books containing rules of
rhetoric. Spalding.
+ Particulam illam.] By particula Quintilian means the mere brief
rules on the different parts of eloquence, laid down by other writers on
the art. Regius.
EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 9
BOOK I.
CHAPTER. I.
Remarks on the capacities of boys in general, § 1–3. Of nurses,
4, 5. Of parents, slaves, and paedagogi, 6–11. Of learning
Greek and Latin, 12–14. Of the proper age for beginning to
learn, 15–19. Of the proper method of teaching children, 20–
24. Of learning the alphabet, and of writing, 25–29. Of learn-
ing to read, of subjects for writing, of learning by heart, and of
improving the pronunciation, 30–37.
1. LET a father, then, as soon as his son is born, conceive,
first of all, the best possible hopes of him ; for he will thus
grow the more solicitous about his improvement from the very
beginning; since it is a complaint without foundation that
“to very few people is granted the faculty of comprehending
what is imparted to them, and that most, through dulness of
understanding, lose their labour and their time.” For, on the
contrary, you will find the greater number of men both ready
in conceiving and quick in learning; since such quickness is
natural to man; and as birds are born to fly, horses to run,
and wild beasts to show fierceness, so to us peculiarly belong
activity and Sagacity of understanding; whence the origin of
the mind is thought to be from heaven. 2. But dull and
unteachable persons are no more produced in the course of
nature than are persons marked by monstrosity and deformi-
ties; such are certainly but few. It will be a proof of this
assertion, that, among boys, good promise is shown in the far
greater number; and, if it passes off in the progress of time,
it is manifest that it was not natural ability, but care, that was
wanting. 3. But one surpasses another, you will say, in
ability. I grant that this is true ; but only so far as to
accomplish more or less; whereas there is no one who has not
gained something by study. Let him who is convinced of this
truth, bestow, as soon as he becomes a parent, the most vigi-
lant possible care on cherishing the hopes of a future orator.
4. Before all things, let the talk of the child's nurses not be
\º Chrysippus wished them, if possible, to be
omen of some knowledge; at any rate he would have the
best, as far as circumstances would allow, chosen. To their
morals, doubtless, attention is first to be paid ; but let them
also speak with propriety. 5. It is they that the child will hear
10 QUINTILIAN. [B. I.
first; it is their words that he will try to form by imitation.
We are by nature most tenacious of what we have imbibed in
our infant years; as the flavour, with which you scent vessels
when new, remains in them ; nor can the colours of wool, for
which its plain whiteness has been exchanged, be effaced;
and those very habits, which are of a more objectionable
nature, adhere with the greater tenacity; for good ones are
easily changed for the worse, but when will you change bad
ones into good? Let the child not be accustomed, therefore,
even while he is yet an infant, to phraseology which must be:
unlearned. §
6. In-parents I should wish that there should be as much
learning as possible. Nor do I speak, indeed, merely of
fathers; for we have heard that Cornelia, the mother of the
Gracchi (whose very learned writing in her letters has come
down to posterity), contributed greatly to their eloquence ;
the daughter of Laelius * is said to have exhibited her
father's elegance in her conversation; and the oration of
the daughter of Quintus Hortensius, delivered before the
Triumviri,t is read not merely as an honour to her sex. 7.
Nor let those parents, who have not had the fortune to get
learning themselves, bestow the less care on the instruction of
their children, but let them, on this very account, be more
solicitous as to other; particulars.
Of the boys,' among whom he who is destined to this
prospect is to be educated, the same may be said as concerning
Titll'S6S.
8. Of paedagogiſ this further may be said, that they should
* Caius Laelius, surnamed the Wise, had two daughters, one of
whom was married to Caius Fannius, and the other to Mucius Scaevola.
See Cic. Brut. c. 58. Regius. From the passage of Cicero to which
Regius refers, it appears that the one to whom Quintilian alludes was
the wife of Mucius. Burmann.
+ Of this speech Freinshemius, with the aid of Appian, has given
Some notion in his excellent supplement to Livy, czzii. 44, 45; and
there is an allusion to it in Val. Max. viii. 3. Hortensia pleaded
before Octavianus, Antony, and Lepidus, for a remission of part of the
tax laid on matrons. Spalding.
# Other duties not properly included under tuition, which parents
who are themselves unlearned cannot discharge.—Spalding.
§ It is not free-born youths, compeers of the pupil, that Quintilian
means, but young slaves. Spalding.
| There is no word in our language for the padagogus, who was a
CH. I.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 1 I
either be men of acknowledged learning, which I should wish
to be the first object, or that they should be conscious of their
want of learning; for none are more permicious than those
who, having gone some little beyond the first elements, clothe
themselves in a mistaken persuasion of their own knowledge;
since they disdain to yield to those who are skilled in teaching,
and, growing imperious, and sometimes fierce, in a certain
right, as it were, of exercising their authority (with which that
sort of men are generally puffed up), they teach only their
own folly. 9. Nor is their misconduct less prejudicial to the
manners of their pupils; for Leonides, the tutor of Alexander,
as is related by Diogenes of Babylon,” tinctured him with
certain bad habits, which adhered to him, from his childish
education, even when he was grown up and become the great-
est of kings.
10. If I seem to my reader to require a great deal, let him
consider that it is an orator that is to be educated; an ardu-
ous task, even when nothing is deficient for the formation of
his character; and that more and more difficult labours yet
remain ; for there is need of constant study, the most excel-
lent teachers, and a variety of mental exercises. 11. The
best of rules, therefore, are to be laid down ; and if any one
shall refuse to observe them, the fault will lie, not in the
method, but in the man.f
slave of good character, and sometimes of some education, that had
the charge of young persons, but was quite distinct from the Övöäorica)\og
or praeceptor. See Smith's Dictionary of Gr. and Rom. Antiq. art.
Paedagogus.
* We have no book extant of Diogenes of Babylon ; he was a
Stoic philosopher, who came to Rome with Critolaus and Carneades in
that celebrated embassy mentioned by Cicero, De Orat. ii. 37, 38, and
who wrote on language and dialectics; nor is there any mention in
other writers of the bad habits which Alexander contracted from his
tutor, except an allusion to them in Hincmar, bishop of Rheims,
Epist. xiv. ad Proceres Regni. Spalding. This passage of Hincmar
was first pointed out by Colomesius, who observes that there is a
second allusion to the subject in another letter of the same writer; and
that it is also noticed by St. Jerome in his Epist. ad Latam de Institu-
tione Paulag filiat.
+ Quae si quis gravabitur, non rationi defuerit, sed homini.] Various
explanations of these words have been attempted. The most satis-
factory appears to be that of Spalding, who supplies aliquid as the
nominative case to defuerit, and by homini understands him who
disregards the rules.
12 QUINTILIAN. [B. I.
If however it should not be the good fortune of children
to have such nurses as I should wish, let them at least have one
attentive padagogus, not unskilled in language, who, if anything
is spoken incorrectly by the nurse in the presence of his pupil,
may at once correct it, and not let it settle in his mind. But
let it be understood that what I prescribed at first is the right
course, and this only a remedy.
12. I prefer that a boy should begin with the Greek
language, because he will acquire Latin, which is in general use,
even though we tried to prevent him, and because, at the same
time, he ought first to be instructed in Greek learning, from
which ours is derived. T3. Yet I should not wish this füle to be
So superstitiously observed that he should for a long time speak
or learn only Greek, as is the custom with most people; for
hence arise many faults of pronunciation, which is viciously
adapted to foreign sounds, and also of language, in which
when Greek idioms have become inherent by constant usage,
they keep their place most pertinaciously even when we speak
a different tongue. 14. The study of Latin ought therefore
to follow at no long interval, and soon after to keep pace with the
Greek; and thus it will happen, that, when we have begun to
attend to both tongues with equal care, neither will impede
the other.
15. Some have thought that boys, as long as they are under
Seven years of age, should not be set to learn, because that is
the earliest age that can understand what is taught, and
endure the labour of learning. Of which opinion a great many
writers say that Hesiod was, at least such writers as lived
before Aristophanes the grammarian,” for he was the first to
deny that the ‘Tºro&#x21,+ in which this opinion is found, was
the work of that poet. 16. But other writers likewise, among
* Concerning this grammarian, consult especially F. A. Wolf's
Prolegomena in Homerum, p. 216, Seqq. Spalding.
T This poem is lost. It was attributed by some to the Centaur
Chiron, the tutor of Achilles, but to Hesiod by the majority of writors,
among whom was Aristophanes the comic poet, who is said by
Phrynichus and Thomas Magister to have ridiculed it as the work of
Hesiod, in his lost comedy of the Aavra)\fic. Aristotle, Polit. vii. 17,
seems very nearly to agree with Hesiod in opinion, though he does not
(as Regius states, and after him Harles ad Fabric. Biblioth. Gr. v. 1, p.
15) make any allusion to this precept of Hesiod. Spalding.
CH. I.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 13
whom is Erastothenes,” have given the same advice. Those,
however, advise better, who, like Chrysippus, think that no part
of a child's life should be exempt from tuition; for Chrysippus,
though he has allowed three years to the nurses, yet is of opi-
nion that the minds of children may be imbued with excellent
instruction even by them. 17. And why should not that age
be under the influence of learning, which is now confessedly
subject to moral influence 2+ I am not indeed ignorant
that, during the whole time of which I am speaking, scarcely
as much can be done as one year may afterwards accomplish,
yet those who are of the opinion which I have mentioned, ap-
pear with regard to this part of life to have spared not so much
the learners as the teachers. 18. What else, after they are
able to speak, will children do better, f for they must do some-
thing? Or why should we despise the gain, how little soever
it be, previous to the age of seven years? For certainly, small
as may be the proficiency which an earlier age exhibits, the
child will yet learn something greater during the very year in
which he would have been learning something less. 19. This
advancement extended through each year, is a profit on the
whole; and whatever is gained in infancy is an acquisition to
youth. The same rule should be prescribed as to the following
years, so that what every boy has to learn, he may not be too
late in beginning to learn. Let us not then lose even the
earliest period of life, and so much the less, as the elements of
learning depend on the memory alone, which not only exists
in children, but is at that time of life even most tenacious.
20. Yet I am not so unacquainted with differences of age,
as to think that we should urge those of tender years severely,
or exact a full complement of work from them ; for it will be
* He was the keeper of the Alexandrian library in the time of
Ptolemy Euergetes, and the author of several books, which are all
lost, except some fragments of his Geography, which have been col-
lected by Ancher, Seidel, and Bernhardy. A work called Karao-
reptopoi went for a long time under his name, but is now considered to
be some grammarian's compilation from Hyginus. See Dr. Smith's
Dictionary of Biography and Mythology, and Fabricius's Bibl. Gr. vol.
iv. p. 117, ed. Harl.
f Cur autem, non pertineat ad literas attas, gua ad mores jam.
pertimet A] “Why should not that age belong to learning, which already
belongs to manners or morals.”
3. Better than learning to read.
| 4 QUINTILIAN. [B.I.
…” "
necessary, above all things, to take care lest the child should
conceive a dislike to the application which he cannot yet love,
and continue to dread the bitterness which he has once tasted,
even beyond the years of infancy. Let his instruction be an

amusement to him ; let him be questioned, and praised ; and
let him never fºlpleased that he does not know a thing; and
“sometimes, if he is unwilling to learn, let another be
taught
iº.
**** *-º-º-º-º-º-º-º:
before him, of whom he may be envious. Let him strive for
victory now and then, and generally suppose that he gains it;
and let his powers be called forth by rewards, such as that age
prizes. -
21. We are giving small instructions, while professing to
educate an orator; but even studies have their infancy; and
as the rearing of the very strongest bodies commenced with
milk and the cradle, so he, who was to be the most eloquent of
men, once uttered cries, tried to speak at first with a stutter-
ing voice, and hesitated at the shapes of the letters. Nor, if it
is impossible to learn a thing completely, is it therefore un-
necessary to learn it at all.” 22. If no one blames a father, who
thinks that these matters are not to be neglected in regard
to his son, why should he be blamed who communicates to the
public what he would practise to advantage in his own house?
And this is so much the more the case,f as younger minds
more easily take in Small things; and as bodies cannot be
formed to certain flexures of the limbs unless while they are
tender, so even strength itself makes our minds likewise more
unyielding to most things. 22. Would Philip, king of
Macedonia, have wished the first principles of learning to be
communicated to his son Alexander by Aristotle, the greatest
philosopher of that age, or would Aristotle have undertaken that
office, if they had not both thought that the first-rudiments of
instruction are best treated by the most accomplished teacher,
and have an influence on the whole course ? 24. Let us sup-
pose, then, that Alexander were committed to me, and laid in
my lap, an infant worthy of so much solicitude (though every
* Wec si quid discere satis mon, est, ideo mec necesse est.] If a child
cannot learn so much of anything as we could wish, it is not on that
account proper that he should be kept from learning it altogether.
f Atgwe eo magis gºod.] So much the more is a father not to be
blamed, i.e. is to be commended for paying attention to small matters
in the education of his son.
CH. I.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 15
man thinks his own son worthy of similar solicitude), should I
be ashamed, even in teaching him his very letters, to point out
some compendious methods of instruction ?
For that at least, which I see practised in regard to most
children, by no means pleases me, namely, that they learn the
names and order* of the letters before they learn their shapes.
25. This method hinders their recognition of them, as, while
they follow their memory that takes the lead,t they do not fix
their attention on the forms of the letters. This is the reason
why teachers, even when they appear to have fixed them
sufficiently in the minds of children, in the straight order in
which they are usually first written, § make them go over them
again the contrary way, and confuse them by variously changing
the arrangement, until their pupils know them by their
shape, not by their place. It will be best for children,
therefore, to be taught the appearances and names of the
letters at once, as they are taught those of men. 26. But that
which is hurtful with regard to letters, will be no impediment
with regard to syllables.|| I do not disapprove, however, the
practice, which is well known, of giving children, for the sake
of stimulating them to learn, ivory figures of letters to play
with, or whatever else can be invented, in which that infantine
age may take delight, and which may be pleasing to handle,
look at, or name. t
27. But as soon as the child shall have begun to trace thé
forms of the letters, it will not be improper that they should
be cut for him, as exactly as possible, on a board, that his
** ---
*-** ... -- - --~~~~ ******
* Contextum.] Their arrangement and position in the alphabet.
Spalding.
+ Antecedentem memoriam..] They know by heart the order in which
the letters follow each other, and therefore do not attend sufficiently
to their shapes, but pronounce their names as it were from memory.
Turnebus. I quote this note from Turnebus because Spalding hesitates
at antecedentem, not knowing what sense to give it, and observing that
Gedoyne renders the words, leur mémoire qui va plus vite Qué leurs
yewal. But Turnebus is undoubtedly right.
f Qua, causa est praecipientibus, wi.] “Which is the cause to teachers
that.” *
§ The order of the alphabet, in which letters are first shown to
children, before they begin to form them into syllables.
| It will do no harm if boys learn syllables by heart before they
know the look of them. Regius.
16 QUINTILIAN. [B.I.
style” may be guided along them as along grooves, for he will
then make no mistakes, as on wax (since he will be kept in
by the edge on each side, and will be unable to stray beyond
the boundaryf); and, by following these sure traces rapidly
and frequently, he will form his hand, and not require the
assistance of a person to guide his hand with his own hand
placed over it. 28. The accomplishment of writing well and
expeditiously, which is commonly disregarded by people of
quality, is by no means an indifferent matter; for as writing
itself is the principal thing in our studies, and that by which
alone sure proficiency, resting on the deepest roots, is secured,
a too slow way of writing retards thought, a rude and confused
hand cannot be read; and hence follows another task, that of
reading off what is to be copied from the writing; 29. At all
times, therefore, and in all places, and especially in writing
private and familiar letters, it will be a source of pleasure to
us, not to have neglected even this acquirement.
30. For learning syllables there is no short way; they must
all be learned throughout; nor are the most difficult of them,
as is the general practice, to be postponed, that children may be
at a loss, forsooth, in writing words. 31. Moreover, we must
not even trust to the first learning by heart; it will be better to
have syllables repeated, and to impress them long upon the
memory; and in reading too, not to hurry on; in order to
make it continuous or quick, until the clear and certain con-
nexion of the letters become familiar, without at least
any necessity to stop for recollection. Let the pupil then
begin to form words from syllables, and to join phrases
together from words. 32. It is incredible how much retard-
ation is caused to reading by haste; for hence arise hesita-
* The iron pencil used for writing on waxed tablets.
+ Spalding notices that this passage is somewhat tautological, but
says that it is the same in all the manuscripts.
f Quae ec his transferenda Swnt.] By his is meant tam male scriptis
commentariis. Spalding. k
§ Ut in nominibus scribendis deprehendantwr.] Deprehend? is haprere,
to be obliged to hesitate, to be brought to a stand, to be nonplussed ;
as in xii. 8, 6. . . . Ut is used with a certain irony, as if tutors put off
the learning of difficult syllables for the very purpose of puzzling the
child afterwards. Spalding. Burmann and Gesner give the same
sense to deprehendantwr which Spalding gives.
| Suppeditare—poterit..] Poterit Suppeditare se, “shall be able to
present itself.” Nisi gvwm, “ unless when,” I have rendered by “until.”
CH. I.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 17
tion, interruption, and repetition, as children attempt more
than they can manage; and then, after making mistakes, they
become distrustful even of what they know. 33. Let reading,
therefore, be at first sure, then continuous, and for a long
time slow, until, by exercise, a correct quickness is gained.
34. For to look to the right, as everybody teaches, and to look
forward, depends not merely on rule, but on habit,” since,
while the child is looking to what follows, he has to pronounce
what goes before, and, what is very difficult, the direction of
his thoughts must be divided, so that one duty may be dis-
charged with his voice, and another with his eyes.
When the child shall have begun, as is the practice, to write
words, it will cause no regret if we take care that he may not
waste his efforts on common words, and such as perpetually
occur. 35. For he may readily learn the explanations of
obscure terms, which the Greeks cally?.006&l, while some other
occupation is before him, and acquire, amidst his first rudi-
ments, a knowledge of that which would afterwards demand a
special time for it. Since, too, we are still attending to small
matters, I would express a wish that even the lines, which are
Set him for his imitation in writing, should not contain useless
sentences, but such as convey some moral instruction. 36. The
remembrance of such admonitions will attend him to old age,
and will be of use even for the formation of his character.f It
is possible for him, also, to learn the sayings of eminent 11, c. ,
and select passages, chiefly from the poets (for the reading
of poets is more pleasing to the young), in his play-time;
since memory (as I shall show in its proper place) is most neces-
Sary to an orator, and is eminently strengthened and mourished
by exercise; and, at the age of which we are now speaking,
and which cannot, as yet, produce anything of itself, it is
almost the only faculty that can be improved by the aid of
teachers. 37. It will not be improper, however, to require of
boys of this age (in order that their pronunciation may be
* Won rationis modo Sed usi's quoque est.] The sense is evidently,
“it is more easily recommended than practised.” Rationis modo esse
may be applied to what is done sold ratione, i.e., in this passage at
least, Solo praecepto ; and if this wst's quoque est, it appears that there is
also need of much w8ws or practice that it may be done effectually.
Spalding. By ratio is understood art or method. Rollin.
t Usque ad mores proficiet.] “Ad ipsos mores pertinget, penetrabi ."
Spalding.
C
18 - QUINTILIAN. {B.I.
fuller and their speech more distinct) to roll forth, as rapidly
as possible, certain words and lines of studied difficulty, com-
posed of several syllables, and those roughly clashing together,
and, as it were, rugged-Sounding; the Greeks call them ×27,870ſ.
This may seem a trifling matter to mention, but when it is
neglected, mary faults of pronunciation, unless they are re-
moved in the years of youth, are fixed by incorrigible ill habit
for the rest of life.
CHAPTIER II.
Considerations on public and private education; public education to be
preferred; alleged corruption of morals in public schools; equal
corrupt. on at home, § 1–8. Reply to the objection that a
pupil receives less attention from a master in a school than from
a domestic tutor, 9–16. Emulation, friendship, incitements
to masters and pupils, and other advantages of public education,
17–31. !
1. BUT let us suppose that the child now gradually increases
in size, leaves the lap, and applies himself to learning in
earnest. In this place, accordingly, must be considered the
question, whether it be more advantageous to confine the
learner at home, and within the walls of a private house, or to
commit him to the large numbers of a school, and, as it were,
to public teachers.” 2. The latter mode, I observe, has had
the sanction of those by whom the polity of the most eminent
states was settled, as well as that of the most illustrious
authors.
Yet it is not to be concealed, that there are Some who, from
* Welwt publicis praeceptoribus.] Respecting the meaning of the word
velvt I cannot satisfy myself, and am surprised that no commentator
has made any remark upon it. I suspect, however, that Quintilian
thought it necessary to qualify the word publicis by velut because these
teachers could not properly be called public, as they did not receive
salaries from the public treasury. Quintilian himself is mentioned by
St. Jerome, in Eusebius's Chronicon, as the first master of a public
school that received a stipend from the emperor ; and perhaps, accord-
ing to the mode of speaking in those times, he could not properly be
called a public teacher, for the very reason that he received his pay,
not from the public treasury, but from the emperor's privy purse.
Spalding.
CH. II.] TEDUCATION OF AN ORATOR: | 9
certain notions of their own, disapprove of this almost” public
mode of instruction. These persons appear to be swayed
chiefly by two reasons: one, that they take better precautions
for the morals of the young, by avoiding a concourse of human
beings of that age which is most prone to vice ; (from which
cause I wish it were falsely asserted that provocations to
immoral conduct arise ;) the other, that whoever may be
the teacher, he is likely to bestow his time more liberally
on one pupil, than if he has to divide it among several.
3. The first reason indeed deserves great consideration; for if
it were certain that Schools, though advantageous to studies,
are pernicious to morals, a virtuous course of life would
seem to me preferable to one even of the most distinguished
eloquence. But in my opinion, the two are combined and
inseparable; for I am convinced that no one can be an orator
who is not a good man; and, even if any one could, I should
be unwilling that he should be. On this point, therefore, I
shall speak first.
4. People-think that morals are corrupted in schools; for in-
deed they are at times corrupted ; but such may be the case even
at home. Many proofs of this fact may be adduced ; proofs of
characteri having been vitiated, as well as preserved with the
utmost purity, under both modes of education. It is the dis-
position of the individual pupil, and the care taken of him, that
make the whole difference. Suppose that his mind be prone
to vice, suppose that there be neglect in forming and guarding
his morals in early youth, seclusion would afford no less
opportunity for immorality than publicity; for the private
tutor may be himself of bad character; nor is intercourse with
vicious slaves at all safer than that with immodest free-born
youths. 5. § But if his disposition be good, and if there be
not a blind and indolent negligence on the part of his parents,
* Prope pubveco more.] For this adverb prope it seems still more
difficult to say anything Satisfactory than for the preceding velut.
Perhaps Quintilian used it because the children are not altogether taken.
from under the control of their parents, as was the case, for instance,
at Sparta.
+ Opinionis.] That is, existimationis, famoe. Spalding. So Regius.
† Natura, cujusque totum curaque distat..] “Natura cujusque puerie;
cura parentum.” Gesner.
Ś The remarks in this section seem to refer wholly to public edu-
cation.
C 2
20 - QUINTILIAN. [B.I.
it will be possible for them to select a tutor of irreproach-
able character, (a matter to which the utmost attention is paid
by sensible parents,) and to fix on a course of instruction of
the very strictest kind; while they may at the same time place
at the elbow of their son some influential friend or faithful
freedman, whose constant attendance may improve even those
of whom apprehensions may be entertained.
6. The remedy for this object of fear is easy. Would that
we ourselves did not corrupt the morals of our children | We
emervate their very infancy with luxuries, That delicacy of
education, which we call fondness, weakens all the powers,
both of body and mind: What luxury will he not covet in his
manhood, who crawls about on purple ! He cannot yet articu-
late his first words, when he already distinguishes Scarlet, and
wants his purple.* 7. We form the palate of children before
we form their pronunciation. They grow up in Sedan chairs;
if they touch the ground, they hang by the hands of attendants
supporting them on each side. We are delighted if they utter
any thing immodest. Expressions which would not be tole-
rated even from the effeminate youths of Alexandria, f we hear
from them with a smile and a kiss. Nor is this wonderful; we
have taught them; they have heard such language from our-
selves. 8. They see our mistresses, our male objects of
affection ; every dining-room rings with impure songs; things
shameful to be told are objects of sight. From such practices
springs habit, and afterwards nature. The unfortunate
children learn these vices before they know that they are
* Jam, coccum intelligit, jam conchylium poscit..] Spalding, with Passe-
ratius, would read cogwum, “he knows the cook,” and take conchylium in
the sense of “shell-fish,” as in Hor. Epod. ii. 49; Sat. ii. 4, 30 ; 8, 27,
in order that there may be no recurrence to purple, after in purpuris
Tepit, but that this sentence may refer wholly to eating, and be aptly
followed by ante palatum corum, quâm 08, instituimus. All the other
commentators are satisfied with coccum, “Scarlet,” and understand
conchylium as meaning “purple;” but certainly this appears to
be needless repetition. Pliny indeed distinguishes conchylium from
purpura, but we are obliged to translate them both by the same word.
+ Alexandrinis—deliciis.] All the commentators before Burmann
referred these words to the general luxury of the Egyptians, or to the
rites of Serapis; “but Quintilian,” says that critic, “does not allude so
much to the luxury of the Egyptians, as to that of the Romans, circa
pueros Alexandrinos : see the commentators on Petronius, c. xxxi.”
Spalding follows Burmann.
CH. II.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 21
vices; and hence, rendered effeminate and luxurious, they do
not imbibe immorality from schools, but carry it themselves
into Schools.
9. But, it is said, one tutor will have more time for one
pupil. First of all, however, nothing prevents that one pupil,
whoever he may be,” from being the same with him who is
taught in the School. But if the two objects cannot be united,
I should still prefer the day-light of an honourable seminary to
darkness and Solitude; for every eminent teacher delights in a
large concourse of pupils, and thinks himself worthy of a still
more numerous auditory. 10. But inferior teachers, from a con-
sciousness of their inability, do not disdaim to fasten on single
pupils, and to discharge the duty as it were of padagogi.
11. But supposing that either interest, or friendship, or
money, should secure to any parent a domestic tutor of the
highest learning, and in every respect unrivalled, will he how-
ever spend the whole day on one pupil? Or can the applica-
tion of any pupil be so constant as not to be sometimes
wearied, like the sight of the eyes, by continued direction to
one object, especially as study requires the far greater portion
of time to be solitary.f 12. For the tutor does not stand by
the pupil while he is writing, or learning by heart, or thinking;
and when he is engaged in any of those exercises, the company
of any person whatsoever is a hindrance to him. Nor does
every kind of reading require at all times a praelector or
interpreter; for when, if such were the case, would the know-
ledge of so many authors be gained 2 The time, therefore,
during which the work as it were for the whole day may be
laid out, is but short. 13. Thus the instructions which are to
be given to each, may reach to many. Most of them, indeed,
are of such a nature that they may be communicated to all at
Once with the same exertion of the voice. I say nothing of the
topics; and declamations of the rhetoricians, at which, cer-
* Nescio quem.] This expression is used with a certain irony, as if
Quintilian would say, “That wonderful pupil of whom you talk so
much.” Spalding. He recommends the wrion of public and private
instruction. Gesmer.
f Plus secreti.] That is, “plus secreti quam conjuncti cum docente,
viz., studii vel operis.” Spalding.
f Partitionibus.] This word, says Spalding, has reference to the
different topics and heads under which instruction was given by rhe-
toricians to their pupils. He refers to Ernesti. Lex. Techn. Lat. in
voce partitio, and Lex. Techn. Graec. v. čvaipéqug. Cic, de Orat. ii. 19.
2? QUINTILIAN. [B. I.
tainly, whatever be the number of the audience, each will still
carry off the whole. 14, For the voice of the teacher is not
{like a meal, which will not suffice for more than a certain
; number, but like the sun, which diffuses the same portion of
{ light and heat to all. If a grammarian, too, discourses on the
art of speaking, solves questions, explains matters of history, or
illustrates poems, as many as shall hear him will profit by his
instructions. 15. But, it may be said, number is an obstacle
to correction-and-explanation.* Suppose that this be a dis-
advantage in a number, (for what in generali Satisfies us in
every respect?) we will soon compare that disadvantage with
other advantages.
. Yet I would not wish a boy to be sent to a place where he
will be neglected. Nor should a good master encumber him-
self with a greater number of scholars than he can manage ;
and it is to be a chief object with us, also, that the master may
be in every way our kind friend, and may have regard in his
teaching, not so much to duty, as to affection. Thus we shall
never be confounded with the multitude. 16. Nor will any
master, who is in the slightest degree tinctured with literature,
fail particularly to cherish that pupil in whom he shall observe
application and genius, even for his own honour. But even if
great schools ought to be avoided (a position to which I cannot
assent, if numbers flock to a master on account of his merit),
the rule is not to be carried so far that schools should be
avoided altogether. It is one thing to shun schools, another to
choose from them. -
17. If I have now refuted the objections which are made
to schools, let me next state what opinions I myself en-
tertain. 18. First of all, let him who is to be an Orator, and
who must live amidst the greatest publicity, and in the full day-
light of public affairs, accustom himself, from his boyhood, not
to be abashed at the sight of men, nor pine in a solitary and
... s it were recluse way of life. The mind requires to be con-
stantly excited and roused, while in such retirement it either
Alanguishes, and contracts rust, as it were, in the shade, or, on
\he other hand, becomes swollen with empty conceit, since he
; * Praelectioni.] By praelectio is to be understood that instruction
jwhich a master gives to boys in lessons which they have to prepare,
*śand which can scarcely be given to two at once. Spalding.
f Quid fere.] “What, almost, satisfies us.” The meaning is, that
there is hardly anything that satisfies us. Nihil est ab Omni parte beatum.
CII. II.] JEDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 23
who compares himself to no one else, will necessarily attribute
too much to his own powers. 19. Besides, when his acquire-
ments are to be displayed in public, he is blinded at the light
of the sun, and stumbles at every new object, as having learned
in solitude that which is to be done in public. 20. I say
nothing of friendships formed at school, which remain in full
force even to old age, as if cemented with a certain religious
obligation ; for to have been initiated in the same studies is a
not less sacred bond than to have been initiated in the same
sacred rites. That sense, too, which is called common Sense,”
where shall a young man learn when he has separated himself
from society, which is natural not to men only, but even to dumb
animals 2 21. Add to this, that, at home, he can learn only
what is taught himself; at School, even what is taught others.
22. He will daily hear many things commended, many things
corrected ; the idleness of a fellow student, when reproved, will
be a warning to him ; the industry of any one, when com-
mended, will be a stimulus; emulation will be excited by
praise; and he will think it a disgrace to yield to his equals in
age, and an honour to surpass his seniors. All these matters
excite the mind; and though ambition itself be a vice,t yet it
is often the parent of virtues.
23. I remember a practice that was observed by my masters,
not without advantage. Having divided the boys into classes,
they assigned them their order in speaking in conformity to
the abilities of each ; and thus each stood in the higher place to
declaim according as he appeared to excel in proficiency.
24. Judgments were pronounced on the performances; and
great was the strife among us for distinction ; but to take the
lead of the class was by far the greatest honour. Nor was
sentence given on our merits only once; the thirtieth day.
brought the vanquished an opportunity of contending again.
* Spalding observes that the expression sensus communis, in the
signification of our “common sense,” did not come into general use till
after the time of Cicero. It is found, he observes, in Horace, Sat. i.
3, 36, and Phaedrus, i. 7. Much the same may be said of ambitio,
which occurs a little below ; it was not generally used for “ambition,”
in our sense of the word, till after Cicero's day, though it was certainly
coming into use in that sense in his time.
+ Ambition is not to be called a vice unless it be inordinate, or
shown in a bad cause. I know not why Quintilian as well as Sallust
(Cat. c. 13) should have so decidedly called it a vice. A virtuous man
may be ambitious as well as a vicious man.
24 QUINTILIAN. [B. I.
, Thus ho who was most successful, did not relax his efforts,
while uneasiness incited the unsuccessful to retrieve his
honour. * 25. I should be inclined to maintain, as far as I
can form a judgment from what I conceive in my own mind,
i that this method furnished stronger incitements to the study
of eloquence, than the exhortations of preceptors, the watch-
fulness of paedagogi, or the wishes of parents.
26. But as emulation is of use to those who have made some
advancement in learning,t so, to those who are but beginning,
and are still of tender age, to imitate their School-fellows is more
pleasant than. to imitate their master, for the very reason that it
is more easy; for they who are learning the first rudiments;
will scarcely dare to exalt themselves to the hope of attaining $
that eloquence which they regard as the highest; they will
rather fix on what is nearest to them, as vines attached to
trees gain the top by taking hold of the lower branches first.
27. This is an observation of such truth, that it is the care
even of the master himself, when he has to instruct minds
that are still unformed, not (if he prefer at least the useful to
the showy) to overburden the weakness of his scholars, but to
moderate his strength, and to let himself down to the capacity
of the learner. 28. For as narrow-necked vessels reject a
great quantity of the liquid that is poured upon them, but are
filled by that which flows or is poured into them by degrees,
so it is for us to ascertain how much the minds of boys can
receive, since what is too much for their grasp of intellect will
not enter their minds, as not being sufficiently expanded to
admit it. 29. It is of advantage therefore for a boy to have
school-fellows whom he may first imitate, and afterwards try to
surpass. Thus will he gradually conceive hope of higher ex-
cellence.
To these observations I shall add, that masters themselves,
when they have but one pupil at a time with them, cannot feel
the same degree of energy and spirit in addressing him, as
* Ad depellendam, ignominiam..] “To throw off dishonour.”
f Firmiores profectus.] Why this observation is made, says Spalding,
may not at once appear; but the sense is, that the more advanced
pupils strive with one another, who shall most resemble the master
himself, while the younger pupils rather make their older school-fellows
the objects of their imitation.
i. Prima elementa, by a metonymy, for pºwer; prima clementa discentes.
Regius.
§ Effingendae.] “Of completely forming.”
CH. III.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 25
when they are excited by a large number of hearers. 30. Elo.
quence depends in a great degree on the state of the mind,
which must conceive images of objects, and transform itself, so
to speak, to the nature of the things of which we discourse.
Besides, the more noble and lofty a mind is, by the more
powerful springs, as it were, is it moved, and accordingly is
both strengthened by praise, and enlarged by effort, and is
filled with joy at achieving something great. 31. But a
certain secret disdain is felt at lowering the power of elo-
quence, acquired by so much labour, to one auditor ; and the
teacher is ashamed to raise his style above the level of ordinary
conversation. Let any one imagine, indeed, the air of a man
haranguing, or the voice of one entreating, the gesture, the
pronunciation, the agitation of mind and body, the exertion,
and, to mention nothing else, the fatigue, while he has but
one auditor; would not he seem to be affected with something
like madness 2 There would be no eloquence in the World,
if we were to speak only with one person at a time.
CHAPTER III
1)isposition and abilities of a pupil to be ascertained, § 1–3. Pre-
cociousness not desirable, 3–5. On the management of pupils,
6, 7. On relaxation and play, 8–13. On corporal punishment,
14—18.
1. LET him that is skilled in teaching, ascertain first of all,
when a boy is entrusted to him, his ability and disposition.
The chief symptom of ability in children—is memory, of which
the excellence is twofold, to receive with ease and retain. With
fidelity. The next symptom is imitation ; for that is an indi
cation of a teachable disposition, but with this provision, that
it express merely what it is taught, and not a person's manner
or walk, for instance, or whatever may be remarkable for de-
formity. 2. The boy who shall make-it-his-aim to raise a
laugh by his love of mimicry, will-afford me no hope of good
capacity; for he who is possessed of great talent will be
well disposed; else I should think it not at all worse
to be of a dull, than of a bad, disposition; but he who is
honourably inclined will be very different from the stupid or
Q6 QUINTILIAN. |B, I.
idle. 3. Such a pupil as I would have, will easily learn what
is taught him, and will ask questions about Some things, but
will still rather follow than run on before. That precocious
sort of talent scarcely ever comes to good fruit. 4. Such are
those who do little things easily, and, impelled by impudence,
show at once all that they can accomplish in such matters.”
But they succeed only in what is ready to their hand ; they
string words together, uttering them with an intrepid counte-
nance, not in the least discouraged by bashfulness; and do
little, but do it readily. 5. There is no real power behind, or
any that rests on deeply fixed roots; but they are like seeds
which have been scattered on the surface of the ground
and shoot up prematurely, and like grass that resembles
corn, and grows yellow, with empty ears, before the time of
harvest. Their efforts give pleasure, as compared with their
years; but their progress comes to a stand, and our wonder
diminishes.
6. When a tutor has observed these indications, let him next
consider how the mind of his pupil is to be managed. Some boys
are indolent, unless you stimulate them ; some are indignant at
being commanded ; fear restrains some, and unnerves others;
continued labour forms some ; with others, hasty efforts succeed
better. 7. Let the boy be given to me, whom praise stimulates,
whom honour delights, who weeps when he is unsuccessful.
His powers must be cultivated under the influence of am-
bition ; reproach will sting him to the quick ; honour will
incite him ; and in such a boy I shall never be apprehensive
of indifference.
8. Yet some relaxation is to be allowed to all ; not only
because there is nothing that can bear perpetual labour, (and
even those things that are without sense and life are unbent by
alternate rest, as it were, in order that they may preserve their
vigour,) but because application to learning depends on the
will, which cannot be forced. 9. Boys, accordingly, when re-
invigorated and refreshed, bring more sprightliness to their
learning, and a more determined spirit, which for the most
part spurns compulsion. 10. Nor will play in boys dis-
please me; it is also a sign of vivacity; and I cannot expect
* Illic.] Gesner and, Spalding, following Gebhard, would read illico,
and eject statim ; so that the passage would stand, quicquid posswºt,
ällico o tewdwr.t.
CH. III.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. Q7
that he who is always dull and spiritless will be of an eager
disposition in his studies, when he is indifferent even to that
excitement which is natural to his age. 11. There must how-
ever be bounds set to relaxation, lest the refusal of it beget an
aversion to study, or too much indulgence in it a habit of
idleness. There are some kinds of amusement, too, not
unserviceable for sharpening the wits of boys, as when they
contend with each other by proposing all sorts of questions in
turn. 12. In their plays, also, their moral dispositions show
themselves more plainly, supposing” that there is no age so
tender that it may not readily learn what is right and wrong;
and the tender age may best be formed at a time when it is igno-
rant of dissimulation, and most willingly submits to instructors;
for you may break, sooner than mend, that which has hardened
into deformity. 13. A child is as early as possible, therefore,
to be admonished that he must do nothing too eagerly, nothing
dishonestly, nothing without self-control; and we must always
keep in mind the maxim of Virgil, Adeo in teneris consuescere
imultum est, “of so much importance is the acquirement of habit
in the young.” º
14. But that boys should suffer corporal punishment, though
it be a received custom, and Chrysippus makes no objection to
it, I by no means approve; first, because it is a disgrace, and
a punishment for slaves, and in reality (as will be evident if
you imagine the age changed f) an affront; secondly, ºt
if a boy's disposition be so abject as not to be amended by * ,
reproof, he will be hardened, like the worst of slaves, even to .
stripes; and lastly, because, if one who regularly exacts his
tasks be with him, there will not be the least need of any
Such chastisement. 15. At present, the negligence of padagogi.
seems to be made amends for in such a way that boys are not
obliged to do what is right, but are punished whenever they
* The character in childhood displays itself to advantage, provide \
that the master knows how to turn the childish simplicity to profit,
and feels convinced that the understanding of what is right may be
produced and fostered even in the tenderest years. Spalding.
tº That is, if the punishment be inflicted on a grown person.
Spalding.
f Nunc fere negligentia paedagogorum sic emendari videtwr, wt pºweri
mon facere, &c.] Burmann, with some other editors, has videntur, with
negligentiá in the ablative case, and thinks that the passage would
be improved if we were to read emendari videntwº pºweri, wt von, &c.
28 QUINTILIAN, - [B.I.
have not done it. Besides, after you have coerced a boy with
stripes, how will you treat him when he becomes a young man,
to whom such terror cannot be held out, and by whom more
difficult studies must be pursued ? 16. Add to these consider-
ations, that many things unpleasant to be mentioned, and
likely afterwards to cause shame,” often happen to boys while
being whipped, under the influence of pain or fear ; and such
shame enervates and depresses the mind, and makes them
shun people's sight and feel a constant uneasiness.f 17. If,
moreover, there has been too little care in choosing governors
and tutors of reputable character, I am ashamed to say how
Scandalously unworthy men may abuse their privilege of
punishing, Š and what opportunity also the terror of the
unhappy children may sometimes afford to others. I will not
dwell upon this point; what is already understood is more than
enough. It will be sufficient therefore to intimate, that no
man should be allowed too much authority over an age so weak
and So unable to resist ill-treatment.
18. I will now proceed to show in what studies he who is to
be so trained that he may become an orator, must be instructed,
and which of them must be commenced at each particular
period of youth.
CHAPTER IV.
Of grammar, sect, 1–6. Remarks on certain letters and derivations
- of words, 7–12. Changes in words, 13–17. Of the parts of
speech, 18–21. Some observations on nouns and verbs, 22—29.
1. IN regard to the boy who has attained facility in reading
and writing, the next object is instruction from the gram-
* Praesertim si mates praebere cogantun'. Burmann.
f Ipsius lucis fugam, ct taedium dictat.] “Induces a shunning of the
very light, and an uneasiness.” s
† Sº minor in diligendis custodwm et praeceptorwm moribus fuit.] “If
there has been too little care in making choice of the morals of
guardians and preceptors.”
§ In quae probra nefandi homines—abutantwr.] Intelligit stupra, quae
Sæpe pueris inferendi hinc occasio praebetur; quod aperté non voluit
efferre, sed intelligentibus pauca satis. Ita probrum pro impudicitiã
et stupro Sæpe Suetonius. Wid. Caes, 43; Aug. 65, et alibi. Burmann.
|| Others besides the pardagogi.
CH. IV.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. Q9
marians.” Nor is it of importance whether I speak of the
Greek or Latin grammarian, though I am inclined to think
that the Greek should take the precedence. 2. Both have the
same method. This profession, then, distinguished as it is,
most compendiously, into two parts, the art of speaking cor-
rectly, and the illustration of the poets, carries more beneath the
surface than it shows on its front. 3. For not only is the art
of writing combined with that of speaking, but correct reading
also precedes illustration, and with all these is joined the exer-
cise of judgment, which the old grammarians,f indeed, used
with Such severity, that they not only allowed themselves to
distinguish certain verses with a particular mark of censure, .
and to remove, as spurious, certain books which had been in-
scribed with false titles, from their sets, but even brought
Some authors within their canon, and excluded others altogether
from classification.S 4. Nor is it sufficient to have read the
poets only ; every class of writers must be studied, not simply
for matter, but for words, which often receive their authority
from writers. Nor can grammar be complete without a know-
ledge of music, since the grammarian has to speak" of metre
ańd rhythm; nor if he is ignorant of astronomy, can he under-
* That is, the language masters, teachers of languages and literature,
Latin or Greek, as is evident from what is afterwards said of them.
ºf He means especially those of Alexandria, of whom Willoison has
treated, in our day, in his Prolegomena to the Iliad, and F. A. Wolf,
also, in his Prolegomena to Homer; both with great erudition.
Spalding. * -
† The critics used two marks, the asterisk, to signify that something
was wanting; the obelisk, to indicate that something had been interpo-
lated or was faulty. Twºmebus.
§ Auctores alios in ordinem redegerint, alios Omnimo eacemerºnt numéro.]
There has been much dispute about the meaning of these words. I
follow Spalding, who adopts the opinion of Ruhnken, that redigere in
ordinem, and easimere & mumero are expressions equivalent to the Greek
words āykpivstv and Škkpivetv. That this is the right interpretation
will now scarcely be doubted. Regius, and others of the older critics,
thought that redigere in ordinem signified “to condemn” (as cogére in
ordinem, “to reduce to the ranks,” in Livy and other writers, with
reference to a tribune or centurion), and eactmere 8 numero, “to select
from the common herd.” The question is discussed at Some length by
Spalding.
| So far, at least, as to acquire a correct ear for rhythm in prose,
and for metre in poetry.
*I Ei-dicemdum, sit..] Ei, i. e. grammatica, the thing for the person.
Ignara, too, below, refers to grººmmatica.
30 QUINTILIAN. [B.I.
stand the poets, who, to say nothing of other matters, so often.
allude to the rising and setting of the stars in marking the
seasons; nor must he be unacquainted with philosophy, both
on account of numbers of passages, in almost all poèms, drawn
from the most abstruse subtleties of physical investigation, and
also on account of Empedocles among the Greeks, and Varro
and Lucretius among the Latins, who have committed the pre-
cepts of philosophy to verse. 5. The grammarian has also
need of no small portion of eloquence, that he may speak aptly
and fluently on each of those subjects which are here mentioned.
Those therefore are by no means to be regarded who deride
this science as trifling and empty, for unless it lays a sure
foundation for the future orator, whatever superstructure you
raise will fall; it is a science which is necessary to the young,
pleasing to the old, and an agreeable companion in retirement,
and which alone, of all departments of learning, has in it
more service than show.
6. Let no man, therefore, look down on the elements of
grammar as small matters; not because it requires great
labour to distinguish consonants from vowels, and to divide
them into the proper number of semivowels and mutes, but
because, to those entering the recesses, as it were, of this
temple, there will appear much subtlety on points, which may
not only sharpen the wits of boys, but may exercise even
the deepest erudition and knowledge. 7. Is it in the power
of every ear to distinguish accurately the sounds of letters?
No more, assuredly, than to distinguish the Sounds of musical
strings. But all grammarians will at least descend to the dis-
cussion of such curious points as these : whether any necessary
letters be wanting to us, not indeed when we write Greek, for
then we borrow two letters” from the Greeks, but, properly, in
Latin: 8, as in these words, Seruus et wºulgus, the AEolic di-
gamma+ is required; and there is a certain sound of a letter
* Y and Z.
f When the Romans pronounced the consonant v, they did not
disinguish it from the vowel, but designated both by the character w.
In writing such words as servus and vulgus, therefore, the want of a
distinct character for each was greatly felt, the same letter being used
twice, as serwus, ww.lgus, with two different sounds. See Cassiodorus de
Orthographia, Putsch. p. 2282. The sound of the digamma was, how-
ever, that of the English w, when it commenced a syllable, as Walker,
in opposition to Lowth, maintains in his Pronouncing Dictionary,
CH. IV.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 31
between u and i, for we do not pronounce optimum like opi-
mum ; * in here, too, neither e nor i is distinctly heard: ;
whether, again, other letters are redundant (besides the mark
of aspiration, which, if it be necessary, requires also a contrary
marki), as ſc, which is itself the mark of certain names,S and
q (similar to which in sound and shape, except that q is
slightly warped by our writers, koppa'ſ now remains among the
Greeks, though only in the list of numbers), as well as a, the
last of our letters, which indeed we might have done without," if
we had not sought it. 10. With regard to vowels, too, it is the
business of the grammarian to see whether custom has taken
any for consonants, since iam is written as tam, and wos as cos.”
But vowels which are joined, as vowels, make either one long
p. 3, sect. 9. Claudius Caesar attempted to bring the digamma into
use, but old custom was too strong for him, as Priscian says, Putsch. p.
546. See Tacit. Ann. xi. 14; Dionys. Hal. Antiq. Rom. p. 16, ed. Sylb. ;
Foster on Accent and Quantity, p. 122. Spalding. -
* We do not pronounce the letter so fully in optimum as in
opimum, but, as it were, with a duller sound, so as to make it nearly
the same with w, Optumwm. Spalding.
ºf Hence it appears why the poets used either here or her?, as it
suited their purpose. Spalding. Here is used by Juvenal, iii. 23,
and by Horace, Sat. ii. 8, 2. From c. 7, sect. 22, it appears that here
was commonly used in Quintilian's time.
# The old Latins, like the Greeks, put the mark of aspiration over
the vowels, as we ourselves see in old manuscripts, in which we read
divium and Ödie, and as appears from this passage of Quintilian, for,
Says he, if a sign of aspiration be necessary, a sign of the absence of
aspiration is also necessary. Camerarius.
Ś Quae et psa quorundam nominum nota est.] Why Quintilian adds
this remark, especially with et İpsa, is not altogether clear. I suppose
that he alludes, however, to the letter h : for as h was not admitted by
Some to be a letter, but was called merely a mark or sign, So Quintilian
seems to think that k might rather be regarded as a distinction of
certain particular words than as a letter of the alphabet. Spalding.
Raeso and Kalendae were two of the words for which it stood. Priscian
says that k and q were not necessary to the Romans, as they had c.
Turnebus. See also Velius Longus apud Putsch. p. 22.18.
|| Quintilian signifies that, in the old Greek alphabet, Koppa, the
Kuph of the Hebrews, was counted as one of the letters. It was
variously formed, and stood for the number ninety. Spalding.
“Slightly warped,” paulum obliquatur, Gesner and Spalding under-
stand of the sinuous tail of the Roman q.
* Before a was introduced into the Roman alphabet, rea, was written
'régs, and pia, pics. Max. Victorin. apud Putsch. p. 1945.
* That is, iam is as much a monosyllable, in pronunciation, as tam,
and wos, i.e. vos, as cos. For wos, Burmann and Gesner read quos,
32 QUINTILIAN. [B. I.
vowel,” as the ancients wrote, who used the doubling of them
instead of the circumflex accent,f or two ; though perhaps some
one may suppose that a syllable may be formed even of three
vowels; but this cannot be the case, unless some of them do the
duty of consonants. 11. The grammarian will also inquire how
two vowels only have the power of uniting with each other,
when nome of the consonants can break any letter but another
consonant.' But the letter unites with itself; for coniicit is
from iacit, and so does u, as wulgus and Seruus are now writ-
ten. Let the grammarian also know that Cicero" was inclined
to write aiio and Maiia with a double i, and, if this be done,
the one i will be joined to the other as a consonant. 12. Tetº
the boy, therefore, learn what is peculiar-in-letters, what is
common, and what relationship each has to each, and let
him not wonder why scabellum ** is formed from Scammum, or
* The sense of this passage, says Spalding, is as follows: two vowels
coming together form either one vowel, as vehemens, or two, as awt;
for three wowels are never joined to form a syllable unless one of
them discharge the duty of a consonant, as vae.
f As videere instead of vidéré. *
† The same two vowels are sometimes so united that the one melts
or merges into the other; they no longer preserve the force of two
vowels, but one assumes the nature of a consonant. Thus, comicit is
not a word of four syllables, but only of three ; yet the second is not
lengthened, as the first i becomes in reality a consonant. Gesner.
§ The case is different with regard to the same two consonants
coming together. In the word addit, for example, both d’s retain
their full force, and form a long syllable with the vowel a. But one
consonant sometimes “breaks” another different from itself; thus
liquids “break” mutes, i.e. coalesce with them in such a manner as to
form one sound, and on that account do not necessarily lengthen a
short vowel preceding them. This passage is fully illustrated by
another of Quintilian, xii. 10, 29, where the letter f, in the very word
frango, is said to break a consonant. Gesner. In this example, how-
ever, it is not the liquid that is said to “break” or weaken the mute,
but the mute that is said to break the liquid ; thus, less will be heard
of the sound of the r if f be put before it than if no letter precede it.
In like manner, too, the sound of the fivill be less full when r follows
it than if no letter intervened between it and the vowel. The conso-
nants, therefore, mutually “break” or weaken each other. *
| He mentions the derivation, as Spalding justly remarks, to show
that there were really two 's in coniicit, the a of iacit being changed
into i.
* The commentators have sought in vain for any such remark in
the extant works of Cicero.
** For scamellwin, as hybernws for hymern/ws.
CH. IV.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 33
why bipennis, an axe with an edge each way, is formed from
pinna, which means something sharp; that he may not follow
the error of those, who, because they think that this word is
from two wings, would have the wings of birds called pinnae.*
13. Nor let him know those changes only which de-
clension f and prepositions introduce, as Secat secuit, cadit
excidit, cadit eacidit, calcat eaculcat ; (so lotus from lavare,
whence also illotus; and there are a thousand other similar
derivations;) but also what alterations have taken place, even
in nominative cases, through lapse of time ; for, as Walesii and
Fusii have passed into Valerii and Furii, so arbos, labos, vapos,
as well as clamos and lases, have had their day. 14. This very
letters, too, which has been excluded from these words, has
itself, in some other words, succeeded to the place of another
letter; for instead of mersare and pulsare, they once said mer-
tare and pultare. They also said fordeum and foedus, using,
instead of the aspiration, a letter similar to vau ; for the
Greeks, on the other hand, are accustomed to aspirate, whence
Cicero, in his oration for Fundanius, laughs at a witness who
could not sound the first letter of that name. 15. But we have
also, at times, admitted b into the place of other letters,
whence Burrus and Bruges, and Belena. The same let-
ter moreover has made bellum out of duellum, whence
Some have ventured to call the Duellii, Bellii.ºſſ 16. Why
need I speak of stlocus and silites ? #* Why need I men-
* Quintilian seems to think that the wings of birds should never be
called pinnae; but this was a rule not generally observed. Vossius,
looking to this passage of Quintilian, supposes that pinna was derived
from an old adjective pinnus, acute.
ºf Used of verbs as well as of nouns.
† For lares.
Ś The Greeks used the aspirated f, or p ; and the Greek witness
could not get rid of the aspirate in attempting to pronounce Fundanius.
| For Pyrrhus and Phryges, see Cic. Orat. c. 48. Regius and others
suppose that Belena is for Helena ; “but,” says Spalding, “there is a
more ingenious conjecture of Cannegieter, which perhaps comes nearer
to the truth, in his dissertation on Avianus, p. 257; he thinks that the
rustic tribe Velina, mentioned by Cicero, Horace, and Persius, is meant,
as Boltºnia is used for Voltinia, also the name of a tribe, in one of
Gruter's inscriptions.”
"I See Cic. Orat. c. 45. Of that family was the Duellius, or, as
generally written, Duillius, who gained the first victory by sea over the
Carthaginians.
** We read stilites for lites on old marbles. That Stlocus was used for
ID
• 34 QUINTILIAN . [B.I.
tion that there is a certain relationship of the letter t to d?
Hence it is far from surprising if, on the old buildings of our
city, and well-known temples, is read Alea’anter and Cassantra.
Why should I specify that o and u are interchanged 2 so that
Hecoba and motria, Culchides and Pulyaena, were used, and,
that this may not be noticed in Greek words only, dederont
and probaveront. So 'Oöugosig, whom the AEolians made
Oöövgoºg, was turned into Ulysses. 17. Was not e, too,
put in the place of i, as Menerva, leber, magester, and Diiove
and Veiove for Diiovi and Veiovi ? But it is enough for me to
point to the subject; for I do not teach, but admonish those
who are to teach. The attention of the learner will then be
transferred to syllables, on which I shall make a few remarks
under the head of Orthography.
He, whom this matter shall concern, will then understand
how many parts of speech there are, and what they are ;
though as to their number writers are by no means agreed. 18.
For the more ancient, among whom were Aristotle and Theo-
dectes, said that there were only verbs, mouns, and convinctions,
because, that is to say, they judged that the force of language
was in-verbs, and the matter of it in nouns (since the one is
what we speak, and the other that of which we speak), and that
the union of words lay in convinctions, which, I know, are by
most writers called conjunctions, but the other term seems to
be a more exact translation of ovyögquág. 19. By the phi-
losophers, and chiefly the Stoics, the number was gradually in-
creased ; to the convinctions were first added articles, then
prepositions; to nouns was added the appellation, next the
pronoun, and afterwards the participle, partaking of the nature ol
the verb; to verbs themselves were joined adverbs. Our lam-
guage does not require articles, and they are therefore divided
among other parts of speech.” To the parts of speech already
locus is shown by Festus, who also mentions Stlata, a kind of boat, from
latus, broad, Spalding.
* In alias partes orationis Spargwntwr.] An extraordinary mode of
speaking, as Spalding observes. What the Greeks expressed by means
of the article, says Quintilian, was expressed among the Latins by the
aid, sometimes of one part of speech, sometimes of another. But the
chief instrument for supplying the want of the article was the pronoun
ille; as, in this chapter, sect. 11, ab illo “jacit,” which the Greeks would
have expressed by & To roi jacit. Gesner observes, too, that alter was
equivalent to 6 á\\og, “the other,” while alius meant simply “another.”
CH. Iv.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 35
mentioned was added the interjection. 20. Other writers,
however, certainly of competent judgment, have made eight
parts of speech, as Aristarchus, and Palaemon” in our own day,
who have included the vocable, or appellation, under the name
or noun, as if a species of it.f But those who make the moun
one, and the vocable another, reckon nine. But there were
some, nevertheless, who even distinguished the vocable from the
appellation, so that the vocable should signify any substance
manifest to the sight and touch, as a house, a bed; the ap-
pellation, that to which one or both of these properties should
be wanting, as the wind, heaven, God, virtue. They added also
the asseveration, as hew, “alas!” and the attrectation, as
fasceatim, “in bundles;”f distinctions which are not approved
by me. 21. Whether ºrgognyogic, should be translated by
vocable or appellation, and whether it should be comprehended
under the noun or not, are questions on which, as being of
little importance, I leave it free to others to form an opinion."
22. Let boys in the first-place-learn to decline notins and
conjugate verbs; for otherwise they will never arrive at the ,
understanding of what is to follow ; an admonition which it
would be superfluous to give, were it not that most teachers,
through ostentatious haste, begin where they ought to end, and,
while they wish to show off their pupils in matters of greater
display, retard their progress by attempting to shorten the
road. 23. But if a teacher has sufficient learning, and (what
is often found not less wanting) be willing to teach what he
has learned, he will not be content with stating that there are
three genders in nouns, and specifying what nouns have two
or all the three genders. 24. Nor shall I hastily deem that
tutor diligent, who shall have shown that there are irregular
* A grammarian at Rome in the reigns of Tiberius and Claudius.
Suetonius on Eminent Grammarians, c. 23; Juvenal, vi. 453; vii. 215.
A few relics of his writings may be seen in the collection of the Gram-
marians by Putsch.
+ Tangwam species ejus.] How a nominative can be used here is
scarcely apparent ; but it cannot be an accusative plural, as the vocable
and appellation are but one thing. Gesner would substitute specimen.
I think the most simple mode of correction is to write speciem.
Spalding. -
: Hew is an asseveration, inasmuch as it strengthens the lamen-
tations of him who utters it. Fasceatim signifies attrectation or
handling, because we use such adverbs when we take hold of or handle.
a number of things in our hand or imagination. Spalding.
D 2
36 QUINTILIAN. - [B, I,
nouns, called epicene, in which both genders are implied under
one, or nouns which, under a feminine termination, signify
males, or, with a neuter termination, denote females; as Mu-
rana and Glycerium. 25. A penetrating and acute teacher will
search into a thousand origins of names; * derivations which
have produced the names Rufus, “red,” and Longus, “long,”
from personal peculiarities; (among which will be some of
rather obscure etymology, as Sulla, Burrhus, Galba, Plancus,
Pansa, Scaurus, and others of the same kind ;) some also from
accidents of birth, as Agrippa, Opiter, Cordus, Posthumºus;
some from occurrences after birth, as Vopiscus; while others,
as Cotta, Scipio, Lamas, Seramus, spring from various causes.
26. We may also find people, places, and many other things,
among the origins of names. That sort of names among slaves,
which was taken from their masters, whence Marcípores and
Publipores, has fallen into disuse. Let the tutor consider,
also, whether there is not among the Greeks ground for a
sixth case, and among us even for a seventh ; for when I say
hastá percussi, “I have struck with a spear,” I do not express
the sense of an ablative case, nor, if I say the same thing in
Greek, that of a dative.S -
§ 27. As to verbs, who is so ignorant as not to know their
# kinds, qualities, persons, and numbers ? Those things belong
' to the reading school, and to the lower departments of instruc-
tion. But such points as are not determined by inflexion,
will puzzle some people; for it may be doubted, as to certain
words, whether they are participles, or nouns formed from the
verb, as lectus, sapiens. 28. Some verbs look like nouns, as frau-
dator, nutritor. Is not the verb in Itur in antiquam silvam
of a peculiar nature, for what beginning of it can you find?||
Fletwr is similar to it. We understand the passive sometimes
in one way, as,
Panditur intered domus omnipotentis Olympi;
* Scrutabitwr mille praeceptor—origines nomin'wm.] Burmann would
read ille praeceptor, not liking the expression mille origines. The
derivations of the proper names that follow may be ascertained from
the Latin lexicons.
+ Marcipor for Marci puer ; Publipor for Publii puer. See Priscian,
p. 700, ed. Putsch. -
† That is, of a case of taking away; casus awferendi.
§ Of the case of giving; dandi casus.
| That is, what first person singular; eor not being is use.

CH. V.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR, 37
sometimes in another, as,
Totºs
Usque aded turbatur agris.
There is also a third way,” as urbs habitatur, whence likewise
campus curritur, mare navigatur. 29. Pransus also and potus
have a different signification from that which their form indi-
cates. I need hardly add, that many verbs do not go through
the whole course of conjugation. Some, too, undergo a change,
as fero in the preterperfect; some are expressed only in the
form of the third person, as licet, piget; and some bear a
resemblance to mouns passing into adverbs; for, as we say noctu
and diu, so we say dictu and factu ; since these words are
indeed participial, though not like dicto and facto. .
CHAPTER V.
Necessity of correctness in speaking and writing, § 1. On single
words, 2, 3. Choice of words, 4. Barbarisms, 5–10. Barbarisms
in poets and other writers, 11—17. Faults in pronunciation, 17;
18. On the aspiration, 19—21. The accents, 22–24. On ending
a word with an acute accent, 25–30. Legitimate accentuation,
31—33. On the solecism, 34–37. Different kinds of solecisms,
38–41. No dual number in Latin, 42—44. Solecisms in various
parts of speech, 45–51. Figures of speech, 52–54. On foreign
words, 55–57. Greek words, 58–64. Compound words, 65–70.
Words proper, metaphorical, common, new, 71, 72.
1. SINCE all language has three kinds of excellence, to
be correct, perspicuous, and elegant, (for to speak with propriety,
which is its highest quality, most writers include under
elegance,) and the same number of faults, which are the op-
posites of the excellences just mentioned, let the grammarian
consider well the rules for correctness which constitute the first
part of grammar. 2. These rules are required to be observed,
verbis awt singulis aut pluribus, in regard to one or more words.
The word verbum I wish to be here understood in a general
sense, for it has two significations: the one, which includes all
words of which language is composed, as in the verse of
Horace,
Verbague provisam rem non invita sequentur,
“And words, not unwilling, will follow provided matter;” the
* Namely, when neuters and intransitives, which properly have no
passive voice, assume the nature of transitives, by being joined with a
nominative case in the passive. Spalding.
38 QUINTILIAN. [B. I.
other, under which is comprehended only one part of speech,
as lego, scribo; to avoid which ambiguity some have preferred
the terms voces, dictiones, locutiones. 3. Words, considered
singly, are either our own, or foreign, simple or compound,
proper or metaphorical, in common use or newly invented.
A word taken singly is oftener objectionable than fault-
less;* for however we may express anything with pro-
priety, elegance, and Sublimity, none of these qualities arise
from anything but the connection and order of the discourse;
since we commend single words merely as being well suited to
the matter. The only good quality, which can be remarked
in them, is their vocalitas, so to speak, called at polyſoz,
“euphony;” which depends upon selection, when of two words,
which have the same signification, and are of equal force, we
make choice of the one that has the better sound.
5. First of all, let the offensiveness of barbarisms and
solecisms be put away. But as these faults are sometimes
excused, either from custom, or authority, or, perhaps, from
their nearness to beauties, (for it is often difficult to distinguish
faults from figures of speech,) let the grammarian, that so
uncertain a subject of observation may deceive no one, give his
earnest attention to that nice discrimination, of which we shall
speak more fully in the part where we shall have to treat of
figures of speech. 6. Meanwhile, let an offence committed
in regard to a single word, be called a barbarism.
But some one may stop me with the remark, what is there
here worthy of the promise of so great a work? Or who does
not know that barbarisms are committed, some in writing,
others in speaking 3 (because what is written incorrectly must
also be spoken incorrectly ; though he who speaks incorrectly
may not necessarily make mistakes in writing ;) the first
sort being caused by addition, curtailment, substitution, or
transposition ; the second by separation or confusion of sylla-
* Words, considered simply in themselves, may have the one
excellence which Quintilian calls euphony. But they may have a
great many faults; for they may be disgusting, mean, low, or bar-
ibarous. Turnebus. The text is, Uni verbo vitium. Sæpius qu&m virtus
inest : for which Gedoyne gives, “Le plus souvent la qualité d'un mot,
prisen lui même, est purement négative.”
+ Cujus in eo delectus est, ut.j “The choice for which lies in this,
that.” No commentator expresses any suspicion of the Soundness
of the text.
† B. ix. c. 1–3.
JH. V.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 39
bles, aspiration, or other faults of sound 2 7. But though these
may be small matters, boys are still to be taught, and we put
grammarians in mind of their duty. If any one of them, how-
ever, shall not be sufficiently accomplished, but shall have just
entered the vestibule of the art, he will have to confine himself
within those rules which are published in the little manuals of
professors; the more learned will add many other instructions,
the very first of which will be this, that we understand bar-
barisms as being of several kinds. 8. One, with reference to
country, such as is committed when a person inserts an African
or Spanish term in Latin composition; as when the iron ring,
with which wheels are bound, is called canthus,” though Persius
uses this as a received word; as when Catullus+ got the word
ploa:enum, “a box,” on the banks of the Po ; and in the speech of
Labienus, (if it be not rather the speech of Cornelius Gallus,):
the word casnar, “a parasite,” is brought from Gaul $ against
Pollio; as to mastruca, “a shaggy garment,” which is a
Sardinian word, Cicero || has used it purposely in jest. 9."
Another kind of barbarism is that which we regard as proceed-
ing from the natural disposition, when he, by whom anything
has been uttered insolently, or threateningly, or cruelly, is
said to have spoken like a barbarian. 10. The third kind
of barbarism is that of which examples are everywhere abun-
dant, and which every one can form for himself, by adding
a letter or syllable to any word he pleases, or taking one away,
* Quintilian evidently signifies that canthus is a Spanish word,
though the Greeks claim it as theirs. Regius. Turnebus says that it
occurs in the Iliad, but is mistaken, for it is not to be found in Homer
at all. Casaubon, on Persius, v. 71, where it occurs, observes that it
is used by no Greek writer except the grammarians. Burmann sup-
poses the word to be of Celtic origin.
+ lxxxix. 5, 6: Gingivas verö ploa:end habet veteris.
# Of this speech I find no mention elsewhere. Labienus (the son
probably of him who deserted the party of Julius Caesar, A.U.C. 703),
and Cornelius Gallus, both enemies of Mark Antony, may both have
composed severe speeches against his friend Pollio. Spalding.
Ś It appears strange that Quintilian, in bringing this word from
Gaul, not only differs from Varro, who, de L. L. i. 6, attributes it to
the Osci, but does not even allude to a writer of so high authority on
such a point. Festus agrees with Varro respecting the origin of the
word. Spalding.
| In his oration for Scaurus, of which only some fragments remain.
See Ernesti's edition, vol. iv. p. 1057. He also uses the epithet mas-
truccatus de Provinciis consularibus, c. 7. Spalding.
40 QUINTILIAN. [B. I.
or substituting one for another, or putting one in a place where
it is not right for it to be. 11. But some grammarians, to
make a show of learning, are accustomed, for the most part, to
take examples of these from the poets, and find fault with the
authors whom they interpret. A boy ought to know, however,
that such forms of speech, in writers of poetry, are con-
sidered as deserving of excuse, or even of praise; and learners
must be taught less common instances. 12. Thus Tinca of
Placentia” (if we believe Hortensius, who finds fault with
him) was guilty of two barbarisms in one word, saying precula
instead of pergula; first, by the change of a letter, putting c
for g, and secondly, by transposition, placing r before the pre-
ceding e. But Ennius, when committing a like double fault,
by saying Metieo Fufetieo, f is defended on the ground ol
poetic licence. 13. In prose, too, there are certain received
, changes; for Cicero ; speaks of an army of Canopita, though
the people of the city call it Canobus; and many writers have
wauthorized Tharsomenus for Thrasymenus, Š although there is
a transposition in it. Other words suffer similar treatment;
for if assentior, “I assent,” be thought the proper way of
spelling that word, Sisenna has said assentio, and many have
followed him and analogy; or, if assentio be deemed the right
method, the other form, assentior, is supported by common
practice. 14. Yet the prim and dull | teacher will suppose
that there is either curtailment in the one case, or addition
in the other. I need hardly add that some forms, which,
taken singly, are doubtless faulty, are used in composition
without blame. 15. For dua, tre, and pondo, are barbarisms
of discordant gender; yet the compounds duapondo, “two
pounds,” and trepondo, “three pounds,” have *ſ been used by
* He is mentioned by Cicero, Brut. c. 46. Spalding. *
f If the poems of Ennius were extant, the two faults of which he is
guilty might be discovered. Regius. But as Ennius's works have
perished, that discovery is not likely to be made. We see that e is
inserted, but what the other irregularity is we know not. Spalding
bestows some discussion on the question, but settles nothing.
f I have not yet found the passage, nor do I think that it exists
among the writings of Cicero now extant. But the change of 5 into
p in Canobus was adopted by almost all the Latin writers. Spalding.
§ The name of the well-known lake at which Hannibal defeated the
Romans. *
| Peacus ping wisque.] At once conceited and stupid.
* Equivalent to dwas and tres (libras) pondo, two and three pounds
in weight, dwas and tres being feminine and pondio neuter.
cH. V.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 41
everybody down to our own times; and Messala maintains ,
that they are used with propriety. 16. It may perhaps seem :
absurd to say that a barbarism, which is incorrectness in a
single word, may be committed in number and gender, like a
solecism ; yet scala, “stairs,” and scopa, “a broom,” in the
singular, and hordea,” “barley,” and mulsa, “mead,” in the
plural, as they are attended with no change, withdrawal,
or addition of letters, are objectionable only because plurals
are expressed in the singular, and singulars in the plural; and
those who have used gladia, “swords,” have committed a fault
in gender. 17. But this point, too, f I am satisfied with
merely noticing, that I myself may not appear to have added
another question: to a branch of study already perplexe
through the fault of certain obstinate grammarians. -
Faults which are committed in speaking require more
Sagacity in criticising them, because examples of them cannot
be given from writing, except when they have occurred in
verses, as the division of the diphthong in Europań, and the
irregularity of the opposite kind, which the Greeks call
syndresis and synalaepha, and we conflexio, “combination,”
as in the verse in Publius Varro, Š
Qwwm te flagranti dejectum fulmine Phaeton ;
For, if it were prose, it would be possible to enunciate those
letters by their proper syllables. Those peculiarities, also,
which occur in quantity, whether when a short syllable is
made long, as in Italiam fato profugus, or when a long one
is made short, as in Univs ob nowam et furias, you would not
remark except in verse; and even in verse they are not to be
* Scalae was sometimes used in the singular; scopae scarcely ever.
Bordea is used by Virgil. Why it should be wrong to use mulsa in
the plural more than vina does not appear, mulsum being in fact an
adjective or participle with vinum understood.
+ Quoque.] This word has reference to i. 4, 17, where almost the
same words are used at the end of what is said about letters, Spalding.
†: About barbarism, namely, in number. Spalding.
Ś Publius Terentius Varro, called Atacinus, from the place in Gallia
Narbonensis where he was born. He was contemporary with Marcus
*erentius Varro, so much celebrated for his learning. Spalding.
| AEn. i. 6. When the metre allowed, Virgil generally shortened the
first syllable in Italus ; and it was right that he should do So, if the
word is really derived from vitw!ws. . Spalding.
42 QUINTILIAN. - [B, I.
regarded as faults. 19. Those which are committed in sound,
are judged only by the ear; though as to the aspirate, whether
it be added or retrenched, in variation from common practice,
it may be a question with us whether it be a fault in writing;
if h indeed be a letter, and not merely a mark, as to which
point opinion has often changed with time. 20. The ancients
used it very sparingly even before vowels, as they said ados
and ircos; and it was long afterwards withheld from con-
junction with Consonants, as in Graccus and triumpus. But
Suddenly an excessive use of it became prevalent, so that
choronae, chenturiones, praechones, are still to be seen in
certain inscriptions; on which practice there is a well-known
epigram of Catullus.* Hence there remain, even to our times,
wehementer, conprehendere, and mihi. Among the ancient
writers, also, especially those of tragedy, we find in old copies
mehe for me.
22. Still more difficult is the marking of faults in respect
to the tenores, “tones,” (which I find called by the old writers
tonores, as if, forsooth, the word were derived from the Greeks,
who call them révol,) or accents, which the Greeks call ºrgogo,6ía
when the acute is put for the grave, or the grave for the acute;
as if, in the word Camillus, the first syllable should receive
the acute accent; 23. Or if the grave is put for the circumflex,
as when the first syllable of Cethegus has the acute, for thus
the quantity of the middle syllable is altered ; # or if the cir-
cumflex is put for the grave, as when the second syllable is
circumflexed in * * *,i by contracting which from two syllables
* Epigr. lxxviii. de Ariosive JTirrio.
+ The quantity of the middle syllable would be altered in both
words; instead of Cămăllus, Céthégus, we should have Cómillus, Céthé-
gus, i.e. Céthégus.
† The text has apice circumductá sequente, but Spalding very happily
conjectures that apice is a mere corruption of the word which Quin-
tilian gave as an example, and which we can now scarcely hope to
discover. Spalding would read Appº, if it were certain that the use of
such genitives in , (not ii) had been altogether laid aside in the time
of Quintilian. “The genitive of words in us and ium was not formed
in it in the best age of the Latin language, but in alone, e.g. fili,
ingeni, Tulli. So at least it was pronounced in the poets before and
during the Augustan age; Bentley, Ter. Andr. ii. 1, 20. Of the poets
Propertius first used the form in it, which is common in Ovid and
later poets. It was probably pronounced i in prose, even if written ii.
It is impossible to decide on the orthography from the fluctuation of
CH. V.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 43
into one, and then circumflexing it, people commit two errors.
24. But this happens far more frequently in Greek words, as
Atreus, which, when I was young, the most learned old men
used to pronounce with an acute on the first syllable,” so that
the second was necessarily grave, as was also that of Tereus
and Nereus. Such have been the rules respecting accents.
25. But I am quite aware that certain learned men, and some
grammarians also, teach and speak in such a manner as to
terminate a word at times with an acute sound, for the sake
of preserving certain distinctions in words, as in circum in these
lines, -
Quae circum litora, circum
Piscosos scopulos,
lest, if they make the second syllable in circum grave, a circus
might seem to be meant, not a circuit. 26. Quantum and
quale, also, when asking a question, they conclude with a
grave accent; when making a comparison, with an acute ; a
practice, however, which they observe almost only in adverbs
and pronouns; in other words they follow the old custom.
27. To me it appears to make a difference, that in these
phrases we join the words; for when I say circum litora, I
enunciate the words as one, without making any distinction
between them ; and thus one syllable only, as in a single word,
is acute. The same is the case in this hemistich,
Trojae qui primus ab Oris.'"
28. It sometimes happens, too, that the law of the metre
alters the accent : as, - -
Pecudes, pictaegwe volucres ;
the MSS. Mancipi remained in common use.” Zumpt's Latin Gram-
"mar, sect. ix.
* “So far,” says Spalding, “is clear, that they made the first syllable
acute ; but whether they pronounced the rest of the word as two
syllables, or as one, is uncertain.” He is inclined, however, to think
that they made three syllables, because Quintilian calls the next
syllable the “second,” whereas, if there had been but two, he would
probably have said the last. Yet we cannot think this argument of
much weight when we see that Quintilian speaks of the “second"
syllable of circum in sect. 25. The genitive, from what Quintilian
says, they appear to have contracted into two syllables. The poets
contracted or not, in all the cases, as they pleased; but Quintilian is
speaking of pronunciation in prose.
+ Qui, in qui primus, loses its accent by almost coalescing with the
44 QUINTILIAN. [B.I.
For I shall pronounce volucres with an acute on the middle
syllable, because, though it be short by nature, it is long by
position, that it may not form an iambus,” which a heroic
verse does not admit. 29. But these words, taken separately,t
will not vary from the rule; or, if custom # shall triumph, the
old law of the language will be abolished; the observation of
which law is more difficult among the Greeks, (because they
have several modes of speaking, which they call dialects, and
because what is wrong in one is sometimes right in another;S)
but among us the principle of accentuation is very simple.
30. For in every word the acuted syllable is confined within
the number of three syllables, whether those three be the
only syllables in the word, or the three last ; and of these,
the acuted syllable is either the next, or next but one, to
the last. Of the three syllables of which I am speaking,
moreover, the middle one will be long, or acute, or circumflex;
a short syllable in that position will, of course, have a grave
Sound, and will accordingly acute the one that stands before
it, that is, the third from the end. 31. But in every word
there is an acute syllable, though never more than one; nor
is that one ever the last, and consequently in dissyllables it is
the first. Besides there is never in the same word one syllable
circumflexed and another acuted, for the same syllable that is
circumflexed is also acuted;"| neither of the two, therefore,
following word, so that of the three syllables it is only pri that has
any accent. . . . Bentley, in his dissertation on the metres of Terence,
allows no accent to either qui or ab. Spalding.
* As being from volūcer.
† This refers to what he says at the commencement of sect. 27:
“We join the words;” he denies that circum, qui, quale, quantum, and
words of that sort, vary, unless they are closely united to others, from
the general rule for acuting the penultimate in dissyllables, and conse-
quently making the last grave. Spalding. Separata, “taken sepa-
rately,” i.e. apart from others, pronounced by themselves. Regius.
f That is, the custom of those persons who pronounced circum,
quantum, quale, in the way noticed in sect. 25, 26.
§ Gesner and Spalding suspect that this parenthesis is an interpola-
tion.
| So Cic. Orat. c. 18. Spalding.
* As there is never more than one acute syllable in a word, there
will never, where there is one syllable of a word circumflexed, be
another acuted, because the syllable which is circumflexed is already
acuted, the circumflex accent being compounded of the acute and
grave accents. With in e4dem in the text is to be understood voce.
CH. W.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 45
will terminate a Latin word. Those words, however, which
consist but of one syllable, will be either acuted or circumflexed,
that there may be no word without an acute.
32. In sounds also occur those faults of utterance and pro-
nunciation, of which specimens cannot be given in writing;
the Greeks, who are more happy in inventing names, call them
iotacisms, lambdacisms, jazyórnºrsg, and TA&reſco/001 : * as also
2017.00-00tc., when the voice is heard, as it were, in the depths
of the throat. 32. There are also certain peculiar and inex-
pressible sounds, for which we sometimes find fault with whole
nations. All the incorrectnesses, then, which we have men-
tioned above, being removed, there will result that which is
called ågø0éretc., that is, a correct and clear utterance of words
with an agreeableness of Sound; for so may a right pronuncia-
tion be termed.
34. All other faults arise out of more words than one ;
among which faults is the solecism ; though about this also
there has been controversy. For even those who admit that
it lies in the composition of words, yet contend that, because
it may be corrected by the amendment of a single word, it is
the incorrectness of a word, and not a fault in composition;
35. since, whether amarae corticis or medio cortice constitutes
a fault in gender, (to neither of which do I object, Virgilf
being the author of both ; but let us suppose that one of the
two is incorrect,) the alteration of one word, in which the fault
lay, produces correctness of phraseology; so that we have
amari corticis or medić cortice. This is a manifest misrepre-
sentation; for neither of the words is wrong, taken separately,
but the fault lies in them when put together; and it is a fault
therefore of phrase. 36. It is, however, a question of greater
Sagacity, whether a solecism can be committed in a single
word ; as if a man, calling one person to him, should say venite,
* An iotacism is when the sound of the iota is too much protracted,
as when, for Troia, Maia, we say Troiia Maña, doubling, as it were,
the letter. See Isidore Origg. i. 31; Diomed, Putsch. p. 448. A
lambdacism is a similar fulness or doubling of the letter l, as for elucit,
ellucit. See Isidore and Diomed, ll. cc., and Erasmus, Dial. de Pro-
nuntiatione, who also says that ioxvórng is a shrillness or squeaking
of the voice from too great contraction of the throat, TXate tagſtog
being the opposite fault, when, from the mouth opening too widely,
the sound is too full and broad. -
+ Ecl. vi. 62, 63; Georg. ii. 74.
46 QUINTILIAN. [B. I.
or, sending several away from him, should say abi, or discede;
Or, moreover, when an answer does not agree with the question,
as if to a person saying quem vides 3 you should reply ego.
Some also think that the same fault is committed in gesture,
when one thing is signified by the voice, and another by a nod
or by the hand. 37. With this opinion I do not altogether
agree, nor do I altogether dissent from it; for I allow that a
Solecism may occur in one word, but not unless there be some-
thing having the force of another word, to which the incorrect
word may be referred; so that a solecism arises from the
union” of things by which something is signified or some
intention manifested ; and, that I may avoid all cavilling, it
Sometimes occurs in one word, but never in a word by itself.
38. But under how many, and what forms, the solecism
occurs, is not sufficiently agreed. Those who speak of it most
fully make the mature of it fourfold, like that of the barbar
ism ;t so that it may be committed by addition, as, Veni de
Sugis in Alexandriam ; by retrenchment, as Ambulo viam,
Afºgypto venio ; me hoc fecit ; 39. by transposition, by which the
order of words is confused, as, Quoque ego; Enim hoc voluit;
Autem non habwit ; under which head, whether igitur, placed
at the beginning of a phrase, ought to be included, may
be a matter of dispute, because I see that eminent authors
have been of opposite opinions as to the practice, it being
common among some, while it is never found in others. 40.
These three sorts of irregularity some distinguish from the
Solecism, and call a fault of addition “a pleomasm,” of retrench-
ment “ an ellipsis,” of inversion “an anastrophe,” and allege
that if these fall under the head of solecism, the hyperbaton
may be included under the same title. 41. Substitution is,
without dispute, when one thing is put for another; an irre-
gularity which we find affecting all the parts of speech, but
most frequently the verb, because it has most modifications;
and accordingly, under the head of substitution, occur sole-
cisms in gender, tense, persons, moods, (or states, or qualities,
if any one wish that they should be so called,) being six, or,
as some will have it, eight; in number (since into however
* That is, the incorrect union.
+ Sect. 6.
f I do not find eight moods expressly mentioned by any of the
grammarians. Spalding.
CH. W.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 47
many forms you distinguish each of the parts of speech of
which mention has just been made, there will be so many sorts
of errors liable to be committed), as well as in numbers, of
which we have the singular and plural, the Greeks also the
dual. 42. There have, indeed, been some who assigned us
also a dual, scripsere, legere; a termination which was merely
a softening for the sake of avoiding roughness of Sound, as,
among the old writers, male merere for malé mereris ; and
thus what they call the dual consists in that one sort of termi-
nation only, whereas among the Greeks it is found not only
through almost the whole system of the verb, but also in nouns;
though even so the use of it is very rare. 43. But in no one
of our authors is this distinction of ending to be discovered;
on the contrary, the phrases, Devenere locos, Conticuere om-
nes, Consedere duces, show us plainly that no one of them
refers to two persons only ; diacere, too, though Antonius Rufus”
gives it as an example of the contrary, the crierf pronounces
concerning more advocates than two. 44. Does not Livy,
also, near the beginning of his first book, say, Tenuere arcem
Sabini, and a little afterwards, In adversum Romani Subiere 2
But whom shall I follow in preference to Cicero, who, in his
Orator, says, “I do not object to scripsere, though I consider
scripserunt to be preferable?”
45. In appellative and other nouns, likewise, the soleeism
shows itself in regard to gender, and to number, but especially
to case. Whichsoever of those three shall be put in the place of
another, the error may be placed under this head ; as also
incorrectnesses in the use of comparatives and superlatives ;S
* Of Antonius Rufus there is no mention in any other writer,
except that the scholiasts on Horace relate that he was known by his
translations of Homer and Pindar, and by some comedies that he
wrote. An allusion is also made to him by Velius Longus, de Orthogr.
Putsch. p. 2237. Spalding. :
+ At trials the crier of the court, after the pleaders on both sides had
finished their speeches, used to Say Diacere, “they have spoken ;” but
though this might frequently refer to two speakers, it was often
uttered at the conclusion of the speeches of several. Spalding.
† C 47. -
§ I follow Gesner's punctuation in this passage : Quicquid eorum
alteri succedet, hºwic parti subjungatw, licet ; per comparationes, &c.; but
something seems to have fallen out of the text between licet and per.
Gallaeus puts a full stop at licet, and changes per into Inswper; but
this alteration does not much mend the passage.
48 QUINTILIAN. [B. i.
as well as cases in which the patronymic is put for the posses-
sive, or the contrary.* 46. As to a fault committed in regard
to quantity, such as magnum peculiolum, there will be some
who will think it a solecism, because a diminution is used
instead of the integral word; but for my own part, I doubt
whether I should not rather call it a misapplication of a word,
for it is a departure from the signification; and the impropriety
of a solecism is not an error as to the sense of a word, but in
the junction of words. 47. In respect to the participle errors
are committed in gender and case, as in the noun; in tense, as
in the verb; and in number, as in both. The pronoun, also,
has gender, number, and case, all of which admit mistakes of
this kind. 48. Solecisms are committed, too, and in great
numbers, as to parts of speech,+ but it is not enough merely to
remark this generally, lest the pupil should think a solecism
committed only where one part of speech is put for another,
as a verb where there ought to have been a noun, or an adverb
where there ought to have been a pronoun, and the like.
j49. For there are some nouns cognate, as they say, that is, of
* the same kind, in regard to which he who shall use another
; species than that which he ought to use, will be guilty of no
less an error than if he were to use a word of another genus.
50. Thus an and aut are both conjunctions, yet you would be
incorrect in asking, hic, aut ille, sit 2 Ne and non are both
adverbs, yet he who should say non feceris for me feceris, would
fall into a similar error, since the one is an adverb of denying,
the other of forbidding. I will add another example; intro
and intus are both adverbs of place ; yet eo intus, and intro
sum, are Solecisms. 51. The same faults may be committed in
regard to the different sorts of pronouns, interjections, and
prepositions. The discordant collocation of preceding and fol-
lowing words, also, in a sentence of one clause, is a solecism.
* Agamemnonius Orestes is an example of the possessive for the
patronymic ; but of the patronymic used for the possessive the com-
mentators give no instance. Diomede, Putsch. p. 310, observes that
the patronymic cannot be so used.
f That is, by mistaking the parts of speech, and putting one for
another.
† In oratione comprehensionis wrºus sequentium ac priorum inter se
inconveniens positio.] An obscure passage. The commentators under-
stand it of the ancicolwthon. Quintilian has given no example, or we
might have discovered his meaning more easily. . . . By oratio com-
CH. V.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 49
52. There are expressions, however, which have the appear-
ance of solecisms, and yet cannot be called faulty, as tragaedia
Thyestes, Ludi Floralia, and Megalesia ; for though these
modes of expression have fallen into disuse in later times,
there was never any variation from them among the ancients.
They shall therefore be called figures ; figures more common
indeed among the poets, but allowable also to writers and
speakers in prose. 58. But a figure will generally have some-
thing right for its basis, as I shall show in that part of my
work which I just before promised.* Yet what is now called
a figure will not be free from the fault of solecism, if it be
used by any one unknowingly.f 54. Of the same sort, though,
as I have already said, they have nothing of figure, are names
with a feminine termination which males have, and those with
a masculine termination which females have. But of the
solecism I shall say no more ; for I have not undertaken to
write a treatise on grammar, though, as grammar met me in
my road, I was unwilling to pass it without paying my respects
to it. . -
55. In continuation, that I may follow the course which I
prescribeds to myself, let me repeat that words are either Latin
or foreign. Foreign words, like men, and like many of our
institutions, have come to us, I might almost say, from all
nations. 56. I Say nothing of the Tuscans, Sabines, and
prehensionis whius I understand words joined, not separated, or to be
distinguished by commas, according to our fashion. Spalding. Positio
Spalding is inclined to take in the sense of casus, on the supposition
that expressions somewhat similar to ludi Floralia, and others noticed
in the next section, were what Quintilian had in view ; but this notion
seems hardly compatible with the other words of the sentence, for, if
this were Quintilian's meaning, why should sequentia and priora be
particularly specified ? Turnebus seems to shoot nearer to the mark,
suggesting that Quintilian means such a mistake as a man would commit
in saying omnia priºs experiri qu&m armis sapientem decet instead
of arma. The French translator in Didot's edition, 1853, renders the
passage thus: “Il y á aussi solécisme, lorsque, dans une phrase Sans
division, les mots qui précèdent et ceux qui suivent, ne s'accordent
pas entre eux.”
* Book ix. c. 1–3. -
+ Spalding aptly quotes Seneca, Ep. 95: “A grammarian is not
ashamed if he commits a solecism knowingly ; he is ashamed if he
commits one unknowingly.”
# I: 4, 24. --
Ś See sect. 3.
50 QUINTILIAN. [B.I.
Praenestines, for though Lucilius attacks Vectius” for using their
dialect, as Pollio discovers Patavinity in Livy, I would con-
sider every part of Italy as Roman. 57. Many Gallic words
have prevailed among us, as rheda, “a chariot,” and pelorri-
tum, “a four-wheeled carriage,”f of which, however, Cicero
uses one, and Horace the other. Mappa, “a napkin,” too, a
term much used in the circus, the Carthaginians claim as theirs;;
and gurdus, a word which the common people use for foolish,
had, I have heard, its origin in Spain. § 58. But this division|
of mine is intended to refer chiefly to the Greek language ;
for it is from thence that the Roman language is, in a very
great degree, derived; and we use even pure Greek words,
where our own fail, as they also sometimes borrow from us.
Hence arises the question, whether it is proper that foreign
words should be declined with cases in the same way as our
own. 59. If you meet with a grammarian who is a lover of
the ancients, he will say that there should be no departure from
the Latin method; because, as there is in our language an
ablative case, which the Greeks have not, it is by no means
becoming for us to use one case of our own, and five Greek
cases. 60. And he would also praise the merit of those who
studied to increase the resources of the Latin language, and
asserted that they need not introduce foreign practices; under
the influence of which notion they said Castörem, with the
middle syllable long, because such was the case with all our
nouns whose nominative case ends in the same letters as
Castor; and they retained the practice, moreover, of saying
Palaemo, Telamo, and Plato (for so Cicero also called him),
because they found no Latin word that terminated with the
* Camerarius and Turnebus suppose that this is the orator Vectius,
or Vettius, mentioned by Cicero, Brut. c. 46, as his contemporary; but
he, as Spalding observes, was a Marsian; and the Vectius attacked by
Lucilius must have lived before Cicero's time. Who the Vectius men-
tioned in the text was, is, therefore, uncertain.
f Vossius derives rheda from the German or Belgic reden, or ryden,
“to ride” on horseback, or in a carriage ; but what sort of carriage it
properly meant is unknown. Petorritum, as Spalding observes, refer-
ring to Bulletus's Celtic Lexicon, is from the Celtic pedwar, “four,”
and rit, “a wheel.”
i: The learned have not yet penetrated to its Phoenician origin.
Spalding.
§ The Spaniards, says Vossius, have still the word gordo, “fat.”
| The division of words into native and foreign, sect. 55. -
CH. V.] . EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 51
letters o and n. 61. Nor did they willingly allow masculine
Greek mouns to end in as in the nominative case, and accord-
ingly, we read in Caelius, Pelia Cincinnatus;* in Messala,
Bene fecit Euthia ;t in Cicero, Hermagora; so that we need
not wonder that the forms AEnea and Anchisa were used by
most of the old writers: for, said they, if those words were
written as Maecenas, Suffenas, Asprenas, they would end in
the genitive case, not with the letter e, but with the syllable
tis. 62. Hence, to Olympus and tyrannus they gave an acuted
middle syllable, because our language does not permit the first
syllable of a word, if short, to have an acute accent when two
long syllables follow.j: 62. Thus the genitive had the forms
Achilli and Ulixi :$ and many others similar. The modern
grammarians have now made it a practice rather to give
Greek declensions to Greek nouns; a practice which cannot,
however, always be observed. For myself, I prefer following
the Latin method, as far as propriety allows; for I would not
now say Calypsonem, like Junonem, though Caius Caesar,
* Whether these are the words of Caelius, Cicero's contemporary, an
orator of some eminence, who is mentioned by Quintilian, i. 6, 29; iv.
2, 123, or of the historian Caelius Antipater, who lived in the time of
the Gracchi, no commentator has told us ; nor does it appear why
Pelias, who seems to have been the father of Alcestis, so well known
from the history of Jason, is called Cincinnatus, since nothing is said
about his hair, as far as I remember, by any of the poets. That
Quintius Cincinnatus, the famous dictator, was named a cincinnis, from
his curls, is generally admitted. Spalding. -
+ Of whom Messala thus spoke, we are ignorant ; and I know no
mention of a Euthia in any writer, except that the accuser of Phryne,
against whom Hyperides defended her, had that name, Spalding.
† Inde Olympo et tyranno acutam media/m dedērunt, quia dwabws
longis sequentibus primam brevem acwt moster sermo non patitur..] Here
is a manifest error, not of the transcribers, as it would appear, but of
Quintilian himself, from inadvertence. At first he seems to have had
in his thoughts the difference between the Roman and the Greek
method of pronunciation; as the Romans would Bay, 'OXüpatroc,
rvpavvoc, instead of the Greek "OXupatroc, ripavvog : but having
chanced to put those words in the dative, to suit dederunt, he accom-
modated his rule (as to two long syllables preceded by a short one) to
that case, forgetting that it was a law of the Greek language as much
as of the Latin. In the manuscripts there is no assistance, for they all
concur, with wonderful exactness, in the received reading. Spalding.
§ From the nominatives Achilleus and Ulysseus, by synaeresis.
Turnebws. -
| In his books de Analogia, now lost, as learned men have very
justly supposed. Spalding. 2
E
52 QUINTILIAN. [B. I.
following the older writers, uses this mode of declining. 64.
But custom has prevailed over authority. In other words,
which may be declined without impropriety in either way, he
who shall prefer to use the Greek form will speak, not indeed
like a Roman, but without incurring blame.
65. Simple words are what they are in their first position,”
that is, in their own nature. Compound words are either
formed by subjoining words to prepositions, as innocens, (care
being taken that there be not two prepositions inconsistent
with each other, as imperterritus, f otherwise two may be at
times joined together, as incompositus, reconditus, and, a word
which Cicero uses, subabsurdum;) or they coalesce, as it were,
from two bodies into one, as maleſicus. 66. For to form words
out of three constituent parts I should certainly not grant to
our language ; though Cicero says that capsis is compounded of
cape si vis; ; and some are found to maintain that Lupercalia
also consists of three parts of speech, luere per caprum."
67. As to solitawrilia, it is now believed that it is for suove-
taurilia, and such indeed is the sacrifice, as it is described
also in Homer. ‘Iſ But these words are constructed, not so
much of three words, as of parts of three words. Pacuvius
* Primó positione.] That is, in their nominative case, the form in
which they are first laid down. “Primitive nouns are called nomina
primae impositionis.” Turnebus.
+ Whether Quintilian forgot that Virgil had used this word, or did
not think that even Virgil's authority could justify the use of it, we
cannot tell. It is not perhaps strictly defensible; for after per has
been used to increase the signification of territus, in is prefixed to
negative both ; so that it is merely equivalent to interritus, the per
being rendered useless. But it is not much more objectionable than
imperturbatus, used by Ovid ; and imperfectus is a similar compound.
From Virgil it was adopted by Silius Italicus and others. -
:: Orat. c. 45. Yet perhaps the great man was mistaken, as he is
more than once in regard to etymology ; for neither does Quintilian
agree with him. Capsis appears to be an archaism for ceperis, as capsit,
according to Festus or Paulus, is for ceperit, i.e., prehenderit. In
Plautus, Poenul. iv. 3, 6, the MSS. and old editions give ceperit for
capsit from a gloss. So capso, Bacchid. iv. 4, 61 ; capsimus, Rud. ii. 1,
15. Spalding. -
§ It is generally supposed to be from Lupercus, a name of Pan, or a
priest of Pan. Lupercus is thought to be lupos arcews. j
| From sus, ovis, and taurus. Quintilian admits that this is the
sºnerally received derivation, though he himself does not sanction it.
§olitawrilia is from solus, for totus, and taurus.
* Odyss. xi. 130 ; xxiii. 277.
CH. v.] . |EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 53
however appears to have formed compounds, most inelegantly,
of a preposition and two other words: -
We're?
Bepandºrostrum, incurvicervicum pecus,
“The broad-nosed, crook-necked flock of Nereus.” Com-
pounds, however, are formed either of two entire Latin words,
as superfui, subterfugi, (though it is a question whether these
are indeed formed of entire words,”) of an entire and in-
complete word, as malevolus ; of an incomplete and entire
word, as noctivagus; of two incomplete words, as pedissequus ;
of a Latin and a foreign word, as biclinium ; of a foreign and
a Latin word, as epitogium and Anticato ; or of two foreign
words, as epirhedium, for though the preposition #7) is Greek,
and rheda Gallic, and though neither the Greek nor the Gaul
uses the compound, yet the Romans have formed their word of
the two foreign words. 69. Frequently, too, the union causes a
change in the prepositions, as abstulit, awfugit, amisit, though
the preposition is merely ab, and coit, the preposition being
con; and so ignavi, erepti, and similar compounds. 70. But the
composition of words in general is better suited to the Greeks;
with us it is less successful; though I do not think that this
results from the nature of the language; but we look with more
favour on foreign compounds; and, accordingly, while we ad-
mire zvgro.5%ayo, we hardly defend incurvicervicum from
derision.
71. Words are proper when they signify that to which they
were first applied; metaphorical, when they have one signifi-
cation by nature, and another in the place in which they are
used. Common words we use with greater Safety; new ones
we do not form without some danger; for if they are well re-
ceived, they add but little merit to our style, and, if rejected,
they turn to jokes against us. 72. Yet we must make
attempts; for, as Cicero says, even words which have seemed
harsh at first, become softened by use.
As to the onomatopoeia, it is by no means granted to our
* The prepositions super and subter have indeed lost their accent in
these compound words; see sect. 27. But if any one supposes that
they are therefore not compounded of entire words, he must deny that
any compound is formed of entire words, since one of the words must
necessarily lose its accent. Spalding. This explanation was suggested
by Gesner.
.
i
t
54. QUINTILIAN. [B. I.
language; for, if we should venture to produce anything like
those justly admired expressions Xíyás 8162, “the bow twanged,”
and of's 39002066,” “the eye hissed,” who would endure it 2
We should not even dare to say balare, “to bleat,” or hin-
nire, “to neigh,” unless those words were supported by the
Sanction of antiquity. f
A.
'Z
CHAPTER VI.
Of language, § 1–3. Analogy, 4–11. Departures from it, 12–27.
Etymology, 28–33. Abuses of it, 34–38. Old words, 39–41.
Authority, 42. Custom, 43–45. -
A 1. By speakers, as well as writers, there are certain rules to
be observed. Language is based on reason, antiquity, autho-
rity, custom. It is analogy, and sometimes etymology, that
affords the chief support to reason. A certain majesty, and, if
I may so express myself, religion, graces the antique. Autho-
rity is commonly sought in orators or historians ; for, as to the
poets, the obligation of the metre excuses their phraseology,
unless, occasionally, when, though the measure of the feet
offers no impediment to the choice of either of two expressions,
they fancifully prefer one to the other ; as in the following
phrases: Imo de Stirpe recisum, AE8ria quo congessere palum-
bcs, Silice in nudá,t and the like ; since the judgment of men
eminent in eloquence is in place of reason, and even error is
without dishonour in following illustrious guides. Custom,
however, is the surest preceptor in speaking; and we must use
hraseology, like money, which has the public stamp.
But all these particulars require great judgment, especially
|analogy; which, translating it closely from Greek into Latin,
people have called proportion. 4. What it requires is, that a
writer or speaker should compare whatever is at all doubtful,
with something similar concerning which there is no doubt, so
as to prove the uncertain by the certain. This is done in two
* Il. iv. 125; Odyss, ix. 394.
+ Virg. Æn. xii. 208; Ecl. iii. 69; i. 15. Yet, with regard to stirps,
Virgil adheres to the rule of the grammarians, that it is masculine
when used of trees, feminine when used of persons. Palumbes is
feminine in Horace. Silea, was more frequently used in the masculine
gender. +.
CH. VI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 55
ways: by a comparison of similar words, in respect chiefly
to their last syllables (for which reason the words that have but
one syllable are said not to be accountable to analogy), and by
looking to diminutives. 5. Comparison, in nouns, shows
either their gender or their declension; their gender, as, when
it is inquired whether funis be masculine or feminime, panis
may be an object of comparison with it ; their declension, as,
if it should be a subject of doubt whether we should say hac
domu or hac domo, and domuum or domorum, domus, anus,
manus may be compared with each other. 6. The formation
of diminutives shows only the gender of words, as (that I may
take the same word for an example) funiculus proves that funis
is masculine. 7. There is also similar reason for comparison
in verbs; as if any one, following the old writers, should pro-
nounce fervere with the middle syllable short, he would be
convicted of speaking incorrectly, since all verbs which end
with the letters e and o in the indicative mood, when they
have assumed the letter e in the middle syllables in the infini-
tive, have it necessarily long, as prandeo, pendeo, spondeo,
prandëre, pendere, spondere. 8. But those which have o
only in the indicative, when they end with the same letter e in
the infinitive, shorten it, as lego, dico, curro, legere, dicere,
currere ; although there occurs in Lucilius,
Fervit agua et fervet ; fervit numc, fervet ad annum.
“The water boils and will boil; it boils now, and will boil for a year.”
But with all respect to a man of such eminent learning, if
he thinks fervit similar to currit and legit, fervo will be a word
like curro and lego, a word which has never been heard by
me. But this is not a just comparison; for servit is like
fervit,” and he that follows this analogy must say fervire as
well as servire. 10. The present indicative also is sometimes
discovered from the other moods and tenses; for I remember
that some people who had blamed me for using the word
pepigi, were convinced by me of their error; they had allowed,
indeed, that the best authors had used pepigi, but denied that
analogy permitted its use, since the present indicative paciscor,
as it had the form of a passive verb, made in the perfect tense
pactus sum. 11. But I, besides adducing the authority of
* A very proper observation of Quintilian ; for when did the termi-
nation ervit belong to the third conjugation ? Spalding.
56 QUINTILIAN. [B. I.
orators and historians, maintained that pepigă was also Sup-
ported by analogy; for, as we read in the Twelve Fables, ni
ita pagunt, I found cadunt similar to pagunt, whence the
present indicative, though it had fallen into disuse through
time, was evidently pago, like cado ; and it was therefore
certain that we say pepigi like cecidi. 12. But we must re-
member that the course of analogy cannot be traced through
all the parts of speech, as it is in many cases at variance with
itself.” Learned men, indeed, endeavour to justify some
departures from it, as, when it is remarked how much lepus and
lupus, though of similar terminations in the nominative, differ
in their cases and numbers, they reply that they are not of the
Same sort, since lepus is epicene, and lupus masculine;
although Varro, in the book in which he relates the origin of
the city of Rome, uses lupus as feminine, following Ennius and
Fabius Pictor. 13. But those same grammarians, when they
are asked why aper makes apri, and pater patris, assert that
the first is declined absolutely, and the second with reference
to something; t and, besides, as both are derived from the
Greek, they recur to the rule that Torgög gives patris, and
%rgov apri. 14. But how will they escape from the fact
that nouns, which end with the letters u and s in the nomina-
tive singular, never, even though feminime, end with the
syllable ris in the genitive, yet that Venus makes Veneris;
and that, though mouns ending in es have various endings in the
genitive, yet their genitive never ends in that same syllable ris,
when, nevertheless, Ceres obliges us to say Cereris 2 15. And
what shall I say of those parts of speech, which, though all of
similar commencement, proceed with different inflexions, as
Alba Ś makes Albani and Albenses, Volo, volui and volavi ?
* To say that analogy is at variance with itself is an incorrect mode
of expression. Quintilian means that we often find departures from
analogy where we might expect to see strict adherence to it. *
+ Ad aliquid.] A per being expressed without reference to anything
else, while pater has relation to filius ; but this distinction cannot
account for the difference in the genitive cases. Ad aliquid is taken
from the Troög ru in the Categories of Aristotle. “Ad aliquid dictum
est quod sine intellectu illius ad quod dictum est, proferri non potest,
ut filius, servus.” Priscian, p. 580, ed. Putsch. Spalding. -
† He forgot tellus, wris, as we are reminded by Turnebus.
§ There are two towns named Alba, one in Latium, from which
comes Albani, the other on the lake Fucinus, whose inhabitants are
called Albemses. Varro, de L. L. lib. vii. -
CH. VI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 57
For that verbs, which end with the letter oin the first person
singular, are variously formed in the perfect, analogy itself
admits, as cado makes cecidi, spondeo, Spopondi, pingo pinaci,
lego legi, pono posti, frango fregi, laudo laudavi ; 16. Since
analogy was not sent down from heaven, when men were first
made, to give them rules for speaking, but was discovered after
men had begun to speak, and after it was observed how each
word in speaking terminated. It is not therefore founded on
reason, but on example; nor is it a law for speaking, but the
mere result of observation; so that nothing but custom has
been the origin of analogy. 17. Yet some people adhere to it
with a most unpleasantly perverse attachment to exactness; so
that they will say audaciter in preference to audacter,” though all
Orators adopt the latter, and emicavit instead of emicuit, conire
instead of coire. Such persons we may allow to say audiwisse,
and scivisse,f tribunale, and faciliter; let them also have their
frugalis, instead of frugi, for how else can frugalitas be
formed ? 18. Let them also prove that centum millia nummum
and fidem Deum are two solecisms, since they err in both
case and number; for we were ignorant of this, forsooth, and
were not merely complying with custom and convenience, as in
most cases, of which Cicero treats nobly, as of everything else,
in his Orator. 19. Augustus, too, in his letters written to
Caius Cæsar, $ corrects him for preferring to say calidum rather
than caldum, not because calidum is not Latin, but because
it is unpleasing," and, as he has himself expressed it by a
Greek word, Tagſagyoy.
* See, respecting this word, the commentators on Livy, xxii. 25,
and especially Duker and Drakenborch on xl. 55. Spalding.
+ Yet audivisse and Scivisse, unless our texts be extremely corrupt,
have been used by writers in many passages. Perhaps Quintilian,
therefore, only meant to blame those who said that we ought always to
use those uncontracted forms; for Cicero, Orat. c. 47, says plenum
werbum rect3 dict et immºnwtwm usitate. Spalding.
# As if every body else, except those critics, was ignorant that
nºwmºm/wm is for nºwmºmorum, and dewm for deorwm. See Cic. Orat. c. 46.
Ś The son of Agrippa, and adopted son of Augustus, whose
letters to him are all lost, except a fragment preserved by Aulus
Gellius, xv. 7.
| Colomesius supposes that calidus was rejected on account of its
similarity in sound to callidus. - -
* Quia sit odiosum.] Burmann ingeniously conjectures quia i sit
otiosum. But the text is probably correct.
58 QUINTILIAN. [B. I.
iº
#
º
f
i
#.
f
ſ
Y
#
20. All this indeed they consider as mere gºogºrsio,
“orthoepy,” which I by no means set aside; for what is so
necessary as correctness of speech? I think that we ought to .
adhere to it as far as possible, and to make persevering resist-
ance against innovators; but to retain words that are obsolete
and disused, is a species of impertinence, and of puerile osten-
tation in little things. 21. Let the extremely learned man,
who has Saluted you without an aspirate, and with the second
syllable lengthened,” (for the verb, he will say, is avére,) say
also calefacere and conservavisse rather than what we say; +
and with these let him join face, dice, and the like. 22. His
way is the right way; who will deny it? but a smoother and
more beaten road is close by the side of it. There is nothing,
however, with which I am more offended, than that these men,
led away by oblique cases, permit themselves, I do not say not
to find, but even to alter nominative cases, as when ebur and
robur, so spoken and written by the greatest authors, are made
to change the vowel of the second syllable into o, because their
genitives are roboris and eboris, and because sulfur and jecur
preserve the vowel u in the genitive. For which reason also
jecur and femur have raised disputes. 23. This change of
theirs is not less audacious than if they were to substitute the
letter o for u in the genitive case of sulfur and guttur, because
eboris and roboris are formed with of after the example of
Antonius Gnipho, who acknowledges that robur and ebur are
proper words, and even marmur, but would have the plurals
of them to be robura, ebura, marmura. 24. But if they
had paid attention to the affinity of letters, they would have
understood that roboris is as fairly formed from robur as
militis, limitis, from miles, limes, or judicis, vindicis, from
iudex, vindex, and would have observed some other forms to
which I have adverted above.S. 25. Do not similar nominative
cases, as I remarked, diverge into very dissimilar forms in
* Saying Avé instead of Havé, which, though incorrect, was in
common use. Spalding.
ºf Namely calfacere and conservásse.
f An eminent grammarian and rhetorician, whose school is said
to have been frequented by many great men, and even by Cicero
himself after he was praetor. See Suetonius on Eminent Grammarians,
c. vii.; Macrob. Sat. iii. 12.
§ I. 4, 12.
| Sects. 12 and 15.
CH. VI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 59
the oblique cases, as Virgo, Juno ; fusus, lusus ; cuspis, puppis;
and a thousand others? It happens, too, that Some nouns are
not used in the plural, others not in the singular; some are
indeclinable; some depart altogether from the form of their
nominatives, as Jupiter. 26. The same peculiarity happens
in verbs, as fero, tuli, of which the preterperfect is found,”
and nothing more. Nor is it of much importance, whether
those unused parts are actually not in existence, or whether
they are too harsh to be used; for what, for example, will
progenies make in the genitive singular, or what will spes make
in the genitive plural? Or how will quire and ruere, form
themselves in the perfect passive, or in the passive participles?
27. It is needless to advert to other words, when it is even
uncertain whether senatus makes senatus senatuí, or senałł
senato.t. It appears to me, therefore, to have been not
unhappily remarked that it is one thing to speak Latin, and
another to speak grammar. Of analogy I have now said
enough, and more than enough.
Etymology, which inquires into the origin of words, is called
by Cicero notation, because its designation in Aristotle is
où000Xoy, that is, nota; for to a literal rendering of rug.07.0/ſo,
which would be veriloquium, Cicero himself, who formed that
word, is averse. There are some, who, looking rather to the
meaning of the word, call it origination. 29. This part of
grammar is sometimes of the utmost use ; as often, indeed, as
the matter, concerning which there is any dispute, stands in
need of interpretation; as when Marcus Coelius would prove
that he was a homo frugi, “a frugal man,” not because he was
temperate, (for on that point he could not speak falsely,) but
because he was profitable to many, that is fructuosus, from
whence, he said, was derived frugality. A place is accordingly
* The preterperfect and the tenses formed from it. The text is,
fero, tuli, cujus praeteritum perfectum, et ulterius non invenitºr, of which,
as Spalding says, the construction is not very clear. He, however,
rightly determines that tuli must be the antecedent to cujus, and not
unhappily proposes to read mil for non. *
† The old grammarians (see Putsch. pp. 10 and 712) say that the
nouns of the fourth declension anciently conformed to the second.
But I do not remember that any writer has used senato ; Senati, in the
genitive, occurs frequently in Sallust. Spalding.
f On what occasion, or in what speech, Marcus Coelius so facetiously
argued, I do not find recorded. That his morals were not of the
purest, Cicero, who defends him, admits. Spalding.
60 QUINTILIAN. [B.I.
assigned to etymology in definitions. 30. Sometimes, also,
it endeavours to distinguish barbarous from polite words; as
when a question arises whether Sicily should be called
Triquetra or Triquedra, * and whether we should say meridics
or medidies;f and similar questions concerning other words
which yield to custom. 31. But it carries with it much learn-
ing, whether we employ it in treating of words sprung from
the Greek, which are very numerous, especially those inflected
according to the AEolic dialect, to which our language has most
similitude, or in inquiring, from our knowledge of ancient
history, into the names of men, places, nations, cities; whence
come the names of the Bruti, Publicolae, Pici; why we say
Latium, Italia, Beneventum; what is our reason for using
the terms Capitol, Quirinal hill, and Argiletum. §
! 32. I would now allude, also, to those minuter points, on
ſwhich the greatest lovers of etymology weary themselves; men
iwho bring back to their true derivation," by various and mani-
#fold arts, words that have become a little distorted, shortening
or lengthening, adding, taking away, or interchanging letters
pr syllables. In this pursuit, through weakness of judgment,
they run into the most contemptible absurdities. Let consul be
(I make no objection) from “consulting” or from “judging,” for
the ancients called consulere “judicare,” whence still remains
the phrase rogat boni consulas, that is, bonum judices. 33.
Let it be old age that has given a name to the senate,” for the
Senators are fathers ; let reac, rector, and abundance of other
words, be indisputably from rego; nor would I dispute the
ordinary derivation of tegula, regula,ti and other words similar
* From éðpa 2 Or from quadra 2 Spalding.
+ Cicero, Orat. c. 47, thinks that meridies was preferred from regard
to euphony.
† See Foster on Accent and Quantity, p. 92, Seqq. Spalding refers
to a thesis by Schardamus, Leidae, 1776, entitled Latina lingua est
dialectus lingwº Graeca. * *
§ See Servius on Virg. AEn. viii. 345; Livy i. 19.
| These remarks Quintilian directs at Varro, who addressed three
books on this subject to Cicero, and as many to Septimius, as well as
other writers who were perpetually referring to etymology, a practice
which seems to have had its origin in Plato's Cratylus, where it is
said that no word is used without a reason. Twrºebus.
* Veritatem.] "Etvgov. So Cic. Orat. c. 48. Consule veritatem.
* Senectus.]
++. The quantity of the first syllable of these words might seem to
make the received derivation from tego and rego doubtful. Spalding.
CH. VI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. - 61
to them ; let classis, also, be from calare, “to call together,”
and let lepus be for levipes, and vulpes for volipes. 34. But
shall we also allow words to be derived from contraries, as
lucus, “a grove,” from luceo, “to shine,” because, being thick
with shade, parum lucet, it does not shine * As ludus, “a
school,” from ludo, “to play,” because it is as far as possible
from play ? As Ditis, “Pluto,” from dives, “rich,” because
he is by no means rich 2 Or shall we allow homo, “man,” to
be from humus, “ the ground,” because he was sprung from
the ground, as if all animals had not the same origin, or as if
the first men had given a name to the ground before they gave
one to themselves 2 Shall we allow verba, “words,” to be
from ačr verberatus, “beaten air 7”. 35. Det us go on, and
we shall get so far that stella, “a star,” will be believed to
be luminis stilla, “a drop of light,” the author of which
derivation, an eminent man in literature, it would be un-
generous for me to name in regard to a point on which he
is censured by me. 36. But those who have recorded such
etymologies in books have themselves set their names to
them; and Caius Granius+ thought himself extremely clever
for saying that calibes, “bachelors,” was the same as calites,
“inhabitants of heaven,” because they are alike free from
a most heavy burden, resting his derivation, too, on an ar-
gument from the Greek, for he affirmed that fiftéougi was
used in the same sense. Nor does Modestus; yield to him
In imagination, for he says that because Saturn cut off the
genitalia of Caelus, men who have no wives are, therefore,
called calibes. 37. Lucius AElius declares that pituita,
“phlegm,” is so called quia petat vitam, because “it aims
at life.” But who may not be pardoned after Varro, who
wished to persuade Cicero'ſ (for it was to him that he wrote
* This derivation has passed into a proverb. Varro, de L. L. p. 8,
gives an equally wonderful derivation of coelum, from celando, Quod
apertwm est. Spalding. 4.
f I have not been able to discover anything of a grammarian of
that name. Spalding.
: Quasi disi 0.86c Vossius derives caelebs from cottºm and X8tºrw, .
quasi koixlip, carens lecto nuptial.
Ś Suetonius on Eminent Grammarians, c. xx.
| An interpretation of the carmina Saliorum by Caius AElius, a man
well acquainted with Latin literature, is cited by Warro de L. L., vi. 1.
Gesner. No Lucius AElius is known.
* To whom the books de Linguà Latinâ are inscribed.
62 QUINTILIAN. - [B.I.
this), that ager, “a field,” is so called because in eo agatur
aliquid, “something is done in it,” and that graculos, “jack-
daws,” are so named because they fly gregatim, “in flocks,”
though it is evident that the one is derived from the Greek,
and the other from the cries of the birds themselves 2 But
of such importance was it to Varro to derive, that merula
“a blackbird,” he declared, was so named because it flies
alone, as if mera volans. Some have not hesitated to apply
to etymology for the origin of every name or word; deducing
Longus and Rufus, as I remarked,” from personal peculiarities;
strepere and murmurare from particular sounds; with which
they join, also, certain derivatives, as veloa, “swift,” deduced
from velocitas, “swiftness,”f and the greater number of com-
pounds (as being similar to them), which, doubtless, have their
origin from something, but demand no exercise of ingenuity,
for which, indeed, except on doubtful points, there is no
opportunity in these investigations.
39. Words derived from antiquity have not only illustrious
patrons, but also confer on style a certain majesty, not un-
attended with pleasure ; for they have the authority of age,
and, as they have been disused for a time, bring with them
a charm similar to that of novelty. 40. But there is need
of moderation in the use of them, in order that they may
not occur too frequently, nor show themselves too manifestly,
since nothing is more detestable than affectation ; nor should
they be taken from a remote and already forgotten age, as
are topper, “quickly,” antigerio, “very much,”; eacanclare, “to
draw out,” prosapia, “a race,” and the verses of the Salii,
which are scarcely understood by the priests themselves. 41.
Those verses, however, religion forbids to be changed ; and we
must use what has been consecrated ; but how faulty is speech,
of which the greatest virtue is perspicuity, if it needs an inter-
preter! Consequently, as the oldest of new words will be
the best, so the newest of old words will be the best.
* I. 4, 25. -
+ Ut a velocitate dicitur velox.] The substantive is generally con-
sidered to be derived from the adjective. It seems not unreasonable
to suppose thet the text must be corrupt, and that some fanciful
derivation of veloa, originally filled the place which velocitate now
occupies.
+ On these two words, see Festus.
CH. VI.] Ysgºw OF AN ORATOR. &
.63
Nº
42. The case is simir with regard to authority; for though
he may seem to commit no fault who uses those words which
the greatest writers have hāsded down to him, yet it is of
much importance for him to Čbusider, not only what words
they used, but how far they gave a sanction to them ; for
no one would now tolerate from us tuburchimabundus, “de-
vouring,” or lurchimabundus, “voracious,” though Cato was the
father of them ; nor would people endure lodices, “blankets,”
in the masculine gender, though that gender Spleases Pollio;
nor gladiola for “little swords,” though Messala Naas used it;
nor parricidatus, “parricide,” which was though scarcely
endurable in Caelius;* nor would Calvust induce me to use
collos, “necks;” all which words, indeed, those authors them-
Selves would not now use.
... , 43. There remains, therefore, custom, for it would be almost
ridiculous to prefer the language which men have spoken rather
than that which they now speak; what else, indeed, is old
language, but the old manner of speaking 2 But even for
following custom judgment is necessary; and we must settle,
in the first place, what that is which we call custom ; 44. for if
custom be merely termed that which the greater number do, it
will furnish a most dangerous rule, not only for language, but,
what is of greater importance, for life. For where is there so
much virtue that what is right can please the majority ?: As,
therefore, to pluck out hairs, $ to cut the hair of the head in a
succession of rings, and to drink to eacess in the bath," what-
ever country those practices may have invaded, will not become
the custom, because no one of them is undeserving of censure,
though we bathe and clip our hair, and take our meals together
according to custom, so, in speaking, it is not whatever has
become a vicious practice with many, that is to be received as
a rule of language. 45. For, not to mention how the ignorant
* I understand the historian. Spalding.
+ Caius Licinius Calvus, the Orator, mentioned with commendation
by Cicero, Brut. c. 82. See Wetzel on Epist, ad Div. xv. 21. He is
often mentioned by Quintilian. Spalding.
f Oi TrAstovec kakoi, said Bias. -
$ Welli.] The extremely delicate plucked the hair from their skins
with tweezers, or removed it by other means. Juv. Sat, viii. 114;
Sueton. Caes. 45, Oth. 12, et alibi; Aul. Gell. vii. 12.
| Compare xii. 19, 47; Juvenal, vi. 502; Suet. Ner. 51.
"I Lampridius, Commod. c. 11 : In ipsis balneis edebat.



64 ,-- __” QUINTILIAN. / [B. I.
2"
2^ ... --
commonly speak, we know that whole theatres, and all the
a crowd of the circus, have freqJ26tly uttered barbarous ex-
clamations.” Custom in speg)’ſng, therefore, I shall call the
agreement of the educated?' as I call custom in living the
agreement of the good.
CHAPTER VII.
Of orthography, § 1. Distinction of words of doubtful signification,
22–6. Composition with prepositions, 7–9. On the letter k,
10. Orthography subservient to custom ; antique spelling, 11–
27. Difference between spelling and pronunciation, 28, 29. Ne-
cessity of judgment, 30–32. Quintilian defends his remarks on
this subject, 33–35. -
1. SINCE we have mentioned what rules are to be followed
in speaking, we must now specify what are to be observed by
writers. What the Greeks call gºoygopio, we may call the
art of writing correctly; an art which does not consist in
knowing of what letters every syllable is composed (for this
study is beneath the profession even of the grammarian), but
exercises its whole subtilty, in my opinion, on dubious points.
2. As it is the greatest of folly to place a markt on all long
syllables, since most of them are apparent from the very
nature of the word that is written, yet it is at times necessary
to mark them, as when the same letter gives sometimes one
sense and sometimes another, according as it is short or long;
thus malus is distinguished by a mark, to show whether it
means “a tree" or “a bad man;” 3. palus, too, signifies one
thing when its first syllable is long, and another when its
Second is so; and when the same letter is short in the
nominative and long in the ablative, we have generally to
be informed by this mark which quantity we are to adopt.
* The customary language of the multitude, therefore, is not to be
our example. }
tº Apicern..] Probably, from the name, something similar to the
mark with which we distinguish the ablative case of the first declen-
Sion. Hence it appears that it was customary to use distinctive marks
for words similarly spelled, but of different signification,


CH. VII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR, 65
4. Grammarians have in like manner thought that the
following distinction should be observed ; namely, that we
should write the preposition ear, if the word specto was com-
pounded with it, with the addition of s in the Second syllable,
ea’specto ; if pecto, without the s. 5. It has been a distinction,
also, observed by many, that ad, when it was a preposition,
should take the letter d, but when a conjunction, the letter
t;* and that cum, if it signified time, should be written with
a q and two u's following, but if it meant accompaniment,
with a c. 6. Some other things were even more trifling than
these, as that quicquid should have a c for the fourth letter,
lest we should seem to ask a double question,f and that we
should write quotidie, not cotidie, to show that it was for quot
diebus. But these notions have already passed away among
other puerilities. -
7. It is however a question, in writing prepositions, whether
it is proper to observe the sound which they make when joined
to another word, or that which they make when separate, as,
for instance, when I pronounce the word obtinuit : for our
method of writing requires that the second letter should be b ;
while the ear catches rather the sound of p > f 8. or when I say
immunis, for the letter n, which the composition of the word
requires, is influenced by the sound of the following syllable,
and changed into another m. 9. It is also to be observed, in
dividing compound words, whether you ought to attach the
middle consonant to the first or to the second syllable ; for
aruspew, as its latter part is from spectare, will assign the
letter s to the third syllable; abstemius, as it is formed of ab-
stinentia temeti, “abstinence from wine,” will leave the s to the
first syllable. 10. As to k, I think it should not be used in
any words, except those which it denotes of itself, so that it
may be put alone.S This remark I have not omitted to make,
because there are some who think k necessary when a follows;
though there is the letter c, which suits itself to all vowels.
* The distinction, therefore, between ad and at, which we scrupu-
lously observe, I should suppose that Quintilian disregarded. Spalding.
f Quid 2 quid 3
# In manuscripts we frequently find optinere, which is proved from
this passage to be not always a mistake of the copyists. It is indeed
difficult to preserve the grave sound of 5 when t follows; before d, as
in obducere, it is very easy. Spalding.
§ See i, 4, 9.
H'
66 QUINTILIAN. [B. I.
11. But Orthography submits to custom, and has therefore fre-
quently been altered. I say nothing of those ancient times when
there were fewer letters, and when their shapes were different
from these of ours, and their natures also different, as that of o
among the Greeks, which was sometimes long and sometimes
short, and, as among us, was sometimes put for the syllable
which it expresses by its mere name.* 12. I say nothing also
of d, among the ancient Latins, being added r as the last
letter to a great number of words, as is apparent from the
rostral pillar erected to Caius Duellius in the forum ; ; nor
nor do I speak of g being used in the same manner, as, on
the pulvinar || of the Sun, which is worshipped near the temple
of Romulus, is read vesperug, which we take for vesperugo.
13. Nor is it necessary to say anything here of the interchange
of letters, of which I have spoken above;* for perhaps as they
wrote they also spoke.
* That is, for the interjection.
ºf Ut—d—ultimam adjectam.] How is this accusative governed ? E:
seems to be wanting after wt : ut et (transeo Sc.) d ultimam, &c.
† This we may ourselves see, as the base of this ancient monument
has been preserved even to our times, and a representation of it is
given in a treatise by Peter Ciacconius, whence Graevius has copied it
into his Florus, p. 156; and it is also to be found in Gruter, p. 404.
The letters are not yet obliterated; and we read pugnandod for pug-
mando marid for maró - dictatored for dictatore ; in altod for in alto ;
navaled praedad for naval; praedd. More examples are given by Vossius,
Art. Gramm. ii. 14. Spalding.
Ś Of this addition I find no example in monumental inscriptions;
and Quintilian himself appears to intimate that it was more rare than
the preceding. It is probable that the ancients, instead of vespere,
used vesperu, like moctu, an ablative case, as is proved, from Ennius, by
Vossius, de Anal. ii. 12. To this they added g, vesperug, which the
contemporaries of Quintilian erroneously supposed (for Quintilian
himself rejects the supposition) to be for vesperuginem, regarding it as
a curtailed instead of a lengthened word. Spalding.
| In what sense Quintilian uses this word is by no means clear.
That the letters were embroidered on the pulvimar, or couch, with the
needle, as Gesner in his Thesaurus supposes, seems a conjecture quite
inadmissible; but there were pulvinvaria made of solid material, in
imitation of real couches, on which the letters might have been
engraved. But it appears best to take pulvinar in the sense of a
temple in which pulvinaria were spread. In Livy xxi. 62, we may
Suppose pulvimariwm to be used in this sense ; and we may also refer
to Tacitus, Ann. xv. 74. Spalding. This sense of the word is
abundantly established in Scheller's Latin Lexicon. w
*] I, 4, 12–17.
CH. VII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR 67
14. It was for a long time a very common custom not to
double the semivowels; while, on the other hand, even down
to the time of Accius and later, they wrote, as I have re-
marked,” long syllables with two vowels. 15. Still longer
continued the practice of using e and i together, joining them
in the same manner as the Greeks in the diphthong ai. This
practice was adopted for a distinction in cases and numbers,
as Lucilius + admonishes us:
Jam pueri venere : E postremum facito, atque J,
Vt puerei plures fiant ::
and afterwards,
Mendaci furique addes E, Qww.m. dare fure;
JusSeris.S
However this addition of e is both superfluous, since i has the
nature as well of a long as of a short letter, and also sometimes
inconvenient; for in those words which have e immediately
before the last syllable, and end with i long, we should use, if
we adopted that method, a double e, as awreei, argenteei, and
the like; and this would be extremely embarrassing to those
who are being taught to read; 17. as happens also among the
Greeks by the addition of the letter i, which they not only
write at the end of dative cases, but sometimes even in the
middle of a word, as AHIXTHI, because etymology, in making
a division of the word into three syllables, requires that letter.
18. The diphthong ou, for the second letter of which we now
Substitute e, our ancestors expressed, with a varied pronuncia-
.* I. 4, 10.
+ He wrote rules of grammar in verse. Regius. Whether these
remarks on grammatical points were introduced among his satires, or
were separate compositions, critics cannot inform us.
£ That is, “Now the boys (pueri) are come ; make the conclusion e
and t, that the boys (puerei) may be made plural.” The e was inserted
to distinguish the plural from the genitive singular.
Ś Spalding considers that fur is used in the quotation in the sense
of Servus. If so, the sense will be, “To a liar and a slave (mendac?
furique) you shall add e, when you shall order to give to a slave;” i.e.,
when you shall use the dative case, which was to end in ei to dis-
tinguish it from the ablative. See Velius Longus, Putsch. p. 2220 ;
Atul. Gell. xiii. 25. -
|| For Agorj, the dative case of Ayothc, a robber. Gryphius's
edition, for in tres syllabas, has in dwas syllabas, which Burmann
Would adopt, making the division Ant—orji, or Ag—gri. The first
syllable of the word requires an iota, as coming from Xsia, “booty.”
F 2
68 QUINTILIAN. - [B, I.
tion, by a and i, some using it in all cases like the Greeks,
others only in the singular, when they had to form a genitive
or dative case, whence Virgil, a great lover of antiquity, has
inserted in his verses pictai vestis, and aula; ; but in the plural
number of such nouns they use e, as Syllae, Galbae. 19. There
is on this point also a precept of Lucilius,” which, as it is ex-
pressed in a great number of verses, whoever is incredulous
about it may seek in his ninth book.
20. I may mention, too, that in the time of Cicero, and some-
what later, the letters, as often as it occurred between two long
vowels, or followed a long vowel, was doubled, as caussa, cassus,
divissiones; for that both he and Virgil wrote in this way, their
own hands show. 21. But those of a somewhat earlier period
wrote the word jussi, which we express with two s's, with only
one. That optimus, maarimus, should take i as their middle letter,
which among the ancients was u, is said to have been brought
about by an inscription to Caius Caesar.f 22. The word here we
now end with the letter e ; but I still find in the books of the
old comic writers Heri ad me venit; if which same mode of
spelling is found in the letters of Augustus,S which he wrote
or corrected with his own hand, 23. Did not Cato the
Censor, also, for dicam and faciam, write dicem and faciem 3 ||
and did he not observe the same method in other verbs which
terminate in a similar way ? This is indeed manifest from his
old writings, and is remarked by Messala in his book on the
letter s. Sibe and quase occur in the writings of many
authors; but whether the authors themselves intended them
to be written thus, I do not know ; that Livy spelled them in
that way, I learn from Pedianus, who himself imitated Livy;
we end those words with the letter 7.
25. Why need I allude to vortices and vorsus and other
* This precept is lost. It seems to have been similar to that of
Nigidius Figulus, which we find in Aul. Gell. xiii. 25. Spalding.
f Caligula, who first adopted this title of optimus maximus ; Sueton.
c. 22. The same mode of spelling continued, as appears from an
inscription to Trajan in Gruter, p. 247, and Reines. iii. 13, 15. Bur-
777,0.70/??). º
† Seei. 4, 8. Terence, Phorm. i. 1, 2.
§ See i. 6, 19. Sueton. Aug. c. 71 ; Cal. c. 8. See also Aul. Gell.
x. 24.
| Festus gives recipiem also from Cato; and attingem, but without
naming the author from whom it comes.
CH, VII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 69
similar words, in which Scipio Africanus is said to have first
changed the second letter into e? 26. Our tutors wrote
ceruum and seruum with the letters u and o, ceruom, seruom,
in order that the same two vowels, following each other, might
not coalesce and be confounded in the same Sound ; they are
now written with two us, on the principle which I have
stated ;” though in neither way is the word which we conceive
exactly expressed. Nor was it without advantage that
Claudius introduced the AEolic letterf for such cases 27. It
is an improvement of the present day that we spell cui with
the three letters which I have just written; for in this word,
when we were boys, they used, making a very offensive sound,
qu and oi, only that it might be distinguished from qui.
28. What shall I say, too, of words that are written other-
wise than they are pronounced? Gaius is spelled with the
letter c, which, inverted, means a woman ; for that women
were called Caia, as well as men Caii, appears even from our
nuptial ceremonies. 29. Nor does Gneius assume that letter, in
designating a praenomen, with which it is sounded. § We read,
too, columna and consules | with the letter n omitted; and
Subura, when it is designated by three letters, takes c as the
third." There are many other peculiarities of this kind; but I
fear that those which I have noticed have exceeded the limits
of So unimportant a subject. - - -
30. On all such points let the grammarian use his own
judgment, for in this department it ought to be of the greatest
authority. For myself, I think that all words, (unless custom
has ordered otherwise,) should be written in conformity with
their sound. 31. For this is the use of letters, to preserve
* See i. 4, 11.
+ See i. 4, 7.
† In which the woman said, Ubi tu Caius, ibi ego Caia.
§ For it is marked Cº., not, as it ought to be, Gn. Spalding. But
he is inclined, not without reason, to think the words in praenominis
notă a glossema. i
| Spalding observes that he knows of no example of the omission
of n in columna. CoS. and Coss. were the ordinary abbreviations of
consul and consules. -
* Varro de Ling. Lat. lib. iv. derives Subwrra from a pagus called
Sucusanus, and supposes that it was originally Sucusa, that the c was
afterwards changed into b, and that Subusa was then transformed into
Suburra. We frequently see Suc., says Spalding, as the designation of
the Suburran or Sucusan tribe in the inscriptions of Gruter.
70 QUINTILLAN. [B. I.
words, and to restore them, like a deposit, to readers; and
they ought, therefore, to express exactly what we are to say.
32. These are the most important points as to speaking and
writing correctly. The other two departments, those of speak
ing with significancy * and elegance, I do not indeed take
away from the grammarians, but, as the duties of the rheto-
rician remain for me to explain, reserve them for a more
important part of my work.
33. Yet the reflection recurs to me, that some will regard
those matters of which I have just treated as extremely trifling,
and even as impediments to the accomplishment of anything
greater. Nor do I myself think that we ought to descend to
"extreme solicitude, and puerile disputations, about them; I even
consider that the mind may be weakened and contracted by
being fixed upon them. 34. But no part of grammar will be
hurtful, except what is superfluous. Was-Gigero the less of
an orator because he was most attentive to, the study of
grammar, and because, as appears from his letters, he was a
rigid exactor, on all occasions, of correct language from his
Son 2 Did the writings of Julius Cæsar On Analogy diminish
the vigour of his intellect? Or was Messala less elegant as a
writer, because he devoted whole books, not merely to single
words, but even to single letters? These studies are injurious,
not to those who pass through them, but to those who dwell
immoderately upon them.
CHAPTER VIII.
Of reading, § 1–4. Authors to be read, Greek and Latin, 4–12.
T)uty of the grammarian, 13–17. Of lectures on historical read-
ing, 18–21. ^.
1. READING remains to be considered; in which how a boy
may know when to take breath, where to divide a verse, f
* Significanter.] Spalding interprets this word by perspicué, clare.
But it signifies something more; it implies speaking with propriety,
using language Suited to the subject, and putting “proper words in
proper places.”
+ Versum distinguere.] That is, to divide a verse properly in reading,
so as not to run always on to the end of it, and there drop the voice.
That Quintilian is speaking of the reading of poetry, is apparent from
CH. VIII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 7 f.
where the sense is concluded, where it begins, when the voice:
is to be raised or lowered, what is to be uttered with any par-
ticular inflexion of sound, or what is to be pronounced with
greater slowness or rapidity, with greater animation or gentle-l
ness than other passages, can be taught only in practice. 2.;
There is but one direction, therefore, which I have to give ini
this part of my work, namely, that he may be able to do alo ;
this successfully, let him understand what he reads. . .
Let his mode of reading, however, be, above all, manly,
uniting gravity with a certain degree of sweetness; and let
not his reading of the poets be like that of prose; for it is.
verse, and the poets say that they sing; yet let it not
degenerate into sing-song, or be rendered effeminate with un-
natural Softness, as is now the practice among most readers;
on which sort of reading we hear that Caius Cæsar, while he
was still under age, observed happily to some one that was
practising it, “If you are singing, you sing badly; if you pre-
tend to read, you nevertheless sing.” 3. Nor would I have
prosopopeia, pronounced, as some would wish them, after the
manner of actors; though I think there should be a certain
alteration of the voice by which they may be distinguished
from those passages in which the poet speaks in his own
person. -
4. Other points * demand much admonition to be given on
them ; and care is to be taken, above all things, that tender
minds, which will imbibe deeply whatever has entered them.
while rude and ignorant of everything, may learn, not only
what is eloquent, but, still more, what is morally good. 5.
It has accordingly boen an excellent custom, that reading
should commence with Homer and Virgil, although, to
understand their merits, there is need of maturer judgment;
but for the acquisition of judgment there is abundance of time;
for they will not be read once only. In the meantime, let the
mind of the pupil be exalted with the sublimity of the heroic
verse, conceive ardour from the magnitude of the subjects, and
|
:
the next section; and he had previously, i. 4, 2, mentioned in-
struction in the reading of the poets as part of the grammarian's duty.
Spalding. -
* Besides the mere method of reading, caution is to be used as to
the subjects read; and moral instruction should be occasionally
introduced during the lesson, according as the matter may suggest it.
72 QUINTILIAN. * [B.I.
#
|a f{
be imbued with the noblest sentiments, 6. The reading of
tragedies is beneficial; the lyric poets nourish the mind, pro-
vided that you select from them, not merely authors, but
portions of their works; for the Greeks are licentious in
many of their writings, and I should be loath to interpret
Horace in certain passages. As to elegy, at least that which
treats of love, and hendecasyllables,” and poems in which
there are portions of Sotadic verses, (for concerning Sotadic
verses themselves no precept need even be mentioned,) let
them be altogether kept away, if it be possible; if not, let
them at least be reserved for the greater strength of mature.
age,t 7. Of comedy, which may contribute very much to
eloquence, as it extends to all sorts of characters and passions,
I will state a little further on, in the proper place, the good
which I think it may do to boys; when their morals are out of
danger, it will be among the Subjects to be chiefly read. It
is of Menander that I speak, though I would not set aside
other comic writers; for the Latin authors, too, will confer
some benefit. 8. But those writings should be the subjects of
lectures for boys, which may best nourish the mind and
enlarge the thinking powers; for reading other books, which
relate merely to erudition, advanced life will afford sufficient
time.
The old Latin authors, however, will be of great use, though
most of them, indeed, were stronger in genius than in art.
Above all they will supply a copia verborum ; while in their
tragedies may be found a weightiness of thought, and in their
comedies elegance, and something as it were of Atticism. 9.
There will be seen in them, too, a more careful regard to
regularity of structure than in most of the moderns, who have
considered that the merit of every kind of composition lies
solely in the thoughts. Purity, certainly, and, that I may so
express myself, manliness, is to be gained from them; since
we ourselves have fallen into all the vices of refinement, even
in our manner of speaking. 10. Let us, moreover, trust to
the practice of the greatest orators, who have recourse to the
* Under this name we understand chiefly Phalaecian verses, such as
“s.-
Catullus wrote. Twºmebus. "ºº-º-º-, .......... . . . . "
+ Quintilian seems to have been afraid of giving a pupil Sotadie
verses, and others of an effeminate character and full of trochaics,
gwod et molle quid Sonarent, et continerent plerwmgwe res obscaenas.
Spalding.
CH, VIII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 73
poems-of-the-afficients, as well for the support of their argu-
ments, as for the adornment of their eloquence. 11. For in
Cicero, most of all, and frequently, also, in Asinius, and
others nearest to his times, we see verses of Ennius, Accius,
Pacuvius, Lucilius, Terence, Cacilius, and other poets,
introduced, with the best effect, not only for showing the learns
ing of the speakers, but for giving pleasure to the hearers,
whose ears find in the charms of poetry a relief from the want-
of elegance in forensic pleading. 12. To this is to be added
no mean advantage, as the speakers confirm what they have
stated by the sentiments of the poets, as by so many testi- '
monies. But those first observations of mine have reference
rather to boys, the latter to more advanced students,” for the
love of letters, and the benefit of reading, are bounded, not by .
the time spent at school, but by the extent of life. -
13. In lecturing on the poets, the grammarian must attend
also to minor points; so that, after taking a Yerse to pieces,

merely for writing poetry, but even for prose composition; and
that he may distinguish what words are barbarous, or mis-
applied, or used contrary to the rules of the language; 14.
not that the poets may thus be disparaged, (to whom, as they
are commonly forced to obey the metre, so much indulgence
is granted, that even solecisms are designated by other names
in poetry, for we call them, as I have remarked, f metaplasms, *
schematisms, and schemata, i and give to necessity the praise
of merit,) but that the tutor may instruct the pupil in figura-
tive terms, Š and exercise his memory. 15. It is likewise
* Priora illa—haec sequentia.] The former are the directions which
Quintilian had given about the reading of the poets; the latter the
observations which he had made about the introduction of their verses
in prose composition. Spalding. But Spalding thinks that the words
priora and sequentia are mere interpretations which häve crept into
the text from the margin.
+ I. 5, 52. - -
f Metaplasmus is any change in the form of a word, effected by
aphaeresis, paragoge, or any other figure. Schematism? and Schemata.
have the same meaning ; and Spalding thinks it possible that the
former may have been introduced into the text by some incorrect
transcriber.
Ś Artificialium commonere.] That is, vocabula artis frequent w8w nota
reddere discentibus. Spalding, -
*
%
tº
74 - QUINTILIAN. [B. I.
useful, among the first rudiments of instruction, to show in
how many senses each word may be understood. About
glossemata, too, that is, words not in general use, no small
attention is requisite in the grammatical profession. 16. With
still greater care, however, let him teach all kinds of tropes,
from which not only poetry, but even prose, receives the
greatest ornament, as well as the two sorts of schemata or
figures, called figures of speech and figures of thought. My
observations on these figures, as well as those on tropes, I put
off to that portion of my work in which I shall have to speak
of the embellishments of composition. 17. But let the tutor,
above all things, impress upon the minds of his pupils what
merit there is in a just disposition of parts, and a becoming
treatment of subjects; what is well suited to each character;
what is to be commended in the thoughts, and what in the
words; where diffuseness is appropriate, and where contraction.
18. To these duties will be added explanations of historical
points, which must be sufficiently minute, but not carried into
supérfluous disquisitions; for it will suffice to lecture on facts
which are generally admitted, or which are at least related by
eminent authors. To examine, indeed, what all writers, even
the most contemptible, have ever related, is a proof either of
extravagant laboriousness, or of useless Ostentation, and chains
and overloads the mind, which might give its attention to other
things with more advantage. 19. For he who makes
researches into all sorts of writings, even such as are unworthy
to be read, is capable of giving his time even to old women's
tales. Yet the writings of grammarians are full of noxious
matters of this kind, scarcely known even to the very men who
wrote them. 20. Since it is known to have happened to
Didymus,” than whom no man wrote more books, that, when
he denied a certain story, as unworthy of belief, his own book
containing it was laid before him. 21. This occurs chiefly in
fabulous stories, descending even to what is ridiculous, and
sometimes licentious; whence every unprincipled grammarian
has the liberty of inventing many of his comments, so that he
may lie with safety concerning whole books and authors, as it
may occur to him, for writers that never existed cannot be
produced against him. In the better known class of authors
* He is said by Athenaeus, iv. p. 139, to have written three thousand
five hundred books; by Seneca, Ep. 88, four thousand.
CH. IX.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 75
they are often exposed by the curious. Hence it shall be
accounted by me among the merits of a grammarian to be
ignorant of some things.
CHAPTER IX.
Commencement of composition, § 1. AEsop's fables, 2. Sentences,
chrice, ethologiae, 3, 4, Narratives from the poets, 5.
1. Two of the departments, which this profession undertakes,
have now been concluded, namely, the art of speaking cor-
rectly, and the earplanation of authors; of which they call the
one methodice and the other historice. Let us add, however,
...to the business of the grammarian, some rudiments of the art
of speaking, in which they may initiate their pupils while still
too young for the teacher of rhetoric. 2. Let boys-learn, then,
to relate orally the fables of Æsop, which follow next after the
nurse's stories, in plain language, not rising at all above
mediocrity, and afterwards to express the same simplicity in
writing. Let them learn, too, to take to pieces, the verses of - .
the poets, and then to express them in different words; and
afterwards to represent them, somewhat boldly, in a paraphrase,
in which it is allowable to abbreviate or embellish certain parts,
provided that the sense of the poet be preserved. 3. He who
shall successfully perform this exercise, which is difficult even
for accomplished professors,” will be able to learn anything.
Tet sentences, also, and chria, and ethologies, # be written by
* I confess that I hesitate at this passage, doubting whether a work
which is difficult even consummatis professoribus, can properly be
imposed upon boys. I am inclined to think, therefore, that those
words must be taken as an ablative rather than a dative, in the sense
of “under the instruction of accomplished professors.” Yet such
construction is certainly harsh, and unlike that of Quintilian.
Spalding. -
+ “A sentence is the enunciation of some general proposition,
exhorting to something, or deterring from something, or showing
what something is.” Priscian, citing from Hermogenes, p. 1333, ed.
Putsch. “What the Greeks call xpsia, is the relation of some saying
or action, or of both together, showing its intention clearly, and
having generally some moral instruction in view.” Priscian, ib. p.
1332. “Of the ethologia,” says Spalding, “we cannot find any such
clear and exact definition.” It seems to have been a description or
illustration of the morals or character of a person.
76 QUINTILIAN. [B. T.
the learner, with the occasions of the sayings added according
to the grammarians, because these depend upon reading. The
nature of all these is similar, but their form different ; because
a sentence is a general proposition ; ethology is confined to
certain persons. 4. Of chria several sorts are specified: one
similar to a sentence, which is introduced with a simple state-
ment, He said, or He was accustomed to say: another, which
includes its subject in an answer: He, being asked, or, when
this remark was made to him, replied; a third, not unlike
the second, commences, When some one had, not said, but
done, something. 5. Even in the acts of people some think
that there is a chria, as, Crates, having met with an ignorant
boy, beat his tutor: and there is another sort, almost like this,
which, however, they do not venture to call by the same name,
but term it a x261%ag; as, Milo, having been accustomed to
carry the same calf every day, ended by carrying a bull.” In
all these forms the declension is conducted through the same
cases, f and a reason may be given as well for acts as for Say-
ings. Stories told by the poets should, I think, be treated by
boys, not with a view to eloquence, but for the purpose of
increasing their knowledge. Other exercises, of greater toil
and ardour, the Latin teachers of rhetoric, by abandoming
them, have rendered the necessary work of teachers of
grammar. The Greek rhetoricians have better understood the
weight and measure of their duties.
* This is an eacample, conveying something of the nature of moral
instruction ; it illustrates the effects of perseverance, and of the
regular discharge of any duty.
+ Per eosdem casus.] The margin of Gryphius has per omnes casus,
and so Philander admonishes us to read. The chria might commence
with any case ; thus, Cato diacit literarwm radices amaras esse, fructus
jucundiorcs. Catomis dictum fertwr literarum, &c. Caton; hoc dictum,
tribuilwr, &c. Catoncin diacisse forwnt, &c. Te, Cato, diacisse, &c. A
Catone olim dictum est, &c.
CH. X.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 77
CHAPTER X.
Of other studies preliminary to that of rhetoric, § 1. Necessity
of them, 2–8. Authority of the ancients in favour of learn-
ing music, 9–16. Union of music with grammar, 17–21.
Utility of music to the orator, 22–30. What sort of music to
be studied, 31–33. Utility of geometry, 34–37. Geometrical
proof, 38–45. Astronomy; examples of the benefit attending a
knowledge of it, 46–49.
1. THESE remarks I have made, as briefly as I could, upon
grammar, not so as to examine and speak of every thing,
which would be an infinite task, but merely of the most
essential points. I shall now add some concise observations
on the other departments of study, in which I think that boys
should be initiated before they are committed to the teacher of
rhetoric, in order that that circle of instruction, which the
Greeks call #yzúzXiog Totòsſo, may be completed.
2. For about the same age the study of other accomplish-
ments must be commenced ; concerning which, as they are
themselves arts, and cannot be complete without the art of
oratory,” but are nevertheless insufficient of themselves to
form an orator, it is made a question whether they are neces-
sary to this art. 3. Of what Service is it, Say Some people,
for pleading a cause, or pronouncing a legal opinion, to know
how equilateral triangles may be erected upon a given line 2 Or
how will he, who has marked the Sounds of the lyre by their
* Et esse perfecta, sine orand; scientiá won possunt.] Burmann, and
most of the recent editors, have et esse perfecta Sine his orandi scientia
mon potest, from a conjecture of Regius. Five manuscripts, says Bur-
mann, omit the mon, before possunt. But Spalding's reading, which is
that of the majority of the best manuscripts, seems to be right.
Burmann's would set aside all necessity for the following question:
an. Sint hºwic opera, necessariae, guaritºr : if the art of oratory could not
be perfect without those other arts or sciences, there would be no need
of inquiring whether those arts or sciences were necessary to the art of
oratory. What Quintilian says is, that those arts or sciences cannot
be perfect without the art of oratory, that is, that the art of oratory is
necessary to them, and that it is then to be inquired whether, they are
necessary to the art of oratory. Spalding's explanation is, that some
knowledge of language, or the art of oratory, is necessary to the
understanding and teaching of the arts; mathematics, for instance,
cannot be clearly and efficiently taught or studied without the aid of
correct language. -
78 QUINTILIAN. [B. I.
names and intervals, defend an accused person, or direct con-
Sultations, the better on that account 2 4. They may perhaps
reckon, also, many speakers, effective in every way in the
forum, who have never attended a geometrician, and who
know nothing of musicians except by the common pleasure of
listening to them. To these observers I answer in the first
place (what Cicero also frequently remarks in his book ad-
dressed to Brutus?), that it is not such an orator as is or has
been, that is to be formed by us, but that we have conceived
in our mind an idea of the perfect orator, an orator deficient
in no point whatever. 5. For when the philosophers would
form their wise man, who is to be perfect in every respect,
and, as they say, a kind of mortal god, they not only believe
that he should be instructed, in a general knowledge of divine
and human things, but conduct him through a course of
questions which are certainly little, if you consider thern
merely in themselves, (as, sometimes, through studied subtleties
of argument,) not because questions about hornst or crocodilest
can form a wise man, but because a wise man ought never to
be in error even in the least matters. 6. In like manner, it
is not the geometrician, or the musician, or the other studies
which I shall add to theirs, that will make the perfect orator
(who ought to be a wise man), yet these accomplishments will
contribute to his perfection. We see an antidote, for example,
and other medicines to heal diseases and wounds, compounded
of many and sometimes opposite ingredients, from the various
qualities of which results that single compound, which resem-
bles none of them, Š yet takes its peculiar virtues from them
* See the Orator ad M. Brutum, c. 1 and 29.
+ Ceratinae.] Sc. quastiones, captiones, ambiguitates. Puzzling ques-
tions, which seem to have had their name from the following syllo-
gism : “You have what you have not lost; but you have not lost
horns; therefore you have horns.” See Sen. Ep. Lib. v., and Politian,
Miscell. c. 54. -
+ Crocodilinge.] Named from the following question : A crocodile,
having seized a woman's Son, said that he would restore him to her, if
she would tell him truth; she replied, “you will not restore him ; ”
ought the crocodile to have restored the child or not ?
§ Earum.] There is nothing in the text to which this word can
properly be referred ; Spalding supposes that herbis has been lost from
between effectibws and componi, and that Qworwm should be altered into
quarvºm.
CH. X.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 79
all ; 7. mute, insects, too, compose the exquisite flavour of
honey, inimitable by human reason, of various sorts of flowers
and juices; and shall we wonder that eloquence, than which
the providence of the gods has given nothing more excellent
to men, requires the aid of many arts, which, even though they
may not appear, or put themselves forward, in the course of a
speech, yet contribute to it a secret power, and are silently
felt 7 8. “People have been eloquent,” some one may say,
“without these arts;” but I want a perfect orator. “They
contribute little assistance,” another may observe ; but that, to
which even little shall be wanting, will not be a whole; and
it will be agreed that perfection is a whole, of which though
the hope may be on a distant height as it were, yet it is for us
to suggest every means of attaining it, that something more, at
least, may thus be done. But why should our courage fail
us? Nature does not forbid the formation of a perfect orator;
and it is disgraceful to despair of what is possible. \
9. For myself, I could be quite Satisfied with the judgment
of the ancients; for who is ignorant that music (to speak of
that science first) enjoyed, in the days of antiquity, so much,
not only of cultivation, but of reverence, that those who were
musicians were deemed also prophets and Sages, as, not to
mention others, Orpheus and Linus, both of whom are trans-
mitted to the memory of posterity as having been descended
from the gods, and the one, because he soothed the rude and
barbarous minds of men by the wonderful effect of his strains,
as having drawn after him not only wild beasts, but even
rocks and woods. 10. Timagenes” declares that music was
the most ancient of sciences connected with literature; an
opinion to which the most celebrated poets give their support,
according to whom the praises of gods and heroes used to be
sung to the lyre at royal banquets. Does not Virgil's Iopas,
too, sing errantem lunam Solisque labores, “the wandering
moon, and labours of the sun;” the illustrious poet thus
plainly asserting that music is united with the knowledge of
* A friend of Asinius Pollio, mentioned also x. 1, 75. He was
disliked by Augustus for his freedom of speech, but was distinguished
for his merits as a historian. See L. Seneca de Irā, c. 23 ; M. Seneca,
Controv. xxxiv.; and Vossius, who has collected many particulars
concerning him, de Hist, Graec. i. 24. Spalding.
80 QUINTILIAN. [B.I.

#
divine things? If this position be granted, music will be
hecessary also for the orator; for, as I observed,” this part of
ſº which, after being neglected by Orators, has been
taken up by the philosophers, was a portion of our business,
and, without the knowledge of such subjects, there can be no
perfect eloquence.
# 12. Nor can any one doubt that men eminently renowned
for wisdom have been cultivators of music, when Pythagoras,
and those who followed him, spread abroad the notion, which
iſ they doubtless received from antiquity, that the world itself
# was constructed in conformity with the laws of music, which
the lyre afterwards imitated. 13. Nor were they content,
moreover, with that concord of discordant elements, which
they call &ggovío., “harmony,” but attributed even sound to
the celestial motions; for Plato, not only in certain other
passages, but especially in his Timaeus, cannot even be under-
stood except by those who have thoroughly imbibed the
principles of this part of learning. What shall I say, too, of
the philosophers in general, whose founder, Socrates himself,
was not ashamed, even in his old age, to learn to play on the
lyre? 14. It is related that the greatest generals used to
play on the harp and flute, and that the troops of the Lacedæ-
monians were excited with musical notes. What other effect,
indeed, do horns and trumpets produce in our legions, since
the louder is the concert of their sounds, so much greater is
the glory of the Romans than that of other nations in war?
15. It was not without reason, therefore, that Plato thought
music necessary for a man who would be qualified for engaging
in government, and whom the Greeks call Toxtrixóg. Even the
chiefs of that sect which appears to some extremely austere,
and to others extremely harsh, were inclined to think that
some of the wise might bestow a portion of their attention on
this study, Lycurgus, also, the maker of most severe laws
for the Lacedæmonians, approved of the study of music. 16.
Nature herself, indeed, seems to have given music to us as a
benefit, to enable us to endure labours with greater facility;
for musical sounds cheer even the rower; and it is not only
in those works, in which the efforts of many, while some
pleasing voice leads them, conspire together, that music is of
avail, but the toil even of people at work by themselves find
* Prooem. sect. 14. -
CH.X.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 81
itself soothed by song, however rude.* 17. I appear, however,
to be making a eulogy on this finest of arts, rather than con- ;
necting it with the orator. Let us pass lightly over the fact,
then, that grammar and musict were once united; since
Archytas and Aristoxenus, indeed, thought grammar compre-
hended under music; ; and that they themselves were teachers
of both arts, not only Sophron; shows, (a writer, it is true, only
of mimes, but one whom Plato so highly valued, that he is said
to have had his books under his head when he was dying,) but
also Eupolis, whose Prodamus teaches both music and gram-
mar, and Maricas, that is to say, Hyperbolus, confesses that
he knows nothing of music but letters. 18. Aristophanes,
also, in more than one of his comedies," shows that boys were
accustomed to be thus instructed in times of old; and, in the
Hypobolimaeus” of Menander, an old man, laying before a
father, who is claiming a son from him, an account as it were
of the expenses that he had bestowed upon his education, says
* Verse sweetens toil, however rude the sound;
All at her work the village maiden sings;
Nor, while she turns the giddy wheel around,
Revolves the sad vicissitudes of things. -
Repeated, from a forgotten volume of poems, by Johnson to Boswell.
“Croonin’ to a body's sel'.” ... •
said Burns,
“Does weel eneugh.” -
+ The ancients regarded chiefly the origin of the word musice (from
poiſoat), bestowing it on whatever contributed to the cultivation of the
mind; as gymnastice comprehended all that formed the exercise of the
body. These departments of instruction for youth are, however, fre-
quently mentioned, as by Xenophon de Republ. Lacedæm., Ypſippata,
povo.ukh, kai Tà év traXaig Tpg. Spalding.
f Music being understood in the sense given to it in the preceding
note, grammar would be a portion of it.
§ On Sophron, see Fabric. Bibl. Gr. p. 493, ed. Harles; and Smith's
ibiog. and Mythol. Dictionary. -
| Whether Prodamus was the name of a comedy, as Meursius
thinks, may be doubted; he was perhaps only one of the characters in
a drama. But that Maricas was the name of a comedy of Eupolis, is
well agreed among authors. There is an allusion to it in the Clouds
of Aristophanes, ver. 553, who intimates that the play was written to
expose Hyberbolus, a pestilent demagogue. Spalding.
"I Won who libro.] Spalding conjectures loco. That it is the dramatist
Aristophanes who is meant, he says, there can be no doubt ; but what
writer has ever applied the word liber to a play ?
** The Supposititious Son. -
G.
82 QUINTILIAN, [B.I.
that he has paid a great deal to musicians and geometers.
19. Hence too it was customary at banquets that the lyre
should be handed round after the meal; and Themistocles,
on confessing that he knew not how to play, “was accounted,”
to use the words of Cicero, “but imperfectly educated.”
Among the Romans, likewise, it was usual to introduce lyres
and flutes at feasts. The verses of the Salii also have their
tune; and these customs, as they were all established by
Numa, prove that not even by those, who seem to have been
rude and given to war, was the cultivation of music neglected,
as far as that age admitted it. 21. It passed at length,
indeed, into a proverb among the Gauls, that the uneducated
had no commerce either with the Muses or the Graces.
22. But let us consider what peculiar advantage he who is
to be an orator may expect from music. Music has two kinds
of measures, the One in the 80 unds of the voice,” the other in
the motions of the body; for in both a certain due regulation
is required. Aristoxenus the musician divides all that belongs
to the voice into 30%g, “rhythm,” and gºog #!/wergov, “me-
lody in measure;” of which the one consists in modulation,
the other in singing and tunes.f Are not all these ; qualifi-
cations, then, necessary to the Orator, the one of which relates
to gesture, the second to the collocation of words, and the
third to the inflexions of the voice, which in speaking are
extremely numerous 2 23. Such is undoubtedly the case;
unless we suppose, perchance, that a regular structure and
smooth combination of words is requisite only in poems and
Songs, and is superfluous in making a speech; or that com-
position and modulations are not to be varied in Speaking, as
in music, according to the nature of the subject. 24. Music,
* Quintilian is here speaking only with reference to an orator.
+ The one being ué\og áust gov, like that of an AEolian harp,
free and unmeasured melody; the other, the melody of any regular
tune or measure.
: He refers to all the parts of music that he has mentioned since
the commencement of sect. 22; and these parts are three ; the silent
music of graceful motion, the music of well arranged words, and
music in the modulation of the voice. Spalding.
§ Compositio et Sonus.], Spalding hesitates at the word compositio, and
would willingly eject it from the text, not seeing how it differs from
copulatio immediately preceding. Compositio, however, seems to refer
to the due blending of sounds; copulatio to the junction of words
without reference to their sounds,
CH. X.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 83
t
however, by means of the tone and modulation of the voice,
expresses sublime thoughts with grandeur, pleasant ones with
Sweetness, and ordinary ones with calmness, and sympathises
in its whole art with the feelings attendant on what is ex-
pressed. 25. In oratory, accordingly, the raising, lowering, or
other inflexion of the voice, tends to move the feelings of the
hearers; and we try to excite the indignation of the judges in
one modulation of phrase * and voice, (that I may again use
the same term,t) and their pity in another; for we see that
minds are affected in different ways even by musical instru
ments, though no words cannot be uttered by them.
26. A graceful and becoming motion of the body, also,
which the Greeks call giguºuſo, is necessary, and cannot be
Sought from any other art than music; a qualification on
which no small part of oratory depends, and for treating on
which a peculiar portion of our work is set apart.j AIf an
orator shall pay extreme attention to his voice, whât is so,
properly the business of music? But neither is this depart-
ment of my work to be anticipated; so that we must confine
ourselves, in the mean time, to the single example of Caius,
Gracchus, the most eminent orator of his time, behind whom,
when he spoke in public, a musician used to stand, and to give,
with a pitch-pipe, which the Greeks call royágoy, the tones in
which his voice was to be exerted. 28. To this he attended
even in his most turbulent harangues, both when he frightened
the patricians, and after he began to fear them. .
For the sake of the less learned, and those, as they say, “ of .
a duller muse,” I would wish to remove all doubt of the utility:
of music. 29. They will allow, assuredly, that the poets:
should be read by him who would be an orator; but are they,S,
then, to be read without a knowledge of music? If any one'
S SO blind of intellect, however, as to hesitate about the read-
.ng of other poets, he will doubtless admit that those should
* Collocationis.] That is, collocationis verborum, phraseology or style.
f Whether by “same term” he means voice or modulation it is not
easy to decide ; but I think modulation. Spalding.
: Book xi. c. 3. As he is to treat fully on the subject there, he will
not anticipate here.
§ The student will observe that the h; and illos in the text are to be
construed thus : num, igitur h; sine musice legendi ? and illos certè con-
cesserit legendos, &c. Spalding proposes alterations, but without
necessity. By music is meant a knowledge of metre and melody.
G 2 f
84. QUINTILIAN. - [B.I.
|
#
be read who have written poems for the lyre. 30. On these :
matters I should have to enlarge more fully, if I recommended
this as a new study; but since it has been perpetuated from
the most ancient times, even from those of Chiron and Achilles
to our own, (among all, at least, who have not been averse to a
regular course of mental discipline,) I must not proceed to
make the point doubtful by anxiety to defend it. 31. Though
I consider it sufficiently apparent, however, from the very
examples which I have now given, what music pleases me,
and to what extent, yet I think that I ought to declare more
expressly, that that sort of music is not recommended by me,
which, prevailing at present in the theatres, and being of an
effeminate character, languishing with lascivious notes, has in
a great degree destroyed whatever manliness was left among
us; but those strains in which the praises of heroes were sung,
and which heroes themselves sung; not the sounds of psal-
teries and languishing lutes,” which ought to be shunned even
by modest females, but the knowledge of the principles of the
art, which is of the highest efficacy in exciting and allaying the
passions. 32. For Pythagoras, as we have heard, calmed a
party of young men, when urged by their passions to offer
violence to a respectable family, by requesting the female
musician, who was playing to them, to change her strain to a
spondaic measure;f and Chrysippus assigns a peculiar tune
for the lullaby; of nurses, which is used with children. 33.
There is also a subject for declamation in the Schools, not
unartfully invented, in which it is supposed that a flute-player,'
who had played a Phrygian|| tune to a priest while he was sacri.
***
|
*
**
* Psalteria—Spadicas.] He means, if I am not mistaken, instruments
of an extremely effeminate character, rendered so by the extraordinary
number of strings. Spalding. Of the Spadia, nothing is known but that
it was a stringed instrument, named, probably, from the wood (spadia,
a palm-branch) of which it was made, Pollux iv. 59. Aul. Gell. iii. 9.
# Which was more grave and solemn.
f Allectationi..] We can hardly think this word genuine. Hemster.
husius conjectured lallationi, from lallare, “to sing lullaby.” See
Spalding's notes. |
§ Ponitºur tibicen—accusari.] Spalding very justly observes that the
construction, and the general usage of the verb pono with reference to
subjects of declamation, require tibicinem, ; unless accusar? be altered
to accusatus, which would be on the whole a less eligible emendation.
|| How exciting the Phrygian measure was may be seen in Jam-
blichus's Life of Pythagoras, c. 25. It was first used in the enthusiastic
CH.X.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 85
ficing, is accused, after the priest has been driven to madness,
and has thrown himself over a precipice, of having been the
cause of his death; and if such causes have to be pleaded by
an orator, and cannot be pleaded without a knowledge of
music, how can even the most prejudiced forbear to admit that
this art is necessary to our profession ? -
34. As to geometry, people admit that some attention to it is
of advantage in tender years; for they allow that the thinking
powers are excited, and the intellect sharpened by it, and that
a quickness of perception is thence produced; but they fancy
that it is not, like other sciences, profitable after it has been
acquired, but only whilst it is being studied. 35. Such is the
common opinion respecting it. But it is not without reason
that the greatest men have bestowed extreme attention on this
Science; for as geometry is divided between numbers and
figures, the knowledge of numbers, assuredly, is necessary not
only to an orator, but to every one who has been initiated even
in the rudiments of learning. In pleading causes, it is very
often in request; when the speaker, if he hesitates, I do not say
about the amount of a calculation, but if he even betray, by
any uncertain or awkward movement of his fingers, a want of
confidence in his calculations, is thought to be but imperfectly
accomplished in his art. 36. The knowledge of linear figures,
too, is frequently required in causes; for law-suits occur con-
cerning boundaries and measures. But geometry has a still
greater connexion with the art of oratory.
37. Order, in the first place, is necessary in geometry; and
is it not also necessary in eloquence 2 Geometry proves what
follows from what precedes, what is unknown from what is
known ; and do we not draw similar conclusions in speaking 2
Does not the well known mode of deduction from a number
of proposed questions consist almost wholly in syllogisms?
Accordingly you may find more persons to say that geometry
is allied to logic, than that it is allied to rhetoric. 38. But
even an orator, though rarely, will yet at times prove logically,
for he will use syllogisms if his subject shall require them, and
will of necessity use the enthymem, which is a rhetorical
syllogism. Besides, of all proofs, the strongest are what are
sacred ceremonies of the Phrygian or Berecynthian mother. Lucian
in his Harmonides, near the beginning, mentions Tö évôsov, “the
divine fury,” of the Phrygian melody. Spalding.
:
*
§ {
ſ
;
86 QUINTILIAN. [B.I.
called geometrical demonstrations;* and what does oratory
make its object more indisputably than proof?
j Geometry often, moreover, by demonstration, proves what is
# apparently true to be false. This is also done with respect to
numbers, by means of certain figures which they call pavö0-
%20foºl,f and at which we were accustomed to play when we
were boys. But there are other questions of a higher nature.
For who would not believe the asserter of the following pro.
position: “Of whatever places the boundary lines measure
the same length, of those places the areas also, which are
contained by those lines, must necessarily be equal?” 40. But
this proposition is fallacious; for it makes a vast difference
what figure the boundary lines may form ; and historians, who
have thought that the dimensions of islands are sufficiently
indicated by the space traversed in sailing round them, have
been justly censured by geometricians.j. 41. For the nearer
to perfection any figure is, the greater is its capacity; and if
the boundary line, accordingly, shall form a circle, which of all
plane figures is the most perfect, it will embrace a larger area
than if it shall form a square of equal circumference. Squares,
again, contain more than triangles of equal circuit, and trian-
gles themselves contain more when their sides are equal than
when they are unequal. 42. Some other examples may per-
haps be too obscure ; let us take an instance most easy of
comprehension even to the ignorant. There is scarcely any
man who does not know that the dimensions of an acre extend
two hundred and forty feet in length, and the half of that
number in breadth; and what its circumference is, and how
much ground it contains, it is easy to calculate. 43. A figure
of a hundred and eighty feet on each side, however, has the
Same periphery, but a much larger area contained within its
four sides. If any one thinks it too much trouble to make the
calculation, he may learn the same truth by means of smaller
numbers. Ten feet, on each side of a square, will give forty
for the circumference, and a hundred for the area; but if
* Or “linear demonstrations.” Compare v. 10, 7.
+ Of these no example is to be found.
: “Of such censure,” says Spalding, “I find no instance among the
authors of antiquity, though Pithoeus, in his note on this passage, says
that Polybius and Thucydides were blamed on that account by Proclus
in his commentary on Euclid's Elements.” He adds that he has
searched in the passages indicated by Pithoeus, to no purpose. -
CH, X.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 87
there were fifteen feet on each side, and five at each end, they
would, with the same circuit, deduct a fourth part from the
area inclosed. 44. If, again, nineteen feet be extended in
parallel lines, only one foot apart, they will contain no more
squares than those along which the parallels shall be drawn;
and yet the periphery will be of the same extent as that which
incloses a hundred. Thus the further you depart from the
form of a square, the greater will be the loss to the area. 45.
It may therefore happen even that a smaller area may be
inclosed by a greater periphery than a larger one.” Such is
the case in plane figures; for on hills, and in valleys, it is
º even to the untaught that there is more ground than
S13 W.T. .
º Need I add that geometry raises itself still higher, so as
even to ascertain the system of the world 2 When it demon-
strates, by calculations, the regular and appointed movements
of the celestial bodies, we learn that, in that system, there is
nothing unordained or fortuitous; a branch of knowledge
which may be sometimes of use to the orator. 47. When
Pericles freed the Athenians from fear, at the time that they
were alarmed by an eclipse of the Sun, by explaining to them
the causes of the phaenomenon; or when Sulpicius Gallus, in
the army of Paulus AEmilius, made a speech on an eclipse of
the moon, that the minds of the Soldiers might not be terri-
fied as by a supernatural prodigy, do they not, respectively,
appear to have discharged the duty of an orator? 48. Had
Nicias been possessed of such knowledge in Sicily, he would
not have been confounded with similar terror, and have given
over to destruction the finest of the Athenian armies; as Dion,
we know, when he went to overthrow the tyranny of Diony-
sius, was not deterred by a similar phaenomenon. 49. Though
the utility of geometry in war, however, be put out of the
question, though we do not dwell upon the fact that Archime-
des alone protracted the siege of Syracuse to a great extent,
it is sufficient, assuredly, to establish what I assert, that
numbers of questions, which it is difficult to Solve by any other
* Thus a right-angled triangle, whose base is 8 feet, perpendicular 6
feet, and hypotenuse 10 feet, will contain 24 square feet within a
periphery of 24 feet ; while a parallelogram 12 feet long, and 1 foot
broad, will contain only 12 square feet within a periphery of 26 feet.
+ Supposing the sky to be a flat surface.
88 QUINTILIAN. - [B.I.
§
.i.&
|
ſ
ſ
:
method, as those about the mode of dividing, about division to
infinity, and about the rate of progressions, are accustomed to
be solved by those geometrical demonstrations; so that if an
orator has to speak (as the next book* will show) on all sub-
jects, no man, assuredly, can become a perfect orator without
a knowledge of geometry. -
CHAPTER XI.
Instruction to be received from the actor, § 1–3. He should
correct faults of pronunciation, 4–8. He should give directions
as to look and gesture, 9–11. Passages from plays should be
recited by the pupil, 12, 13. Passages also from speeches, 14.
Exercises of the palaestra to be practised, 15–19.
1. SoME time is also to be devoted to the actor, f but only
so far as the future orator requires the art of delivery; for I do
not wish the boy, whom I educate for this pursuit, either to be
broken to the shrillness of a woman's voice, or to repeat the
tremulous tones of an old man's. 2. Neither let him imitate
the vices of the drunkard, nor adapt himself to the baseness
of the slave ; nor let him learn to display the feelings of love,
or avarice, or fear; acquirements which are not at all neces-
sary to the orator, and which corrupt the mind, especially
while it is yet tender and uninformed in early youth ; for
frequent imitation settles into habit. It is not even every
gesture or motion that is to be adopted from the actor; for
though the orator ought to regulate both to a certain degree,
yet he will be far from appearing in a theatrical character, and
will exhibit nothing extravagant either in his looks, or the
movements of his hands, or his walk;f for if there is any
art used by speakers in these points, the first object of it
should be that it may not appear to be art. -
* Ch. 21.
+ Comoedo..] Properly a comic actor; but I have thought it sufficient
to translate it by “actor” simply. “The comic actors,” observes
Turnebus, “were eminently skilled in the gestures requisite for good
delivery.” -
f Excursionibus.] By excursio Quintilian means procursio, or “step-
ping forward,” in which the orator ought to indulge but seldom, and
only for a moment, that he may not appear discurrere, “to run up and
down.” Twrmebus, &
CH.XI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. S9
4. What is then the duty of the teacher as to these particu-
lars? Let him, in the first place, correct faults of pronuncia-
tion, if there be any, so that the words of the learner may be \
fully expressed, and that every letter may be uttered with its
proper sound. For we find inconvenience from the two great."
weakness or too great fulness of the sound of some letters;
Some, as if too harsh for us, we utter but imperfectly, or
change them for others, not altogether dissimilar, but, as it were,' '
Smoother. 5. Thus X takes the place of g, in which even
Demosthenes found difficulty, (the nature of both which letters
is the same also with us,) and when c, and similarly g, are
wanting in full force, they are softened down into t and d.”
6. Those niceties about the letter s,t such a master will not
even tolerate; nor will he allow his pupil's words to sound in
his throat, or to rumble as from emptiness of the mouth ; nor
will he (what is utterly at variance with purity of speaking)
permit him to overlay the simple sound of a word with a fuller
Sort of pronunciation, which the Greeks call zoºro.ºrgº.o.ouávoy:
a term by which the sound of flutes is also designated, when,
after the holes are stopped through which they sound the shrill
notes, they give forth a bass sound through the direct outlet
only. 2 :
8. The teacher will be cautious, likewise, that concluding
syllables be not lost; that his pupil’s speech be all of a similar :
character; that whenever he has to raise his voice, the effort may ...
be that of his lungs, and not of his head ; that his gesture may
be suited to his voice, and his looks to his gesture. 9. He will
have to take care, also, that the face of his pupil, while speaking,
look straight forward; that his lips be not distorted; that no
opening of the mouth immoderately distend his jaws; that
* As in the imperfect pronunciation of children, who, instead of
cura, would say twra, instead of Galba, Dalba. This softening of ex-
pression is ridiculed by Lucian in his Airch Pwynévtwv. Spalding.
+ I freely confess myself ignorant what those niceties were, as I
have found no passage among the ancients in which they are noticed.
There is a quotation from AElius Dionysius, however, which Hemster-
husius ad Lucian. Judic. Vocalium adduces from Eustathius ad Il. K.
p. 813 : “AElius Dionysius says,” remarks Eustathius, “that Pericles
was reported to have disliked the configuration of the mouth in pro-
nouncing the letter sigma, as widening it ungracefully, and to have
exercised himself in uttering it before a looking-glass.” By the
“niceties,” therefore, may be meant an affected suppression of the hiss
in pronouncing the letter. Spalding.
90 QUINTILIAN. [B. I.
his face be not turned up, or his eyes cast down too much,
or his head inclined to either side. 10. The face offends in
various ways; I have seen many speakers, whose eye-brows
were raised at every effort of the voice; those of others I have
seen contracted; and those of some even disagreeing, as they
turned up one towards the top of the head, while with the
other the eye itself was almost concealed. To all these mat-
ters, as we shall hereafter show, a vast deal of importance is
to be attached ; for nothing can please which is unbecoming.
12. The actor will also be required to teach how a narrative
should be delivered ; with what authority persuasion should be
enforced ; with what force anger may show itself; and what
tone of voice is adapted to excite pity. This instruction he will
give with the best effect, if he select particular passages from
plays, such as are most adapted for this object, that is, such as
most resemble pleadings. 13. The repetition of these passages
will not only be most beneficial to pronunciation, but also
highly efficient in fostering eloquence. 14, Such may be the
pupil’s studies while immaturity of age will not admit of any-
thing higher; but, as soon as it shall be proper for him to
read orations, and when he shall be able to perceive their
beauties, then, I would say, let Some attentive and skilful tutor
attend him, who may not only form his style by reading, but
oblige him to learn select portions of speeches by heart,
and to deliver them standing, with a loud voice, and exactly as
he will have to plead; so that he may consequently exercise
by pronunciation both his voice and memory.
15. Nor do I think that those orators are to be blamed who
have devoted some time even to the masters in the palaestra.
I do not speak of those by whom part of life is spent among
oil, and the rest over wine, and who have oppressed the powers
of the mind by excessive attention to the body; (such characters
I should wish to be as far off as possible from the pupil that I
am training;) 16. but the same name* is given to those by
whom gesture and motion are formed; so that the arms may
be properly extended; that the action of the hands may not
be ungraceful or unseemly ; that the attitude may not be un-
becoming; that there may be no awkwardness in advancing
the feet; and that the head and eyes may not be at variance
* That is the name of palaestrici, palaestricis, which precedes, being,
as Spalding observes, of the masculine, not of the neuter, gender.
CH. XII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 91
with the turn of the rest of the body. 17. For no one will deny
that all such particulars form a part of delivery, or will sepa-
rate delivery itself from oratory; and, assuredly, the orator
must not disdain to learn what he must practise, especially
when this chironomia, which is, as is expressed by the word
itself, the law of gesture, had its origin even in the heroic
ages, and was approved by the most eminent men of Greece,
even by Socrates himself; it was also regarded by Plato as a
part of the qualifications of a public man, and was not omitted by
Chrysippus in the directions which he wrote concerning the edu-
cation of children. 18. The Lacedæmonians, we have heard,
had, among their exercises, a certain kind of dance, as con-
tributing to qualify men for war. Nor was dancing thought a
disgrace to the ancient Romans; as the dance which continues
to the present day, under the Sanction and in the religious rites
of the priests, is a proof; as is also the remark of Crassus
in the third book of Cicero de Oratore, where he recommends
that an Orator should adopt a bold and manly action of body, not
learned from the theatre and the player, but from the camp, or
even from the pala stra; the observation of which discipline
has descended without censure even to our time. 19. By me,
however, it will not be continued beyond the years of boyhood,
nor in them long; for I do not wish the gesture of an orator
to be formed to resemble that of a dancer, but I would have
Some influence from such juvenile exercises left, so that the
gracefulness communicated to us while we were learning may
Secretly attend us when we are not thinking of our move-
mentS.
CHAPTER XII.
No fear to be entertained lest boys should be engaged in too many
studies, if judgment be used; examples of the number of things
to which the human mind can attend at once, § 1–7. Boys endure
study with spirit and patience, 8–11. Abundance of time for all
necessary acquirements, 12–15. Unreasonable pretexts for not
pursuing study, 16–19.
1. IT is a common question whether, supposing all these
things are to be learned, they can all be taught and acquired
at the same time ; for Some deny that this is possible, as the
92 QUINTILIAN. [B. I.
mind must be confused and wearied by so many studies of
different tendency, for which neither the understanding, nor
the body, nor time itself, can suffice; and even though mature
age may endure such labour, yet that of childhood ought not
to be thus burdened.
2. But these reasoners do not understand how great the
power of the human mind is ; that mind which is so busy and
active, and which directs its attention, so to speak, to every
quarter, so that it cannot even confine itself to do only one thing,
but bestows its force upon several, not merely in the same day,
but at the same moment. 3. Do not players on the harp, for
example, exert their memory, and attend to the sound of their
voice, and the various inflexions of it, while, at the Same time,
they strike part of the strings with their right hand, and pull,
stop, or let loose others with their left, while not even
their foot is idle, but beats time to their playing, all these
acts being done simultaneously 2 4. Do not we advocates, when
surprised by a sudden necessity to plead, say one thing while
we are thinking of what is to follow, and while, at the very
same moment, the invention of arguments, the choice of
words, the arrangement of matter, gesture, delivery, look, and
attitude, are necessarily objects of our attention ? If all these
considerations, of so varied a nature, are forced, as by a single
effort, before our mental vision, why may we not divide the
hours of the day among different kinds of study, especially as
variety itself refreshes and recruits the mind, while, on the
contrary, nothing is more annoying than to continue at one
juniform labour? Accordingly writing is relieved by reading,
łand the tedium of reading itself is relieved by changes of
“subject. 5. However many things we may have done, we
are yet to a certain degree fresh for that which we are going
to begin. Who, on the contrary, would not be stupified, if he
were to listen to the same teacher of any art, whatever it
might be, through the whole day? But by change a person
will be recruited; as is the case with respect to food, by
varieties of which the stomach is re-invigorated, and is fed
with several sorts less unsatisfactorily than with one. Or let
those objectors tell me what other mode there is of learning.
Ought we to attend to the teacher of grammar only, and then
to the teacher of geometry only, and cease to think, during the
second course, of what we learned in the first 2 Should we
CH. XII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 93
then transfer ourselves to the musician, our previous studies
being still allowed to escape us? Or while we are studying
Latin, ought we to pay no attention to Greek 2 Or, to make
an end of my questions at once, ought we to do nothing but
what comes last before us? 7. Why, then, do we not give
similar counsel to husbandmen, that they should not cultivate
at the same time their fields and their vineyards, their olives
and other trees, and that they should not bestow attention at
once on their meadows, their cattle, their gardens, and their
bee-hives? Why do we ourselves devote some portion of our
time to our public business, some to the wants of our friends,
Some to our domestic accounts, some to the care of our persons,
and some to our pleasures, any one of which occupations would
weary us, if we pursued it without intermission ? So much
more easy is it to do many things one after the other, than to
do one thing for a long time.
8. That boys will be unable to bear the fatigue of many
studies, is by no means to be apprehended; for no age suffers
less from fatigue. This may perhaps appear strange ; but we
may prove it by experience. 9. For minds, before they are
hardened, are more ready to learn ; as is proved by the fact
that children, within two years after they can fairly pronounce
words, speak almost the whole language, though no one incites
them to learn ; but for how many years does the Latin tongue
resist the efforts of our purchased slaves | You may well
understand, if you attempt to teach a grown up person to read,
that those who do everything in their own art with excellence,
are not without reason called Tøð0029878, that is, “instructed
from boyhood.” 10. The temper of boys is better able to bear
labour than that of men; for, as neither the falls of children,
with which they are so often thrown on the ground, nor their
crawling on hands and knees, nor, soon after, constant play,
and running all day hither and thither, inconvenience their
bodies so much as those of adults, because they are of little
weight, and no burden to themselves, so their minds like-
wise, I conceive, suffer less from fatigue, because they exert
themselves with less effort, and do not apply to study by
putting any force. upon themselves, but merely yield them-
Selves to others to be formed. 11. Moreover, in addition to
the other pliancy of that age, they follow their teachers, as it
were, with greater confidence, and do not set themselves to
94 QUINTILIAN. |B.I.
measure what they have already done. Consideration about
labour * is as yet unknown to them; and, as we ourselves have
frequently experienced, toil has less effect upon the powers
than thought.t
12. Nor will they ever, indeed, have more disposable time;
because all improvement at this age is from hearing. When
the pupil shall retire by himself to write, when he shall pro-
duce and compose from his own mind, he will then either not
have leisure, or will want inclination, to commence such
exercises as I have specified. 13. Since the teacher of gram-
mar, therefore, cannot occupy the whole day, and indeed ought
not to do so, lest he should disgust the mind of his pupil, to
what studies can we better devote his fragmentary intervals.
so to term them, of time 2 14. For I would not wish the
pupil to be worn out in these exercises; nor do I desire that
he should sing, or accompany songs with musical notes, or
descend to the minutest investigations of geometry. Nor
would I make him like an actor in delivery, or like a dancing-
master in gesture; though, if I did require all such qualifica-
tions, there would still be abundance of time; for the imma-
ture part of life, which is devoted to learning, is long; and I
am not speaking of slow intellects. 15. Why did Plato, let
me ask, excel in all these branches of knowledge which I
think necessary to be acquired by him who would be an
orator? He did so, because, not being satisfied with the
instruction which Athens could afford, or with the science of
the Pythagoreans, to whom he had sailed in Italy, he went
also to the priests of Egypt, and learned their mysteries.
16. We shroud our own indolence under the pretext of
difficulty; for we have no real love of our work; nor is eloquence
* Laboris judicium.] When they are told to execute any task, they
do not reflect, like people of maturer years, and try to form a judgment,
whether it is worth while to do it or not, but set about it at once. I
take this to be the sense of the words. The French translator, in
Didot's edition, renders them, “ils ne connaissent pas encore ce que
c'est que le veritable travail.” - -
+ Minus afficit sensus fatigatio quâm cogitatio.] I see that these
words are not understood by some. Cogitatio applies to him who
produces something from his own mind; fatigatio to him who merely
executes the orders of others, whether by labour of body or of mind.
Spalding. The French translator follows Spalding's interpretation :
“il est moins pénible de remplir une tâche donnée, que de produire
de Soi-même.” -
CH. XII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 95
º
ever sought by us, because it is the most honourable and noble
of attainments, or for its own sake; but we apply ourselves to
labour only with mean views and for sordid gain. 17. Plenty
of orators may speak in the forum, with my permission, and
acquire riches also, without such accomplishments as I recom-
mend; only may every trader in contemptible merchandise be
richer than they, and may the public crier make greater profit
by his voice I would not wish to have even for a reader of
this work a man who would compute what returns his studies
will bring him. 18. But he who shall have conceived, as
with a divine power of imagination, the very idea itself of
genuine oratory, and who shall keep before his eyes true
eloquence, the queen, as an eminent poet calls her, of the
world, and shall seek his gain, not from the pay that he
receives for his pleadings, but from his own mind, and from
contemplation and knowledge, a gain which is enduring and
independent of fortune, will easily prevail upon himself to
devote the time, which others spend at shows, in the Campus
Martius, at dice, or in idle talk, to say nothing of sleep and
the prolongation of banquets, to the studies of geometry and
music; and how much more pleasure will he secure from such
pursuits than from unintellectual gratifications ! 19. For
divine providence has granted this favour to mankind, that
the more honourable occupations are also the more pleasing.
But the very pleasure of these reflections has carried me too
far. Let what I have said, therefore, suffice concerning the
studies in which a boy is to be instructed before he enters on
more important occupations; the next book will commence,
as it were, a new subject, and enter on the duties of the
teacher of rhetoric.
'96 QUINTILIAN, [B, II,
BOOK II.
CHAPTER I.
Boys are not put under the professor of rhetoric early enough; reasons
why they should begin to receive instruction from him at an
earlier age, § 1–3. The professions of the grammarian and
teacher of rhetoric should be in some degree united, 4–13.
1. IT has been a prevalent custom (which daily gains
ground more and more) for pupils to be sent to the teachers
fof eloquence, to the Latin teachers always, and to the Greeks
sometimes, at a more advanced age than reason requires. Of
this practice there are two causes: that the rhetoricians,
especially our own, have relinquished a part of their duties,
and that the grammarians have appropriated what does not
belong to them. 2. The rhetoricians think it their business
merely to declaim, and to teach the art and practice of
declaiming, confining themselves, too, to deliberative and
judicial subjects, * (for others they despise as beneath their
profession,) while the grammarians, on their part, do not
deem it sufficient to have taken what has been left them,
(on which account also gratitude should be accorded them,) but
encroach even upon prosopopeiaet and Suasoryi speeches,
in which even the very greatest efforts of eloquence are dis-
played. 3. Hence, accordingly, it has happened, that what
was the first business of the one art has become the last of the
other, and that boys of an age to be employed in higher de-
partments of study remain sunk in the lower school, and
* The other department of eloquence, the demonstrative or epideictic,
which ought to command the attention of rhetoricians, they despise.
Thus in the speeches of Seneca the father, we see only Swasoriae and
controversia, deliberative and judicial addresses; and in the declama.
tions circulated under the name of Quintilian we find nothing but
mere controversia. Spalding. Quintilian would have narratives, or
statements of facts, eulogies, and invectives, to form part of the first
exercises in rhetoric, as will appear hereafter. Capperonier.
+ By prosopopeiſe we must here understand speeches suited to the
characters of persons by whom they are supposed to have been spoken.
Quintilian speaks of them in b. ii. c. 8. Regius. Such are the
speeches in Livy and other historians. Twºmebus.
+ Suasorias.] Speeches of the kind which they call deliberative,
differing from controverside, which is a term properly applied only to
judicial pleadings. Capperonier. The term Swasoria, included both
persuasory and dissvasory speeches.
CH.I.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 97
practise rhetoric under the grammarian. Thus, what is
eminently ridiculous, a youth seems unfit to be sent to a
teacher 35 declamation until he already knows how to declaim,
4. Let us assign, each of these professions its due limits.
Let gammar, (which, turning it into a Latin word, they have
called literatura, “literature,”), know its own boundaries,
especially as it is so far advanced beyond the humility indicated
by its name, to which humility the early grammarians restricted
themselves ; for, though but weak at its source, yet, having
gained strength from the poets and historians,” it now flows
on in a full channel; since, besides the art of speaking cor-
rectly, which would otherwise be far from a comprehensive art,
it has engrossed the study of almost all the highest depart-
ments of learning; 5. and let not rhetoric, to which the power
of eloquence has given its name, decline its own duties, or
rejoice that the task belonging to itself is appropriated by
another; for while it neglects its duties, it is almost expelled
from its domain. 6. I would not deny, indeed, that some of
those who profess grammar, may make such progress in know-
ledge as to be able to teach the principles of oratory; but, i.
when they do so, they will be discharging the duties of a "
rhetorician, and not their own.
7. We make it also a subject of inquiry, when a boy may
be considered ripe for learning what rhetoric teaches. In
which inquiry it is not to be considered of what age a boy is,
but what progress he has already made in his studies. That
I may not make a long discussion, I think that the question
when a boy ought to be sent to the teacher of rhetoric, is best
decided by the answer, when he shall be qualified. 8. But
this very point depends upon the preceding subject of con-
sideration; for if the office of the grammarian...is...extended
even to Suasory speeches, the necessity for the rhetorician
will come later. If the rhetorician, however, does not shrink
from the earliest duties of his profession, his attention is
required even from the time when the pupil begins narra-
tions, f and produces his little exercises in praising and
blaming. 9. Do we not know that it was a kind of exercise
among the ancients, suitable for improvement in eloquence, for
* Whom the grammarians undertake to explain and illustrate. Cap-
peronier. r
f A narrationibus statim.] Beware of taking & for post. Spalding.
H
98 QUINTILIAN. . [B.II.
pupils to speak on theses,” common places,f and other ques-
tions, (without embracing particular circumstances or persons,)
on which causes, as well real as imaginary, depend? Hence
it is evident how dishonourably the profession of rhetoric has
abandoned that department which it held originally, and for
a long time solely. 10. But what is there among those
exercises, of which I have just now spoken,' that does not
relate both to other matters peculiar to rhetoricians, and,
indisputably, to the sort of causes pleaded in courts of justice?
Have we not to make statements of facts in the forum ? I
know not whether that department of rhetoric is not most of
all in request there. 11. Are not eulogy and invective often
introduced in those disputations 2 Do not common places, as
well those which are levelled against vice, (such as were com-
posed, we read, by Cicero, ) as those in which questions are
discussed generally, (such as were published by Quintus Hor-
tensius, as, Ought we to trust to light proofs 3 and for witnesses
and against witnesses,) mix themselves with the inmost
substance of causes? 12. These weapons are in some degree
to be prepared, that we may use them whenever circumstances
* By this term Quintilian means quaestiones infinitae, on either side
of which a rhetorician may speak with plausibility. This kind of
exercise was in use in Cicero's time, when what we now call declama-
tiones, as Seneca observes, were called theses. Turnebus. Theses, or
quaestiones infinitat, are questions or topics not circumscribed by any
particulars relating to persons, places, or times; theses being thus
distinguished from hypotheses. Capperonier. See ii. 4, 24; iii. 5, 5, 7;
Cic. Orat. c. 14, 36 ; Topic. c. 21. Spalding.
ºf “Communes loci,” says Turnebus, “are general disquisitions on
points of morality ; or questions on points of law, on which the
speaker might take either the affirmative or negative side;” as how far
we ought to trust witnesses, or what credit showld be given to written
documents.
† Suetonius observes that the old rhetoricians employed themselves
greatly in progymnasmata. Turnebus.
§ He means at the end of sect. 8. Spalding.
| Gesner very properly refers to the end of the preface to the
Paradoaces, where Cicero observes that he used, for the sake of ex-
ercise, to occupy himself about the $Stuká of the schools, that is, on
questions having no reference to particular circumstances or persons.
. . . . But whether “we read” should be understood as signifying
that Quintilian had himself read Cicero's compositions, or that he had
merely seen some reference to them in some other writer, we have
nothing to enable us to decide. The latter supposition appears to me
the more probable. Spalding. -
CH.II.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR, 99
require. He who shall suppose that these matters do not
concern the orator, will think that a statue is not begun when
its limbs are cast.* Nor let any one blame this haste of mine
(as some will consider it) on the supposition that I think the
pupil who is to be committed to the professor of rhetoric is to be
altogether withdrawn from the teachers of grammar. 13. To
these also their proper time shall be allowed, nor need there
be any fear that the boy will he overburdened with the lessons
of two. masters. His labour will not be increased, but that
which was confounded under one master will be divided; and
each, tutor will thus be more efficient in his own province.
This method, to which the Greeks still adhere, has been disre-
garded by the Latin rhetoricians, and, indeed, with some
* of excuse, as there have been others to take their
uty.f -
CHAPTER II.
Choice of a teacher, § 1–4. How the teacher should conduct himself
towards his pupils, 5–8. How the pupils should behave, 9–13.
Some additional observations, 14, 15.
1. As soon therefore as a boy shall have attained such pro-
ficiency in his studies, as to be able to comprehend what we
have called the first precepts of the teachers of rhetoric, he
must be put under the professors of that art.
2. Of these professors the morals must first be ascertained;
a point of which I proceed to treat in this part of my work,
not because I do not think that the same examination is to be
made, and with the utmost care, in regard also to other teachers,
(as indeed I have shown in the preceding book, ) but because
the very age of the pupils makes attention to the matter
still more necessary. 3. For boys are consigned to these
professors when almost grown up, and continue their studies
under them even after they are become men ; and greater care
* See Aristotle's Rhetoric, i. 16.
t Namely the grammarians who continue their instruction even after
pupils are put under the rhetorician.
; See c. 5.
H 2
100 QUINTILIAN. [B. II.
t...’
o'
sº
2.
* A
-- A
*
|
i.
must in consequence be adopted with regard to them, in order
that the purity of the master may secure their more tender
years from corruption, and his authority deter their bolder age
from licentiousness. 4. Nor is it enough that he give, in
himself, an example of the strictest morality, unless he regulate,
also, by severity of discipline, the conduct of those who come
to receive his instructions.
Let him adopt, then, above all things, the feelings of a
parent towards his pupils, and consider that he succeeds to the
place of those by whom the children were entrusted to him.
5. Let him neither have vices in himself, nor tolerate them
!gin others. Let his austerity not be stern, nor his affability too
Jº Zeasy, lest dislike arise from the one, or contempt from the
:*. -
... • A.
other. Let him discourse frequently on what is honourable
and good, for the oftener he admonishes, the more seldom will
he have to chastise. Tet him not be of an angry temper,
and yet not a conniver at what ought to be corrected. Let
him be plain in his mode of teaching, and patient of labour,
but rather diligent in exacting tasks than fond of giving them
of excessive length. 6. Let him reply readily to those who put
questions to him, and question of his own accord those who
do not. In commending the exercises of his pupils, let him be
neither niggardly nor lavish ; for the one quality begets dislike
of labour, and the other self-complacency. 7. In amending
what requires correction, let him not be harsh, and, least of all,
not reproachful; for that very circumstance, that some tutors
blame as if they hated, deters many young men from their
proposed course of study. Let him every day say something,
and even much, which, when the pupils hear, they may carry
away with them, for though he may point out to them, in their
course of reading, plenty of examples for their imitation, yet
the living voice, as it is called, feeds the mind more nutritiously,
and especially the voice of the teacher, whom his pupils, if
fimuch more readily we imitate those whom we like, can scarcely
be expressed. -
9. The liberty of standing up and showing exultation, ºn
giving applause,” as is done under most teachers, is by no means
to be allowed to boys; for the approbation even of young men,
fº are but rightly instructed, both love and reverence. How
* Not to the master, but to one another, as Spalding observes, and
as appears from what follows.

CH. II.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 101
when they listem to others, ought to be but temperate. Hence
it will result that the pupil will depend on the judgment of
the master, and will think that he has expressed properly
whatever shall have been approved by him. 10. But that
most mischievous politeness, as it is now termed, which is shown
by students in their praise of each other's compositions, what-
ever be their merits, is not only unbecoming and theatrical,”
and foreign to strictly regulated Schools, but even a most
destructive enemy to study, for care and toil may well appear
Superfluous, when praise is ready for whatever the pupils have
produced. 11. Those therefore who listen, as well as he who
Speaks, ought to watch the countenance of the master, for
they will thus discern what is to be approved and what to be
condemned ; and thus power will be gained from composition,
and judgment from being heard.t 12. But now, eager and
ready, they not only start up at every period, but dart forward,
and cry out with indecorous transports. The compliment is
repaid in kind, and upon such applause depends the fortune of
a declamation; and hence result vanity and self-conceit, inso-
much that, being elated with the tumultuous approbation of
their class-fellows, they are inclined, if they receive but little
praise from the master, to form an ill opinion of him. 13.
But let masters, also, desire to be heard themselves with atten-
tion and modesty; for the master. Ought not-to-speak to suit the
taste of his pupils, but the pupils to suit—that Of the -master.
If possible, moreover, his attention should be-directed to
observe what each pupil commends in his speeches, and for what
reason; and he may then rejoice that what he says will give-
pleasure, not more on his own account than on that of his
pupils who judge with correctness.
14. That mere boys should sit mixed with young men; I
do not approve ; for though such a man as ought to preside
over their studies and conduct, may keep even the eldest of
his pupils under control, yet the more tender oughſ, to be
separate from the more mature, and they should all be kept
* Such as is given by spectators in the theatre; see i. 2, 9. Spalding.
Quintilian appears also to intimate the insincerity of the applause.
+ Sic stilo facultas continget, auditione judicium.] The style meant is
that of the speaker or reciter himself, who brings with him from home
a written speech, which is the awditio or “recitation heard” by his
fellow-students that form the audience. Spalding.
J 02 QUINTILIAN. [B.II.
free, not merely from the guilt of licentiousness, but even
from the suspicion of it. 15. This point I thought proper
briefly to notice; that the master and his school should be
clear of gross vice, I do not suppose it necessary to intimate.
And if there is any father who would not shrink from flagrant
vice in choosing a tutor for his son, let him be assured that all
other rules, which I am endeavouring to lay down for the
benefit of youth, are, when this consideration is disregarded,
useless to him.
CHAPTER III.

A pupil should be put under an eminent teacher at first, not under an
inferior one, § 1–3, Mistakes of parents as to this point, 3, 4.
The best teacher can teach little things best, as well as great ones,
5–9. The pupils of eminent teachers will afford better examples
to each other, 10–12. -
1. NoF is the opinion of those to be passed in silence, who,
even when they think boys fit for the professor of rhetoric,
imagine that he is not at once to be consigned to the most
eminent, but detain him for Some time under inferior teachers,
with the notion that moderate ability in a master is not only
better adapted for beginning instruction in art, but easier for
comprehension and imitation, as well as less disdainful of
undertaking the trouble of the elements. 2. On this head I
think no long labour necessary to show how much better it is
to be imbued with the best instructions, and how much diffi-
culty is attendant on eradicating faults which have once gained
ground, as double duty falls on succeeding masters, and the
task indeed of unteaching is heavier and more important than
that of teaching at first. 3. Accordingly they say that
Timotheus, a famous instructor in playing the flute, was
#accustomed to ask as much more pay from those whom
janother had taught as from those who presented themselves
to him in a state of ignorance. The mistakes committed in
the matter, however, are two ; one, that people think inferior
teachers sufficient for a time, and, from having an easily
satisfied appetite, are content with their instructions; (such
supineness, though deserving of reprehension, would yet be
CH. III.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 103
in some degree endurable, if teachers of that class taught
only worse, and not less;) the other, which is even more
common, that people imagine that those who have attained
eminent qualifications for speaking will not descend to inferior
matters, and that this is sometimes the case because they
disdain to bestow attention on minuter points, and sometimes
because they cannot give instruction in them. 5. For my
part, I do not consider him, who is unwilling to teach little
things,” in the number of preceptors; but I argue that the
ablest teachers can teach little things best, if they will; first,
because it is likely that he who excels others in eloquence, has
gained the most accurate knowledge of the means by which
men attain eloquence; 6. secondly, because method,+ which,
with the best qualified instructors, is always plainest, is of
great efficacy in teaching; and lastly, because no man rises to
such a height in greater things that lesser fade entirely from his
view. Unless indeed we believe that though Phidias made a
Jupiter well, another might have wrought, in better style than
he, the accessories to the decoration of the work; or that an
Orator may not know how to speak; or that an eminent phy-
sician may be unable to cure triting ailments.
7. Is there not then, it may be asked, a certain height of
eloquence too elevated for the immaturity of boyhood to com-
prehend it? I readily confess that there is ; but the eloquent
professor must also be a man of sense, not ignorant of teach-
ing, and lowering himself to the capacity of the learner; as
any fast walker, if he should happen to walk with a child,
would give him his hand, relax his pace, and not go on quicker
than his companion could follow. 8. What shall be said, too,
if it generally happens that instructions given by the most
learned are far more easy to be understood, and more per-
spicuous than those of others? For perspicuity is the chief
virtue of eloquence, and the less ability a man has, the more
he tries to raise and swell himself out, as those of short
stature exalt themselves on tip-toe, $ and the weak use most
* Comp. i. 4, 23.
+ Ratio.] Ratio is the same as theoria ; opposed to praais. Spalding.
Quintilian means method ; and intimates that the more learned teacher
will be more methodical, the less learned less methodical. Twºmebus.
f Dilatare.] In allusion, perhaps, to the fable of the frog and the
ox, Phaedr. i. 24. Spalding. :
Ś Staturá breves in digitos eriguntºr.] An illustration borrowed by
104. QUINTILIAN. - [B.II.
|
j
threats. 9. As to those whose style is inflated, displaying a
vitiated taste, and who are fond of sounding words,” or faulty
from any other mode of vicious affectation, I am convinced
that they labour under the fault, not of strength, but of weak-
ness, as bodies are swollen, not with health, but with disease,
and as men who have erred from the straight road generally
make stoppages.f . Accordingly, the less able a teacher is, the
more obscure will he be. **** - ". . . . . . . ....... ... .…. .......… -- ~ *-* * * *
10. It has not escaped my memory, that I said in the
*… • *-*.*.*.*.*. - .
preceding book, (when I observed that education in schools
was preferable to that at home,) that pupils commencing their
studies, or but little advanced in them, devote themselves
more readily to imitate their school-fellows than their master,
such imitation being more easy to them. This remark may
be understood by Some in such a sense, that the opinion which
I now advocate may appear inconsistent with that which I
advanced before. 11. But such inconsistency will be far
from me ; for what I then said is the very best of reasons
why a boy should be consigned to the best possible instructor,
because even the pupils under him, being better taught than
those under inferior masters, will either speak in such a
manner as it may not be objectionable to imitate, or, if they
commit any faults, will be immediately corrected, whereas the
less learned teacher will perhaps praise even what is wrong,
and cause it, by his judgment, to recommend itself to those
Johnson in his Life of Gray, who, he says, is “tail by walking on tip-
toe.”
* Tumidos, et corruptos, et tinºvulos.] The twmidi are those who are
foolishly ambitious of sublimity; the corrupti, those who are always
aiming to say something witty or clever ; the tinºvuli, those who seek
for fine-sounding words and phrases. Rollin.
f Devertwmt.] Devertunt in hospitia, go to seek lodging for the night,
and thus arrive at a later period at their place of destination, which, if
they had kept to the right road, they might have reached on the day
on which they started. Spalding. An obscure passage, and perhaps
Inot free from unsoundness. The second comparison, like the first,
ought to indicate something wrong lying hid under the appearance of
what is right. . . . We may suppose that those who have quitted the
right track, seek for deverticula, bye-roads, for the sake of amusing
themselves, or of shortening the remainder of their journey. Rollin.
The reader may use his judgment as to which of these two illustrations
is to be preferred. That of Rollin may receive something like support
from Liv. ix. 7: Et legentibus velut deverticula @ mana—qwC&réreºn.
i. C. 2, sect. 26. -
CH. IV.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 105
who listen to it. 12. Let a master therefore be excellent as
well in eloquence as in morals; one who, like Homer's
Phoenix, * may teach his pupil at once to speak and to act.
CHAPTER IV.
Elementary exercises, § 1. Narratives, or statements of facts, 2–4.
Exuberance in early compositions better than sterility, 4–8. A
teacher should not be without imagination, or too much given to
find fault with his pupil's attempts, 8–14. The pupil’s compo-
sitions should be written with great care, 15–17. Exercises in
confirmation and refutation, 18, 19. In commendation and censure
of remarkable men, 20–21. Common places, 22; 23. Theses, 24,
25. Reasons, 26. Written preparations for pleadings, 27–32.
Praise and censure of particular laws, 33–40. Declamations on
fictitious subjects a later invention, 41, 42.
I SHALL now proceed to state what I conceive to be the
first duties of rhetoricians in giving instruction to their
pupils, putting off for a while the consideration of what is
alone called, in common language, the art of rhetoric ; for to
me it appears most eligible to commence with that to which
the pupil has learned something similar under the gram-
IYlä.T18.]].S.
2. Since of narrations, (besides that which we use in
pleadings,) we understand that there are three kinds ; the
fable,f which is the subject of tragedies and poems, and
which is remote, not merely from truth, but from the appear-
ance of truth;$ the argumentum, which comedies represent,
and which, though false, has a resemblance to truth ; || and
the history, in which is contained a relation of facts; and
since we have consigned poetic narratives to the grammarians,"
* Iliad, ix. 432.
† Or mythological subject.
f That is epic poems, in which we find much that is at variance, not
only with truth, but with probability; narratives which Aristotle in
his Poetics calls &\oya, döövata. Capperonier.
Ś As the fables of Atreus and Thyestes, Medea, Iphigenia, and all
the stories of metamorphoses. Cic. Rhetor. i. 19. Camerarius.
| As approaching nearer to nature and the real events of life.
* Book i. c. 4.
106 QUINTILIAN. [B.II.
let the historical form the commencement of study under the
rhetorician; a kind of narrative which, as it has more of
truth, has also more of substance. 3. What appears to me
the best method of narrating, I will show when I treat of the
judicial part of pleading.” In the meantime it will suffice to
intimate that it ought not to be dry and jejune, (for what
necessity would there be to bestow so much pains upon study,
if it were thought sufficient to state facts without dress or
decoration ?) nor ought it to be erratic, and wantonly adorned
with far-fetched descriptions, in which many speakers indulge
with an emulation of poetic licence. 4. Doth these kinds of
narrative are faulty ; yet that which springs from poverty is
worse than that which comes from exuberance.
From boys perfection of style can neither be required nor
expected ; but the fertile genius, fond of noble efforts, and
conceiving at times a more than reasonable degree of ardour,
is greatly to be preferred. Nor, if there be something of
exuberance in a pupil of that age, would it at all displease me.
I would even have it an object with teachers themselves to
nourish minds that are still tender with more indulgence, and
to allow them to be satiated, as it were, with the milk of
more liberal studies. The body, which mature age may after-
wards nerve, may for a time be somewhat plumper than seems
desirable. 6. Hence there is hope of strength ; while a
child that has the outline of all his limbs exact commonly
portends weakness in subsequent years. Let that age be
daring, invent much, and delight in what it invents, though
it be often not sufficiently severe and correct. The remedy
for exuberance is easy ; barrenness is incurable by any labour.
7. That temper in boys will afford me little hope in which
mental effort is prematurely restrained by judgment. I like
what is produced to be extremely copious, profuse even beyond
the limits of propriety. Years will greatly reduce super-
fluity; judgment will smooth away much of it; something
will be worn off, as it were, by use, if there be but metal
from which something may be hewn and polished off, and
such metal there will be, if we do not make the plate too thin
at first, so that deep cutting may break it. 8. That I hold
such opinions concerning this age, he will be less likely to
* Book iv. c. 2.
CH. IV.] FDUCATION OF AN OTATOR. 107
wonder who shall have read what Cicero * says: “I wish
fecundity in a young man to give itself full scope.”
Above all, therefore, and especially for boys, a dry master is,
to be avoided, not less than a dry soil; void of all moisture, for
plants that are still tender. . Under the influence of Such a
tutor, they at once become dwarfish, looking as it were
towards the ground, and daring to aspire to nothing above
every day talk. To them, leanness is in place of health, and
weakness instead of judgment ; and, while they think it
sufficient to be free from fault, they fall into the fault of
being free from all merit. Let not even maturity itself,
therefore, come too fast; let not the must, while yet in the
vat, become mellow, for so it will bear years, and be improved
by age.
10. Nor is it improper for me, moreover, to offer this ad-
monition; that the powers of boys sometimes sink under too
great severity in correction; for they despond, and grieve, and
at last hate their work, and, what is most prejudicial, while
they fear every thing, they cease to attempt any thing.
11. There is a similar conviction in the minds of the culti-
vators of trees in the country, who think that the knife must
not be applied to tender shoots, as they appear to shrink from
the steel, and to be unable as yet to bear an incision. 12. A
teacher ought therefore to be as agreeable as possible, that
remedies, which are rough in their own nature, may be
rendered soothing by gentleness of hand; he ought to praise
Some parts of his pupils' performances, to tolerate some, and
to alter others, giving his reasons why the alterations are
made; and also to make some passages clearer by adding
something of his own. It will also be of service too at times,
for the master to dictate whole subjects himself, which the
pupil may imitate and admire for the present as his own.
13. But if a boy's composition were so faulty as not to admit
of correction, I have found him benefited whenever I told him
to write on the same subject again, after it had received fresh
treatment from me, observing that “he could do still better,”
since study is cheered by nothing more than hope.
14. Different ages, however, are to be corrected in different
ways, and work is to be required and amended according to
the degree of the pupil's abilities. I used to say to boys when
* De Orat, ii. 21.
108 Qū INTILIAN. [B.II.
they attempted any thing extravagant or verbose, that “I was
j, Satisfied with it for the present, but that a time would come
ſ when I should not allow them to produce compositions of such
# a character.” Thus they were satisfied with their abilities, and
yet not led to form a wrong judgment.
15. But that I may return to the point from which I
digressed, I should wish narrations to be composed with the
utmost possible care; for as it is of service to boys at an early
age, when their speech is but just commenced, to repeat what
they have heard in order to improve their faculty of speaking;
#(let them accordingly be made, and with very good reason, to
|: over their story again, and to pursue it from the middle,
either backwards or forwards; but let this be done only while
they are still at the knees of their teacher, and, as they can do
nothing else, are beginning to connect words and things, that
they may thus strengthen their memory ;) so, when they shall
have attained the command of pure and correct language, ex-
itemporary garrulity, without waiting for thought, or scarcely
*taking time to rise,” is the offspring of mere ostentatious
boastfulness. 16. Hence arises empty exultation in ignorant
parents, and in their children contempt of application, want of
all modesty, a habit of speaking in the worst style, the practice
of all kinds of faults, and, what has often been fatal even to
great proficiency, an arrogant conceit of their own abilities.
17. There will be a proper time for acquiring facility of
speech, nor will that part of my subject be lightly passed over
by me; but in the mean time it will be sufficient if a boy with
all his care, and with the utmost application of which that age
is capable, can write something tolerable. To this practice let
him accustom himself, and make it natural to him. He only
fwill succeed in attaining the eminence at which we aim, or
the point next below it, who shall learn to speak correctly
before he learns to speak rapidly.
18. To narrations is added, not without advantage, the task
of refuting and confirming them, which is called &yo.6%80% and
zCºrozozsvá.f This may be done, not only with regard to
|
*
1. Viac surgend; mora.] They scarcely allow themselves time to rise
som their seat before they begin to speak. Capperonier.
+ The meaning of these terms is pretty well intimated by Quintilian
himself; avaokévr) is refutation, and karaokevi) is assertion. Turnebus.
More concerning them may be seen in Aphthonius.
CH.IV.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 109
fabulous subjects, and such as are related in poetry, but with
regard even to records in our own annals; as if it be inquired
whether it is credible that a crow settled upon the head of
Walerius when he was fighting, to annoy the face and eyes of his
Gallic enemy with his beak and wings,” there will be ample
matter for discussion on both sides of the question; 19. as
there will also be concerning the serpent, of which Scipio is
said to have been born, as well as about the wolf of Romulus,
and the Egeria of Numa. As to the histories of the Greeks,
there is generally licence in them similar to that of the poets.
Questions are often wont to arise, too, concerning the time or
place at which a thing is said to have been done; sometimes
even about a person; as Livy, for instance, is frequently in
doubt, and other historians differ one from another.
20. The pupil will then proceed by degrees to higher
efforts, to praise illustrious characters and censure the im-
moral ; an exercise of manifold advantage; for the mind is
thus employed about a multiplicity and variety of matters;
the understanding is formed by the contemplation of good and
evil. Hence is acquired, too, an extensive knowledge of
things in general; and the pupil is soon furnished with
ea:amples, which are of great weight in every kind of causes,
and which he will use as occasion requires. 21. Next succeeds
exercise in comparison, which of two characters is the better or
the worse, which, though it is managed in a similar way, yet
both doubles the topics, and treats not only of the nature, but
of the degrees of virtues and of vices. But on the management
of praise and the contrary, as it is the third part of rhetoric,
I shall give directions in the proper place.j:
22. Common places, (I speak of those in which, without
specifying persons, it is usual to declaim against vices them-
Selves, as against those of the adulterer, the gamester, the
licentious person,) are of the very nature of Speeches on trials,
and, if you add the name of an accused party, are real accu-
sations. These, however, are usually altered from their
treatment as general subjects to something specific, as when
the subject of a declamation is a blind adulterer, a poor
gamester, a licentious old man. 23. Sometimes also they have
* Livy, book vii.; Aul. Gell. ix. 2.
f Aul. Gell. vii. 1.
j B. iii. c. 7.
| Iſ) QUINTILIAN. [B.II.
their use in a defence ; for we occasionally speak in favour
of luxury or licentiousness ;” and a procurer or parasite is
sometimes defended in such a way, that we advocate, not the
person,t but the vice.
24. Theses, which are drawn from the comparison of things,
as whether a country or city life is more desirable, and whether
the merit of a lawyer or a soldier is the greater, are eminently
proper and copious subjects for exercise in Speaking, and con-
tribute greatly to improvement, both in the province of persua-
sion and in discussions on trials. The latter of the two
subjects just mentioned is handled with great copiousness by
Cicero in his pleading for Muraena. 25. Such theses as the
following, whether a man ought to marry, and whether political
offices should be sought, belong almost wholly to the deli-
| berative species, for, if persons be but added, they will be
Suasory.f
26. My teachers were accustomed to prepare us for conjec-
tural causes S by a kind of exercise far from useless, and very
pleasant to us, in which they desired us to investigate and
| show why Venus among the Lacedæmonians was represented
armed; why Cupid was thought to be a boy, and winged, and
armed with arrows and a torch," and questions of a similar
nature, in which we endeavoured to ascertain the intention, or
object about which there is so often a question in controver.
sies. This may be regarded as a sort of chria.**
27. That such questions as those about witnesses, whether
are ought always to believe them, and concerning arguments,
Whether we ought to put any trust in trifling ones, belong to
y
* Gesner observes that Cicero has done something of this kind in his
oration for Caelius, though with great caution and modesty. There is
certainly some palliation of those vices offered in c 17–21. Spalding.
+ For then it would cease to be a locus communis, and become a
cause. Spalding.
f Swasoriae, persuasory or dissuasory, i.e. deliberative.
§ In which it is inquired whether a thing is, or is not ; why any-
thing is as it is ; with what intention anything was done. Such
questions were said to belong to the status conjecturalis ; see b. vii.
c. 2. Capperonier.
| The cause is said by Lactantius, Inst. Div. i. 20, to have been the
bravery exhibited by the Spartan women on a certain occasion against
the Messenians, when a temple was vowed to Venus &rmata.
* See Propert. ii. 9.
** See i. 9, 4.
CII. IV.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. | | 1
forensic pleading, is so manifest that some speakers, * not
undistinguished in civil offices, have kept them ready in writ-
ing, and have carefully committed them to memory, that,
whenever opportunity should offer, their extemporary speeches
might be decorated with them, as with ornaments fitted into
them.f 28. By which practice, (for I cannot delay to express
my judgment on the point,) they appeared to me to confess
great weakness in themselves. For what can such men pro-
duce appropriate to particular causes, of which the aspect is
perpetually varied and new 2 How can they reply to questions
propounded by the opposite party 2 How can they at once
meet objections, or interrogate a witness, when, even on topics
of the commonest kind, such as are handled in most causes,
they are unable to pursue the most ordinary thoughts in any
words but those which they have long before prepared ?. 29.
When they say the same things in various pleadings, their
cold meat, as it were, served up over and over again, must
either create loathing in the speakers themselves, or their
unhappy household furniture, which, as among the ambitious
poor, is worn out by being used for several different purposes,
must, when detected so often by the memory of their hearers,
cause a feeling of shame in them ; 30. especially as there is
Scarcely any common place so common, which can incorporate
well with any pleading, unless it be bound by some link to
the peculiar question under consideration, and which will not
show; that it is not so much inserted as attached; 31. either
because it is unlike the rest, or because it is very frequently
borrowed without reason, not because it is wanted, but because
it is ready ; as some speakers, for the sake of sentiment, in-
troduce the most verbose common places, whereas it is from
the subject itself that sentiments ought to arise. 32. Such
remarks are ornamental and useful if they spring from the
question, but every remark, however beautiful, unless it tends
to gain the cause, is certainly superfluous, and sometimes
* As Hortensius; see ii. 1, 11. Spalding.
# Emblematis.] The word signifies anything that is inserted in or
applied to any other thing. Thus in Cicero emblemata is used for
ornaments attached to gold and silver vases, capable of being taken off
at pleasure. Rollin.
† Apparedtgue.] The sense of the text is clear, but the construction
obscure ; nor has any satisfactory explanation or emendation of it
been proposed.
#
| 12 ^UINTILIAN. [B.II.
even noxious. But this digression has been sufficiently pro-
longed.
33. The praise or censure of laws requires more mature
powers, such as may almost suffice for the very highest efforts.
Whether this exercise partakes more of the nature of delibera-
tive or controversial Oratory, is a point that varies according to
the custom and right of particular nations. Among the
Greeks the proposer of laws was called to plead before the
judge ; among the Romans it was customary to recommend or
disparage a law before the public assembly.* In either case,
however, few arguments, and those almost certain, f are
advanced ; for there are but three kinds of laws, relating to
sacred, public, or private rights. 34. This division has regard
chiefly to the commendation of a law, as when the speaker
extols it by a kind of gradation, because it is a law, because it
is public, because it is made to promote the worship of the gods.
35. Points about which questions usually arise, are common to
all laws; S for a doubt may be started, either concerning the
right of him who proposes the law, (as concerning that of
Publius Clodius who was accused of not having been properly
created tribune, ) or concerning the validity of the proposal
itself, a doubt which may refer to a variety of matters, as for
* Certain judges were appointed by the assembly of the people
called momothetae, before whom the proposer of a new law had to appear
and support it; his adversaries were the defenders of the old law
which the new one would abrogate. Spalding.
ºf Fere certa..] In opposition to the particulars to which he alludes in
the following section, de quibus quºri solet, i.e., daubitari. The argu-
ments advanced in favour or condemnation of a law are generally such
as can have but one tendency, that is, to prove the law to be either
extremely good or extremely bad ; they are very seldom such as can
be turned to advantage on either side of the question. Spalding.
# It is only however the old law that can be thus praised; for the
new, when it is proposed, is not properly a law. Spalding.
§ The points meant by Quintilian, Says Spalding, are such as regard
the mere form and mode of proposing or bringing forward a law ; for
whether a law was good or bad would appear from the nature and
tendency of it.
| Clodius, being a patrician by birth, could not be made a tribune
of the people, without having been first made a plebeian by adoption.
Cicero maintained that his adoption had been irregular, Pro Domo, c.
13–17, where reference is also made to the auspices and to three
market-days ; on which the reader may consult Ernesti's Clavis.
Spalding.
CH. Iv.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 113
instance, whether the proposal has been published on three
market days, or whether the law may be said to have been
proposed, or to be proposed, on an improper day, or contrary
to protests, or to the auspices, or in any other way at variance
with legitimate proceedings ; or whether it be opposed to any
law still in force. 36. But such considerations do not enter
into these early exercises, which are without any allusion to
persons, times, or particular causes. Other points, whether
treated in real or fictitious discussions, are much the same ;
for the fault of any law must be either in words or in matter.
37. As to words, it is questioned whether they be sufficiently
eacpressive ; or whether there is any ambiguity in them ; as to
matter, whether the law is consistent with itself; whether it
ought to have reference to past time, or to individuals. But
the most common inquiry is, whether it be proper or eacpedient.
38. Nor am I ignorant that of this inquiry many divisions
are made by most professors; but I, under the term proper,
include consistency with justice, piety, religion, and other
similar virtues. The consideration of justice, however, is
usually discussed with reference to more than one point; for
a question may either be raised about the subject of the
law, as whether it be deserving of punishment or reward, or
about the measure of reward or punishment, to which an objec-
tion may be taken as well for being too great as too little. 39.
Expediency, also, is sometimes determined by the nature of
the measure, sometimes by the circumstances of the time.
As to some laws, it becomes a question, whether they can be
enforced. Nor ought students to be ignorant that laws are
sometimes censured wholly, sometimes partly, as examples of
both are afforded us in highly celebrated orations. 40. Nor
does it escape my recollection that there are laws which are
not proposed for perpetuity, but with regard to temporary
honours or commands, such as the Manilian law, about which
there is an oration of Cicero. But concerning these no direc-
tions can be given in this place; for they depend upon the
peculiar nature of the subjects on which the discussion is
raised, and not on any general consideration.
41. On such subjects did the ancients, for the most part,
exercise the faculty of eloquence, borrowing their mode of
argument, however, from the logicians. To speak on fictitious
cases, in imitation of pleadings in the forum or in public coun-
I
|
114 QUINTILIAN. [B, II.
cils, is generally allowed to have become a practice among
the Greeks, about the time of Demetrius Phalereus. 42.
Whether that sort of exercise was invented by him, I (as I
have acknowledged also in another book*) have not succeeded
in discovering; nor do those who affirm most positively that he
did invent it, rest their opinion on any writer of good au-
thority; but that the Latin teachers of eloquence commenced
this practice towards the end of the life of Lucius Crassus,
Cicerof tells us; of which teachers the most eminent was
Plotius.
CHAPTER W.
Advantages of reading history and speeches, § 1–3. On what points
in them the professor of rhetoric should lecture, 4—9. Faſalty
composition may sometimes be read, to exercise the pupil's judg-
ment, 10–13. Usefulness of this exercise, 14—17. Best authors
to be read at an early age, 18—20. The pupil should be cautious
of imitating very ancient or very modern writers, 21–26.
1. BUT of the proper mode of declaiming I shall speak a
little further on ; in the mean while, as we are treating of the
first rudiments of rhetoric, I should not omit, I think, to
observe how much the professor would contribute to the
advancement of his pupils, if, as the explanation of the poets
is required from teachers of grammar, So he, in like manner,
would exercise the pupils under his care in the reading of
history, and even still more in that of speeches; a practice
which I myself have adopted in the case of a few pupils, whose
age required it, and whose parents thought it would be ser-
viceable to them. 2. But though I then deemed it an ex-
cellent method, two circumstances were obstructions to the
* If that acknowledgment was made in the book De Causis Corruptoe
Eloquentiae, it does not occur in the Dialogue which we have under
that title. Spalding.
f De Orat. iii. 24. Concerning Plotius, see Suet. de Clar. Rhet, cap.
2; Seneca Rhet. p. 134 Bip.; Varro in fragm. p. 289 Bip. ; Quintilian,
xi. 3, 143. Spalding. º .
# For most of his pupils, according to the custom of the Romans,
had come to Quintilian at too advanced an age. See c. 1, sect. 1 and 8.
Spalding.
CH. v.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. | i 5
practice of it; that long custom had established a different
mode of teaching, and that they were mostly full-grown youths,
who did not require that exercise, that were forming tilem-
selves on my model. 3. But though I should make a new
discovery ever so late, I should not be ashamed to recommend
it for the future. I know, however, that this is now dene
among the Greeks, but chiefly by assistant-masters, since the
time would seem hardly sufficient, if the professors were
always to lecture to each pupil as he read. 3. Such lecturing,
indeed, as is given, that boys may follow the writing of an
author easily and distinctly with their eyes, and such even as
explains the meaning of every word, at all uncommon, that
occurs, is to be regarded as far below the profession of a
teacher of rhetoric. -
5. But to point out the beauties of authors, and, if occasion
ever present itself, their faults, is eminently consistent with
that profession and engagement, by which he offers himself to
the public as a master of eloquence, especially as I do not
require such toil from teachers, that they should call their
pupils to their lap, and labour at the reading of whatever book
each of them may fancy. 6. For to me it seems easier, as
well as far more advantageous, that the master, after calling
for silence, should appoint some one pupil to read, (and it will
be best that this duty should be imposed on them by turns,)
that they may thus accustom themselves to clear pronuncia-
tion; 7. and then, after explaining the cause for which the
oration was composed, (for so that which is said will be better
understood,) that he should leave nothing unnoticed which is
important to be remarked, either in the thought or the lap-
guage ; that he should observe what method is adopted in the
eacordium for conciliating the judge; what clearness, brevity,
and apparent sincerity, is displayed in the statement of facts ;
what design there is in certain passages, and what well con-
cealed artifice; (for that is the only true art in pleading which
cannot be perceived except by a skilful pleader;) 8, what
judgment appears in the division of the matter; how subtle
and urgent is the argumentation ; with what force the speaker,
excites, with what amenity he soothes; what severity is shown
in his invectives, what urbanity in his jests : how he com-
mands the feelings, forces a way into the understanding, and
makes the opinions of the judges coincide with what he
- I 2
116 QUINTILIAN. [B, II.
asserts. 9. In regard to the style, too, he should notice—any
expression that is peculiarly appropriate, elegant, or sublime;
when the amplification deserves praise; what quality is op-
posed to it, what phrases are happily metaphorical, what.
figures of speech are used, what part of the composition is .
smooth and polished, and yet manly and vigorous.
10. Nor is it without advantage, indeed, that inelegant and
faulty speeches, yet such as many, from depravity of taste,
would admire, should be read before boys, and that it should
be shown how many expressions in them are inappropriate,
obscure, tumid, low, mean, affected, or effeminate; expressions
which, however, are not only extolled by many readers, but,
what is worse, are extolled for the very reason that they are
vicious, 11. for straight-forward language, naturally expressed,
seems to some of us to have nothing of genius; but whâtéver
departs, in any way, from the common course, we admire as
Something exquisite ; as, with. Some persons, more. regard is
shown for figures that are distorted, and in any-respect
monstrous, than for such as have lost mone of the advantages.
of ordinary conformation. 12. Some, too, who are attracted
by appearance, think that there is more beauty in men who
are depilated and Smooth, who dress their locks, hot from the
curling-irons, with pins, and who are radiant with a com-
plexion not their own, than unsophisticated nature can give;
as if beauty of person could be thought to spring from cor-
ruption of manners.
13. Nor will the preceptor be under the obligation merely
to teach these things, but frequently to ask questions upon
them, and try the judgment of his pupils. Thus carelessness
will not come upon them while they listen, nor will the instruc-
tions that shall be given fail to enter their ears; and they
will at the same time be conducted to the end which is sought
in this exercise, namely that they themselves may conceive
and understand. For what object have we in teaching them,
but that they may not always require to be taught 2
14. I will venture to say that this sort of diligent exercise
will contribute more to the improvement of students than all
the treatises of all the rhetoricians that ever wrote ; which
doubtless, however, are of considerable use, but their scope is
more general ; and how indeed can they go into all kinds of
questions that arise almost every day ? 15. So, though
CH.V.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 117
certain general precepts are given in the military art, it will
yet be of far more advantage to know what plan any leader
has adopted wisely or imprudently, and in what place or at
what time; for in almost every art precepts are of much less
avail than practical experiments. 16. Shall a teacher declaim
that he may be a model to his hearers, and will not Cicero
and Demosthenes, if read, profit them more? Shall a pupil,
if he commits faults in declaiming, be corrected before the
rest, and will it not be more serviceable to him to correct the
speech of another? Indisputably; and even more agreeable ;
for every one prefers that others’ faults should be blamed
rather than his own. 17. Nor are there wanting more argu-
ments for me to offer; but the advantage of this plan can
escape the observation of no one ; and I wish that there may
not be so much unwillingness to adopt it as there will be
pleasure in having adopted it.*
18. If this method be followed there will remain a question
not very difficult to answer, which is, what authors ought to
be read by beginners? Some have recommended inferior,
writers, as they thought them easier of comprehension ; others
have advocated the more florid kind of writers, as being better
adapted to nourish the minds of the young. 19. For my
part, I would have the best authors commenced at once, and
read always; but I would choose"the clearest in style, and
historian,” but to understand him there is need of some pro-
ficiency. 20. Cicero, as it seems to me, is agreeable even to
beginners, and sufficiently intelligible, and may not only profit,
but even be loved; and next to Cicero, (as Livy; advises,)
Such authors as most resemble Cicero.
21. There are two points in style on which I think that the
greatest caution should be used in respect to boys : one is
* Gesner very judiciously observes that fecisse should be inserted in
the text between quâm and non displicebit.
+ There has been much discussion among critics as to whether hic
in hic historiae major est auctor is to be referred to Sallust or Livy ; but
that it ought to be referred to Sallust, will not be doubted, as
Spalding observes, by any one who refers to Martial, xiv. 191; Vell.
Pat. ii. 36; Tacit. Ann. iii. 30 ; Sen. Rhet. p. 274.
† Quintilian repeats this advice of Livy in x. 1, 39, where he says
that it was given in a letter to his son. But the letter is lost. Spalding.
118 - QUINTILIAN. [B. II.
that no master, from being too much an admirer of antiquity,
should allow them to harden, as it were, in the reading of the
Gracchi, Cato,” and other like authors; for they would thus
become uncouth and dry ; since they cannot, as yet, under-
stand their force of thought, and, content with adopting their
style, which, at the time it was written, was doubtless ex-
cellent, but is quite unsuitable to our day, they will appear to
themselves to resemble those eminent men. 22. The other
point, which is the opposite of the former, is, lest, being
captivated with the flowers of modern affectation, they should
be so seduced by a corrupt kind of pleasure, as to love that
luscious manner of writing which is the more agreeable to the
A
{ }
tſ
minds of youth in proportion as it has more affinity with
them. 23. When their taste is formed, however, and out of
danger of being corrupted, I should recommend them to read
not only the ancients, (from whom if a solid and manly force
of thought be adopted, while the rust of a rude age is cleared
off, our present style will receive additional grace,) but also
the writers of the present day, in whom there is much merit.
24. For nature has not condemned us to stupidity, but we
ourselves have changed our mode of speaking, and have
indulged our fancies more than we ought; and thus the
ancients did not excel us so much in genius as in severity of
manner. It will be possible, therefore, to select from the
moderns many qualities for imitation, but care must be taken
that they be not contaminated with other qualities with which
they are mixed. Yet that there have been recently, and are
now, many writers whom we may imitate entirely, I would not
only allow, (for why should I not?) but even affirm. 26. But
who they are it is not for everybody to decide. We may even
err with greater safety in regard to the ancients; and I would
therefore defer the reading of the moderns, that imitation may
not go before judgment.
* The speeches of the Gracchi are lost. Of the many books that
Cato wrote none has survived but his treatise on agriculture. -
CH. VI.j EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 119
CHAPTER WI.
In composition, the pupil should have but moderate assistance, not too
much or too little.
1. THERE has been also a diversity of practice among
teachers in the following respect. Some of them, not con-
fining themselves to giving directions as to the division of any
subject which they assigned their pupils for declamation,
developed it more fully by speaking on it themselves, and
amplified it not only with proofs but with appeals to the
feelings. 2. Others, giving merely the first outlines, ex-
patiated after the declamations were composed, on whatever
points each pupil had omitted, and polished some passages
with no less care than they would have used if they had them-
selves been rising to speak in public.
Both methods are beneficial; and, therefore, for my own
part, I give no distinction to either of them above the other;
but, if it should be necessary to follow only one of the two,
it will be of greater service to point out the right way at first,
than to recall those who have gone astray from their errors;
3. first, because to the subsequent emendation they merely
listen, but the preliminary division they carry to their medita-
tion and their composition ; and, secondly, because they more
willingly attend to one who gives directions than to one who
finds faults. Whatever pupils, too, are of a high spirit,” are
apt, especially in the present state of manners, to be angry at
admonition, and offer silent resistance to it. 4. Not that
faults are therefore to be less openly corrected; for regard is
to be had to the other pupils, who will think that whatever the
master has not amended is right. But both methods should
be united, and used as occasion may require. To beginners
should be given matter designed,” as it were, beforehand, in
proportion to the abilities of each. But when they shall
appear to have formed themselves sufficiently on their model,
* Vivaciores.] That is, says Spalding, alacriores, animosiores, support-
ing his opinion by several apt quotations. Capperonier unhappily
thought that the word meant astate provectores.
+ Praeformata..] A metaphorical expression borrowed from architects,
who sketch out their work either by Sciographia, Čchºographia, or
Orthographia. Turnebus.
120 QUINTILIAN. [B.II.
a few brief directions may be given them, following which,
they may advance by their own strength without any support.
6. It is proper that they should sometimes be left to them-
selves, lest, from the bad habit of being always led by the
efforts of others, they should lose all capacity of attempting
and producing anything for themselves. But when they seem
to judge pretty accurately of what ought to be said, the labour
of the teacher is almost at an end; though, should they still
commit errors, they must be again put under a guide.
7. Something of this kind we see birds practise, which divide
| food, collected in their beaks, among their tender and helpless
| young ones; but, when they seem sufficiently grown, teach
them, by degrees, to venture out of the nest, and flutter
round their place of abode, themselves leading the way; and
at last leave their strength, when properly tried, to the open
sky and their own self-confidence.*
* Valerius Flaccus, vii. 375:
Qualis adhuc teneros supremum pallida foetus
Mater ab excelso produxit in aéra nido,
Hortaturque sequi, brevibusque insurgere pennis ;
Illos coerulei primus ferit horror Olympi;
Jamgue redire rogant, adsuetaque quaeritur arbor.
As when the anxious dam her tender young
Leads from their lofty nest to loftier skies,
Bidding them follow her, and rise upborne
On half-grown wings; the blue expanse, first tried,
Strikes them with dread; they, fluttering, chirp for leave
Back to return, and seek th’ accustom'd tree.
Of which lines the germ, as Burmann remarks, is found in Ovid,
Met. viii. 213 :
- Velut ales ab alto
Quæ teneram prolem produxit in aéra nido,
Hortaturque sequi.
The simile is very happily adopted by Goldsmith :
And as a bird each fond endearment tries,
To lure her new-fledged offspring to the skies.

CH. VII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 121 .
CHAPTER VII. ~~~~)
Pupils should not always declaim their own compositions, but some-
times passages from eminent writers, ~~~!
1. ONE change, I think, should certainly be made in what
is customary with regard to the age of which we are speaking,
Pupils should not be obliged to learn by heart what they have
composed, and to repeat it, as is usual, on a certain day, a
task which it is fathers that principally exact, thinking that
their children then only study when they repeat frequent
declamations; whereas proficiency depends chiefly on the dili-
gent cultivation of style. 2. For though I would wish boys
to compose, and to spend much time in that employment, yet,
as to learning by heart, I would rather recommend for that
purpose select passages from Orations or histories, or any other
sort of writings deserving of such attention. 3. The memory
will thus be more efficiently exercised in mastering what...is
another's than what is their own ; and those who shall have
been practised in this more difficult kind of labour, will fix in
their minds, without trouble, what they themselves have
composed, as being more familiar” to then. ; they will also
accustom themselves to the best compositions, and they will
always have in their memory something which they may
imitate, and will, even without being aware, re-produce--that-
fashion of style which they have deeply impressed upon their
minds. 4. They will have at command, moreover, an abun-
dance of the best words, phrases, and figures, not sought for
the occasion, but offering themselves spontaneously, as it
were, from a store treasured within them. To this is added
the power of quoting the happy expressions of any author,
which is agreeable in common conversation, and useful in
pleading; for phrases which are not coined for the sake of the
cause in hand have the greater weight, and often gain us
more applause than if they were our own.
5. Yet pupils should sometimes be permitted to recite what
they themselves have written, that they may reap the full
reward of their labour from that kind of applause which is most
* Spalding retains familiarius in his text, but has no doubt that'
Jamiliario, given by Obrecht, is the true reading. e
122 QUINTILIAN. [B. II.
desired.* This permission will most properly be granted
# when they have produced something more polished than ordi-
nary, that they may thus be presented with some return for
their study, and rejoice that they have deserved to recite their
composition. -
CHAPTER VIII.
Variety of talent and disposition in pupils requires variety of treat-
ment, § 1–5. How far an inclination for any particular line of
study should be encouraged and cultivated, 6–15.
1. IT is generally, and not without reason, regarded as an
excellent quality in a master to observe accurately the differ-
ences of ability in those whom he has undertaken to instruct,
and to ascertain in what direction the nature of each particu-
larly inclines him; for there is in talent an incredible variety;
nor are the forms of the mind fewer than those of the body.
2. This may be understood even from orators themselves, who
differ so much from each other in their style of speaking, that
no one is like another, though most of them have set them-
selves to imitate those whom they admired. 3. It has also
been thought advantageous by most teachers to instruct each
pupil in such a manner as to cherish by learning the good
qualities inherited from nature, so that the powers may be
assisted in their progress towards the object to which they
i chiefly direct themselves. As a master of palaestric exercises,
# when he enters a gymnasium full of boys, is able, after trying
... their strength and comprehension in every possible way, to
decide for what kind of exercise each ought to be trained ;
;4, so a teacher+ of eloquence, they say, when he has clearly
jobserved which boy's genius delights most in a concise and
* That is, the applause of their fellow students. If they merely
wrote, and did not recite, they would gain, as Spalding observes, the
commendation of the master only.
+ Ita praeceptorem.] The accusative depends on something under-
stood, which must be sought in the preceding utile visum, est, ačwnt, or
Bomething similar, being supplied. That Quintilian is repeating the
opinion of others is shown by the subjunctives cygłescat, possit, faciat.
Spalding.
CH. VIII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 123
polished manner of speaking, and which in a spirited, or
grave, or smooth, or rough, or brilliant, or elegant one, will so
accommodate his instructions to each, that he will be advanced
in that department in which he shows most ability; 5. because
nature attains far greater power when seconded by culture;
and he that is led contrary to nature, cannot make due pro-
gress in the studies for which he is unfit, and makes those
talents, for the exercise of which he seemed born, weaker by
neglecting to cultivate them.
6. This opinion seems to me (for to him that follows reason
there is free exercise of judgment even in opposition to
received persuasions) just only in part. To distinguish pecu-
liarities of talent is absolutely necessary ; and to make choice
of particular studies to suit them, is what no man would dis-
{
A
*
|
gountenance. 7. For one youth will be fitter for the study of .
history than another; one will be qualified for writing poetry, ºf
another for the study of law, and some perhaps fit only to be ºf
sent into the fields. The teacher of rhetoric will decide in
accordance with these peculiarities, just as the master of the
palaestra will make one of his pupils a runner, another a boxer,
another a wrestler, or fit him for any other of the exercises that
are practised at the Sacred games.
8. But he who is destined for public speaking must strive
to excel, not merely in one accomplishment, but in all the
accomplishments that are requisite for that art, even though
some of them may seem too difficult for him when he is learn-
ing them; for instruction would be altogether superfluous if
the natural state of the mind were sufficient. 9. If a pupil
that is vitiated in taste, and turgid in his style, as many are,
is put under our care, shall we allow him to go on in his own
way ? Him that is dry and jejune in his manner, shall we not
nourish, and, as it were, clothe 2 For if it be necessary to
prune something away from certain pupils, why should it not
be allowable to add something to others ? 10. Yet I would not
fight against nature; for I do not think that any good quality,
which is innate, should be detracted, but that whatever is
inactive or deficient should be invigorated or supplied. Was
that famous teacher Isocrates, whose writings are not stronger
proofs that he spoke well, than his scholars that he taught well,
inclined, when he formed such an opinion of Ephorus and
Theopompus as to say that “the one wanted the rein and the
124 QUINTILIAN. [B.II.
other the spur,” to think that the slowness in the duller, and
the ardour in the more impetuous, were to be fostered by edu-
cation ? On the contrary,t he thought that the qualities of
each ought to be mixed with those of the other. 12. We must
so far accommodate ourselves, however, to feeble intellects,
that they may be trained only to that to which nature invites
them ; for thus they will do with more success the only thing
which they can do. But if richer material fall into our hands,
from which we justly conceive hopes of a true orator, no
rhetorical excellence must be left unstudied. 13. For though
Such a genius be more inclined, as indeed it must be, to the
exercise of certain powers, yet it will not be averse to that of
others, and will render them, by study, equal to those in which
it maturally excelled; just as the skilful trainer in bodily
exercise, (that I may adhere to my former illustration,) will
not, if he undertakes to form a pancratiast, teach him to
strike with his fist or his heel only, or instruct him merely in
wrestling, or only in certain artifices of wrestling, but will
practise him in everything pertaining to the pancratiastic art.
There may perhaps be some pupil unequal to some of these
exercises. He must then apply chiefly to that in which he
can succeed. 14. For two things are especially to be avoided ;
one, to attempt what Cannot be accomplished; and the other,
to divert a pupil from what he does well to something else for
which he is less qualified. But if he be capable of instruc-
tion, the tutor, like Nicostratus whom we, when young, knew
at an advanced age, will bring to bear upon him every art of
instruction alike, and render him invincible, as Nicostratus
was in wrestling and boxing,' for success in both of which con-
* See Cic. de Orat. iii. 9; Brut. c. 56; also Quintil. x. 1, 74. Con-
sult also Ruhnken, Historia Oratorum, p. 87. Spalding.
f Qww.m.—arbitraretwº.] I have taken a little liberty with this
qwum, on account of another preceding it. The sentence, if rendered
with exact literalness, would hardly please the English reader. The
scholar will easily see the sense.
† In qué merità ad spem, oratoris simus aggressi.] “On which we
have justly risen to the hope of an orator.” “Aggredi ad Spem,” says
Spalding, “for se tollere in Spem : and in qué for quá oblatá, cujus
occasione.” -
Ś A pancratiast and wrestler. See Pausan. v. 21. The saying, #yd,
Trovãow Trávra kará Nukóa Tparov, which occurs twice in Suidas, in
#yd) and Nukóa Tparog, is said to refer to a player of that name.
CH.IX.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 125
tests he was crowned on the same day. 15. How much more
must such training, indeed, be pursued by the teacher of the
future orator | For it is not enough that he should speak
concisely, or artfully, or vehemently, any more than for a
singing master to excel in acute, or middle, or grave tones
only, or even in particular subdivisions of them : since elo-
quence is, like a harp, not perfect, unless, with all its strings
stretched, it be in unison from the highest to the lowest note.
CHAPTER IX.
Pupils should regard their tutors as intellectual parents.
1. HAVING spoken thus fully concerning the duties of
teachers, I give pupils, for the present, only this one admoni-
tion, that they are to love their tutors not less than their studies,
and to regard them as parents, not indeed of their bodies, but
of their minds. 2. Such affection contributes greatly to im-
provement, for pupils, under its influence, will not only listen
with pleasure, but will believe what is taught them, and will
desire to resemble their instructors. They will come together,
in assembling for school, with pleasure and cheerfulness; they
will not be angry when corrected, and will be delighted when
praised; and they will strive, by their devotion to study, to be-
come as dear as possible to the master. 3. For as it is the
duty of preceptors to teach, so it is that of pupils to show
themselves teachable; neither of these duties, else, will be of
avail without the other. And as the generation of man is
effected by both parents, and as you will in vain scatter seed,
unless the furrowed ground, previously softened, cherish it,
So neither can eloquence come to its growth unless by mutual
agreement between him who communicates and him who
receives.
126 QUINTILIAN. [B. II.
CHAPTER X.
Remarks on declamations, $ 1, 2. Injudiciousness in the choice of
subjects has been an obstruction to improvement in eloquence,
3—5. On what sort of subjects pupils may be permitted to
declaim, 6–8. What alterations should be made in the common
practice, 9–15. -
1. WHEN the pupil has been well instructed, and sufficiently
exercised, in these preliminary studies, which are not in them-
selves inconsiderable, but members and portions, as it were, or
higher branches of learning, the time will have nearly arrived
for entering on deliberative and judicial subjects. But before
I proceed to speak of those matters, I must Say a few words
on the art of declamation, which, though the most recently
invented% of all exercises, is indeed by far the most useful.
2. For it comprehends within itself all those exercises of which
I have been treating, and presents us with a very close resem-
blance to reality; and it has been so much adopted, accordingly,
that it is thought by many sufficient of itself to form oratory,
since no excellence in continued speaking can be specified,
which is not found in this prelude + to speaking. 3. The
practice however has so degenerated through the fault of the
teachers, that the license and ignorance of declaimers have been
among the chief causes that have corrupted eloquence. But
of that which is good by nature we may surely make a good
use. 4. Let therefore the subjects themselves, which shall be
imagined, be as like as possible to truth; and let declamations
to the utmost extent that is practicable, imitate those plead-
ings for which they were introduced as a preparation. 5. For
as to magicians, and the pestilence, and oracles, $ and step-
* See i. 4, 41, 42.
i Meditatione.] That is pusXérm, or exercise. Capperonier.
† Such a subject as that of the tenth of the declamations ascribed
to Quintilian, entitled Sepulchrum, Incantatºm.
§ Pestilentiam, et responsa.] These two words appear to refer to the
same subject, which is that of the 326th declamation of those called
Quintilian's : A people suffering from pestilence sent a deputy to
consult an oracle about a remedy; the answer given him was that he
must sacrifice his own son. On his return he communicated the oracle
to his son, but concealed it from the public authorities, telling them
that they had to perform certain sacred rites. When the rites were
finished, the pestilence did not abate; and the son then put himself to
CII.x.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. J Q7
º
mothers more cruel than those of tragedy, and other subjects
more imaginary than these, we shall in vain seek them among
sponsions and interdicts.” What, then, it may be said, shall we
never suffer students to handle such topics as are above belief,
and (to say the truth) poetical, so that they may expatiate and
exult in their subject, and swell forth as it were into full
body ?? 6. It would indeed be best not to suffer them ; but
at least let not the subjects, if grand and turgid, appear also,
to him who regards them with severe judgment, foolish and
ridiculous; so that, if we must grant the use of such topics, let
the declaimer swell himself occasionally to the full, provided
he understands that, as four-footed animals, when they have
been blown with green fodder, are cured by losing blood, and
thus return to food suited to maintain their strength, so must
his turgidity be diminished, and whatever corrupt humours he
has contracted be discharged, if he wishes to be healthy and
strong; for otherwise his empty swelling will be hampered; at
the first attempt at any real pleading. ----.
7. Those, assuredly, who think that the whole exercise of
declaiming is altogether different from forensic pleading, do
not see even the reason for which that exercise was instituted;
8. For, if it is no preparation for the forum, it is merely like
theatrical Ostentation, or insane raving. To what purpose is ,
it to instruct a judge, who has no existence 2 To state a case
that all know to be fictitious? To bring proofs of a point on . .
which no man will pronounce sentence? This indeed is nothing .
more than trifling; but how ridiculous is it to excite our feel-
ings, and to work upon an audience with anger and Sorrow,
unless we are preparing ourselves by imitations of battle for
serious contests and a regular field? 9. Will there then be
death. After the pestilence had subsided, the father was accused of
treason to the state. See also Declamat. 384, and the 19th and 43rd
of those ascribed to Calphurnius Flaccus.
* Law terms; sponsio was when a litigant engaged to pay a certain
sum of money if he lost the cause ; an interdict was when the praetor
ordered or forbade anything to be done, chiefly in regard to property.
Thºrnebws. -
+ Quasi in corpus cant..] Compare c. 4, sect. 5.
+ A dºpes, fat.
§ Deprehendetwr.] Not equivalent to invenietºr or agnoscetur, but to
in arctum deferetur et aestwabit, se eaſpedire néScien8. See i. 1, 30.
Spalding.
12.8 * QUlNTILIAN. [3, Il.
no difference, it may be asked, between the mode of speaking
at the bar, and mere exercise in declamation? I answer, that
if we speak for the sake of improvement, there will be no
difference. I wish, too, that it were made a part of the exer-
cise to use names ; * that causes more complicated, and requir-
ing longer pleadings, were invented; that we were less afraid of
words in daily use ; and that we were in the habit of mingling
jests with our declamation ; all which points, however we may
have been practised in the schools in other respects, find us
novices at the bar.
10. But even if a declamation be composed merely for dis-
play, we ought Surely to exert our voice in some degree to
please the audience. For even in those oratorical composi-
tions, which are doubtless based in some degree upon truth, but
are adapted to please the multitude, (such as are the panegy-
rics which we read, and all that epideictic kind of eloquence,)
it is allowable to use great elegance, and not only to acknow-
ledge the efforts of art, (which ought generally to be concealed
in forensic pleadings,) but to display it to those who are called
together for the purpose of witnessing it. 12. Declamation
therefore, as it is an imitation of real pleadings and delibera-
tions, ought closely to resemble reality, but, as it carries with
it something of ostentation, to clothe itself in a certain ele-
gance. 13. Such is the practice of actors, who do not pro-
nounce exactly as we speak in common conversation, for such
pronunciation would be devoid of art; nor do they depart far
from nature, as by such a fault imitation would be destroyed;
but they exalt the simplicity of familiar discourse with a cer-
tain Scenic grace.
14. However some inconveniences will attend us from the
nature of the subjects which we have imagined, especially as
many particulars in them are left uncertain, which we settle as
suits our purpose, as age, fortune, children, parents, strength,
laws, and manners of cities ; and other things of a similar
kind. 15. Sometimes, too, we draw arguments from the very
faults of the imaginary causes. But on each of these points
* Which were not introduced in declamations; for pater, tyrammicida,
abdicatus, raptor were used as general terms, rendering the whole per-
formance less animated, and less like reality. In Swasoriae oraížomes
persons were specified, but to them Quintilian seems to make no
reference in these remarks. Spalding.
CH. XI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. -- | Q9
we shall speak in its proper place. For though the whole
object of the work intended by us has regard to the forma-
tion of an orator, yet, lest students may think anything want-
ing; we shall not omit, in passing, whatever may occur that
fairly relates to the teaching of the schools.
CHAPTER XI.
Some think instruction in oratory unnecessary, § 1, 2. Boasts and
practices of the ignorant, 3–5. Some study only parts of their
speeches ; want of connexion in their matter, 6, 7.
1. FROM this point, then, I am to enter upon that portion
of the art with which those who have omitted the preceding
portions usually commence. I see, however, that some will
oppose me at the very threshold; men who think that
eloquence has no need of rules of this kind, and who, satisfied
with their own natural ability, and the common methods of
teaching and exercise in the schools, even ridicule my dili-
gence; following the example of certain professors of great
reputation. It was one of those characters, I believe, who,
being asked what a figure and what a thought was, answered
that “he did not know, but that, if it had any relation to his
subject, it would be found in his declamation.” 2. Another
of them replied to a person who asked him “whether he was a
follower of Theodorus or Apollodorus,” “I am a prize-
fighter.” Nor could he indeed have escaped an avowal of
his ignorance with greater wit. But such men, as they have
* Percontanti. Theodoreus an Apollodoreus esset, Ego, inquit, parmu-
larius Sum.] Theodorus and Apollodorus were well-known rhetoricians,
often mentioned by Quintilian, and leaders of parties. That pay-
nularius signifies one who favoured the gladiators in the theatre and
arena, called Thraces from their armour, has been shown by the com-
mentators on Suet. Domit. c. 10. . . . The man to whom Quintilian
alludes intimates that he knew whom to favour in the arena and the
circus, but that for parties among rhetoricians he had no care. Gesner.
“It is almost the same as if a person, upon being asked whether he
were a Nominalist or a Realist, were to reply, ‘ I am a Carthusian,’
that is, I do not care for or do not know the names Nominalist and
Realist.” Scheller's Lexicon, s.v. parmularius
& K
130 QUINTILIAN. [B. II.
attained eminent repute through the goodness of their
natural powers, and have uttered many things even worthy of
remembrance, have had very many imitators that resemble
them in negligence, but very few that approach them in
ability. 3. They make it their boast that they speak from
impulse, and merely exert their natural powers; and say that
there is no need of proofs or arrangement in fictitious subjects,
but only of grand thoughts, to hear which the auditory will be
crowded, and of which the best are the offspring of venture-
someness. 4. In meditation, also, as they use no method,
they either wait, often for some days,” looking at the ceiling
for some great thought that may spontaneously present itself,
or, exciting themselves with inarticulate sounds, as with a
trumpet, they adapt the wildest gestures of body, not to the
utterance, but to the excogitation of words.
5. Some, before they have conceived any thoughts, fix upon
certain heads, under which something eloquent is to be
introduced ; but, after modulating their words to themselves,
aloud and for a long time, they desert their proposed arrange-
ment, from despairing of the possibility of forming any
connexion, and then turn to one train of ideas, and again to
another, all equally common and hackneyed. 6. Those how-
ever who seem to have most method, do not bestow their
i efforts on fictitious causes, but on common topics, in which
ºf they do not direct their view to any certain object, but throw
* out detached thoughts as they occur to them. 7. Hence it
happens that their speech, being unconnected and made up of
different pieces, cannot hang together, but is like the note-
books of boys, in which they enter promiscuously whatever has
been commended in the declamations of others. Yet they
sometimes strike out fine sentiments and good thoughts (for so
indeed they are accustomed to boast); but barbarians and
slaves do the same ; and, if this be sufficient, there is no art
at all in eloquence.
* Pluribus sape diebºws.] Gallaeus and Gesner thought that these
words, as absurdly hyperbolical, should be struck out of the text.
Comp. xi. 3, 160; x. 4, 15.
CH. XII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. | 3 ||
CHAPTER XII.
Why the ignorant often seem to speak with more force than the
º, learned, § 1–3. They attack more boldly, and are less afraid of
failure, 4, 5. But they cannot choose judiciously, or prove with
effect, 6. Their thoughts sometimes striking, 7. Apparent dis-
advantages of learned polish, 8. Unlearned speakers often
vigorous in delivery, 9, 10. Occasionally too much admired by
teachers of Oratory, 11, 12.
1. I MUST not forbear to acknowledge, however, that people
in general adopt the notion that the unlearned appear to speak
with more force than the learned. But this opinion has its
origin chiefly in the mistake of those who judge erroneously,
and who think that what has no art has the more energy; just
as if they should conceive it a greater proof of strength to
break through a door than to open it, to rupture a knot than
to untie it, to drag an animal than to lead it. 2. By such
persons a gladiator, who rushes to battle without any know-
ledge of arms, and a wrestler, who struggles with the whole
force of his body to effect that which he has once attempted, is
called so much the braver; though the latter is often laid
prostrate by his own strength, and the other, however violent
his assault, is withstood by a gentle turn of his adversary's
Wrist.*
3. But there are some things concerning this point that very
naturally deceive the unskilful; for division, though it is of
great consequence in pleadings, diminishes the appearance of
strength; what is rough is imagined more bulky than what is
polished; and objects when scattered are thought more
numerous than when they are ranged in order. i.
4. There is also a certain affinity between particular excel-
lences and faults, in consequence of which a railer passes for a
free speaker, a rash for a bold one, a prolia for a copious one.
But an ignorant pleader rails too openly and too frequently, to
the peril of the party whose cause he has undertaken, and
often to his own. 5. Yet this practice attracts the notice of
people to him, because they readily listen to what they would
not themselves utter.
Such a speaker, too, is far from avoiding that venturesome-
* Illum, vehementis impetás, eaccipit adversarić mollis articulus.] “The
flexible joint of the adversary withstands him [who is] of violent
assault ;” vehementis impetits being a genitive of quality.
K 2
I 32 - QUINTILIAN. [B. II.
, mess which lies in mere expression,” and makes desperate
iſ efforts; whence it may happen that he who is always seeking
something extravagant, may sometimes find something great;
but it happens only seldom, and does not compensate for
undoubted faults.
6. It is on this account that unlearned speakers seem some-
times to have greater copiousness of language, because they
pour forth every thing; while the learned use selection and
moderation. Besides, unlearned pleaders seldom adhere to
the object of proving what they have asserted ; by this means
they avoid what appears to judges of bad taste the dryness of
questions and arguments, and seek nothing else but matter in
which they may please the ears of the court with senseless
gratifications.
7. Their fine sentiments themselves, too, at which alone they
aim, are more striking when all around them is poor and
mean ; as lights are most brilliant, not amidst shades as
Cicero says,t but amidst utter darkness. Let such speakers
therefore be called as ingenious as the world pleases, provided
it be granted that a man of real eloquence would receive the
praise given to them as an insult. -
8. Still it must be allowed that learning does take away
something, as the file takes something from rough metal, the
whetstone from blunt instruments, and age from wine; but it
takes away what is faulty; and that which learning has
polished is less only because it is better. *
9. But such pleaders try by their delivery to gain the repu-
tation of speaking with energy : for they bawl on every
occasion and bellow out every thing with uplifted hand, as
* Illud quoque alterum, quod est in clocutione ipsá, periculum, minºs
witat.] Spalding says that by alterwm periculum is meant the other sense
of the word danger, that is, the figurative sense, it being used here
metaphorically, distinct from “verwm periculum,” real danger. He should
rather have said that we should understand Quintilian as referring to
one kind of periculwin which lies in the speaker's matter or thoughts,
and which he incurs maledicemdo, sect. 4; and another kind which lies
merely in his style of speaking, in elocutione ipsû, in which he is always
aiming at something grand and striking. I translate the first by
“ peril,” and the second by “venturesomeness,” as they cannot be both
rendered by the same word in English Compare c. xi. Sect. 3.
+ JDe Orat. iii. 26. The reference was first discovered by Al-
meloveen. Gesner justly observes that Quintilian alludes to the pas-
Sage in jest.
CH.XIII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 133
º
they call it, raging like madmen with incessant action, panting
and Swaggering, and with every kind of gesture and movement
of the head. 10. To clap the hands together, to stamp the
foot on the ground, to strike the thigh, the breast, and the
forehead with the hand, makes a wonderful impression on an
audience of the lower order,” while the polished speaker, as he
iknows how to temper, to vary, and to arrange the several
parts of his speech, so in delivery he knows how to adapt his
action to every variety of complexion in what he utters; and,
if any rule appears to him deserving of constant attention, it
would be that he should prefer always to be and to seem
modest. But the other sort of speakers call that force which
ought rather to be called violence.
11. But we may at times see not only pleaders, but, what is
far more disgraceful, teachers, who, after having had some
short practice in speaking, abandon all method and indulge in
every kind of irregularity as inclination prompts them, and call
those who have paid more regard to learning than themselves,
foolish, lifeless, timid, weak, and whatever other epithet of
reproach occurs to them. 12. Let me then congratulate them
as having become eloquent without labour, without method,
without study; but let me, as I have long withdrawn from the
duties of teaching and of speaking in the forum, because I
thought it most honourable to terminate my career while my
services were still desired, console my leisure in meditating
and composing precepts which I trust will be of use to young
men of ability, and which, I am sure, are a pleasure to myself.
CHAPTER XIII.
Quintilian does not give rules from which there is no departure;
pleaders must act according to the requisitions of their subjects,
1–7. What an orator has chiefly to keep in view, and how far
rules should be observed, 8–17.
1. BUT let no man require from me such a system of
precepts as is laid down by most authors of books of rules, a
* Mirè ad pullatum circulum facit..] The colour or dirt of the toga,
and still more of the twmica, which many of the poor wore without
anything over it, characterizes a multitude of the lower and unedu-
cated class of people. So Plin. Ep. vii. 17: Illos Quoque Sordidos et
pullatos reveremwr. See Quint. vi. 4, 6. Spalding.
134 QUINTILIAN. [B.II.
system in which I should have to make certain laws, fixed by
immutable necessity, for all students of eloquence, commencing
with the procemium, and what must be the character of it, say.
. ing that the statement of facts must come next, and what rule
º, must be observed in stating them ; that after this must come
the proposition, or as Some have preferred to call it, the eac-
cursion ;” and then that there must be a a certain order of
questions ; adding also other precepts, which some Speakers
observe as if it were unlawful to do otherwise, and as if they
were acting under orders; 2. for rhetoric would be a very
easy and small matter, if it could be included in one short
body of rules, but rules must generally be altered to suit
the nature of each individual case, the time, the occasion, and
necessity itself; consequently, one great quality in an orator
is discretion, because he must turn his thoughts in various
directions, according to the different bearings of his subject.
3. What if you should direct a general, that, whenever he draws.
up his troops for battle, he must range his front in line, extend
his wings to the right and left, and station his cavalry to de-
fend his flanks 2 Such a method will perhaps be the best, as
often as it is practicable ; but it will be subject to alteration
from the nature of the ground, if a hill come in the way, if a
river interpose, if obstruction be caused by declivities, woods,
or any other obstacles: 4, the character of the enemy, too,
may make a change mecessary, or the nature of the contest in
which he has to engage; and he will have to fight, sometimes
with his troops in extended line, sometimes in the form of
wedges, and to employ, sometimes his auxiliaries, and some-
times his own legions; and sometimes it will be of advantage
to turn his back in pretended flight. 5. In like manner,
whether an exordium be necessary or Superfluous, whether it
should be short or long, whether it should be wholly addressed
to the judge, or, by the aid of Some figure of speech, directed
occasionally to others, whether the statement of facts should
be concise or copious, continuous or broken, in the order of
events or in any other, the nature of the causes themselves
must show. 6. The case is the same with regard to the order
of cxamination, since, in the same cause, one question may
often be of advantage to one side, and another question to the
other, to be asked first; for the precepts of oratory are not
* See b. iv. c. 3, 4.
CH. XIII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 135
established by laws or public decrees, but whatever is con-
tained in them was discovered by expediency. 7. Yet I shall
not deny that it is in general of service to attend to rules, or I
should not write any; but if expediency shall suggest any-
thing at variance with them, we shall have to follow it,
deserting the authority of teachers.
8. For my part I shall, above all things,
Direct, enjoin, and o'er and o'er repeat,”
that an orator, in all his pleadings, should keep two things
in view, what is becoming, and what is expedient; but it
is frequently expedient, and sometimes becoming, to make
Some deviations from the regular and settled order, as, in
statues and pictures, we see the dress, look, and attitude,
varied. 8. In a statue, exactly upright, there is but very
little gracefulness, f for the face will look straight for-
ward, the arms hang down, the feet will be joined, and the
whole figure, from top to toe, will be rigidity itself; but a
gentle bend, or, to use the expression, motion of the
body, gives a certain animation to figures. Accordingly, the
hands are not always placed in the same position, and a
thousand varieties are given to the countenance. 10. Some
figures are in a running or rushing posture, Some are seated
or reclining, some are uncovered, and others veiled, some par-
take of both conditions. What is more distorted and elaborate
than the Discobolus of Myron ºf Yet if any one should find
fault with that figure for not being upright, would he not
prove himself void of all understanding of the art, in which
the very novelty and difficulty of the execution is what is most
deserving of praise? 11. Such graces and charms rhetorical
figures afford, both such as are in the thoughts and such as
lie in words, for they depart in some degree from the right
line, and exhibit the merit of deviation from common practice.
12. The whole face is generally represented in a painting, yet
Apelles painted the figure of Antigonus with only one side of
* A verse from Virgil, AEn. iii. 436, Praedicam, et repeteng iterwºngue
iterumque momebo, praedicam being purposely changed by Quintilian
into praecipiaſm. -
+ Quintilian had some notion of the waving line of beauty, of
which Hogarth has so ably treated.
† See Plin. H. N. xxxiv. 19. Lucian Philopseud. Vol. vii. p. 268,
ed. Bip.
136 QUINTILIAN. [B. II.
his face towards the spectator, that its disfigurement from the
loss of an eye might be concealed. Are not some things, in
like manner, to be concealed in speaking, whether, it may be,
| because they ought not to be told, or because they cannot be
expressed as they deserve? 13. It was in this way that
Timanthes, a painter, I believe, of Cythnus,” acted, in the
picture by which he carried off the prize from Colotes, of
Teium ; for when, at the sacrifice of Iphigenia, he had repre-
sented Calchas looking sorrowful, Ulysses more sorrowful, and
had given to Menelaus the utmost grief that his art could
depict, not knowing, as his power of representing feeling was
exhausted, how he could fitly paint the countenance of the
father, he threw a veil over his head, and left his grief to be
estimated by the spectator from his own heart. 14. To this
device is riot the remark of Sallust somewhat similar, For I
think it better to say nothing concerning Carthage, than to say
but little ž For these reasons it has always been customary
with me, to bind myself as little as possible to rules which the
Greeks call 20.00%.1%, and which we, translating the word as
well as we can, term universalia or perpetualia, “general” or
“constant ;” for rules are rarely found of such a nature, that
they may not be shaken in Some part, or wholly overthrown.
But of rules I shall speak more fully, and of each in its
own place. 15. In the mean time, I would not have young
men think themselves sufficiently accomplished, if they have
learned by art some one of those little books on rhetoric,
which are commonly handed about, and fancy that they are thus
Safe under the decrees of theory. The art of speaking depends
on great labour, -onstant study, varied exercise, repeated
* Timanthes, opinor, Cythmius.] See Plin. H. N. xxxv. 36; Cic. Orat.
c. 22; Val. Max. viii. 11, ext. But it has been justly observed that
the painter took the hint from Euripides, Iphig. Aul. 1550. Spalding.
What Euripides, says is, that “Agamemnon, when he saw Iphigenia
going to be sacrificed, uttered a groan, and, turning away his head, shed
tears, veiling his face with his robe.” Spalding remarks that the
doubt implied in Op?nor refers to the country of Timanthes, Quintilian
not being certain whether he was a Cythmian or not ; though why
Quintilian should have been so anxious to avoid error about the
painter's country, when he was merely making a passing observation
on his picture, it is not easy to say. For further particulars about
Timanthes and his painting, the reader may consult Smith's Dict, of
Biog, and Mythol.
CH. XIV.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 137
gº)
trials, the deepest Sagacity, and the readiest judgment. 16.
But it is assisted by rules, provided that they point out a fair
road, and not one single wheel-rut, from which he who thinks it
unlawful to decline, must be contented with the slow progress
of those who walk on ropes. Accordingly, we often quit the
main road, (which has been formed perhaps by the labour of
an army,) being attracted by a shorter path ; or if bridges,
broken down by torrents, have intersected the direct way, we
are compelled to go round about ; and if the gate be stopped
up by flames, we shall have to force a way through the wall.
17. The work of eloquence is extensive and of infinite variety,
presenting something new almost daily; nor will all that is
possible ever have been said of it. But the precepts which
have been transmitted to us I will endeavour to set forth, con-
sidering, at the same time, which of them are the most valua-
ble, whether anything in them seems likely to be changed for
the better, and whether any additions may be made to them,
or anything taken from them. : -
CHAPTER XIV.
Of the term rhetoric or oratory, § 1–4. Heads under which Quin-
tilian considers the art of oratory, 5.
1. SOME who have translated £nrogſz) from Greek into
Latin, have called it ars oratoria and oratriæ. I would not
deprive those writers of their due praise, for endeavouring to
add to the copiousness of the Latin language, but all Greek
words do not obey our will, in attempting to render them from
the Greek, as all our words, in like manner, do not obey that
of the Greeks, when they try to express something of ours in
their own tongue. 2. This translation is not less harsh than
the essentia and entia of Flavius,” for the Greek 000ſ, : nor is
* It is probable that he is the same person whom writers in general
call Papirius Fabianus, a contemporary of Seneca, a philosopher well
acquainted with the nature of things, as he is called by Plin. H. N.
xxxvi. 24. Both the Senecas, father and son, say a great deal of him,
the one in the Praef. Controv. ii. p. 132–134; the other in the Epist.
ad Lucil. 100. Spalding. But from Sen. Ep. 58, it appears, according
to the emendation of Muretus, now generally adopted, that Cicero had
previously used the word. Compare Quint. viii. 3, 53.
138 QUINTILIAN. |B.II.
it indeed exact, for oratoria will be taken in the same sense as
elocutoria, oratria, as elocutria, but the word rhetorice, or
, which we are speaking, is the same sort of word as eloquentia,
# and it is doubtless used in two senses by the Greeks. 3. In
One acceptation it is an adjective, ars rhetorica, as navis
piratica : in the other a substantive, like philosophia or ami-
citia. We wish it now to have the signification of a sub-
stantive, just as yºu go.ziz) is rendered by the substantive
literatura, not by literatriæ, which would be similar to oratriæ,
nor by literatoria, which would be similar to oratoria; but for
the word rhetorice, no equivalent Latin word has been found.
4. Let us not, however, dispute about the use of it, especially
as we must adopt many other Greek words; for if I may use
the terms physicus, musicus, geometres, I shall offer no un-
Seemly violence to them by attempting to turn them into
Latin ; and since Cicero himself uses a Greek title for the
books which he first wrote upon the art, we certainly need
be under no apprehension of appearing to have rashly trusted
the greatest of orators as to the name of his own art.
RHEToRIC, then, (for we shall henceforth use this term with-
out dread of sarcastic objections,) will be best divided, in my
opinion, in such a manner, that we may speak first of the art,
next of the artist, and then of the work. The art will be that
which ought to be attained by study, and is the knowledge how
to speak well. The artificer is he who has thoroughly acquired
the art, that is, the Orator, whose business is to speak well.
The work is what is achieved by the artificer, that is, good
speaking. All these are to be considered under special heads;
but of the particulars that are to follow, I shall speak in their
Several places; at present I shall proceed to consider what
is to be said on the first general head.
CH. XV.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 139
CHAPTER XV.
What rhetoric is, $ 1, 2. To call it the power of persuading is to give
an insufficient definition of it, 3–9. To call it the power of per-
Swading by Speech is not sufficient, 10, 11. Other definitions, 12–
23. That of Gorgias in Plato ; that of Plato or Socrates in the
Phaedrus, 24–31. That of Cornelius Celsus, 32. Other defi-
nitions more approved by Quintilian, 33–37. Quintilian's own
definition, 38.
1. FIRST of all, then, we have to consider what rhetoric is.
It is, indeed, defined in various ways; but its definition gives
rise chiefly to two considerations, for the dispute is, in general,
either concerning the quality of the thing itself, or concerning
the comprehension of the terms in which it is defined. The
first and chief difference of opinion on the subject is, that
Some think it possible even for bad men to have the name of
orators; while others (to whose opinion I. attach myself) main-
tain that the name, and the art of which we are speaking, can
be conceded only to good men.”
2. Of those who separate the talent of speaking from the
greater and more desirable praise of a good life, some have
called rhetoric merely a power, some a science, but not a vir-
tue,t some a habit, some an art, but having nothing in com-
mon with science and virtue; some even an abuse of art, that
is, a zoºxorax.yfo. 3. All these have generally supposed, that
the business of oratory lies either in persuading, or in speaking
in a manner adapted to persuade, for such art may be attained
by one who is far from being a good man. The most common
definition therefore is, that oratory is the power of persuading.
What I call a power, some call a faculty, and others a talent,
but that this discrepancy may be attended with no ambiguity,
* This was the opinion also of Cato the Censor, given in his book
De Oratore addressed to his son, as appears from Seneca the fathe ,
Praef. ad Controv. l. i., a remarkable passage, and worthy of attention
from the studious. Orator est, Marce fili, vir bonus dicemdé peritus.
Antonius, in Cic. De Orat. ii. 20, distinguishes the Orator from the good
man, as does also Cicero himself, Invent. i. 3, 4. See Quintilian xii.
1, 1 ; and Prooem. tot, op. sect. 9. Spalding.
+ See c. 20.
:: We call that art a kakorsy via which has not a good, but a bad
end, as the magic art ; and some abuse oratory to the hurt of their
fellow creatures. Turnebws.
140 t QUINTILIAN. [B. II.
I mean by power, 60young. 4. This opinion had its origin
from Isocrates, if the treatise on the art, which is in circulation
under his name, is really his.” That rhetorician, though he
had none of the feelings of those who defame the business of
the orator, gives too rash a definition of the art when he says,
“That rhetoric is the worker of persuasion, Tatēočg 67,000gyóg:
for I shall not allow myself to use the peculiar term ‘f that
Ennius applies to Marcus Cethegus, SUADF medulla. 5. In
Plato too, Gorgias, in the Dialogue inscribed with his name,
says almost the same thing; but Plato wishes it to be received
as the opinion of Gorgias, not as his own. Cicero, in several
passages; of his writings, has said, that the duty of an orator
is to speak in a way adapted to persuade. 6. In his books
on Rhetoric also, but with which, doubtless, he was not satis-
fied, § he makes the end of eloquence to be persuasion.
But money, likewise, has the power of persuasion, and
interest, and the authority and dignity of a speaker, and
even his very look, unaccompanied by language, when ||
either the remembrance of the services of any individual, or
a pitiable appearance, or beauty of person, draws forth an
opinion. 7. Thus when Antonius, in his defence of Manius
Aquilius, exhibited on his breast, by tearing his client's robe,
the scars of the wounds which he had received for his
country, he did not trust to the power of his eloquence, but
applied force, as it were, to the eyes of the Roman people,
who, it was thought, were chiefly induced by the sight to
* The treatise of Isocrates Cicero (de Invent. ii. 2) intimates that he
had not seen. There is a learned discussion of Manutius concerning
it in a note on Epist. ad Div. i. 9. He conjectures that there may have
been a treatise of Isocrates the younger, of Apollonia, a disciple of the
greater Isocrates, mentioned by Harpocration (in Štrakróc) and Suidas.
See Ruhnk. Hist. Crit. Oratt. Graecc. prefixed to Rutilius Lupus, p. 84,
segg. Spalding. ‘.
# Declinatione.] That is, the peculiar form of derivative from the
primitive swaldeo. See viii. 3, 32; and Varro L. L. lib. v. p. 61, ed. Bip.
Capperonier.
# De Orat. i. 31 ; Quaest. Acad. i. 8 ; De Invent. i. 5, init.
§ He shows his dissatisfaction with his Rhetorica, or books de In-
ventione, “qui sibi exciderint,” Orat. i. 2, init. See Quint. iii. 1, 20 ;
iii. 6, 58, 63. Spalding.
| Spalding's text has quo, but I have adopted qwum, which he
supposes, in his note, to be the true reading, referring to Drakenborch
ad Liv. xxiv. 34, where it is shown that quo and gww.m., or quom, ar
often confounded. -
CH. XV.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 141
acquit the accused. 8. That Servius Galba” escaped merely
through the pity which he excited, when he not only produced
his own little children before the assembly, but carried round
in his hands the son of Sulpicius Gallus, is testified, not only
by the records of others, but by the speech of Cato. 9.
Phryne too, people think, was freed from peril, not by the
pleading of Hyperides, though it was admirable, but by the
exposure of her figure, which, otherwise most striking, he had
uncovered by opening her robe. If, then, all such things per-
suade, the definition of which we have spoken is not satis-
factory. .
10. Those, accordingly, have appeared to themselves more
exact, who, though they have the same general opinion as to
rhetoric, have pronounced it to be the power of persuading by
speaking. This definition Gorgias gives, in the Dialogue which
we have just mentioned, being forced to do so, as it were, by
Socrates. Theodectes, if the treatise on rhetoric, which is
inscribed with his name, is his, (or it may rather, perhaps, as
has been supposed, be the work of Aristotle,) does not dissent
from Gorgias, for it is asserted in that book, that the object of
oratory is to lead men by speaking to that which the speaker
wishes. 11. But not even this definition is sufficiently com-
prehensive; for not only the orator, but others, as harlots, flat-
terers, and seducers,t persuade, or lead to that which they
wish, by speaking. But the Orator, on the contrary, does not
always persuade; so that sometimes this is not his peculiar
object; sometimes it is an object common to him with others,
who are very different from orators. 12. Yet Apollodorus
varies but little from this definition, as he says, that the first
and Supreme object of judicial pleading is to persuade the
iwdge, and to lead him to whatever opinion the speaker may
wish, for he thus subjects the Orator to the power of fortune,
So that, if he does not succeed in persuading, he cannot retain
the name of an orator. 13. Some, on the other hand, detach
themselves from all considerations as to the event, as Aristotle,
* When he was praetor in Spain he had put to death a body of
Lusitanians after pledging the public faith that their lives should be
spared; an act for which he was accused before the people by the
tribune Libo, who was supported by Cato. Turnebws. See Cic. de
}rat. i. 53.
+ Corruptores.] Qui mares venantur. Spalding. Cic. Verr. iii. 2 .
atil. ii. 4. Not bribers, for they seduce with money, not with words.




























| 42 QUINTILIAN. - [B. II.
who says, that oratory is the power of finding out whatever can
persuade in speaking.” But this definition has not only the
fault of which we have just spoken, but the additional one of
comprehending nothing but invention, which, without elocu-
tion, cannot constitute oratory. 14. To Hermagoras, who says,
that the object of oratory is to speak persuasively, and to
others, who express themselves to the same purpose, though
not in the same words, but tell us that the object of Oratory is
to say all that ought to be said in order to persuade, a suf-
ficient answer was given when we showed that to persuade is
not the business of the orator only.
15. Various other opinions have been added to these, for
some have thought that oratory may be employed about all
subjects, others only about political affairs, but which of these
notions is nearer to truth, I shall inquire in that part of myº
work which will be devoted to the question. 16. Aristotle
seems to have put everything in the power of oratory when he
says, that it is the power of saying on every subject whatever
can be found to persuade : and such is the case with Pa-
trocles, who, indeed, does not add on every subject, but, as he
makes no exception, shows that his idea is the same, for he
calls oratory the power of finding whatever is persuasive in
speaking, both which definitions embrace invention alone.
Theodorus,S in order to avoid this defect, decides oratory to
be the power of discovering and expressing, with elegance,
whatever is credible on any subject whatever. 17. But, while
one who is not an orator may find out what is credible as well
as what is persuasive, he, by adding on any subject whatever,
grants more than the preceding makers of definitions, and
allows the title of a most honourable art to those who may
* Toij 0s topija at Tö évôsyópsvoy Tru6avoy. Rhet. i. 2, 1.
f Dicendi..] Though this is the reading of all copies, Spalding justly
observes that it cannot be right, as it is at variance with what is said
in sect. 13, and that we ought to read inveniend; or something similar.
† He is mentioned again, iii. 6, 44. Nothing more is known of him
than is to be learned from these two passages.
Ś I do not suppose him to be the same that is mentioned in sect. 21,
or Quintilian would scarcely have added “ of Gadara” when he men
ioned him the second time, unless he had intended to distinguish the
one from the other. We must suppose, therefore, that it is Theodorus of
Byzantium who is meant ; a rhetorician mentioned by Plato Phaedr
p. 26.5 E, as well as by Quint. iii. 1, 11; and see Cic. Brut. c. 12; Orat.
c. 12. Spalding.




















CH. XV., EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 143
persuade even to crime. 18. Gorgias, in Plato, calls himself
a master of persuasion in courts of justice and other assem-
blies, and says that he treats both of what is just and what is
unjust ; and Socrates allows him the art of persuading, but not
of teaching.
19. Those who have not granted all subjects to the orator,
have made distinctions in their definitions, as they were neces-
sitated, with more anxiety and verbosity. One of these is
Ariston, a disciple of Critolaus, the Peripatetic, whose defi-
nition of oratory is, that it is the science of discovering and
expressing what ought to be said on political affairs, in language
adapted to persuade the people. 20. He considers oratory a
science, because he is a Peripatetic, not a virtue, like the
Stoics,” but, in adding adapted to persuade the people, he
throws dishonour on the art of oratory, as if he thought it
unsuited to persuade the learned. But of all who think
that the orator is to discourse only on political questions, it
may be said, once for all, that many duties of the orator are
set aside by them; for instance, all laudatory speaking, which
is the third part of oratory. 21. Theodorus, of Gadara, (to
proceed with those who have thought oratory an art, not a
virtue,) defines more cautiously, for he says, (let me borrow
the words of those who have translated his phraseology from
the Greek,) that oratory is an art that discovers, and judges,
and enunciates with suitable eloquence, according to the measure
of that which may be found adapted to persuading, in any sub-
iect connected with political affairs. 22. Cornclius Celsus, in
like manner, says that the object of Oratory is to speak per-
suasively on doubtful and political matters. To these defi-
* Cicero, de Orat. iii. 18, says that the Stoics alone, of all the philo-
sophers, have called eloquence virtue and wisdom, : see also Acad. Quaest.
i. 2. The Stoics necessarily held this opinion, as they also gave
dialectics and physics the name of virtues, Cic. de Fin. iii. 21; and of
dialectics, taken in its widest sense, Oratory or rhetoric may be considered
as a part. The Stoics, indeed, make the word $7two Tijum the basis of all
their definitions of virtues; see Stob. Eclog. p. 167, ed. Antv. ; and
virtue itself is defined by Musonius Rufus, the master of Epictetus, as
/..nowledge not merely theoretical, but practical : Stob. Serm. p. 204, ed.
Tigur. If therefore the definition of eloquence in the text had pro-
ceeded from a Stoic, and not a Peripatetic, he would have acknowledged
it to be a virtue by the very admission that it was knowledge. See e.
20 of this book. Spalding.
f The epideictic, the other two parts being the deliberative and the
judicial.
11 || QUINTILIAN. [B. II.
nitions there are some, not very dissimilar, given by others,
such as this: oratory is the power of judging and discoursing
on such civil questions as are submitted to it, with a certain
persuasiveness, a certain action of the body, and a certain mode
of delivering what it expresses. 23. There are a thousand
other definitions, but either similar, or composed of similar
elements, which we shall notice when we come to treat upon
the subjects of oratory.
Some have thought it neither a power, nor a science, nor an
art; Critolaus calls it the practice of speaking ; (for such is
the meaning of the word r21% :) Athenaeus,” the art of deceiv-
ing.t 24. But most writers, satisfied with reading a few
passages from Plato's Gorgias, unskilfully extracted by their
predecessors, (for they neither consult the whole of that
dialogue, nor any of the other writings of Plato,) have fallen
into a very grave error, supposing that that philosopher enter-
tained such an opinion as to think that oratory was not an art,
but a certain skilfulness in flattering and pleasing ; 25. Or, as
he says in another place, the simulation of one part of polity,
and the fourth sort of flattery, for he assigns two parts of
polity to the body, medicine, and, as they interpret it, exercise,
and two to the mind, law and justice, and then calls the art of
cooks the flattery or simulation of medicine, and the art of
dealers in slaves the simulation of the effects of eacercise, as
they produce a false complexion by paint and the appearance
of strength by unsolid fat; the simulation of legal science he
calls sophistry, and that of justice rhetorie. 26. All this is,
indeed, expressed in that Dialogue, and uttered by Socrates,
under whose person Plato seems to intimate what he thinks;
but some of his dialogues were composed merely to refute those
who argued on the other side, and are called ěžayzºrizof:
others were written to teach, and are called 60%0.71%0ſ. 27.
But Socrates, or Plato, thought that sort of oratory, which was
then practised, to be of a dogmatic character, for he speaks of
it as being 20.7& Toijroy roy "góToy by Upaſs Toxiraúzcºa,S “ac-
cording to the manner in which you manage public affairs,”
* He is mentioned again, iii. 1, 16. Nothing more is known of him
than is to be learned from these two passages of Quintilian.
f It is strange that among 'those who said that Oratory was neither a
power, nor a science, nor an art, Quintilian should rank one who called
it the “art of deceiving.” Spalding.
† Plato Gorg. sect. 43, Seqq. p. 462, ed. Steph.
§ Sect. 120, p. 500 C.
CH.xv.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 145
and understands oratory of a sincere and honourable nature.
The dispute with Gorgias is accordingly thus terminated: “It
is therefore necessary that the Orator be a just man, and that
the just man should wish to do just things.” 28. When this
has been said, Gorgias is silent, but Polus resumes the subject,
who, from the ardour of youth, is somewhat inconsiderate, and
in reply to whom the remarks on simulation and flattery are
made. Callicles, who is even more vehement, speaks next,
but is reduced to the conclusion, that “he who would be a
true orator must be a just man, and must know what is just ;”f
and it is therefore evident, that oratory was not considered by
Plato an evil, but that he thought true oratory could not be
attained by any but a just and good man. 29. In the Phaedrus
he sets forth still more clearly, that the art cannot be fully
acquired without a knowledge of justice, an opinion to which I
also assent. Would Plato, if he had held any other senti-
ments, have written the Defence of Socrates, and the Eulogy
of those who fell in defence of their country, compositions
which are certainly work for the orator? 30. But he has
even inveighed against that class of men who used their
abilities in speaking for bad ends. Socrates also thought the
speech, which Lysias had written for him when accused, im-
proper for him to use, though it was a general practice, at that
time, to compose for parties appearing before the judges
speeches which they themselves might deliver; and thus
an elusion of the law, § by which one man was not allowed
to speak for another, was effected. 31. By Plato, also,
those who separated oratory from justice, and preferred
* Sect. 35, p. 460 C.
† Sect. 136, p. 508 C. *
i. Plato wrote a funeral oration on some Athenians who had fallen
in battle ; a composition, says Cicero, which was so well received, that
it was recited publicly on a certain day in every year. Turnebus.
§ Of this law I have found no mention in any other author, nor has
any one of Quintilian's commentators paid due attention to this
passage. That what he says is true, and that it was not customary at
Athens for one man to speak for another, seems to be shown by the
fact that in the works of the Greek orators the litigants always speak
for themselves. The only exception was, when the litigant had not
the privilege of speaking, as Callias, who was a metacc, and for whom
Lysias spoke ; (see Lys. Orat. v., and Wolf. Prol. in Lept. p. 69;) and
persons under age, and women. Spalding. He adds a few more
remarks, which the reader may consult."
L
i46 QUINTILIAN. [B.II.
what is probable to what is true, were thought no proper
teachers of the art, for so he signifies, too, in his Phaedrus.
32. Cornelius Celsus, moreover, may be thought to have been
of the same opinion with those to whom I have just referred,
for his words are, the orator aims only at the semblance of
truth ; and he adds, a little after, not purity of conscience, but
the victory of his client, is the reward of the pleader. Were
such assertions true, it would become only the worst of men to
give such pernicious weapons to the most mischievous of cha-
racters, and to aid dishonesty with precepts; but let those
who hold this opinion consider what ground they have for it.
33. Let me, for my part, as I have undertaken to form a
perfect orator, whom I would have, above all, to be a good
man, return to those who have better thoughts of the art.
Some have pronounced oratory to be indentical with civil
polity; Cicero calls it a part of civil polity ; and a knowledge
of civil polity, he thinks, is nothing less than wisdom itself.
Some have made it a part of philosophy, among whom is
Isocrates.* 34. With this characterſ of it, the definition that
oratory is the science of speaking well, agrees excellently, for
it embraces all the virtues of Oratory at once, and includes also
the character of the true orator, as he cannot speak well
unless he be a good man. 35. To the same purpose is the
definition of Chrysippus, derived from Cleanthes, the science
of speaking properly. There are more definitions in the same
philosopher, but they relate rather to other $ questions. A defi-
nition framed in these terms, to persuade to what is necessary,
would convey the same notion, except that it makes the art
* This we may suppose to have been said in the lost treatise men-
tioned in sect. 4. In the rest of his writings he is accustomed to use
the word philosophy with more latitude than was usual ; as in the
Banegyric, ) arspi roëg X6) ovg pºooopia. Spalding.
+ Hwic ejus substantia.] That is, otoig, pigst, essentiae, natura: ; si
nimirum hanc esse rhetorices essentiam, naturam, substantiam, statu-
erimus. Capperonier.
†: “Cleanthes wrote a treatise on the art of rhetoric, and so did
Chrysippus, but their writings were of such a nature that if a man
wished his mouth closed for ever he has nothing to do but read them.”
Cic. de Fin. iv. 3. In their definition the expression doubtless was
ôp6ác Aéystv, instead of sā Āšystv, which is found in Sext. Empir. p.
289, and Diog. Laërt. vii. 42. Spalding.
§ Not to this, whether eloquence is to be attributed to a good man
only.
CH.xVI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 147
depend on the result. 30. Areus% defines oratory well, say-
ing that it is to speak according to the excellence of speech.
Those also exclude bad men from oratory who consider it as
the knowledge of civil duties, since they deem such knowledge
virtue; but they confine it within too marrow bounds, and to
political questions. Albutius,t no obscure professor or author,
allows that it is the art of speaking well, but errs in giving it
limitations, adding, on political questions, and with probability,
of both which restrictions I have already disposed; those, too,
are men of good intention, who consider it the business of
oratory to think and speak rightly.
37. These are almost all the most celebrated definitions, and
those about which there is the most controversy; for to
discuss all would neither be much to the purpose, nor would
be in my power; since a foolish desire, as I think, has pre-
vailed among the writers of treatises on rhetoric, to define
nothing in the same terms that another had already used; a
vain-glorious practice which shall be far from me. 38. For I
shall say, not what I shall invent, but what I shall approve;
as, for instance, that oratory is the art of speaking well;
since, when the best definition is found, he who seeks for
another must seek for a worse.
This being admitted, it is evident at the same time what
object, what highest and ultimate end, oratory has ; that object
or end which is called in Greek ráXog, and to which every art
tends; for if oratory be the art of speaking well, its object and
ultimate end must be to speak well.
CHAPTER XVI.
Oratory said by some to be a pernicious art, because it may be
perverted to bad ends, Š 1–4. We might say the same of other
things that are allowed to be beneficial, 5, 6. Its excellences,
7–16. The abundant return that it makes for cultivation, 17—19.
1. Next comes the question whether oratoru is useful; for
. . **
* He may possibly have been the Stoic philosopher of Alexandria,
for whose sake Caesar Octavianus spared that city; see Plut. in Anton.
p. 953 A. His name is sometimes written Arius, the Greek being
'Apelog. See Fabric. Bibl. Gr. Harl. vol. iii., p. 540. Spalding. z
t Caius Albucius Silus, of Novaria, a rhetorician of the age of
L 2
148 QUINTILIAN. [B.II.
some are accustomed to declaim violently against it, and, what
is most ungenerous, to make use of the power of oratory to lay
accusations against Oratory; 2. they say that eloquence is that
which saves the wicked from punishment; by the dishonesty of
which the innocent are at times condemned ; by which de-
liberations are influenced to the worse ; by which not only
popular seditions and tumults, but even inexpiable wars, are
eaccited ; and of which the efficacy is the greatest when it exerts
itself for falsehood against truth. 3. Even to Socrates, the comic
writers make it a reproach that he taught how to make the worse
reason appear the better; and Plato on his part says that
Tisias and Gorgias% professed the same art. 4. To these
they add examples from Greek and Roman history, and give a
list of persons who, by exerting such eloquence as was mis-
chievous, not only to individuals but to communities, have
disturbed or overthrown the constitutions of whole states;
asserting that eloquence on that account was banished from the
state of Lacedæmon, and that even at Athens, where the
orator was forbidden to move the passions, the powers of
eloquence were in a manner curtailed.
5. Under such a mode of reasoning, neither will generals,
nor magistrates, nor medicine, nor even wisdom itself, be of
any utility; for Flaminius+ was a general, and the Gracchi,
Saturnini, and Glauciae were magistrates; in the hands of
physicians poisons have been found ; and among those who
abuse the name of philosophers have been occasionally
detected the most horrible crimes. 6. We must reject food,
for it has often given rise to ill health ; we must never go
under roofs, for they sometimes fall upon those who dwell
beneath them; a sword must not be forged for a soldier, for a
robber may use the same weapon. Who does not know that
fire and water, without which life cannot exist, and, (that I may
not confine myself to things of earth,) that the Sun and moon,
the chief of the celestial luminaries, sometimes produce hurt-
ful effects 2
Augustus. SciSenec. Rhet. Contr. iii. praef. p. 197 Bip.; also Sueton.
de Rhet. 3.
* “Tisias and Gorgias, by the power of words, make small things
great, and great things small.” Plato Phaedr. p. 257, A.; see also p.
273, A, B, C. Spalding.
+ The general who was defeated by Hannibal at the lake Thrasi-
IlléIlliS.
CH.xvi.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 149
7. Will it be denied, however, that the blind Appius, by the
force of his eloquence, broke off a dishonourable treaty of peace
about to be concluded with Pyrrhus? Was not the divine
eloquence of Cicero, in opposition to the agrarian laws, even
popular 2* Did it not quell the daring of Catiline, and gain,
in the toga, the honour of thanksgivings, the highest f that is
given to generals victorious in the field 2 8. Does not oratory
often free the alarmed minds of soldiers from fear and per-
suade them, when they are going to face so many perils in
battle, that glory is better than life? Nor indeed would the
Lacedæmonians and Athenians influence me more than the
people of Rome, among whom the highest respect has always
been paid to orators. 9. Nor do I think that founders of cities
would have induced their unsettled multitudes to form them-
selves into communities by any other means than by the influ-
ence of the art of speaking; † nor would legislators, without the
utmost power of oratory, have prevailedon men to bind themselves
to submit to the dominion of law. 10. Even the very rules
for the conduct of life, beautiful as they are by nature, have
yet greater power in forming the mind when the radiance of
eloquence illumines the beauty of the precepts. Though the
weapons of eloquence, therefore, have effect in both directions,
it is not just that that should be accounted an evil which we
may use to a good purpose.
11, But these points may perhaps be left to the considera-
tion of those who think that the substance of eloquence lies
in the power to persuade. But if eloquence be the art of
speaking well, (the definition which I adopt,) so that a true
orator must be, above all, a good man, it must assuredly be
acknowledged that it is a useful art. 12. In truth, the
sovereign deity, the parent of all things, the architect of the
world, has distinguished man from other beings, such at least
as were to be mortal, by nothing more than by the faculty of
speech. 13. Bodily frames superior in size, in strength, in
firmness, in endurance, in activity, we see among dumb
* A speech against the agrarian laws could not have been well
received by the people, without being in the highest degree forcible and
eloquent. “While you spoke, (O Cicero !) the tribes relinquished the
agrarian law, that is, their own meat and drink.” Plin. H. N. vii. 31.
+ Being preliminary to a triumph, by which, however, it was not
always followed. Cic. Ep. ad Div. XV. 5.
:: See Cicero de Inv. i. 2; De Orat. i. 8.
I5() QUINTILIAN. [B II.
creatures, and observe, too, that they have less need than we
have of external assistance. To walk, to feed themselves,
to swim over water, they learn, in less time than we can, from
nature herself, without the aid of any other teacher. 14.
Most of them, also, are equipped against cold by the produce
of their own bodies; weapons for their defence are born with
them; and their food lies before their faces; to supply all
which wants mankind have the greatest difficulty. The
divinity has therefore given us reason, superior to all other
qualities, and appointed us to be sharers of it with the im-
mortal gods. 15. But reason could neither profit us so much,
nor manifest itself so plainly within us, if we could not express
by speech what we have conceived in our minds; a faculty
which we see wanting in other animals, far more than, to a
certain degree, understanding and reflection. 16. For to con-
trive habitations, to construct nests, to bring up their young,
to hatch them.* to lay up provision for the winter, to produce
works inimitable by us, (as those of wax and honey,) is perhaps
a proof of some portion of reason; but as, though they do such
things, they are without the faculty of speech, they are called
dumb and irrational. 17. Even to men, to whom speech has
been denied, of how little avail is divine reason | If, therefore,
we have received from the gods mothing more valuable than
speech, what can we consider more deserving of cultivation
and exercise? or in what can we more strongly desire to be
superior to other men, than in that by which man himself is
superior to other animals, especially as in no kind of exertion
does labour more plentifully bring its reward 2 18. This will
be so much the more evident, if we reflect from what origin,
and to what extent, the art of eloquence has advanced, and
how far it may still be improved. 19. For, not to mention
how beneficial it is, and how becoming in a man of virtue, to
defend his friends, to direct a Senate or people by his counsels,
or to lead an army to whatever enterprise he may desire, is it
not extremely honourable to attain, by the common under-
standing and words which all men use, so high a degree of
* Do they then bring them up before they hatch them 2 Yet the
expression of Homer is exactly similar, Érpaq's v jö’ &yévovro. Spalding.
Guthrie ignorantly supposed (let me be pardoned for noticing so small
a matter) that eaccludel'e meant to exclude the young ones from the
nest when they are able to shift for themselves.
CH.XVII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 151
esteem and glory as to appear not to speak or plead, but, as
was the case with Pericles, to hurlforth lightning and thunder 2
*
CHAPTER XVII.
Oratory is manifestly an art, § 1–4. Yet some have denied that it is,
and said that its power is wholly from nature, 5–8. Examples
from other arts, 9, 10. Every one that speaks is not an orator,
11—13. Opinion of Aristotle, 14. Other charges against oratory;
that it has no peculiar subject or matter, and that it sometimes
deceives, 15–18. Refutation of these charges, 19–21. Unfairly
objected to it that it has no proper end, 22–26. Not pernicious
because it sometimes misleads, 27–29. Another objection, that
it may be exerted on either side of a question, and that it
contradicts itself; answered, 30–36. Oratory is sometimes
ignorant of the truth of what it asserts; but the same is the
case with other arts and sciences, 36–40. Confirmation of its
being an art, 41–43. -
\
I. THERE would be no end if I should allow myself to ex-
patiate, and indulge my inclination, on this head. Let us
proceed, therefore, to the question that follows, whether oratory
be an art. 2. That it is an art, every one of those who have
given rules about eloquence has been so far from doubting,
that it is shown by the very titles of their books, that they are
written on the oratorical art; and Cicero also says, that what
is called oratory is artificial eloquence. This distinction, it is
not only orators that—have-claimed for themselves, (since they
may be thought, perhaps, to have given their profession some-
thing more than its due,) but the philosophers, the Stoics, and
most of the Peripatetics, agree with them. 3. For myself, I
confess, that I was in some doubt whether I should look upon
this part of the inquiry as necessary to be considered; for who
is so destitute, I will not say of learning, but of the common
understanding of mankind, as to imagine that the work of
building, or weaving, or moulding vessels out of clay, is an
art, but that oratory, the greatest and noblest of works, has
attained such a height of excellence without being an art 2
Those, indeed, who have maintained the contrary opinion, I
suppose not so much to have believed what they advanced, as
to have been desirous of exercising their powers on a subject
I 52 * 3: QUINTILIAN. [B.II.
of difficulty, like Polycyates, when he eulogized Busiris and
Clytaemnestra; though he is said also to have written the
speech that was delivered against Socrates; nor would that in-
deed have been inconsistent with his other compositions.”
5. Some will have oratory to be a natural talent, though
they do not deny that it may be assisted by art. Thus
Antonius, in Cicero de Oratore,t says that Oratory is an effect
of observation, not an art; but this is not advanced that we
may receive it as true, but that the character of Antonius, an
orator who tried to conceal the art that he used, may be Sup-
ported. 6. But Lysias seems to have really entertained this
opinion ; for which the argument is, that the ignorant, and
barbarians, and slaves, when they speak for themselves, say
Something that resembles an eacordium, they state facts, prove,
refute, and (adopting the form of a peroration) deprecate.
7. The supporters of this notion also avail themselves of certain
quibbles upon words, that nothing that proceeds from art was
before art, but that mankind have always been able to speak
for themselves and against others; that teachers of the art
appeared only in later times, and first of all about the age of
Tisias and Corax ;f that oratory was therefore before art, and
is consequently not an art. 8. As to the period, indeed, in
which the teaching of oratory commenced, I am not anxious
to inquire; we find Phoenix, however, in Homer, Š as an
instructor, not only in acting but in speaking, as well as
several other orators; we see all the varieties of eloquence in
the three generals, and contests in eloquence proposed
among the young men," and among the figures on the shield
of Achilles** are represented both law-suits and pleaders. 9.
* Because in every case he took the wrong side.
f I. 20; ii, 7, 8. The word observatio, however, as Spalding
observes, is not to be found in either of these passages of Cicero.
† Corax was a Sicilian, who, about B. C. 470, secured himself great
influence at Syracuse by means of his oratorical powers. He is said
to have been the earliest writer on rhetoric. Tisias was his pupil.
See Cic. Brut. 12; de Orat. i. 20; Quint. iii. 1, 8.
§ Il. ix.432. -
| The copious style in the oratory of Nestor; the simple in that of
Menelaus ; and the middle in that of Ulysses. See Aul. Gell. vii. 14;
Clarke ad Il. iii. 213. Capperonier thinks that Phoenix, Ulysses, and
Ajax are meant, the speakers in the deputation to Achilles, Iliad ix.
* Il. xv. 284 : ÖTórs kočpot àpiogstav Tspi più001.
** Jl. xviii. 497–508.
CH.xVII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 153
It would even be sufficient for me to observe, that everything
which art has brought to perfection had its origin in nature,
else, from the number of the arts must be excluded medicine,
which resulted from the observation of what was beneficial ol
detrimental to health, and which, as some think, consists
wholly in experiments, for somebody had, doubtless, bound up
a wound before the dressing of wounds became an art, and had
allayed fever by repose and abstinence, not because he saw
the reason of such regimen, but because the malady itself
drove him to it. 10. Else, too, architecture must not be con-
sidered an art, for the first generation of men built cottages
without art; nor music, since singing and dancing, to Some sort
of tune, are practised among all nations. 11. So, if any kind
of speaking whatever is to be called oratory, I will admit that
oratory existed before it was an art; but if every one that
speaks is not an orator, and if men in early times did not
speak as orators, our reasoners must confess that an Orator is
formed by art, and did not exist before art. This being
admitted, another argument which they use is set aside,
namely, that that has no concern with art which a man who has
not learned it can do, but that men who have not learned
oratory can make speeches. 12. To support this argument
they observe, that Demades,” a waterman, and AEschines,t an
actor, were orators; but they are mistaken ; for he who has
not learned to be an orator cannot properly be called one, and
it may be more justly said, that those men learned late in life,
than that they never learned at all; though Æschines, indeed,
had some introduction to learning in his youth, as his father
was a teacher; nor is it certain that Demades did not learn;
and he might, by constant practice in speaking, which is the
most efficient mode of learning, have made himself master of
all the power of language that he ever possessed. 13. But
we may safely say, that he would have been a better speaker
if he had learned, for he never ventured to write out his
speeches for publication, though we know that he produced
considerable effect in delivering them.
14. Aristotle, for the sake of investigation, as is usual with him,
has conceived, with his peculiar subtlety, certain arguments at
* Sext. Empir. p. 291. Fabric. Harl. ii. p. 868.
+ Demosth. pro Cor. p. 307, 314, 329, ed. Reisk.
f Cic. Brut. c. 9; Quint. xii. 10, 49.
154 - QUINTILIAN. [B.II.
variance with my opinion in his Gryllus;* but he has also
written three books on the art of rhetoric, in the first of which
hé not only admits that it is an art, but allows it a connexion
with civil polity, as well as with logic.f 15. Critolaus, and
Athenodorus, of Rhodes, have advanced many arguments on
the opposite side. Agnon, by the very title of his book, in
which he avows that he brings an accusation against rhetoric,
has deprived himself of all claim to be trusted.| As to Epi-
curus," who shrunk from all learning, I am not at all
surprised at him.
16. These reasoners say a great deal, but it is based upon
few arguments; I shall therefore reply to the strongest of
them in a very few words, that the discussion may not be
protracted to an infinite length. 17. Their first argument is
with regard to the subject or matter, “for all arts,” they say,
“have some subject,” as is true, “but that Oratory has no pe-
culiar subject,” an assertion which I shall subsequently prove
to be false. 18. The next argument is a more false charge,
for “no art,” they say, “acquiesces in false conclusions, since
art cannot be founded but on perception, which is always
true; but that oratory adopts false conclusions, and is, conse-
quently, not an art.” 19. That oratory sometimes advances
what is false instead of what is true, I will admit, but I shall
not for that reason acknowledge that the speaker acquiesces in
false conclusions, for it is one thing for a matter to appear in
a certain light to a person himself, and another for the person
to make it appear in that light to others. A general often
employs false representations, as did Hannibal, when, being
hemmed in by Fabius, he tied faggots to the horns of oxen,
and set them on fire, and, driving the herd up the opposite
hills in the night, presented to the enemy the appearance of a
* The work is lost. Gryllus was the son of Xenophon, that was
killed at Mantineia. Aristotle seems to have borrowed his name ; and
he related, according to Diog. Laërt. ii. 58, that many eulogies were
written on Gryllus, even for the sake of pleasing his father. The
Gryllus of Aristotle is mentioned by Diog. Laërt. v. 22. Spalding.
+ Rhet. i. 2, 1.
† Compare ii. 15, 23. On his arguments against Oratory, see Sext.
Emp. p. 291, 292. Spalding.
§ Of Athenodorus and Agmon nothing certain 1s known. Spalding.
| The title of his book shows that he is not an impartial judge.
* See xii. 2, 24; Cie. de Fin. i. 7.
CH.xvii.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 155
retiring army; but Hannibal merely deceived Fabius; he him-
self knew very well what the reality was. 20. Theopompus,
the Lacedæmonian, when, on changing clothes with his wife,
he escaped from prison in the disguise of a woman, came to
no false conclusion concerning himself, though he conveyed a
false notion to his guards. So the orator, whenever he puts
what is false for what is true, knows that it is false, and that
he is stating it instead of truth; he adopts, therefore, no false
conclusion himself, but merely misleads another. 21. Cicero,
when he threw a mist, as he boasts, over the eyes of the judges
in the cause of Cluentius, was not himself deprived of sight;
nor is a painter, when, by the power of his art, he makes us
fancy that some objects stand out in a picture, and others
recede, unaware that the objects are all on a flat surface.
22. But they allege also, that “all arts have a certain de-
finite end to which they are directed; but that in oratory there
is sometimes no end at all, and, at other times, the end which
is professed is not attained.” They speak falsely, however, in
this respect likewise, for we have already shown, that oratory
has an end, and have stated what that end is, an end which
the true orator will always attain, for he will always speak
well. 23. The objection might, perhaps, hold good against
those who think that the end of oratory is to persuade, but my
orator and his art, as defined by me, do not depend upon the
result; he indeed who speaks directs his efforts towards vic-
tory, but when he has spoken well, though he may not be
victorious, he has attained the full end of his art. 24. So a
pilot is desirous to gain the port with his vessel in Safety, but
if he is carried away from it by a tempest, he will not be the
less a pilot, and will repeat the well-known saying, “May I
but keep the helm right!” 25: The physician makes the
health of the patient his object, but if, through the violence of
the disease, the intemperance of the sick person, or any other
circumstance, he does not effect his purpose, yet, if he has
* A proverbial expression, from the Greek épôāv táv waiv : a
portion of a prayer to Neptune : Grant, O Neptune, that I may guide
the ship right. Spalding refers to Cic. ad Q. Fr. i. 2; Ep. ad Div. xii.
25 ; Sen. Epist, 85 ; Aristid. in Rhod. 542 ed. Jebb ; Stobaeus. p. 577;
Isidore, Orig., who gives from Ennius, Ut clavum rectum temean,
^avimgue gubernem : also Sen. Cons, ad M. Fil. c. 16 ; Erasmus,
Adag. iii. 1, 28.
156 QUINTILIAN. [B.II.
done everything according to rule, he has not lost sight of the
object of medicine. So it is the object of an orator to speak
well, for his art, as we shall soon show still more clearly, con-
sists in the act, and not in the result. 26. That other allega-
tion, which is frequently made, must accordingly be false also,
that an art knows when it has attained its end, but that oratory
does not know, for every speaker is aware when he has spoken
well.
They also charge oratory with having recourse to vicious
means, which no true arts adopt, because it advances what is
false, and endeavours to excite the passions. 27. But neither
of those means is dishonourable, when it is used from a good
motive, and, consequently, cannot be vicious. To tell a false-
hood is sometimes allowed, even to a wise man;* and the
orator will be compelled to appeal to the feelings of the judges,
if they cannot otherwise be induced to favour the right side.
28. Unenlightened men sit as judges, f who must, at times, be
deceived, that they may not err in their decisions. If indeed
judges were wise men: if assemblies of the people, and every
sort of public council, consisted of wise men; if envy, favour,
prejudice, and false witnesses, had no influence, there would
be very little room for eloquence, which would be employed
almost wholly to give pleasure. 29. But as the minds of the
hearers waver, and truth is exposed to so many obstructions,
the orator must use artifice in his efforts, and adopt such means
as may promote his purpose, since he who has turned from the
right way cannot be brought back to it but by another turning.
30. Some common sarcasms against Oratory are drawn from
the charge, that orators speak on both sides of a question;
hence the remarks, that “no art contradicts itself, but that
oratory contradicts itself;” that “no art destroys what it has
itself done, but that this is the case with what oratory does;”
that “it teaches either what we ought to say, or what we
ought not to say, and that, in the one case, it cannot be an art,
because it teaches what is not to be Said, and, in the other, it
cannot be an art, because, when it has taught what is to be
said, it teaches also what is directly opposed to it.” 31. All
* Cic. Off, ii. 14, 16, 17.
+ The reader will remember that the judices of the Romans were
similar to our jurymen, but more numerous. See Adam's Roman
Antiquities, or Smith's Dict, of Gr. and Rorm. Ant.
CH. XVII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 157
these charges, it is evident, are applicable only to that species
of oratory which is repudiated by a good man and by virtue
herself; since, where the cause is unjust, there true oratory
has no place, so that it can hardly happen, even in the most
extraordinary case, that a real orator, that is, a good man, will
speak on both sides. 32. Yet, since it may happen, in the
course of things, that just causes may, at times, lead two wise
men to take different sides, (for the Stoics think that wise men
may even contend with one another, if reason leads them
to do so,”) I will make some reply to the objections, and
in such a way that they shall be proved to be advanced
groundlessly, and directed only against such as allow the
`s name of Orator to speakers of bad character. 33. For
oratory does not contradict itself; one cause is matched against
another cause, but not oratory against itself. If two men,
who have been taught the same accomplishment, contend
with one another, the accomplishment which they have been
taught will not, on that account, be proved not to be an art;
for, if such were the case, there could be no art in arms, be-
cause gladiators, bred under the same master, are often
matched together; nor would there be any art in piloting a
ship, because, in naval engagements, pilot is often opposed to
pilot; nor in generalship, because general contends with
general. 34. Nor does oratory destroy what it has done, for
the orator does not overthrow the argument advanced by him-
self, nor does oratory overthrow it, because, by those who
think that the end of oratory is to persuade, as well as by the
two wise men, whom, as I said before, some chance may have
opposed to one another, it is probability that is sought; and
if, of two things, one at length appears more probable than
the other, the more probable is not opposed to that which pre-
viously appeared probable; for as that which is more white is
not adverse to that which is less white, nor that which is more
sweet contrary to that which is less sweet, so neither is that
which is more probable contrary to that which is less probable.
35. Nor does oratory ever teach what we ought not to say, or
* The Stoics were compelled to hold this opinion, for they said that
to govern a state was the business of a wise man, and yet could not
venture to affirm that a wise man was to be found in any particular
state only. I cannot at this moment, however, find any passage among
the ancient authors expressly to that effect. Spalding.
!
158 QUINTILIAN. B. II.
that which is contrary to what we ought to say, but that which
we ought to say in whatever cause we may take in hand. , 36.
And truth, though generally, is not always to be defended;
the public good sometimes requires that a falsehood should be
supported.* -
in Cicero's second book De Oratore,t are also advanced
the following objections: that art has place in things which
are known, but that the pleading of an orator depends on
opinion, not on knowledge, since he both addresses himself to
those who do not know, and sometimes says what he himself
does not know. 37. One of these points, whether the judges
have a knowledge of what is addressed to them, has nothing .
9 do with the art of the orator; to the other, that art has--
place in things which are known, I must give some answº.
Oratory is the art of speaking well, and the orator knows how
to speak well. 38. But it is said, he does not know whether
what he says is true; neither do the philosophers, who say
that fire, or water, or the four elements, or indivisible atoms,
are the principles from which all things had their origin,;
know that what they say is true; nor do those who calculate
the distances of the stars, and the magnitudes of the sun and
the earth, yet every one of them calls his system an art;S
but if their reasoning has such effect that they seem not to
imagine, but, from the force of their demonstrations, to know
what they assert, similar reasoning may have a similar effect
in the case of the orator. 39. But, it is further urged, he does
not know whether the cause which he advocates has truth on
its side; nor, I answer, does the physician know whether the
patient, who says that he has the head-ache, really has it, yet
he will treat him on the assumption that his assertion is true,
and medicine will surely be allowed to be an art. Need I add,
that oratory does not always purpose to say what is true, but
does always purpose to say what is like truth? but the orator
must know whether what he says is like truth or not. 40.
Those who are unfavourable to Oratory add, that pleaders often
defend, in certain causes, that which they have assailed in
others; but this is the fault, not of the art, but of the person.
* Compare c. 7, sect. 27, and sect. 27–29 of this chapter,
f C. 7. The words are put into the mouth of Antonius,
: See the first book of Lucretius.
§ Or Science, as we should now term it.
CH. XVIII.] ED'UCATION OF AN ORATOR. T 59
These are the principal charges that are brought against
oratory. There are others of less moment, but drawn from
the same Sources. -
41. But that it is an art, may be proved in a very few
words; for whether, as Cleanthes maintained, an art is a
power working its effects by a course, that is by method, no man
will doubt that there is a certain course and method in
oratory; or whether that definition, approved by almost every.
body, that an art consists of perceptions” consenting and co-
operating to some end useful to life, be adopted also by us, we
have already shown that everything to which this definition
applies is to be found in Oratory. 42. Need I show that it
depends on understanding and practice, like other arts? If
logic be an art, as is generally admitted, Oratory must certainly
be an art, as it differs from logic rather in species than in
genus. Nor must we omit to observe that in whatever pursuit
one man may act according to a method, and another without
regard to that method, that pursuit is an art ; and that in
whatever pursuit he who has learned succeeds better than he
who has not learned, that pursuit is an art.
43. But, in the pursuit of Oratory, not only will the learned
excel the unlearned, but the more learned will excel the less
learned ; otherwise there would not be so many rules in it,
or so many great men to teach it. This ought to be acknow-
edged by every one, and especially by me, who allow the
attainment of oratory only to the man of virtue.
|
CHAPTER XVIII.
Arts or sciences are of three kinds; rhetoric is a practical art or
science, § 1, 2. Partakes of the nature of arts of other kinds, 3–5.
1. BUT as some arts consist merely in an insight into things,
that is, knowledge of them, and judgment concerning them,
such as astronomy, which requires no act, but is confined to
a mere understanding of the matters that form the subject
* Perceptionum.] From the Greek karaXàibētc, signifying “things
thoroughly comprehended and understood.” ‘.
60 QUINTILIAN. [B.II.
of it (a sort of art which is called 9aogºrizī, “theoretic”);
others in action, the object of which lies in the act, and is
fulfilled in it, leaving nothing produced from it (a sort of art
which is called Tgo.zrazh, “practic”), as dancing ; 2. others in
production, which attain their end in the execution of the
work which is submitted to the eye (a sort which we call
arounTax%, “productive”), as painting, we may pretty safely
determine that oratory consists in act, for it accomplishes in
the act all that it has to do. Such indeed has been the judg-
ment pronounced upon it by every one.
3. To me, however, it appears to partake greatly of the other
sort of arts; for the subject of it may sometimes be restricted
to contemplation ; since there will be oratory in an orator even
though he be silent ; and if, either designedly, or from being
disabled by any accident, he has ceased to plead, he will not
cease to be an orator, more than a physician who has left off prac.
tice ceases to a physician. 4. There is some enjoyment, and
perhaps the greatest of all enjoyments, in retired meditation ;
and the pleasure derived from knowledge is pure when it is
withdrawn from action, that is, from toil, and enjoys the calm
contemplation of itself. 5. But oratory will also effect some-
thing similar to a productive art in written speeches and histo-
rical compositions, a kind of writings which we justly consider
as allied to oratory. Yet if it must be classed as one of the
three sorts of arts which I have mentioned, let it, as its per-
formance consists chiefly in the mere act, and as it is most
frequently exhibited in act, be called an active, or a practical
art, for the one term is of the same signification as the other.
CHAPTER, XIX.
Nature and art; nature contributes more to oratory, in students of
moderate ability, than art ; in those of greater talent, art is of more
avail; an example.
1. I AM aware that it is also a question whether nature or
learning contributes most to oratory. This inquiry, however,
* Such artes we call “sciences.” The term art we distinguish from
science by applying it only to that which produces something, as
painting, architecture.
CH. XIX EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 161
has no concern with the subject of my work; for a perfect
orator can be formed only with the aid of both ; but I think it
of great importance how far we consider that there is a ques-
tion * on the point. 2. If you suppose either to be independent
of the other, nature will be able to do much without learning,
but learning will be of no avail without the assistance of
nature. But if they be united in equal parts, I shall be
inclined to think that, when both are but moderate, the influ-
ence of nature is nevertheless the greater; but finished orators,
I consider, owe more to learning than to nature. Thus the best
husbandman cannot improve soil of no fertility, while from fertile
ground something good will be produced even without the aid of
the husbandman; yet if the husbandman bestows his labour on
rich land, he will produce more effect than the goodness of the
Soil of itself. 3. Had Praxiteles attempted to hew a statue out
of a millstone, I should have preferred to it an unhewn block
of Parian marble; † but if that statuary had fashioned the
marble, more value would have accrued to it from his work-
manship than was in the marble itself. In a word, nature is
the material for learning; the one forms, and the other is
formed. Art can do nothing without material; material has
its value even independent of art; but perfection of art is of
more consequence than perfection of material.
CHAPTER XX.
Whether rhetoric be a virtue, as some call it, § 1–4. Proofs of this,
according to the philosophers, 5–7. Other proofs, 8–10.
1. IT is a question of a higher nature, whether oratory is to
be regarded as one of those indifferent arts, which deserve
neither praise nor blame in themselves, but become useful or
* Quam—qua-stionem.] This is obscurely expressed, says Spalding;
but quam is equivalent to qualem, quâm laté comprehensam.
f The lover of art will hardly agree with Quintilian. Spalding.
But, as Rollin observes, nothing could have been less suitable for
sculpture than the stone used for millstones; and Quintilian might
suppose that it would have been impossible, even for a Praxiteles, to
have produced even a tolerable statue from it.
- MI
J62 QUINTILIAN. [B.II.
otherwise according to the characters of those who practise
them; or whether it is, as many of the philosophers are of
opinion, a positive virtue.”
2. The way, indeed, in which many have proceeded and still
proceed in the practice of speaking, I consider either as no art,
&rexyſoz, as it is called, (for I see numbers rushing to speak
without rule or learning, just as impudence or hunger has
prompted them,) or as it were a bad art, which we term
zozorexyſo, ; for I imagine that there have been many who
have exerted, and that there are some who still exert, their
talent in speaking to the injury of mankind. 3. There is also
a kind of poºr&ſorexyfox, a vain imitation of art, which indeed
has in itself neither good nor evil, but a mere frivolous exer-
cise of skill, such as that of the man who sent grains of vetches,
shot from a distance in succession, and without missing,
through a needle, and whom Alexander, after witnessing his
dexterity, is said to have presented with a bushel of vetches;
which was indeed a most suitable reward for his performance.*
4. To him I compare those who spend their time, with great
study and labour, in the composition of declamations, which
they strive to make as unlike as possible to anything that
happens in real life. \
But that oratory which I endeavour to teach, of which I con-
ceive the idea in my mind, which is attainable only by a good
man, and which alone is true Oratory, must be regarded as a virtue.
* See note on c. 15, sect. 20. “ Virtues are distinguished by Aris-
totle into two kinds, the intellectual, which are exerted in the discovery
of truth and the accomplishment of our objects, under which head
oratory may be included, as it is an art; and the moral, which influence
the will, actions, and conduct, under which head Quintilian shows that
oratory may also be ranked as a virtue. Turnebus.
f It has been a question what sort of performance we should
conceive this man's to have been. Naudaeus, or Naudé, in his Sym-
tagma de Studio Liberali, cited by Bayle, Art. Macedonia, note S, says
that the man put a pea in his mouth, and, blowing it out, made it stick
upon the point of the needle. This interpretation is adopted by Bayle,
and by Spalding; by Bayle with the utmost confidence, and by
Spalding with some hesitation, for he admits that the verb inserere is
hardly applicable to the fixing of peas on the point of a needle. For
my part, I consider that the expression inserere in acwm wholly forbids
us to understand anything else than that the peas were driven through
the needle's eye. We may suppose it to have been a peculiar needle,
with a large eye, made for the purpose. How the peas were impelled,
Quintilian leaves us to conjecture.
CH. XX.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 163
5. This is an opinion which the philosophers support by many
subtle arguments, but which appears to me to be more clearly
established by the simpler mode of proof which follows, and
which is peculiarly my own. What is said by the philosophers
is this : If it is a quality of virtue to be consistent with itself
as to what ought to be done and what ought not to be done,
(that quality, namely, which is called prudence,) the same
quality will have its office as to what ought to be said or not to
be said. 6. And if there are virtues, for the generation of
which, even before we receive any instruction, certain princi-
ples and seeds are given us by nature,” (as for that of justice,
of which some notion is manifested even in the most ignorant
and the most barbarous,) it is evident that we are so formed
Originally as to be able to speak for ourselves, though not
indeed perfectly, yet in such a manner as to show that cer-
tain seeds of the faculty of eloquence are in us. 7. But in
those arts which have no connexion with virtue, there is not
the same nature. As there are two kinds of speech, there-
fore, the continuous, which is called oratory, and the concise,
which is termed logic, (which Zeno thought so nearly connected
that he compared the one to a clenched fist, and the other to
an open hand,) if the art of disputation: be a virtue, there will
be no doubt of the virtue of that which is of So much more
noble and expansive a nature. -
But I wish the reader to understand this more fully and
plainly from what is done by oratory; for how will an orator
succeed in eulogy, unless he has a clear knowledge of what is
honourable and what is disgraceful? Or in persuasion, unless
he Understands what is advantageous? Or in judicial pleadings,
unless he has a knowledge of justice? Does not oratory also de-
mand fortitude, as the orator has often to speak in opposition to
the turbulent threats of the populace, often with perilous defiance
of powerful individuals, and sometimes, as on the trial of Milo,
* The Stoics and Academics said that the seeds of virtues were
innate in us, and that, if we would but suffer them to grow, they
would secure us a halpy life. Turnebus.
+ I wish that he had given an illustration of this position.
† Ars disputatria..] That is, dialectics or logic. ... If mere dry logic
be a virtue, how much more will rich and forcible eloquence be a
virtue !
M 2
| 64 QUINTILIAN. [B. II.
amidst surrounding weapons of soldiers ? So that if oratory be
not a virtue, it cannot be perfect.*
9. If, moreover, there is a sort of virtue in every species of
animals, in which it excels the rest, or the greater number, of
ôther animals, as force in the lion, and swiftness in the
horse, and it is certain that man excels other animals in reason
and speech, why should we not consider that the distinctive
virtue of man lies as much in eloquence as in reason ?
Crassus in Cicerot justly makes an assertion to this effect:
“For eloquence,” says he, “is one of the most eminent vir-
tues;” and Cicero himself, in his own character, both in his
epistles to Brutus,f and in many other passages of his writings,S
calls eloquence a virtue.
10. But, it may be alleged, a vicious man will sometimes pro-
duce an exordium, a statement of facts, and a series of argu-
ments, in such a way that nothing shall be desired in them.
So, we may answer, a robber will fight with great bravery, yet
fortitude will still be a virtue; and a dishonest slave will bear
torments without a groan, yet endurance of pain will still merit
its praise. Many other things of the same nature occur, but
from different principles of action. Let what I have said,
therefore, as to eloquence being a virtue, be sufficient, for of
its usefulness I have treated above. - -
* On the contrary, if oratory be perfect oratory, it must necessarily
be a virtue.
# De Orat. iii. 14.
† This passage the learned have in vain sought in the Epistles to
Brutus; nor is their disappointment at all wonderful, if the ingenious
and learned Tunstall is right, in his Epistle to Middleton, in condemn-
ing those epistles as spurious. His condemnation has an authoritative
supporter in Ruhnken, ad Vell. Pat. ii. 12. Spalding. Of the spuri-
ousness of the epistles to Brutus, as they are called, few, surely, will
now be found to doubt. Such is their poverty of matter, and affecta-
tion of style, that it is wonderful that Middleton should ever have
thought them comparable to the genuine letters of Cicero. -
Ś Partit. Orat. c. 23, init. ; Acad. Q. i. 2.
CH.XXI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 1 (jà
CHAPTER XXI.
Opinions as to the subject of rhetoric, Š 1–4. That of Quintilian,
which agrees with those of Plato and Cicero, 5, 6. Objections to
it noticed, 7–11. No dispute between rhetoric and philosophy
about their respective subjects, 12, 13. The orator not obliged to
know everything, 14, 15. He will often speak better on arts than
the artists themselves, 16–19. The opinion of Quintilian sup-
ported by those of other authors, 20–23. t
1. As to the material of oratory, some have said that it is
speech ; an opinion which Gorgias in Plato” is represented as
holding. If this be understood in such a way that a discourse,
composed on any subject, is to be termed a speech, it is
not the material, but the work; as the statue is the work of a
statuary; for speeches, like statues, are produced by art. But
if by this term we understand mere words, words are of no
effect without matter. 2. Some have said that the material
of Oratory is persuasive arguments ; which indeed are part of
its business, and are the produce of art, but require material
for their composition. Others say that its material is ques-
tions of civil administration ; an opinion which is wrong, not
as to the quality of the matter, but in the restriction attached;
for such questions are the subject of oratory, but not the only
subject. 3. Some, as oratory is a virtue, say that the subject
of it is the whole of human life. Others, as no part of human
life is affected by every virtue, but most virtues are concerned
only with particular portions of life, (as justice, fortitude,
temperance, are regarded as confined to their proper duties
and their own limits,) say that oratory is to be restricted to
one special part, and assign to it the pragmatic department of
ethics, or that which relates to the transactions of civil life."f
4. For my part, I consider, and not without authorities to
support me, that the material of oratory is everything that
may come before an orator for discussion. For Socrates in
Plato seems to say to Gorgias” that the matter of oratory is
* Plato Gorg. p. 449 E.
+ Eique locum in ethice negotialem assignant, id est, Tpayparticóv.]
T}y pars negotialis he means that which relates to law proceedings, civil
and judicial causes. Turnebws. Or that which relates to the acts of
civil life, or the conduct of affairs in general. Capperonier.
† Gorg. p. 449–454.
166 QUINTILIAN. [B.II.
not in words but in things. In the Phaedrus” he plainly shows
that oratory has place, not only in judicial proceedings and
political deliberations, but also in private and domestic mat-
ters. Hence it is manifest that this was the opinion of Plato
himself.f 5. Cicero, too, in one passage, calls the material
of oratory the topics which are submitted to it for discussion,
but supposes that particular topics only are submitted to it.
ABut in another passage $ he gives his opinion that an orator
j has to speak upon all subjects, expressing himself in the
following words: “The art of the orator, however, and his
t
very profession of speaking well, seems to undertake and
promise that he will speak elegantly and copiously on what-
ever subject may be proposed to him.” 6. In a third passage,
also, he says: “But by an orator, whatever occurs in human
life (since it is on human life that an Orator's attention is to
be fixed, as the matter that comes under his consideration)
ought to have been examined, heard of, read, discussed,
handled, and managed.” -
# 7. But this material of oratory, as we define it, that is, the
subjects that come before it, some have at one time stigmatized
as indefinite,’ſſ at another as not belonging to Oratory, and have
called it, as thus characterised, an ars circumcurrens, an infinitely
discursive art, as discoursing on any kind of subject. 8. With
such as make these observations I have no great quarrel; for
they allow that oratory speaks on all matters, though they deny
that it has any pecular material, because its material is manifold.
9. But though the material be manifold, it is not infinite; and
other arts, of less consideration, deal with manifold material,
as architecture, for instance, for it has to do with everything
that is of use for building; and the art of engraving, which
works with gold, silver, brass, and iron. As to sculpture, it
extends itself, besides the metals which I have just named,
to wood, ivory, marble, glass, and jewels, 10. Nor will a topic
cease to belong to the orator because the professor of another
art may treat of it; for if I should ask what is the material of
* P. 261 A.
f As being put into the mouth of Socrates.
i: De Orat. i. 15; Inv, i. 4.
§ T)e Orat. i. 6.
|| De Orat. iii. 14.
T Infinitam.] Indefinite, indeterminate; because it represents oratory
as devoted to no particular subject, but as ready to exert itself on any
topic on which men can speak. Capperonier
CH.XXI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 167
the statuary, the answer will be “brass;” or if I should ask
what is the material of the founder of vases, that is the worker
in the art which the Greeks call x2Azevrixá, the reply would
also be “brass;” though vases differ very much from statues.
11. Nor Ought medicine to lose the name of an art, because
anointing and exercise are common to it with the palaestra, or
because a knowledge of the quality of meats is common to it
with cookery.
12. As to the objection which some make, that it is the
business of philosophy to discourse of what is good, useful,
and just, it makes nothing against me; for when they say a
philosopher, they mean a good man; and why then should I
be surprised that an Orator, whom I consider to be also a good
man, should discourse upon the same subjects? 13. especially
when I have shown, in the preceding book,” that philosophers
have taken possession of this province because it was aban-
doned by the orators, a province which had always belonged
to oratory, so that the philosophers are rather trespassing
upon our ground. Since it is the business of logic, too, to dis-
cuss whatever comes before it, and logic is uncontinuous ora-
tory, why may not the business of continuous Oratory be
thought the same 2
14. It is a remark constantly made by some, that an orator
nust betskilled in all arts if he is to speak upon all subjects. I
might reply to this in the words of Cicero,f in whom I find .
this passage: “In my opinion no man can become a thoroughly
accomplished orator, unlessine shall have attained a knowledge
of every subject of importance, and of all the liberal arts;” but
for my argument it is sufficient that an orator be acquainted
with the subject on which he has to speak. 15. He has not
a knowledge of all causes, and yet he ought to be able to speak
upon all. On what causes, then, will he speak? on Such as he
has learned. The same will be the case also with regard to
the arts and sciences; those on which he shall have to speak
he will study for the occasion, and on those which he has
studied he will speak.
16. What then, it may be said, will not a builder speak of
building, or a musician of music, better than an orator? As-
suredly he will speak better, if the orator does not know what
is the subject of inquiry in the case before him, with regard to
* Prooem. sect. 10 segg. + De Orat. i. 6.
168 - QUINTILIAN. [B.II.
matters connected with those sciences. An ignorant and
illiterate person, appearing before a court, will plead his own
cause better than an orator who does not know what the sub-
ject of dispute is ; but an orator will express what he has
learned from the builder, or the musician, or from his client,
better than the person who has instructed him. 17. But the
builder will speak well on building, or the musician on music,
if any point in those arts shall require to be established by his
opinion; he will not be an orator, but he will perform his part
like an orator, as when an unprofessional person binds up a
wound, he will not be a surgeon, yet he will act as a surgeon.
18. Do subjects of this kind never come to be mentioned in
panegyrical, or deliberative, or judicial oratory? When it was
under deliberation, whether a harbour should be constructed
at Ostia,” were not orators called to deliver opinions on the
subject? yet what was wanted was the professional knowledge
of the architect. 19. Does not the orator enter on the ques-
tion, whether discolorations and tumours of the body are
symptoms of ill health or of poison?t yet such inquiries be-
long to the profession of medicine? Will an orator never
have to speak of dimensions and numbers? yet we may say
that such matters belong to mathematics; for my part, I
believe that any subject whatever may, by some chance, come
under the cognizance of the orator. If a matter does ºf come
under his cognizance, he will have no concern with it. '
20. Thus I have justly said, that the material of oratory is
everything that is brought under is notice for discussion, an
assertion which even our daily conversation supports, for
whenever we have any subject on which to speak, we often
signify by some prefatory remark, that the matter is laid
before us. 21. So much was Gorgias of opinion that an
orator must speak of everything, that he allowed himself to be
questioned by the people in his lecture-room, upon any sub-
ject on which any one of them chose to interrogate him.
, Hermagoras also, by saying, that “the matter of Oratory lies
* See Suet. Claud. c. 20, where it is stated that the work had often
been contemplated by Julius Cæsar, but deferred from time to time on
account of its difficulty.
‘i Cicero touches on this medical part, so to speak, of eloquence in
his speech for Cluentius, c. 10. Spalding.
† Plato Gorg. p. 447 C. In reference to this passage of Plato, see
Cic, de Orat. iii. 32; i. 22; de Inv. i. 5; de Fin. ii. 1.
CH. XXI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. T 69
in the cause and the questions * connected with it,” compre-
hends under it every subject that can possibly come before it
for discussion. 22. If indeed he supposed that the questions
do not belong to oratory, he is of a different opinion from me;
but if they do belong to oratory, I am supported by his
authority, for there is no subject that may not form part of a
cause or the questions connected with it. 23. Aristotle,t too,
by making three kinds of oratory, the judicial, the deliberative,
and the demonstrative, has put almost everything into the
hands of the orator, for there is no subject that may not enter
into one of the three kinds.
24. An inquiry has been also started, though by a very few
writers, concerning the instrument of oratory. The instrument
I call that without which material cannot be fashioned and
adapted to the object which we wish to effect. But I consider
that it is not the art that requires the instrument, but the
artificer. Professional knowledge needs no tool, as it may be
complete though it produces nothing, but the artist must have
his tool, as the engraver his graving-instrument, and the
painter his pencils. I shall therefore reserve the consideration
of this point for that part of my work in which I intend to
speak of the orator. : •
* See iii. 5, 16; iii. 6, 2. The questions meant are general questions,
as, “Whether the senses may be trusted,” “Whether an old man
ought to marry,” and the like, which Cicero excludes from the depart-
ment of the orator, de Invent. i. 6. -
+ Rhet. i. 3, 3; Cic. de Invent. i. 5.
£ B. xii. e. 5.
170 QUINTILIAN. [B, III.
BOOK III.
CHAPTER I.
Quintilian proposes to consider the various branches and precepts of
oratory more fully than they are generally set forth in treatises on
the art; a part of his work more desirable for students than
agreeable to them, Š 1–4. Diversities of opinions and methods,
5–7. Various writers on the art ; the Greeks, 8–15. Followers
of Hermagoras, Apollodorus, Theodorus, 16–18. The Romans,
19–21. Quintilian will give his own opinion on matters as they
occur, 22.
1. Since I have examined in the second book what oratory
is, and what is its object; since I have shown, as well as my
abilities allowed, that it is an art,” that it is useful,f and that
it is a virtue ; ; and since I have put under its power every
Subject $on which it may be necessary to speak, I shall now pro-
ceed to show whence it had its origin, of what parts it consists,"
and how every department of it is to be contemplated * and
treated; for most of the writers of books on the art have
stopped even short of these limits;ff so that Apollodorus:
confined himself to judicial pleadings only.
2. Nor am I ignorant that those who are studious of oratory
have desired to receive from me that part of my work, of which
this book proceeds to treat, more anxiously than any other; a
part which, though it will be the most difficult to myself, from
the necessity of examining a vast diversity of opinions, will
yet perhaps afford the least pleasure to mv readers, since it
* B. ii., c. 17.
+ B. ii. c. 16.
: B. ii. c. 20.
§ B. ii. c. 21.
| By what authors and writer's rhetoric has been invented and
taught; and what is its origin, whether art or nature. Capperonier.
" He alludes to the five parts, invention, arrangement, language,
* memory, delivery. Capperonier.
** Invenienda.] “Conceived of ;” what idea we must form of each
part ; and how we must produce matter with reference to it.
it Intra quem modwm.] Gesner rightly observes that the preposition
intra signifies that previous writers on rhetoric had confined themselves
within a less compass than that to which Quintilian had extended his
work. Compare xi. 3, 8; 45. Spalding.
ji See sect, 17.
CH.I.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 171
admits merely of a dry exposition of rules. 3. In other parts
I have endeavoured to introduce some little embellishment,
not with the view of displaying my own ability, (since for that
purpose a subject of more fertility might have been chosen,) but
in order that, by that means, I might more successfully attract
youth to the study of those matters which I thought necessary
for their improvement; if, possibly, being stimulated by some
pleasure in the reading, they might more willingly learn those
precepts of which I found that a bare and dry enumeration
might be repulsive to their minds, and offend their ears,
especially as they are grown so delicate. 4. It was with such
a view that Lucretius * said he put the precepts of philosophy
into verse; for he uses, as is well known, the following
simile .
Ac veluti pueris absinthia tetra medentes
Qwwm dare conantwr, privs Oras pocwla circum
Aspirant mellis dulci jiavoque liquore:
“And as physicians, when they attempt to give bitter worm-
wood to children, first tinge the rim round the cup with the
sweet and yellow liquid of honey,” &c. 5. But I fear that
this book may be thought to contain very little honey, and a
great deal of wormwood, and may be more serviceable for
instruction than agreeable. I am afraid, too, that it may find
the less favour, as it will contain precepts not newly in-
vented, for the most part, by me, but previously given by
others; and it may also meet with some who are of contrary
opinions, and who will be ready to assail it ; because most
authors, though they have directed, their steps to the same
point, have made different roads towards it, and each has
drawn his followers into his own. 6. Their adherents, more-
over, approve whatever path they have pursued, and you will
not easily alter prepossessions that have been inculcated into
youth, for every one had rather have learned than learn.
7. But there is, as will appear in the progress of the book,
an infinite diversity of opinions among authors; as some have
* B. i. v. 934; iv. 11. In the first of these passages, however, we
find Sed, and in the second Nam, instead of Ac, and, instead of .
aspirant, contingumt. Such variations have led to the supposition that
there were two editions of Lucretius's poem ; see Spalding's note, and
the “Remarks” prefixed to my translation of Lucretius, p, vii. viii.
Spalding observes that “aspirare mellis liquore” will be equivalent to
“odore et sapore mellis imbuere.”
172 QUINTILIAN. B. III.
added their own discoveries to what was previously rude and
imperfect, and then others, that they might seem to produce
Something themselves, have even altered what was right. 8.
The first writer who, after those that the poets have mentioned,
touched at all upon oratory, is said to have been Empedocles,”
and the most ancient composers of rules on the art were Corax
and Tisias,t natives of Sicily; to whom succeeded a native of
the same island, Gorgias the Leontine, who, as is said, was a
pupil of Empedocles. 9. Gorgias, through the advantage of
a very long life, (for he lived a hundred and nine years,)
| flourished as a contemporary with many rhetoricians; and was
thus a rival of those whom I have just named, and survived
; even the age of Socrates. 10. At the same period with him
lived Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Prodicus of Ceos, Prota-
goras of Abdera, (from whom Euathlus is said to have learned
‘the art of oratory, on which he published a treatise, for ten
thousand denarii,j.) Hippias of Elis, and Alcidamus of Elaea,
whom Plato calls Palamedes; 11. There was also Antiphon,
(who was the first that wrote speeches $ and who, besides,
composed a book of rules on rhetoric, and was thought to have
pleaded his own cause on a trial with great ability,) Polycrates,
by whom I have said || that a speech was written against
Socrates, and Theodorus of Byzantium, one of those whom
Plato'ſ calls Aoyoóczíðaxoſ, “artificers in words.” 12. Of these,
the first that treated general subjects were Protagoras, Gor-
gias, Prodicus, and Thrasymachus. Cicero, in his Brutus,”
Says that no composition, having any rhetorical embellishment,
was written before the time of Pericles, but that some pieces
of his were in circulation. For my part, I find nothing
* Movisse aligua circa rhetoricem Empedocles dicitºr.] 'Eutréðok\éa Ö
'AptororéAmc pm at Trpátov ºntopticº) v Icekivmkévau. Sextus Empir, p.
370 of Fabricius's edition, who observes that Quintilian uses the same
kind of expression as Aristotle. The book of Aristotle, from which
the phrase was taken, called Sophistes, is now lost ; Diog. Laert. viii.
57. See Spalding's note.
f See ii. 17, 7.
ºf £312 10s., the denarius being valued at 7%d.
§ He was the first that wrote speeches, and sold them to accused
persons, or persons going to law, to use as their own, as is related by
Ammianus Marcellinus, xxx. 4. Spalding. 9. V. -
| See ii. 17, 4.
"I Phaedr. p. 266 E.
** C. 7.
CH.I.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 173
answerable to the fame of such eloquence as his,* and am
therefore the less surprised that some should think that
nothing was written by Pericles, but that the writings, which
were circulated under his name, were written by others.
13. To these succeeded many other rhetoricians, but the
most famous of the pupils of Gorgias was Isocrates; though
authors, indeed, are not agreed as to who was his master; I,
however, trust to Aristotlet on that point. 14. From this
time different roads, as it were, began to be formed; for the
disciples of Isocrates were eminent in every department of
learning; and, when he was grown old, (he lived to complete
his ninety-eighth year,) Aristotle began to teach the art of
oratory in his afternoon lessons, frequently parodying, as is
Said, the well-known verse from the tragedy of Philoctetes,
thus: -
Aio Xpów awarāv, Kai 'Lookpármy #61. Aéyévv, Š
“It is disgraceful to be silent, and to allow Isocrates to speak.”
A treatise on the art of Oratory was published by each of them;
* See xii. 2, 42 ; 10, 49; where Quintilian positively asserts that no
writings of Pericles were extant in his time; and Ruhnken, in his Hist.
Crit. Or. Gr. p. 38, brings plenty of authorities to support that
assertion, though Cicero (Brut. c. 7, and de Orat. ii. 22) seems to have
had greater faith in the genuineness of the writings circulated under
the name of Pericles. Could the genuine writings of Pericles have been
lost between the age of Cicero and that of Quintilian ; I think not.
See, on this doubtful subject, Fabr. Biblioth. ed. Harles, vol. ii. p. 746.
Spalding.
f Aristotle must have expressly stated this in some part of his
writings, but we find no such passage in any of those left to us.
Many of his books are lost, however; as the Theodectea ; see ii. 15, 10.
Dionysius Halicarnassensis (Tom. ii. p. 94) says that not only Gorgias
was a preceptor of Isocrates, but also Prodicus of Ceos, and Tisias of
Syracuse, and mentions, as an opinion of some, that he was instructed
by Theramenes. See Pseudo-Plutarch, p. 836 F., and Suidas under
Isocrates. Spalding.
† See Aul. Gell. xx. 5, who says that what Aristotle taught on
rhetoric was among his eacoterica, instructions which he used to give
in the evening, when his audience was less select than in the morning.
Ś See Cicero de Orat. iii. 35 ; Tusc. i. 4; Orat. c. 19. Bentley,
Menage, and others have corrected cai 'Iookpátmy into 'Iookpātmy 6'
for the sake of the metre. Hermann, Opusc. v. iii. p. 129, supposes,
with Bentley, that the verse is from the Philoctetes of Euripides.
Diogenes Laertius (v. 3) says that the verse was applied, not to
Isocrates, but to Xenocrates. -
174 . QUINTILIAN. [B.III.
but Aristotle made his to consist of several books. At the
same time lived Theodectes, of whose work I have already
spoken. 15. Theophrastus, also, a disciple of Aristotle, wrote
very carefully on rhetoric ; and since that time the philoso-
phers, especially the leaders of the Stoics and Peripatetics,
have paid even greater attention to the subject than the
rhetoricians. 16. Hermagoras then made, as it were, a way
for himself, which most orators have followed; but Athenaeus”
appears to have been most nearly his equal and rival. After-
wards Apollonius Molon, Areus,f Caecilius, and Dionysius of
Halicarnassus, wrote much upon the art. 17. But the two
that attracted most attention to themselves were Apollodorus
of Pergamus, who was the teacher of Caesar Augustus at Apol-
lonia, and Theodorus of Gadara, who preferred to be called a
native of Rhodes, and whose lectures Tiberius Caesar, when he
retired into that island, is said to have constantly attended.
18. These two rhetoricians taught different systems, and
their followers were thence called Apollodoreans and Theo-
doreans, after the manner of those who devote themselves to
certain sects in philosophy. But the doctrines of Apollodorus
you may learn best from his disciples, of whom the most exact
in delivering them in Latin was Caius Valgius, Š in Greek
Atticus. Of Apollodorus himself the only work on the art
seems to have been that addressed to Matius; "I for the epistle
ritten to Domitius” does not acknowledge the other books
attributed to him. The writings of Theodorus were more
numerous; and there are some now living who have seen his
disciple Hermagoras.
19. The first among the Romans, as far as I know, that
* See ii. 15, 23
‘i See i. 15, 36.
† See ii. 11, 2.
§ Caius Valgius Rufus, a grammarian and rhetorician in the time of
Augustus, to whom he inscribed a book on herbs, Plin. H. N. xxv. 2.
Whether the learned have rightly, or too curiously, distinguished him
from Titus Valgius Rufus, the poet, the friend of Horace and Tibullus,
I leave for the consideration of others. Spalding. See c. 3, sect. 17.
| Probably the Dionysius Atticus mentioned by Strabo, xiii. p. 635.
* I suppose that this is the Matius mentioned by Pliny, H. N. xii.
6, by whom he is called Divi Awgust amicus. Burmaºn.
** I consider that this is the Domitius Marsus, the elegant poet and
prose writer in the time of Augustus; he is mentioned by Quintilian
again, vi. 3. Spalding.
CH.I.]. EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 175
composed anything on this subject, was Marcus Cato the
Censor; * after whom Marcus Antonius+ made some attempt
in it; it is the only writing that is extant of his, and is in
quite an unfinished state. Less celebrated writers followed,
whose names, if occasion shall anywhere require, I will not
forbear to mention. 20. But Marcus Tullius Cicero threw
the greatest light, not only on eloquence itself, but also on its
precepts, giving the only model of excellence among us in
speaking and in teaching the art of speaking; after whom it
would be most becoming to be silent, if he himself had not
said that his books on rhetorici escaped from his hands when
he was very young, and if he had not intentionally omitted, in
his Dialogues on Oratory, those minor points on which most
learners require instruction.S. 21. Cornificius || wrote much
on the same subject; Stertinius something considerable; and
Gallio'ſ the father a little. But Celsus” and Laenas, if
who preceded Gallio, and Virginius,S$ Pliny," and Tutilius"||
in our own age, have written on the art with greater accuracy.
* See ii. 15, 1.
+ See Cicero de Orat. i. 47, 48.
† See note on ii. 15, 6.
§ See De Orat. i. 6; 36; ii. 3; Epist. ad ljiv. i. 9.
| Probably the Quintus Cornificius to whom Cicero writes, Epist. 8d.
Div. xii. 17, 18, 23. -
"I This ſºorician is not mentioned by any other writer, unless, he
be the Maxi, Tūs Stertinius noticed by Senecca, Controv. ix. Spalding.
** He is noticed again by Quintilian, ix. 2, 91, from which passage,
compared with Sen. Controv. p. 159, ed. Bip... it clearly appears that
he was the same person to whom Seneca the father often alludes, and
calls Junius Gallio, and who adopted the son of that Seneca, the eldest
brother of the philosopher. He was the friend of Ovid (Senec. Suas.
iii. p. 25), whose epistle from Pontus, iv. 11, is perhaps addressed to
him. Spalding.
++ Seeii. 15, 22.
†† See x. 7, 32; xi. 3, 183. In the latter passage he is called Laenas
Popilius. I find no mention of him in any author besides Quintilian.
'Spalding.
§§ Mentioned by Tacitus, Ann. xv. 71 : Virginius Studia juvenwin
eloquentiá fovebat; also by Quintilian iii. 6, 44; iv. 1, 23; vii. 4, 24;
xi. 3, 26. Spalding.
|| The author of the Natural History, who wrote three books on the
education of an orator ab incunabulis ; Plin. Ep. iii. 5, 5.
"I"ſ Mentioned by Martial, v. 57, 6. Some suppose, from Plin. Ep. vi.
32, that Quintilian married his daughter. Spalding concurs with
Gedoyn in supposing that we should read, in that passage of Pliny,
Quintiamo instead of Quintiliano.
176 QUINTILIAN. LB.III.
There are also at this very time eminent writers on the same
subject, who, if they had embraced every part of it, would
have relieved me from my present task; but I forbear to
mention the names of living authors; the due time for honour-
ing them will arive; for their merits will live in the memory
of posterity, to whom the influence of envy will not reach.
22. Yet, after so many great writers, I shall not hesitate to
advance, on certain points, my own opinions; for I have not
attached myself to any particular sect, as if I were affected
with any spirit of Superstition; and, as I bring together the
observations of many authors, liberty must be allowed my
readers to choose from them what they please; being myself
content, wherever there is no room for showing ability, to
deserve the praise due to carefulness.
CHAPTER II.
Of the origin of oratory, § 1, 2. Nature and art, 3. Objection to
Cicero's notion, 4.
1. THE question, what is the origin of oratory, need not
detain us long; for who can doubt that men, as soon as they
were produced, received language from nature-ºself, the
parent of all things, (which was at least the commencement of
oratory,) and that utility brought improvement to it, and
method and eacercise perfection? 2. Nor do I see why some
should think that accuracy in speaking had its rise from the
circumstance that those, who were brought into any danger by
accusation, set themselves to speak with more than ordinary
care for the purpose of defending themselves.* This, even if
a more honourable cause, is not necessarily the first ; especially
as accusation goes before defence ; unless any person would
Say that a sword was forged by one who prepared steel for his
own defence earlier than by one who designed it for the
destruction of another.
It was therefore nature that gave origin to speech; and
observation that gave origin to art; for as, in regard to medi
* I have not found in any writer an express assertion to this effect.
Spalding.

CH.III.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 177
cine, when people saw that some things were wholesome and
others unwholesome, they established an art by observing their
different properties, so, with respect to speaking, when they
found some things useful and others useless, they marked
them for imitation or avoidance; other people added other
things to the list according to their nature; these observations
were confirmed by experience; and every one then taught what
he knew... 4. Cicero,” indeed, has attributed the origin of
eloquence to founders of cities and to legislators; in whom
there certainly must have been some power of speaking; but
why he should regard this as the very origin of oratory, I do
not see ; as there are nations at this day without any fixed
Settlements, without cities, and without laws, and yet men
who are born among them discharge the duties of ambassadors,
make accusations and defences, and think that one person
speaks better than another.
CHAPTER III,
Divisions of the art of Oratory, § 1–3. Various opinions respecting - k
them, 4, 5. Cicero's not always the same, 6, 7. Opinions of some
Greek writers, 8, 9. Of the order of the division or parts, 10.
Whether they should be called parts, or works, or elements, 11.
1. THE whole art of oratory, as the most and greatest.
writers have taught, consists of five parts, inventien, arrange- ºr
ment, ea pression, memory, and delivery or action; for the last
is designated by either of these terms. But every speech, by
which any purpose is expressed, must of necessity consist of
both matter and words ; 2. and, if it is short, and included
in one sentence, it may perhaps call for no further considera-
tion; but a speech of greater length requires attention to a
greater number of particulars; for it is not only of consequence
what we say, and how we say it, but also where we say it;
there is need therefore also for arrangement. But we cannot
Say everything that our subject demands, nor everything in its
proper place, without the assistance of memory, which will
accordingly constitute a fourth part. 3. And a delivery which
is unbecoming either as to voice or gesture, vitiates, and
* De Orat. i. 8. -
N
178 QUINTILIAN. [B.III.
almost renders ineffectual, all those other requisites o
eloquence; and to delivery therefore must necessarily be
assigned the fifth place.
4. Nor are some writers, among whom is Albutius,” to be
be regarded, who admit only the first three parts, because
memory, they say, and delivery, (on which we shall give
directions in the proper place,t) come from nature, not from
art. Thracymachus, however, was of the same opinion as far
as concerns delivery. 5. To these some have added a sixth
part, by subjoining judgment to invention, as it is our first
business to invent, and then to judge. For my part, I do not
consider that he who has not judged has invented; for a
person is not said to have invented contradictory or foolish
arguments, or such as are of equal value to himself and his
adversary, but not to have avoided them. 6. Cicero, indeed,
in his Rhetorica, Š has included judgment under invention;
but, to me, judgment appears to be so mingled with the first
three parts (for there can neither be arrangement mor expression
without it), that I think even delivery greatly indebted to it.
7. This I would the more boldly affirm, as Cicero, in his Par-
titiones Oratoriae, arrives at the same five divisions of which
I have just spoken ; for, after first dividing oratory into two
parts, invention and expression, he has put matter and arrange-
ment under invention, and words and delivery under expression,
and has then made memory a fifth part, having a common
influence on all the rest, and being, as it were, the guardian of
them. He alsº says, in his books de Oratore," that eloquence
consists of five divisions; and the opinions expressed in these
* Albutius Novariensis came to Rome in the reign of Augustus,
and was received into the friendship of Plancus. He opened a school
at Rome, and taught rhetoric. Seneca mentions him in his Declama-
tions and Controversies. Turnebw8. -
+ £3. xi. c. 2 and 3.
# Compare iii. 1, 10. He might have said this in the táxvm
§nt-opticſ) which Suidas attributes to him. There was more than one
book of his extant, as appears from Cicero Orat. c. 52. Spalding.
§ The books De Inventione. The particular passage, however, to
which Quintilian refers, is not to be found in what is now extant of
them.
|| C. i. sect. 3.
* The text has in Oratore, but, as Gesner has observed, there is no
passage to that effect in the Orator. The division into five parts will
be found in the De Oratore, i. 31.
CH. III.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 179
books, as they were written at a later period, may be regarded
as more settled."
8. Those authors appear to me to have been not less de-
sirous.* to introduce something new, who have added order
after having previously specified arrangement,f as if arrange-
ment were anything else than the disposition of things in the
best possible order. Dioni has specified only invention and
arrangement, but has made each of them of two kinds,
relating to matter and to words; so that expression may be
included under invention, and delivery under arrangement;
to which parts a fifth, memory, must be added. The followers
of Theodorus, for the most part, distinguish invention into two
Sorts, referring to matter and eacpression ; and them add the
three other parts. 9. Hermagoras puts judgment, division,
order, and whatever relates to expression, under economy,
which, being a Greek term, taken from the care of domestic
affairs, and used in reference to this subject metaphorically,
has no Latin equivalent.
10. There is also a question about the following point,
namely, that, in settling the order of the parts, some have
put memory after invention, some after arrangement. To me
the fourth place seems most suitable for it; for we must not
only retain in mind what we have imagined, in order to arrange
it, and what we have arranged in order to express it, but we
must also commit to memory what we have comprised in
words; since it is in the memory that everything that enters
into the composition of a speech is deposited.
11. There have been also many writers inclined to think
that these divisions should not be called parts of the art of
oratory but duties of the orator, as it is the business of the
orator to invent, arrange, express, et cetera. 12. But if we coin-
cide in this opinion, we shall leave nothing to art; for to speak
well is the duty of the orator, yet skill in speaking well
constitutes the art of Oratory ; or, as others express their
notions, it is the duty of the orator to persuade, yet the power
of persuading lies in his art. Thus to invent arguments and
* Not less than those who are mentioned in sect. 5 as having intro-
duced a sixth part.
+ Dispositio. * º
f Supposed by Turnebus and Spalding to be Dion Chrysostom.
- N 2
180 QUINTILIAN. [B. III.
arrange them are the duties of the orator; yet invention and
arrangement may be thought peculiar parts of the art of oratory.
13. It is a point, too, about which many have disputed,
whether these are parts of the art of oratory or works of it,
or (as Athenaeus * thinks) elements of it, which the Greeks
call grouxsio. But no one can properly call them elements; for
in that case they will be merely first principles, as water, or fire,
or matter, or indivisible atoms, are called the elements of the
world ; nor can they justly be named works, as they are not
performed by others, but perform something themselves.
14. They are therefore parts ; for as oratory consists of them,
and as a whole consists of parts, it is impossible that those
things of which the whole is composed can be anything else but
parts of that whole. Those who have called them works, ap-
pear to me to have been moved by this consideration, that they
did not like, in making the other division of oratory, to adopt
the same term; for the parts of Oratory, they said, were the
panegyrical, the deliberative, and the judicial. 15. But if these
are parts, they are parts of the matter rather than the art; for
in each of them is included the whole of oratory; since no one
of them can dispense with invention, arrangement, expression,
memory, and delivery. Some, therefore, have thought it better
to say that there are three kinds of Oratory; but those whom
Cicerot has followed have given the most reasonable opinion,
namely, that there are three kinds of subjects for oratory.
CHAPTER IV.
Whether there are three sorts of oratory, or more, § 1–3. Quintilian
adheres to the old opinion that there are but three; his reasons,
4–8. Opinions of Anaximenes, Plato, Isocrates, 9–11. Quin-
tilian's own method, 12–15. He does not assign particular sub-
jects to each kind, 16.
1. BUT it is a question whether there are three or more.
Certainly almost all writers, at least those of the highest
authority among the ancients, have acquiesced in this tripartite
distinction, following the opinion of Aristotle, who merely calls
* II. 15, 23. f De Orat. i. 31 ; Top. c. 24.
CH. IV.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 181
the deliberative by another name, concionalis,” “suitable for
addresses to public assemblies.” 2. But a feeble attempt was
made at that time by some of the Greek writers, an attempt
which has since been noticed by Cicero in his books De Oratore,t
and is now almost forced upon us by the greatest author £
of our own day, to make it appear that there are not only
more kinds, but kinds almost innumerable. 3. Indeed,
if we distinguish praising and blaming in the third part of
oratory, in what kind of oratory shall we be said to employ
ourselves when we complain, console, appease, excite, alarm,
encourage, direct, explain obscure expressions, narrate, entreat,
offer thanks, congratulate, reproach, attack, describe, command,
'retract, eacpress wishes or opinions, and speak in a thousand
other ways 2 4. So that if I adhere to the opinion of the
ancients, I must, as it were, ask pardon for doing so, and must
inquire by what considerations they were induced to confine a
subject of such extent and variety within such narrow limits 2
5. Those who say that the ancients were in error, suppose that
they were led into it by the circumstance that they saw in
their time orators exerting themselves for the most part in these
three kinds only; for laudatory and vituperative speeches were
then written ; it was customary to pronounce funeral orations;
and a vast deal of labour was bestowed on deliberative and
judicial eloquence; so that the writers of books on the art
included in them the kinds of eloquence most in use as the
only kinds. 6. But those who defend the ancients, make three
sorts of hearers; one, who assemble only to be gratified; a
second, to listen to counsel; and a third, to form a judgment
on the points in debate. For myself, while I am searching
for all sorts of arguments in support of these various opinions,
it occurs to me that we might make only two kinds of Oratory,
bn this consideration, that all the business of an Orator lies in
:auses either judicial or eactrajudicial. 7. Of matters in which
decision is sought from the opinion of a judge, the nature is
self-evident; those which are not referred to a judge, have respect
either to the past or to the future; the past we either praise
or blame; and about the future we deliberate. 8. We may
* Ampanyopulcóv. Arist. Rhet. i. 1, 10; iii. 14, 11.
+ II. I0.
f Turnebus and Spalding suppose that Pliny the Elder is meant.
See c. i. sect. 21. All the other ºmmentators are silent.
182 QUINTILIAN. [B.III.
also add, that all subjects on which an orator has to speak
are either certain or doubtful; the certain he praises or
blames, according to the opinion which he forms of them ; of
the doubtful, some are left free for ourselves to choose how to
decide on them, and concerning these there must be delibera-
tion; some are left to the judgment of others, and concerning"
these there must be litigation. .
9. Anaximenes admitted only the general divisions of ju-
dicial and deliberative, but said that there were seven species;
those, namely, of eachorting and dissuading, of praising and
blaming, of accusing and defending, and of examining, which
he calls the eacetastic sort ; but it is easy to see that the first
two of these species belong to the deliberative kind of oratory,
the two following to the epideictic, and the last three to the
judicial. 10. I pass over Protagoras, who thinks that the
only parts of Oratory are those of interrogating, replying, com-
manding, amd intreating, which he calls six.0%. Plato, in his
Sophistes,” has added to the judicial and deliberative a third
kind which he calls TgogouſXArizöy, and which we may allow
ourselves to call the sermocinatory sort, which is distinct from
the oratory of the forum, and suited to private discussions, and
of which the nature is the same as that of dialectics or logic.
ll. Isocratest thought that praise and blame have a place in
every kind of oratory.
To me it has appeared safest to follow the majority of
writers; and so reason seems to direct. 12. There is, then,
as I said, one kind of Oratory in which praise and blame are
included, but which is called, from the better part of its office,
the panegyrical; others, however, term it the demonstrative or
epideictic. (Both names are thought to be derived from the
Greeks, who apply to those kinds the epithets àyzowiczorizöy
and #71621%ruzóy. 13. But the word āºriósix rizöy seems to me
to have the signification, not so much of demonstration as of
ostentation, and to differ very much from the term āyzowicz-
grizöy; for though it includes in it the laudatory kind of oratory,
lit does not consist in that kind alone. 14. Would any one
ideny that panegyrical speeches are of the epideictic kind? Yet
! they take the suasory form, and generally speak of the interests
of Greece. So that there are, indeed, three kinds of oratory;
* Ed. Steph. p. 222.
‘i See ii, 15, 4.
CH.v.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 183
but in each-of-them part is devoted to the subject-matter, and …
part to display. But perhaps our countrymen, when they
call a particular kind demonstrative, do not borrow the name
from the Greeks, but are simply led by the consideration that
praise and blame demonstrate what the exact nature of any-
thing is.) 15. The second kind is the deliberative, and the third
the judicial. Other species will fall under these genera, nor
will there be found any one species in which we shall not have
either to praise or to blame, to persuade or to dissuade, to enforce
a charge or to repel one ; while to conciliate, to state facts, to
inform, to exaggerate, to extenuate, and to influence the judgment
of the audience by exciting or allaying the passions, are com-
mon to every sort of oratory. -
16. I could not agree even with those, who, adopting, as I
think, a division rather easy and specious than true, consider
that the matter of panegyrical eloquence concerns what is
honourable, that of deliberative what is eaſpedient, and that of
judicial what is just ; for all are supported, to a certain extent,
by aid one from another ; since in panegyric justice and eaſpe-
diency are considered, and in deliberations honour; and you
will rarely find a judicial pleading into some part of which
something of what I have just mentioned does not enter.
CHAPTER V.
Division into things and words: other divisions, $ 1–3. Questions
concerning what is written and what is not written, 4. Definite
and indefinite questions, 5–7. Species of indefinite ones, 8–11.
Questions on general subjects not useless, 12–16. Definition of
a cause, 17, 18.
1. BUT every speech consists at once of that which is ex-
pressed, and of that which expresses, that is, of matter and
words. Ability in speaking is produced by nature, art, and
practice; to which some add a fourth requisite, namely imita-
tion ; which I include under art. 2. There are also three-
objects which an orator must accomplish, to inform, to move,
to please ; for this is a clearer partition than that of those who
divide the whole of oratory into what concerns things and pas-
sions; since both these will not always find a place in the subjects
184 QUINTILIAN. - [B.III.
of which we shall have to treat. Some subjects are altogether
unconnected with the pathetic, which, though it cannot make
room for itself everywhere, yet, wherever it forces an entrance,
produces a most powerful effect, .
3. The most eminent authors are of opinion that there are
Some things in pleading that require proof, and others that do
not require it; and I agree with them. Some, however, as
Celsus, think that an orator will not speak on any subject
unless there be some question about it; but the majority of
authors, as well as the general division of Oratory into three
kinds, are opposed to him; unless we say that to praise what
is acknowledged to be honourable, and to blame what is ad-
mitted to be dishonourable, is no part of an orator's business.
4. All writers admit, however, that questions depend on
what is written or what is not written. Questions about some-
thing written concern legality; those about something not writ-
ten concern fact. Hermagoras, and those who follow him, call
the former kind legal questions, the latter rational questions,
using the terms yoguzöy and Xoyuzów. 5. Those who make all
questions relate to things and words are of the same opinion.
It is also agreed that questions are either indefinite or
definite. The indefinite are those which, without regard to per-
Sons, time, place, and other such circumstances, are argued
for or against. This sort of questions the Greeks call 030a1g :
Cicero * propositions; others general questions relating to civil
affairs; others questions suitable for philosophical discussion ;
while Athenaeus makes them parts of the cause to be decided.
6. Cicerof distinguishes them into questions relating to know-
ledge and to action ; so that “Is the world governed by
divine providence?” will be a question of knowledge, “Ought
we to take part in the management of public affairs?” a
question of action. The former kind he subdivides into three
species, “whether a thing is,” “what it is,” and “ of what
nature it is ;” for all these points may be unknown; the latter
kind into two, “how we should obtain the thing in question,”
and “how we should use it.”
7. Definite questions embrace particular circumstances, per-
sons, times, and other things; they are called by the Greeks
ū70%ggig : by our countrymen, causes. In these the whole
* See. ii. 1, 9. *
+ Topic. c. 21; Partit. Orat. c. 18.
CH. V.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. I 85
inquiry seems to be about things and persons. 8. The indeft-
nite is always the more comprehensive ; for from it comes the
definite. To make this plainer by an example, the question
“whether a man should marry” is indefinite ; the question
“whether Cato should marry” is definite, and may accordingly
become the subject of a suasory speech. But even those
which have no allusion to particular persons are generally
referred to something; for “ought we to take a share in the
government of our country?” is an abstract question, but
“ought we to take a share in the government of it under a
tyranny?” has reference to something definite. 9. Yet here
also there lies concealed, as it were, a person; for the word
tyranny doubles the question, and there is a tacit considera-
tion of time and quality; yet you cannot properly call the
question a cause.
Those questions which I call indefinite are also called
general; and, if this be a proper term, definite questions will
also be special. But in every special question is included the
general, as being antecedent. 10. In judicial causes, too, I
know not whether whatever comes under the question of
quality is not general: Milo killed Clodius: He was in the
Tight to kill a lier-in-wait : does not this question arise,
Whether it be right to kill a lier-in-wait 2 In conjectural
matters, also, are not these questions general,t was hatred,
or covetousness, the cause of the crime 7 Ought we to trust to
evidence ea tracted by torture ? Ought greater credit to be
given to witnesses or to arguments : As to definitions, it is
certain that everything comprehended in them is expressed
generally. -
11. Some think that those questions which are limited to
particular persons and causes may sometimes be called theses,
if only put in a different way; so that, when Orestes is ac-
cused, it is a cause, but when it is inquired whether Orestes
was justly acquitted, it is a thesis; of which Sort also is the
question whether Cato was right in giving Marcia to Horten
sius & These writers distinguish a thesis from a cause by
* II. 4, 24, 25.
f The principal question and status in conjectural causes, or those
Concerning matters of fact, can scarcely contain anything general, but
the particular arguments, which are brought to support it, are commonly
treated 68tukùg, like theses, or general questions. Turnebus.
186 QUINTILIAN. [B.III.
saying that a thesis has respect to what is theoretical, a cause
to what is actually done ; since, in regard to a thesis, we dis-
pute only with a view to abstract truth, in a cause we consider
some particular act. -
12. Some, however, think that the consideration of general
questions is useless to an orator, as it is of no profit for it to
be proved, they say, that we ought to marry, or that we should
take part in the government of the state, if we are hindered
from doing so by age or ill-health. But we cannot make the
same objection to all questions of the kind; as, for example,
to these : whether virtue is the chief good, and whether the
world is governed by divine providence. 13. Moreover, in
inquiries that relate to an individual, though it is not enough
to consider the general question, yet we cannot arrive at the
decision of the particular point without discussing the general
question first. For how will Cato consider whether he himself
ought to marry, unless it be first settled whether men ought to
marry at all ? Or how will it be inquired whether Cato ought
to marry Marcia, if it be not previously decided whether Cato
ought to take a wife 2 14. Yet there are books in circulation
under the name of Hermagoras, which support the opinion
that I am opposing; whether it be that the title is fictitious,
or whether it were another Hermagoras that wrote them ; for
how can they be the productions of the same Hermagoras who
wrote so much and so admirably on this art, when, as is
evident, even from Cicero’s first book on rhetoric,” he divided
the subject-matter of oratory into theses and causes 7 a division
which Cicero himself condemns, contending that the thesis is
no concern of the orator's, and referring this kind of question
wholly to the philosophers. 15. But Cicero has relieved me
from all shame at differing with him, as he not only censurest
those books himself, but also, in his Orator, in the books
which he wrote De Oratore, $ and in his Topica, directs us
to abstract the discussion from particular persons and oc-
casions, because we can speak more fully on what is general
than what is special, and because whatever is proved uni-
* De Invent. i. 6. Compare Quint. ii. 21, 21.
+ See Quint. ii. 15, 6.
j. C. 14.
§ III. 30.
|| C. 21.
CH. v.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 187
versally must also be proved particularly. 16. As to the
state of the question, it is the same with regard to every kind
of thesis as with regard to causes. To this is added that there
are some questions that concern matters absolutely, and others
that refer to something particular; of the former kind is
whether a man ought to marry; of the latter, whether an old
man ought to marry ; of the former kind, is whether a man be
brave ; of the latter, whether he be braver than another man.
17. Apollodorus, to adopt the translation of his disciple
Valgius,” defines a cause thus: The cause is the matter having
regard in all its parts to the question ; or, the cause is the
matter of which the question is the object. He then gives this
definition of the matter: The matter is the combination of per-
sons, places, times, motives, means, incidents, acts, instruments,
sayings, things written and not written. 18. For my part, I
here understand by the cause what the Greeks call Vºráðssig, by
the matter what they term "ragforczog. But some writers have
defined the cause itself in the same way as, Apollodorus de-
fines the matter. Isocrates says that a cause is a definite
Question relating to civil affairs, or a disputed point between a
definite number of persons. Cicerot speaks of it in these words:
A cause is determined by reference to certain persons, places,
times, actions, and events, depending for decision either on all
or the majority of them.
* See iii. 1, 18.
f Topic, c. 21, init.
188 QUINTILIAN, [B.III.
CHAPTER VI.
Of the status or state of a cause, $ 1–4. What it is, 5–12. From
whom the state proceeds, the accuser or defendant, 13–21. How
many states there are ; the ten categories of Aristotle, 22–24.
Others make nine, others seven, 25–28. As to the number of
states, some make one only, 29, 30. Others two, as Archidemus,
Pamphilus, Apollodorus, Theodorus, Posidonius, Cornelius Celsus,
31–38. Another mode of making two states, 40–43. Most
authors make three, as Cicero, Patrocles, Marcus Antonius,
Virginius, 44–46. Athenaeus, Caecilius, and Theon make four,
45–48. The quadripartite methods of Aristotle and Cicero, 49,
50. Some have made five, six, seven, eight States, 51—54. Dis-
tinction of status rationales, quaestiones legales, 55–57. Cicero
speaks of a status negotialis, 58, 59. Hermagoras first introduced
eacception, 60. Legal questions; Albutius, 61, 62. Quintilian
departs in some degree from the method which he formerly
adopted, 63–67. His opinion of eacception ; remarks upon it,
68–79. In every cause there are three points to be ascertained,
80–82. A fourfold division, useful to learners, 83–85. These
four points included under two genera, the rationale and the
legale, 86, 87. Resemblances in the genus legale spring from the
three points above-mentioned, 88–90. In every simple cause
there is but one state, 91–93. In complex causes there are
several states, either of the same or of different kinds; examples,
94—104.
1. SINCE every cause, therefore, is comprehended in some
state,” I think that before I proceed to specify how the several
kinds of causes are to be managed, I must consider that ques-
tion which has reference to all of them alike, what is a state 2
as well as whence it is drawn,t and how many and what kinds
of states there are 2 Some have been of opinion, however, that
all these questions concern only judicial matters; but, when I
* I was very much in doubt, for some time, what English word I
should adopt for status, or otáouc, but being able to find no English
word exactly equivalent to it, I thought it best, on the whole, to take
the derivative from it, State, which, whenever it is used for status in
this chapter, I shall print in italics. The exact meaning of it the
learner will perhaps best understand from sect. 6, where it is said to
be, not the question itself, but the genus quaestionis, or “nature of the
question.” See also sections 9, and 73–76. The “status,” says
Turnebus, “is that in quo stet mitaturque causa quasi cardine aliquo.”
The English words “ground” or “position” would express it in many
cases, but not satisfactorily in all. Gedoyn was obliged to take the
French word átat.
ºf Whether from the accuser or defendant. See sect. 13–22.
CH. VI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 189
have treated of all the three kinds of oratory, the result will,
make their ignorance apparent. 2. What I call the state,
some term the settlement ;* others the question ; others that
which appears from the question; and Theodorus styles it the
general head, zapáXoloy yewizºrorov, to which everything else
is referred. But though the names are different, the meaning
is the same ; nor is it of any consequence to learners by what
term anything is distinguished, so that the thing itself be
clear. 3. The Greeks call the state gºrgotg: a name which
they think was not first given it by Hermagoras, but, as some
suppose, by Naucratis, f a disciple of Isocrates, or, as others
imagine, by Zopyrus ; of Clazomenae; though even Æschines
appears to use the term in his oration against Ctesiphom Š
when he intreats the judges not to allow Demosthenes to
wander from the subject, but to oblige him to speak directly.
to the state of the case. 4. The name is said to be derived
either from the fact that in it lies the commencement of con-
troversy in the cause, or that the cause rests on it. -
Such is the origin of its name; let us now consider what it
is. Some have defined the state to be the first conflict of
questions, who, I think, have conceived rightly, but have not
expressed themselves with sufficient judgment. 5. For the
state is not the first conflict; You have done, I have not done,
but that which results from the first conflict, that is, the
nature of the question, you have done; I have not done;
has he done 7 You have done this ; I have not done this ;
what has he done 7 But as it appears from these examples,
that the first sort of question depends on conjecture, the
other on definition, and as it is on these points that each
side will insist, the question will be one either of a conjectural.
or of definitive state. 6. Supposing a person should say, sound
is the concussion of two bodies, he would be in the wrong, I
* Constitutionem.] This term is used by Cicero de Inv. i. 8; Script.
ad Fferenn. i. 11. Who used the other terms, I have not discovered.
Spalding.
+ See Dionys. Halicarn. in Arte, 39, vol. ii. Cicero de Orat. ii. 23;
iii. 44; Orat. c. 51. “His funeral orations, especially those on Mau-
solus, king of Caria, are mentioned by some writers.” Spalding. See
Suidas V. Isocrates and Theodectes, and A. Gellius, x. 68.
f Diog. Laert ix. 114.
§ Ed. Steph. p. 83 ; where, however, rääug is now found instead of
O'Taoug.
190 QUINTILIAN. [B.III.
think; for the sound is not the concussion, but the result of
the concussion. This is a mistake, however, of but trifling
consequence; for the meaning is understood in whatever way
it be expressed; but in regard to oratory, an error of vast im-
portance has arisen among students who have imperfectly,
understood their authors, and who, as they read the words
first conflict, thought that the state was always to be taken
from the first question; a supposition which is altogether un-
founded. 7. For there is no question that has not its state;
since there is none that is not founded on assertion and de-
nial; but some questions form an integral part of causes, and
on these a decision must be pronounced ; while others are
introduced from without, contributing something, however,
like auxiliaries, to the general strength of the cause ; and it
then happens that there are said to be several questions in the
same suit. 8. Of these the least important often occupies
the first place; for it is a common artifice among us to aban-
don those points in which we have least trust, after they have
been dwelt upon, sometimes conceding them as it were, of our
own accord, to the opposite side, and sometimes contenting
ourselves with making an ascent from them to stronger
grounds of argument.
9. A simple cause, though it may be defended in various
ways, cannot contain more than one point on which a decision
is to be pronounced; and hence the state of the cause will be
that which the pleader regards as the chief object to be gained,
and the judge as the chief object of attention; for it is on this
that the cause will take its stand. 10. But of questions there
may be different states;* since, to make this plain by a very
short example, when the accused says, Even if I did it, I was
right in doing it, he makes the state that of quality; but when
he adds, but I did not do it, he makes it that of conjecture.
But the defence, I have not done it, is always the stronger;
and therefore I shall consider the state as lying in that argu-
ment which I should use if I were not allowed to use more
than one. 11. We therefore rightly say the first conflict of causes,
not of questions. Cicero, in pleading for Rabirius Postumus,
makes it his object, in the first part of his speech, to show
that the charge could not be brought against a Roman knight;t
* Comp. sect. 21. -
+ The first part extends to the end of c. 7. Cicero maintains that
CH. VI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 191
and, in the latter part, he asserts that no money came into his
client's hands; but I should say that the state lies in that
which is the stronger point. 12. Nor, in his speech for Milo,
should I consider that the struggle in the cause” commences
with those early questions which are introduced immediately
after the exordium," but where he proceeds to prove, with his
whole strength, that Clodius was a lier-in-wait, and was there-
fore justly put to death. And that which an orator ought to
settle in his mind before everything else, even though he pur-
pose to offer many arguments in support of his cause, is what
he would wish to be most apparent to the judge. But though
this is the first thing to be considered, it does not follow that
it will be the first to be stated.
13. Others have thought that the state is the first point of
opposition offered by the party against whom you are pleading;
an opinion which Cicero; expressed in the following words:
On which the defence first takes its stand, as if ready to grapple
with the opponent to overthrow him. Hence, again, rises
another question, whether he who replies always determines
the state. To this motion Cornelius Celsus is eminently
opposed, saying the state does not arise from him who denies,
but from him who supports his own assertion ; as, for instance,
if an accused person denies that a man has been killed, the
state would come from the accuser, because he would proceed
to prove what he had affirmed; if the accused should say that
the man was lawfully killed, the state would come from him,
and the affirmation be on his side, the burden of proof being
transferred from one party to the other. 14. With that writer
I do not agree; for what is said in contradiction to him is
nearer the truth, that there is no point of dispute if the party
with whom you are going to law makes no reply, and that
accordingly the state proceeds from the respondent. 15. In
my own opinion, however, the case happens sometimes one
way and sometimes another, varying according to the nature
of the cause; because the affirmation may be thought some-
by the Julian law de repetundis an action could not be brought against
a Roman knight who had held no office. Spalding.
* Confliaisse causam.] Francius would read constitisse.
+ All the manuscripts have amte prooemium, which Spalding retains
in his text, but rightly condemns as absurd in his notes. Capperonier
and many others read post procemium with Aldus.
# Topic. c. 25 imit.
192 QUINTILIAN. [B. III.
times to determine the state, as in conjectural causes; for it is
rather the plaintiff that uses conjecture; (some, moved by this
consideration, have said that the state proceeding from
the defendant is a negative state ;) and in a syllogism”
the whole of the reasoning proceeds from him who affirms.
16. But because he who denies appears in those casest also
to lay upon the opposite party the necessity of determining the
state, (for if he says, I have not done the deed, he will
oblige his opponent to use conjecture, and if he says My
opponent has not the law on his side, he will compel him to
have recourse to the syllogism,) let us grant that the state
proceeds from the defendant. Nevertheless, however, the
matter will come to the same thing, that sometimes the
plaintiff will determine the state, and sometimes the defendant.
17. For let this be the assertion of the accuser, You have
killed a man, if the accused deny the charge, it is the accused
that will determine the state ; but if he admits the truth of it,
but says that the man was an adulterer, and was lawfully
Killed, (and it is certain that there is a law which gives per-
mission to kill an adulterer,) then, unless the accuser makes
some reply, there will be no case. But if the accuser rejoins,
He was not an adulterer, refutation then commences on the
part of the accuser, and it is he that will determine the state;
which will thus indeed have its origin in the first denial, but
that denial will be made by the accuser, not by the accused.
18. It may happen, too, that the same question may make the
Same person either accuser or accused ; for instance, the law
says, “Let not him who has exercised the profession of an
actor sit in the first fourteen rows of seats;” but a man who
had appeared as an actor before the praetor in his garden, but
had not exhibited himself on the public stage, seated himself
* A syllogism is a status legalis, in which we bring under the meaning
of the written law something which is not actually included in the
expressed letter of the law. It is so called because a syllogism is used,
in which the law is given in the major proposition, and the minor the
act to be brought under the signification of the law. Turnebus.
Quintilian furnishes an example in b. vii. c. 9 : if a man had killed his
mother, his accuser might use the syllogism against him in this way :
“The law says, that he who kills his father is to be sewn up in a sack,
&c.; you have been guilty of an equally great crime by killing your
mother; therefore, &c.” Capperonier. See Hermogenes, Trºpi Gráoewy,
p. 16 ; Cicero de Inv. i. 13; ii. 50 ; Script. ad Herenn. i. 13. Spalding.
ºf Illic.] In conjecturalibus causis et in syllogismo. Spalding.
CH. VI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 193
on one of those fourteen rows;* 19. the charge then brought
against him is, You have exercised the profession of an actor,
the denial is, I have not exercised it, and the question, What
it is to eacercise the profession of an actor # If he be accused
under the law respecting the theatre, the denial will proceed
from the accused; but if he be expelled from the theatre, and
demand reparation for unjust expulsion, the denial will be on the
part of the accuser. 20. But that which is laid down by the
majority of writers+ will certainly be of more frequent occur-
I'êIl Cé.
Those have escaped these difficulties who have said that the
state is that which results from the affirmation and the denial;
as, You have done the deed, I have not done it, or I was right
in doing it. 21. Let us consider, however, whether that is the
state, or whether it is in that that the state lies. Hermagoras
calls that the state from which the matter in question is
understood, and to which also the proofs of each party are
directed as their object. My own opinion has always been, as
there are frequently different states of questions in a cause, to
regard that as the state of the cause which is the strongest
point in it, and on which the whole matter chiefly turns. If
any one profess to call this the general question, or the general
head, I shall not dispute with him on that point, (any more
than if he should invent yet another name by which the same
thing might be signified, although I know that many rhe-
toricians have devoted whole volumes to this discussion,) but
I am satisfied to let it be called the state. 22. As there is the
greatest dissension among writers, however, on all other
matters, so, in regard to this, there appears to me to have
been extraordinary eagerness to advance different opinions;
insomuch that it is neither agreed what number of states there
are, nor what are their names, nor which of them are general
and which special.
23. Aristotle, first of all, specifies ten elements, to which
* Which were assigned to the knights by the law of Lucius Otho
Roscius. Sic placuit vano, qui nos distinacit, Othoni. Spalding observes
that it would appear from Cicero, Philipp. ii. 18, that infames were
excluded from those fourteen rows; and actors were infamé8.
+ Namely, that the respondent makes the status. Compare sect. 13.
Spalding.
it The ten categories or predicaments of Aristotle: substance, quality,
quantity, relation, place, time, doing, Suffering, habit, position. .
O
194 QUINTILIAN. [B, III.
every possible question appears to have some reference: oãofo,
which Flavius calls essentia,” (nor indeed is there any other
Latin word for it,) and to which belongs the question “whether
a thing is;” quality, of which the signification is plain enough;
quantity, of which a twofold distinction has been made by later
writers, in reference to the questions “how great?” and “how
many ?”f relation to something, whence are drawn considera-
tions concerning “exception "; and “comparison;”$ 24.
next come where and when ; then doing, suffering, condition,
which has regard to a person’s “being armed " or “clothed;”
and last of all zejóð21, position, which is a comprehensive sort
of category, having reference to “sitting,” “standing,”
“lying.” But of all these, the first four only appear to
concern the states of causes; the rest seem to concern only
topics for argument. 25. Others| have specified nine
elements: person, in respect to which inquiry is made con-
cerning the mind, the body, and external circumstances; an
element which, I see, refers to the means of establishing
conjecture and quality; time, which the Greeks call ×góvog, in
regard to which arises, for example, the question “whether he
whom his mother brought forth when she was given up to her
creditors was born a slave?” place, in connection with which
* See ii. 14, 2.
f Quâm magnum et quâm multum.] The first denoting magnitude, of
which the parts are connected ; the second multitude, of which the
parts are unconnected. Twrºebus. .
f Translatio.] As an equivalent for this word, I have adopted
“exception,” not because I am satisfied with it, but because I cannot
find anything better. The Latins, besides translatio, called it eacceptio
judicii declimatoria, or sometimes praescriptio ; the Greeks pºsta Näslug
or trapayoapſ. Gedoyn has rendered it compétence, the question being
whether it is competent to a person who appears as an accuser, to bring
an action against the person whom he accuses, (as in the accusation
against Rabirius Postumus mentioned in sect. 11,) or to bring it at that
particular time, or in that particular manner. See sect. 52, 69, and 84–86.
§ Comparatio.] Comparatio among rhetoricians is generally a species
of qualitas or status juridicialis, in Greek ávttoragic, when the accused
person confesses that he has been guilty of a crime, but attempts to
show that the ill which he did was the cause of some greater good ;
Comp. vii. 4, 12; Cic ºro de Invent. i. 11; ii. 24. Spalding. -
| Who they are, I have not discovered. Spalding. This appears to
have been the opinion of Theodorus, who calls circumstances elements,
as we learn from Fortunatianus. Turnebws.
"I Dwm addicta est mater.] This question is settled by distinction;
for addicti are not properly servi, but were said esse in Servitute, or pro
servis, not servire servitutem. See vii. 3, 26–28; v. 10, 60. Burmann,
CH. VI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 195
arises such a question as “whether it was lawful to kill a
tyrant in a temple,” or “whether he who lay hid in his own
house underwent his term of exile;” 26. time in another Sense,
which the Greeks call zolgág, and which they would have to
mean a portion of time in a more general sense, as Summer,
or winter; under this falls the question about “the reveller
during a pestilence;”f act, or ºrg&äg, to which they refer the
question “whether a man did a thing knowingly or unknow-
ingly; from compulsion or by chance;” number, which may be
regarded as a species of quantity, as “whether thirty rewards
were due to Thrasybulus for having cut off thirty tyrants;”
27, cause, from which proceed many trials, as whenever a deed
is not denied, but defended, as having been done with justice ;
rgóTog, or manner, when what the law allowed to be done in One
way is said to have been done in another; hence arises the
question about “the adulterer scourged or starved to death;"|
and opportunity for action, which is too well understood to
need any explanation or example; the Greek term however is
&pogºol gyov. 28. These writers, like Aristotle, think that
no case can occur that does not connect itself with some of
these elements. Some take away two of them, number and
opportunity; and for what I called act substitute things, that
is, ºrg/yºro. These doctrines I have thought it sufficient
just to notice, that I might not be supposed to have purposely
omitted them. But I neither consider that states of causes
are properly determined by these categories, nor that all topics
for arguments are included in them; and this will be apparent
to those who read with attention what I am going to Say on
each of these heads; for there will be found to be many par-
ticulars that are not comprehended under these elements.
29. I have read in many authors that some rhetoricians are
i The question being whether his house could be called a place of
€X11é.
f Quintilian, by saying ille commissator, intimates that the subject
was well known, but I have found no allusion to it in any other writer
on rhetoric. Spalding.
# The question is, whether the mode of punishment was lawful.
That to kill an adulterer was permitted by law is agreed. Gesner
cites Bynkershoek's Observat. Jur. Rom. v. 8, p. 142, ed. Genev. 1761,
who says that it was lawful to scourge an adulterer, (referring to Val.
Max. vi. 1, 13,) but not to starve him to death, which was not an
infliction of sudden anger. Spalding.
Ś Locos.] Sc. argumentorum, as in c. 24.
O 2
196 QUINTILIAN. - [B. III.
of opinion that there is in reality but one state, namely, the
conjectural; but who the rhetoricians that held this opinion
were, those authors have not told us, nor have I been able
anywhere to discover. They are said, however, to have formed
their notions on this ground, that our knowledge of everything
is the result of indications.” But from similar reasoning they
might say that the only state is that of quality, as a question
may always arise about the quality or nature of anything about
which we speak. 30. From either mode the greatest con-
fusion will result; nor will it make any difference, indeed,
whether we admit one kind of state only, or none at all, if all
causes are of the same nature. Conjecture is derived from
conjicere, “to throw together,” that is, from making all our
reasonings converge towards truth; whence also interpreters
of dreams and omens are called conjectores, “ conjecturers.”
But this sort of state has received various names, as will
appear from what follows.
31. Some have made two kinds of states. Archidemus,f
for instance, admitted the conjectural and the definitive, ex-
cluding that of quality ; because he thought that we imagine
about quality thus: “What is unjust? what is iniquitous?
what is it to be disobedient 2" questions which he terms de
eodem et alio,S “about identity and difference.” 32. With
this opinion theirs is at variance who would make indeed
two kinds of state, but. One negative, and one juridical; the
negative is the same as that which we call the conjectural,
to which some have given the term negative absolutely, others
partially, because they considered that the accuser employs
conjecture, and the accused, denial. The juridical is that
which in Greek is called Ötzo.107.0/1zóg, “treating of right.”
33. But as quality is set aside by Archidemus, so by these
writers is rejected definition, which they make dependent on
* Signis.] See b. v. c. 3. But perhaps sigma is used in a rather
wider sense here than there, where he distinguishes ampsia from
Tepukňpta. Spalding.
† An eminent Stoic. , Arrian. Epict. iii. 2. He is called princeps
dialecticorum by Cicero, Quaest. Acad. iv. 57.
† He thought that we inquire about quality in such a way that we
always have at least recourse to definition. Spalding. -
§ IIspi Toi) attoi kai Toij Štěpov, Aristotle, Topic. i. 5, where the
question is about supporting or overthrowing a definition. Capperonier.
See sect. 37, 49; vii. 3, 8; Cic. Topic. c. 22; Partit. Or, c. 19.
CH, VI] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 197
the juridical state, and think that we must imagine “whether
it is right that what is charged against a person should be
called sacrilege,” for example, “ or theft, or madness.” 34.
Of this opinion was Pamphilus,” but he distinguished quality
into several kinds.
Many succeeding writers, altering only the names, have
divided states of causes into two kinds by saying that they are
either about something that is doubtful, or about something that
is certain ; for such indeed is the case; nor can it be other-
wise than either certain that a thing has been done, or uncer-
tain ; if it is uncertain, the state is conjectural ; if it is certain,
there is room for other kinds of states. 35. Indeed, Apollodorus
Says the same thing, when he observes that the question lies
either in things eaternal, by which conjecture is settled, or in
our own opinions ; calling the former sort of questions ºrgozy-
pºrizów, “practical,” the latter Tag äyyoto.g., “dependent on
iudgment.” Those also say the same who make the two kinds
of State, &T867.77"oy and T207,717+1zów, dubious and presumptive,
the latter meaning what is evident. 36. Theodorus, too,
expresses himself similarly, as he thinks that the question is
either as to whether a thing has happened, or as to particulars
relating to what is admitted to have happened, that is, Tagi
oùoſoºg zoºl ov/CaCazóToy. For in all these distinctions the first
kind of state belongs to conjecture, the second to other matters.
But these other matters Apollodorus makes to be two, quality
and de nomine, that is definition ; Theodorus four, eacistence,
guality, quantity, and relation. 37. There are some also who
make the question de eodem et alio, “about identity and differ-
ence,” belong sometimes to quality and sometimes to definition.
Posidonius, too, ranges states of causes under two heads,
words and things. With respect to a word, he thinks that the
* Mentioned by Aristotle, Rhet. ii. 23. Whether he is the same that
is mentioned by Quintilian xii. 10, 6, by Pliny in several places, and
by Cicero, de Orat. iii. 21, is, says Spalding, very uncertain.
+ As circumstances, indications, writings, evidence. In speaking of
things lying in opinions, he means that it Tests with the judges in
causes to determine whether any particular thing is to be called just
or unjust, &c. Twº'nebus.
# The first means that which we do not comprehend by any Tpó\m-
bug or conception of our own, and concerning which we are therefore
in doubt, until it is established by facts or proofs; the latter, that
which is settled in our minds, and consequently appears certain to us.
Spalding. -
198 QUINTILIAN. [B, III.
questions are, “Whether it has any meaning? what? how
many meanings? and how it has such meaning?” With
respect to things, he notices conjecture, which he calls xor'
cºcºngly, “assumption from perception,” quality, definition, x&P
#yyotozy, “rational induction,” and relation. Hence also comes
the distinction into things written and unwritten.* 38. Cor-
nelius Celsus himself, too, makes two general states : “Whether
a thing is,” and “ of what mature it is.” Under the first he
includes definition, because it is equally a question whether a
man who denies that he has stolen anything from a temple, or
who owns that he stole from it the money of a private indi-
vidual, is guilty of sacrilege.f Quality he divides into fact
and what is written ; to what is written he assigns four legal
questions,f setting aside earception ; Ś quantity and intention ||
he puts under conjecture." *
39. There is also another method of division into two states,
which tells us that a question must relate either to substance
or to quality; and that quality is considered either in its
most general sense, or with regard to particulars.” 40. To
substance belongs conjecture ; for inquiry may be made con-
cerning any thing “whether it has been, is, or will be;” and
* Questions as to the written letter of the law are quaestiones legales.
Questions as to other matters, not written, are decided by conjecture,
quality, and definition. Turnebus.
+ Because there is a denial, observes Turnebus, in both cases. In
the first case the accused denies that he took anything at all from the
the temple ; in the second, he denies that he took anything belonging
to the temple. See sect. 41 and 49. “This is an example much used
by other writers on rhetoric as well as Quintilian ; as by Hermogenes,
by the writer ad Herenn. i. 12, and by Aristotle.” Spalding.
:: Concerning writing and the intention of the writer; ambiguity ;
contradictory laws; and the syllogism. Capperonier.
§ See sect. 23.
| Mentis quaestionem.] That is, cilm quaeritur quo animo fecerit, when
it is inquired with what intent a person did a thing. Turnebus. See
Wll. Z.
* That is, under the status conjecturalis or quaestio de facto. Cappe-
I'Onlel”.
** Awt in summo genere consistere, aut in succedentibus.] Qualitas de
summo genere, or infinita, is when it is inquired what is the nature and
form of anything in general; but such questions are chiefly confined
to the philosophers, entering very rarely into legal discussions, though
sometimes into deliberative addresses. Turnebus. In succedentibus,
is “in Subalternis, ut aiunt, speciebus, generi summo subjectis.” Cap-
peronzer.
CH. VI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. I 99
sometimes concerning the intention of it; and this method is
better than their's who have named the conjectural state a state
of fact, as if inquiry could be made only concerning the past,
and concerning what has been done. 41. As to the considera-
tion of quality in its most general sense,” as “Whether that is
honourable which is everywhere commended,” it rarely occurs in
judicial proceedings; but with reference to particulars, ques-
tions arise either about some common term, as “Whether he
has committed sacrilege who has stolen a private person’s
money from a temple,” or about a name given to some par-
ticular act, when it is certain that an act has been done, and
there is no doubt what the act that has been done is. Under
this head are included all questions about what is honourable,
just, expedient. 42. In these states, too, are said to be com-
prehended others, because quantity is sometimes referred to
conjecture, as in the question, “Is the sun greater than the
earth 2° and sometimes to quality, as when it is asked, “What
degree of punishment or reward it is just that some particular
individual should receive ;” because, also, eacception f has
relation to quality, and definition is concerned with ea:-
ception ; ; 43. and because, moreover, contradictory laws, and
the ratiocinatory state,' that is, the syllogism, and questions
in general, regarding writings and the intention of the writer,
depend on considerations of equity ; (except that this last case
Sometimes admits of conjecture, as when we inquire what the
legislator meant;) but ambiguity must necessarily be explained
by conjecture, because, as it is plain that the words may be
understood in two ways, the question is solely about the in-
tention.
44. By a great number of writers there are recognised three ||
general states, a division which Cicero also adopts in his
* Qualitatis de summo genere.] See note on sect. 39; and vii. 4, 1.
* See sect. 38 and 11.
f As in the case of the person accused of sacrilege, sect. 38, who
will say to his accuser, translatione utens, “ you cannot proceed against
me for sacrilege, but only for simple theft;" and then arises a question
about the definition of sacrilege. Capperonier.
Ś That status legalis, in which we endeavour to make a law apply to
some case which is not included in the letter of it. See b. vii. c. 8.
Capperon?er. On the syllogism, see sect. 15.
| From sect. 31 he has been speaking of those who admit only two.
200 QUINTILIAN. [B. III.
Orator,” expressing his opinion that everything that can
become a subject of controversy or disputef is comprehended
in the questions Whether it is, what it is, and of what particu-
lar nature it is ; the names; are too well known to make it
necessary to mention them. Patrocles S is of the same
opinion. 45. Marcus Antonius || also made three states, as in
the following words: “The questions from which all pleadings
arise are but few : whether a thing has been done, or has not
been done;" whether it is right or wrong;” whether it is good
or bad.”ff But since that which we are said to have done
rightly, is understood in such a sense that we appear to have
acted, not merely in conformity with the law, but in accordance
with equity, those who have followed Antonius have been in-
clined to distinguish those states more exactly, and have in
consequence called them the conjectural, the legal, and the
juridical; a distinction which is approved by Virginius.j.
46. Of these they then made several species, so as to put
under the legal state definition, as well as other states which
have their name from what is written ; as that of contradictory
laws, which is called &vriyoº ſo. : that of writing and meaning or
intention, that is, x&r& £nºy zoºl 61&volc.) : that of gar&xºpug,S$
which we distinguish by different terms, as translative, trans-
sumptive, transpositive ; the syllogism, [] which we call the
ratiocinatory or collective state ; and that of ambiguity, which
is called in Greek &ºp1607.ſo, ; all which I have enumerated,
* C. Y.5. See also De Orat. i. 31 ; ii. 24 and 26.
+ Omnia quae in controversiam aut in contentiomem veniant.] By con-
troversia is properly meant genus oration's judiciale, opposed to Swastºriae,
as is evident from b. vii. c. 2, and from Cicero de Orat. ii. 24. . . . The
word contentio probably alludes to the philosophiae contentiones, which
Cicero, de Orat. ii. 24 and 26, calls sometimes disputationes, and some-
times disceptationes. Capperonier.
f The first is the status conjecturalis ; the second the Status defini-
tivus ; and the third qualitas. Capperonier.
§ II. 15, 16.
| In that book, I suppose, which he left unfinished. See c. i. Sect.
19. Twrºvebus.
"I Status conjecturalis, or quaestio de facto. Capperonier.
** Status legalis, or descripto. Capperonier.
++ Status qualitatis. Capperonier.
†† See c. i. sect. 19.
§§ See sect. 23.
|| See sect. 15.
CH. VI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 201
because they are called states by most writers, though some
would prefer that they should be called legal questions.
47. Athenæus has made four states, the Tgorgsºrrix} or ºrogog.
&nrix} 07&ots, that is, the eachortative, which belongs properly
to the Suasory; the ovyrexix), by which it appears from what
follows, rather than from the name itself, that the con-
jectural is signified; the tºrcºcºrix}, (which is the definitive,)
for it consists in a change of terms;* and the juridical, which
he distinguishes by the same Greek namef as other writers.
For there is, as Isaid, great variation as to names. 48. There
are Some who think the tºrcº A&zrix} grâqug is the eacceptional, Š
looking to the motion of change contained in the name.
Others, as Caecilius and Theon, have made the same number of
states, but of a different kind: Whether a thing is # what it is ?
of what species it is ? how great it is # 49. Aristotle in his
Rhetoric | [divides the whole matter into three parts: What
is true, what is to be sought or avoided, (which belongs to the
deliberative department of Oratory,) and the consideration de
eodem atque alio, “about identity and difference;” but, by
division, he arrives at such a conclusion that he thinks we
must examine, as to any thing, whether it is, of what nature
it is, how great it is, and of what parts it consists." In one
place, however, he notices the force of definition, where he
says that some charges are thus met: “I have taken, but I
have not stolen; I struck, but I did nothing wrong.” 50. Cicero
also in his books of rhetoric ** had enumerated four states re-
garding fact, name, kind, and action ; so that conjecture should
refer to fact, definition to name, quality to kind, and right
* Because the name, which is given to the charge by the accuser, is
changed by the defendant, and another put in its place ; as, “I grant
that it is theft ; I deny that it is sacrilege.” Turnebus.
f Aucatoxoyukij.
: C, 22.
§ Because, in eacceptions, we change either the judge, or the prose-
cutor, or the time, or the mode of proceeding : intra)\\árrºw, “to
change.” Twºrnebws.
| Spalding observes that is scarcely possible to find any passage in
Aristotle's Rhetoric to which Quintilian can be thought to refer. He
then proposes to omit the original of the words which I have included
in brackets, and refers for what follows to Arist. Rhet. iii. 17, 1, and i.
13, 9.
* Quâm multum.] Quantitas discreta. Capperonier. See sect. 23.
** De Inv. i. 8.
202 QUINTILIAN. [B, III.
to action. Under right he had included eaception. But in
another place” he treats legal questionsh as species of actions.j:
51. Some writers on rhetoric have made five states, those of
conjecture, definition, quality, quantity, and relation. Theo-
dorus also, as I remarked, $ adopts the same number of general
heads, whether a thing is, what it is, of what species it is, how
great it is, and to what it has reference. The last he regards as
having most concern with comparison, since better and worse,
greater and less, are terms that have no meaning unless they
refer to something. 52. But relation, as I observed before, |
affects questions of legal right, such as, “Has this man a right
to go to law 2° or “Is it fit that such a person should do such
a thing?” or “May he proceed against a particular person,” or
“at a particular time,” or “in a particular manner ?” for all
such inquiries must have reference to something.
53. Others think that there are six states : conjecture, which
they call yáygoug:"I quality, peculiarity, that is, ióſórng a term in
which definition is implied; quantity, which they call &#1& ;**
comparison ; eacception, for which, also, a new name, agrá-
grozoig, has been found ; new, I mean, as applied to state, for
it had been previously used by Hermagoras in a different way,
to denote one of the various sorts of juridical questions.
54. Others have been of opinion that there are seven ; by
whom neither exception, nor quantity, nor comparison were
admitted; but, in the place of those three, were substituted
fourti sorts of legal questions, and added to the threej states
to be determined by reasoning.
55. Others have gone so far as to make eight, adding
earception to the other seven.
* Partit. Orat. c. 31 and 38.
ºf Those noticed in sect. 46.
# Species actionis.] Actionem paullo latius accipimus, ut jus agendi
significet et legis actionem. Turnebus.
$ Sect. 36. . -
| See sect. 23. We must read incidit, not incidumt, as Capperonier
and Spalding observe. +
*I Because the question in it is respecting the origin or cause ; as
whether a thing was done, and by whom. Turnebw8. -
** Because it relates to quantity to show the worthiness or wmworthi-
'ness, the sufficiency or insufficiency, of a thing. Thºrnebus. -
†† The four mentioned in sect. 46 : scripti et voluntatis ; ambiguity;
legwm contrariarum syllogism.
j: Conjecture; definition ; quality.
CH. VI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 203
By some writers another distinction has been introduced,
that of giving the name of “states” only to the status rationales,
and calling the status legales, as I said” before, “questions;”
as in the former the question is about fact, in the latter about
the written letter. Others, on the contrary, have preferred that
the status legales should be called “states,” and the status
rationales “questions.” 56. But others have thought that there
are only three status rationales, whether a thing is, what it is,
and of what kind it is ; Hermagoras is the only one who has
made four, conjecture, peculiarity, exception, quality, to
which latter he applies the expression, zoºr& ovuòsſºnzáro,
“according to accidents,”f adding as an explanation, “whether
it happen to a person to be good or bad.j: 57. Quality he then
distinguishes into four species, as relating to things to be sought
or avoided, which fall under the deliberative department of
oratory; to persons, to whom the panegyrical kind applies; to
things in general, a department which he calls Tgoyularizá, and
in which the question is about things themselves, without any
reference to persons, as “whether he is free who is under trial.
about his liberty; $ whether riches beget pride; whether a
thing is just or good;” and to judicial questions, in which
similar inquiries are made, but with regard to certain definite
persons; as, “whether a certain person acted justly or well in a
particular transaction ?” 58. Nor am I ignorant that in the first
book of Ciceroſ on Rhetoric there is another explanation of the
part relating to things in general, as it is there said that “it is
the department in which it is considered what is right accord-
ing to civil usage and according to equity; a department with
which lawyers are thought by us to be specially concerned.”
59. But what the judgment of Cicero himself was respecting
* Sect. 46, fin.
+ See Aquila Romanus, in Ruhnk. ed. Leips, p. 155 : Status quem.
qualitatis aut eac accidenti appellant Secundum. Hermagoram. Spalding.
j: Regardant, sans doute, le vice et la vertu comme des qualités
accidentelles. Gedoym's version.
§ Qui est in assertione..] On which subject a law was made by Marcus
Antoninus, as we learn from Lampridius, c. 9. Pinus. Assertio is a
trial about the liberty of any person ; as, when a free man was called
to judgment with the object of making him a slave ; ut in Servitutem
assereretur. This was termed causa liberalis. Turnebus. The phrase
asserere in servitutem occurs twice in Livy.
|| De Inv. i. 11.
204 QUINTILIAN. [B.III.
these books, I have already mentioned;* for into their pages
were thrown the various portions of knowledge which he had
brought from the school when a young man, f and if there is
any fault in them, it is that of his instructor ; ; whether he was
moved by the circumstance that Hermagoras places first under
this head examples from questions of right, or by the considera-
tion that the Greeks call interpreters of the law ºrgayºcarizoſ.
60. Cicero, however, substituted for these books his excellent
dialogues de Oratore, and, therefore, is not to be blamed as if he
had delivered erroneous precepts.
I return to Hermagoras. He was the first of all rhetoricians
that made eacception a distinct state, $ though some advances
towards it, but not under that name, are found in Aristotle.|
61. As to legal questions, he has specified these four: that
which relates to what is written and what is intended, (which
he designates by the phrase zoºr& £nry zoºl Urašaigeoty, that is,
“the expression and the exception,” the former of which terms
is common to him with all other writers, the latter, “ex-
ception,” has been less used,) that which is ratiocinatory or
dependent on reasoning, that of ambiguity, and that which
concerns contradictory laws. 62. Albutius," adopting the
same division, withdraws eacception, putting it under the
juridical department. In legal questions also he thinks that
there is no state which is properly called ratiocinatory.
I am aware that those who shall read the ancient writers
* C. V. sect. 15.
+ Swnt enim regesta in hos commentarios, quos adolescens dedua erat,
schola..] Burmann observes that scholas, if the text be correct, is to be
taken in the sense of disputationes, but would rather read Swnt enºm.
welut res digestab in hos commentarios, quos adolescens deduo'erat Scholá;
which differs very little from the reading of Stephens's edition, adopted
by Capperonier, Swnt enim velut res regestcº in hos commentarios, quas
adolescens dedualerat Scholá. Compare Cic. Tusc. Quæst. i. 4, and
Quint. ii. 11, 7. -
† Tradentis est.] Who he was, we do not know. Spalding. -
§ Cic. De Inv. i. 11 : Hujus constitutionis [translativae] Hermagoras
inventor esse eacistimatur.
| Capperonier refers to Rhet. ii. 15, 8.
* Albutius differs from Hermagoras, in removing exception from
the quaestiones rationales, and putting it under the quaestiones legales,
including it in quality ; while from the legales quaestiones he excludes
ratiocinatio as superfluous. This also Cicero appears to do in his De
Orat. b. ii. and Part. Orat. Twºmebus.
CH.VI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 205
with attention will find still more states; but I am afraid that
what I have said on this subject has exceeded due bounds.
63. For myself, I confess that I am now inclined towards
an opinion somewhat different from that which I formerly
held; and perhaps it would be safest for me, if I regarded
only my own reputation, to make no change in that which
for many years I have not only thought but have sanctioned
with my approbation. 64. But I cannot endure to be guilty
of dissimulation in any point on which I give judgment,
especially in a work which I am composing with a view to
being of some profit to well-disposed young men; for Hippo-
crates,” so celebrated in the art of medicine, is thought to have
acted most honourably in acknowledging some mistakes that he
had made, in order to prevent posterity from erring with him.
Cicero,if too, did not hesitate to condemn some of his published
works and others which he wrote afterwards, as his Catullus
and Lucullus, and those books on Rhetoric to which I just now
alluded. 65. For longer perseverance in study would be
superfluous, if we were not at liberty to find out something
Jetter than what was advanced before. Nothing however of
what I then taught was useless, for what I shall now teach will
recur to the same principles, so that no one will repent of
having learned from me. All I intend to do, is to re-produce
the same materials, and to arrange them with somewhat better
effect. But I wish every One to be satisfied that I com-
municate new light to others as soon as I have gained it
myself. - -
66. According to the system of most authors, then, I ad-
hered to three ratiocinatory states, those of conjecture, quality,
* Hippocrates, as he was dressing the wound of a man who had
been struck with a stone on the head, found that he had been deceived
with regard to the sutures of the skull, and confessed his mistake.
This is mentioned to his honour by Celsus, viii. 4, who contrasts his
noble-mindedness with the meanness of little men, who, quéd nihil
habent, nihil Sibi detrahºwnt. See Hippoc. Epid. v. 14.
+ See Cicero, Ep. ad Attic. xiii. 12, 13, 16, 19. Having at first
composed the Disputationes Academicº in two books, giving the first
the title of Lucullus and the second that of Catullus, he afterwards
produced another edition in four books, in which he made Varro the
chief character. Of the second edition, only the first book has
descended to us; of the first edition, the second book, entitled
Lucullus, is extant. The rest is lost. Spalding.
206 QUINTILIAN. [B.III.
and definition, and one legal.” These were my general states.
The legal I divided into five species, those relating to writing
and intention, contradictory laws, induction,t ambiguity, and
eaception. 67. I now see that the fourthf of the general
states may be withdrawn from them; for the primary division is
sufficient, by which I pronounced $ some states to be ratioci-
natory, others legal ; thus the fourth will not be a state, but a
species of question; otherwise it would be a ratiocinatory state.
68. From those also, which I called sp cies, I withdrew ea:-
ception; having frequently indeed observed, (as all who listened
to my instructions can remember,) and having asserted even
in those lectures which were published without my consent,
(but in which I however included this remark,) that the state
of eacception can scarcely be found in any cause so evidently
that some other may not seem to be rightly named in that
cause instead of it; and that in consequence that state had
by some writers been wholly set aside. 69. Yet I am not
ignorant that many cases are treated under this state of ea:-
ception, as in almost all causes in which a person is said to
have failed from irregularity in for ‘I, such questions as these
arise : “Whether it was lawful for such a person to bring an
action at all, or against some other particular person, or before
some particular judge, or at some particular time,” and what-
ever other similar questions may be asked. 70. But persons,
times, suits, and other matters, are considered under the state
of exception for some pre-existent cause; SO that the ques-
tion lies, not in the state of eacception itself, but in the cause
for which recourse is had of the state of eaception. “You
* See c. v. sect. 4.
+ Collectivum statum. The same as the syllogismus. Compare
sect. 46.
† Quintilian justly blames his own division, for it was a division
into three species and one genus ; all the members of it were, therefore,
not of the same order. Capperonier.
, Ś The status legalis.
|| See the Proëm, c. 7.
* Cecidisse formuld..] It was customary among the Romans, that if
any one brought an action irregularly, or demanded anything more
than he was justified in demanding, he lost his cause, and was said
either formula cadere or caust, cadere; and thus in these cases they
were obliged to have recourse to eacception. Turnebus. See Torrent.
ad Suet. Claud. c. 14. Capperonier. See sect. 52; and Cicero de Inv.
i. 8.
CH. VI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. Q07
ought not to seek restitution of this deposit before the praetor, but
before the consuls; for the sum is too great to come under the
cognizance of the praetor;” the question then is, “whether the
sum is too great for the praetor's cognizance;” and this is a
question as to fact. 71. “It is not lawful for you to proceed
against me, for you could not become agent for the opposite
party;” here the question for judgment is, “whether he could
become agent.” “You ought not to have proceeded by inter-
dict, but to have made a demand;” the matter in doubt is,
“whether the proceeding by interdict was right.” 72. All
these points come under the head of legal questions. Do not
prescriptions,” also, (even those in which eaception appears
most manifest,) lead to the same sorts of questions as those
laws under which the action is brought, so that the inquiry will
be either about the name of an act, about what is written and
the intent of the writer, or about something to be settled by
argument. The state then springs from the question ; the
state of exception does not embrace the point for which the
pleader contends, but the question because of which he con-
tends,f 73. This will be made plainer by an example: “You
have killed a man; I have not killed him ;” the question is
“whether the accused did kill the man,” the state is the con-
jectural. The following case is different: “I have a right to
proceed against you; you have not ;” when the question will
be, “whether he has a right,” and hence the state; for whether
he be allowed to have a right or not, belongs to the event, not
to the cause, and to that which the judge may decide, not to
that because of which he may give such decision. 74. This is
similar to it: “You deserve to be punished; I do not deserve
to be punished;” the judge will see whether he does deserve
to be punished; but here there will not be either question or
state; where then 2 “You deserve to be punished, for you
have killed a man; I have not killed a man: ” here then is a
question “whether he did kill a man?” “I ought to be
honoured ; you ought not ; ” is there here any state 7 I think
not. “I ought to be honoured, for I have killed a tyrant; you
* Praescriptiones.] Compare b. vii, c. 5. They are the eacceptiones of
the Jurisconsulti, as Lexicons will show ; in Greek trapaypapai.
Spalding. See sect. 23.
+ As whether a man has committed Sacrilege or simple theft.
# Compare sect. 70.
Ś Vulgó, quaestio de facto. Capperonier.
208 QUINTILIAN. [B.III.
have not killed a tyrant;” here there is both question and
state.* 75. In like manner, “You have no right to proceed
against me; I have a right,” has no state ; where is it then 2
“You have no right to proceed against me, because you are
infamous ;” here the question is “whether he is infamous,” or
“whether an infamous man has a right to proceed against
another :” and here are both questions and states.f. The kind
of cause: is therefore exceptional, like the comparative, and
that of recrimination.
76. But, you will say, “I have a right; you have not,” is
similar to “you have killed; I did right in killing;” I do not
deny that it is so; but this does not make a state; for these
are not propositions, (if they were, the cause would receive no
explanation from them,) as propositions must be accompanied
with reasons. “Horatius committed a crime, for he killed his
sister; he committed no crime, for he had a right to kill her
who mourned at the death of an enemy;” the question here
will be, “whether this was a sufficient reason for killing her;”
and thus the state will be that of quality. 77. In like manner
with regard to exception : “You have no right to disin-
herit ś your son, for an infamous person is not allowed to
engage in any legal process; I have a right, for disinheriting
is not a legal process;” the question is, “what is a legal pro-
cess 2" here we shall use definition ;|| “you are not allowed to
disinherit;” here will be the syllogism." The case will be
similar with regard to all matters concerning the ratiocinatory
and legal states. 78. I am not unaware, however, that some
have included exception under the ratiocinatory kind of
states, in this way: “I have killed a man, but by order of the
emperor;” “I gave up the offerings in the temple to a tyrant,
but he compelled me to do so;” “I quitted my post, but
through being harassed by bad weather, floods, ill-health;”
* Status conjecturalis, or fact quaestio. Capperonier.
† Of two kinds; first, the status conjecturalis or definitivus, whether
the man was really infamous; secondly, the status qualitatis, whether
an infamous person has the right of going to law. Capperonier.
f Genus causae, not status; see sect. 67; also iii. 10, iii. 4, respecting
the genus comparativum and mutua accusatio. Also vii, 2, 9, and 22;
vii. 4, 12. Spalding.
§ A father could not disinherit his son without taking him before
the judges, and proving his unworthiness by a regular legal process.
| Finiemus.] Erit status definitivus. Capperonier.
* That is, the status called syllogismus. See sect. 16. Capperonier.
CH. VI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR 209
that is, it was not my fault, but the fault of those circum-
stances. 79. From these authors I differ still more widely;” for
it is not the act that is brought under the exceptional state,
but the cause of the act, as happens indeed in almost every
defence; and besides, he who adopts such a mode of defence,
does not depart from the state of quality, f for he says that he
himself is free from blame; so that two kinds of quality; are
rather to be distinguished; one, by which the act and the
accused party, the other, by which the accused only, is de-
fended.S
80. We must therefore adhere to those writers whose au-
thority Ciceroſ has followed, and who say that there are three
points about which there is a question in every cause ; whether
a thing is," what it is,** and of what species it is ;ff a distinc-
tion which even nature herself teaches us; for there must first
of all be something which is the object of the question ; con-
cerning which it certainly cannot be determined what and of
what species it is, until it be settled that it really exists; and
this, therefore, is the first question. 81. But as to that which
is proved to exist, it does not immediately appear what it is.
When this point is also decided, there remains, last of all, the
quality; and, when all these particulars are settled, nothing
further is left.
82. Under these heads are contained indefinitej and de-
finite|| questions; some of these heads are considered in what-
ever kind of matter we discuss, whether demonstrative, de-
liberative, or 'udicial; and they comprise also suits at law,
* Liberiºs.] Than from those to whom he alludes in sect. 66.
+ A formá qualitatis. That is, from the status qualitatis assumptionis,
which the Greeks call pietào Taguc, and the Latins remotio criminis, or
sometimes purgatio. Capperonier.
t Quality is twofold; absolute, when we contend that a deed is in
itself just and right ; assumptive or presumptive, when we attempt to
palliate, by assumed arguments, that which we cannot prove to be
right in itself, and to show that the agent is not to be blamed.
Twrºvebºws.
§ When we throw the blame upon circumstances, as in sect. 78.
| Compare sect. 44. Spalding.
*I Status conjecturalis.
** Status definitivus.
ft Status qualitatis.
if Theses, or general questions.
§§ Referring to certain times, places, circumstances.
Q10 QUINTILIAN. 3. “, [B, III.
whether regarded with reference to ratiocinatory or to legal
questions; for there is no legal dispute which is not to be
resolved by the aid of definition, consideration of quality, or
conjecture. 83. But to those who are instructing the igno-
rant, a plan more extended at first, and a road, if not marked
out by the straightest possible line, yet more easy and open,
will not be without advantage. Let students learn, therefore,
before all, that there are four modes of proceeding in every
cause ; which four modes he who is going to plead ought to
make it his first business to consider. For, to begin first of
all with the defendant, by far the strongest mode of defence is,
if the charge which is made can be denied;* the next, if an act
of the kind charged against the accused can be said not to have
been done ;t the third, and most honourable, if what is done is
proved to have been justly done. If we cannot command
these methods, the last and only mode of defence is that of
eluding an accusation, which can neither be denied nor com-
bated, by the aid of Some point of law, so as make it appear
that the action has not been brought in due legal form. 84.
Hence arise questions referring either to the general action
or to exception ;S for there are some things objectionable in
their own nature, yet allowed by law, as it was permitted,
for instance, by the twelve tables, that the body of a debtor
might be divided among his creditors;|| but public feeling has
set aside that law; and some things may be equitable in them-
selves, but prohibited by law, as liberty in making wills.”
85. By the accuser nothing more is to be kept in view than
that he must prove that something was done; that a particular
thing was done; that it was done wrongfully; and that he
brings his action according to law. Thus every cause will
depend upon the same sorts of questions, only the allegations
* Status imfitialis, otherwise conjecturalis, vulgó quaestio fact. Cap-
peronler.
+ Status definitivus. Capperonier.
# Status qualitatis, vulgó juris quaestio. Capperonier.
§ Status pºsta)\hilswg or trapaypa pric, eacceptio foré, or eacceptio judici;
declinatoria, which is sometimes called praescriptio. Capperonier.
| See Aul. Gell. xx. 1.
** Of the restraints laid on testamentary disposition of property,
see Smith's Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Ant. Art. Legatum. The most
effective law was the lea: Falcidia, passed B.C. 40, which provided that
a testator should not give more than three-fourths of his property in
legacies, and thus secured at least one-fourth to the legal heir.
CH. VI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 2ll
of the different parties will sometimes be interchanged;* as
in those causes in which the question is about a reward, it is
for the plaintiff to prove that what was done was right.
86. These plans, as it were, and forms, of proceeding, which
I then called general states, resolve themselves, as I showed,+
into two general kinds, the one dependent on reasoning, the
other on legality. The one dependent on reasoning is the
more simple, as it consists merely in the contemplation of the
mature of things; and it is sufficient, therefore, in respect to
it, to mention conjecture, definition, quality. 87. Of legal
questions there must necessarily be more species, as laws are
numerous, and have various forms. We rest on the words of
one law, and on the spirit of another; when we find no law
ready to support us, we press some one into our service; we
compare some, one with another; we interpret Some in a
manner different from that in which they are usually under-
stood. 88. Thus from those three states; spring the follow-
ing resemblances as it were of states, sometimes simple,
sometimes mixed, § yet always wearing their own peculiar
appearance, as that which refers to what is written and what is
Čntended, which, without doubt, is included under quality or
conjecture ; that which is treated by Syllogism, which has
regard especially to quality; that which respects contradictory
laws, which belongs to the same states as what is written and
what is intended ; and that referring to ambiguity, which is
always settled by conjecture. 89. Definition also is common
to both kinds | of questions, those which depend on the con-
sideration of matters of fact, and those which are to be decided
by adherence to the written letter.
All these questions, though they fall under those three
states, yet since they have severally, as I said, "I Something
* Thus, in accusations, the complainant is to prove that something
is wrong; but, in cases of claiming rewards, the complainant has to
prove that something is right. Turnebus.
+ See sect. 67 ; also c. v. sect. 4.
† Those of conjecture, definition, and quality. Capperonier.
Š Because there is sometimes in one cause one state of scriptum et
voluntas : sometimes several Scripta and several voluntates ; or some-
times scriptum et voluntas is mixed with leges contrariae and ambiguitas;
and there are similar combinations in other causes. Twrmebus, -
| He alludes to the two general questions, de re and descripto. See
c. 5. Capperonier.
*] He alludes, if I mistake not, to sect. 87. Spalding.
P 2
212 QUINTILIAN. i B.III.
peculiar, appear necessary to be explained to learners; and
they may be allowed to call them either legal states or ques-
tions, or secondary heads, if they but understand that nothing
is sought in them but what is contained under the three
general heads which I have before mentioned.* 90. But
* Sect. 80.4
“In these sections, 87–89,” says Capperonier, “is shown the later
ystem of Quintilian concerning status oratori; ; and, that it may be
the better understood, I have thought it well to compare it, not only
with his former system, but with those of Cicero, the writer ad
Herennium, and Hermogenes.
Quintilian at first admitted four general States :
1. The conjectural.
2. The definitive.
3. That of quality.
4. The legal,
He then divided the legal into five species:
1. That of Scriptwrm et voluntas.
2. That of contradictory laws.
3. The syllogism.
4. That of ambiguity.
5. That of exception. &
But in his later system he admits only three general states :
1. The conjectural.
2. The definitive.
3. That of quality, which in b. vii. c. 4, he divides in the same
manner as other rhetoricians; for, in his retractation, he
endeavours to prove that eacception is not properly a state ; and
that his first four species of the legal state may be referred to
some one of the three general states.
The system of Cicero respecting states is to be found in his first book
de Inventione Rhetoricó, near the commencement.
He acknowledges four ratiocinatory states:
1. The conjectural, or that concerning fact.
2. The definitive, or that concerning the name of a fact
3. That of quality, which he divides into
1. The judicial which is either absolute §
or assumptive : and the assump-
tive he divides into
1. Concession.
2. Remotio criminis, or averting of the accusation.
3. Relatio criminis, or retorting on the accuser.
4. Comparison.
4. Exception. ſº
And five legal states :
1. That of Scriptwm et voluntas.
2. That of contradictory laws.
3. That of ambiguity.
CH. VI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 213
with questions referring to quantity, to a whole as consisting
of parts, to relation, and, as some have thought, to comparison,
4. The ratiocinatory, or syllogism.
5. The definitive.
But in his de Oratore, ii. 24, 26, Topic. c. 21, 24, and Part, Orat. c. :
29, he mentions only the three most common states:
1. The conjectural.
2. The definitive.
3. That of quality.
The system of the writer ad Herennium concerning states is that
which follows, b. i. c. 11, 13.
He first of all lays down these three general states :
1. The conjectural.
2, The legal.
3. The judicial, or that of quality.
He then divides the legal into six species:
. That of scriptum et voluntas.
. That of contradictory laws.
. That of ambiguity.
. That of definition.
. That of exception.
. The ratiocinatory, or syllogism.
The judicial he divides into two species:
1. The absolute.
2. The assumptive ; which he subdivides into four :
1. Concession.
2. Remotio criminis.
3. Relatio criminis.
4. Comparison.
The system of Hermogenes, as given in his books de Partitionibus,
is this :
Of every rhetorical question the status is either
1. One of conjecture, or,
2. One of definition, or,
3. One of quality.
Quality is either
1. Ratiocinatory, about something dome, or,
2. Legal, about something written.
Ratiocinatory quality is either
1. Practical, about something to be done, or,
2. Juridical, about something done.
Juridical quality is either
1. Absolute, or,
2. Presumptive, or assumptive.
Assumptive juridical quality is divided into
1. Relatio, that is, retorting on the accuser.
2. Comparison.
3. Remotio, or repelling of the accusation.
4. Concession.
i
214 QUINTILIAN. [B. III.
the case is not the same ; for they are to be regarded, not as
concerning differences in the laws, but as dependent on
reasoning alone, and are, therefore, always to be placed under
conjecture or quality; as when we ask with what intention a
person did anything, or at what time, or in what place. 91.
But I shall speak of particular questions when I proceed to treat
of the rules for division.*
This is agreed among all writers, that in every simple cause
there is but one single state ;t but that many questions, which,
as secondary points, are referred to that in which the main
point for judgment is contained, may be comprised in one and
the same cause; (92. I also think that it is sometimes doubtful
what state we ought to adopt, as many means of defence are
employed against one accusation; and as it is said with regard
to the colouri of a statement of facts, that that is the best
which a speaker can best maintain, so it may be said in this
case also, that that state should be chosen, in support of which
the orator can put forth most strength; 93. and accordingly,
in settling a mode of defence for Milo, one course found favour
with Cicero, when he pleaded the cause, and another with
Brutus, when he composed a speech for Milo by way of exer-
cise;S as Cicero maintained that Clodius had been killed de-
servedly, as a lier-in-wait, yet without intention on the part of
Legal quality is divided into questions respecting
1. Scriptwm et voluntas.
2. Contradictory laws.
3. The syllogism.
4. Ambiguity.
To all these he subjoins exception, or pistóAmipug, which he some-
times calls trapaypaſph.”
I have extracted this tabular view of states from Capperonier,
because, though it has not escaped the sarcasm of Burmann, as indi-
cating ostentatious diligence, it may be of great service to such as
would thoroughly understand, not only this chapter, but many other
parts of Quintilian. -
* Book vii.
+ To speak properly, there is in every simple cause but one principal
state, though many other States, which we may call incidental, occur,
and which are referred to the principal state. Capperonier.
f See iv. 2, 88. -
§ See X. 1, 23; 5, 20. I have found no mention of this speech of
Brutus in any author except Quintilian. To a speech of Brutus for
Deiotarus there is an allusion in Cicero Brut. c. 5, ad Att. xiv. 1, and
in the writer of the Dialogue de Or. c. 21 ; it was delivered, however,
at a different time from that of Cicero for T)eiotarus. The writer of the
CH, VI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 2 I 5
Milo; but Brutus even gloried on behalf of Milo that he had
killed a bad citizen;) 94. but that in complex causes two or
three states may be found, either of different kinds, as when a
person denies that he did one thing,” and maintains that he
was in the right in doing another, f or of the same kind, as
when a person denies two charges, or all the charges brought
against him. 95. This happens, also, when there is a question
about some one thing which several persons are trying to
obtain, either all relying on the same kind of claim, as that of
relationship; or some on one kind and some on another, as
some on a will and some on relationship. But whenever there
are several claimants, and one kind of defence is made against
one and another against another, there must necessarily be
several kinds of states; as in the following subject of contro-
versy, the law standing thus: 96. Let wills made according to
the laws be valid. Let the children of intestate parents be heirs.
Let a disinherited son possess none of his father's property. .
Let an illegitimate son, if born before one that is legitimate, be
to his father as legitimate ; if born after, only as a citizen. § Let
it be lawful for every father to give his son in adoption. Let it
be lawful for every son given in adoption to return into his own
family if his natural father dies without children. 97. A
father, who, having two sons, had allowed one to be adopted
by another man, and had disinherited the other, had after-
wards an illegitimate son, and then, after appointing the dis-
inherited son his heir, died. All the three laid claim to the
estate. (Let me observe that the Greeks call an illegitimate
son vö90g : we have no Latin term exactly corresponding to
Dialogue shows that the eloquence of Brutus was different from that of
Cicero, see c. 17, 18, 25, and more fitted for philosophical discussion
than for pleading causes, as also appears from Quintilian X. 1, 123.
Compare Cic. ad Att. xiv. 20 ; xv. 1. Spalding.
* Here will be the status conjecturalis, or fact quaestio. Capperonier.
+ Here will be the status qualitatis absolutae. Capperonier.
j. Whether there really was such a law among the Romans, (among
the Greeks it is certain that there was,) or whether it was merely as-
sumed in the schools for the purpose of exercise in declamation, is a
matter of dispute with the jurisconsulti. See vii. 4, 11 ; viii. 47, 6.
Spalding. •
§ Nor can I say whether this was law beyond the walls of the -
schools. We find something very different in Papinianus. See Schul-
tingius, Jurisprud. Ante Just. p. Ayreri 849. Spalding.
Ql 6 QUINTILIAN. [B.III.
it,” as Cato remarks in one of his speeches, and, therefore,
adopt the Greek word. But let us attend to our subject.)
98. To him who was named as heir in the will was opposed
the law, Let a disinherited son possess none of his father's pro-
perty, and hence arose the state referring to what is written
and what is intended, it being inquired “whether he could
inherit in any way? whether according to the intention of the
father? whether as being named as heir in the will?” As to
the illegitimate son, there arise two considerations, that he was
born after the legitimate sons, and was not born before a
legitimate one. 99. The first consideration goes into the syl-
logismi or inference, “whether sons alienated from the family:
are in the same condition as if they had never been born ?”$
The other is that regarding what is written and what is in-
tended; for it is admitted that he was not born before a legiti-
mate son; but he will rest his cause on the intention of the
law, which he will say was, that an illegitimate son, born when
there was no longer a legitimate son in the family, should be
considered as legitimate. 100. He will also set aside the
written letter of the law, by saying that “it is certainly no
detriment to an illegitimate son if a legitimate one was not
born after him,” and will insist on this argument: Suppose
that an illegitimate son only be born ; in what relation will he
stand to his father ? only as a citizen 3 Yet he will not be born
after a legitimate son. Will he be as a son in every respect 2
get he will not be born before a legitimate one. If, therefore, we
can conclude nothing from the words of the law, we must take
our stand on the intention of it. 101. Nor let it perplex any
one that two states|| arise from one law; the law is two-fold,
* Among the Greeks nothos meant one who was born of a reputable
father and a disreputable mother; the Latin Spurius, on the contrary,
meant one who was born of a reputable mother and disreputable
father. See Isidore, Orig. ix. 5. Various derivations are given of the
word spurius, but all doubtful. -
f The first question will be treated under the status legalis which is
called the syllogism, as it does not rest on the express words of the
law, but infers from some part of the law something favourable to the
matter in hand. Capperonier.
f Whether by adoption or by being disinherited. Capperonier.
§ If so, he was, though not formally, as they say, yet virtually, born
before legitimate children. Capperonier.
| Status legales ; One, the syllogism; the other, de Scripto et volumtate.
Capperonier. *
CH. VI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. Q 17
and has accordingly the form of two laws. To the son wishing
to return into the family, it will be said, in the first place, by
him who is named as heir in the will, “Though it be lawful
for you to return, I am still heir ;” and the state will be the
same” as in regard to the claim of the disinherited son ; for
the question is “whether a disinherited son can be heir 2"
102. In the next place, it will be said by both, (as well by the
one who is named heir as by the illegitimate one,) “It is not
lawful for you to return into the family, for our father did not
die without children.” But, in saying this, each of the two
will rest his case on his own peculiar ground; for the disin-
herited son will assert, “that a disinherited son is also one of
the children,” and will draw a proof of his assertion from the
very law by which it is pretended that he is set aside; as it
would be superfluous, he would say, for a disinherited son to
be forbidden to inherit the property of his father, if he were to
be accounted as a stranger, but, as he would have been, by his
right as a son, the heir of his father if he had died without a
will, the law is now brought against him, which, however, does
not prevent him from being a son, but from being an heir.
The state, then, will be that of definition: the question,
“what is a son 2° 103. The illegitimate son, on his part, will
allege that his father did not die without children, resting on
the same arguments which he used in making his claim at
first, to show that he was a son; unless he also have recourse
to the state of definition, and ask, “whether illegitimate chil-
dren are not children 2° There will thus be in this one cause
either two special legal states, those of the letter and intention
and the syllogism, besides one of definition, or those three
which are the onlyf real and natural states, that of conjecture,
with regard to the writing and intention of the writer, that of
quality in the syllogism,i and that of definition, which suf-
ficiently explains itself. -
In every kind of legal controversy, too, must be compre-
hended a cause, a matter for judgment, and the containing
point, $ for there is nothing brought into question in which
* Namely, descripto et voluntate. Capperonier.
f See sect. 82.
† See sect. 88.
§ The continens, rö avvéxov, that which contains the very substance
of the cause ; that which is the chief matter in the cause to be pleaded,
2} 8 QUINTILIAN. [B.III.
there is not some reason, something to which judgment is
directed, and something which chiefly contains the substance
of the matter in question. But as these things vary according
to the mature of causes, and as they are taught by most of the
writers on judicial pleadings, let them be reserved for the
part” in which I shall treat of such affairs. For the present,
as I have divided+ causes into three kinds, I shall follow the
order which I have prescribed to myself.
CHAPTER VII.
Of panegyric or laudatory eloquence ; not wholly distinct from prac.
tical discussion, $ 1, 2. An orator does not always speak on
doubtful points, 3, 4. Panegyric sometimes requires proof and
defence, and very frequently amplification, 5, 6. Praise of the
gods, 7–9. Praise of men more varied, 10, 11. Men extolled
for personal endowments and fortunate circumstances, 12–14.
For mental qualifications, 15, 16. For memorials which they
leave of themselves, 17, 18. In censure the case is reversed, 19–
21. On praise of the living, 22. It makes a difference where a
panegyric is delivered, 23, 24. Advantage may be taken by the
orator of the proximity of certain virtues to certain vices, 25.
Praise of cities, places, public works, 26, 27. What state most
prevailed in this department of oratory, 28.
1. I SHALL commence with that species of oratory which is
devoted to praise and censure. This species Aristotle, and
Theophrastus who follows him, seem to have excluded alto-
gether from the practical department of speaking, and to
have considered that its only object is to please the audience,
an object which is indeed intimated by its name epideictic from
ärlösizyvºol, to display. 2. But the usage of the Romans has
given it a placé in civil transactions; for funeral orations are
often a duty attached to some public office, and are frequently
assigned to the magistrates by a decree of the Senate ; and to
commend or censure a witness is not without effect on the
and of the greatest efficiency for obtaining it, especially on the side of
the plaintiff. Capperonier. See c. 11, sect. 4–10.
* C. 11
+ see the end of c. 3, and the whole of c. 4.
:: Opposing the epideictic, as being for display, to the pragmatic, or
practical,
CH. VII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 2 : 9
result of trials; while it is lawful, also, to produce panegyrists
on behalf of accused persons;” and the written compositions
published against Cicero's competitors,f against Lucius Piso,
Clodius, and Curio, are full of invective, and yet were received
as opinions in the senate. 3. But I do not deny that some,
discourses of this kind have been composed merely for osten."
tation, as those in praise of the gods, and of the heroes of
former times; a fact by which a question noticed abovej is
Solved, and by which it is shown that those were mistaken who
thought that an Orator would never speak on any but doubtful
subjects. 4. Are the praises of Jupiter Capitolinus, a perpetual
Subject at the sacred contests, doubtful ? Or are they not
treated in oratorical style?
But as panegyric which is employed for practical purposes,
requires proof, so that which is composed for display, calls
Sometimes for some semblance of proof; 5. as the orator who
should say that Romulus was the son of Mars, and was nursed
by a she-wolf, would offer in proof of his celestial origin, the
the arguments that, being thrown into a running stream, he
could not be drowned ; that he had such success in all his
undertakings, that it is not incredible that he was sprung from
the god who presides over war; and that the people of those
times had no doubt that he was even received into heaven.
6. But some particulars in such subjects will be treated as if
they required defence ; as in a panegyric on Hercules, the
orator would perhaps apologize for his change of dress with the
queen of Lydia, and the tasks, as we are told, imposed upon
him. But the peculiar business of panegyric is to amplify and
embellish its subjects. - - - - - - --
This kind of eloquence is devoted chiefly to gods or men;
though it is sometimes employed about animals and things ill-
animate. 7. In praising the gods, we shall, in the first place
* If a man, for instance, was publicly accused, and had previously
governed a province well, ten deputies might be sent from it to appear
as his lawdatores or eulogists on his trial. Such deputies were sent
from Marseilles and Narbonne to speak in praise of Fonteius. Twrve-
bus. See Cic. in Verr. v. 22.
f Quintilian means the attacks made by Cicero upon Catiline and
Antonius, his competitors for the consulship. The fragments that
remain of them are called Oratio in Togá Camdidd. See the argument
of Asconius Pedianus on that oration.
j: C. 5, sect. 3.
...” ---
,'º'
220 … QUINTILIAN. [B.III.
'4
* | £y
º
; :
º -
4-
*:: * ~ *
*º-º-º:
:* - /
express a general veneration for the majesty of their nature,
and shall then éulogize the peculiar power of each, and such of
their inventions as have conferred benefit on mankind. 8. In
regard to Jupiter, for instance, his power in ruling all things
is to be extolled ; in regard to Mars, his Supremacy in war; in
regard to Neptune, his command of the sea. In respect to
inventions, we extol, in praising Minerva, that of the arts; in
praising Mercury, that of letters; in praising Apollo, that of
medicine; in praising Ceres, that of corn; in praising Bacchus,
that of wine. Whatever exploits, also, antiquity has recorded
as performed by them, are to receive their encomium. Parent-
age, too, is a subject of panegyric in regard to the gods, as
when any one is a son of Jupiter ; antiquity, as to those who
were sprung from Chaos; and offspring, as Apollo and Diana
are an honour to Latona. 9. We may make it a subject of
praise to some that they were born immortal; and to others,
that they attained immortality by their merits; a kind of glory
which the piety of our own emperor has made an honour to the
present age. -
10. The praise of men is more varied. First of all it is
distinguished with respect to time, that which was before them,
and that in which they themselves lived; and, in regard to those
who are dead, that also which followed their death. Ante-
cedent to the birth of a man will be his country, parents, and
ancestors, to whom we may refer in two ways; for it will be
honourable to them either to have equalled the nobility of their
forefathers, or to have ennobled a humble origin by their
achievements. I 1. Other subjects for eulogy may also sometimes
be found in the time that preceded a man's birth ; such as
occurrences, for example, that denoted his future eminence by
prophetic indications or auguries; as the Oracles are said to
have foretold that the son of Thetis would be greater than his
father. 12. The praises of a man personally should be de-
rived from the qualities of his mind, body, or external circum-
stances. The merits of corporeal and accidental advantages
are of less weight than those of the mind, and may be treated
in many ways. Sometimes we celebrate beauty and strength
with honour of words, as Homer extols them in his Agamem-
non and Achilles. Sometimes comparative weakness may
contribute much to our admiration, as when Homer says that
Tydeus was small of stature, yet a warrior. 13. Fortune, too,
CH. VII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. QQ]
gives dignity, as in kings and princes; for in their condition
there is the ampler field for displaying merit; and among
people of other conditions, the less resources a person has, the
greater honour he acquires by making a praiseworthy use of
them. All advantages, indeed, which are external to us, and
which have fallen to us accidentally, are not subjects of praise
to a man merely because he possessed them, but only in case
he employed them to good purpose. 14. For wealth, and
power, and influence, as they offer most opportunities for good
or evil, afford the surest test of our morals; since we are sure
to be either better for them or worse.
15. Praise of the good qualities of the mind is always just;
but more than one way may be pursued in the treatment of it;
for sometimes it is more honourable to follow the progress of a
person's life and the order of his actions; so that his natural-
genius, shown in his early years, may be first commended, then
his advancement in learning, and then his course of conduct,
including not only what he did, but what he said; sometimes
it will be better to divide our praises among the several kinds
of virtues, fortitude, justice, temperance, and others, and to
assign to each the honour of that which has been done under
its influence. 16. Which of these two methods will be the
more eligible for us, we shall have to consider according to our
Subject, keeping in mind, however, that the celebration of those
deeds is most pleasing to the audience which the object of our
praise is said to have been the first to do, or to have done
alone, or with the aid of but few supporters; and whatever else
he may have effected beyond hope or expectation, and especially
what he has done for the good of others rather than for his
OWI1.
17. Of the time which follows the death of persons, it is not
always in our power to treat; not only because we sometimes
praise them while they are still living, but because few occa-
sions offer on which divine honours, or public decrees, or
statues erected at the expense of the state, can be celebrated.
18. Among such subjects for eulogy, I would reckon monu-
ments of genius, which may be admired through all ages; for
Some, like Menander,” have obtained more justice from the
judgment of posterity than from that of their contemporaries.
Children reflect glory upon their parents, cities on their
* The comic poet. See x. 1, 72 ; Aul. Gell. xvii. 4.
22 ) QUINTILIAN. [B.III
founders, laws on those who have made them, arts on their
inventors; and institutions also on their authors, as it was
appointed by Numa, for instance, that we should worship the
gods, and by Publicola that the consuls should lower the fasces
before the people. -
19. The same method will be observed in censure, but so as
to set things in a different light; for meanness of origin has
been a dishonour to many ; and nobility itself has rendered
others more conspicuous and more odious for their vices. To
some, as is said to have been the case with Paris, mischief
which it was foretold they should cause, has produced dislike;
on others, as Thersites and Irus, deformity of person, or mis-
fortune, has thrown contempt. In regard to others, good
qualities corrupted by vices, have rendered them hateful;
thus we find Nireus represented by the poets as cowardly, and
Pleisthenes * as debauched. 20. Of the mind, too, there are as
many vices as virtues; and both, as in panegyric, may be
treated in two ways. On some men ignominy has been
thrown after death ; as on Maelius, whose house was levelled
with the ground, and Marcus Manlius, whose praenomen was
not allowed to be borne by his posterity. 21. Of the vicious,
also, we hate even the parents. To founders of cities it is an
opprobrium to have drawn together a people noxious to those
around them ; as was the case with the original author f of
the Jewish superstition ; so the laws of the Gracchi brought
odium on their name; and any example of vice given to posterity
disgraces its author, as that of the obscenity which a Persian is
said to have first ventured to practise with a woman of Samos.:
22. With respect to the living, also, the judgments formed of
them by others are proofs of their character ; and the honour
or dishonour shown to them proves the Orator's eulogy or cen-
sure to be just.
23. But Aristotle thinks it of importance to the Orator to
* It is uncertain who Pleisthenes was, or whether the reading be
sound. Some would read Cleisthenes, who is mentioned as an effemi-
nate and licentious man by Aristophanes, Ran. 57, and 425 ; and by
Suidas.
+ Gesner and Spalding rightly suppose that Moses is meant, not
Christ, as some have imagined ; for Quintilian must Surely have
known, as Gesner remarks, that the origin of the Jews was of earlier
date than the time of Christ.
: Of this no mention is found elsewhere. Spalding.
CH.VII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 223
consider the place in which anything is to be commended or
censured ; for it makes a great difference what the manners of
the audience are, and what opinions are publicly entertained
among them ; as they will be most willing to believe that the
virtues which they approve are in him who is eulogized, or
that the vices which they hate are in him whom we censure.
Thus the judgment formed by the orator as to the effect of his
speech, even before the delivery of it, will be pretty certain.
24. Some praise of his audience, too, should always be
mingled with his remarks, (for it makes them favourably dis-
posed towards him,) and, whenever it is possible, should be so
introduced as to strengthen his cause. A panegyric on literary
studies will be received with less honour at Sparta than
at Athens; a panegyric on patience and fortitude with
greater. Among some people it is honourable to live by
plunder”; among others to respect the laws. Frugality would
perhaps have been an object of hatred with the Sybarites;
luxury would have been the greatest of crimes among the
ancient Romans. 25. Similar diversity is found in individuals.
A judge is most favourable to a pleader when he thinks that
his sentiments coincide with his own. Aristotle also directs,
(a precept which Cornelius Celsus has since carried almost to
excess,) that, as there is a certain proximity of virtues and
vices, we should sometimes avail ourselves of words that
approach each other in sense, So as, for instance, to call a
person brave instead of rash, liberal instead of prodigal, frugal
instead of avaricious ;... or, on the contrary, the vice may be
put for the virtue. This is an artifice, however, which a true
orator, that is, a good man, will never adopt, unless he happen
of to be led to it by a notion promoting the public good.
26. Cities are eulogized in the same way as persons; for their
founder is to be considered as their parent; and antiquity con-
fers much dignity on their inhabitants; as we see in regard to
people who are said to be sprung from the soil of their country.
In their transactions there are the same virtues and vices as
in the conduct of individuals. Some have peculiar advantages
to be noticed, as in their situation or defences. Citizens may
be an honour to them, as children to parents. g
27. Encomiums may also be bestowed on public works, in
respect to which magnificence, utility, beauty, and the architect
* See Thucyd. i. 5; Hom. Odyss, iii. 71.
224 QUINTILIAN. - [B.III.
of them, are commonly considered. Magnificence, as in
temples; utility, as in walls; beauty, and the architect, in both.
Panegyrics on places are also found ; as that on Sicily in
Cicero *; in which we regard, in like manner, beauty and
utility; beauty in maritime regions, plains, and pleasant spots;
utility, in respect to healthfulness or fertility of soil. There
is a kind of general praise, too, for honourable sayings or
actions. 28. There is praise, indeed, for things of every
kind; for eulogies have been written on sleep and death, and
by physicians on certain sorts of food.
While I do not admit, therefore, that this laudatory depart-
ment of oratory relates only to questions concerning what is
honourable, I think, at the same time, that it is chiefly com-
prised under quality +; though certainly all three states i may
enter into this kind of composition, and Ciceroš has observed
that Caius Caesar has availed himself of them in his invective
on Cato. But the whole of panegyrical oratory bears some
resemblance to deliberative, because, for the most part, that
which is recommended in the one is praised in the other.
CHAPTER VIII.
Deliberative oratory not confined to questions of utility, Ś 1. Whether
nothing is useful but what is honourable, 2, 3. Deliberative
oratory not concerned wholly with the state of quality, 4, 5. What
kind of exordium requisite in it, 6–9. Statement of facts, 10, 11.
The passions to be moved, 12, 13. Whether it solely concerns
affairs of government, 14. That a thing can be done, is either
certain or uncertain, 17–21. The three topics of persuasion,
22–26. Some do not distinguish topics from divisions of topics,
27, 28. The pleasing, the useful, and the honourable, 29–35.
Use of examples, 36, 37. How things that are honourable may
be recommended, and sometimes such as are at variance with
honour, 38–47. Authority of the speaker, 48. Prosopopeiae, 49
—51. In the schools deliberative subjects have a great re-
semblance to controversies, 52–57. An error into which de-
claimers fall, 58–66. Advantage of reading history, 67–70.
I AM surprised, also, that deliberative oratory is confined
* Verr. ii. 1, segg. ; also iv. 48. *
+ The state of quality, which refers not less to what is honourable
than to what is just. Capperonier.
# Those of conjecture, quality, and definition. Capperonier.
§ Topic. c. 25.
CH. VIII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 225
by some authors wholly to matters of utility. If we ought to
follow one sole object in it, the opinion of Cicero * would have
greater weight with me, who thinks that this department of
speaking is chiefly occupied about what is honourable f. Nor
do I doubt, indeed, that those who adopt the former opinion,
consider, according to a very noble principle, that nothing is
advantageous but what is honourable. 2. This notion would
certainly be very just, if the resolutions of the good and wise
were always ready to support us. But in addressing the
unlearned, to whom our opinions must often be delivered, and
especially in haranguing the people, the majority of whom are
ignorant, the two must be kept distinct, and we must speak
more in conformity with ordinary apprehension. 3. For there
are many who, though they may consider an action to be honour-
able, do not immediately allow it to be sufficiently advanta-
geous, and, led by the prospect of advantage, approve what
they cannot doubt to be highly dishonourable, as the treaty
with the Numantimes $ and the passing under the yoke at the
defile of Caudium.]
4. Nor is it sufficient to include deliberative oratory" in the
state of quality, in which is comprised the question of what is
honourable and what is useful ; for often, in respect to these,
there is room for conjecture; at times some definition is to be
considered;** and occasionally, too, legal inquiriesti may occur,
especially in reference to private proceedings, if ever a doubt
arises whether a thing be lawful. Of conjecture I shall speak
more fully a little below.j: 5. As to definition, meanwhile, there
is this question in Demosthenes, “Whether Philip should give
or restore $$ Halonnesus to the Athenians ?” and in Cicero, in
* De Orat. ii. 82. .
+ Dignitate.] That is, homestate. Capperonier. -
†: We must not speak of that which is honourable as being neces-
Sarily advantageous.
§ Florus, ii. 18.; Well. Pat. ii. 90.
| Liv. ix. 1–11. -
* Eas.] Sc. deliberativas, which occurs at the beginning of the
chapter.
** That is, it may often come under the status conjecturalis or status
definitivus.
++ Legales—tractatus.] That is, legales gwastiones or status. Capperonier.
†: Sect. 16, 17. -
§§ “The island of Halonnesus was anciently held by the Athenians
but, in the time of Philip, was occupied by pirates, whom Philip
226 QUINTILIAN. [B. III.
his Philippics, “What is a tumult?” Is there not, too, the
question, similar to those in judicial causes, about the statue of
Servius Sulpicius, “whether statues are to be erected to those
only who perish on an embassy by the sword 2’t 6. The delibe-
rative:department of oratory, therefore, (which is also called the
suasory,) while it consults concerning the future, inquires also
into the past. It has two objects, to persuade and to dissuade.
An exordium, such as is usual in judicial pleadings, it does
not require ; because whoever consults an orator is already
--------——T---... .
well-disposed to hear him. Yet the commencement, whatever
it be, ought to have some resemblance to an exordium ; for we
must not begin abruptly, or with whatever we may fancy,
because in every subject there is something naturally first.
7. In speaking before the Senate, and, indeed, before the
people, the same object is to be kept in view as in addressing
judges, namely, that of securing the goodwill of the majority of
those to whom we speak. Nor is this to be thought surprising,
when the favour of the audience is sought even in pane-
gyrics, where the purpose is not to attain any advantage,
but merely to bestow praise. 8. Aristotle, indeed, and not
without reason, thinks that we may often commence, in
deliberative speeches, with an allusion to ourselves, or to the
character of him who differs in opinion from us; borrowing
this method, as it were, from judicial pleadings; sometimes in
Such a manner, that our subject may be made to appear of
less or greater importance than our audience imagine it.j 9.
In panegyrics, he thinks that the exordium may be allowed
the utmost latitude; since it is sometimes taken from something
foreign to the subject, as Isocrates has taken his in his oration in
praise of Helen ;S or from something bordering on the subject,
ejected from it, but, when the Athenians asked for possession of it, he
refused to give it them, saying that it was his own. The speech
exhorts the Athenians not \apéâvely airfiv, d\A’ &TroXauÉdvévy, not
to receive it as given, but as restored to them.” Libanius's Argument
to the speech of Demosthenes concerning Halonnesus. See AEsch.
against Ctesiphon, p. 65, ed. Steph. Spalding.
* Philipp. viii. 1, 2. The senate deliberated whether they should
call the hostile operations against Mark Antony a bellum or a twmultus.
+ Philipp. ix. l. Sulpicius was sent on an embassy to Mark Antony,
and being unwell at the time, and it being winter, suffered so much
from the journey that he died.
f Rhet. iii. 14, 11.
Isocrates commences with remarks on the rhetoricians and
CH. VIII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 227
as the same orator, in his Panegyric, complains that “more
honour is paid to the good qualities of the body than to those
of the mind;” and as Gorgias, in his oration at the Olympic
games, extols those who first instituted such meetings.
Sallust, following, doubtless, the example of these orators,
has commenced his histories of the Jugurthine War and the
Conspiracy of Catiline with introductions having no relation to
his narratives. 10. But I am now to speak of deliberative
oratory, in which, even when we adopt an exordium, we ought
to content ourselves with one that is short, resembling as it
were an initial chapter or statement.
As to a regular statement of facts, a private subject of dis-
cussion will never require it, at least a statement of the matter
on which an opinion is to be given ; for no man is ignorant of
the particulars on which he consults others. 11. Statements,
however, of many external circumstances relative to the sub-
ject of deliberation may be introduced In deliberative
addresses to the people a statement setting forth the orde,
of circumstances is indispensable. 12. Deliberative oratory
requires appeals to the feelings more than any other kind of
eloquence; for indignation is often to be kindled and allayed;
and the minds of the audience are to be moved to fear, eager-
ness, hatred, benevolence. Sometimes, too, pity is to be
excited, whether we have, for example, to recommend that aid
be given to a besieged town, or whether we be called upon to
lament the overthrow of a people in alliance with us.
13. But what is of most weight in deliberative speeches is
authority in the speaker; for he who desires everybody to
trust to his opinion about what is expedient and honourable,
ought to be, and to be esteemed, a man of the greatest
judgment and probity. In judicial pleadings it is commonly
thought allowable for a man to indulge, in some degree, his
own feelings; but every one supposes that counsel is given by
a speaker in accordance with his moral principles.
14. Most of the Greek rhetoricians have been of opinion
that the business of all this kind of Oratory is with addresses,
to the multitude, and have confined it wholly to affairs of *
government. Even Cicero * considers it chiefly with reference
sophists, who used to treat of absurd and trifling matters in their
speeches. Turnebus,
* De Orat. ii. 81–83.
t
Q 2
228 QUINTILIAN. [B. III.
to that department, and accordingly says that for those who
are to give advice concerning peace, war, levies of troops,
public works, or revenues, the two things chiefly to be known
are the resources and the manners of the people whom they
address; so that his arguments may be derived at once from the
particular circumstances and from the character of his hearers.
15. To me it appears that there is greater variety in this field
of eloquence; for the classes of persons who consult, and the
kinds of advice that may be given, are extremely numerous.
In persuading and dissuading, them, three particulars are
chiefly to be regarded : what is the subject of deliberation; who
those that deliberate are ; and what is the character of him
that would influence their deliberations.
16. As to that which is the subject of deliberation, it is either
certain that it may be carried into effect, or uncertain. If it
be uncertain, its uncertainty will be the sole point for conside-
ration, or, I should say, the chief point, for it will often happen
that we shall assert, first of all, that a thing, even if it could
be done, ought not to be done, and, next, that it cannot be
done. But when the question is respecting something uncer-
tain, the point is conjectural,” as whether the Isthmus can be
cut through, or the Pontine marshes drained,+ or a harbour
made at Ostia 2: Or whether Alcalander was likely to find
lands beyond the ocean *|| 17. But even in regard to things
which are acknowledged to be practicable, there will some-
times be room for conjecture: as if it were inquired, for
instance, whether it would ever happen that the Romans would
subdue Carthage ; whether Hannibal would return if Scipio
transported his army into Africa ; whether the Samnites would
keep faith if the Romans were to lay down their arms. As to
some things, too, it is credible both that they can be done,
and that they will be done, but at some other time, or in some
other place, or in some other manner.
18. Where there is no place for conjecture other points are
* Conjectura est.] That is, status conjecturalis, or facti quastio. Cap-
peronier.
f Respecting both these undertakings, see Suet. Caes, c. 44; Calig.
c. 21 ; Nero, c. 19. On digging through the Isthmus, there is a little
treatise attributed to Lucian. Spalding,
I See ii. 21, 18.
§ See the first of the Swasorice of Sel
| At the Fwrcce Cawdiva; ; see sec
CH. VIII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 229
to be regarded. In the first place the deliberation will be
held, either on account of the matter itself, on which opinions
are asked, or on account of some extrinsic reasons that affect
it. The Senate deliberates, for example, with regard to
the matter itself, when they consider whether they shall
vote pay for the army.* 19. This is a simple question.
Reasons are adduced for doing a thing, as when the
senate deliberates whether they shall deliver up the Fabiá
to the Gauls threatening war;f or for not doing it, as when
Julius Cæsar deliberates whether he shall persist in marching
into Germany, when his soldiers were everywhere making
their wills.j. 20. These two questions offer more than one point
for consideration ; for as to the former, the reason for delibe-
rating is, that the Gauls are threatening war, but a question
may also be raised, whether even, without such threatening,
those ought not to have been given up, who, being sent as ambas-
sadors, had engaged in battle contrary to law, and had killed
the king $ to whom they had received communications & 21.
As to the other subject, Caesar would, doubtless, not have deli-
berated at all, if it had not been for the consternation of his
troops; yet there is room for inquiring whether, independently
of that circumstance, it would have been proper for him to pro-
ceed into Germany. But we must always speak first on that
point which might be a subject for deliberation even if other
circumstances were detached from it.
22. Some have thought that the topics for persuasion are
the three considerations what is honourable, what is useful,
and what is necessary. For the introduction of the third
I find no motive;| for, when any force oppresses us, it
may be necessary for us to suffer something, but certainly not
to do anything; but it is about doing that deliberation is con-
cerned. 23. Or if they call that necessity to which men are
driven by the fear of some greater evil, the question respect-
* Livy, v. 59, relates that the senate decreed pay for the soldiers
from the public treasury, they having previously supported themselves
in the field at their own expense; a decree which was very pleasing to
the people. Turnebw8.
+ Livy, v. 30. tº tº c
f At the time when he was going to march against Ariovistus: Caes.
B. G. i. 39.
§ He is called dua, by Livy, v. 36. Capperonier.
| According to the opinion of Aristotle, Rhet. i. 4, 2.
Q30 QUINTILIAN. IB, III.
ing it will be one of expediency; as if the inhabitants of a
besieged city, inferior in numbers to the besiegers, and in want
of water and provisions, deliberate about surrendering to the
enemy, and it be said, that it is necessary for them to surrender,
it must be added, for otherwise they must be destroyed, and thus
it appears that it is not necessary for them to surrender, for the
very reason that they may be destroyed if they prefer to submit
to destruction. In fact, the Saguntimes * did not surrender, nor
those who were surrounded in the vessel of Opitergium.f 24. In
such circumstances, therefore, the question will be either con-
cerning expediency, alone, or there will be hesitation between
what is expedient and what is honourable. But, it may be
said, if a man wishes to have children, he is under the neces-
sity of taking a wife. Doubtless : but he who wishes to have
children must first be convinced that he ought to take a wife;
25. and consequently there appears to me to be no place for
deliberation when there is necessity, any more than when it is
settled that a thing cannot be done; for all deliberation is
about something doubtful. Those, therefore, have made a better
distinction who have called the third head Övyczzów, which our
countrymen term possibile, “possibility;” and though our Latin
term may seem uncouth, yet it is the only one to be found.
26. That these three considerations do not enter into every
subject of deliberation is too evident to make it necessary for
me to demonstrate. Yet by most writers the number is
increased ; for things are reckoned by them as general con-
siderations which are but special objects for notice; since what
is lawful, just, pious, equitable, and merciful, (mansuetum, for
so they interpret rô #wagoy,) and whatever else may be added
of a similar character, may be included under what is honour-
able. 27. Whether, again, a thing be easy, important, plea-
sant, or free from danger, belongs to the consideration of
expediency. These particular points for consideration arise
from what is said in reply to us by our opponents: It is indeed
eacpedient, but it is difficult, of little importance, unpleasant,
and dangerous. 28. Yet some think that deliberation at times
occurs concerning agreeableness merely ; as when a consulta-
tion is held about the erection of a theatre, or the institution
* Liv. xxi. 14 ; Sil. Ital. ii. 696.
d ºsº Flor. ii. 33; Lucan, iv. 462 seqq. They put one another to
€”. GEl.
CH. VIII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 23]
of games ; but I do not suppose that any man is so totally
given up to pleasure as to look in a subject for deliberation to
nothing but gratification. 29. For there must always be some-
thing that should be thought of higher consideration ; as in
regard to games, the honour of the gods; in regard to the erec-
tion of a theatre, useful relaxation from labour, and the unbe-
coming and inconvenient contention for places among the
crowd, if there should be no theatre; and religion, at the same
time, will have its place in the consideration, as we may call
the theatre a temple, as it were, for the festival solemnized
ºthere to the gods.
30. Often, too, we say that advantage is to be disregarded,
in order that we may do what is honourable ; (as when we
counsel the people of Opitergium not to surrender themselves
to the enemy, though they will perish unless they do so;) and
Sometimes we may have occasion to set what is honourable
below what is advantageous; (as when we advise, as in the
second Punic war, that the slaves should be armed;%) 31.
though even in the latter case we must not altogether admit
that the proceeding is dishonourable; (for we may say that all
men are free by nature, and are formed of the same matter,
and that some even of the slaves may be descended from
noble ancestors;) and, in the former cºse, when the danger is
evident, other considerations may be alleged, as we may assert
that, if they surrender, they may perish even more cruelly,
should the enemy, for instance, not keep their word, or should
Caesar, as is more probable, obtain the superiority. 32. But
considerations which are so much opposed to one another, are
frequently softened by some alteration in the words; for expe-
diency itself is altogether set at nought by that sect f who say
not only that what is honourable is always preferable to what
is expedient, but that nothing can even be expedient which is
not honourable ; while, on the other hand, what we call
honourable, another sect ; calls vain, Ostentatious, foolish, and
more commendable in words than in reality.
33. Nor is what is advantageous compared only with what
is disadvantageous, but things that are advantageous or disad-
vantageous are compared with one another; as when we try to
* After the battle of Cannae: Florus, ii. 6; Livy, xxii. 57.
+ The Stoics. Gallaews.
† The Epicureans. Gallaºws.
Q32 QUINTILIAN. [B. III.
determine, of two advantageous measures, which is the more
advantageous, or of two that are disadvantageous, which is the
less so. The difficulty may be still increased ; for sometimes
three subjects for deliberation may present themselves; as
when Pompey deliberated” whether he should betake himself
to Parthia, or Africa, or Egypt. Thus it is not only inquired
which of two courses is preferable, but which is the most eligi-
ble of three. 34. In questions of this kind, there will never
occur any doubt as to a matter which is every way in our
favour; for when there is no room for speaking against a
measure what motive can there be for hesitating about it 2
Thus every subject for deliberation is generally nothing else
but a subject for comparison ; and we must consider, both
what we would attain and by what means, so that we may form
an estimate whether there is greater advantage in that which we
pursue, or greater disadvantage in the means by which we pursue it.
35. A question of advantage may also have reference to time:
it is eacpedient, but not now ; or to place: not here; or to per-
sons: not for us, or against those ; or to a particular mode of
proceeding: not thus ; or to measure: not to so great a degree.
But we have still more frequently to take persons:f into con-
sideration, with a view to what may be becoming; a point
which is to be regarded in respect not only to ourselves but to
those also who consult us. 36. Though examples, therefore,
are of the utmost effect in deliberative Oratory, because men
are most easily led to consent to any measure by instances of
similar proceedings, yet it makes a great difference whose
authority is adduced, and to whom it is recommended ; for the
feelings of those who listen to deliberative speeches are
various. 37. Our audience may be also of two kinds; for
those who consult us, are either many, or single individuals;
and, as to each, distinctions are to be made ; since, with regard
to a number of persons, it makes a great difference whether they
are a senate, or a people, whether Romans, or Fidenates, whether
Greeks, or Barbarians ; and, in respect to individuals, whether
we recommend that public offices should be sought by Cato or
by Caius Marius, and whether Scipio the elder, or Fabius con-
* After the battle of Pharsalia ; see Plutarch. Wit. Pomp. ; Lucan,
viii. 256 segg.
f He now enters on the second part of the division which he made
in sect. 15.
CH.VIII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 233
sult with us on the mode of conducting a war.” 38. We must
in like manner look to sex, dignity, and age. But it is the
character of our hearers that should lead us to make the chief
difference in our addresses to them. To recommend honour-
able measures to those who are honourable is extremely easy ;
but if we ever have occasion to enforce a right course of con-
duct on the unprincipled, we must be careful not to reproach
them with the opposite nature of their life. 39. The minds $
of such an audience are to be influenced, not by dissertations
on the nature of virtue, for which they have no regard, but by
allusions to honour, and to the opinion of others, and if such
arguments to their vanity do not move them, by showing
the advantage likely to follow from what you advise, or rather
perhaps, and with more effect, by showing them how much is
to be dreaded if they act otherwise. 40. For besides the fact
that minds of the lightest principles are most easily alarmed,
I know not whether the fear of evil has not naturally more
influence with the majority of mankind than the hope of good;
to whom also the knowledge of what is vicious comes with
greater facility than the knowledge of that which is virtuous."
41. Sometimes also actions which are scarcely honourable are
recommended to the good; and to those of a rather opposite
character are proposed measures in which nothing but the
advantage of those who seek the advice is regarded.
I am well aware what sort of reflection may at once occur
to the reader of this passage. “Is this, them,” he may ask,
“the practice that you recommend ?f and do you think it
right?” 42. Cicero might absolve me, who writes in the fol-
lowing manner to Brutus, (after mentioning many courses of
conduct which might be fairly recommended to Caesar,S)
should I act as an honest man, if I should recommend these
measures & Certainly not ; for the proper object of an adviser
is the advantage of him whom he advises. But the measures
are right. Who says otherwise & But in giving advice there is
* In Livy, xxxviii. 40, Scipio and Fabius deliberate on the mode of
conducting the war against Carthage; Scipio recommends that it be
transferred into Africa; Fabius, that it be carried on in Italy.
Turnebws. -
f A passage very similar to that in Cicero pro Caelio, 4, 17: Haec
igitwr est twa disciplina 2 &c. See ix. 2, 15. Spalding.
: The letter is not extant. Capperonier.
Ś Augustus.
234 QUINTILIAN. [B.III.
23.3
is of a deeper nature, and does not concern deliberative
speeches only, the subject is reserved by me for my twelfth
book,” which will be my last. 43. I should not wish anything
to be done dishonourably;'t and, in the meantime, let these
questions be considered to belong at least to the exercises of
the schools; for the nature of what is bad should be known,
that we may the better support what is good. -
, 44. If any one, however, recommend to a good man any-
not always-room for what is right. As this question, however,
Athing not quite honourable, let him remember not to recom-
; mend it as dishonourable, in the manner in which some
{
declaimers urge Sextus Pompey to engage in piracy, for the
very reason that it is nefarious and cruel; but some palliation
must be thrown over what is disgraceful, even in addressing
the immoral. 45. It is in this way that Catiline speaks in
Sallust, so that he seems to rush daringly into a heinous
enterprise, not through want of regard for honesty, but
through indignation. It is thus also that Atreus speaks in
Varius: § .
“I now endure gross wickedness, and now
I’m forc’d to act it.”
How much more them is this pretension to honour to be
maintained before those who have a real regard to their cha-
racter 46. Accordingly, if we advise Cicero to implore the
mercy of Antony, or even to burn his Philippics, (supposing
such to be the condition on which Antony offers him life, ) we
shall not insist upon his love of life, (for if this has any influ
ence on his mind, it will maintain that influence even though
we remain silent,) but we shall exhort him to preserve himself
for the service of his country. 47. He will have occasion for
such a pretext, that he may not be ashamed of his suppli-
* See the whole of the twelfth chapter.
+ Nec ego quicqwam fieri turpiter velim..] Though a dishonourable
course may at times be recommended, Quintilian would not have it
recommended as dishonourable, but would have some plausible pretext
alleged for adopting it. Rollim.
f Catil. c. 20, ed. Cort.
§ In his Thyestes. See x. 1, 98. This was the Warius who was the
friend of Virgil and Horace.
| See Sen. Suasor. 6 and 7.
CH. VIII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 235
cations to Antony. Or if we advise Caius Caesar” to assume
kingly power, we shall assert that the state cannot subsist but
under the rule of one master; for he who deliberates about a
criminal proceeding, seeks only how he may appear to do as
little wrong as possible.
48. It is of much importance, also, what the character of
the adviser is; because, if his previous life has been illus-
trious, or if the mobility of his birth, or his age or fortune, ex-
cites expectation, care must be taken that what he says may
not be at variance with the dignity of him who says it; but
a character of a contrary nature requires a humbler tone; for
what is liberty in some, is, in others, called presumption; to
Some their authority is sufficient support, while the force of
reason itself scarcely upholds others. f
49. In consequence prosopopeiae + appear to me the most
difficult of all speeches of this kind; for in them the task of
sustaining a character is added to the other arduous points of
Suasory eloquence. Caesar, Cicero, and Cato, speaking on the
same subject, must each express himself differently. But
exercise in this department is extremely beneficial, both
because it requires double effort, and because it greatly
improves the powers of those who would be poets or historians.
50. To orators it is even indispensable; for there are many
speeches composed by Greek and Latin orators for others to
use, to whose condition and character what was expressed in
them was to be adapted. Did Cicero think uniformly in the
Same manner, or assume the Same character, when he wrote
for Cneius Pompey, for Titus Ampius, and for others? Did
he mot rather, looking to the fortune, dignity, and actions of
each of them, express the very character of all to whom he
gave words, so that, though they spoke in a better style than
their own, they yet appeared to speak in their own persons?
* Augustus. See the arguments used by Agrippa and Maecenas, to
induce him to assume the sovereignty, in Dion Cassius. “But even the
wisest of the Romans seem to have felt such alarm at the mention of
the word regnum, that Quintilian himself, who not only endured the
rule of Domitian, but called it one of the greatest blessings that had
ever fallen upon mankind, alludes, by no means obscurely, to affectation
of sovereign power as a res nefaria, a “criminal proceeding.” Spalding.
f By prosopopeiae he understands declamations in which the speaker
assumes the character of another person, and represents him as delibe-
rating. Rollin. See vi. 1, 25 ; ix. 2, 29, 37; xi. 1, 39.
i: For the reason given above, that the character must be sustained,
and persuasive arguments found.
236 QUINTILIAN, [B.III.
51. A speech is not less faulty which is unsuited to the per-
son, than that which is unsuited to the subject, to which it
ought to be adapted. Lysias, accordingly, is thought to de-
serve great praise for preserving so exact an air of truth in
the speeches which he wrote for the illiterate.*
It ought, indeed, to be a chief object with declaimers to
consider what is suitable to different characters; for they
speak on but few subjects of controversy as advocates,f but
generally harangue in the character of Sons, fathers, rich men,
old men, morose or good-natured persons, misers or super-
stitious people, cowards or jesters; so that actors in comedy
have scarcely more parts to master on the stage than they
have in the schools. 52. All these representations of charac-
ters may be regarded as prosopopeiae, which I include under
deliberative orations, because they differ from them in nothing
but the personation of a character, though this is sometimes
introduced into those deliberative subjects, which, taken from
history, are conducted under the real names of the speakers.
53. Nor am I ignorant that poetical and historical prosopopeiae
are sometimes given in the schools by way of exercise; as the
pleading of Priam before Achilles, or the address of Sylla to
the people on laying down the dictatorship. But these will
fall under some of the three heads into which I have divided
causes; for we have to intreat, to make declarations, to give
reasons, and to do other things of which I have spoken above, i.
in various forms and as the subject may require, both in the
judicial, and in the deliberative, and in the demonstrative,
kind of oratory. 54. But in all these S we very often utter
fictitious speeches attributed to characters which we ourselves
introduce; as in Cicero's speech for Coelius, Appius Caecus,
and Clodius, the brother of Clodia, are both represented as
* Such is the commendation bestowed upon him by Dionysius
Halicarnassensis, p. 82.
+ In scholastic declamations the pupils spoke on few subjects as
advocates, but generally in the character of one of the parties con-
cerned, as sons, fathers, old men, &c.; and thus prosopopeiae differed
from Swasoriae only in the character maintained ; for in Swasoriae the
speaker gave advice in his own person, in prosopopeiae in that of another.
Rollin.
i. C. 4, sect. 3. -
§ In his...] I consider the word his as referring to the three kinds of .
oratory which Quintilian has just mentioned, and not, as Gedoyn
thinks, to rogare, &c.; though his view of the passage is not without
speciousness. Spalding.
CH, VIII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 237
addressing Clodia, the former being made to reproach her with
her intrigues, and the other to admonish her about them.*
55. Matters for debate, too, are often introduced in the
schools, which approach nearer to the judicial than the delibe-
rative kind of oratory, and which are indeed compounded of
the two ; as when a discussion is held before Caesar about the
punishment of Theodotus; f for it consists of an accusation and
a defence, which are the proper parts of judicial pleadings.
56. But the question of expediency also enters into it; it is in-
quired whether it was to the advantage of Caesar that Pompey
was killed; whether war is to be apprehended from the king, if
Theodotus be put to death ; whether such war would not be
embarrassing and dangerous at the present time, and likely to be
of long duration. 57. Considerations also arise about the
honourableness of the proceeding: as whether it would be
becoming in Casar to avenge Pompey; whether it was to be
apprehended that he would injure the cause of his party, if he
should confess that Pompey was undeserving of death. 58. De-
liberations on such questions may occur even in real, causes.j.
There has, however, prevailed among most declaimers, in
regard to deliberative speeches, an error that has not been
without its consequences; for they have imagined that the
deliberative style of speaking is different from the judicial, and
indeed altogether opposed to it; and they have accordingly
affected abrupt commencements, a kind of oratory always
vehement, and a liberal embellishment, as they call it, in
their expressions, and have studied to make shorter notes,
* C. 14, 15. The text is ille in castigationem, hic in hortationem,
amorum, compositus. The soundness of hortationem is doubtful, but
nothing better has been suggested. Gesmer proposed curationem,
which, I suppose, hardly satisfied himself, and has satisfied no one else.
If we turn to the passage of Cicero, we find that the brother is made
to dissuade the sister from following one who despises her, and to
advise her, if she will still continue to intrigue, to seek some other
object for her love. .
# A rhetorician of Chios or Samos, who was the first to suggest to
Btolemy that Pompey, when he landed in Egypt, should be put to
death. See Plutarch, Life of Pompey, c. 77, 80; Appian, B.C. ii. 84,
90 ; Seneca de Ira, ii. 2; Seneca Controvers. ii. 13.
3: Comp. c. 62.
§ Comp. ii. 12, 9. Spalding.
| Breviores commentarios.] They brought less written matter from
home, and rose to speak relying on their own ardour and resolution to
238 QUINTILIAN. [B. III.
forsooth, for deliberative than for judicial subjects. 59. For
my part, though I do not see that there is any need for a
regular exordium in deliberative speeches for the reasons
which I have previously stated,” I still do not understand
why we should commence with furious exclamation; for he who
is asked his opinion on a question proposed, does not, if he is
a man of sense, begin immediately to cry out, but endeavours
to gain the confidence of those who consult him by a modest
r and rational entrance on the subject, 60. Or why should the
style of the speaker be like a torrent, and uniformly vehe-
ment, when counsel requires in the most eminent degree
moderation and calm reasoning? I admit that, in judicial
pleadings, the tone of the speaker is often lowered in the
exordium, the statement of facts, and the argumentative
portions, and that, if you take away these three parts, there
will remain something like the substance of which deliberative
orations consist, but that substance ought to be more calm, not
more violent and furious.
61. As to grandeur of diction, it is not to be affected by
those who declaim deliberative speeches more than by
others; but it comes more naturally to them ; for to those who
imagine their own subjects, great personages are generally
most attractive, such as those of kings, princes, people, Senates,
with important topics for discussion; and thus, when the style
j is suited to the matter, it assumes a degree of magnificence
from it. 62. With regard to real causes the case is different,
and therefore Theophrastus+ has pronounced that the language
in all deliberative oratory should be free from every kind of
affectation; following in this respect the authority of his
master, though he does not hesitate frequently to differ from
him ; 63. for Aristotle was of opinion $ that the panegyrical
department of oratory was the best adapted for improvement
in composition, and next to it the judicial; since the first is
pour forth words. Compare sect. 63. Commentari; here are notes
made for future orations; see i. 8, 19; iii. 6, 59; and Cic. Brut. c. 44
extr. But as they made fewer notes for their speeches, the speeches
were in Gonsequence shorter. Comp. Sect. 68. Spalding.
* Sect. 6.
# III. 1, 15.
i Aristotle.
§ See Rhet. iii. 12, 5 ; where, however, the reasons which Quintilian
adds are not given. Spalding.
CH, VIII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 239
devoted wholly to display, and the latter requires art so as
even to deceive the hearers if expediency demands; but counsel
needs nothing but truth and prudence, 64. With these
critics in respect to panegyric, I agree ; for all other writers
have expressed themselves of a similar opinion; but in judicial
and deliberative subjects I think that the manner of speaking
is to be adapted to the matter, according to the nature of the
question that may be under consideration. 65. I see that the
Philippics of Demosthenes are distinguished by the same
merits as the speeches which he pronounced in judicial causes;
and the opinions of Cicero delivered in the senate, and his
speeches to the people, exhibit a splendour of eloquence not less
luminous than that which appears in his accusations and de-
fences. Yet he speaks of the deliberative kind of oratory in
this way:* The language ought to be uniformly simple and
grave, and more distinguished for studied thoughts than for
studied phraseology. 66. That there is no kind of oratory
to which the application of examples is more suitable, all
writers are justly agreed, as the future seems for the most
part to correspond to the past, and experience is regarded as
Some attestation to reason.
67. As to shortness or length in such speeches, it depends,
not on the nature of the subject,i but on the compass of it;
for as in deliberations the question is generally more simple,
so in judicial affairs it is often of less extent.:
All these remarks he will find to be true, who shall prefer,
instead of growing grey over the treatises of the rhetoricians,
to read, not speeches only, but also histories; for in history
the orations pronounced to the people, and the opinions de-
livered in councils of state, generally afford examples of
persuasion and dissuasion. 68. He will find, too, that in
deliberative speeches the commencements are not abrupt;
that the diction in judicial pleadings is often more animated;
* Partitiones Oratoriae, c. 27 fin.
+ Genere materiae..] Whether it be demonstrative, deliberative, or
judicial, it is not on the particular kind that the length or brevity,
ought to depend. Capperonier.
# Quintilian blames certain teachers, who directed that judicial.
speeches should be of considerable length, and deliberative speeches:
shorter, whereas length is not to be measured by the kind of cause,
but by the subject, and consequently deliberative are sometimes longer
than judicial speeches. Twrmebw8. º
240 QUINTILIAN. [B.III.
that style is suited to the matter in one class as well as in the
other; and that the speeches in courts of justice are sometimes
shorter than those in public councils. 69. Nor will he find in
them the faults into which some of our declaimers fall, who
indulge in coarse invectives against those that dissent in opinion
from them, and speak, on the whole, as if they were the natural
adversaries of those who ask their advice ; and thus exhibit
themselves in the character rather of railers than of counsellors.
70. Let young men know that these remarks are written for
their admonition, that they may not allow themselves to be
taught otherwise than they will have to speak, and spend their
time upon learning that which they will have to unlearn. But,
whenever they shall be called to give counsel to their friends,
to pronounce an opinion in the senate, or to offer advice if the
emperor consult them, they will be taught by practice what
they cannot perhaps receive on the credit of precepts.
CHAPTER IX.
Of judicial oratory; the departments of it often injudiciously increased;
the proper number is five, Ś i–6. The order to be observed in
speaking and writing, 7–9. -
1. I AM now to speak of the judicial kind of oratory, which
is extremely varied, but lies in the two duties of attack and
defence. The divisions of it, as most authors are of opinion,
are five, the exordium, the statement of facts, the proof of
what we advance, the refutation of our adversary, and the
peroration. 2. To these some have added partition, proposition,
and digression ; the first two of which evidently fall under
proof; for you must necessarily propose what you are going to
prove, as well as conclude after you have proved; and, if pro-
position is a division of a cause, why is not also conclusion ?” As
for partition, it is only one of the duties of arrangement, which is
a portion of oratory in general, equally pervading all its parts and
the whole body of each, like invention and delivery. 3. We are,
therefore, not to consider partition as one division of a speech,
* Which no writer on oratory has yet considered as a division of it.
Spalding.
CH.IX.] EDUCATION OF AN 'ORATOR. 24, 1
taken as a whole, but as belonging to every single question in
it; for what question is there in which the Orator may not
state what he is going to say in the first place, what in the
second, and what in the third ; and this is the business of
partition. How ridiculous is it them, that each question
should be a species of proof, and that partition, which is
but a species of question, should be called a part of the
speech as a whole 2 4. But as for digression, or, what has
become a more common term, excessus, “excursion,” if it be
without the cause, it cannot be a part of the cause ; and, if it
be within the cause, it is an aid or ornament to the parts from
which it proceeds; for if whatever is in the cause is to be
called a part of the cause, why is not every argument, com-
parison, common place, address to the feelings, and eaſample,
called a part of the cause?
5. I do not, however, agree with those who, like Aristotle,”
omit refutation, as comprehended under proof; for proof
establishes, refutation overthrows. Aristotle t also makes an
innovation to a certain degree, by placing next to the exordium,
not the statement of facts, but the proposition; but this he
does because he thinks the proposition the genus, and the
statement of facts the species; and supposes that there is not
always a necessity for the first, but for the second always and
in all cases.
6. But with regard to the divisions which I have made, it is
not to be understood that that which is to be delivered first is
necessarily to be contemplated first;f for we ought to consider,
before everything else, of what nature the cause is ; what is
the question in it ; what may profit or injure it next, what is
to be maintained or refuted ; and then, how the statement of
facts should be made. 7. For the statement $ is preparatory to
proof, and cannot be made to advantage, unless it be first
settled what it ought to promise as to proof. Last of all, it is
to be considered how the judge is to be conciliated; for, until
all the bearings of the cause be ascertained, we cannot know
what sort of feeling it is proper to excite in the judge, whether
* Rhet. ii. 26, 3 ; iii. 13, 4; 17, 14.
+ Rhet. iii. 13. :
t Cic. de Inv. i. 14; de Orat. ii. 77; see also Quint. iii. 6, 12.
§ Eapositio.] Take care not to confound it with propositio. It is
plainly the same as marrotto. Spalding.
R.
242 QUINTILIAN. [B.III.
}
inclined to severity or gentleness, to violence or laxity, to
inflexibility or mercy.
8. Yet, I do not, on these accounts, agree with those who
think that the exordium is to be written last;” for though it
is proper that our materials should be collected, and that we
should settle what effect is to be produced by each particular,
before we begin to speak or write, yet we ought certainly to
begin with that which is naturally first. 9. No man begins
to paint a portrait, or mould a statue, with the feet; nor does
any art find its completion where the commencement ought
to be. Else what will be the case if we have no time to write
our speech 2 Will not so preposterous a practice disappoint
us? The orator's materials are, therefore, to be first contem-
plated in the order in which we direct,f and then to be written
in the order in which he is to deliver them.
CHAPTER X.
A cause rests either on one point of controversy, or on several; on
points of the same or of different kinds, $ 1, 2. Comparison,
3, 4. We must first settle the kind of cause ; what points are to
be considered next, 5. *
1. EvKRY cause, in which there is one method for a plaintiff,
and another for a defendant, consists either in a controversy
about one charge or about several. The one is called simple,
the other complea. A question about a theft by itself, or an
act of adultery by itself, is single and independent. When
there are several questions, they may be either of the same
kind, as in a charge of extortion ; or of different kinds, as in
a charge of sacrilege and homicide at the same time. This
union of charges does not now occur in public trials, because
the praetor takes cognizance of each according to a fixed law,
but is frequent in the causes tried before the emperors and the
senate, and used to be common in those that came before the
people; and disputes between private individuals often require
* Antonius, in Cicero de Oratore, mentions this as his practice.
+ Praecipimus.] Ad ipsum Fabium pertimet. Gesner. -
† Namely, since the quaestiones perpetuſe were instituted. See
Adam's Rom. Ant. p. 116, 8vo. ed. , , , ,
CH.X.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR, 243
one judge to determine as to many different points of law.
2. Nor will there be more than two kinds of causes, even in
cases where one party prosecutes the same suit, and on the
same ground, against several; or two against one ; or several
against Several; as we sometimes see occur in actions about
inheritances; because, though there be several parties, the
cause is still but one, unless indeed the condition * of the
parties give rise to distinct questions.
3. There is, however, said to be a third kind, different from
these, called comparative ; and some consideration with regard
to comparison frequently happens in some part of a cause ; as
when, in a case before the centumviri, there arises, after other
questions, one of this kind, which of two persons s better enti-
tled to an inheritance 2 But it seldom happens that trials are
appointed in the forum + merely for that object, and only in
cases of divination, which take place for the purpose of appoint-
ing an accuser, or sometimes between informers to decide which
of two has a better claim to a reward.
4. To this number some have indeed added a fourth, called
&yrazornyogic, “recrimination,” or mutual accusation; but
others think that this is comprehended under the comparative
kind; and the case of reciprocal suits f will be similar to it; a
case which happens very frequently; and if this ought also to be
called &vrizornyogío, (for it has no proper appellation with us,)
there will be two kinds of it, one in which the parties bring
the same charge against each other ; the other in which they
bring different charges. The case is similar with regard to
demands.
5. When the nature S of the cause has been determined, we
shall then have to consider, whether the fact, which is made a
charge by the accuser against the defendant, is to be denied,
* As in the trial respecting two legitimate sons and one illegitimate,
c. 6, sect. 95. Twºmebus.
f Hence it is evident that the centumviri did not sit in the forum.
Capperonier.
: When the accuser claims one thing from the defendant, and the
defendant another thing from the accuser. The French term is recon-
vention. Capperonier.
§ Genus causae.] That is, what kind of judicial cause it is; for genus
does not here refer to the threefold division into demonstrative, delibe-
rative, and judicial Capperonier.
| Status infitialis, or facti quaestio. 2
R.
244 QUINTILIAN. [B.III.
or to be justified,” or to be called by another name,f or to be
excluded : from that particular sort of process. By this
means the states of causes are determined.
CHAPTER XI.
Hermagoras's method of proceeding ; the question, § 1–3. The
mode of defence, 4–6. The point for decision, 7, 8. The ground
or substance of the cause, 9. The question and the point for
decision may be conjoined or separate, according to the nature of
the cause, 10–17. Opinions of Cicero, 18–20. Hermagoras too
fond of nice subdivisions, 21–25. Method of Theodorus, 26, 27.
Conclusion, 28.
1. WHEN these matters are settled, Hermagoras thinks that
we must next consider what is the question, the mode of defence,$
the point for judgment, the ovyážoy," or point “containing” the
accusation, or, as some call it it, the firmamentum, or “founda–
tion ” of the cause.
Question, in its more general sense, is understood to mean every-
thing on which two or more plausible opinions may be advanced.
2. But in regard to judicial matters, it is to be taken in two
senses; one, when we say that a cause involves several ques-
tions, among which we include even those of least importance;
the other, when we mean the great question on which a cause
turns. It is of the second that I now speak, and it is from
this that the state has its origin: Has a thing been done 2**
What has been done ºff Has it been justifiably done 7: 3.
These interrogatories Hermagoras, Apollodorus, and many
other writers, call properly questions; Theodorus, as Iobserved, $
* Status qualitatis.
f Status definitivus.
+ Status translativus. -
§ Ratio.] “Moyen de défense.” Gedoyn. Ratio est qué id, quod
factum esse constat, defenditur ; sect. 4.
| Judicatio.] Tô kpwéuevov, the point on which the judges have to
pronounce a decision. Capperonier.
*|| Quod continet accusationem. Auct. ad Herenn. i. 16.
** Status conjecturalis.
++ Status deſ?nitivus.
†† Status qualitatis.
§§ C. 6. sect. 2, 5; and see sect. 26 of this chapter.
CH.XI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 245
terms them general heads, and the minor questions, or those
dependent on them, special heads ; as it admitted that one
question may arise from another question, and that a species*
may be divided into species. 4. This principal question of
all, then, they call the Čºrnºo.
The mode of defence is that process by which what is
admitted to have been done is justified. To exemplify it, why
should I not use that instance which almost all writers have
adopted? Orestes killed his mother: this is admitted; he
says that he killed her justly : the state will then be that of
quality; the question, Whether he killed her justly : the ground
of defence will be that Clytemnestra killed her husband, the
father of Orestes : this is called the ałrlov.
The point for judgment, the zgyöugyov, will be, in this case,
whether even a mother guilty of such a crime ought to be killed
by her son.
5. Some have made a distinction between offroy and cirío,
making the first signify the cause for which a trial becomes
necessary, as the killing of Clytemnestra ; the second, the
ground on which the deed is justified, as the killing of Aga-
memnon. But such has been the disagreement as to the
sense of these words, that Some call cirío, the cause of the
trial, and cºrrow the cause of the deed, while others use them
in senses exactly contrary. Among the Latins some have
adopted the terms initium, “ commencement,” and ratio,
“reason;” some include both under the same term. 6.
Cause also appears to arise from cause, Człrloy 3% oitſov, as,
Clytemnestra killed Agamemnon because he had sacrificed their
common daughter, and brought home a captive as his concubine.
The same authors are of opinion that in one question there
may be several grounds of defence; as, for example, if Orestes
adds another cause for having killed his mother, namely, that
he was forced to obey an oracle ; and that, whatever number
of causes for the deed may be alleged, there are the same
number of points for judgment; as it will also be a point for
judgment whether he ought to have obeyed the oracle. 7. But
even one alleged cause for a deed may, as I conceive, give rise
to several questions and points for judgment; as in the case
* Logicians divide a species into individuals, but deny that it can
be divided into other species, unless it be put in the sense of genus ;
. in which sense Quintilian seems to use it here. Regius,
246 QUINTILIAN. [B.III.
of the man, who, after he had killed his wife on catching her in
adultery, subsequently killed the adulterer, who at first escaped,
in the forum; for the alleged cause for the deed is but one, He
was an adulterer; but several questions and points for judg-
ment may arise, as whether it was lawful to kill him at that
time, or in that place. 8. But as, when there are several
questions, and all have their states, there is yet but one state
in the cause to which everything is referred, so there is but
one proper point for judgment, on which the decision is
pronounced.
9. As to the guyážov, (which, as I said, some call continens,
others firmamentum, and Cicero * the strongest argument of the
defender, and the fittest point for adjudication,) Some regard
it as that after which nothing remains to be ascertained; some,
as that which is the strongest point for adjudication. 10. The
reason of the deed is not a point for consideration in all causes;
for what reason for the deed need be sought, when the deed is
altogether denied ? But when the reason of the deed is an
object of consideration, they deny that the ultimate point for
decision rests on the same ground as the first question ; an
observation which Cicero makes both in his Rhetorica t and
his Partitiones.j. 11. For, when it is Said, It was done; it
was not done ; was it done 7 the question rests on conjecture,
and the judication rests on the same ground as the question,
because the first question and the ultimate decision are about
the same point. But when it is said, Orestes killed his mother;
he killed her justly ; no, but unjustly ; did he kill her justly 7
the question rests on the consideration of quality; but this is
not yet the point for decision. When them will it be? After
the statement, She had killed my father ; but you ought not,
therefore, to have killed your mother; ought Orestes to have
killed her ? here is the point for decision. 12. The funda-
mental point of the defence I will give in the words of Cicero Š
himself: “if Orestes were inclined to say that the disposition
of his mother towards his father, towards himself and his
sisters, towards his kingdom, and towards the reputation of
his race and family, had been of such a nature that her children
felt of all people most obliged to inflict punishment on
her.” 13. Others also use such examples as these : the law
says, let him who has eahausted his patrimony not be allowed
* Inv. i. 14. + Inv. i. 14. j: C. 30. § Inv. i. 14
CH. XI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 247
to address the people; but the defendant exhausted his upon
public works ; and the question then is, whether whoever has
eachausted his patrimony is not to be allowed ; and the point
for judgment, whether he who has eachausted his patrimony in
such a way is not to be allowed. 14. Or the case of the
Auruncan soldier,” who killed the tribune Caius Lusius, when
he made dishonourable advances to him, in which the question
is, whether he killed him justly ; the ground of defence, that he
made dishonourable advances; the point for judgment, whether
it were lawful for a person to be killed uncondemned; whether
it were lawful for a tribune to be killed by a soldier.
15. Some also regard the question, as in one state, and the point
for decision in another ; the question whether Milo did right in
killing Clodius, is in the state of quality;f the point for decision,
whether Clodius lay in wait for Milo, isinthe state of conjecture.j:
16. They say also that a cause often strays into some matter
which does not properly belong to the question, and on which
the decision is pronounced. I am not at all of their opinion ; for
the question, for instance, whether every man who has eachausted
his patrimony is forbidden to address the people, must have its
decision ; and, therefore, the question and the point for decision
will not be different; but there will be more than one ques-
tion, and more than one point for decision. 17. In the case of
Milo, too, is not the question of fact considered with reference
to the question of quality? for if Clodius lay in wait, it follows
that he was justly killed. But when the cause goes into some
other matter, and recedes from the question which was first
proposed, the question will be in the state in which the point
for decision is.
18. Respecting these matters even Cicero is in Some degree at
Variance with himself; for in his Rhetorica, as I said above,'
he has followed Hermagoras; in his Topica, he expresses
* The story is noticed by Cicero, Pro Mil. c. 4, and Val. Max. vi. 1,
12, and is related at length by Plutarch in his Life of Marius. Plutarch
calls the soldier Trebonius; Valerius calls him Caius Plotius. It is
also mentioned in the third of the declamations attributed to Quin-
tilian. Of what country the soldier was a native no other author
specifies. Spalding.
‘f Question of right.
†: Question of fact.
§ C. 6, sect. 59.
|| C. 25.
248 QUINTILIAN. [B.III.
himself of opinion that the xguyángyov, the point of judgment, is
the consideration arising from the state ; and in addressing Tre-
batius, a lawyer of his time, he calls it the point about which
the discussion is, and terms the particulars in which that
point is contained continentia, the “containing particulars;”
the firmamenta, “ supports” as it were of the defence, without
which there would be no defence at all. 19. But in his Partitiones
Oratoriae” he calls the firmamentum that which is opposed to
the defence; because the continens, the “containing point,” as it
is the first thing, is advanced by the accuser; while the ratio,
“mode of defence,” proceeds from the defendant; and from
the opposition of the ratio and firmamentum arises the question
for decision.
Those authors, therefore, have settled the matter more
iudiciously and concisely, who have made the state, and the
containing point, and the question for decision, to be all the
same, and have pronounced the containing point to be that
without which there would be no discussion. 20. In this
“containing point” they seem to me to have included both
allegations, that Orestes killed his mother, and that Clytem-
nestra killed Agamemnon. The same writers think that the
state and the point for judgment always concur ; and indeed
any other opinion would have been at variance with their
views.
21. But this studied subtilty about names of things is but
ostentatious labour, and has only been noticed by me that I
might not appear to have given too little consideration to the
work which I have taken in hand; but a master who teaches
without affectation need not split his mode of teaching into
such minute distinctions. 22. Excessive subdivision is a fault
into which many rhetoricians have fallen, and especially Her-
magoras, a man otherwise of great Sagacity, and deserving of
admiration on many accounts, and censurable only for too
anxious diligence, so that even what we blame in him is not
unworthy of some degree of commendation. 23. But the way
which I follow is far shorter, and for that reason plainer, and
will neither fatigue the learner with long windings, nor ener
vate the body of his language by portioning it out into minute
particulars.f For he who sees what point it is that comes
* C. 29.
+ A mixture of metaphors unusual with Quintilian.
CH.XI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR, 249
into controversy; what the opposite side wishes to do with
regard to it, and by what means; what his own side has to
do, (a particular especially to be regarded,) cannot be without
a full understanding of all the matters on which I have just
spoken. 24. Nor can there, we may say, be any person, not
utterly devoid of sense, and a stranger to all practice in
pleading, that does not know what it is that gives rise to a
discussion, (which is called by the rhetoricians the cause and
the containing point,) what is the question between two.
parties, and on what point judgment must be given; which
three things are indeed all the same ; for the subject of the
question is that which comes into controversy, and judgment
is given respecting that which is the subject of the question.
25. But we do not perpetually keep our attention fixed on
these matters, but, moved with the desire of obtaining praise
by whatever means, or carried away with the pleasure of
speaking, we allow ourselves to wander from our subject; since
matter without the cause is always more abundant than within
it, for in the controversy itself there is indeed comparatively
little, and everything else is beyond its limits; and, in the one
case, we speak only of matters in which we have been in-
structed, in the other, on whatever we please. 26. Nor is it
so much to be charged upon ourselves that we should discover
the question, the containing point, and the point for judgment,
(for to discover them is easy,) as that we should always look
steadily to our object, or at least, if we digress from it, should
recover sight of it, lest, while we are striving for applause, our
arms should drop from our grasp.
27. The school of Theodorus, as I said,” distinguishes
every thing into heads ; under which term several particulars
are comprehended. Under the first only the main question,
the same as the state ; under the next, other questions, which
refer to the main question ; under the third, the proposition
with its proofs. The word is used in the same sense in which
we say caput rei est, “it is the head of the business;” in
Menander,” xspáX&tów Śort. But, in general, whatever is to be
proved will be a head, whether of greater or lesser importance.
* See sect. 3.
+ Turnebus supposes that Menander the rhetorician is meant;
Gallaeus and Spalding, with more probability, Menander the writer of
comedies.
f
f
250 QUINTILIAN. [B. III,
28. Since I have now set forth, even more circumstantially
than was requisite, what is taught on these points by the
writers of books on rhetoric ; and since I have already” speci-
fied the several parts of judicial causes, my next book shall
treat of proems or eacordia.
* C. 9. sect. 1.
EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 25]
BOOK IV.
INTRODUCTION.
The grandsons of the sister of Domitian committed to the tuition of
Quintilian ; a new motive for care in composing his work. He
proceeds to speak of the exordium of a speech, the statement of
facts, the proof, the refutation of adverse allegations, and the
peroration.
1. AFTER finishing, my dear Marcellus Victor, the third
book of the work dedicated to you, and completing about the
fourth part of my task, a motive for fresh diligence, and deeper
solicitude as to the judgment that I may deserve from the
public, have occurred to me. Hitherto we were but compar-
ing studies, as it were, between ourselves; and if my method
of instruction was but little approved by others, I thought my-
self likely to be quite contented with our domestic advantage,
deeming it sufficient to regulate the education of your son and
my own. 2. But since Domitian Augustus has vouchsafed
me the charge of his sister's grandsons,” I should not suffi-
ciently feel the honour of his divine judgment,t if I were not
to estimate the greatness of my undertaking as proportioned
to this distinction. 3. For what pains can I spare in the culti-
vation of the morals of youth, in order that the most upright
of censors may have reason to approve them 2 Or in pro-
moting their studies, that I may not be found to have disap-
pointed, in this respect, the expectations of a prince most
eminent, not only in other accomplishments, but also in elo-
quence P 4. And if no one is surprised that the greatest
* They were the sons of Flavius Clemens and Domitilla, the grand-
daughter of Vespasian, who was the daughter of another Domitilla,
the sister of Domitian ; the name of the latter Domitilla's husband is
unknown. See Suet. Dom. c. 15; Dion. Cass. p. 1112, ed. Reim.
Spalding.
+ Similar adulation is bestowed by Welleius Paterculus on Tiberius,
ii. 94, 104, 123. Domitian assumed to himself the titles of Domin/ws
and Dews, as is related by Suetonius, Dom. c. 13. See also Martial,
Ep. v. 81; x. 72 ; iii. 12, 15, 9, 10. See Barthius ad Stat. Sylv. i. 1,
62. Spalding. -
† Sanctissimus censor.] Domitian was the first of the Roman empe-
rors that assumed the title of supreme censor; see Dion. Cass, lib.
lxvii. p. 1104, ed. Reim. On some coins he is styled censor perpetuw8.
252 QUINTILIAN. [B.Iv.
poets have often invoked the Muses, not only at the beginning
of their works, but, on advancing in their course, and arriving
at Some point of greatimportance, have renewed their addresses,
and used as it were fresh solicitations, 5. I myself shall surely
be pardoned also, if I now do that which I omitted to do when
I entered on my subject, and call all the deities to my aid,
and especially him than whom there is no deity more auspicious
or more peculiarly favourable to learning; in order that he may
inspire me with ability proportioned to the expectation which
he has raised of me, may propitiously and kindly support me,
and render me in reality such as he has supposed me to be.
6. For such devotional feeling, this, though my greatest, is
not my only reason; for besides, as my work advances, the
parts on which I am entering are more important and
more difficult than those which have preceded them. It
is now to be shown, in the next place, what is the process
of judicial causes, which are extremely numerous and diver-
sified; what is the purpose of the ea ordium ; what is the
proper form of a statement of facts; what constitutes the force
of proofs, either when we confirm our own assertions, or over-
throw those of our adversary; and what is the power of a pero-
nation, either when the memory of the judge is to be refreshed
by a short recapitulation, or when, what is far the most effec-
tive, his feelings are to be excited. 7. On these particulars, some
authors, as if they dreaded the weight of the whole in a body,
have preferred to write separately, and even thus have published
several books on each of them; while I, having ventured to
embrace them all, see before me a labour almost boundless,
and am oppressed with the very thought of the task which I
have undertaken. But, as I have begun, I must persevere;
and, if I fail in strength, must nevertheless proceed with
courage.
CH.I.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 253
CHAPTER I.
Etymology of the word proem, § 1–3. An erroneous practice in the
Schools and in the forum, 4. Object of the proem or exordium, 5.
How the good will and attention of the judge may be gained by
allusion to different characters concerned in the cause, 6—19.
Farther observations on the same subject, 20 –27. Difference
between the exordium and the conclusion, 28, 29. Matters con-
nected with the characters and the cause to be considered, 30–32.
Solicitude to be shown by the pleader; brevity to be promised;
accurate division of matter to be made, 33–36. To conciliate
the judge must be the pleader's constant object throughout his
speech, 37–39. Five kinds of causes, 40–41. Some make two
purposes of a proem, proposition and insinuation; the latter more
easy for the advocate than for his client, 42—49. An unnecessary
rule of the Apollodoreans, 50, 51. Points to be regarded in the
exordium, 52–60. The speaker's memory must not fail him in
it, 61. Its length must be proportioned to the cause, 62. Whether
apostrophe, and other figures of speech, may be used in it, 63–71.
Whether a formal exordium is always necessary, 72–75. Mode of
transition to the statement of facts, 76–79.
1. THAT which is called the beginning, or ea ordium in Latin,
the Greeks seem with greater reason to have termed the
Tgoofulov : for by our writers is signified only a commencement,
but the Greek rhetoricians plainly show that this is the part pre-
liminary to the entrance on the subject on which the orator is
to speak. 2. For whether it be because oftºn signifies a tune,
and players on the lyre + have called the short prelude that
they execute, for the purpose of conciliating favour, before they
enter upon the regular contest for the prize,t a proaºmium,
orators, in consequence, have distinguished the address which
they make to gain the good will of the judges, before they com-
mence their pleading, by the same appellation; 3. or whether,
because the Greeks call a way of 10g, it became a practice to call
that a proacmium which precedes the entrance on a subject; it
is certainly the proem, or eacordium, that produces a good effect
on the judge before he understands what the cause is ; and we
act erroneously in the schools, in using exordia of such a nature
* Aristot. Rhet. iii. 14, 1.
t Legitimum certamen.] Some read carmen, observes Rollin. Spald-
ing says that he met with carmen in the text only of one manuscript,
but saw it in the margin of some others. “It is the dydºv that is
meant, in which they contended for the honour and reward of skill.
Examples are numerous; see, e.g. Sueton. Ner, c. 12, 22, 23.” Gesner.
254 QUINTILIAN. [B.IV,
as if the judge was thoroughly acquainted with the cause. 4.
The liberty taken in this respect arises from the circumstance
that the usual idea of the cause * is given previous to the com-
mencement of the declamation. Such kind of exordia may
be adopted indeed in the forum in second processes, but
in a first process f seldom or ever, unless we chance to
plead before a judge to whom the matter has become known
from some other quarter.
5. In giving an exordium at all there is no other object but
to prepare the hearer to listen to us more readily in the sub-
sequent parts of our pleading. This object, as is agreed
among most authors, is principally effected by three means,
by securing his good will and attention, and by rendering him
desirous of further information ; not that these ends are not
to be kept in view throughout the whole pleading, but because
they are pre-eminently necessary at the commencement, when
we gain admission as it were into the mind of the judge in
order to penetrate still farther into it.
6. As to good will, we either gain it from persons connected
with the cause, or have it from the cause itself. But in respect
to persons, regard is not to “ had to three only, (as most rhe-
toricians have supposed,) the prosecutor, the defendant, and the
judge ; for the exordium sometimes takes its complexion from
the character of the pleader ; and though he speaks sparingly
and modestly concerning himself, yet, if he be deemed a good
man, much influence, in reference to the whole cause, may de-
pend on that consideration; for he will then be thought to bring
to the support of his party not merely the zeal of an advocate,
but almost the testimony of a witness. 7. Let him be regarded
as coming to plead, therefore, from being induced by obligations
of kindred or friendship, or above all, if it be possible, by respect
for his country, or for some strong considerations of precedent.
This, without doubt, is still more to be observed by the parties
* Illa velut imago litis.] That is, the thema, which is prefixed to the
declamation, as in those of Seneca and Quintilian. See iv. 2, 28; vii.
1, 4. Spalding. - .*
+ Secundis actionibus—primis guidem rarð.] Secundae actiones are
such as the libri secundae actionis against Verres, when, as the trial
could not be brought to an end at once, it was adjourned for three
days. Not that this secumda actio really took place ; but such is the
way in which Cicero represents the case. Primae actiones are mentioned
'Xii. 9, 16. Spalding.
CH. I.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 255
themselves, so that they may seem to go to law from some
important and honourable motive, or even from necessity.
8. But as the authority of the speaker becomes thus of the
highest efficacy, if, in his undertaking the business, all suspi-
cion of meanness, or hatred, or ambition, be far removed from
him, so it is a sort of tacit commendation to him, if he represents
himself as weak, and inferior in ability to those acting against
him, a practice which is adopted in most of the exordia of
Messala. 9. For there is a matural feeling in behalf of those
oppressed; and a conscientious judge most willingly listems to
an advocate whom he does not suspect of any, design to draw
him from justice. Hence arose that dissembling of the speakers,
of antiquity to conceal their eloquence, so extremely different;
from the ostentation of our times. s
10. We must also take care not to appear insolent, malig-
nant, overbearing, or reproachful towards any man or body of
men, especially such as cannot be wounded without exciting
an unfavourable feeling in the judge. 11. That nothing
should be said against the judge himself, not only openly, but
nothing even that can be understood as adverse to him, it
would be foolish in me to advise, if such things did not some-
times take place.
The character of the advocate for the opposite party may
sometimes afford us matter for an exordium ; if we speak of
him sometimes with honour, making it appear that we fear
his eloquence and influence, so as to render them objects of
suspicion to the judge; or sometimes, though very rarely, with
contempt, as Asinius Pollio, in pleading for the heirs of
Urbinia,” enumerates the choice of Labienus as advocate for
the opposite party among the proofs of the badness of their
cause. 12. Cornelius Celsus denies that such remarks consti-
tute exordia, as having no relation to the cause; I, however,
am led to form a contrary opinion, not only by the authority
* To the enmity between Asinius Pollio and Labienus I have
alluded on i. 5, 8. The Urbinian case, as far as it can be understood
from two other passages in which it is noticed, (vii. 2, 5, 26,) was of the
following nature : Certain persons, who, resting their claims either on
a will or on relationship, sought to get possession of the property of
Urbinia, were opposed by Clusinius Figulus, whom the claimants
declared to be a slave, his real name being Sosipater ; and whose
character Pollio tried to depreciate by remarking on his connexion
with a man so unprincipled as Labienus. Comp. xii. 1, 13. Spalding.
}
|
256 - QUINTILIAN. [B.IV.
of the greatest authors, but because I consider, for my own
part, that whatever relates to the pleader of the cause relates
to the cause itself; since it is but natural that judges should
be more inclined to believe those whom they are more inclined
to hear.
13. As to the character of the prosecutor, it may be treated
in various ways; sometimes his worth may be asserted, some-
times his weakness commended to notice. Sometimes a state-
ment of his merits may be proper, when a pleader may speak
with less reserve in praise of another's worth than he would in
that of his own. Sex, age, condition, are of great influence,
as in the case of women, old men, or wards, when they plead
in the character of wives, parents, or children. 14. Commi.
seration alone, indeed, has effect even upon a right-minded
judge. But such matters are to be lightly touched, and not
exhausted, in an exordium.
The character of the adversary is commonly attacked with
references to topics of a similar nature, but directed against
him; for on the powerful envy must be shown to attend, on
the mean and abject, contempt; on the base and criminal,
hatred; three qualities that have great power in alienating the
favour of the judges. 15. Nor is it enough merely to state
such particulars, (for this is in the power even of the ignorant,)
but most of them must be magnified or extenuated, as may
be expedient; for to give effect to them is the business of the
orator; the mere expression of them may be inherent in the
cause itself.
16. The favour of the judge we shall conciliate, not merely
by offering him praise, (which ought indeed to be given with
moderation, though it is to be remembered at the same time,
that the privilege of offering it is common to both parties,) but
by turning his praises to the advantage of our cause, appealing,
in behalf of the noble to his dignified station, in behalf of the
humble to his justice, in behalf of the unfortunate to his pity,
in behalf of the injured to his severity; and using similar
appeals in other cases. 17. I should wish also, if possible, to
know the character of the judge, for, according as it may be
violent, gentle, obliging, grave, austere, or easy, it will be
proper to make his feelings subservient to our cause where they
fall in with it, and to soften them where they are repugnant to it.
18. But it sometimes happens, also, that he who sits as
CH. I.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 257
judge is either our enemy or the friend of our opponent, a
circumstance which ought to claim the attention of both sides,
but more particularly, perhaps, of that to which the judge
seems to incline. For there is sometimes, in unprincipled
judges,” a foolish propensity to give sentence against their
friends, or in favour of parties with whom they are at enmity,
and to act unjustly that they may not seem to be unjust.
19. Some have been judges, too, in their own causes. I
find, for instance, in the books of observations published by
Septimius,f that Cicero was engaged in a cause of that nature;
and I myself pleaded the cause of Queen Berenice; before
that queen herself. In this case the mode of procedure is
similar to that in those which I have just mentioned; for he
who pleads in opposition to the judge exaggerates the confi-
dence of his client, and he who pleads in his favour expresses
apprehension of feelings of delicacy on his part.S. 20. Opi-
nions, moreover, such as the judge may appear to have brought
with him in favour of either party || are to be overthrown or
established. Fear" is sometimes to be removed from the
mind of the judge; as Cicero, in his speech for Milo, strove to
convince the judges that they were not to think the arms of
Pompey arrayed against them ; and sometimes to be held out to
* Pravis judicibus hic ambitus.] Aldus reads pravus.
+ To this Septimius and his work no other writer appears to make
any allusion. . . . The cause in which Cicero was engaged cannot have
been like any of those of his pleading with which we are acquainted,
as those of Ligarius, Deiotarus, Marcellus, (to which Turnebus com-
pares it.) for those were causes of Caesar himself, before whom they
were pleaded. Spalding.
ſt She with whom Titus was in love, and to whom he even promised
marriage, but was obliged to send her away from Rome against his
will and her own; Suet. Tit. c. 7. She was the daughter of the elder
Agrippa, king of Judaea, and widow of Herod, her own uncle, king of
Chalcis in Syria. As she twice resided at Rome, first in the reign of
Vespasian, and afterwards in that of Titus, when she attempted to
revive that prince's affection for her, she might have had legal disputes
from various causes, but I find no allusion to any elsewhere. Spalding.
§ The orator who pleads against the judge, boasts of the confidence
of his party in having nothing to fear from the judge, though he is
also their opponent. The orator who is on the judge's side, intimates
his fear that the judge, from false delicacy, may give sentence against
himself, though his cause is just. Rollin.
| Praccipwé.] Prae alterá parte, though he ought to be strictly im-
partial. Spalding.
*I See vi. 1, 13. Almeloveen.
QUINTILIAN. [B. IV.
them, as Cicero acted in his pleadings against Verres.* 21. But
of the two 'modes of producing fear in the judges, the one is
common and well received, when we express concern, for ex-
ample, that the Roman people may not think unfavourably of
them, ; or that their privilege of sitting as judges may not be
transferred from them to another body;t but the other is unusual
and violent, when the speaker threatens the judges with a
łcharge of bribery; a threat which it is certainly safer to address
to a larger body of judges than to a small one, for the bad are
alarmed and the good pleased, but to a single judge I should
never recommend it to be used, unless every other resource
has failed. 22. But should necessity drive us to it, it is
no part of oratorical art, any more than to appeal from the
judgment of the tribunal, (though an appeal is often advanta-
geous,) or to impeach a judge before he gives sentence; for
one who is not an orator may threaten and denounce.
23. If the nature of the cause itself afford us topics for con-
ciliating the judge, it will be proper, above all, that such of
them be selected for introduction into the exordium as may
appear most favourable to our object. On this head Virginius;
is in error, for he says Theodorus is of opinion that from every
question in the cause some thought may be selected for the
exordium. 24. Theodorus does not say this, but merely that
the judge is to be prepared for the most important points; a
precept in which there would be nothing objectionable, if it
did not enjoin that as a general rule which every pleading
does not admit, and which every cause does not require. For
when we rise to open the case on behalf of the prosecutor,
while it is still unknown to the judge, how shall we bring
forward thoughts from every question in it? Surely the sub-
ject must previously be stated. Let us admit that some ques-
tions may then be brought forward, (for so the form of our
pleading sometimes requires,) but must we, therefore, bring
forward all the most important ones, that is, the whole cause 2
If so, the statement of facts will be dispatched in the exordium.
* The first actio against Verres, which is wholly in place of an
exordium, as it is indeed called by Asconius Pedianus, being pre-
liminary to the examination of the witnesses. Spalding. -
+ From the senators to the knights, or from the knights to the
Senators; changes which were sex eral times made. Capperonier.
# III. 1, 21. -
CH. I.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. Q59
*
25. Or if, as frequently happens, the cause is somewhat diffi-
cult, should we not try to gain the goodwill of the judge in
other parts of the pleadings, and not present the bare roughness
of every point to his mind before we have attempted to incline
it in our favour? If such matters were always rightly
managed at the opening of a speech, there would be no need
of any formal exordium. 26. At times, accordingly, some par-
ticulars, which may be of great effect in conciliating the favour
of the judge, may be previously” introduced, and not without
advantage, in the commencement.
What points, again, are likely to gain us favour in causes,
it is not necessary for me to enumerate ; for they will be mani-
fest to the pleader, when he understands the nature of a cause:
and all particulars, in so great a variety of suits, cannot possi-
bly be specified. 27. But as it is for the Service of a cause to
discover and amplify its favourable points, so it is expedient to
refute, or at least to eatenuate, whatever is prejudicial to it.
Compassion may also spring from the nature of our cause, if
we have suffered, or are likely to suffer, any severe misfortune.
28. Nor am I inclined, as some are, to think that an ù.
exordium differs from a peroration only in this respect, that
in a peroration is narrated what has gone before, and in an
exordium is set forth what is to come. The difference rather
lies in this, that in the introduction the kind feelings of the
judge should be touched, but cautiously and modestly; while
in the peroration we may give full scope to the pathetic, we may
attribute fictitious speeches to our characters, and evoke the
dead and produce their children;f attempts which are not made
in exordia.
29. But as to those feelings of pity, which I mentioned above,
it is necessary not only to excite them in our favour in the
exordium, but to turn away the effect of them from our oppo-
ment; and as it is for our advantage that our lot should be
thought likely to be deplorable if we should be defeated, so is
it that the pride of our adversary should be apprehended as
likely to be overbearing if he should conquer.
* Interim.] “In the mean time,” i.e., before proceeding to the body
of the speech.
f. Pignora eorwm.] We should read reorwm, which, Spalding first
conjectured, and afterwards found in the passage as cited by Cassio-
dorus in Rhetoribus Pithoeanis, p 333.
# I suppose that he refers to sect. 27. Spalding.
S 2
260 QUINTILIAN. [B.IV.
30. But exordia are often taken from matters which are not
properly concerns of our clients or their causes, but which yet
in some way relate to both of them. With the persons of our
clients are connected not only their wives and children, to
whom I have previously alluded,” but their relatives and
friends, and sometimes countries and cities, and whatever else
may be injured by the failure of those whom we are defending.
31. To the cause, among external circumstances, may be
referred the occasion, from which is derived the exordium in
behalf of Coelius; + the place, from which is taken that in behalf
of Deiotarus;: the appearance of things, whence that in behalf
of Milo ; Ś public opinion, whence that against Verres;| and in
short, that I may not specify everything, the report respecting
the trial, the eaſpectation of the people; for, though none of
these things form part of the cause, they yet have a con-
nexion with the cause, 32. Theophrastus adds that an
exordium may be derived from the form of the pleading,
as that of Demosthenes for Ctesiphon appears to be, when
he entreats to be allowed to speak as he himself may think
most proper, rather than according to the mode which the pro-
secutor has laid down in his charge."[
33. Confidence often suffers from being thought to partake
of presumption. But artifices which procure us favour, and
which, though common to almost all pleaders, are not to be
neglected, even if for no other reason than that they
may not be first employed against us, are to wish, to
ea press detestation, to enterat, to show anariety; because if a
cause appears to be brought forward which is new, important,
atrocious, and of consequence in regard to precedent, it gene-
rally renders the judge extremely attentive, and especially if
he is moved by concern for himself or his country; and his
feelings must then be excited by hope, fear, admonition, sup-
* I consider the allusion to be to sect. 28, not, as Gesner thinks, to
sect. 13. Spalding.
+ Pro Coel. c. 1, Mörétur quod diebws festis, &c.
f C. 2. Moveor etiam locê 'psius insolentiá, &c.
§ C. l. Haec nov; judicii mova forma, &c.
| Act. pr. c. l. Inveteravit enim jam opinio, &c.
"I ARschines had solicited the judges not to allow Demosthenes to
indulge in any irregularity, but to oblige him to reply to the charges in
the same order in which he himself had stated them. Hence Demos-
thenes took his exordium. Twrmebw8.
\
CH. I.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 261
plication, and even by false representations,” if we think that
they will be of service to us.
34. It also has effect in securing the attention of the audi-
ence, if they think that we shall not detain them long, or
enter upon matters foreign to the subject. Such attention in
itself makes the judge desirous of information, and especially
if we can state, briefly and clearly, the substance of the matter
of which he has to take cognizance; a method which Homer
and Virgil have adopted at the commencement of their poems.
35. As to the length of it, it should be such as to resemble a
proposition rather than an exposition, and show, not how every
particular in the cause occurred, but on what particulars the
pleader intends to speak. Nor do I know that a better
example of such a summary can be found than that of Cicero
in his speech for Aulus Cluentius: 36. “I have remarked,
judges, that the whole speech of the accuser is divided into
two parts;+ of which one appeared to me to rest, and princi-
pally to depend, on the odium, now long prevalent, arising
from the judgment of Junius, the other to touch, for form's
Sake, timidly and diffidently, on the question of the charge
of poisoning, though it is on this point that the present
inquiry has according to law been instituted.” All this, how-
ever, is more easy for the defender than the prosecutor,
because by the one the judge is merely to be warned, by the
other he must be informed. -
37. Nor shall any authors, however eminent, induce me to -
entertain the opinion that I may sometimes dispense with
rendering the judge attentive and willing to listen. (Not that
I am ignorant of the reason which is alleged by them, namely,
that it is for the advantage of a bad cause that its nature
should not be understood; but the truth is, that the judge's
ignorance of a cause does not arise from inattention on his
* Vanitate.] That is mendacio, as Capperonier has rightly explained
it. Badius, Rollin, and Gedoyn, fixing their thoughts unhappily on
their own language, understand it in the sense of ambitione judicis ;
and I am surprised to see that Gesner is similarly inclined. Com-
pare xi. 2, 22. . . . How Quintilian can uphold his orator, who is to be
a good man, in this vanitas, I leave for others to consider. Spalding.
ºf Cluentius had been accused, first of having procured the con-
demnation of Oppianicus by bribing the judges, or rather jury, in the
trial before Junius; secondly, of having given poison to Oppianicus.
Thºrnebws. -
Q62 QUINTTLIAN. [B. Iv.
part, but from error into which he is led.) 38. Suppose that
our adversary has spoken, and has perhaps produced conviction
in the judge; we require that his opinion should be changed,
and it cannot be altered unless we render him attentive and
willing to listen to what we are going to say. How are we to
act then 2 I consider that some of our adversary's arguments
must be weakened, or depreciated, and moticed with a sort
of contempt, in order to lessen the strong feeling of favour
which the judge has for the opposite party; a method which
Cicero adopted in pleading for Ligarius. 39. For what else
was the object of that irony,” but that Caesar might be induced
to give less attention to the cause, as presenting no extraordi-
nary features? What is the purpose of the speech for Coelius,
but that the charge might seem less important than it was
thought to be?
But of the rules which I have proposed, it is evident that
some are applicable to one sort of causes, and some to another.
40. The kinds of causes,f too, most rhetoricians pronounce to
be five, the honourable, the mean, the doubtful or ambiguous,
the paradoaical, and the obscure; that is, the vö0ãoy, the #60:09,
the 30¢föošov, the Togóðošov, and the Övoºrcºgo.7.07.00% roy. Some
think that to these it is proper to add the base, which some
comprehend under the mean, others under the paradoxical.
41. What they call paradoa;ical, is something that is brought
to pass contrary to human expectation. In an ambiguous
cause we should make it our chief object to render the judge
well affected, in an obscure one desirous of information, in a
mean one attentive. As for an honourable cause, it has suffi-
cient attraction in itself to conciliate ; in one that is paradoa-
ical or base, there is need of palliation.
42. Hence some divide the exordium into two parts, the
introduction and the insinuation ; in order that in general, in
the introduction, there may be a straightforward request for
the judge's goodwill and attention; but, as this cannot be
made in a dishonourable cause, Some insinuation may then be
directed cautiously into his mind, especially if the aspect of
* Comp. sect. 70.
+ This has reference only to the judiciale genus causarum, of which
these five genera are in reality Species ; they are mentioned by Cicero
de Inv. i. 15; Fortunatianus, p. Pith, 60 ; Sulp. Victor, p. ejusd. 243.
Spalding. s
CH.I.1 EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. Q63
the cause is not even plausible, either because the ground of
it is dishonourable in itself, or because it is disapproved by the
public; or if, again, the cause suffers from the appearance of
a patron or a father against a client or a son,” which renders
it unpopular, or from that of an old or blind man, or an
infant, which excites feelings of compassion. 43. What arts
we must adopt to counteract these difficulties, rhetoricians
teach us at great length, imagining cases for themselves, and
treating them according to the forms of judicial processes;
but such peculiarities, as they spring from varieties of causes,
of which we cannot give rules as to every species, unless they
be comprehended under general heads, might be enumerated
to infinity. 44. For every difficulty a remedy must therefore be
Sought from the peculiar mature of the case. Let it, however,
be laid down as a general rule, that we should turn from that
which is prejudicial to us to that which is favourable. If we
are perplexed about our cause, the character of our client may
aid us; if about our client, the nature of our cause; if
nothing that can be a support to us, presents itself, we may
seek for something to damage our adversary; for as it is our
greatest wish to gain more favour than our adversary, so it
will be our next object to incur less dislike. 45. In regard
to offences which cannot be denied, we must endeavour to
make them appear less heavy than has been represented, or
to have been committed with another intent, or to have no
reference to the present question, or to be capable of being
expiated by repentance, or to have been already sufficiently
punished. Such allegations it is easier for the advocate to
make, therefore, than for his client; for he can praise without
incurring the charge of conceit, and may sometimes even blame
to advantage. 46. He will sometimes, accordingly, pretend
that he is moved with concern, (like Cicero in his speech for
Rabirius Posthumus,) in order to gain the ear of the judge,
and will assume the sincerity of a person who feels the truth of
what he says with a view to gain greater belief when he proceeds
to justify or disprove the charges against his client. We are,
therefore, to consider first of all whether we should adopt the
* If a client pleads against his patron, or a son against his father,
the very appearance and presence of either the patron or the father on
the trial, (to say nothing of the unfavourable feeling among the
audience), discourages the client or the son. Rollin.
264 QUINTILIAN. + [B.IV.
character of a party in the suit or of an advocate, whenever
either is in our power. In the Schools, indeed, there is free
choice; but in the forum, it is rare that a person is competent
to plead his own cause. 47. A youth learning to declaim,
however, ought to plead causes, such at least as chiefly depend
on the pathetic, in the character of the parties themselves;
for the feelings cannot be transferred ; and the emotion
received from another person's mind is not communicated with
the same force as that which proceeds from our own. 48. For
these reasons there is thought to be need of insinuation, if the
pleading of our opponent has taken effect on the mind of the
judges, or if we have to address them when their attention is
fatigued; from the one of which difficulties we shall extricate
ourselves by promising to bring our own proofs, and by eluding
the arguments of the adversary, and from the other by giving
hopes that we shall be brief, and by recurring to those other
means by which I have shown” that the judge may be rendered
attentive. 49. A little pleasantry, too, seasonably introduced,
refreshes the minds of the judges, and gratification, from
whatever quarter produced, relieves the tedium of listening.
Nor is the art of anticipating what is likely to be said against
us without its use; as Cicero Sayst that he knew some had
expressed surprise that he, who had for so many years defended
many, but prosecuted none, should now appear as the accuser of
Verres; and then shows that the accusation of Verres is a de-
fence of the allies. This rhetorical artifice is called prolepsis, or
“anticipation.” 50. As it is useful at times, it is now almost
constantly adopted by Some declaimers, who think that they
must never begin but with something contrary to their real
object.
Those who follow Apollodorus deny that there are only the
three ways which I have specifiedſ of propitiating the judge,
and enumerate various other sorts of them, almost infinite in
number, derived from the character of the judge, from notions
formed of circumstances relating to the cause, Š from opinions
entertained of the cause itself, and from the elements of which
every cause is composed, as persons, deeds, words, motives,
* Sect. 33, 34.
+ At the commencement of the Divinatio in Q. Caecilium.
+ Sect. 5.
§ Comp. sect. 31.
CH. I.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 265
seasons, places, occasions, and the like. 51. That advantage
may really be taken of these particulars, I readily admit, but
consider that they all come under the three heads specified;
for if I make the judge propitious, attentive, and ready to be
informed, I find nothing more that I need desire; as the very
fear,” which appears to have the greatest influence indepen-
dent of these particulars, both secures the attention of the
judge, and deters him from showing partiality to the opposite
side. *
52. Since it is not sufficient, however, to indicate to learn-
ers what enters into the nature of an exordium, without
instructing them also how an exordium may be best composed,
I add that he who is going to speak should reflect what he has
to Say, before whom, for or against whom, at what time or place,
amidst what concurrence of circumstances, under what prepos-
Sessions of the public ; what opinion it is likely that the judge
has formed previous to the commencement of the pleadings,
and what the speaker has to desire or deprecate. Nature herself
will lead him to understand what he ought to say first. 53.
But now they think anything with which they happen to start,
an introduction, and whatever occurs to them, especially if it
be some thought that pleases them, serves them, forsooth, for
an exordium. Many points, doubtless, may be introduced into
the exordium which are derived from other parts of the cause,
or which are common to the exordium with other parts; but
nothing will be said preferably in any particular part, but that
which cannot be said equally well in any other part.
54. There is much attraction in an exordium which derives
its substance from the pleading of our opponent, for this
reason, that it does not appear to have been composed at
home, but to be produced on the spot, and from the suggestion
of the subject; it increases the reputation of the speaker for
ability, from the facility which he exhibits, and, from wearing
the appearance of a plain address, prompted by what has just
been said, gains him the confidence of his audience; insomuch
that, though the rest of his speech may be written and care-
fully studied, the whole of it nevertheless seems almost entirely
extemporaneous, as it is evident that its commencement re-
ceived no preparation at all. 55. Very frequently, too, an
exordium will be pleasing from a certain modesty in the
* Sect. 20, seqq. Spalding,
266 QUINTILIAN. [B.IV.
thoughts, style,” tone, and look of the speaker, so far that even
in a cause which hardly admits of controversy, the confidence
of the orator ought not to display itself too plainly ; for the
judge generally detests assurance in a pleader, and, as he
knows his own authority, tacitly looks for a due portion of
respect. 56. We must take no less care, also, that we may
not excite suspicion in the exordium ; and therefore no appear-
ance of study ought to be shown in it, because all art on the
part of the orator seems to be directed against the judge.
57. But to avoid the suspicion of using art is the achievement
of the highest art; a precept which is given by all writers on
rhetoric, and with the utmost propriety; yet the present
practice, from the state of things in our times, is somewhat at
variance with it ; because on certain trials, especially capital
ones, and those before the centumviri, the judges themselves
require to be addressed in careful and formal speeches, and
think themselves slighted if study is not apparent in every
pleading before them, desiring not only to be instructed but
to be pleased. 58. Moderation in such a practice is difficult, Ş
but it may be so far observed that we may give our oratory the
appearance of carefulness and not of cunning.
. Of the old precepts this still remains in force, that no
wnwsual ea pression, no highly audacious metaphor, nothing
borrowed from what is obsolete and antiquated, or from poetic
license, should appear in the eacordium. 59. For we are not
as yet admitted to full freedom of speech, and the attention of
the audience, being still fresh, keeps us under restraint, but
when their minds are propitiated and warmed, greater liberty
will be tolerated, and especially when we have entered on
those moral topics | of declamation whose natural fertility
prevents the boldness of an expression from being observed
amid the splendour of beauty that surrounds it."
• 60. Our style in the exordium ought not to resemble that
of the argumentative, or sentimental, or narrative parts of our
* Compositionis.] Sc. verborum. Capperonier.
+ See iii. 10, 3.
# Comp. iv. 2, 122; v. 10, 115.
§ Comp. iv. 1, 9; xii. 9, 5.
| Locos.] See. ii. 1, 11 ; 4, 22.
* See c. 2, sect. 117; and ix. 4, 29.
CH.I.] EDUCATION OF AN : ORATOR. Q67
speech. Nor should our manner be too prolix * or circum-
locutory, but should wear the appearance of...simpligity and
unaffectedness, not promising too much either in words or
look. A mode of delivery in which all art is concealed, and
which, as the Greeks say, is, &ys"Tipwrog, “unostentatious,”
steals often most successfully on the mind of the hearer. But
such points are to be managed according to the way in which
it is expedient that the minds of the judges should be im-
pressed. . -
61. To be confused in memory, or to lose our fluency of
speech, has nowhere a worse effect than at the commencement,
as a faulty exordium may be compared to a countenance dis-
figured with scars; and that pilot is surely one of the worst
who runs his vessel aground as it is leaving the harbour. As
to the length of an exordium, it must be regulated by the
nature of the cause. 62. Simple causes require but a short
introduction; such as are perplexed, suspicious, or unpopular,
demand a longer one. But those who have prescribed laws for
all exordia, saying that they must be limited to four sentences,f
make themselves ridiculous. Yet immoderate length in the
introduction is no less to be avoided, lest the speech should
seem to have a head of disproportionate size, and lest that
which ought to prepare the hearer should weary him.
63. The figure by which the orator's address is turned from
the judge, and which is called apostrophe, some rhetoricians
wholly exclude from the exordium, being doubtless led by
some show of reason to form such an opinion on this point; for
it must be admitted that it is most natural for us to address
ourselves chiefly to those whose good will we desire to secure.
64. At times, however, some striking thought $ may be neces-
* Oratio—deducta.] Stating matters in a long series, as deducere
carmen in Ovid. Burmann. g
+ Intra quatuor sensus.] That is, four sentences; 6tavotaug, expressed
in as many periods; four propositions of reasonable length. Cappe-
romier. Something of this kind must have appeared in books on
rhetoric in Quintilian's time. Spalding.
:: Spalding retains quo in his text, but proposes quod in his note, to
which I have made my version conformable.
§ Sensus aliquis.] That is, sententia quaºdam eacimia, some remark-
able observation ; such as the Greeks mean by vömpa, and the Italians
by concetto. Capperonier.
268 QUINTILIAM. [B.IV.
sary to our exordium,” and this may be rendered more lively
and spirited if directed to another person. Should this be
the case, by what law, or by what superstitious regard for
rules, should we be prevented from giving force to our con-
ceptions by this figure? 65. Writers of books on the art,
indeed, do not proscribe the figure as being illicit, but because
they do not think it advantageous; and thus, should the
advantage of using it be proved, we shall be forced to adopt it
for the same reason for which we are now prevented. 66. De-
mosthenes: directs his remarks to AEschines in his exordium ;
Cicero, in commencing his speech for Ligarius, addresses him-
self to Tubero, and, in the beginning of those for several other
persons, speaks to whomsoever he pleases. 67. His exordium
to the speech for Ligarius, indeed, would have been much
more languid, if it had been in any other form ; as the reader
will better understand, if he directs to the judge all that most
spirited part which is in this form, You have, therefore, Tubero,
that which is most to be desired by an accuser, etc., for then
the address would seem really turned away,; and the whole
force of it would be lost if we were to say, Tubero therefore has
that which is most to be desired by an accuser. 68. In the
first method the orator urges and presses on his opponent; in
the second he would merely make a statement. The case
would be similar with the passage in Demosthenes, if you alter
the turn of it. Has not Sallust, too, adopted an exordium
directly addressed to Cicero, against whom he was pleading,
starting with the words, I should bear your reproaches, Marcus
Tullius, with concern and indignation, etc.? § The same
form has been chosen by Cicero in his attack on Catiline, How
long then will you abuse our patience, etc.? 69. And that we
may not wonder at the use of the apostrophe, Cicero, in his
defence of Scaurus, who was accused of bribery, (a pleading
* Hoc procemio.] In hoc ipso, de quo jam agimus, prooemio.
Spalding.
+ P. 228, extr. ed. Reisk.
† Verè aversa, vided twr oratio.] A play, as Spalding observes, on the
word apostrophe. -
§ These words are found at the commencement of the declamation
against Cicero, falsely attributed to Sallust. It is probable that the
author of that declamation, finding the words in Quintilian, pressed
them, as well as those in ix. 3, 89, O Romule Arpinas, into his own
service. See my translation of Sallust, p. 276.
CH.I.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 269
which is found in his commentaries,” for he defended Scaurus
twice,) employs the prosopopeia, f making another person
speak for his client; and in his oration for Rabirius Posthumus, i.
and in that also for Scaurus when accused of extortion, he in-
troduces eaſamples in the exordium; while in his speech for
Cluentius he commences, as I have previously observed, with
partition. <--
70. But these figures are not, because they may sometimes
be used effectively, to be used perpetually, but only whenever
reason prevails over rule ; as we may sometimes employ the
simile, provided it be short, the metaphor, and other figures,
(which the timid and careful teachers of rhetoric prohibit,)
unless that noble specimen of irony in the speech for Ligarius,
which I noticed a little above, gives offence to any reader.
71. Other faults in exordia they have exposed with greater
justice. That sort of exordium which may be adapted to
Several causes is called vulgar;"[ (a species which, though
regarded with little favour, we may occasionally adopt with
advantage, and which is not always avoided by the greatest
Orators;) that which our opponent may use as well as ourselves,
is termed common ; that which our opponent may turn to his
own purpose, is designated as commutable; that which has no
just connexion with the cause, is styled detached; that which
is derived from Some other subject, transplanted; some, again,
are blamed as long, or contrary to rule. Most of these faults,
however, are not peculiar to the exordium, but may be found
in any or every part of a speech. --
72. Such are the points to be noticed with respect to the
exordium, as often as there may be occasion for one ; which is
not always the case, for it is sometimes Superfluous; as when
the judge, for instance, is sufficiently prepared without it, or
* See X. 7, 30. The other trial of Scaurus was for extortion.
Cicero's defence of him on that occasion was published. Scaurus was
acquitted of extortion, and found guilty of bribery. See Dr. Smith's
Dict. of Biog. and Mythol, -
+ He introduçes in his exordium some one speaking for the accused;
a figure even more bold than the apostrophe. The commentaries men.
tioned in the text are entirely lost. Spalding. :
# C. 1, extr.
§ Sect. 36.
| Sect. 39.
"I See ad Herenn. i. 7 extr. ; Cic. de Inv. i. 18; Quint. v. 13, 34.
Spalding. -
270 - QUINTILIAN. [B.IV.
when the subject itself requires no introduction. Aristotle,”
indeed, denies that it is ever necessary in addressing able judges.
Sometimes, too, we cannot employ an exordium, even if we
wish ; as when the judge is much occupied, when time is short,
or when a superior authority f obliges us to enter at once upon
our subject. 73. Sometimes, on the other hand, the nature
of an exordium is found in other parts of the speech; for in
the statement of facts, or in the course of our arguments, we
occasionally ask the judges to attend, or to be favourable to
us; a practice by which Prodicus thought that they might be
roused when disposed to sleep. 74. The following passage is
an example: Then Caius Varenus, Š he who was killed by the
slaves of Ancharius, (to this point, judges, pay, I beseech you, the
most careful attention,) etc. If the cause, moreover, consists of
many heads, a proper introduction must be prefixed to each
head : as, Listen now to what follows ; or, I now proceed to the
meat particular. 75. But even among the proofs themselves
many observations occur that serve the purpose of an intro-
duction, such as Cicero makes in his speech for Cluentius,"
when about to speak against the censors, and in that for Mu-
raºna,” when he makes an apology to Servius. But this prac-
tice is so common as to make it unnecessary to establish it by
examples. -
76. Whether, when we have used an exordium, we after-
wards commence a statement of facts, or proceed at once to.
produce our proofs, that point ought to be stated last in our
introduction, with which the commencement of the sequel will
most naturally unite itself. 77. But the affectation in the
schools, of disguising the transition in some striking thought,
* Rhet, iii. 14, 8. See Quint. xii. 10, 52. -
+. If the emperor, for instance, should be judge. Spalding.
†: Non eacordio.] These words, observes Spalding, are to be taken as
OIlê.
§ Comp. iv. 2, 26 ; ix. 2, 56, where the same passage is quoted.
Lucius Varenus, as far as can be judged from a very few fragments of
this lost oration of Cicero, was accused of having killed Caius Varenus
and Salarius, and of having attempted the life of Cneius Varenus.
Cicero endeavours to transfer the guilt from Lucius Varenus to the
slaves of Caius Ancharius Rufus, (vii. 2, 10,) but was unsuccessful, for
Lucius Varenus was condemned. vii. 2, 36. Spalding.
| Multiplea, causa.] See iii. 10, 1 ; iv. 2, 85.
*I C. 42. -
** C. 2.
CH. I. EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 27 1
and trying to gain applause, forsooth, for what is little more
than a trick,” is frigid and puerile; though Ovid constantly
indulges in it in his Metamorphoses; but, for him, necessity
may be some excuse, as he had to unite things the most dis-
cordant into the semblance of a whole. 78. But what need is
there for the Orator to conceal his transitions, and impose upon
the judges, when they require to be admonished to give their
attention to the Order of particulars ? The commencement of
the statement of facts will even be lost upon them, if they are
not aware that such statement is begun. 79. Accordingly, as it
is best not to rush abruptly into our statement, so it is preferable
not to pass to it without notice. But if a long and perplexed
exposition is to follow, the judges must be specially prepared
for it; as Cicero has done in many places, and more remarkably
in this ºf I shall make a rather longer introduction than ordi-
nary to demonstrate this point, and I entreat you, judges, not to
receive it winfavourably ; for, when the commencement is under-
stood, you will with far more ease comprehend the sequel.
Such are the principal notions which I have conceived
respecting the exordium.
* Ut ipse transitus efficiat aligwam utique sententiam, et hujus velut
pracStigiae plausum petat.] “That the transition itself may form some
particular thought, and may seek applause for this trick, as it were.”
Spalding would read petant, sc. oratores. Capperonier observes that
sententia is here the same as yuápm or vónpa.
‘i Pro Cluent. c. 4 extr.
272 . QUINTILIAN. ſpry.
CHAPTER II.
Of the statement of facts; some make too nice distinctions respecting
it, 1–3. A formal statement not always necessary, 4–8. Those
are mistaken who suppose that a statement is never necessary on
the part of an accused person who denies the charge, 9–19.
What the judge already knows may sometimes be stated, 20–23.
The statement need not always immediately follow the exordium,
24–27. The practice of the schools injudiciously transferred to
the forum, 28–30. The statements should be clear, brief, and
credible, 31–35. Of clearness, 36–39. Of brevity, 40–47. Of
credibility, 48–53. The statement of facts should prepare the
judge for the proof of them, 54—60. Certain qualities have in-
judiciously been made peculiar to the statement, 61–65. A
ridiculous direction that the statement should be omitted in a
cause which is unfavourable to us, 66. Difficult points must be
variously managed, according to the nature of the case, 67–74.
In a conjectural cause we must make a statement, but with art
and care, 75–81. We must sometimes divide our statement, and
invert the order of occurrences, 82–87. Of fictitious statements,
88–93. Complexion of a statement, 94—100. How we must
act if the facts be partly for us and partly against us, 101, 102.
Apostrophe and other figures absurdly excluded from the state-
ment, 103–115. The statement should be embellished with
every grace of language, 116–124. Of authority in the pleader,
125–127. Of repetition, 128. Of the commencement and con-
clusion of the statement, 129—132.
i. IT is most natural, and ought to be most usual, that when
the judge has been prepared by the methods which have been
noticed above, the matter, on which he is to give judgment,
should be stated to him. 2. This is the narrative, or state-
ment of the case; but, in touching upon it, I shall purposely
pass over the too subtle distinctions of those who make several
kinds of statements; for they will have an exposition, not only
of the business on which the question is brought before the
judges, but of the person whom it concerns, as, Marcus Pali-
canus, a man of humble birth, a native of Picenum, loquacious
rather than eloquent;* or of the place at which it occurred, as,
Lampsacus, judges, is a town on the Hellespont ºf or of the
time, as,
* We learn from Aulus Gellius, i. 15, that these words are taken
from the lost history of Sallust. The man characterized in them is
doubtless the same that Cicero, Brut. c. 62, calls aptiorem awribus
imperitorum. Compare Val. Max. iii. 8 Rom. 3; Ascon. Ped. p. 19,
61 ; ad Cic. Div. c. 3, et Act, in Verr. pr. c. 15; Cic, ad Attic. i. 1, 18.
Spalding.
ºf Cic. in Werr. i. 24.
CH.II.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 273
In early spring, when from the hoary hills
The cold snow melting flows; *
or of the causes of the occurrence, which historians very often
give, when they show whence arose a war, a sedition, or a pesti-
lence. 3. In addition to these distinctions, they call Some
statements perfect, others imperfect; but who is not aware of
such a difference? They add that there is a kind of statement
regarding past time, which is the most common kind; another
respecting the present, such as that of Cicero + about the stir
of Chrysogonus's friends when his name was mentioned; and
a third relating to the future, which can be allowed only to
prophets; for hypotyposis ; is not to be regarded as a state-
ment of facts. 4. But let us turn our attention to matters of
more importance. *
Some have thought that there must always be a statement
of facts; but that this notion is unfounded, may be proved by
many arguments. In the first place, there are some causes so
brief, that they require only a mere proposition| rather than
a statement. 5. This may happen at times on either side,
when there is either no exposition of matters, or when the
parties are agreed about the fact, and there is no dispute but
concerning the law; as in such questions as these before the
centumviri, Whether a son or a brother ought to be the
heir of a woman that dies intestate ; or whether puberty
is to be decided by years or by a certain habit of body. Or
when there is indeed room for a statement of facts in the
cause, but every particular of it is previously known to the
judge, or has been fully set forth in the preceding part. 6. At
times, again, it may happen only on one side, and more fre-
quently on that of the prosecutor, either because it is sufficient
for him to make a simple proposition, or because it is more
advantageous for him to do so. It may be sufficient, for
instance, to say, I claim a certain sum of money lent on
certain conditions ; or, I claim a legacy according to a
* Virg, Georg. i. 43.
ºf Pro Rosc. Am. c. 23.
# IX. 2, 40; Cic. De Orat. iii. 53.
§ From Seneca the father, p. 149, we learn that Apollodorus always
required a statement of facts, but that Theodorus did not. Spalding.
| See the fourth chapter of this book; also c. 1, sect. 35, and iii. 6, 76.
T
274 QUINTILIAN. [B. IV.
certain will; and it will be for the opposite party to show
why such claims are not due. 7. It is sufficient for the
prosecutor, and more advantageous, to open his cause in
this way, I say that the sister of Horatius has been killed
by him, for the judge comprehends the whole charge from
this one proposition ; and then the way in which the act
took place, and the motive for it, are left rather to be
stated by the defendant. 8. As for the accused person, he
will withhold a statement of facts, when the charge against
him can neither be denied nor palliated, but will rest solely on
a question of law; thus, in the case of the man who, having
stolen the money of a private person out of a temple, is
accused of sacrilege, a confession will show more modesty
than a statement. We do not deny, the defendant and his advo-
cate may say, that the money was taken from the temple ; but
the accuser makes the charge that we are amenable to the law
against sacrilege, though the money was private, and not conse-
crated ; and it is for you to decide the question whether
sacrilege has been committed.
9. But though I allow that there are at times such reasons
for giving no statement of facts, I dissent from those who
think that there is no statement when an accused person
merely denies the charge which is brought against him; an
opinion which is held by Cornelius Celsus, who considers that
most trials for murder, and all those for bribery and extortion,
are of this class; 10. for he thinks that there are no state-
ments of facts but such as give a general exposition of the
charge on which judgment is to be pronounced; yet he admits
himself that Cicero gives a statement of facts in his oration
for Rabirius Posthumus; though Cicero denies that any money
came into the hands of Rabirius, which was the very point on
which the question rested ; and, in his statement of facts, he
gives no exposition of the charge.
11. For my part, besides resting on the authority of emi-
nent rhetoricians, I am myself of opinion that there are two
kinds of statements in judicial causes; the One sort being an
exposition of the cause itself, and the other of the circum-
stances connected with it. 12. I have not killed a man ;
here there is no statement of facts; it is admitted that there
is none; but there will be one, and sometimes a long one, in
reply to the support of the accusation, and in regard to the
CH. II.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 275
past life of the accused, the causes by which an innocent man
has been brought into peril, and other circumstances by which
the charge is rendered incredible. 13. For the accuser does
not say merely, You have killed, but states by what proofs he
can establish his assertion; as in tragedies, when Teucer
accuses Ulysses of having killed Ajax,” saying that he was
found in a solitary place, near the dead body of his enemy,
and with a blood-stained sword in his hand, Ulysses does
not merely reply that the deed was not committed by him,
but affirms that there was no enmity between Ajax and him-
self, and that they had been rivals only for glory ; and then
adds how he came into that lonely spot, saw the dead body
lying on the ground, and drew the Sword out of the wound.
To this statement are subjoined various arguments. # 14. But
there is a statement of fact even when the accuser says, You.
were in the place in which your enemy was killed, and the
defendant says, I was not, for he must show where he was.
For the same reason, causes of bribery and extortion may
have several statements of this kind, as there may be several
heads of accusation ; in which statements, indeed, the charges
will be denied, but resistance must at the same time be made
to the accuser's arguments, sometimes singly, sometimes in a
body, by an exposition of matters totally different from his.
15. Will a person accused of bribery act wrong in stating
what sort of parents he had, how he himself has lived, or on
what pretensions he relied when he proceeded to stand for
office 2 Or if a man is accused of extortion, may he not
advantageously give an account of his past life, and of the
means by which he brought upon him the resentment of his
whole province, or of his accuser, or some particular witness 2
16. If such an account is not a statement of facts, neither is
that first speech of Cicero in behalf of Cluentius, commencing
with the words Aulus Cluentius Habitus; for there is nothing
in that speech about the poisoning, but merely about the
* We find nothing of this sort in the tragedies now extant relating
to this subject. That of Sophocles represents Ulysses as friendly to
Teucer. Spalding. #4
+ As, I am not to be accused of killing him because I was found near
the body : else suspicion would have fallen upon you, his brother, if
you had been found near it. Twºrnebws.
# Cic. pro Cluent. c. 5.
T 2
276 QUINTILIAN. [B.IV.
causes by which his mother became his enemy. 17. State-
ments also relate to the cause, but are not part of the cause
itself, which are given for the sake of example, as that in
Cicero's speech against Verres concerning Lucius Domitius,”
who crucified a shepherd because he confessed that he had
used a hunting-spear in killing a boar which he offered as a
present to Domitius; 18. or for the purpose of exposing some
charge foreign to the case, as in Cicero's oration for Rabirius
Posthumus ºf For as soon as he came to Aleaſandria, judges,
the only method of preserving his money proposed by the king
to Posthumus was this, that he should take the charge, and
as it were stewardship, of the palace ; or with the inten-
tion of exaggerating, as in the description of the journey of
Verres.j:
19. Sometimes a fictitious statement of particulars is intro-
duced ; either to rouse the feelings of the judges, as that in
the speech for Roscius respecting Chrysogonus, which I men-
tioned a little above; $ or to amuse them with a little plea-
Santry, as that in the speech for Cluentius regarding the
brothers Cepasii;|| or, occasionally, to make a digression for
the purpose of embellishment, as that in the speech against
Verres'ſ concerning Proserpine: It was in these parts that a
mother is said formerly to have sought her daughter. All these
observations assist to show that he who denies may not only
make a statement, but a statement concerning the very point
which he denies.
20. Nor is the observation which I made above, that a
statement is superfluous respecting a matter with which the
judge is acquainted, to be taken absolutely; for I wish it to be
understood in this sense, that it is superfluous if the judge not
only knows the fact, but takes such a view of it as is favoura-
ble to our side. 21. For a statement of facts is not made
merely that the judge may comprehend the case, but rather
that he may look upon it in the same light with ourselves.
* In Werr. v. 3. Burmann thinks that obtulerat in the text should
be obtulerant, as it was not the shepherd that presented the boar, but
others, of whom Domitius inquired who had killed so large a beast.
# C. 10.
† In Verr. i. 16, 17.
§ Sect. 3.
| Cic. pro Cluent. c. 20, 21.
* IV. 38.
CH. II.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 277
Though, therefore, he may not require to be informed, but only
to be impressed in a certain way, we may make a statement
with Some preliminary remarks, as that, we are aware that he
has a general knowledge of the case, but entreat him not to be
unwilling to listen to an account of particulars. 22. Some-
times we may pretend to repeat our statement for the informa-
tion of some new member taking his seat among the judges;
Sometimes, in order that even the by-standers may be convinced
of the iniquity of what is asserted on the opposite side. In
this case, the statement must be diversified with varieties of
phraseology, to spare the judge the weariness of hearing what
he already knows; thus, we may say, You remember, and, Per-
haps it may be unnecessary to dwell on this point, or, But why
should I say more on this subject, when you are already
acquainted with it 7 or, Of the nature of this affair, you are
not ignorant; or we may introduce various other phrases similar
to these. 23. Besides, if a statement of facts seem always
unnecessary before a judge to whom the cause is known, the
pleading of the cause before him may seem also to be some-
times unnecessary. -
24. There is another point about which there is still more
frequently a question, Whether the statement of facts is always
to be immediately subjoined to the eaſordium ; and those who
hold the affirmative cannot be thought destitute of arguments
to support them ; for as the exordium is made with the intent
that the judge may be rendered more favourable by it, and
more willing and attentive to understand the case, and as proof
cannot be adduced unless the case be previously understood, it
appears right that the judge should at once be made master of
the facts. 25. But the nature of a cause Sometimes justly changes
this order; unless, perchance, Cicero be thought, in that excel-
lent oration which he wrote on behalf of Milo, and which he
has left to us, to have injudiciously delayed his statement of
facts, by introducing three questions” before it; or unless it
would have been of any profit to relate how Clodius lay in
wait for Milo, if it had been supposed impossible for an accused
person, who confessed that he had killed a man, to be defended,
* These three questions are to be gathered from what follows:
1. About defending a man who confessed that he had killed another.
2. About the pre-judgment of the Senate. 3. About the feeling of
Pompey. Spalding.
278 QUINTILIAN. [B.IV.
or if Milo had been already prejudged and condemned by the
senate, or if Pompey, who, to favour some party, had sur-
rounded the place of trial with a troop of armed men, had
been dreaded by Milo as ill-disposed towards him. 26. These
questions, therefore, were of the nature of an exordium, as
they all served to prepare the judge. But in his speech for
Varenus, also, he did not introduce his statement of facts
until he had refuted certain allegations. This mode of pro-
ceeding will be of advantage, too, whenever the charge is not
only to be resisted, but to be retorted on the opposite party,
so that our own case being first established, our statement of
facts may be the commencement as it were of a charge against
our adversary; as, in a passage of arms, care to ward off a blow
takes the precedence of anxiety to inflict one
27. There are some causes, and indeed not a few, which
are easy to be defended so far as to refute the charge on which
the trial bears, but which labour under many grievous enormi-
ties of the defendant's former life; and these must first be set
aside, in order that the judge may listen favourably to the
defence of the point about which the question really is. Thus,
when Marcus Coelius is to be defended, does not his advocate
judiciously repel the imputations against him of luaury, licen-
tiousness, and immorality, before he proceeds to consider that
of poisoning 7 It is about these points that the whole of
Cicero's pleading is employed. And does he not then make a
statement about the property of Palla,” and explain the whole
question respecting the violence,t which is defended by the
pleading of Caelius himself?; 28. But the custom of the
schools is our guide, in which certain points are proposed for
us to speak upon, which we call themata, Š and beyond which
there is nothing to be refuted ; and thus it is that our state-
ment of facts is always subjoined to our exordium. 29. Hence,
too, is the liberty which the declaimers take to make a state-
ment of facts even when they appear to speak in the second
* Cic. pro Cael. c. 10. We know nothing of that affair from any
other quarter. Spalding. Palla was the name of a man whose
property Caelius had been accused of appropriating to himself.
+ In killing Dion the legate of the Alexandrimes; c. 10, and 21, 22.
i For Caelius also defended himself in this cause ; comp. xi. 1, 51 ;
and Suet. de Clar. Rhet. c. 2. Spalding.
§ See c. 1, sect. 4.
CH. II.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 279
place in a cause; * for when they speak for the prosecutor,t
they make a statement of facts just as if they were speaking
first, and a defence as if they were replying to the opposite
party; and such practice is very proper; for as declamation is
an exercise preparatory to pleading in the forum, why should
not learners qualify themselves to take either the first or second
place?.. But, ignorant of the proceedings in the courts, they
think that when they come into the forum no departure is to
be made from the manner to which they have been accustomed
in the schools. 30. Yet even in scholastic declamations it
occasionally happens that a mere propositioni is in place of a
Statement of the case; for what statement has he to make
who accuses a jealous man of ill-treating his wife, or he who
accuses a cynics of indecency before the censors, when the
whole charge is sufficiently expressed by a single word, in
whatever part of the speech it be introduced 2 But on this
head I have said enough.
31. I shall now add some remarks on the method of stating
a case. A statement of a case is an account of a thing done, or
supposed to have been done ; which account is adapted to per-
suade ; or, as Apollodorus defines it, a narrative to inform the
auditor what the matter in question is. Most writers, and
especially those who are of the school of Isocrates, direct that
it should be lucid, brief, and probable. It is of no con-
sequence if, instead of lucid, we say perspicuous, or, instead
of probable, credible or apparently deserving of belief.
32. Of this specification I approve ; though Aristotle | differs
from Isocrates in one particular, as he ridicules the direction
* Ut etiam secundo partis swap loco narrare videdntwr.] Dicendi locus,
which learned men have laboured to explain, is nothing else but the
order in speaking which was assigned to each advocate; for it was not
invariably settled in the forum that the accuser should speak first, and
the defendant reply ; see vii. 1, 37. He therefore spoke in the second
place to whom the duty was committed of answering the statements
on the opposite side, whether he was the prosecutor or the accused.
In the schools, where there was no replying, there was no such order
observed; W. 13, 50; vii. 1, 38. Hence we understand why Quintilian
uses the expression videantwr narrare. Comp. Sect. 5. Spalding.
t Understand in the second place, i.e., after the first advocate for the
prosecutor has spoken. Capperonier.
#: See sect. 4.
$ See Declam. Quint. 283 ; Cynicus diserti filius.
| Rhet. iii. 16, 4.
280 - QUINTILIAN. [B. IV.
about brevity, as if it were absolutely necessary that a state-
ment should be long or short, and as if there were no possi-
bility of fixing on a just medium. As to the followers of
Theodorus, they recognize only the last quality, saying that it
is not always proper to state briefly or lucidly. , 33. On this
account I must the more carefully distinguish the various
peculiarities of statements, in order to show on what occasions
each quality is most desirable.
A statement, then, is either wholly in our own favour,
wholly in that of our opponent, or a mixture of both. If it be
wholly in our own favour, we may be content with the three
qualities of which the effect is that the judge more readily
wnderstands, remembers, and believes. 34. Nor let any one
think me to blame for remarking that the statement which is
wholly in our favour ought to be made probable, though it betrue;
for there are many narratives true which are not probable, and
many probable which are not true. We must therefore take no
less pains that the judge may believe what we say truly than
what we invent. 35. The qualities, indeed, which I have just
enumerated, are meritorious in other parts of our speech ; for
through our whole pleading we should avoid obscurity; a certain
succinctness in what we say should be everywhere observed ;
and all that is advanced ought to be credible. But these
qualities are most of all to be studied in that part which gives
the first information to the judge ; for if, in that part, he
happens not to understand, not to remember, or not to
believe, we shall exert ourselves to no purpose in the sequel. ,
36. The statement, however, will be clear and perspicuous,
if it be expressed, first of all, in proper and significant words,
not mean, nor far-sought, nor at variance with common use,
and if it give a lucid account, also, as to circumstances,
persons, occasions, places, and motives, and be delivered, at
the same time, in such a way that the judge may without
difficulty comprehend what is said. 37. This excellence is
wholly disregarded by most speakers, who, prepared for the
shouts of a multitude, whether suborned for the purpose or
collected by chance, cannot endure the silence of an attentive
auditory, and do not think themselves eloquent unless they
shake the whole court with noise and vociferation; they con-
sider that to state a matter calmly belongs only to every-day
conversation, and is in the power of even the most illiterate,
CH. II.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 281
while, in truth, it is uncertain whether they will not or cannot
perform that of which they express such easy contempt.
38. For if they try every department of eloquence, they will
find nothing more difficult than to say what every one, when
he has heard it, thinks that he himself would have said ; and
for this reason, that he does not contemplate it as said with
ability, but with truth ; but it is when an orator is thought to
speak truth that he speaks best. 39. But now, as if they had
found a wide field for themselves in their statement, they
assume an extravagant tone of voice in this part of their
speech, throw back their heads,” strike their elbow against
their sides, and revel il, every sort of combination of thoughts
and words; while, what is monstrous, their delivery pleases,
and their cause is not understood. But let me put an end to
these animadversions, lest I should gain less favour by pre-
Scribing what is right than ill-will by censuring what is wrong.
40. Our statement will be sufficiently concise, if, in the
first place, we commence the exposition of the case at the
point where it begins to concern the judge; next, if we say
nothing foreign to the cause ; and, lastly, if we retrench every-
thing of which the absence will deduct nothing from the
knowledge of the judge or the advantage of our client. 41.
For there is often a brevity in parts, which nevertheless leaves
the whole very long; as, I came to the harbour ; I beheld a
vessel; I asked for how much it would take me ; I agreed
about the price ; I went on board; the anchor was weighed;
we loosed our cable,f and set sail. Here none of the
phrases can be expressed with greater brevity; yet it would
be sufficient to say, I set sail from the harbour; and whenever
the event sufficiently indicates what has preceded it, we ought
to be content with expressing that from which the rest is
understood. 42. As I can easily say, therefore, I have a
grown-up son, it is quite superfluous for me to indulge in
circumlocution, and say, Being desirous of having children, I
married a wife, I had a son born to me, I reared him, and
have brought him up to full age. Some of the Greek
writers, accordingly, have distinguished a concise exposition,
* Cervicem repomunt.] As a sign of self-satisfaction. So Cic. in
Verr. iii. 19: Tamenme putamus patronwm, twum in hoc crimine cervicu-
lam jactaturum et populose ac coronae daturum ? Spalding.
+ Solvimus oram.] See the Epistle to Trypho, sect. 3.
282 QUINTILIAN. [B.IV.
güyrogloy, from a brief one, the first being free from everything
superfluous, while the other may possibly want something that
is necessary. 43. For myself, I make brevity consist, not in
saying less, but in not saying more, than is necessary; for as
to repetitions, and rocuroWoyfoºl, and Teglogo?.0%io.1, which some
writers on rhetoric desire to be avoided in a statement of facts,
I say nothing about them, since such faults are to be shunned
for other reasons than that of observing brevity.
44. We must no less be on our guard, however, against
that obscurity which attends on those who abbreviate every
part too much; and it is better that there should be something
superabundant in a statement than that anything should be
wanting; for what is unnecessary is attended with weariness,
but what is necessary is not withheld without danger. 45. We
must consequently avoid the conciseness of Sallust, (though
in him it is accounted a merit,) and all abruptness in our
language; that which does not escape a reader who has leisure
to re-examine, is perhaps lost altogether upon a mere auditor,
who has no opportunity of hearing it repeated ; and a reader,
besides, is generally a person of learning; while a judge is
often one whom the country sends to the courts” to give a
decision on what he can manage to understand; so that
perhaps everywhere, but especially in the statement of facts,
we ought to adhere to a judicious medium in our language,
and Say just what is necessary, and what is enough.
46. But by what is necessary I would not wish to be under-
stood what is barely necessary to state a fact; for brevity ought
not to be wholly unadorned, or it becomes mere rudeness. What
attracts us, beguiles our attention; the more agreeable a story
is, the less long it appears; and a pleasant and easy road,
though it be of greater extent, fatigues us less than a shorter
one that is rugged and unattractive. 47. Nor would I ever
have so much regard to brevity as not to wish that everything
should be inserted that can make the statement of facts
* In decurias.] Decuriæ of the judices, of which Augustus constituted
four, and Caligula added a fifth. Each of these consisted of a thousand
or more judices, who, as they were mostly engaged in tilling their
grounds, and came into the city only when required to act as judices,
were for the most part rude and illiterate. These decurice were for
trials on public matters; for private causes there were the consilia
centumviralia. Spalding. --
CH.II.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. QS3
credible; for one that is every way plain and curtailed may be
called not so much a statement as a confession. There are also
many statements that are necessarily long from the nature of
the case, and for attending to them, as I recommended above,”
the judge must be prepared by the conclusion of the exordium ;
and we must then study, by every art in our power, to take
Something from the length and something from the tediousness
of our narrative, 48. We shall make it somewhat less long,
if we defer such particulars as we can to another part of our
speech, not without specifying, however, what we defer : What
motives he had for killing him, whom he took as accomplices,
how he disposed his ambush, I shall relate when I offer my
proofs. 49. Some particulars, too, may be set aside, as it were,
out of the course of the narrative; an expedient of which we
have an example in Cicero: Fulcinius died; for many cir-
cumstances that attended the event, I shall omit, as being
unconnected with the cause. Division also lessens the
tediousness of a statement: I shall relate what took place
before the commencement of the affair;t I shall relate what
occurred during the course of it; I shall relate what happened
afterwards. 50. Thus there will appear rather to be three
short narratives than a single long one. Sometimes it will
be proper to break our statements by a short interlocution:
You have heard what occurred before ; hear now what
jollowed. Thus the judge will be relieved at the conclusion
of the first part, and will prepare himself for entering as it
were upon a new subject. 51. But if, when all these artifices
have been tried, the detail of particulars will still extend to .
a great length, a kind of recapitulation at the end of each part
will not be without its advantage, such as Ciceroj gives even
in a short statement: Hitherto, Caesar, Quintus Ligarius is
free from all blame ; he left his home not only for no war, but
without there being even the least suspicion of war, etc.
52. As to credibility in our statement, it will not be wanting,
if we first consult our own judgment, so as to advance nothing
contrary to nature; and if, in addition, we assign causes and
motives for the facts which we detail; (I do not mean for all,
* C. 1. sect. 79.
f Ante ipsum re; contractum.] Every affair is said contrahi, when it is
entered upon, and hence contractus is used for initiv/m. Spalding.
f Pro Ligar. c. 2.
284. QUINTILIAN. - [B.IV.
but for those about which there is any question;) and if
we represent our persons, at the same time, as of a character
in accordance with the facts which we wish to be believed of
them ; a person accused of theft, for instance, as covetous ; of
adultery, as libidinous ; of homicide, as rash ; or the contrary, if
we are on the defence; and we must do the same with regard
to places, occasions, and similar particulars. 53. There is also
a certain management of the narrative which gives it credi-
bility, as in plays and pantomimes; for some things naturally
follow and attach themselves to others, so that, if you make
the first part of your statement judiciously, the judge himself
will understand what you are going to say afterwards. 54. Nor
will it be without advantage if we scatter here and there some
seeds of proof, but so as not to forget that we are stating a
series of facts and not of arguments. Occasionally, however,
we may even confirm what we advance with some degree of
proof, but simple and short; for example, in a case of poison-
ing, we may say, He was well when he drank, he fell down
suddenly, and a blackness and swelling of the body immediately
followed. 55. Preparatory remarks produce the same effect,
as when it is said that the accused was strong, armed, and on
his guard, in opposition to those who were weak, unarmed, and
unsuspecting. On everything, indeed, of which we have to
treat under the head of proof, as character, cause, place, time,
instrument, occasion, we may touch in our statement of facts.
56. Sometimes, if these considerations fail us, we may even
confess that the charge, though true, is scarcely credible, but
observe that it must be regarded on this account as a greater
atrocity; that we know not how it was committed, or why ;
that we wonder at the occurrence, but will nevertheless prove
the truth of it. 57. But the best of all preparations of this
kind are those of which the intention is not apparent; as in
Cicero every circumstance is most happily premised by which
Clodius may be proved to have lain in wait for Milo, and not
Milo for Clodius; but what has the greatest effect is that
most artful assumption of an air of simplicity: Milo having
been in the senate-house that day, returned home as soon as the
senate broke up, changed his shoes and his dress, and waited a
short time, while his wife, as is usual, was getting ready.
58. How well is Milo represented as having done nothing
with premeditation, nothing with haste! This effect that
CH.II.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 285
master of eloquence produces not only by the circumstances
which he narrates, and by which he signifies Milo's delay and
composed manner of departure, but by the familiar and ordi-
nary words which he uses, and his well concealed art in
adopting them ; for if the particulars had been stated in
other terms, they would have warned the judge, by their very
sound,” to be on his guard against the pleader. 59. To most
people this passage appears lifeless, but it is hence manifest
how wholly the art escaped the judge, when it is hardly
observed even by a reader.
Such are the qualities that render a statement of facts credi-
ble. 60. As to directions that we should avoid contradictions
or inconsistencies, if any one needs them, he will receive
further instruction in vain, though some writers on rhetoric
introduce such matters into their works, imagining that they
were hidden from the world till they were sagaciously dis-
covered by themselves.
61. To these three properties of a statement of facts some
add magnificence, which they call gayo.7076ersio, but which is
neither appropriate to all pleadings, (for what place can
language, raised above the ordinary level, have in most
causes about private property, about loans of money,
letting and hiring, and interdicts?) nor is always bene-
ficial, as is evident from the last example from the speech for
Milo.
62. Let us bear in mind, too, that there are many causes
in which we have to confess, to excuse, to extenuate what we
state, in all which cases magnificence of language is utterly
inadmissible. It is therefore no more our business, in making
a statement, to speak magnificently, than to speak dolefully, or
invidiously, or gravely, or agreeably, or politely; qualities which,
though each is commendable in its proper place, are not to be
assigned, and as it were devoted, to this part peculiarly.
63. That quality, also, which Theodectes assigns peculiarly
to the narrative of facts, desiring that it should be not only
magnificent but pleasing, is, though very suitable to that part
of a speech, merely common to it with other parts. There are
some, too, who add clearness, or what the Greeks call vagyaſo.
* I read strepitu ipso (not ipsum) judicem, a conjecture of Rollin,
approved by Spalding. * **.
286 QUINTILIAN. [B. IV.
64. Nor will I deceive my reader so far as to conceal from him
that Cicero * desires several qualities in a statement of facts ;
for besides requiring it to be plain, and concise, and credible,
he would have it self-evident, characteristic, and suitable to the
occasion. But everything in a speech ought to be in Some
degree characteristic and suitable to the occasion, as far as is
possible. Self-evidence in a marrative, as far as I understand the
meaning of the term, is doubtless a great merit, (as what is
true is not only to be told, but ought to a certain extent to
make itself seen,) but it may surely be included under perspi-
cuity, which some, however, have even thought hurtful at times,
because in some cases, they say, truth must be disguised.
65. But this is an absurd observation ; for he who wishes to
disguise truth, wishes to relate what is false as if it were true :
and, in what he relates, he must still study that his statement
may seem self-evident.
66. But since we have come, by some chance as it were, to
a more difficult kind of statements, let me say something on
those causes in which the truth is against us; in which case
some have thought that the statement of facts should be wholly
omitted.* Nothing, certainly, is easier than such omission,
except it be to forbear from pleading the cause altogether. But
if, for some good reason, you undertake a cause of this sort, what
art will there be in confessing by your silence that your cause is
bad? unless you think that the judge will be so senseless as to
decide in favour of that which he knows that you are unwilling
to tell him. 67. I do not dispute that as some things in a
statement may be denied, others added, and others altered, so
likewise some may be suppressed ; but such only are to be
suppressed as we ought or are at liberty to suppress. This is
done sometimes for the sake of brevity, as when we say, for
example, He answered what he thought proper. .
68. Let us distinguish, therefore, the different kinds of
causes ; for in causes in which there is no question about the
charge, but only about a legal point, we may, though the
matter be against us, admit the truth : He took money from a
temple, but it was that of a private individual ; and he has
therefore not committed sacrilege. He carried off a maiden ;
* De Orat. ii. 80; Topic. c. 26; Part. Orat. c. 9.
‘f See v. 13, 16.
CH. II.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. Q87
get option * is not to be granted to her father. 69. He dis-
honoured a well-born youth ; and the youth, on being dis-
honoured, hung himself, yet the author of his dishonour is not to
be capitally punished as being the cause of his death, but is to
pay ten thousand sesterces,f the fine imposed on him who is
guilty of such a crime. But in such confessions something of
the bad impression may be removed which the statement of
our opponent may have produced; since even our slaves
speak apologetically concerning their own faults. 70. Some
things, also, we may palliate without assuming the tone of
narrative: He did not, as our opponent alleges, enter the temple
jor the purpose of stealing, or watch for a favourable moment
Jor accomplishing such object ; but, tempted by the opportunity,
the absence of the guards, and the sight of money, which has
too strong; an influence over human resolution, he yielded. But
what has this to do with the question ? He transgressed, and
became a thief ? It is of no use to palliate an act of which we
do not shrink from the penalty. 71. Sometimes, too, we may
seem even to condemn our own client; addressing him, for ex-
ample, thus: Would you have me say that you were ea cited with
wine? That you fell into an error £ That you were led astray
in the darkness £ All this may perhaps be true ; but you have
nevertheless dishonoured a free-born person ; you must pay ten
thousand sesterces. Sometimes, again, our cause may be
guarded by a careful opening, and then fully stated, 72.
Every thing was adverse to the three sons who conspired to
kill their father; they had drawn lots, and had entered their
father's chamber, at night, one after another, while he was
sleeping; but, as none of them had the heart to kill him,
they confessed the whole matter to him when he awoke.
* The woman on whom a rape was committed had the privilege of
choosing whether the ravisher should be put to death or marry her;
but the father had, by law, no choice in the case. Gesner. To the
vitiatarum electiones there is an allusion in the Dialogue de Orat. c.
35; comp. vii. 8, 4. Spalding.
+ By the Scatinian or Scantinian law. Some other passages in
ancient writers are at variance with what Quintilian says about the
amount of the fine, as is shown by Bach, Hist. Jurispr. Rom. ii. 2, 29.
But the same amount is specified in the Declamations attributed to
Quintilian, 252 and 370. Spalding.
f Nimium quâm.] Spalding observes that he has been unable to find
this expression in any other author, and proposes to read mimium
quantum, which is a common phrase.
Q88 QUINTILIAN. [B, Iv.
73. Yet if the father (who indeed divided his estate among
them,” and defended them when accused of parricide) should
plead thus, As to defence against the law, a charge of parricide
is brought against young men whose father) is still alive, and
appears on their behalf; and to give a regular statement of the case,
therefore, would be superfluous, since the law has no bearing on it;
but if you require a confession of my own misconduct, I was an
austere father, and a tenacious guardian of #hat property which
would have been better managed by them; 74. and should then ob-
serve that they were prompted to the act by youths whose fathers
were more indulgent, but had nevertheless such feelings as was
proved by the fact that they could not kill their father; for
that it would have been needless for them to take an oath to kill
him, if they had had the resolution to do so without it, nor would
there have been any need of a lot, had not each of them been
desirous to be eaempted from the act ; all arguments of this
nature, such as they are, would find the mirids of the audience
more favourably disposed to receive them, when softened by
the brief defence offered in the first proposition. 75. But
when it is inquired whether a thing occurred, or what sort of
thing occurred, how, though everything be against us, can we
avoid making a statement, if we adhere to what is due to our
cause ? The accuser has made his statement, and, not con-
fining himself to intimate how matters took place, has added
much to our prejudice, and exaggerated it by his language; his
proofs have been brought; his peroration * excited the judges,
and left them full of indignation ; they naturally wait to hear
what will be advanced on our side, 76. If we advance nothing,
the judges must necessarily believe that what our opponent
has said really happened, and that it happened just as he re-
presented it. What then, it may be asked, shall we tell the
same story as our opponent 2 If the question is about quality,
(which is the next consideration after that of fact is settled,)
we must tell the same story certainly, but not in the same

* This father had previously divided his estate among his sons who
plotted against his life, and when they were accused of intended parricide
by the father's relations, (as is ingeniously conjectured by the interpreter
calling himself Turnebus) who would succeed to the estate if the sons
were proved guilty, the father himself appeared as advocate for his
children on their trial. Spalding. The structure of the passage, as
he adds, is by no means clear; the wond swbjicitur is probably corrupt.
CH.II.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 289
way; we must assign other causes for actions, and give another
view of them. 77. We may extenuate some things by the
terms in which we speak of them ; luxury may be mentioned
under the Softer term of gaiety, avarice under that of frugality,
and carelessness under that of good nature. A certain degree
of favour, or at least of commiseration, we may gain by our look,
tone, or attitude. A confession of itself will sometimes draw tears.
As to those who are of a contrary opinion about a statement,
I would willingly ask them whether they mean to justify, or
not to justify, that which they do not mean to narrate 2 78. For
if they neither justify facts, nor make a statement of them,
their whole cause will be betrayed; but if they mean to offer a
justification, it is surely necessary for them, for the most part,
to state what they intend to justify. Why, then, should we not
make a statement of that which may be refuted, and make it,
indeed, with that very object? 79. Or what difference is
there between proof and a statement of facts, except that a
statement is a connected exposition of that which is to be
proved, and proof is a verification of that which has been
stated? Let us consider, then, whether such a statement, in
opposition to that of our opponent, ought not to be somewhat
longer and more verbose than ordinary, by reason that we
have to prepare the mind of the judge, and by reason of par-
ticular arguments that we may introduce ; (I say particular
arguments, and not a continued course of argumentation ;) and
it will give great effect to our statement if we affirm, from
time to time, that we shall establish what we say ; that the
strength of our cause could not be shown in the first ea position of
it ; that we intreat the judges to wait, suspend their opinions,
and trust that we shall make good our point, 80. Finally, we
must relate whatever can be related otherwise than our adver-
sary has related it; or, for the same reason,” exordia in such
causes may be thought superfluous, since what further purpose
have they, than to render the judge more disposed to under-
stand the cause ? But it is admitted that there is nowhere
greater use for them, than where the mind of the judge is to
be freed from some prepossession conceived against us.
81. As to conjectural causes,t in which the question is
* Eo etiam..] Eandem ob causam. Spalding. That is, on the suppo-
sition that we were to make no statement.
t When the accused denies that he is guilty of the fact charged
U
290 QUINTILIAN. [B. IV.
about fact, they do not so often require an explanation of the
point on which a decision is to be given, as of the circum-
stances from which a knowledge of it is to be collected. As
the prosecutor will represent those circumstances in an un-
favourable light, the defendant must try to remove the
unfavourable impression produced by him ; the circumstances
must be laid before the judge by the one in a different way
from that in which they are presented to him by the other.
82. But, it may be said, some arguments are strong when
advanced in a body, but of less force when separated. This
remark, I answer, does not apply to the question Whether we
ought to make a statement, but how we ought to make one.
For what hinders us from accumulating a variety of evidence
in our statement, and to promise to produce more ? Or to
divide our statement into portions, to give proofs under each
portion as it is brought forward, and so proceed to what follows?
83. For I do not agree with those who think that we must
always relate matters in the order in which they occurred : I
consider rather that we should relate them in the order which
is best for our cause. This may be effected by various arti-
fices; for sometimes we may pretend that something has
escaped our memory, with a view to introduce it into a place
better suited to our purpose ; sometimes we may quit the
proper order, and assure the judge that we shall afterwards
return to it, as the case will thus be rendered clearer; some-
times, after relating a fact, we may subjoin the motives that
preceded it; 84. for there is no fixed law for a defence, or any
invariable rule; we must consider what is best adapted to the
nature of the case, and to the occasion; and must act as in
regard to a wound, which, according to its state, must either
be dressed at once, or, if the dressing can be delayed, must be
bound up in the meanwhile. 85. Nor would I consider it
unlawful to repeat a thing several times, as Cicero has done in
his speech for Cluentius; a liberty which is not only allowed to be
taken, but is sometimes even necessary, as in cases of extortion,
and all such as are not at all complicated.* It is the part of
a fool, indeed, to be led by a Superstitious regard for rules to
against him, he will hardly make a statement of it, unloss he throws
the guilt upon some other party Turnebus.
* Comp. c. 1, sect. 74; c. 4, Sect. 4.
CH. II.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 29 |
act against the interest of his cause.* 86. It is the practice to
put the statement of facts before the proofs, that the judge
may not be ignorant of the point about which the question is:
and why, then, if every circumstance is to be established or
refuted, is not every circumstance to be stated in our narrative 2
For myself, as far as any account is to be made of my practice,
I know that I used to adopt that method whenever the interest
of any cause required it, and with the approbation, too, of men
of experience, and of those who sat in judgment; and in
general, (a remark which I do not make from vanity, for there
are many, with whom I was associated in pleading, who can
contradict me if I speak falsely,) the duty of stating the case
was assigned to me. 87. Yet I would not on that account say
that we should not more frequently follow the order of facts.
In some facts the order cannot be changed without impropriety;
as if we should say, for example, that a woman had a child, and
should afterwards say that she conceived; that a will was
opened, and then that it was sealed; and if, in speaking of such
matters, you chance to mention first that which happened last,
it is best to make no allusion to that which happened first.
88. There are also at times false statements;f of which
two kinds are introduced in the forum ; one, which depends on
extrinsic support; as Publius Clodius rested his cause on the
testimony of witnesses, when he affirmed that he was at
Interamna the night on which he committed a heinous crime
at Rome; the other, which must be supported by the ability of
the pleader; and this relies sometimes on a mere assumption
of modesty in him, whence it appears to me to be called com-
pleasion ; sometimes on a peculiar representation of the case.
89. But, whichsoever of the two modes we adopt, our first care
must be that what we invent, be possible ; next that it be in
accordance with person, place, and time, and have a character
and order that are probable ; and, if it be practicable, our
representation should be connected with something that is
acknowledged to be true; or be supported by some argument
relative to the question; for what is altogether sought from
without the cause, is apt to betray the licence which we take
in inventing. 90. We must be extremely watchful, too, that
no two particulars (as often happens with tellers of fiction)
* Comp. c. 1, sect. 64, 65 ; and c. 5, sect. 7.
+ Comp, sect. 19.
U 2
Q92 QUINTILIAN. [B.IV.
contradict one another ; (for Some things may suit very well
with certain parts” of our case, and yet not agree with each
other on the whole ;) and also that they be not at variance
with what is acknowledged to be true ; it being a maxim even
in the schools, that the complexion is not to be sought from
without the argument. 91. But both in the schools and in
the forum, the speaker ought to keep in mind, throughout the
whole case, what he has invented, since what is not true is apt
to be forgotten, and the common saying is just, that a liar
ought to have a good memory. 92. Let us consider, also, that
if the question be concerning an act of our own, we must ad-
here to one particular statement; but if concerning the act of
another, we may bring it under a variety of suspicious aspects.
In some scholastic causes, however, in which it is supposed
that a person rinder accusation does not answer to the questions
put to him,t liberty is granted to enumerate all the answers
that might have been given. 98. But let us remember that
we are to feign only such things as are not liable to be dis-
proved by evidence; and these are such as proceed only from
our own thoughts, of which we alone are conscious; such as
are supposed to have been said by the dead, of whom none
will appear to refute them; or by one who has the same
interest with ourselves, for he will not contradict us; or even
by our adversary, as in denying them he will gain no credit.
94. As to imputed motives from dreams and superstitious feel-
ings, they have lost all credibility from the ease with which
they are invented.
Nor is it sufficient to adopt a certain colour in our statement
of facts, unless it preserve a consistency through the whole
case; especially as the only mode of establishing certain points
lies in asseveration and persistence; 95. as the parasite (who
claims as his son a youth that had been three times disin-
herited by a rich man, and allowed to return to him,) will
* Partibus blandiwntur..] Partibus is in the ablative case ; quibusdam.
in partibus : secundum quasdam partes. Capperonier. “Il est des choses
qui se concilient avec certaines parties.” Gedoym.
+ When the subject is such that the accused opposes an obstinate
silence to every interrogatory, or is, for some reason, not allowed to
reply; for though no reply was introduced in scholastic declamations
in general, (see sect. 28,) yet I do not suppose that Quintilian intends
here to say this of all declamations whatever. Spalding.
: It is to be understood that the rich man had thrice signified an in-
CH.II.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 293
have some colour for asserting that poverty was his reason for
exposing the boy; that the character of parasite was assumed
by him merely because he had a son in that house, and that
the innocent youth was disinherited three times only because
he was not the son of the person who disinherited him.
96. But unless he exhibit, throughout all his speech, the
affection of a father, and that in the most ardent manner,
together with the hatred of the rich man towards the youth,
and his own fear for him, as knowing that he will stay with the
greatest danger in a house in which he is so detested, he will
not escape the suspicion of being a suborned claimant.
97. It happens at times in the declamations of the schools,
(I know not whether it can possibly happen in the forum,) that
both parties make the same allegations, and each supports
them on its own behalf; as in this cause: 98. A wife informed
her husband that her step-son had endeavoured to seduce her,
and had appointed a time and place for their meeting ; the son, on
his part, brought a similar charge against his step-mother, only
naming a different time and place; the father finds his son in
the place which the wife had named, and his wife in that
which the son had named ; he divorced his wife, and, as
she said nothing, disinherited his son. Nothing can be
said on behalf of the young man, which may not also be
said on behalf of his step-mother, 99. What is common,
however, to both parties, will be stated; and then, from
the comparison of persons, from the order in which the infor-
mations were given, and from the silence of the wife, when
divorced, arguments will be drawn. 100. Nor ought we to be
ignorant that there are some cases which do not admit of any
colouring, but are simply to be defended;t as was that of the
rich man, who lashed with a Scourge the statue” of a poorer
tention to disinherit his son, which the laws did not allow him to
carry into execution. Hence the son is said in the text to be absolutus,
or sent back to his father's house. The rich man, thus repeatedly
disappointed, suborns a parasite whom he had in his house to claim
the young man as his own son, hoping to get rid of him by that means.
There were, in reality, no laws with regard to disinheriting; they were
merely fictions of the schools. Spalding.
* As when a person rests his defence solely on the law. Spalding.
f Badius Ascensius aptly illustrates this passage by citing a passage
from Paulus, Digest. xlv. 10, 27 : “If the statue of your father,
erected on his monument, has been injured by stones thrown at it,
2.94. QUINTILIAN. [B. IV
mau, that was his enemy, and was in consequence accused of
committing an insult. A pleader cannot say in palliation of
such an act that it was that of a sensible man ; but he may
perhaps succeed in defending it from penalty.
101. But if part of a statement be in our favour, and part
against us, we must deliberate, according to the nature of the
case, whether we ought to blend those parts together, or keep
them distinct. If the facts which make against us be the
more numerous, those which are in our favour will be over-
whelmed by them. In such a case, then, it will be best to
divide them, and, after stating and confirming the circum-
stances that are favourable to us, to adopt against the rest such
remedies as we have already * specified. 102. If the facts in
our favour be the more numerous, we may very well unite
them, that those which are adverse to us, being placed as it
were in the midst of our auxiliaries, may have less force.
Neither the one nor the other, however, are to be exposed
undefended ; but we must take care to support such as favour
us with proof, and add reasons why such as are against us are
not to be credited ; because, unless we make a distinction, it
is to be feared that the good may be polluted by the contami-
nation of the evil.
103. The following directions, too, are commonly given
respecting the statement of facts; that no digression is to be
made from it; that we are to address ourselves constantly to the
judge ºf that we are to speak in no character but owr own ; and
that we are to introduce no argumentation; and some even
add that we are not to attempt to eacite the feelings. These
precepts, doubtless, are to be in general observed ; or, I may
say, never to be departed from, unless the nature of our cause
obliges us to disregard them. 104. In order that our state-
ment may be clear and concise, nothing can be so seldom
justifiable in it as digression ; nor ought there ever to be any
except such as is short, and of such a nature that we may seem
to be hurried into it, out of our right course, by the strength of
you cannot bring an action against the thrower of the stones for
violation of a sepulchre, but you may for the injury done to the
statue ; as Labeo writes.” Something similar is mentioned by Pau-
sanlas, vi. 11, in regard to the statue of Theagenes an athlete. Spalding.
* Sect 65, seqq.
ºf C. 1, sect. 63.
CH.II.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 295
our feelings. 105. Such is that of Cicero * respecting the mar-
riage of Sassia: Oh, incredible wickedness in a woman l such as
has not been heard of, in the whole course of human life, eaccept in
this one female / Oh, unbridled and immoderate lasciviousness /
Oh, unparalleled audacity 1 Not to have feared, if not the power of
the gods, or the opinion of men, at least that very night, and those
nuptial torches | Not to have respected the threshold of the cham-
ber, or the couch of her daughter, or the very walls themselves, the
witnesses of her former marriage / 106. As to constantly ad-
dressing the judge, a brief diversion of our speech from him
Sometimes intimates a thing more concisely, and gives it more
effect. On this point, accordingly, I hold the same opinion as
I expressed respecting the exordium ; and I think the same
with regard to the prosopopeia; which, however, not only
Servius Sulpicius+ has used in his defence of Aufidia, “That
you were languid with sleep, should I suppose, or oppressed with
a heavy lethargy 3 '' etc., but Cicero himself, in speaking of the
ship-masters, (for that passage is a statement of facts,) ex-
claims, “For liberty to enter, you will give so much,” etc.
107. In his pleading for Cluentius, Š too, does not the conver-
sation between Stalenus and Bulbus contribute greatly to the
rapidity of the narrative, and to its credibility ? And that he
may not be supposed to have fallen into this manner undesign
edly, (a supposition which is indeed wholly incredible with
regard to such an orator,) he recommends, in his Oratorical
Partitions, that the statement of facts should display agreeable-
mess, something to eacite surprise and eaſpectation, uneaſpected
'results, conversations between different people, and all the feelings
of the mind. 108. Continued argumentation, as I observed,"
we must never use in our statement of facts; though we may
* Pro Cluent, c. 5.
+ Servius Sulpicius, the friend of Cicero, a very celebrated lawyer,
is said to have spoken in defence of Aufidia, not only here, but in x. 1,
22 ; and this makes it the more difficult to explain vi. 1, 20, where a
speech of his against Aufidia is mentioned; for we learn from x. 1,
116, and 7, 30, that there were only three of his speeches extant, and
it is hardly credible that two of them were on opposite sides in the
same cause. Of Aufidia's case we find no mention in any other writer.
Spalding.
j. In Verr. v. 45.
§ C. 26.
|| C. 9.
* Sect. 79, 103.
296 QUINTILIAN. [B.IV.
introduce a single argument occasionally, as Cicero does in his
speech for Ligarius,” when he says that he had governed his
province in such a way as made it expedient for him that there
should be peace. We may also introduce in our statement,
if the subject requires, a short defence of our client's con-
duct, or a reason for it : for we are not to state things as a
witness, but as an advocate. 109. The simple account of a
fact may be such as this : Quintus Ligarius went into Africa as
lieutenant-general with Caius Considius, But how does Cicero
give it? Quintus Ligarius, when there was not even a suspicion
of war, went into Africa as lieutenant-general with Caius Con-
sidius. 110. In another place, again, Heset out, not only to mowar,
but not even upon the least suspicion of war.t. When it was suffi-
cient for him, too, in proceeding to state a fact, to say, Quin-
tus Ligarius allowed himself to be involved in no transaction, he
adds, looking back to his home, and being desirou8 to return to his
friends. Thus what he stated he made credible by giving a reason
for it, and made a strong impression, at the same time, on the
feelings of his audience.f. 111. I am the more surprised at
those, therefore, who think that we are not to touch the feel-
ings in a statement of facts. If they mean, indeed, that we
are not to work on them long, or as in the peroration, they are
of the same opinion with myself; for tediousness is to be
avoided ; otherwise, why should I not move the judge while I
am instructing him? 112. Why should I not secure, if
possible, at the very opening of my case, the object which I
am desirous to attain at the conclusion of it, especially as I
shall find his mind more manageable, when I come to proofs,
if it has previously been swayed by indignation or pity ?
113. Does not Cicero, Š in a very few words, touch all the
feelings by describing the Scourging of a Roman citizen, not
only showing the condition of the sufferer, the place of the out-
rage. the lature of the infliction, but extolling the spirit with
which he bore it? For he exhibits him as a man of great
magnanimity, who, when he was lashed with rods, uttered no
* C. 2.
+ Pro Lig. c. 1, 2.
i Affectás quoque implevit.] Affectus, as Spalding observes, is in the
genitive case, but he would rather read affectu, as the ablative is more
usual with Quintilian. Cicero, says Gesner, excited the pity of the
judges for Ligarius.
§ In Verr. v. 62.
CH. II.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 297
groan, and made no supplication, but only eacclaimed that he was
a Roman citizen, to the disgrace of his oppressor, and with con-
fidence in the laws. 114. Has he not also, through the whole
of his statement, excited the greatest detestation of the treat-
ment of Philodamus,” and caused the tears of his audience to
overflow at his punishment, not so much relating that they
wept, as exhibiting them weeping, the father, that his son
was to die, and the son that his father was to die & What
more touching could any peroration present? 115. It is
late, too, to bring the feelings, at the end of a speech, to
bear on particulars which we have previously narrated with
coolness; the judge has become familiarized to them, and
hears, without any excitement, that with which he was not
moved when it was new to him ; and it is difficult for us to
change the temper of his mind when once it is settled.
116. For my own part, (for I will not conceal my opinion,
though that which ſ am going to say rests rather upon
experience than upon precepts,) I think that the statement of
facts requires, as much as any part of a speech, to be adorned
with all the attractions and grace of which it is susceptible.
But it makes a great difference what the nature of the case
which we state is. 117, In the smaller sort of cases, there-
fore, such as private ones in general are, the garb of the
statement ought to be neat, and, as it were close-fitting; there
should be the greatest care with regard to words, which, when we
enlarge upon the common topics of morality,t are poured forth
with rapidity, and particular expressions are often lost in the
profusion of language in which they are enveloped ; but here
every word ought to be expressive, and, as Zeno; Says,
tinctured with peculiar signification ; the style should be appa-
rently artless, but as agreeable as possible ; 118, there should be
no figures borrowed from poetry, and received on the authority
of the ancients contrary to the simplicity of language, (for the
diction should be as pure as possible,) but such only as lessen
tedium by variety, and relieve attention by change, so that we
may not fall into similar terminations, similar phrases, and
similar constructions; for a statement has no other attractions,
* In Verp. i. 30.
ºf C. 1, sect. 59.
: Zeno of Citium is doubtless meant. That he wrote on language
and composition appears from Diog. Laert. vii. 4, 39, 40. Spalding.
298 QUINTILIAN. [B.IV.
and, if it be not recommended by such graces, must fail to
please. 119. Nor is the judge in any part more attentive; and
consequently nothing that is expressed with effect is lost upon
him. Besides he is more inclined, I know not how, to believe
what gratifies his ear, and is led by being pleased to being
persuaded.
120. But when the cause is of greater moment, it will be
proper to speak of heinous crimes in a tone of invective, and
of mournful occurrences in one of pity; not that the topics for
exciting the feelings may be exhausted, but that an outline of
them, as it were, may be presented; and that it may at once
appear what the full picture of the case will be. 121. Nor
would I dissuade a speaker from reviving the strong feeling of
the judge, when exhausted with attention, by some remark,
especially if thrown in with brevity; such, for instance, as
this : The servants of Milo did what every one would have
wished his servants to do in such circumstances; or occasionally,
perhaps, a little more boldly, as this :* The mother-in-law mar-
ries her son-in-law, without auspices, without any to sanction the
wnion, and with the most fatal omens. 122. As this practice was
adopted even in days when every speech was composed rather
for use than for show, and the judges were still more austere,
how much more aptly may it be done now, when pleasure has
made its way even into trials for life and fortune? How far
we ought to conform to this taste of our age, I will give my
opinion in another place. Š Meantime I allow that some con-
cession is to be made to it.
123. A probable representation of circumstances which appears
to conduct the audience, as it were, to a view of the case, has,
when subjoined to what is really true, a powerful effect; such,
for example, as the description given by Marcus Caeliusi of
Antonius.' They || find him sunk in the sleep of drunkenness,
* Cic. pro Cluent. c. 5. -
f Rollin and Gesner think that the preface to book viii. is meant ;
also viii. 3, 6, Seqq. Perhaps we may suppose an allusion to xii. 9, 5.
Spalding.
f See i. 6, 29, and Val. Max. iv. 2 Rom. 7.
§ I have no doubt that this was the Caius Antonius who was the
colleague of Cicero in the consulship, the uncle of Mark Antony the
triumvir. That he was accused by Caelius, when a young man, we
know from many writers; see Cic. pro Cael. c. 7 and 31. Spalding.
| Namely the centurions, who brought him news of the approach of
the enemy.
CH. II.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 299
snoring with the whole force of his lungs, and repeating eructa-
tion on eructation, while the most distinguished of his female
companions were stretched across towards him from their several
couches, and the rest lying round in every direction ; 124. who,
however, becoming aware of the approach of the enemy, at-
tempted, half dead with terror, to awaken Antonius; they called
him aloud by name to mo purpose ; they raised his head; one
whispered gentle sounds into his ear; another struck him forcibly
with her hand; but when at length he became conscious of the voice
and touch of each, he only threw his arms round the neck of her
that was neart to him ; he could neither sleep after being rowsed,
nor keep awake from the effects of drunkenness ; but was tossed
about, half asleep and half awake, in the hands of centurions and
harlots. Than this description nothing could be imagined more
probable; nothing offered as a greater subject of reproach;
nothing exhibited more vividly.
125. Nor can I omit to remark how much credit the authority
of the speaker gives to his statement; an authority which we
ought to secure chiefly by our general conduct, but also by our
style of oratory; since the more grave and serious it is, the
more weight it must give to our assertions. 126. We must
especially avoid, therefore, in this part of our speech, all
suspicion of artifice, (for nowhere is the judge more on his
guard,) So that nothing may appear fictitious or studied, but
that all may be thought to emanate rather from the cause than
from the advocate. 127. But this manmer our modern pleaders
cannot tolerate ; we think that our art is lost if it is not seen,
whereas art, if it is seen, ceases to be art. We doat upon
praise, and think it the great object of our labour; and thus
betray to the judges what we wish to display to the by-
standers.
128. There is also a sort of repetition of the statement,
which is called by the Greeks #7161%) notg: a thing more com-
mon in School declamations than in the forum. It was intro-
duced with this object, that, as the statement of facts ought to
be brief, the case might afterwards be set forth more fully and
with more embellishment, in order to move indignation or
pity. To this ractice I think that we should have recourse
but seldom, and never so as to repeat the whole order of
circumstances; for we may effect the same object by recurring
to particulars here and there. Let him, however, that shall
300 QUINTILIAN. [B IV.
determine on such repetition, touch but lightly on facts in his
statement, and, contenting himself with relating what has been
dome, promise to explain more fully how it was done in the
the proper place.
129. As to the commencement of a statement of facts, some
think that it ought to be made with reference to some charac-
ter, whom, if he is on our side, we are to extol, and, if adverse
to us, to attack. This certainly is a very common mode of
proceeding, because on each side there are persons between
whom the dispute lies. 130. But they may sometimes be
introduced with descriptive circumstances, when such a course
is likely to be advantageous; as,” Aulus Cluentius Habitus,
judges, was the father of my client, a man who held the
highest position, not only in the municipal town of Larimum, in
which he was born, but in all that country and neighbourhood,
for his merit, reputation, and respectability of birth ; sometimes
without them : as, when Quintus Ligarius had set out,t etc.
131. Sometimes, however, we may commence with a fact, as
Cicero in his speech for Tullius ::: Marcus Tullius possesses an
estate inherited from his father in the territory of Thurium ; or
as Demosthenes S in behalf of Ctesiphon : For the Phocian
war having broken out, etc. 132. As to the end of the state-
ment, it is a matter of dispute with those who think that the
statement itself should be brought down to the point where the
question arises: as,"| These things having thus happened, Pub-
lius Dollabella the prator published an edict, as is customary,
with regard to violence and men appearing in arms, without any
eacception, only that Æbutius should reinstate Cascina in the
place from which he had eaſpelled him. He said that he had
veinstated him. A sum of money was deposited ; and it is con-
cerning this deposit that you must decide. This can always be
done on the side of the prosecutor, but not always on that of
the defendant.
* Cic. Pro Cluent. c. 5.
+ Cic. pro Ligar. c. 1. *
f A fragment of a lost speech. Another fragment of it is given, v.
13, 21. What Tullius it was is uncertain.
§ Pro Coron. p. 230, ed. Reisk
| Comp. c. 4, sect. 2.
*I Cic. pro Caecin. c. 8.
CH. III.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 301
CHAPTER III.
Of digressions or excursions immediately after the statement, § 1–3.
Not always unreasonable, 4–8. Some preparation often necessary
before proceeding to proof, 9—ll. Digressions may be made in
any part of a speech, but those in the middle should be short,
12—17.
1. IN the order of things the confirmation follows the
statement; for we must prove what we stated only that it
might be proved. But before I proceed to treat of this part, I
must make a few observations on the opinions of certain
rhetoricians.
It is the custom of most speakers, when the order of facts is
set forth, to make a digression to some pleasing and attractive
moral topic, so as to secure as much favourable attention as
possible from the audience. 2. This practice had its rise in
the declamatory ostentation of the schools, and passed from
thence into the forum, after causes began to be pleaded not to
benefit the parties going to law, but to enable the advocates
to make a display; from apprehension, I suppose, that if the
stubbornness of argument should immediately follow the dry
conciseness of narrative, (such as is often necessary,) and the
gratification of eloquent diction should be too long withheld,
their whole oration would appear cold and repulsive. 3. To
this custom there is this objection, that the speakers indulge
in it without making due distinction of causes, and what par-
ticular causes require, but as if such displays of eloquence were
always expedient or even necessary; and in consequence they
force into their digression matters taken from other parts to
which they properly belong ; so that many things must either
be said over again, or, as they have been Said in a place to
which they had no right, cannot be said in their own. 4. I
admit, however, that this sort of excursion may be advan-
tageously introduced, not only after the statement of the case,
but after the different questions in it, altogether or sometimes
severally, when the subject requires or at least permits it; and I
think that a speech is by such means greatly set off and em-
bellished; provided that the dissertation aptly follows and
adheres to what precedes, and is not forced in like a wedge,
separating what was naturally united. 5. For no part of a
Speech ought to be more closely attached to any other part
302 QUINTILIAN. [B. IV.
than the proof is to the statement; unless indeed the di-
gression be intended either as the end of the statement or as
the beginning of the proof. There will therefore sometimes
be room for it; for instance, if our statement, towards the con-
clusion, contains something very heinous, we may enlarge upon
it, as if our indignation, like our breath, must necessarily have
vent. 6. This however ought to be done only when the matter
does not admit of doubt ; else it is of more importance to make
your charge true than atrocious; because the enormity of an
accusation is in favour of the accused as long as it remains
unproved, for belief in the commission of a heinous crime is
extremely difficult. 7. A digression may also be made with
advantage, if, for example, when you have spoken of services
rendered to the opposite party, you proceed to inveigh against
ingratitude ; or if, when you have set forth a variety of charges
in your statement, you show how much danger in consequence
threatens yourself. 8. But all these must be signified briefly;
for the judge, when he has learned the order of the facts, is
impatient for the proof of them, and desires as soon as possible
to settle his opinion. You must be cautious, also, that your
exposition of the case be not forgotten, through the attention
of the judge being turned to something else, or fatigued with
useless delay.
9. But though such digression is not always a necessary
sequel to a statement of facts, it is yet frequently a useful
preparation for the consideration of the question; for instance,
if the case appears, at first sight, unfavourable to us; if we
have to uphold a severe law; if we enforce penal inflictions;
as there will then be room, as it were, for a second exordium,
to prepare the judge for our proofs, or to soothe or excite him;
and this may be done the more freely and forcibly in this place,
as the case is already known to him. 10. With these lenitives,
so to speak, we may soften whatever is offensively hard in our
statement, that the ears of the judge may the more readily
admit what we may have to say afterwards, and that he may
not be averse to concede us justice;* for judges are not easily
convinced of anything against their will. 11. On these oc-
casions, however, the disposition of the judge must also be
ascertained, that we may know whether he is more inclined to
* Nejus nostrum oderint.] Ne nobis sint adversi propter juris rigorem.
Tºrnebus, -
CH. III.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR, 303
law or to equity; for according to his inclination our repre-
sentations will be more or less necessary.
The same subject may also serve as a kind of peroration
after the question. 12. This part the Greeks call the ragéz-
80.019 : the Latins the egressus or egressio. But such sallies,
as I remarked,” are of Several kinds, and may be directed to
different subjects from any part of the cause ; as eulogies of
men and places, descriptions of countries, recitals of occurrences
true or fictitious.f 13. Of which sort, in the pleadings of
Cicero against Verres, are the praises of Sicily, and the rape of
Proserpine; in his speech for Caius Cornelius,” the well.
known celebration of the merits of Cneius Pompey, which the
divine orator, as if the course of his pleading had been sus-
pended at the very name of the heroic leader, suddenly turns
aside to pronounce, breaking away from the matter on which
he had entered.
14. As to the definition of the ºrogéz8&oig, it is, in my
opinion, a dissertation on any subject relating to the interest of the
cause, digressing from the order of facts. I do not see, therefore,
why they assign it to that part of a speech, above all others, which
immediately follows the statement of the case, any more than
why they think that name belongs to a digression only when
Something is to be stated in it, as a speech may swerve from
the right path in so many ways. 15. For whatever goes
beyond those five parts of a speech which we have specified,
is a digression, whether it be an expression of indignation, pity,
detestation, reproach, apology, conciliation, or reply to invective."
Similarly digressive is everything that does not lie within the
question ; all amplification, eatenuation, and eacitement of the
* Sect. 4.
+ C. 2, § 19. *
† III. 7, 27.
§ Of this speech only some fragments remain, which have been pre-
served with the commentary of Asconius Pedianus. “Caius Cornelius,”
says Asconius, “when tribune of the people, after incurring the dis-
pleasure of the senate by the proposal of certain laws, proposed
another law by which no one was to be released from legal obligations
except with the Sanction of the people; a law intended to weaken the
authority of the senate.” Spalding.
| See iii. 9, 1.
*I Maledictorum, refutatio.] Since maledicta have no proper connexion
with the matter in question. So Cic. pro Cluent. c. 23. Doce—quid–
non modó in criminis, Sed in maledict; loco sit objectum. See c. 2, sect.
27. Spalding.
304 QUINTILIAN. [B.IV.
passions; all those moral observations concerning luaury, ava-
rice, religion, duty, which * contribute so much to the agreeable-
ness and ornament of a speech, but which, however, as they
are attached to cognate subjects, and naturally cohere with them,
do not appear to be digressions. 16. But there are numbers of
remarks introduced into matters that have no connexion with
them, remarks by which the judge is excited, admonished, ap-
peased, intreated, or commended, Instances of them are innu-
merable; some we carry with us ready prepared; some we utter
on the spur of the moment, or from necessity; if, for instance,
anything extraordinary occurs while we are speaking, as an
interruption, the sudden arrival of any person, or a disturbance.
17. From such a cause Cicero was obliged to make a digression
in his exordium, when he was speaking for Milo, as appears
from the short speecht which he pronounced on the occasion.
But he that prepares something to precede the question, and
he that adds something to his proofs as in support of them,
may make a somewhat longer digression. He, however, who
makes a Sally from the middle of his speech, ought soon to
return to the point from which he started.
CHAPTER IV.
Of propositions preparatory to proof; not always necessary, § 1, 2.
Sometimes very useful, 3, 4. Various kinds of propositions, and
remarks on them, 5–9.
1. THERE are some writers who place the proposition;
after the statement of facts, as a division of a speech on
any matter for judgment.S To this notion I have already||
replied. In my opinion the commencement of any proof is a
proposition, which may be advanced not only in stating the
principal question, but sometimes even to introduce particular
* It is to be observed that I read ea maximè Quae jucundam et orna-
tam, faciunt orationem, with Rollin. In Spalding's and other texts the
quae is omitted.
+ Orativnculá.] This was the speech that he really delivered on
behalf of Milo, and which was extant in the time of Asconius Pedianus,
having been taken down on the occasion. The more elaborate speech,
which we now have, was never delivered.
: See iii. 9, 5; 11, 27.
§ Judicialis materia.] Orationis, quae versetwr in genere judiciali.
Capperonier.
| III, 9, 2.
CH. IV.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 305
arguments, especially those which are called āryslgäuoro...”
2. But I shall now speak of the formerf kind. It is not
always necessary to use it ; for sometimes what the point in
question is, is sufficiently manifest without any proposition
whatever ; for instance, if the statements of facts ends where
the question begins; so that that which in arguments is com-
monly the recapitulation, is sometimes immediately subjoined
to the statement of the case: These things $ occurred, judges,
just as I have related them ; the lier-in-wait was cut off; violence
was overcome by violence ; or rather audacity was subdued by
valour. 3. But at times it is extremely useful; especially
when the fact cannot be denied, and the question is about the
definition: as, in pleading for him who took the money of a
private person from a temple, you would say, The consideration
is about sacrilege ; it is concerning sacrilege that you have to
decide; SO that the judge may understand that his only duty is
to ascertain whether that which is charged against the accused
is sacrilege. 4. It is also of use in causes that are obscure or
complex, not only that they may be rendered more lucid, but
also, Occasionally, that they may be more striking. A propo-
sition will produce this effect, if there be immediately sub-
joined to it something that may support our pleading: as,
A law has been made eaſpressly, that whatever foreigner mounts
the wall is to be punished with death ; that you are a foreigner
ts certain ; that you mounted the wall there is no doubt;
what remains, then, but that you undergo the penalty & For
such a proposition enforces a confession from the opposite
party, and prevents, in a great measure, delay in giving judg-
ment, not only explaining the question, but supporting it.
5. Propositions are single, double, or complea: ; a distinction
which results from more than one cause ; for several charges
may be combined, as when Socrates was accused of corrupt-
ing the youth and introducing new superstitions; or one charge
may be established by several proofs, as when it was alleged
against Æschines that he had acted dishonestly in his em-
* See v. 14, 14.
f That which concerns the principal question, or State of the cause.
Spalding.
# Summa collectio.] 'Avaks paxaiwang. Pithaeus. In French “reca-
pitulation.” Capperonier.
§ Cic. pro Mil. c. 11.
X.
306 QUINTILIAN. [B. Iv.
bassy, because he had spoken falsely; because he had done
mothing in conformity with the directions given him ; because he
had tarried; because he had accepted presents. 6. The defence may
also contain several propositions; as, in an action to recover a
debt it may be said, You have no right demand it ; for it was
not in your power to become an agent;* nor had he, in whose
mame you act, a right to have an agent ; mor are you the heir of
him from whom I am said to have borrowed; nor was I indebted
to him. 7. Such examples may be multiplied at pleasure; but it is
sufficient to have pointed out that such is the case. If these
allegations are stated singly, with proofs subjoined, they are so
many distinct propositions; if they are combined, they come
under the head of partition.f
8. A proposition is sometimes, also, entirely bare, as is
generally the case in conjectural causes : I accuse of murder;
I charge with theft; sometimes it is accompanied with a reason;
as, Caius Cornelius; has been guilty of treason against the dig-
mity of the tribunate ; for he himself, when tribune of the people,
read his own law before the public assembly. § The proposition
which we bring forward, too, is sometimes our own ; as, I ac-
cuse this man of adultery; sometimes that of our adversary; as,
The charge against me is that of adultery; sometimes affecting
both parties; as, The question between my opponent and me is,
which of the two is the nearer of kin to a person who has died in-
testate. Sometimes, moreover, we may couple opposite propo-
sitions; as, I say thus, my adversary thus.
9. There is a way of speaking which has, at times, the force
of a proposition, though it is in reality not one ; when, after
having made our statement of facts, we add, It is upon these
points that you are to decide; this being a kind of admo-
mition to the judge to direct his attention more earnestly to
the case, and, being roused as by a touch, to observe that the
statement is ended and the proof commenced ; so that, as we
* Procuratori tibi esse non licuit.] He that was infamić notatus could
not be a procurator. Turnebus.
f Partition, with Quintilian, is not properly a portion of the pleading,
but an appendix to the proofs, or preparation for them. See the next
chapter. Capperonier.
3. C. 3, sect. 13.
§ Contrary to the custom, which was, that the praeco should recite
the law, the scriba supplying him with the words, Turnebws.
CH. v.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR, 307
enter upon the establishment of our allegations, he may com-
mence, as it were, a new stage of listening.
CHAPTER V.
Partition of our matter generally useful, § 1–3. When it should be
omitted, 4–9. Examples from Cicero, 10––12. As to states of
conjecture and quality, 13–17. Artifices that may be used, 18–
21. Utility of partition, and the proper qualities of it, 22–28.
1. PARTITION is the enumeration, according to their order,”
of our own propositions, or those of our adversary, or both ; an
enumeration which some think that we should always make,
because, by its aid, the cause is rendered clearer, and the judge
more observant and attentive, if he knows exactly on what point
we are speaking, and on what points we intend to speak after-
wards. 2. Some, on the other hand, think it dangerous to a
speaker, for two reasons: that some things, on which we promise
to speak, may escape our memory, and others, which we may have
omitted in our specification, may occur to us; but nothing of this
kind can happen except to one who is utterly deficientinability, or
one who brings to his pleading nothing settled or premeditated.
3. Otherwise, what method is so plain and clear as that of a
proper division of our matter ? for it follows nature as a guide,
so as to be the greatest aid to the memory, to prevent us from
straying from our proposed course in speaking. I cannot,
therefore, agree with those who think that our partition should
not exceed three propositions. Doubtless, if it be too multi-
farious, it will escape the recollection of the judge, and
perplex his attention ; but it is not to be confined, as by a
law, to this or that number, when a cause may possibly require
Iſl()]'é.
4. There are other reasons why we should not always adopt
a partition; first, because most observations please better when
they appear to be conceived on the moment, and not to be
brought from home, but to spring from the subject itself as we
are discussing it; and hence the common expressions, I had
almost forgotten, It had escaped me, Yow aptly remind me,
* Ordine collata.] That is, regularly following one another; not
separate. Spalding.
X 2
308 QUINTILIAN, [B.IV.
are by no means ill received. If you lay down your course of
proof before-hand, all pleasure of novelty is cut off from the
sequel of your speech. 5. Sometimes, too, the judge must be
misled, and wrought upon by various artifices, that he may
suppose something else to be intended than what is really our
object. A proposition is sometimes startling, and a judge,
if he sees it prematurely, dreads it as a patient dreads the
surgeon's instrument before an operation is performed ; but if,
without any proposition being advanced before-hand, our obser-
vations come upon him when off his guard, and penetrate his
mind, without any warning, when wrapt up, as it were, in
itself, they will make him believe that which he would have
distrusted if we had advanced it at first. 6. Occasionally,
too, we should avoid not only the distinction of questions, but
the mention of them altogether ; the judge should have his
feelings strongly moved, and his attention diverted; for to
instruct is not the only duty of an orator; the power of elo-
quence is best shown in producing excitement But, to such
an effect, that minute carefulness in division, scrupulously
separated into parts,” at a time when we should endeavour to
deprive the judge of the power of deciding against us, is
directly opposed. 7. Are not arguments, also, that are light and
weak when detached, often of great force in a body ? Such
arguments, accordingly, should rather be collected in a mass,
and we should make a Sally with them, as it were, upon the
judge; an expedient which should rarely, however, be adopted,
and only in case of necessity, when reasoning forces us to that
which seems contrary to reasoning."f 8. In addition, it is to
be considered that there is, in every division of a case, some
one point of more importance than the rest, and when the
judge has become acquainted with it, he is apt to disdain other
points as requiring no notice. Consequently, if more charges
than one are to be established or overthrown, a partition is
both advantageous and agreeable ; in Order that what we have
to say on each head may distinctly be shown ; but if we have
* Temwis illa et scrupulosé in partes Secta divisionis diligentia.] Such
is the reading of Spalding, who observes that all the manuscripts, and
all editions before that of Badius Ascensius, have secta. Capperonier,
and most of the later editors, have adopted sectat from Badius. Secta.
diligentia is an expression with which we can hardly feel content, but,
as Spalding asks, if you read Sectac, what will you do with tenwis &
T Corup. c. 2, sect. 85.
CH. v.] |BDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 309
to combat one charge by various arguments, it is needless.
9. Thus, if you should make such a division as this, I shall
show that the accused, for whom I plead, is not of Such a character
that he can be thought to have committed murder; I shall show
that he had no motive for committing murder; I shall show that
at the time the murder was committed he was beyond the Sea,
all that you might prove before that which you place last, must
necessarily appear useless; 10. for the judge is anxious to come
to the strongest point of all; and if he is of a patient temper,
he will silently hold the advocate bound to adhere to his
stated division, or, if he be pressed with business, or be a man
of some dignity, or of rude manners, will call upon him, with
Some reproachful remark, to adhere to it. 11. Some have
been found, accordingly, to disapprove of Cicero's partition in
his speech for Cluentius, where he promises, first of all, that
he will show that no man was ever brought to judgment for
greater crimes, or on stronger evidence, than Oppianicus; meat,
that the preliminary inquiries* were conducted by those very judges
by whom he was condemned; lastly, that the judgment was influ-
enced by money, not on the side of Cluentius, but by the opposite
party; such a division being needless, because, if the third point
could be proved, there was no necessity for introducing the
first or second. 12. On the other hand, no one will be so
unjust or foolish as not to admit that Cicero adopted an excel-
lent division in his pleading for Muraena: I perceive, judges,
that of the whole accusation there are three heads; one concerned
with censure of my client's morals ; another with his competition
for honours; and a third with charges against him for bribery;
for he thus exhibits the cause with the utmost clearness, and
does not render one head useless by another.
13. Most writers also hesitate respecting the following mode
of defence : If I killed the man, I killed him justly; but
I did not kill him ;t for “to what purpose,” it is asked,
“is the first proposition, if the second can be proved? they
are at variance with one another, and while we advance both,
credit is given to neither.” This is indeed partly true ; as we
ought to rest on the second only, provided it be incontro-
vertible. 14. But if we have any apprehension as to the
* Praejudicia..] See book v. c. 1 and 2, and Smith's Dict, of Gr, and
Rom. Ant. Art. Praejudicium.
f Comp. iii. 6, 10.
310 QUINTILIAN. [B, Iv.
stronger, we may very well use the support of both ; for dif.
ferent judges are moved by different arguments; and he who
believes that the deed was done, may think it just ; while he who
will not allow it to be just, will perhaps feel convinced that it
was not done. An unerring hand may be content with one
javelin, but, by an uncertain hand, several should be thrown, in
order that chance may have its influence. 15. Cicero, in
defending Milo, shows admirably, in the first place, that
Clodius was a lier in-wait, and then adds, superabundantly as
it were, that even if he had not been so, a citizen of such
a character might have been slain with great merit and
honour on the part of the slayer. 16. Yet I would not
altogether condemn that order which I just now mentioned;%
because Some arguments, though hard in themselves, may yet
be of use to soften others that are to follow. The common
saying, that we must ask more than what is just in order
to get what is just, f is not without foundation in reason.
17. No one, however, is to take it in such a sense as to suppose
that everything may be attempted ; for the Greeks very wisely
instructus that what cannot be accomplished ought not to be tried.}
But whenever we adopt that double mode of defence of which
I am speaking, we ought to make it our object to draw from
the first head confirmation for the second; for he who might
even have confessed without danger, may appear to have no
motive for speaking falsely when he denies.
18. We must also take good care, whenever we suspect that
the judge desires some other proof than that which we are ad-
vancing, to promise that we will fully and speedily afford him
satisfaction on the point; especially if it affects our client’s
honour. 19. But it frequently happens that a cause, in itself
far from honourable, is supported by the letter of the law; and,
in this case, that the judges may not listen with unwillingness or
disapprobation, they must be often reminded that the vindica-
tion of the integrity and honour of our client will follow ;
that they have but to wait a little, and allow us to proceed
in order. 20. We may pretend also, occasionally, to say
some things against the wish of our client, as Cicero does
* Sect. 13.
+ See Erasmus, Chiliad. ii. 3, 26, who thinks that the saying was
originally used of people offering goods for sale.
: Diog. Laert. i. 70.
CH. v.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 31 1
in his speech for Cluentius, in regard to the law respecting
the duties of judges;” sometimes we may stop, as if we were
interrupted by our client; sometimes we may address our-
selves to him, and entreat him to allow us to take our
own course. 21. Thus we shall gradually make an im-
pression on the mind of the judge; who, while he trusts that
the honour of our client is going to be vindicated, will listen
with less reluctance to our more startling arguments; and,
when he has received some impression from these, the main-
tenance of our client's honour will be the easier for us. Thus
the two points will support each other; and the judge, trusting
to our vindication of character, will be more attentive to the
point of law, and, the point of law being established, will be
more disposed to listen to our vindication of character.
22. But though partition is not always necessary, or even
advantageous, yet, when it is seasonably adopted, it contributes
great lucidity and agreeableness to a speech; for it not only
causes what is stated to become clearer, by drawing certain
particulars out of the crowd, as it were, and placing them full
in the sight of the judges, but relieves the attention by fixing
a definite termination to certain parts, as distances on a road,
marked by inscribed stones, appear greatly to diminish the
fatigue of travellers. 23. For it is a gratification to learn the
measure of the labour which we have acomplished; and to
know how much remains, encourages us to proceed with greater
Spirit to the conclusion ; nothing, indeed, need seem long,
when it is understood where the end is, 24. It was not without
justice that Quintus Hortensius gained great praise for his
exactness in division ; though Cicerof sometimes gently
laughs at his partitions as being counted upon his fingers;
for, as there is moderation requisite in gesture,” So we should,
even with greater reason, avoid a too precise, and, as it were,
jointed, division of our matter. 25. Minute sections, which,
instead of being members, are bits, detract greatly from the
* This law, observes Gesner, respecting the bribery of judges, was
directed against the senators, and Cluentius might have defended
himself from the charge of bribery by saying that he was not a senator.
f Cic. Brut. c. 88 ; pro Quintio, c. 10; Divinat. in Coecil. c. 14, where
he says membra dividere coeperit (Hortensius) et in digitis 8wis singulas
partes causte constituere.
f This touch on gesture is in allusion to Hortensius's counting on
his fingers. Spalding.
312 QUINTILIAN. * [B. IV.
weight of a speech; and those who are eager for the praise of
such distinction, are apt, that they may be thought to have
made nice and numerous divisions, to introduce what is wholly
Superfluous, and to cut asunder what is naturally united;
they make their parts, not so much m0re in number, as less
in bulk ; and, after a thousand partitions, fall into that very
obscurity against which partition was invented.
26. The proposition of a cause, whether divided or single,
ought, whenever it can be introduced with advantage, to be,
above all, plain and clear; (for what can be more disgraceful
than to make that obscure which is adopted for no other pur-
pose than that other parts may not be obscure ?) and it should
also be brief, and not loaded even with a single useless word;
for we must remember that we have not to show what we are
Saying, but what we are going to say. 27. We must be
cautious, too, that nothing may be deficient in it, and nothing
redundant. The most frequent cause of redundancy is, when
we divide into species what it would be sufficient to divide
into genera ; or when, after mentioning the genus, we add
Species to it, as if we should speak of virtue, justice, temperance,
when justice and temperance are but species of virtue.
28. The first step in partition is, to distinguish what is ad-
mitted and what is disputed. Next, in regard to what is
admitted, to distinguish what our adversary admits, and what
we admit; and, in respect to what is disputed, to specify what
our propositions are, and what those of our opponent. But
what is most culpable, is, not to treat of your several points in
the order in which you have arranged them.
INTRODUCTION.j EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 3.13
BOOK W.
INTRODUCTION.
Some rhetoricians have thought that the only duty of an orator is to
teach ; others have called this his chief duty. The necessity for
this book.
1. THERE have been authors,” and some, indeed, of high
reputation, who have thought that the sole duty of an orator is to
inform.f Excitement of the feelings, they considered, was to
be prohibited, for two reasons; first, because all perturbation
of the mind is an evil; and, secondly, because it is inexcusable
for a judge to be diverted from the truth by pity, anger, or any
similar passion ; and to aim at pleasing the audience, when the
object of speaking is to gain victory, they regarded not only as
needless in a pleader, but scarcely worthy even of a man.
2. Many, too, who doubtless did not exclude those arts from
the department of the orator, considered, nevertheless, that his
proper and peculiar office was to establish his own propositions
and to refute those of his adversary. 3. Whichsoever of these
opinions is right, (for I do not here offer my own judgment,)
this book must appear, in the estimation of both parties, ex-
tremely necessary, as the entire subject of it is proof and
refutation; to which all that has hitherto been said $ on
judicial causes is subservient. 4. For there is no other object
either in an introduction or a narrative than to prepare the judge;
and to know the states; of causes, and to contemplate all the
other matters of which I have treated above," would be use-
less, unless we proceed to proof. 5. In fine, of the five parts”
into which we have distinguished judicial pleading, whatever
other may occasionally be unnecessary in a cause, there cer-
tainly never occurs a suit in which proof is not required.
As to directions regarding it, I think that I shall make the
* The commentators rightly refer to Aristotle, Rhet. i. 1, 4. Spalding.
+ See iv. 5, 6. ,”
* According to the Stoics.
§ B. iii. c. 9, Segg
| See b. iii. c. 6.
"I He refers especially, I consider, to the whole of the eleventh
chapter-of-the third book. Spalding.
** Segſ iii. 9, 1 ; iv. 3, 15.
D

3-14 QUINTILIAN. [B. v.
best division of them, by first showing what are applicable to
all kinds of questions, and next, by enlarging on what are pecu-
liar to the several sorts of causes.”
CHAPTER I.
Inartificial proofs. Eloquence not inefficient in regard to them.
1. IN the first place, then, the division which has been laid
down by Aristotlet has gained the approbation of almost all
rhetoricians; namely, that there are some proofs which an
orator adopts that are unconnected with the art of speaking, and
others which he himself eaſtracts, and, as it were, produces, from
his cause. Hence they have called the one sort &rexyot, “in-
artificial,” and the other #yrºxyot, “artificial.” 2. Of the former
kind, are precognitions, public reports, evidence extracted by
torture, writings, oaths, and the testimony of witnesses, with
which the greater part of forensic pleadings are wholly con-
cerned. But though these species of proof are devoid of art in
themselves, they yet require, very frequently, to be supported
or overthrown with the utmost force of eloquence; and those
writers, therefore, appear to me highly deserving of blame, who
have excluded all this kind of proofs from the rules of art. 3. It
is not, however, my intention to collect all that is usually said
for and against these points; for I do not design to lay down
common places, which would be a task of infinite labour, but
merely to point out a general method and plan. The way
being shown, each must exert his ability, not only to follow it,
but to find out similar courses, as the nature of particular
cases may require ; since no one can speak of all kinds of
causes, even among such as have occurred, to say nothing of
such as may occur.
* That is, of judicial causes. There is no reference here, as
Spalding observes, to the division mentioned in iii. 3, 15, and iii. 4, 15.
+ Rhet. i. 1, 2.
CH.II.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR.
3
l
5
CHAPTER II.
Previous judgments. The authority of those who deliver them to be
considered. Similitude in cases; how to be refuted.
1. As to precognitions, the whole matter of them ranges
itself under three heads; first, cases which have been already
decided under similar circumstances, and which may more
properly be termed precedents ; as about wills of fathers which
have been annulled or ratified in opposition to their children;
secondly, judgments relative to the cause itself, (from which
also is derived the name,) such as those which are said to
have been pronounced upon Oppianicus,” and those of the senate
wpon Milo ºf or, thirdly, when sentence has already been given
on the same affair, as in the case of persons that have been
sent out of the country, of appeals in regard to personal
liberty, Ś and of divisions in the judgments of the centumviri,
when they have been separated into two parties.|| 2. Precog-
nitions are established chiefly by two things; the authority of
those who have given judgment, and the similitude of the cases
in question; as for the annulling of them, it is rarely obtained
by reproaching the judges, unless there be a manifest error in
them; for each of the judges wishes the sentence of another to
stand firm, remembering that he himself is also to pronounce a
sentence, and being unwilling to offer a precedent which may
recoil upon himself. 3. The pleader must have recourse,
* Cicero pro Cluent. c. 17, segg. See also iv. 5, 11.
+ Cic. pro Mil. c. 5.
+ Regius and Gesner very properly refer to Digest. xlviii. 22, tit. de
interdictis, et relegatis et deportatis ; also xxiii. de Sententiam passis et
Testitutis. Spalding.
Ś Assertione secunda..] Whoever thought that he was unjustly de-
tained in slavery might procure an assertor to make application for his
liberty by a judicial process, he himself being unable to plead his own
cause. This was called causa liberalis. If the assertor was unsuccess-
ful on the first occasion, he might apply a second and a third time;
Comp. xi. 1, 78; but this privilege of repeating the application was
abolished by Justinian, Codic. vii. 17, 1, 1. Spalding.
| Partibus centumviralium, quae in dwas hastas divisa, Swnt.] With
centumviralium understand causarum. Hasta, a spear, the mark of
authority, is here put for judicium, a company of judges. See xi. 1, 78.
Pliny speaks of quadruplicia centumviralia, Epist. i. 18, 3; vi. 33, 2.
These several divisions or hasta, gave judgment on the same cause.
Spalding.
316 QUINTILIAN. [B.V.
therefore, in the first two cases, if the matter allow, to the dis-
covery of some dissimilarity in the cases; (and there is scarcely
one exactly like another in all particulars;) or, if that course
be impossible, or the cause be the same, some negligence in
the pleadings must be exposed, or we must complain of the
weakness of the parties against whom judgment was given, or
influence that corrupted the witnesses, or of public odium, or
ignorance ; or we must find something that has since occurred
to affect the cause. 4. If none of these allegations be possible,
we may observe that many motives on trials have led to unjust
sentences, and that through such influence Rutilius” was con-
demned, and Clodius and Catilinef acquitted. The judges may
also be solicited rather to examine the question themselves
than to rest their faith on the verdict of others. 5. But
against decrees of the senate, and the ordinances of princes or
magistrates, there is no remedy, unless some difference, how-
ever small, be discovered in the cases, or some subsequent de-
termination of the same persons, or personages of the same
dignity, at variance with the former. If nothing of the kind be
discoverable, there will be no case for judgment.
* See xi. 1, 12. Publius Rutilius Rufus was found guilty of extor-
tion, A.U.G. 662, in consequence of a conspiracy of the publican? against
him, he having defended Asia from their injustice. His property,
being confiscated, was found to be too small to pay the fine laid upon
him, and, at the same time, to have been obtained by the most
honourable means. He went into voluntary exile at Mitylene, and
afterwards at Smyrna, where he received the highest honour from all
the people of Asia, and was presented with greater wealth than he
had previously possessed. See Dion Cass. p. Reim. 44. He was a
Stoic, and pupil of Panaetius, and Seneca frequently mentions him in
conjunction with Socrates as an example of wisdom and fortitude in
enduring adversity. See Sen. de Prov, c. 3; de Tranq. Anim. c. 15;
de Vit. Beat. c. 18; de Benef. v. 17, 37; Epist. 24, 67, 79 ; also Duker
ad Flor. iii. 17, 3 ; Well. Pat. ii. 13, 2. Ernesti Clav. Cic. v. Rutilius;
Schneider ad Cic. Brut. c. 30. Spalding.
t Cicero joins the same three names together in his speech against
Piso, c. 39. See iv. 2, 88. Catiline was accused of connexion with a
vestal virgin, A.U.C. 682, and of extortion, A.U.C. 688. From the first
charge he escaped by the influence of Terentia, the wife of Cicero,
whose sister Fabia is said to have been the vestal with whom he was
concerned ; of the second he was acquitted through the prevarication
of Clodius the accuser; see Cic, in Fragm. apud Asc. Pedian, in Orat.
Cic. contra Anton. p. 145, 151. Spalding.
CH. Iv.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 317
CHAPTER III.
Of public report.
CoMMON fame and report, one party will call the consent
of the whole people, and a sort of public evidence; the other
will term it mere talk without any certain authority, to which
malignity has given rise, and credulity augmentation; an evil
which may affect every man, even the most innocent, through
the artifice of enemies spreading falsehood. Examples will not
be wanting to support either representation.
CHAPTER IV.
Of evidence exacted by torture.
1. THE case is similar with regard to evidence exacted by
torture, which is a frequent subject of discussion ; as one side
will call torture an infallible means for discovering truth, the
other will represent it as a cause of the utterance of falsehood;
because to some persons ability to endure makes lying easy, to
others weakness renders it necessary.” To what purpose
should I say more on this subject? The pleadings of the
ancients and the moderns are alike full of instances. 2. Yet
under this head there will be circumstances peculiar to certain
cases; for if the question be about applying the torture, it will
make a great difference who it is that demands it, and whom he
demands or offers for it, and against whom, and from what
ºmotive ; or, if the torture has been applied, who presided at it,
who it was that was tortured, and how ; whether he uttered what
was incredible or consistent; whether he persisted in his first asser-
tions, or made any change in them, ; whether he confessed at the
commencement of the torture, or after it had proceeded for some
time ; questions which are as numberless as the variety of
C&S6S.
* Comp. c. 10, sect. 70.
3.18 QUINTILIAN. [B. v.
CHAPTER V.
Of the refutation of written testimony.
1. AGAINST writings, too, pleaders have often spoken, and
must often speak, as we know that it is common for documents
not only to be set aside, but to be charged with being forged.
As there must, in the latter case, be either guilt or ignorance
on the part of those who signed them, ignorance will be the
safer and lighter charge; because the number of those whom
we actually accuse will be smaller. 2. But the whole of
such a proceeding * must rest on arguments drawn from the
particular case; if, for example, it is difficult to prove, or even
incredible, that what the writing states occurred; or if (as
more frequently happens) it may be overthrown by proofs
equally inartificial; if he to whose prejudice the deed was
signed, or any one of those who signed it, can be said to have
been absent at the time, or to have died before it; if dates
disagree ; or if anything that occurred before or after is at
variance with what is written. Even a mere inspection is
often sufficient to discover forgery.
CHAPTER VI.
On offering to take an oath, and receiving that of the opposite party,
§ 1, 2. Arguments on the subject, 3–5. Judgment of the expe-
rienced respecting it, 6.
1. As to an oath, parties going to law either offer their own,
or refuse to receive that of their adversary when offered ; or
they require one from him, or refuse to take one when required
from themselves. For a person to offer to take an oath himself,
without allowing his opponent to take his, is commonly a sign
of bad faith. 2. He, however, who shall do so, must either
shelter himself under such purity of moral conduct as to make
it incredible that he will commit perjury, or under the influ-
ence of religion; (in regard to which he will gain more credit
if he act in such a manner as not to appear to come forward
* Hoc ipsum.] By these words he means omne refellendi et accusand:
tabulas negotium. Spalding.
CH. VI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 3.19
with eagerness to take his oath, and yet not to shrink from
taking it ;) or on the small importance of the cause, should
such be its nature, for the sake of which he would hardly incur
the divine displeasure ; or if, in addition to other means of
gaining his cause, he offers his oath, superabundantly, as it
were, as the testimony of a pure conscience.
3. He who shall be unwilling to receive the oath of his
adversary, will allege the inequality of the terms, and remark
that the fear of taking an oath is lightly regarded by many, as
even philosophers have been found to deny that the gods pay
any attention to human affairs; and that he who is ready to
swear without any one putting him to his oath, is disposed to
give sentence himself in his own cause, and to show how light
and easy a thing he considers the obligation by which he offers
to bind himself. 4. But he who offers to accept his adver-
Sary's oath, besides appearing to act with moderation, as he
makes his opponent the arbiter of the cause, relieves the judge
also, to whom the decision belongs, from a heavy responsibility,
since he would certainly rest rather on another man’s oath than
on his own. + 5. Hence the refusal to take oath becomes the more
difficult, unless the affair in question happens to be such that it
cannot be supposed to be known to the party. If this excuse
be wanting, there will be but one course left for him, which is
to say that odium is sought to be excited against him by his
opponent, whose object is to make it appear that he has
ground for complaint in a cause in which he cannot obtain vic-
tory; “and, accordingly, though a dishonest man would have
eagerly availed himself of such a proposal, he himself would
rather prove what he asserts than leave it doubtful in the mind
of any one whether he were guilty of perjury.
6. But, in my younger days, men who had grown old in
pleading used to lay it down as a rule that we should never give
our opponent the option of taking his oath ; as also that he
should never be allowed the choice of a judge ; ; and that a judge
* If he himself is at the pains of bringing forward many arguments
and proofs, and the other party is excused from doing anything more
than taking his oath. Spalding. -
+ For the judges took an oath to give just judgment, and whatever
sentence they pronounced was pronounced on their oath. Spalding.
† In the appointment of the judges by lot, we ought not to yield to
the wish and option of our adversary ; nor in choosing an arbiter in a
case. Turnebus.
320 QUINTILIAN. [B. V.
should not be taken from the counsellors” of the opposite
party; since, if it was thought dishonourable in an advocate
to speak against his client, it should assuredly be considered
more dishonourable to do anything that would injure him.
CHAPTER VII.
Written evidence; how to be refuted, § 1, 2. Modes of proceeding
with regard to witnesses that appear in person, 3–6. An intimate
knowledge of the cause necessary, 7, 8. How voluntary witnesses
should be produced, 9–11. Caution requisite in respect to them,
12–14. How a pleader must act with regard to a witness whom
he knows to be adverse or favourable to the accused, 15–19.
How he must act in regard to one whose disposition he does not
know, 20, 21. Of the interrogation of witnesses, 22–32. Of the
collision between written and oral testimony, 32—34. Of super-
natural testimony, 35–37.
1. THE greatest efforts of pleaders, however, are employed
about evidence. Evidence is given either in writing, or by wit-
messes present in court. The opposition to writings is the more
simple; for shame may seem to have had less preventive power
in the presence of only a few witnesses,i and absence may be
unfavourably represented as intimating self-distrust. If the
character of the writer is open to no reflection, we may per-
haps throw some discredit on that of the witnesses to it.
2. Besides, a secret feeling is entertained unfavourable to all
who offer evidence in writing, as no man gives it in that way
unless of his own free-will, and thus shows that he is no
friend to the party against whom he deposes. Yet a pleader
on the opposite side should not be ready to admit that a friend
may not speak truth on behalf of a friend, or an enemy against
* Eac advocatis.] By this word we are not to understand pleaders,
but those persons whom Asconius, in Divinationem, p. 20, mentions as
attending their friends on trials, either to assist them in legal diffi-
culties, or to support them by their presence and countenance.
Spalding.
+ Less than it would have in an open court, where testimony is
given orally.
† Other witnesses were summoned, and obliged to give evidence at
a certain time: those who gave their testimony in writing gave it
voluntarily. Turnebus. *
CH. VII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 321
an enemy, if the credit of either be unimpeached. But the
subject, in both its bearings, furnishes much matter for con-
sideration.
3. With witnesses who are present there may be great con-
tention, and we accordingly engage, whether against them or
for them, with the double force of regular speeches” and inter-
rogatories. 4. In regular speeches, we commonly offer obser-
vations, first of all, for and against witnesses in general. This
is a common topic for argument; one side maintaining that
there is no evidence stronger than that which rests on human
knowledge, and the other, to detract from the credit of such
knowledge, enumerating every cause by which testimony is
rendered false. 5. The next step is, when pleaders make special
attacks, though on bodies of men; for we know that the testi-
monies of whole nations have been invalidated by orators, as
well as whole classes of evidence; as in the case of hear-say
witnesses, for pleaders maintain that they are not in reality wit-
nesses, but mere reporters of the words of unsworn individuals;
and in cases of extortion, those who swear that they have paid
money to the accused, are to be regarded as parties in the
prosecution, not as witnesses. 6. Sometimes a pleader's re-
marks are directed against individual witnesses; a kind of
attack which we find in many pleadings, sometimes combined
with a defence, and sometimes given separately, as that of Cicero
on the witness Watinius.f
7. Let me therefore consider the whole subject, as I have taken
upon myself to attempt the entire education of an orator;
otherwise, the two books composed on this head by Domitius
Aferi would have been sufficient, a rhetorician whom I at-
tended with great respect when he was old and I was young,
80 that the contents of his books were not only read by me,
but learned from his own mouth. He very justly makes it a
rule that it is the great business of an orator, in regard to this
part of his cause, to gain a thorough knowledge of the whole of
it ; but it is a rule to be observed in regard to every part.
* Actionwm.] Compare sect. 8, where oratio perpetua is used as
equivalent to actio. Spalding. g
+ He had given evidence against Publius Sextius when defended by
Cicero, who, Epist, ad Lentulum i. 9, and ad Q. Fratr. ii. 4, observes
that he attacked him with great vehemence on that occasion. But the
speech is extant. Gesner.
# See i. 5, 24.
y
322 QUINTILLAN. [B. v.
8. How this knowledge may be attained, I shall show when I
arrive at the part of my work destined for that subject.* Such
knowledge will suggest matter for questions, and supply, as it
were, weapons to the hand; and it will also show us for what
the mind of the judge should be prepared by our speech; as it
is by a regular address that the credit of witnesses should be
either established or overthrown ; since every judge is affected
by testimony just as he has been previously influenced to
believe or disbelieve it.
9. Since, then, there are two sorts of witnesses, those who
appear voluntarily, and those whom the judge commonly sum-
mons on public trial according to law, (of the first of which
kinds either party may avail themselves, while the latter is
conceded only to accusers,) let us distinguish the duty of the
pleader who produces witnesses from that of him who refutes
their testimony.
10. He that produces a voluntary witness, may know what
he has to say, and consequently appears to have the easier
task in examining him. But even this undertaking requires
penetration and watchfulness; and we must be cautious that
the witness may not appear timid, or inconsistent, or foolish ;
I 1. for witnesses are confused, or caught in Snares, by the ad-
vocates on the opposite side, and, when they are once caught,
they do more harm than they would have done service if they
had been firm and resolute. They should therefore be well
exercised before they are brought into court, and tried
with various interrogatories, such as are likely to be put
by an advocate on the other side. By this means they will
either be consistent in their statements, or, if they stumble at
all, will be set upon their feet again, as it were, by some op-
portune question from him by whom they were brought forward.
12. But even in regard to those who are consistent in their
evidence, we must be on our guard against treachery; for they
are often thrown in our way by the opposite party, and, after
promising everything favourable, give answers of a contrary
character, and have the more weight against us when they do
110t refute what is to our prejudice, but confess the truth of it.
13. We must inquire, therefore, what motives they appear
to have for declaring against our adversary; nor is it sufficient
to know that they were his enemies; we must ascertain
* B. xii, c, 8.
CH. VII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 323
whether they have ceased to be so ; whether they may not
seek reconciliation with him at our expense ; whether they
have been bribed; or whether they may not have changed their
purpose from penitential feelings; precautions, not only neces.
sary in regard to witnesses who know that which they intend
to say is true, but far more necessary in respect to those who
promise to say what is false.* 14. For they are more likely to
repent, and their promises are more to be suspected; and even
if they keep to their word, it is much more easy to refute them.
15. Of witnesses who are summoned to give evidence, some
are willing to hurt the accused party, and some unwilling ;
and the accuser Sometimes knows their inclination, and is some-
times ignorant of it. Let us suppose for the moment that he
knows it; yet, in either case, there is need of the greatest.
circumspection on the part of him who examines them. 16. If
he find the witness disposed to prejudice the accused, he ought
to take the utmost care that his disposition may not show
itself; and he should not question him at once on the
point for decision, but proceed to it circuitously, so that
what the examiner chiefly wants him to say, may appear to
be wrung from him. Nor should he press him with too many
interrogatories, lest the witness, by replying freely to every-
thing, should invalidate his own credit; but he should draw
from him only so much as it may seem reasonable to elicit
from one witness. 17. But in the case of one who will not
speak the truth unless against his will, the great happiness in
an examiner is, to extort from him what he does not wish tº
Say; and this cannot be done otherwise than by questions that
seem wide of the matter in hand; for to these he will give
such answers as he thinks will not hurt his party; and then,
from various particulars which he may confess, he will be re-
duced to the inability of denying what he does not wish to
acknowledge. 18. For as, in a set speech, we commonly col-
lect detached arguments, which, taken singly, seem to bear
but lightly on the accused, but by the combination of which
* Rollin wishes Quintilian to be thought guiltless of tolerating, or
rather recommending, dishonesty and fraud, referring us to sect. 32 of
this chapter. But I fear that Rollin has no just ground for what he
says ; for in all that Quintilian here remarks about witnesses, (see espe-
cially sect. 26,) there are not many indications of a desire to adhere to
strict probity. Spalding.
Y 2
324 QUINTILIAS. [B. V.
we succeed in proving the charge, so a witness of this kind
must be questioned on many points regarding antecedent and
Subsequent circumstances, and concerning places, times, persons,
and other subjects; so that he may be brought to give some
answer; after which he must either acknowledge what we wish,
or contradict what he himself has said. 19. If we do not suc-
ceed in that object, it will then be manifest that he is unwilling
to speak; and he must be led on to other matters, that he may
be caught tripping, if possible, on some point, though it be
unconnected with the cause ; he may also be detained an ex-
traordinary time, that by saying everything, and more than the
case requires, in favour of the accused, he may make himself
suspected by the judge; and he will thus do no less damage
to the accused than if he had stated the truth against him.
20. But if (as we supposed in the second place) the accuser
be ignorant of the witness's disposition, he must sound his
inclination cautiously, interrogating him, as we say, step by
step, and leading him gradually to the answer which is neces-
sary to be elicited from him. 21. But as there is sometimes
such art in witnesses, that they answer at first according to an
examiner's wish, in order to gain greater credit when they
afterwards speak in a different way, it is wise in an orator to
dismiss a suspected witness before he does any harm.
22. For advocates that appear on behalf of defendants, the
examination of witnesses is in one respect more easy, and in
another more difficult, than for those who are on the side of the
prosecutor. It is more difficult on this account, that they can
seldom or ever know, before the trial, what the witness is going
to Say; and it is more easy, inasmuch as they know, when he
comes to be questioned, what he has said. 23. Under the un-
certainty, therefore, which there is in the matter, great caution
and inquisition is necessary, to ascertain what sort of character
he is that prosecutes the defendant; what feeling he enter-
tains against him ; and from what motives: and all such
matters are to be exposed and set aside in our pleading,
whether we would have the witnesses appear to have been insti-
gated by hatred, or by envy, or by desire of favour, or by money.
If the opposite party, too, produce but few witnesses, we may
reflect on their small number ; if they are extraordinarily
numerous, we may insinuate that they are in conspiracy; if
they are of humble rank, we may speak with contempt of their
CH. VII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR, 325
meanness ; if persons of consequence, we may deprecate their
influence. 24. It will be of most effect, however, to expose
the motives on which the witnesses speak against the defen-
dant, which may be various, according to the mature of causes
and the parties engaged in them ; for to such representations
as I have just mentioned, the opposite party can answer with
common-place arguments; as, when the witnesses are few and
humble, the prosecutor can boast of his simple honesty, in
having sought for none but such as were acquainted with the
case in hand; while to commend a large number, or persons of
consideration, is a somewhat easier task. 25. But occasionally,
as we have to commend witnesses, so we have to decry them,
whether their testimony be read in our pleading, or they be
summoned to give it personally.* Such attempts were more
easy and frequent in the timest when the witnesses were not
examined after the pleading was ended. As to what we should
Say against the witnesses respectively, it can only be drawn
from their individual characters.
26. The manner of questioning witnesses; remains to be
considered. In this part of our duty, the principal point is to
know the witness well; for if he is timid, he may be frightened;
if foolish, misled; if irascible, provoked ; if vain, flattered; if
prolix, drawn from the point. If, on the contrary, a witness is
Sensible and self-possessed, he may be hastily dismissed, as ma-
licious and obstinate; or he may be confuted, not with formal
questioning, but with a short address from the defendant's advo-
cate; or he may be put out of countenance, if opportunity offer,
by a jest; or, if anything can be said against his moral charac-
ter, his credit may be overthrown by infamous charges. 27. It
has been advantageous, on certain occasions, not to press too
* Antt recitatis in actione aut mominatºs testibus.] Gesner hesitates’
how to interpret this passage; Spalding observes that it is manifestly
corrupt. Gesner inquires whether recitatis testibus may be equivalent
to recitatis eorum testimoniis ; but for such interpretation there is no
authority. Spalding thinks that we should read awt recitatis in actione
testationibus, aut nominatis testibus.
+ What times those were, it is not easy to say. That witnesses
were examined in the age of Cicero, either before or during the plead-
ings, is not apparent either from his speeches or from the testimony
of any other writers. Spalding.
:: On the side of the defendant. Quintilian has already made many
observations concerning the examination of witnesses, but with respect
to the side of the prosecutor, Spalding.
326 QUINTILIAN. [B.v.
severely on men of probity and modesty; for those who would
have fought against a determined assailant are softened by
gentle treatment.
Every question is either about some point within the cause
or on Some point without it. On matters within the cause,
the advocate of the accused, as we also directed the accuser,”
may frequently, by putting questions a little widely, and on
subjects from which no suspicion will arise, and by comparing
previous with subsequent answers, reduce witnesses to such a
dilemma as to extort from them against their will what may
be of service to his own cause. 28. On this point there is
certainly no instruction or exercise given in the schools; and
excellence in it depends rather on natural acuteness, or expe-
rience, than anything else. If any model, however, ought
to be pointed out for imitation, the only one that I can recom-
mend is that which may be drawn from the dialogues of the
Socratic philosophers, and especially Plato, in which the ques-
tions are so artful, that, though the respondent answers
correctly to most of them, the matter is nevertheless brought to
the conclusion which the questioner wishes to establish. 29. For-
tune sometimes favours us, by causing something to be said by
a witness that is inconsistent with the rest of his evidence;
and sometimes (as more frequently happens) she makes one
witness say what is at variance with the evidence of another;
but an ingenious mode of interrogation will often lead metho-
dically to that which is so frequently the effect of chance.
30. On matters without the cause, also, many serviceable
questions are often put to a witness; as concerning the character
of other witnesses; concerning his own ; whether anything dis-
honourable or mean can be laid to the charge of any of them ;
whether they have any friendship with the prosecutor, or
enmity against the defendant; in replying to which they are
likely to say something of which we may take advantage, or
may be convicted of falsehood or malevolence. 31. But all
questioning ought to be extremely circumspect, because a wit-
ness often utters smart repartees in answer to the advocates,
and is thus regarded with a highly favourable feeling by the
audience in general. Questions should be put, too, as far as
possible, in familiar language, that the person under exami-
nation, who is very frequently illiterate, may clearly under-
* Sect. 17, 18,
CH. VII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 327
stand, or at least may not pretend that he does not understand;
an artifice which throws no small damp on the Spirit of the
examiner.
32. As to those disgraceful practices of sending a suborned
witness to sit on the benches of the opposite party, that in
being called from thence he may do him the more damage,
either by speaking directly against the person on whose side
he had placed himself, or by assuming, after having appeared
to benefit him by his evidence, airs of impudence and folly, by
which he not only discredits his own testimony, but detracts
from the weight of that of others who may have been of service;
I mention them, not that they may be adopted, but that they
may be shumned.
There is frequently a collision between written attestations
on the one side and the witnesses who appear in person on the
other; and this furnishes matter of debate for both parties;
the one resting their arguments on the Oaths of the witnesses,
and the other on the unanimity of those who signed the depo-
sitions. 33. There is often a question, too, between the wit-
nesses and the arguments; it being argued, on the one side,
that there is in the witnesses knowledge of facts and regard
for their oaths, and in the arguments nothing but mere
subtlety; on the other side, that witnesses are procured by
favour, fear, money, malice, hatred, friendship, or solicitation,
while arguments are drawn from the nature of the subject;
that in hearing witnesses the judge trusts to himself, in listen-
ing to arguments, to another. 34. Such questions are common
to numbers of causes; they have always been, and always will
be, subjects for violent discussion.
Sometimes there are witnesses on both sides, and the ques-
tion arises, with regard to themselves, Which of them are the
most respectable % with regard to the cause, Which of them
have given the most credible evidence 3 and, with regard to the
litigating parties, Which may have had most influence over the
witnesses 3
35. To these kinds of evidence, if any one wishes to add what
are called supernatural testimonies, from responses, Oracles,
and omens, let him be reminded that there are two modes of
treating them, the one general, in respect to which there is an
eternal dispute between the Stoics and Epicureans, whether the
world is governed by a divine providence ; the other special, in
328 QUINTILIAN. [B. V.
reference to * certain parts+ of Supernatural evidence, as they
happen severally to affect the question. 36. For the credit of
oracles may be established or overthrown in one way, and that
of soothsayers, augurs, diviners, and astrologers, in another, as
the nature of the things themselves is entirely different.
In supporting or demolishing such circumstances in a cause .
the voice of the pleader has much to do; as if, for instance,
expressions have been uttered under the effects of wine, or in
sleep, or in madness, or if information has been caught from
the mouth of children ; ; for in regard to all such individuals,
one party will say that they do not feign, and the other that
they mean nothing.
37. The mode of proof by witnesses may not only be offered
with great effect, but may also be greatly missed where it is
not produced : You gave me the money : who counted it 3
where? whence did he come & You accuse me of poisoning: where
did I buy the poison 3 from whom 3 for how much 3 by whose
agency did I administer it 3 who had any knowledge of the deed?
Almost all these points Cicero discusses in his speech for
Cluentius under a charge of poisoning.
Such are the remarks which I have ventured to offer, as
briefly as I could, concerning imartificial proofs.
CHAPTER VIII.
Artificial proofs too much neglected, § 1–3. There are certain par-
ticulars common to all kinds of proofs, 4–7.
1 THE other sort of proofs, which come wholly under the
head of art, and consist in matters adapted to produce belief,
is, for the most part, either altogether neglected, or very
lightly touched upon by those rhetoricians who, avoiding argu-
* All the texts have contra, but we ought evidently to read, as
Spalding observes, circa.
+ As when we inquire, for example, whether a knowledge of the
ſº can be obtained by inspecting the entrails of victims, or not.
'I'wrmebws.
# The relative quos, which Quintilian here uses, does not refer only
to parvulos immediately preceding it, but also to people intoxicated,
Sleeping, &c. Spalding.
CH. VIII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 329
ments, as repulsive and rugged, repose themselves in more
agreeable spots, and, (like those who are said by the poets, on
being charmed with the taste of a certain herb among the
Lotophagi, or with the song of the Sirens, to have preferred
pleasure to security,) while pursuing an empty semblance of
glory, fail to obtain that success for which eloquence is
exerted.
2. But other efforts of oratory, which run through the
continued course of a speech, are designed as aids or embellish-
ments to the arguments of a cause, and add to those sinews,
by which it is strengthened, the appearance of a body, as it
were, superinduced upon them ; so that if anything is said to
have been done, perchance, through anger, or fear, or covet-
ousness, we can expatiate somewhat fully on the nature of those
passions; and, in similar accessory parts, we praise, blame,
exaggerate, extenuate, describe, deter, complain, console, ex-
hort. 3. Such oratorical efforts may be of great service
in treating matters which are certain, or of which we speak
as being certain; and I would not deny that there is
Some advantage in pleasing, and very much in exciting
the feelings; but pleasure and excitement have the most
effect when the judge thinks that he has acquired a full
knowledge of the cause ; knowledge which we cannot convey
to him but by arguments and by every other means in support
of facts.
4. But before I distinguish the differentsorts of artificial proofs,
I think it necessary to intimate that there are certain qualities
common to all kinds of proof. For there is no question which
does not relate either to a thing or to a person ; nor can there
be any grounds for argument, except respecting matters that
affect things or persons ; and these matters are either to be
considered by themselves or referred to something else; 5. nor
can there be any proof except from things consequent or oppo-
site,” which we must seek either in the time that preceded the
* Aut eac consequentibus aut eac repugnantibus.] Regius thought that
in this passage ought to be inserted eac antecedentibus in conformity with
Aristotle Analyt. prior. i. 27; and we may observe that Quintilian
himself, vi. 3, 66, in speaking of the topics from which laughter may
be elicited, specifies consequents, antecedents, and opposites. So, too,
Cic. Topic. c. 4 and 12, and De Orat. ii. 39. . . . . But the omission of
eac antecedentibus is supported by two other passages of Quintilian, v.
330 -- QUINTILIAN. [B. v.
alleged fact, in the time at which it took place, or in the time
that followed it ; nor can anything be proved but from some
other thing, which must either be greater or less than it, or
equal to it. 6. As for arguments, they arise either from general
questions, which may be considered in themselves, apart from
from any connexion with things or persons, or from the cause
itself, when anything is found in it not derived from common
reasoning,” but peculiar to that point on which the decision is
to be pronounced. Of all conclusions, moreover, some are
necessary, Some probable, Some not impossible.
7. Of all proofs, too, there are four forms. Because one
thing is, another is not : as, It is day, therefore it is not might;
because there is one thing, there is also another ; as, The sun
ãs above the earth, therefore it is day; because one thing is not,
another is : as, It is not might, therefore it is day; because one
thing is not, another is not ; as, He is not a rational being,
therefore he is not a man. Having premised these general re-
marks, I shall proceed to particulars.
CHAPTER IX.
Difference of signs, indications, or circumstantial evidence, from proofs,
§ 1, 2. Of conclusive signs or indications, 3–7. Inconclusive
signs are of weight when supported by others, 8–11. Of mere
appearances, 12–14. Of prognostics, 15, 16.
1. ALL artificial proof, then, depends on indications, or argu-
ºments, or ea amples. I am aware that indications are thought
by many i a species of arguments; and I had, in consequence,
two motives for distinguishing them ; the first, that indications
generally, almost always, belong to inartificial proofs; for
a blood-stained garment, a shriek, a livid spot, and similar par-
ticulars, are circumstances of the same nature as writings,
Teports, and depositions; they are not invented by the orator,
but communicated to him with the cause itself; 2. the second,
10, 2, v. 14, 1, 25; and he appears to make it sufficiently evident that
he intended to include antecedentia in consequentia, (see v. 10, 76) as
Regius himself indeed thought likely to be the case. Spalding.
* Not from reasoning common to all causes. Capperonier
ºf Cicero Topic. c. 4, 12.
CH. IX.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 331
that neither can indications, if they are certain, be arguments,
because, where there are certain indications, there is no ques-
tion, and there can be no room for argument except upon a
controverted point; mor, if they are uncertain, can they be
arguments, but have themselves need of arguments.
3. All artificial proofs, then, as I say,” are distinguished,
first of all, into two kinds, one in which the conclusion is
necessary, the other in which it is not necessary. The
former are those which cannot be otherwise, and which the
Greeks call razºágic, or &Avro. 070,2%. , these scarcely seem
to me to come under the rules of art; for when there
is an irrefutable indication, there can be no ground for dis-
pute. 4. This happens whenever a thing must be, or must
have been ; or cannot be, or cannot have been ; and this being
stated in a cause, there can be no contention about the point.
5. This kind of proofs is considered with reference to all times,
past, present, and future ; for that she who has had a child
must have lain with a man regards the past ; that there must be
waves when a strong wind has fallen on the Sea, concerns the
present; and that he whose heart is wounded must die, relates
to the future.f. In like manner it is impossible that there can
be harvest where there has been no sowing ; that a person can be
at Rome when he is at Athens ; Or that he who is without a scar
can have been wounded with a sword. 6. Some have the same
force when reversed; as, a man who breathes must be alive, and
a man who is alive must breathe , but others are not reversible;
for it does not follow that, because he who walks must move,
therefore he who moves must walk. 7. It is consequently possible
that she who has not had a child may have had commeasion with
a mam, that where there are waves, there may yet be no wind on
the sea ; that the heart of him who dies may not have been
wounded ; and, in like manner, that there may have been sowing,
when there was no harvest, that he who was not at Athens, may
mot have been at Rome ; and that he who is marked with a scar
may not have been wounded with a sword.
* Sect. 2.
# The reader may think it a whimsical observation, but I cannot
help thinking that the three eacamples here brought are strong evi-
dences, or, to speak in our author's terms, presumptions [sigma, “indi-
eations”] of the antiquity of the gospel history; unless we suppose,
contrary to all credibility, that Quintilian stumbled upon them by
chance. We here see the facts of our Saviour's birth, his miracles,
and his resurrection, attacked in the strongest manner. Guthrie.
332 QUINTILIAN. [B. V.
8. The other Sort of indications are those from which there
is no absolutely necessary conclusion, and which the Greeks
call sixórcz : these, though they are not sufficient of themselves
to remove all doubt, yet, when they are combined with others,
are of great weight.
9. That from which something else is inferred, as from
blood is suspected murder, the Greeks term, as I said, gnºsſov,
that is, Signum, “a sign ; ” though some of our writers have
used the word indicium, “an indication,” and others vesti-
gium, “a trace.” But as the blood that stained a garment
may have proceeded from a sacrifice or may have flowed
from the nose, it does not necessarily follow that he who has
a blood-stained garment has committed a murder. 10. Yet,
though it is not a sufficient proof of itself, still, when
combined with other circumstances, it cannot but be regarded
as evidence ; as if the man with the blood-stained garment
was the enemy of him who was killed ; if he had previously
threatened his life : if he was in the same place with him ; to
which circumstances when some presumptive proof is added,
it makes what was suspected appear certain. 11. Aimong such
indications, however, there are some which either side may in-
terpret in its own way, as livid Spots, and swelling of the body;
for they may seem to be the effects either of poison or intem-
perance, and a wound in the breast, from which people may
argue that he in whom it is found has perished either by his
own hand or by that of another. The strength of such indi-
cations is proportioned to the support which they receive from
other circumstances.
12. Of indications, which are presumptions indeed, but
from which no necessary conclusion follows, Hermagoras thinks
the following an example: Atalanta is not a virgin, because she
strolls through the woods with young men. If we admit such a
circumstance as a presumption, I fear that we shall make
everything that has any reference to a fact a presumption.
Such circumstances are however treated by rhetoricians as pre-
sumptive proofs. 13. Nor do the Areopagites, when they con-
demned a boy to death for picking out the eyes of quails,”
appear to have had any other thought than that such an act was
* This story I have not seen mentioned elsewhere. The boy might
have bred the quails for the game called Ortygocopia, which was much
practised among the Greeks, and concerning which Gesner refers to
Pollux Onomast. vii. 136, ix. 108. Spalding.
CH. IX.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 333
the indication of a cruel disposition, likely to do mischief to
many if he should be allowed to reach maturity. Hence also
the popularity of Spurius Maelius and Marcus Manlius was re-
garded as an indication that they were aspiring to sovereignty.
14. But I am afraid that this mode of reasoning would carry
us too far; for if a woman's bathing with men is a sign that
she is an adulteress, it will be a sign of the same nature if she
takes her meals with young men, or if she enjoys the intimate
friendship of any man; as a person might perhaps call a depi-
lated skin, a Sauntering walk, and a delicate dress, signs of
effeminacy and unmanliness, if he thinks that they proceed
from corrupt morals, as blood flows from a wound; a sign being
properly that which, proceeding from a matter about which
there is a question, falls under our own observation. 15. Those
appearances, also, which, as they are constantly noticed, are
vulgarly called signs, such as prognostics of the weather, The
golden moon is red from the approach of wind, and The mis-
chievous crow calls for rain with a loud voice,” may, if they
have their causes from the state of the atmosphere, receive
that appellation; 16. for if the moon is red from the influence
of wind, its redness is a sign of wind ; and if, as the same
poet infers, a condensed or rarefied atmosphere gives rise to a
chattering of birds,f we shall consider such chattering also a
sign. We may likewise observe that small things are some-
times signs of great, as this very chattering of the crow; that
greater things are signs of less, nobody wonders.
* Virg. Georg. i. 431, 388.
+ Virg. Georg. i. 419.
334 QUINTILIAN. [B.v.
CHAPTER X.
Of the different names given to arguments among the Greeks and
Latins, Š 1–8. Various significations of the word argument,
9—11. In every cause there must be something that does not
require proof, 12–14. Of credibilities, 15–19. Of sources from
which arguments are drawn, 20–22. From the character of
individuals, 23–31. From circumstances, as motives, place,
time, manner, 32–48. Opportunities and means, 49–52. Argu-
ments from definition, 53–61. Remarks on Cicero's method;
argument and definition assisted by division, 62–70. Arguments
from commencement, increase, and event, 71, 72. From dissi-
militude, opposition, consequentiality, 73–79. From causes and
effects, 80–85. From comparison, 86–89. Too many sub-
divisions under this head, 90–94. Arguments from supposition,
95–99. Precepts not to be followed too superstitiously; ex-
amples, 100–108. An orator must take care what he proposes
to be proved ; an example, 109–118. Utility of rules, 119–121.
Necessity and advantages of study and practice, 122–125.
1. I Now proceed to speak of arguments; for under this term
we include all that the Greeks call v0.90%uoro, Tºgslehuaro,
and &Todaíčeig, of which, though there is some difference in the
names, yet the meaning is nearly the same. The word enthy-
nema, (which we translate, indeed, as we cannot render it
otherwise, by commentum or commentatio, but we had better
use the Greek word itself.) has three meanings; one, which
signifies everything that is conceived in the mind ; (but with
this meaning we have now no concern;) another, which signi-
fies a proposition with a reason; 2. a third, which signifies a
conclusion of an argument, deduced from consequents or oppo-
sites;* although with regard to this sense authors differ; for
some call a conclusion from consequents an epicheirema; but
more will be found of opinion that a conclusion from opposites f
only should be called an enthymeme ; and hence Cornificius
gives it the appellation contrarium. 3. Some have called it 8.
rhetorical syllogism, others an imperfect Syllogism, because it
is not comprised in distinct parts, or in the same number of
parts, as the regular syllogism, such exactness, indeed, not
being required in the orator.
4. Valgius; calls the epicheirema aggressio, “attempt.”
* See c. 8, sect. 5.
t Compare v. 14, 2; viii. 5, 9; Cicero Topi 42
f See iii. l, 18. 2 2 2 2 J1C, C. 13.
*
f
UH. x.i. *:T3 UCATIGN OF AN GRATO 3. 33.
• * * *
i.
Jelsus thinks that it is uot our management of the suiject,”
but the subject itself which we attempt, (that is, the argument
by which we propose to prove anything, and which, though not
yet set forth in words, is fully conceived in the mind,) that is
called an epicheirema. 5. Others are of opinion that it is not
an intended or imperfect proof, but a complete one, proceeding
even to the last species,f that ought to receive this appella-
tion ; and hence its proper acceptation, and that which is most
in use, is that in which it is understood to be 'a certain com-
prehension of a thought which consists at least of three parts.}
6. Some have called an epicheirema a reason, $ Cicero, more
happily, a reasoning ; although he seems to have taken that
name rather from the syllogism than from anything else; for
he calls the status syllogisticus iſ a “ratiocinatory state,” and
gives examples from the philosophers; and, as there is some
affinity between the syllogism and the epicheirema, he may be
thought to have adopted that term judiciously.
7. As to the ČTóðaišig, it is an evident proof; and hence the
term yºupizai &roösſésig, “linear demonstrations,” among
geometers. Caecilius thinks that it differs from the epichei-
rema only in the manner of its conclusion, and that an &T6.
Šalčig is an imperfect epicheirema, for the same reason for
which we said an enthymeme differs from a syllogism ; for
an enthymeme is a part of a syllogism. Some think that the
apodeixis is included in the epicheirema, and is the part of it
which contains the proof. 8. But authors, however different
in other respects, concur in defining both of them so far simi-
larly, as to say that the reasoning in them is from that which
is certain in order to give confirmation to that which is doubt-
ful; a quality which is common to all arguments, for what is
certain is never deduced from what is uncertain. To all these
* Nostram administrationem.] Capperonier aptly refers us to ii. 18,
5 whence we understand that by administratio is to be understood
Tpd{ug as opposed to 68wpia. Spalding.
+ Ultimam speciem.] Compare sect. 56; vii. 1, 23. Porphyry, says
Spalding, called it rô siðuktóratov sióog. The more common appella-
tion, observes Capperonier, is species infima.
: The major, minor, and conclusion. See Cic. Te Inv. i. 34, and c.
14 of this book, sect. 6–9, where it is shown how the Epicheirema is
made to consist of five parts.
Ś Who gave it this name, we cannot now discover. Spalding.
|| De Inv. i. 31, 34.
* See iii. 6, 15.
336 QUINTILIAN. [B. v.
forms of argument the Greeks give the general name of ºrío reig,
which we might by a literal interpretation render fides, “faith;”
but we shall make the sense of it clearer if we call it proof.
9. But the word argument has itself also several signifi-
cations; for the subjects of plays,” composed for acting on the
stage, are called arguments; Asconius Pedianus, in explaining
the topics of the orations of Cicero, says The argument is this:
Cicerot himself, in writing to Brutus, says, “Fearing lest I
should bring from thence any evil upon my Cato, though the
argument was far from similar,” etc.; whence it appears that
every subject for writing is so called. 10. Nor is this wonderful,
when the word is common even among artisans;f Virgil Š also
has argumentum ingens, “a great argument;” and a work of any
considerable number of heads is vulgarly called argumentosum,
“argumentative.” But we have now to speak of that sense of
the word argument, which includes proof, indication, credibility,
aggression, which are all used as names for the same thing,
but, in my opinion, with too little distinction. 11. For proof
and credibility are established not only by arguments dependent
on reasoning, but by such as are called inartificial. As to signs,
which Celsus || calls indications, I have already distinguished ‘I
them from arguments.
Since, then, an argument is a process of reasoning affording a
proof, by which one thing is gathered from another, and which
establishes what is doubtful by reference to what is certain, there
must assuredly be something in a cause that does not require
proof; for unless there be something which is true, or which
appears true, and from which support may be gained for what
is doubtful, there will be no ground on which we can prove
anything. 12. As certainties, accordingly, we have, in the first
place, what is perceived by the Senses, as what we see, what
we hear, as signs or indications ; next, what is admitted by the
general consent of mankind, as, that there are gods, and that
&
* Comp. ii. 4, 2.
+ See note on ii. 20, 10.
†: Artificers not only call the material on which they work argu-
mentum, but also the elaboration and construction of their material.
Thus Cicero in Verr. iv. 56 says ea ebore diligentissimë perfecta argu-
Imenta in valvis erant, that is, simulacra descripta. Turnebus.
§ AEn. vii. 791.
| Ille.] I have no doubt, says Spalding, that it is Celsus who is
Imeant.
*| See c. 9, sect. 2.
CH. X.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 337
respect is to be paid to parents ; 13. also, what is established
by the laws, or what is passed into general usage, with the
concurrence, if not of the whole world, at least of that com-
munity or people among whom we have to plead, as indeed, in
what is called legal right, most points are settled, not by posi-
tive laws, but by common custom ; and, lastly, whatever is
agreed between the two parties, whatever is proved, or what-
ever our adversary does not dispute, 14. For thus will arise
an argument, As the world is governed by a providence,” the
State ought to be governed by some ruling power ; showing that
if it is acknowledged that the world is governed by a providence,
the state ought likewise to be governed. 15. But to him who
Would handle arguments properly, the mature and quality of all .
things whatever ought to be known, as well as their general
%,
º for it is by such knowledge that arguments called
sizórd, “probable,” are established. 16. Now of probability
there are three degrees; one, which rests on very strong
grounds, because that to which it is applied generally happens,
as that children are loved by their parents; a second, somewhat
more inclined to uncertainty, as that he who is in good health
to-day will live till to-morrow ; a third, which is only not repug-
nant to credibility, as that a theft committed in a house was
committed by one of the household. 17. Hence it is that
Aristotle, in his second book on the Art of Rhetoric,f has so
carefully considered what generally attends on various things and
persons, and what things or what persons mature has rendered
friendly or unfriendly to other things or other persons; as, what
accompanies riches, or ambition, or Superstition ; what the good
approve ; what the bad pursue ; what soldiers or husbandmen de-
sire ; and by what means things are severally shunned or sought.
18. But this subject I do not intend to pursue ; for it is not
only long, but even impracticable, or rather infinite; and it is
plain, moreover, to the common understanding of all. If any
OIlê shi desire, however, to be enlightened upon it, I have
shown him from whom he may seek instruction. 19. But
all probability, on which the far greater part of reasoning de-
pends, flows from sources of this nature, whether it be credible
that a father was killed by his son ; that a father committed
* Comp. c. 7, sect. 35.
+ In the first seventeen chapters.
†: Aristotle.
338 QUINTILIAN. [B. V.
incest with his daughter; and, again, whether poisoning be
credible in a step-mother, or adultery in a man of licentious life;
also, whether it be credible that a crime was committed in the
sight of the whole world, or that false testimony was given for a
small bribe ; because each of these crimes proceeds from a
peculiar cast, as it were, of character; I mean generally, not
always, else all reasoning about them would be absolute cer-
tainty, and not mere probable argument.
20. Let us now examine the places of arguments; although,
indeed, the topics of which I have previously spoken% are re-
garded as places of argument by some rhetoricians. By places,
let me observe, I mean, not common places, in the sense in
which the word is generally understood, in reference to lua;ury,
adultery, or such subjects; but the seats of arguments, in which
they lie concealed, and from which they must be drawn {..."
21. For as all kinds of fruits are not produced in all countries,
and as you will be unable to find a bird or a beast, if sº à Tê
ignorant where it is usually produced or makes its abode, and
as, among the several kinds of fishes, some delight in a smooth
and others in a rocky bottom of the water, while particular sorts
are confined to particular regions or coasts, and you could not
attract the ellops; or the scarus $ to our shores, so every kind of
argument is not to be got from every place, and is conseguently
not everywhere to be sought ; 22. otherwise there would be
much wandering about, and, after enduring the utmost labour,
we should not be able to find, unless by chance, that for which
we should seek without method. But if we ascertain where
particular arguments offer themselves, we shall, when we come
to the place where they lie, easily discern what is in it.
23. First of all, then, arguments are to be drawn from
persons ; there being, as I said, a general division of all
arguments into two kinds, those which concern things, and
those which concern persons; and the accidents of things being
cause, time, place, opportunity, instruments, manner, and the
* In the preceding chapter. Spalding.
+ II. 4, 22; v. 12, 16; 13, 57.
f A fish that was thought a delicacy by the ancients. Some have
supposed it to be the same as the acipenser, or sturgeon ; Pliny pro-
nounced them different, H. N. ix. 17, 27; xxxii. 11, 54.
Ś This the Romans also thought a delicacy. See Plin. Il. cc. It is
mentioned by Horace, Ovid, Martial, and Petronius.
|| C. 8, sect. 4.
CH. X.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 339
like. As to persons, I do not undertake to treat of every
particular concerning them, as most rhetoricians have done,
but only of those topics from which arguments may be drawn.
24. These, them, are, birth, for people are mostly thought
similar in character to their fathers and forefathers, and some-
times derive from their origin motives for living an honour-
able or dishonourable life; nation, for every nation has its
peculiar manners, and the same thing will not be alike pro-
bable in regard to a Barbarian, a Roman, and a Greek ;
25. country, for, in like manmer, the laws, institutions, and
opinions of states have their peculiarities; sea, for you would
more readily believe a charge of robbery with regard to a
man, and poisoning with regard to a woman; age, for differ-
ent modes of action belong to different periods of life ; educa-
tion and discipline, for it makes a difference by whom, and in
what manner a person has been brought up ; 26. bodily consti-
tution, for beauty is often drawn into an argument for liber-
timism, and strength for insolence, and the contrary qualities
for contrary conduct ; fortune, for the same charge is not
equally credible in reference to a rich and a poor man, in
reference to one who is surrounded with relations, friends, and
clients, and one who is destitute of all such support; condition,
for it makes a great difference whether a man is illustrious or
obscure, a magistrate or a private person, a father or a son, a
citizen or a foreigner, free or a slave, married or a bachelor,
the father of children or childless ; 27. natural disposition, for
avarice, passionateness, sensibility, cruelty, austerity, and other
similar affections of the mind, frequently either cause credit
to be given to an accusation or to be withheld from it; manner
of living, for it is often a matter of inquiry whether a person
is luxurious, or parsimonious, or mean ; occupations, for a
countryman, a lawyer, a trader, a soldier, a mariner, a phy-
sician, act in very different ways. 28. We must consider also
what a person affects, whether he would wish to appear rich
or eloquent, just or powerful. Previous doings and sayings,
too, are to be taken into account; for the present is com-
monly estimated from the past. To these some add commotion
of the mind, which they wish to be understood in the sense of
a temporary excitement of the feelings, as anger, or fear;
29. and designs, which respect the present, past, and future,
but these, though they are accidents of persons, should yet be
Z 2
340 QUINTILIAN. [B.v.
referred, I think, as considered in themselves, to that spe-
cies of argument which we derive from motives; as also cer-
tain dispositions of mind, in regard to which it is considered
whether a particular person is a friend or an enemy of another
person. 30. They specify also the name among the topics of
argument in regard to a person ; and the name must certainly
be termed an accident of a person, but it is rarely the founda-
tion of any reasoning, unless when it has been given for some
cause, as Sapiens, Magnus, Plenus,” or has suggested some
thought to the bearer of it, as Lentulus's f name led him to think
of joining the conspiracy of Catiline, because dominion was said
to be promised by the Sibylline books and the predictions of
the soothsayers to three Cornelii, and he believed himself, as
he was a Cornelius, to be the third after Sylla and Cinna. 31.
As to the conceit of Euripides, where the brother of Poly-
nices reflects on his name, as an argument of his disposition,
it is extremely poor. For jesting, however, occasion is fre-
quently furnished by a name," and Cicero has more than once
indulged in it in his pleadings against Verres. Such, and of
such a nature, are the common subjects of argument with re-
gard to persons. All I cannot enumerate, either under this
head or under others, but content myself with showing the way
to those who may inquire farther.
32. I now come to things, among which actions are most
closely connected with persons, and must therefore be first
considered. In regard, then, to everything that is done, the
question is, cither why, or where, or when, or in what manner, or
gºby what means, it was done, 33. Arguments are consequently
}^derived from the motives for actions done or to be done ; the
* matter of which motives, which some of the Greek writers calliºn
and others 60yozºag, they divide into two kinds, subdividing each
kind into four species; for the motive for any action is gene-
rally connected with the acquisition, the augmentation, the pre-
* I retain this reading, on the authority of all good copies, but no
reason for the name has hitherto been given, nor has the name itself.
been found in any record or monument of antiquity. Gallaeus and
Obrecht conjecture Plancus, Gesner Plamus from the Greek TrAdvoc.
Burmann thinks that Plenus may have been a surname of Crassus in
the sense of Dives. Spalding.
+ See Sallust, Cat. 47; Orat. in Catil. iii. 4.
: Phoeniss. 639, 640.
§ See vi. 3, 53.
CH. X.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 341
servation, or the enjoyment, of some good, or the avoidance,
diminution, endurance, of some evil, or delivery from it; con-
siderations which have great weight in all our deliberations.
34. But right actions have such motives; wrong ones, on the
contrary, proceed from false notions; for the origin of them is
from the objects which men fancy to be good or evil ; and
hence arise errors of conduct, and corrupt passions, among
which may be reckoned anger, envy, hatred, avarice, presump-
tion,” ambition, audacity, timidity, and other feelings of a simi-
lar nature. Sometimes fortuitous circumstances are added, as
drunkenness, or mistake, which sometimes serve to excuse, and
Sometimes to give weight to a charge, as when a man is said
to have killed one person while he was lying in wait for another.
35. Motives, moreover, are constantly investigated not only to
establish, but to repel, accusations, as when an accused person
maintains that he acted rightly, that is, from a laudable
motive; on which point I have spoken more fully in the third
book.f 36. Questions of definition, too, sometimes depend
upon motives, as whether he is a tyrannicide who killed a
tyrant by whom he had been caught in adultery; and whether
he is guilty of sacrilege who took down arms suspended in a
temple to drive enemies out of his city. 37. Arguments are
also drawn from places ; for it often concerns the proof of a
fact, whether the scene of it was mountainous or level, maritime
or inland, planted or uncultivated, frequented or lonely, near or
distant, suitable or unsuitable for the alleged purpose ; conside-
rations which Cicero treats with very great effect in his de-
fence of Milo. 38. These and similar points most commonly
relate to questions of fact, but sometimes also to questions of
law, as whether a place be private or public, sacred or profane,
our own or belonging to another, as we consider in regard to
a person whether he be a magistrate, or a father, or a foreigner.
39. For hence questions arise ; as, You have taken the money
of a private individual, but, as you took it from a temple, your
crime is not mere theft, but sacrilege.—You have killed an
adulterer, an act which the law allows, but as you committed it
in a brothel, it is murder.—You have done violence, but as you
did it to a magistrate, an action for treason may be brought
* Spes.] In a bad sense; hope of obtaining that to which we have
no right.
+ C. 11, sect. 4.—9.
342 QUINTILIAN. [B.V.
against you. 40. Or, on the other hand, a person may argue,
I had a right to act in such a way, for I was a father, or I was
a magistrate. But it is to be observed that arguments derived
from place afford * matter for dispute as to questions of fact
as well as regarding points of law. Place, too, frequently
affects the quality of an action; for the same act is not allow-
able or becoming in all places alike ; and it is likewise of con-
sequence before what people a question is tried ; for every
people has its peculiar customs and laws. 41. Place has also
influence in commendation or disparagement ; as Ajax says in
Ovid,+ Agimus ante rates causam, et mecum confertur Ulysses 2
“Do we plead our cause before the ships, and is Ulysses com-
pared with me * To Milo, too, it was made a subject of re-
proach, among other things, that Clodius had been killed by
him amidst the monuments of his ancestors. 42. Place has
influence, moreover, in deliberative oratory, as well as time,
some remarks on which I shall subjoin.
Of time, as I have already observed in another place,; there
are two acceptations, since it is viewed either generally or
specially. Generally, as when we say, now, formerly, in the
time of Alea’ander, during the struggle at the siege of Troy;
or whatever relates to the present, past, or future. Specially,
when we speak of received divisions of time, as in the summer,
in the winter, by day, by night, or of accidental occurrences at
any particular period, as during a pestilence, in a war, at a
banquet. 43. Some of Our Latin authors have thought that
sufficient distinction was made if they called time in general
merely time, and special portions of it times. To say nothing
more on that point, regard to time in both senses is to be had
both in deliberative and epideictic, but most frequently in
judicial, pleading. 44. For it gives rise to questions of law, §
and determines the quality of actions, and has great influence
* Sed circa facti controversiam, argumenta praestant, circa juris lites
materiam quaestionum.] The reader will observe that praestant, as
Spalding remarks, refers to hatc guidem ac similia in sect. 38, argumenta
being in the accusative case. “Il faut done remarquer que les argu-
mens tirés du lieu, en même temps qu'ils servent à établir le fait, sont
la matière des questions de droit.” Gedoyn.
+ Metam. xiii. 5.
† III. 6, 25.
§ For instance, if a man surprises an adulterer, who escapes for the
time, but is killed by him on a subsequent occasion. Turnebus.
CH. X.] EDUCATION OF AN OFATOR. 343
in questions of fact, since it sometimes offers irrefragable
proofs, as if a person should be said (as I supposed above *) to
have signed a deed when he died before the date of it, or to
have done something wrong when he was quite an infant or
even not born. 45. Besides it is to be observed that argu-
ments of all kinds are readily drawn either from circumstances
that preceded the fact in question, or occurred at the same time
with it, or happened after it : From previous circumstances,
as, You threatened the deceased with death, you went out at night,
$you went before him on the road ; and motives for deeds, too,
relate to time past: 46. From contemporaneous circumstances,
which some have distinguished more micely than was necessary,
dividing them into that which is combined with an act, as,
A moise was heard, and that which is attached to an act, as
A cry was raised : From subsequent circumstances, as, You
concealed yourself; you fled; discolorations and swellings
appeared on the body. The defendant also will direct his
thoughts to the same divisions of time in order to discredit
the charge that is brought against him. -
47. In these considerations is included all that concerns
deeds and words; but under two aspects; for some things are
done because something else will follow; and others because
something else was done before ; as when it is alleged against a
man accused of trafficking in women, that he bought a beautiful
Woman who had been found guilty of adultery;f or against a
rake accused of parricide that he had said to his father, You
shall not reproach me any more ; for the former is not a traf-
ficker in women because he bought the woman, but he
bought her because he was a trafficker in women ; and
the latter did not kill his father because he uttered those words,
but uttered the words because he meditated killing his father.
48. As to fortuitous occurrences, which also afford ground
for arguments, they doubtless belong to subsequent time, but
are generally distinguished by some peculiarity in the persons
whom they concern ; as if I should say, Scipio was a better
general than Hannibal; he defeated Hannibal.-He was a
good pilot; he never suffered shipwreck.-He was a good husband-
* C. 5, sect. 2. -
+ I hesitate at this example, says Spalding, as there is nothing
bearing on any such case in the Roman law ; but I must suppose it,
he adds, to have been a theme for declamation in the schools. No
other commentator makes any remark about it. -
344 QUINTILIAN. [B.V.
man ; he raised large crops. Or, in reference to bad qualities,
He was eatravagant; he earhausted his patrimony.—He lived
disgracefully; he was disliked by all.
49. We must also, especially in questions of fact, regard
the means of which a party was possessed; for probability
inclines us to suppose that a smaller number was killed by a
larger, a weaker by a stronger, people asleep by people awake,
the unsuspecting by the well prepared. Opposite states of
things lead to opposite conclusions. 50. Such points we re-
gard in deliberative speeches; and in judicial pleadings we
keep them in view with reference to two considerations,
whether a person had the inclination, and whether he had the
power ; for hope depending on power, often gives rise to incli-
nation. Hence that conjecture in Cicero:* “Clodius lay in
wait for Milo, not Milo for Clodius; Clodius was attended with
a body of stout slaves, Milo with a party of women; Clodius
was travelling on horseback, Milo in a carriage; Clodius was
unincumbered, Milo enveloped in a cloak.” 51. Under
means, also, we may include instruments, for they form part of
appliances and resources; and presumptive proofs, too, some-
times arise from instruments, as when a sharp weapon is
found sticking in a dead body. 52. To all this is to be added
manner, which the Greeks call reſºrog, in reference to which
the question is, How a thing was done & And it has relation
both to the quality of an act and to the interpretation of
writings,f as if we should deny that it is lawful to kill an
adulterer with poison, and say that he ought to have been killed
with a sword. It may concern questions of fact also ; as if I
should say that a thing was done with a good intention, and
therefore openly ; or with a bad intention, and therefore insidi-
ously, in the night, and in a lonely place.
53. But in regard to every matter, about the quality or
nature of which there is any question, and which we contem-
plate independently of persons and all else that constitutes a
cause, three points are doubtless to be considered, whether it
is, what it is, and of what nature it is. But as certain topics
of argument are common to all these, the three cannot be
* Pro Mil. c. 10.
# See sect. 40 of this chapter, and iii. 5, 4; iii. 6, 55, 66.
: See sect. 88, and iii. 6, 27.
CH. X.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 345
divided, and must accordingly be introduced under the heads
under which they respectively happen to fall. 3.
54. Arguments, then, are drawn from definition, (ea, fini-
tione seu fine, for both terms are in use,) of which there are
two modes; for we either inquire simply whether such a thing
is a virtue, or with a definition previously given, what virtue
is. Such definition we either express in a general way, as,
Rhetoric is the art of speaking well, or with an enumeration
of particulars, as Rhetoric is the art of rightly conceiving,
arranging, and eacpressing our thoughts, with an unfailing
memory and with propriety of action. 55. We also define a
thing either by its nature, as in the preceding example, or by
reference to etymology, as when we derive the sense of assiduus
from as and do, that of locuples from copia locorum, or that of
pecuniosus from copia pecorum.
To definitions seem especially to belong genus, species, dif:
jerence, property. 56. From all these arguments are de-
duced. Genus can do little to establish species, but very much
to set it aside; what is a tree, therefore, is not necessarily a
plane tree, but what is not a tree, is certainly not a plane
tree; nor can that which is not a virtue be justice; and there-
fore we must proceed from the genus to the ultimate species;”
as to say, Man is an animal, is not enough, for animal is the
genus ; and to Say that he is mortal, though it expresses a
species, is but a definition common to other animals; but if
we say that he is rational, nothing will be wanting to signify
what we wish. 57. On the contrary, species affords a strong
proof of genus, but has little power to disprove it ; for that
which is justice is certainly a virtue, while that which is not
justice may be a virtue, if it is fortitude, prudence, or tempe-
rance. A genus, therefore, will never be disproved by proving
a species, unless all the species, which are included under that
genus, be set aside, as That which is neither mortal nor immor-
ta! is not an animal.
58. To genus and species writers add properties and differences.
By properties a definition is established; by differences it is
overthrown. A property is that which either belongs only to one
object, as speech and laughter to man, or belongs to it, but not
to it alone, as heat is a property of fire. There may be also
many properties of the same thing, as fire, for instance, shines
as well as heats. Consequently, whatever property is omitted
* See sect. 5. Cicero Topic. c. 6.
346 QUINTILIAN. | B.V.
in a definition, will weaken it; but it is not every property
introduced in it that will establish it. 59. It is very often a
question, too, what is a property of something under considera-
tion; for instance, if it be asserted, on the etymology of the
word, “It constitutes a man a tyrannicide to kill a tyrant,” we
may deny it, for if an executioner should kill a tyrant delivered
to him to be put to death, he would not be called a tyrannicide,
nor would a man be called so that had killed a tyrant unawares
or unwillingly. 60. But that which is not a peculiar property
will be a difference ; as it is one thing to be a slave and another
to serve ; whence there is this distinction with regard to addicti,
or insolvent debtors sentenced to serve their creditors: He
who is a slave, if he is set free, becomes a freedman ; but this
is not the case with an addictus; and there are other points of
difference between them, of which I shall speak in another
place.* 61. They call that also a difference, by which, when
the genus is distinguished into species, a species itself is par-
ticularized ; as, Animal is the genus; mortal, a species, ter-
restrial or two-footed, a difference; for we have not yet come
to property, though the animal is distinguished from the
aquatic or the four-footed ; but such distinction belongs, not
So much to argument, as to exact expression of definition.
62. Cicero separates genus and species, which latter he calls
form, from definition, and puts them under relation ; as, for
example, if a person to whom all the silver of another person
has been bequeathed, should claim also the coined silver, he
would found his claim upon genus ; but if a person, when a
legacy has been left to a woman who should have been a mater-
familias to her husband, denies that it ought to be paid to her
who never came into her husband's power, he reasons from
species, because there are two sorts of marriages.f
63. Cicero; also shows that definition is assisted by division,
which he makes distinct from partition, partition being the dis-
tribution of a whole into its parts, division that of a genus
* VII. 3, 26; iii. 6, 25.
+ The two sorts of marriages were per coemptionem, when the woman
was delivered into the hand and power of the man, and was then called
materfamilias ; the other was citra coemptionem, when the connexion
was formed by cohabitation. Turnebus. See Cic. pro Flacc. 34. Adam's
Rom. Ant. p. 426, 8vo. ed. “A legal marriage was either cwm conven-
tione waroris in manum viri, or it was without this conventio.” Smith's
Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Ant. art. Marriage, Roman. -
† Topic. c. 5, 7.
CH. X.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 347
into its forms or species. The number of parts, he says, is
uncertain;% for instance, the parts of which a state consists ;
but that of forms, certain, as the number of forms of govern-
ment, which we understand to be three, that in which the power
is in the hands of the people, that in which it is in those of a
few, and that in which it is in those of one. 64. He, indeed,
does not use these examples, because, writing to Trebatius,t he
preferred taking his instances from law. I have given such,
as I think, plainer.
Properties have reference also to questions dependent on
conjecture ; ; for, as it is the property of a good man to act
rightly, and of a passionate man to be violent in his language,
it is supposed that he who acts rightly is a good man, and that
he who is violent in his language is a passionate one ; and
such as act or speak otherwise are supposed to be of opposite
characters; for when certain qualities are not in certain per-
sons, the inference, though from opposite premises, is of a
similar nature. §
65. Division, in a similar way, serves to prove and to refute.
For proof it is sometimes sufficient to establish one half; as
in this example: A man, to be a citizen, must either have been
born a citizen, or have been made one ; but in refuting you
must overthrow both particulars, and show that he was neither
born nor made a citizen. 66. This mode of reasoning is mani-
fold; and there is a form of argument by successive removals,
by which a whole allegation is sometimes proved to be false,
and sometimes a portion of it, which is left after successive
removals, is shown to be true. A whole allegation is proved
to be false in this manner: You say that you lent this money :
Either then you had it of your own, or you received it from
some one else, or you found it, or you stole it: If you neither had
it of your own, nor received it from any one, nor etc., you did
* Of forms there is always a certain number, and to omit any one
of them in a definition is a fault ; but the number of parts is fre-
quently infinite. Thurnebus.
+ III. 11, 18.
# That is, to the status termed conjecturalis by the rhetoricians;
commonly called quaestio de facto. Capperonier.
§ For example, as it is the part of a merciful man not to do wanton
injury, I shall infer, if a man commits wanton injury, that he is not
merciful. Twrmebus.
..., || Be remotione..] Cicero, Inv. i. 29, calls it enumeration, several par.
ticulars being enumerated, and all overthrown except one, which is
then considered as proved.
848 QUINTILIAN. [B. v.
not lend it, 67. What is left is established as true in this
way: This slave, whom you claim as your own, was either born
in your house, or bought by you, or given to you, or left to you
by will, or captured by you from the enemy, or he belongs to
another person: when it is shown that the suppositions are all
unfounded, except the last, it will be clear that the slave
belongs to another. This kind of argumentation is dangerous,
and must be conducted with great wariness, for if we omit one
particular in the enumeration, our whole edifice will fall to
the ground, to the amusement of our audience. 68. That
mode is safer which Cicero uses in his speech for Caecima,”
when he asks, If this is not the point in question, what is it 3
for thus all other points are set aside at once. That also is
safer, in which two contrary propositions are advanced, of
which it is sufficient for our purpose to establish either ; as in
this example from Cicero:# There is certainly no one so un-
favourable to Cluentius as not to grant me one thing : If it is
certain that those judges were bribed, they must have been bribed
either by Habitus or by Oppianicus; if I show that they were
not bribed by Habitus, I prove that they were bribed by Oppi-
anicus ; if I make it appear that they were bribed by Oppi-
anicus, I clear Habitus from suspicion. 69. Or liberty may be
granted to our adversary to choose one of two propositions, of
which one must necessarily be true, and, whichsoever he
chooses, it may be proved to be adverse to his cause. This is
a mode which Cicero adopts in pleading for Oppius: Whether
was it when he was aiming at Cotta, or when he was attempting
to kill himself, that the weapon was snatched from his hand 3
And in that for Varenus : The option is granted you, whether
!you would prefer to say that Varemus took that road by chance,
or at the instigation and persuasion of the other; and he then
shows that either supposition is equally adverse to the accuser.
70. Sometimes two propositions are stated of such a nature,
that from either, if adopted, the same consequence follows: as
* C. 13.
f Pro Cluent. c. 23. -
# Marcus Aurelius Cotta, proconsul of Bithynia, had dismissed his
quaestor Publius Oppius on suspicion of embezzling the public money
and plotting against his life, of which he was afterwards accused, and
defended by Cicero. See Dion. Cass. b. xxxvi. p. Reim. 100. The
only fragment of Cicero's speech that is extant is the one in the text.
Spalding.
$ See iv. 2, 26; and the fragments in Ernesti. p. 1040.
CH.X.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 34.9
in the common adage, We must philosophize, though we must
not philosophize," or in the still more common question, To
what purpose is a figure, if the subject is intelligible % to what
purpose if it is not intelligible % and in this saying, He who can
endure pain, will tell lies under torture; he who cannot endure
pain will tell lies.
71. As there are three parts of time, so the order of things
is comprised in three stages of progress; for everything has a
beginning, an increase, and a completion; as first, for instance,
there is a quarrel, then one man’s blood is shed, then that of
several. Here then is an origin for arguments supporting
one another; for the end may be inferred from the beginning ;
as in the common saying, I cannot eaſpect a toga praºteata when
I see the commencement of the web black ; or the beginning
may be argued from the end ; as the resignation of the dictator-
ship may be made an argument that Sylla did not take arms
with the object of making himself a tyrant. 72. From the in-
crease of a thing, in like manner, arguments may be drawn
with regard both to its beginning and its end; and that not
only in conjectures as to matters of fact, but in the considera-
tion of points of law ; as, Is the end referable to the beginning 3
that is, Ought the blood shed to be imputed to him with whom
the quarrel began *
73. Arguments are also drawn from similarities: If conti-
mence be a virtue, abstinence is also a virtue ; If a guardian
ought to give security, so likewise should an agent. This argu-
ment is of the nature of that which the Greeks call étoyoyń,
Cicerof induction. From dissimilarities: If joy is a good,
pleasure is not therefore necessarily a good : What is law-
ful in regard to a woman, is not also lawful in regard to a
minor $ From contrarieties : Frugality is a good, for eatrava-
* That is, says Turnebus, we must give some attention to philo-
sophy, though we are not to spend our whole lives in it. A saying of
Neoptolemus in a tragedy of Ennius, to that effect, is cited by Cicero
de Orat. ii. 37.
+ It is not properly a figure of language or of thought that is here
intended, but that sort to which Quintilian alludes, ix. 1, 14, and of
which he treats more fully, ix. 2, 65; see also vii. 4, 28. It is a mode
of-speech by which we indicate obscurely what we do not wish to
express plainly. Spalding.
† Topic. c. 10; De Inv. i. 31.
§ An example from Cicero, Topic. c. 11 : “If you have contracted a
debt to a woman, you can pay her without having recourse to a
350 QUINTILIAN. [B. v.
gance is an evil : If war is the cause of Sufferings, peace will be
the remedy of them : If he deserves pardon who has done an
injury unawares, he does not merit reward who has dome a ser-
vice unawares. 74. From contradictions : He who is wise, is
not a fool. From consequences or adjuncts : If justice is a
good, we ought to judge with justice : If deceit is an evil, we
must not deceive ; and such propositions may be reversed.
Nor are the arguments that follow dissimilar to these ; so that
they may properly be ranged under the same head, to which,
indeed, they naturally belong : What a man never had he has
not lost : A person whom we love we shall not knowingly injure:
For a person whom a man has resolved to make his heir, he has
had, has, and will have,” affection. But as such arguments are
incontrovertible, they partake of the nature of necessary indi-
cations.# 75. The latter sort, however, I call arguments from
what is consequent, or what the Greeks call &zóX0000v, as good-
mess is consequent upon wisdom ; (what merely follows, that is,
happens afterwards, or will be, I would distinguish by the
Greek term Togetógavoy.) But about names I am not anxious;
every one may use what terms he pleases, provided that the
character of the things themselves be understood, and that
the one be regarded as dependent on time, and the other on
the nature of things. 76. Accordingly, I do not hesitate to
call; the following forms of argument consequential, (though
from what precedes in order of time they give an indication of
what is to follow in order of time,) of which some have sought
to make two kinds: the first regarding action, as exemplified
in Cicero's speech for Oppius:$ Those whom he could not lead
forth into the province against their will, how could he detain
against their will ? the other regarding time, as shown in this
passage against Verres: If the Kalends of January put an
end to the authority of the prator's edict, why does not the com-
trustee; but what "you owe to a minor you cannot pay in the same
manner.”
* Habwit, habet, habebit..] The last two words seem to be but little
to the purpose. It was for that reason, perhaps, that Aldus omitted
them; but they are in all other copies. Spalding.
f Signorwm immutabilium.]. See c. 9.
it Vocare, or some such verb, is wanting in the text, as Regius and
others observe.
§ Sect. 69.
| Lib, i. e. 42.
CH. X.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 351.
mencement of its authority bear date from the Kalends of
January 3 77. Both these examples are of such a nature that
if you reverse the propositions they lead to an opposite conclu-
sion; for it is also a necessary consequence that they who could
not have been retained against their will, could not have been
led forth against their will.”
78. Those arguments, too, which are drawn from particu-
lars that mutually support each other, and which some
rhetoricians wish to be deemed of a peculiar kind, (they call
them āz rôy ºrgèg &XX^X&,t Cicero; terms them ea rebus sub
eandem rationem venientibus,) I would rank with those of
necessary consequence; as, If it is honourable for the Rhodians
to let their customs, it is also honourable in Hermocreon to farm
them ; and, what it is proper to learn, it is also proper to teach.
79. Of which nature is the happy saying of Domitius Afer,
not expressed in this manner, but having a similar effect : I
accused, you condemned. § There is also a kind of argument
from two propositions relatively consequent, and which proves
the same thing from opposite statements; as, He who says
that the world was produced, says also that it will come to an
end; for everything which is produced comes to an end. 80.
Similar to this is the kind of argument by which that which
is done is inferred from that which does, or the contrary;
which rhetoricians call an argument from causes. Sometimes
the consquence necessarily happens, sometimes generally, though
not necessarily. Thus a body, for example, casts a shadow in
the light, and, wherever there is a shadow, it necessarily proves
that there is a body. 81. Sometimes, as I said, the conse-
quence is not necessary, whether with reference to the cause
and the effect together, or to the cause or effect severally.
Thus, The sun darkens the skin ; but it does not necessarily
follow that he whose skin is dark has been darkened by the sun.
A road makes a man dusty : but it is not every road that
* The text has, Consequens enim est eos, qui inviti duci non potwerint,
£nvitos now potwisse reténeri, but it is justly observed by Gesner that
the infinitives ought to change places. He thinks that the mistake
may have been Quintilian's own.
f Aristot. Rhet. ii. 23, 3.
+ De Inv. i. 20.
Ś There is a similar expression, as the critics have observed, in Ovid
Metam. xiii. 308. An falso Palemedem crimine twrpe est Accusésse
nihi, vobis damnásse decorum &
352 QUINTILIAN. [B. V.
throws up dust ; nor does it follow that every man who is dusty
has been on a road. 82. Arguments of necessary Consequence
both from cause and effect” are such as these: If it is wisdom
that makes a man good, a good man is necessarily wise; and
So, It is the part of a good man to act wp:rightly, of a bad man
to act dishonourably; and accordingly those who act wprightly
are considered good, and those who act dishonourably, bad; and
this is a just conclusion. But if we say that eaſercise generally
makes the body Strong, it will not follow that whoever is Strong,
has taken ea:ercise, or that whoever has taken eacercise, is Strong;
nor, because fortitude Secures us from fearing death, will it
follow that whoever does not fear death is to be thought a man
of fortitude ; nor if the sum gives men the head-ache, does it
follow that the sum is not useful to men. 83. The following
kind of argument belongs chiefly to the suasory department of
oratory: Virtue confers glory, therefore it is to be followed ;
pleasure brings infamy, therefore it is to be avoided. *
84. But we are judiciously admonished by writers on
oratory that causes are not to be sought too far back; as
Medea, for example, says in the play,+ “Would that never in
the grove of Pelion,” as if “the felling of a fir-tree to the
earth” there had had the effect of producing her misery or
guilt; or as Philoctetes says to Paris,f “If you had controlled
your passion, I should not now be miserable;” for, retracing
causes in this way, we may arrive at any point whatever.
85. To these I should think it ridiculous to add what they
call the conjugate argument, had not Cicero $ introduced it.
An example of it is, That they who do a just thing do justly,
which certainly needs no proof, any more than Quod compas-
cuum est, compaScéré liceré, “On a common pasture it is com-
mon to every man to send his cattle to feed.”
86. Some call those arguments, which I have specified as
drawn from causes or efficients, by another name,” 32%gaug,
* Spalding's text has quº utique jiwnt, and he interprets utique by
necessario, but he inclines to favour utrºngue, which occurs in three
manuscripts, and which will signify, as he remarks, & causis et ab
effectibws.
+ Eurip. Med. v. 3. -
f In the Philoctetes of Accius, as Philander supposes.
§ Cic. Topic. 3. Aristot. Topic. ii. 3 ; Rhetor. i. 7, 27.
| Spalding has alieno nomine ; Capperonier reads alio nomine on the
conjecture of Regius.
CH. X.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. &: 353
that is, issues, for nothing is indeed considered in them but
how one thing results from another.
Arguments called apposite or comparative are such as prove
the greater from the less, the less from the greater, or equals
from equals. 87. A conjecture about a fact is supported by
arguing from something greater : as, If a man commits sacri-
lege, he will also commit an ordinary theft; from something
less, as, He who readily and boldly tells a lie, will commit
perjury; from something equal, as, He who has taken a bribe
to pronounce unjust judgment, will also take a bribe to bear
false witness. 88. A question about a point of law is supported
in a similar way: from something greater, as, If it is lawful
to kill an adulterer, it is also lawful to Scourge him; from some-
thing less, as, If it is lawful to kill a thief in the night, how
much more is it lawful to kill an armed robber 3 from some-
thing equal, as, The punishment which is justly pronounced on
him who has killed his father, is also justly pronounced on him
who has killed his mother. All these arguments find a place
in causes in which we proceed by syllogism.*
89. The following forms are more suitable for questions
dependent on definition or quality :f If strength is good for
bodies, health is not less 80 : If theft is a crime, much more
is sacrilege : If abstinence is a virtue, so is continence: If the
world is ruled by a providence, a state must be directed by a
government: If a house cannot be built without a plan, what
are we to think of the conditct of a fleet or an army 3 90. To
me it would be sufficient to notice this form merely as a genus,
but it is divided by others into species; for arguments are
deduced by them from several things to one, and from one to
several, (as in the common remark, What happens once, may
happen often,) from a part to the whole, from genus to species,
from that which contains to that which is contained, from the
more difficult to the more easy, from the more remote to the
* III. 6, 15.
f See b. iii. c. 6.
# All the commentators have passed this sentence in silence, except
Spalding, who is staggered at the comparison between the respective
values of strength and health, and proposes for Sanitas to read imanitas,
with some suitable alteration in the other words. He says that he has
met with nothing similar elsewhere. I read with Gedoyn, S. robºr
corportbus bomwm est, non minus Sanitas. Spalding's text has, S. r. c. 5.
*On eSt, m. 8.
A A
354 QUINTILIAN. [B.v
nearer, and from the opposites of all these to their opposites;
91. but such arguments are all of the same nature; for they
are drawn from greater things and less, or from things of
equal force ; and, if we pursue such distinctions, there will be
no end of particularization; for the comparison of things is
infinite, and, if we enumerate every kind, we must specify
things that are more pleasant, more agreeable, more necessary,
more honourable, more useful. But let me abstain from
speaking of more, lest I fall into that prolixity which I wish
to avoid. 92. As to the examples of this kind of arguments,
their number is incalculable; but I will notice only a very
few. From the greater, in Cicero's speech for Caecina:* Shall
that which alarms armed troops be thought to have caused no
alarm in a company of lawyers ? From the easier, in his
speech against Clodius and Curio:f Consider whether you
could so easily have been made prator, when he, to whom you
had given way, was not made prator # 93. From the more
difficult, in his speech for Ligarius: Observe, I pray you,
Tubero, that I, who do not hesitate to speak of my own act,
speak boldly of that of Ligarius; and, in the same speech,'
Has not Ligarius ground for hope, when liberty is granted me
to intercede with you even for another ? From the less, in his
speech for Caecina: Is the knowledge that there were armed
men a sufficient ground for you to prove that violence was com-
mitted, and is the fact of having fallen into their hands insuffi-
cient # 94. To sum up the whole in a few words, then, argu-
ments are drawn from persons, causes, places, time, (of which
we distinguished three parts, the preceding, the coincident, and
the subsequent,) manner, (that is, how a thing has been done,)
means, (under which we included instruments,) definition, genus,
Species, differences, peculiarities, removal," division, beginning,
increase, completion, similarity, dissimilarity, contraries, conse-
* C. 15.
ºf See iii. 7, 2.
f Cicero pro Ligar. c. 3. But the words in Cicero are greatly at
variance from those which are given by Quintilian : Vide, quaeso, Tubero,
*: de meo facto non dubitem dicere, de Ligari: non audeam conftteri.
|| C. 16.
* See sect. 66.
CH. x] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR 355
quences, causes, effects, issues, conneaſion, comparison, each of
which is divided into several species.
95. It seems necessary to be added that arguments are deduced
not only from acknowledged facts, but from fictions or supposi-
tions, or, as the Greeks say, x&6' tºróðsory: and this kind of
arguments is found in all the same forms as the other kinds,
because there may be as many species of fictitious as of true
arguments. 96. By using fiction, I here mean advancing
something, which, if it were true, would either solve a ques-
tion, or assist to solve it, and then showing the resemblance
of the point supposed to the point under consideration. That
young men, who have not yet left the school, may understand
this process the better, I will illustrate it by some examples
more suitable to that age.* 97. The law is, that he who does
not maintain his parents is to be imprisoned; a man does not
maintain his parents, and yet pleads that he ought not to go
to prison; he will perhaps have recourse to supposition, if he
were a soldier, if he were an infant, if he were absent from home
on the public service.t. And to oppose the option; of a man
distinguished for bravery, we might use the supposition, if he
ask for Supreme power, or for the overthrow of temples. 98. This
is a form of argument of great force against the letter of a law.
Cicero adopts it in his defence of Caecina: § whence you, or
tyour slaves, or your steward—if your steward alone had driven
me out—but if you have not even a single slave but him who
drove me out —; and there are several other examples in
that speech. 99. But the same sort of fiction is of great use
in considering the quality of an act: || If Catiline, with the
troop of villaims that he took with him, could judge of this
affair, he would condemn Lucius Muraºna. It serves also for
amplification : If this had happened to you at Supper over those
* That is, such as those to which they have been accustomed in the
schools of the rhetoricians. Spalding. n
+ He will endeavour to show that in the circumstances in which he
is placed, he ought to be exempt from maintaining his parents as much
as if he were a soldier, &c.
# To those who had displayed eminent bravery in the field permis-
sion was given to choose some reward. This was a fertile subject for
the Schools, as may be seen in the declamations attributed to Seneca
and Quintilian. Comp. vii. 5, 4. Spalding.
$ C. 19. The words are given imperfectly by Quintilian.
| Pro Muraen, c. 39.
A. A 2
356 QUINTILIAN. [B. v.
monstrous cups of yours” — and, If the republic had a
voice.*
100. These are the common topics of proofs which we find.
specified, and which it is hardly satisfactory to mention under
general heads, as a numberless multitude of arguments springs
from each of them, mor, on the other hand, does the nature of
things allow us to pursue them through all their species; a
task which those who have attempted have incurred the double
disadvantage of saying too much and of not saying all. 101.
Hence most students of rhetoric, when they have fallen into
these inexplicable labyrinths, have, as being fettered by the
inflexible restrictions of rules, lost all power of action, even
that which they ought to have from their own mind, and,
keeping their eyes fixed on a master, have ceased to follow the
guidance of nature. 102. But as it is not sufficient to know
that all proofs are to be drawn from persons or from things,
because each of these general heads branches out into an infi-
nity of others, so he who shall have learned that arguments are
to be deduced from preceding or coincident or subsequent cir-
cumstances, will not necessarily be qualified to judge what
arguments proper for any particular cause are to be deduced
from such circumstances; 103. especially as most proofs are
taken from what is inherent in the nature of a cause, and
have nothing in common with any other cause ; and these
proofs, while they are the strongest, are also the least obvious,
because, though we learn from rules what is common to all
causes, what is peculiar to any particular cause we have to dis-
cover for ourselves. 104. This kind of arguments we may
well call arguments from circumstances, (as we cannot other-
wise express the Greek word Tagforc.org.) or from those things
which are proper to any individual cause. Thus in the case
of the priest guilty of adultery, who, by virtue of the law by
which he had the power of Saving a life, wished to save his
own life, the argument proper to the cause, in opposing him,
* Cic. Philipp. ii. 25.
+ Cic. Catilin. i. 7.
†: A case very similar to this is treated in the 284th of the Decla-
mations attributed to Quintilian, of which the title is this: “Let a
priest have the power of saving one person from capital punishment:
let it be lawful to kill adulterers: a man surprises a priest in the com-
mission of adultery, and, putting him to death, though he claimed his
life on the ground of the law, is accused of murder.” Spalding.
CH. x ) - El) UCATION OF AN ORATOR. 357
would be, you would not save one criminal only, for, if you are
released, it will not be lawful to kill the adulteress;* for this
argument the law supplies, which prohibits killing the adul-
teress without the adulterer. 105. Thus, too, in that contro-
versy, in which the law is, that the bankers might pay the half
of what they owed, but demand payment of the whole of what
was due to them,t and one banker requires the whole of his
debt from another banker, the proper argument for the
creditor, from the nature of the cause, is, “that it was expressly
inserted in the law that a banker might demand the whole
of a debt, for with regard to other people, there was no need
of a law, as every one had the right of exacting a debt
in full except from a banker.”f 106. But many new consi-
derations present themselves in every kind of subject, and
especially in those cases which depend upon writing, because
there is often ambiguity, not only in single words, but, still
more, in words taken together. 107. These points for consi-
deration must necessarily vary, from the complication of laws
and other written documents produced to support or overthrow
them, as one fact brings to light another, and one point of law
leads to the consideration of another: as, I owed you no
7money; why? you never summoned me for a debt; you took no
interest from me ; you even borrowed money from me yourself.
A law says, A son who does not defend his father when accused
of treason is to be disinherited; a son denies that he is amena-
ble to this law unless his father be acquitted; and what is his
proof? Another law, which says that he who is found guilty
of treason is to be sent into easile with his defender. 108. Cicero,
in his speech for Cluentius, says that Publius Popilius and
Tiberius Gutta were found guilty, not of having bribed the
judges, but of having tried to bribe them. What is the proof?
* As it is said in the declamation just mentioned : Quid quod ille
pro duobus petebat 2 nam, adultera sine adultero non poterat occidi. So
Dig. xlviii. 5, 32: Dwm wºrwmque Occidat ; nam, si alterwm occidat,
lege Corneliá (de Sicariis) reus erit. See Schulting. Jurispr. Ante-
Just, p. 746. Spalding. ---
+ On this law I can throw no light either from the forum or from
the schools. But the argument of the creditor seems incomplete.
Spalding.
+ In concluding thus the creditor makes an admission against him-
self, for, if a banker was not required to pay more than half his debts,
he himself could not expect from his debtor more than half of what
was owing to him.
358 QUINTILIAN. [B.v.
That their accusers, who were themselves found guilty of trying
to bribe, were reinstated, according to law, * after having proved
Popilius and Gutta guilty of the same offence.
109. But no less care ought to be taken as to what you
advance, than as to the manner in which what you advance is
to be proved. Here the power of invention, if not the great-
est, is certainly the first requisite; for as arrows are useless to
him who knows not at what he should aim, so arguments
are useless to him who has not ascertained to what point they
are to be applied. 110. This is what cannot be attained by
art; and accordingly, though several orators, after having stu-
died the same rules, will doubtless use arguments of a similar
kind, yet some will devise more arguments for their purpose
than others. Let the following cause, which involves questions
by no means common with other causes, be given as an exam-
ple. 111. When Alexander had demolished Thebes, he found
a document in which it was stated that the Thebans had lent the
Thessaliams a hundred talents. Of this document Aleaxander
made a present to the Thessalians, as he had had their assistance
in the siege. But subsequently, when the Thebans were re-estab-
lished by Cassander, they demanded payment of the money from
the Thessalians. The cause was pleaded before the Amphic-
tyons. It was admitted that the Thebans had lent a hundred
talents, and had not been repaid. 112. The whole contro-
versy depends on this point, that Alexander is said to have
made the present to the Thessalians. But it is admitted also
that no money was given by Alexander to the Thessalians;
and it is therefore a question whether that which was given was
the same as if he had given them money, 113. Of what profit,
then, will grounds of argument be, unless I first settle that the
gift of Alea’ander was of no avail, that he could not give, and
that he did not give. The commencement of the pleading on
the part of the Thebans is at once easy and such as to conci-
liate favour, as they seek to recover as their right that which
was taken from them by force; but then a sharp and vehe-
ment dispute arises about the rights of war, the Thessalians
alleging that upon those rights depend kingdoms and people,
and the boundaries of nations and cities. 114. We have
* Whoever was convicted under any law, might, if he proved
another person guilty under the same law, be reinstated in his former
condition. Thºrnebus. See Dig. xlviii. 14.
CH.X.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 359
therefore to discover, on the other side, how this cause differs
from causes concerning other things that fall into the hands of
a conqueror; and the difficulty in this respect lies not so much
in the proof as in the proposition to be advanced. We may
state in the first place, that, in regard to whatever can be brought
before a court of justice the right of war cam have no power; that
things taken away by arms cannot be retained eacept by arms;
that, consequently, where arms prevail, the judge has no power,
and that when the judge has power, arms have mone. 115.
Such a statement is first to be made, that an argument, such
for example as the following, may be brought to support it:
That prisoners of war, if they effect a return into their country,
are at once free, because what is taken by force of arms cannot
be held except by force of arms. It is peculiar to the cause, also,
that the Amphictyons are the judges in it. (For, concerning
the same question, there is one mode of proceeding before the
centumviri and another before a private judge.”)
116. On the second head, we may allege that the right f
to the money could not have been given by Alexander to the
Thessalians, as right can belong only to him who holds it, and,
being incorporeal, cannot be grasped in the hand. This is a pro-
position more difficult to conceive, than it is, when you have
conceived it, to support it with arguments; such, for example,
as the following: that the condition of an inheritor is different
from that of a conqueror, because right passes to the one, and the
mere property to the other. 117. It is also an argument pecu-
liar to the cause itself that the right over what was owing to a
whole people could not have passed into the hands of the con-
queror, because what a whole people had lent, was due to them
all, and as long as a single one of them survived, he was a
creditor for the whole sum ; and that all the Thebans had not
fallen into the power of Alea’ander. I 18. This argument, such
* Privatºwn judicea).] Take care not to take judea, privatus in the
sense of judea, causae privatae. For the centumviri themselves were
judges only of private causes. But “privat judices were such as were
appointed on arbitrations, and on many kinds of trials, by the praetor,
being themselves almost all private individuals, and accustomed to
have the assistance of lawyers in their proceedings, as Aquilius assisted
in the cause of Quinctius in Cicero; and it is probable that there was
no settled body or order of men from whom such judges were chosen.”
Bach. Hist. Juris. ii. 1, 28. Spalding.
† The right to withhold the payment of the money to the Thebans,
360 QUINTILIAN. [B. V.
is its force, is not upheld by external support, but Sustains
itself by itself. - -
On the third head the commencement of the argumentation
will rest on the more obvious assertion that the right did not
lie in the writing,” a proposition which may be supported by
many confirmations. The intention of Alexander may also be
brought into question, and it may be inquired whether he meant
to oblige or to deceive the Thessalians. It is likewise an argu-
ment peculiar to the cause, and the commencement, as it were,
of a new discussion, that the Thebans, even though it be ad-
mitted that they lost their right, must be thought to have recovered
it by their re-establishment. Under this head may be inquired,
too, what were the views of Cassander ? But all pleading
on behalf of equity had the highest influence with the
Amphictyons. -
119. I make these observations, not because I think that
the knowledge of the general topics from which arguments are
drawn is useless, (for if I had thought so, I should have given
no precepts respecting them,) but that those who have studied
them, may not think themselves, while they neglect other
points, complete and consummate masters of their art ; and
may understand, that unless they acquire other accomplish-
ments, on which I shall soon give instructions, they will have
attained but dumb knowledge. 120. For the power of findiug
arguments was not a result of the publication of books on
rhetoric ; all kinds of arguments were conceived before any
instruction was given respecting them ; and writers after-
wards published the forms of them when they were observed
and collected. It is a proof of this fact, that writers on rhetoric
use old examples of argumentation, extracting them from the
orators, and producing nothing new of their own, or anything
that has not been said before. 121. The real authors of the
art, therefore, are the orators; though certainly some thanks
are due to those by whom our labour has been diminished;
for the arguments which preceding orators have discovered,
* The advocate of the Thebans will say that the right of the
Thebans does not properly lie or consist in the writing, as right is
incorporeal, and cannot be taken in the hand ; and that, accordingly,
though Alexander gave the Thessalians the document by which it
appeared that they had borrowed a hundred talents from the Thebans,
it did not follow that the Thessalians were thus freed from the obliga-
tion of payment. Capperonier.
CH, X.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 361
one after another, by the aid of their natural genius, it is not
necessary for us to seek, and yet they are all accurately known
to us. But this is not sufficient to make an Orator, any more
than to have studied in the palaestra is sufficient to make an
athlete, unless the body be also strengthened by exercise, con-
tinence, food, and, above all, by constitutional vigour; while, on
the other hand, all these advantages are of no avail without the
assistance of art.
122. Let students of eloquence consider also, that every
point to which I have called their attention is not to be found
in every cause ; and that, when a subject for discussion is
brought before them, they need not search for every topic of
argument, and knock as it were, at its door, to know whether
it will answer, and serve to prove what they desire ; they need
not do this, I say, unless while they are still learners, and
destitute of experience. 123. Such examination, indeed,
would render the process of speaking infinitely slow, if it were
always necessary to examine the several kinds of arguments,
and ascertain, by trial, which of them is fit and proper for our
purpose ; and I know not whether all rules for argument
would not be a hindrance to us, unless a certain penetration of
mind, engendered in us by nature and exercised by study,
conducted us straight to all the considerations suited to any
particular cause. 124. For, as the accompaniment of a stringed
instrument, when joined to the notes of the voice, is a great
assistance to it, yet, if the hand of the player be slow, and
hesitates to which string each note of the voice corresponds,
until every string has been sounded and examined, it would be
better for the singer to be content with what his unassisted
power of voice enables him to accomplish. Thus, too, our
system of study ought to be fitted and applied, as it were, after
the manner of a stringed instrument, to rules of this nature:
125. but such an effect is not to be produced without great
practice, in order that, as the hand of the musician, though he
be attending to something else, is yet led by habit to produce
grave, acute, or intermediate notes, so the variety and number
of arguments in a case may not embarrass the judgment of the
orator, but may present and offer themselves to his aid; and
that, as letters and syllables require no meditation on the part
of the writer, so reasons may follow the Orator as of their own
accord.
362 * QUINTILIAN. [B. V.
CHAPTER XI.
Of examples and instances, § 1–5. Of the efficiency, and various
species, of examples, 6–16. Of examples from the fables of the
poets, 17, 18. From the fables of AEsop, and proverbs, 19–21.
Comparison, 22—25. Caution necessary with respect to it, 26—
29. Too much sub-division in it, 30, 31. Comparison of points
of law, 32, 33. Analogy, 34, 35. Authority, 36–41. Authority
of the gods, 42. Of the judge, and of the adverse party, 43.
Examples and authority not to be numbered among imartificial
proofs, 44.
1. THE third sort of proofs, which are introduced into causes
from without, the Greeks call Togo,0sfypºcºrt, ; a term which
they apply to all kinds of comparison of like with like, and
especially to examples that rest on the authority of history.
Our rhetoricians, for the most part, have preferred to give the
name of comparison to that which the Greek calls ºrogozę0Xà,
and to render wagóðglypſo, by example. Example however par-
takes of comparison, and comparison of example. 2. For
myself, that I may the better explain my object, let me include
both under the word Togóðalyg.cz, and translate it by ea ample.
Nor do I fear that in this respect I may be thought at variance
with Cicero,” though he distinguishes comparison from ea ample;
for he divides f all argumentation into two parts, induction;
and reasoning,S as most of the Greeks | divide it into raftº-
§sfygaro, and 3.71%glgágaro, and call the ºrºgóðstyºc, rhetorical
induction. 3. Indeed the mode of argument which Socrates
chiefly used was of this nature ; for when he had asked a
number of questions, to which his adversary was obliged to
reply in the affirmative, he at last inferred the point about
which the question was raised, and to which his antagonist
had already admitted something similar ; this method was
induction. This cannot be done in a regular speech ; but what
is asked in conversation is assumed in a speech. 4. Suppose
that a question of this kind be put : What is the most noble
fruit 2 Is it not that which is the best ? This will at once be
granted. And which is the most noble horse # Is it not that
* De Inv. i. 30.
+ De Inv. i. 31; compare c. 10, sect. 73.
† ETaywyń.
§ Su)\\oytoplác.
| Aristot. Rhet. i. 2, 8.
CH. xi ) EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 363
which is the best ? This, and perhaps more questions to the
same effect, will readily be admitted. Last of all will be
asked the question with a view to which the others were put.
And among men who is the most noble 3 Is it not he who is
the best ? and this may also be allowed. 5. This mode of
interrogation is of great effect in questioning witnesses; but
in a continuous speech there is a difference ; for there the
orator replies to himself: What fruit is the most noble & The
best, I should suppose. What horse 3 That surely which is the
swiftest. And thus he is the best of men, who eacels most, not
in nobleness of birth but in merit.
All arguments, therefore, of this kind, must either be from
things similar, or dissimilar, or contrary. Similitudes are
sometimes sought, merely for the embellishment of speech;
but I will speak on that subject when the progress of my
work requires me to do so;* at present I am to pursue what
relates to proof. 6. Of all descriptions of proof the most effi-
cacious is that which we properly term example ; that is, the
adducing of some historical fact, or supposed fact, intended to
convince the hearer of that which we desire to impress
upon him. We must consider, therefore, whether such
fact is completely similar to what we wish to illustrate,
or only partly so; that we may either adopt the whole of it,
or only such portion of it as may serve our purpose. It is a
similitude when we say, Saturninus was justly killed, as were
the Gracchi. 7. A dissimilitude, when we say, Brutus put his
children to death for forming traitorous designs on their
country; Manlius punished the valour of his son with death.
A contrariety, when we say, Marcellus restored the ornaments
of their city to the Syracusans, who were our enemies; Verres
took away like ornaments from our allies.* Proof in eulogy
and censure f has the same three varieties. 8. In regard also
to matters of which we may speak as likely to happen, exhor-
tation drawn from similar occurrences is of great effect ; as if
a person, for example, on remarking that Dionysius requested
guards for his person, in order that, with the aid of their arms,
he might make himself tyrant, should support his remark with
* VIII 3, 72, segg.
+ Cicero in Verr. iv. 55. -
† That is, in the epideictic or demonstrative department of oratory.
§ That is, in the deliberative department of oratory.
364 QUINTILIAN. [B. v.
the example that Pisistratus secured absolute power in the same
??? (?????.6%".
9. But, as some examples are wholly similar, such as the
last which I gave, so there are others by which an argument
for the less is drawn from the greater, or an argument for the
greater from the less. For the violation of the marriage-bed
cities have been destroyed ;* what punishment is proper to be
inflicted on an adulterer?—Flute-players, when they have re-
tired from the city, f have been publicly recalled; and how much
more ought eminent men of the city, who have deserved well of
their country, and who have withdrawn from popular odium, to
be brought back from easile ºf 10. But unequal comparisons are
of most effect in exhortation. Courage is more deserving of
admiration in a woman than in a man ; and, therefore, if a
person is to be excited to a deed of valour, the examples of
Horatius and Torquatus will not have so much influence over
him as that of the woman by whose hand Pyrrhus was killed;
and, to nerve a man to die, the deaths of Cato and Scipio will
not be so efficient as that of Lucretia ; though these are argu-
ments from the greater to the less.
11. Let me then set before my reader examples of each of
these kinds, extracted from Cicero; for from whom can I
adduce better 7 An example of the similar is the following
from the speech for Muraena:$ For it happened to myself,
that I stood candidate with two patricians, the one the most
abandoned, and the other the most virtuous and eaccellent of
mankind ; yet in dignity I was Superior to Catiline, and in
influence to Galba. 12. An argument from the greater to the
less if found in the speech for Milo : They deny that it is
lawful for him, who confesses that he has killed a human being,
to behold the light of day; but in what city is it, I ask, that
* An allusion to the Trojan war. Spalding.
+ Livy, ix. 30 : “The fluteplayers, being prohibited by the preced-
ing censors from having their maintenance, according to ancient usage,
in the temple of Jupiter, withdrew, in a body, from discontent, to
Tibur ; so that there was nobody in the city to supply music at the
sacrifices. The senate, actuated by religious feelings, sent deputies to
Tibur to use their efforts to effect the return of those men,” &c. See
also Val. Max. ii. 5, 4. Spalding.
f Applicable to the recall of Cicero, as Gesner observes.
C. 8.
}| C. 3.
CH. XI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 365
Jºe
these most foolish of men thus argue? In that city assuredly, which
saw the first trial in it for a capital offence in the case of the
brave Horatius, who, though the state was not then made free,
was nevertheless acquitted in a public assembly of the Roman
people, even though he confessed that he had killed his sister
with his own hand. Another from the less to the greater is
found in the same speech:* I killed, not Spurius Malius,
who, because, by lowering the price of corn, and by lavishing
his patrimony, he appeared to court the populace too uſuch, in-
curred the suspicion of aspiring to royalty, déc., but him, (for
Milo would dare to avow the act when he had freed his country
from peril,) whose shameless licentiousness was carried even to
the couches of the gods, &c., with the whole of the invective
against Clodius.
13. Arguments from dissimilar things have many sources; for
they depend on kind, manner, time, place, and other circum-
stances, by the aid of which Cicero f overthrows nearly all the
previous judgments that appeared to have been formed against
Cluentius, while, by an example of contrast, he attacks f at
the same time the animadversion of the censors, extolling the
conduct of Scipio Africanus who, when censor, had allowed a
knight, whom he had publicly pronounced to have formally
committed perjury, to retain his horse,' because no one
appeared to accuse him, though he himself offered to bear
witness to his guilt if any one thought proper to deny it.
These examples I do not cite in the words of Cicero only be-
cause they are too long. 14. But there is a short example of
contrast in Virgil. || -
At non ille, satum quote mentiris, Achilles,
Talis in hoste fuit Priamo.
Not he, whose son thou falsely call'st thyself,
Achilles, thus to Priam e'er behav'd,
Priam his foe.
15. Instances taken from history we may sometimes relate
* C. 27.
+ Pro Cluent, 32–52.
f Pro Cluent. c. 48. -
§ Traducere equum.] “To pass his horse.” On the ides of July the
Roman knights passed in review before the censors, who deprived of
their horses such of them as they deemed unworthy of being retained
in the equestrian order.
| AEm, ii. 539.
366 QUINTILIAN. [B. v.
in full; as Cicero in his speech for Milo.” When a military
tribune, in the army of Caius Marius, and a relative of that
general, offered dishonourable treatment to a soldier, he was killed
by the soldier whom he had thus insulted; for, being a youth of
proper feeling, he chose rather to risk his life than to suffer dis-
honour; and that eminent commander accounted him blameless,
and inflicted no punishment on him. 16. To other instances
it will be sufficient to allude, as Cicero in the same speech:f
For neither could Servilius Ahala, or Publius Nasica, or
Lucius Opimius, or the Senate during my consulship, have been
considered otherwise than criminal, if it be unlawful for wicked
men to be put to death. Such examples will be introduced
at greater or less length, according as they are more or less
known, or as the interest or embellishment of the subject may
require.
17. The same is the case with regard to examples taken
from fictions of the poets, except that less weight will be
attributed to them. How we ought to treat them, the same ex-
cellent author and master of eloquence instructs us; 18. for an
example of this kind also will be found in the speech already
cited : Learned men, therefore, judges, have not without reason
preserved the tradition, in fictitious narratives, that he who had
killed his mother for the sake of avenging his father, was ac-
quitted, when the opinions of men were divided, by the voice not
only of a divinity, but of the divinity of Wisdom herself. 19.
Those moral fables, too, which, though they were not the
invention of AEsop, (for Hesiod appears to have been the
original inventor of them,) are most frequently mentioned
under the name of Æsop, are adapted to attract the minds,
especially of rustic and illiterate people, who listen less suspi-
ciously than others to fictions, and, charmed by the pleasure
which they find in them, put faith in that which delights them.
20. Thus, Merſenius Agrippa is said to have reconciled the
people to the Senators by that well-known fable about the
* C. 4. See also iii. 11, 14.
+ C. 3. t
it For observations on this point Spalding refers to Fabric. Bibl. Gr.
ed. Harl. vol. i. p. 624, sqq, and p. 593. Plutarch, Conviv. Sept. Sap,
expresses himself of the same opinion as Quintilian; also Theon.
Progym. p. 22. See likewise Bentley's Dissertation on the Epistles of
Phalaris and Fables of AEsop.
CH. XI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 367
members of the human body revolting against the belly;”
and Horace, even in a regular poem, has not thought the use
of this kind of fable to be disdained; as in the verses,f
Quod dia.it vulpes a groto cawta leoni, &c.
To the sick lion what the wily fox
Observed, &c.
The Greeks called this kind of composition, &iyog, j, c.icoºrsfog
7.6).06, as I remarked, $ and Aſºvzóg:|| Some of our writers have
given it the turn apologatio," or “apologue,” which has not
been received into general use. 21. Similar to this is that
Sort of Togo.gifo, which is, as it were, a shorter fable, and is
understood allegorically ; as a person may say, Non nostrum
onws; bos clitellas: “The burden is not mine; the ox, as they
Say, is carrying the panniers.”
22. Next to example, comparison is of the greatest effect,
especially that which is made between things nearly equal,
without any mixture of metaphor: As those who have been
accustomed to receive money in the Campus Martius, are gene-
ºrally most adverse to those candidates whose money they suppose
to be withheld, so judges of a similar disposition came to the
tribunal with a hostile feeling towards the defendant. 23.
IIzgo.60%, which Ciceroff calls comparison, frequently brings
things less obvious into assimilation. Nor is it only like pro-
ceedings of men that are compared by this figure, (as in the
comparison which Cicero makes in his speech for Muraena, if
If those who have already come off the sea into harbour, are
accustomed to warn, with the greatest solicitude, those who are
* Livy, ii. 32.
f Hor. Ep. i. 1, 73. , Quintilian does not quote exactly. &
f Equivalent to più00c, a “tale” or “story ;” see Odyss. xiv. 508,
with the note of Eustathius. Hesiod, Op. et. Di. 200, calls the fable
of the hawk and mightingale aivog. See also Æsch. Ag. 1482; Soph.
Phil. 1380.
§ He refers no further back than the preceding section. Spalding.
| Fabric, Bibl. Gr. wbi supra.
* I have not seen this word anywhere else. Spalding. -
** Clitellae bovi sunt impositae : plane non est nostrum onus, sed
feremus. Cicero Ep. ad Att. v. 15. Scheffer de Re Vehiculari ii. 2,
supposes that Bos Clitellas is the commencement of a fable. Panniers
were for asses or mules, not for Oxen.
++ De Inv. i. 30; see also sect. 2 of this chapter.
ºf C. 2.
368 QUINTILIAN. |B. V.
setting sail from the harbour, in regard to storms, and pirates,
and coasts, because nature inspires us with kindly feelings
towards those who are entering on the same dangers through
which we have passed, how, let me ask you, must I, who just see
land after long tossing on the waves, feel affected towards him
by whom I see that the greatest tempests must be encountered 2)
but similitudes of this kind are also taken from dumb animals,
and even from inanimate objects.
24. Since, too, the appearance of like objects is different in
different aspects,” I ought to admonish the learner, that that
species of comparison which the Greeks call ºxaly, and by
which the very image of things or persons is represented, (as
Cassius+ says, for instance, Who is that making such grimaces,
like those of an old man with his feet wrapped in wool 3) is
more rare in oratory than that by which what we enforce is
rendered more credible ; as, if you should say that the mind
ought to be cultivated, you would compare it with land, which,
if neglected, produces briars and thorns, but, when tilled,
supplies us with fruit; or, if you would exhort men to engage
in the service of the state, you would show that even bees and
ants, animals not only mute but extremely diminutive, labour
nevertheless in common. 25. Of this kind is the following
comparison of Cicero: As our bodies can make no use of their
several parts, the nerves, or the blood, or the limbs, without the
aid of a mind, so is a state powerless without laws. But as he
borrows this comparison from the human body in his speech
for Cluentius, so, in that for Cornelius, Š he adopts one from
horses, and in that for Archias || One from stones. 26. Such
as the following are, as I said," more ready to present them.
* All the texts have quoniam, similium alia facies in tal; ratione, but
Spalding observes that he can see no meaning in tal; ratione, and
proposes to read alić ratione, to which I have made my version con-
formable.
f Supposed to be Cassius of Parma. See Smith's Dict. of Gr, and
Rom. Biography. The line in the text, Qwis istam faciem lamipedis
senis torquens 2 is thought to be a scazon from one of his epigrams.
Lanipes, as Spalding remarks, may mean either that the old man’s feet
were wrapped in wool, or that they were soft and tender as wool.
: Pro Cluent. c. 53.
§ See iv. 4, 8.
|| C. 8.
"I Such references in Quintilian often given great trouble to the
CH.XI.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 360
selves: As rowers are inefficient without a steersman, so are
soldiers without a general.
But the appearance of similitude is apt to mislead us, and
judgment is accordingly to be employed in the use of it; for
we must not say that as a new ship is more Serviceable than an
old one, so it is with friendship ; nor that, as the woman is to
be commended who is liberal of her money to many, so she is to
be commended who is liberal of her beauty to many. The allu-
sions to age and liberality have a similarity in these examples;
but it is one thing to be liberal of money, and another to be
reckless of chastity. 27. We must therefore consider, above
all things, in this kind of illustration, whether what we apply
is a proper comparison; just as in the Socratic mode of ques-
tioning, of which I spoke a little above,” we must take care
that we do not answer rashly ; as Xenophon's wife, in the
Dialogues of AEschines Socraticus, makes inconsiderate replies
to Aspasia; 28, a passage which Ciceroi translates thus: Tell
me, I pray you, wife of Xenophon, if your female neighbour had
better gold than you have, would you préfer hers or your own 3
Hers, replied she. And if she had dress and other ornaments
suited to women, of more value than those which you have,
would you préfer your own or hers & Hers, assuredly, said she.
Tell me them, added Aspasia, if she had a better husband than
you have, whether would you préfer your husband or hers ?
29. At this question the woman blushed; and not without
reason; for she had answered incautiously at first, in say.
ing that she would rather have her neighbour's gold than
her own ; as covetousness is unjustifiable. But if she had
answered that she would prefer her own gold to be like the
better gold of her neighbour, she might then have answered,
consistently with modesty, that she would prefer her husband
to be like the better husband of her neighbour. -
30. I know that some writers have, with useless diligence,
distinguished comparison into several almost imperceptibly
different kinds, and have said that there is a minor similitude,
reader and commentator, as is the case here; but I suppose that he
refers to sect. 23. Spalding.
* Sect. 3.
# The Inv. i. 31. The passage was part of a dialogue in AEschines
Socraticus, entitled Aspasia, which is now lost. See Fabr. Bibl. Gr.
vol. ii. p. 692, ed. Harl. Spalding.
B B
370 QUINTILIAN. [B. v.
as that of an ape to a man, or that of imperfectly formed statues
to their originals ; and a greater similitude, as an egg, we say, is
not so like an egg, as déc. ; and that there is also similitude in
things unlike, as in an ant and an elephant in genus, both
being animals, and dissimilitude in things that are like, as
whelps are unlike to dogs and kids to goats, for they differ in
age. 31. They say, too, that there are different kinds of con-
traries: such as an opposite, as night to day; such as are hurt-
ful, as cold water to fever; such as are repugnant, as truth to
falsehood; such as are negatively opposed, as hard things to
those which are not hard. But I do not see that such distinc-
tions have any great concern with my present subject.
32. It is more to our purpose to observe, that arguments
are drawn from similar, opposite, and dissimilar points of law.
From similar, as Cicero shows, in his Topics,” that the heir, to
whom the possession of a house for his life has been bequeathed,
will mot rebuild it if it falls down, because he would not replace
a slave if he should die. From opposite points, as, There is
no reason why there should not be a valid marriage between
parties who unite with mutual consent, even if no contract has
been signed ; for it would be to no purpose that a contract had
been signed, if it should be proved that there was no consent to
the marriage. 33. From dissimilar points, as in the speech of
Cicero for Caecina ;f Since, if any one had compelled me to
quit my house by force, I should have ground for an action
against him, shall I have no ground for action if a man pre-
vents me by force from entering it # Dissimilar points may be
thus stated: If a man who has bequeathed another all his silver
may be considered to have left him all his coined silver, it is not
on that account to be Supposed that he intended all that was on
his books to be given to him.
34. Some have separated analogy from similitude ; I con-
sider it comprehended in similitude. For when we say, As
one is to ten, so are ten to a hundred, there is a similitude, as
much as there is when we say, As is an enemy, so is a bad
citizen. But arguments from similitude are carried still
further; as, If a conneaſion with a male slave is disgraceful to
a mistress, a connea;ion with a female slave is disgraceful to a
master. If pleasure is the chief object of brutes, it may also be
* C. 3.
f C. 12.
CH.XI.] EDUCATION OF AN OFATOR, 37 Ł
that of men. 35. But an argument from what is dissimilar in
the cases very easily meets such propositions: It is not the
same thing for a master to form a commeaſion with a female
slave as for a mistress to form one with a male slave ; or from
what is contrary: Because it is the chief object of brutes, it
should for that very reason not be the chief object of rational
beings. -
36. Among external supports for a cause, are also to be
numbered authorities. Those who follow the Greeks, by whom
they are termed Zgiosig, call them judicia or judicationes,
“judgments” or “adjudications,” not on matters on which a
judicial sentence has been pronounced, (for such matters must
be considered as precedents,) but on whatever can be adduced
as expressing the opinions of nations or people, or of wise
men, eminent political characters, or illustrious poets. 37. Nor
will even common sayings, established by popular belief, be
without their use in this way; for they are a kind of testi-
monies, and are so much the stronger, as they are not
invented to serve particular cases, but have been said and
confirmed* by minds free from hatred or partiality, merely
because they appeared most agreeable to virtue and truth.
38. If I speak of the calamities of life, will not the opinion of
those nations f support me, who witness births with tears, and
deaths with joy 2 Or if I recommend mercy to a judge, will it
not support my application to observe that the eminently
wise nation of the Athenians regarded mercy not as a mere
affection of the mind, but as a deity ?: 39. As for the
precepts of the seven wise men, do we not consider them as
So many rules of life 2. If an adulteress is accused of poison-
ing, does she not seem already condemned by the sentence of
Cato, who said that every adulteress was also ready to become a
poisoner & With maxims from the poets, not only the compo-
sitions of orators are filled, but the books also of philosophers,
who, though they think everything else inferior to their own
teaching and writings, have yet not disdained to seek authority
* Dicta factaque.] None of the commentators make any remark on
the word facta, though Cicero is speaking only of dicta. -
f As the Trausi in Thrace, Herod. v. 4, and the Essedones, Pomp.
Mel. ii. 1. *
# There was a well-known altar to "EXsoc, Mercy or Pity, in the
forum at Athens; see Apollod. Bibl. ii. 8, with the note of Heyne,
who refers to several other writers. Spalding.
B B 2
372 QUINTILIAN. [B. V.
from great numbers of verses. 40. Nor is it a mean example
of the influence of poetry, that when the Megareans and
Athenians contended for the possession of the isle of Salamis,
the Megareans were overcome by the Athenians on the
authority of a verse of Homer,” (which, however, is not found
in every edition,) signifying that Ajaa’ united his ships with
those of the Athenians. 41. Sayings, too, which have been
generally received, become as it were common property, for
the very reason that they have no certain author ; such as
Where there are friends, there is wealth ; Conscience is instead
of a thousand witnesses ;f and, as Ciceroj has it, Like people,
as it is in the old proverb, generally join themselves with like.
Such sayings, indeed, would not have endured from time
immemorial, had they not been thought true by everybody.
42. By some writers, the authority of the gods, as given in
oracles, is specified under this head, and placed, indeed, in the
first rank; for instance, the Oracle that Socrates was the wisest
of men. To this an allusion is rarely made, though Cicero
appeals to it in his speech De Aruspicum responsis, and in his
oration against Catiline, $ when he points the attention of the
people to the statue of Jupiter placed upon the column, and in
pleading for Ligarius, when he allows that the cause of Casar
is the better as the gods have given judgment to that effect.
Such attestations, when they are peculiarly inherent in the
cause, are called divine testimonies; when they are adduced from
without, arguments. 43. Sometimes, too, we may have an
opportunity of availing ourselves of a saying or act of the judge,
or of our adversary, or of the advocate that pleads against us,
to support the credit of what we assert.
Hence there have been some that have placed easamples
and authorities in the number of imartificial proofs, as the
orator does not invent them, but merely adopts them.
44. But there is a great difference; for witnesses, and exami-
nations, and like matters, decide on the subject that is before the
* Il. ii. 558. See Willoison Proleg. in Hom.; also Arist. Rhet. i. 15,
13; and Strabo p. 394. Plutarch, in his Life of Solon, says that there
was a report that Solon forged the verse.
+ This is the only place among the ancient writers in which this
proverb appears to occur. Spalding.
† De Senectute, c. 3.
§ III. 8, 9.
| C, 6.
CH. XII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 373
judges; while arguments from without, unless they are made
of avail, by the ingenuity of the pleader, to support his alle-
gations, have no force.
CHAPTER XII.
How far we may use doubtful grounds of argument, § 1–3. Some
arguments to be urged in a body, Some singly, 4, 5. Some to be
carefully supported, and referred to particular points in our case,
6, 7. Not to be too numerous, 8. Arguments from the charac-
ters of persons, 9–13. In what order arguments should be
advanced, 14. Quintilian states summarily what others have
given at greater length, 15–17. Algument too much neglected
in the exercises of the schools, 17—23.
1. SUCH are the notions, for the most part, which I have
hitherto held concerning proof, either as conveyed to me by
others, or as gathered from my own experience. I have not
the presumption to intimate that what I have said on the sub-
ject is all that can be said; on the contrary, I exhort the
student to search after me, and allow the possibility of more
being discovered ; but whatever is added, will be pretty much
the same with what I have stated. I will now subjoin a few
remarks on the mode in which we must make use of proofs.
2. It is generally laid down as a principle that a proof
must be something certain, for how can what is doubtful be
proved by what is doubtful? Yet some things, which we allege
in proof of something else, require proof themselves. You
killed your husband, for you were an adulteress.” Here we
must bring proof as to the adultery, that, when that point
appears to be established, it may become a proof of the other
which is doubtful. Your weapon was found in the body of the
murdered man; the accused denies that the weapon is his ;
and we must establish this circumstance in order to prove the
charge. 3. But it is one of the admonitions necessary to be
given here, that no proofs are stronger than those which have
been shown to be certain after having appeared to be doubtful.
You committed the murder, for you had your apparel stained
with blood, Here the allegation that his apparel was stained
* Comp. c. 11, sect. 39.
f
{
{
374 ly INTILIAN. [B.v.
with blood is not so strong an argument against the accused
if he admits it, as if he denies it and it is proved ; for if he
admits it, his apparel may have been stained with blood from
many causes, but if he denies it, he hinges his cause on that
very point, and, if he is convicted on that point, he can make
no stand on anything that follows; since it will be thought
that he would not have had recourse to falsehood to deny the
fact, if he had not despaired of justifying himself if he ad-
mitted it.
4. We must insist on the strongest of our arguments singly;
the weaker must be advanced in a body ; for the former kind,
which are strong in themselves, we must not obscure by sur-
rounding matter, but take care that they may appear exactly
as they are ; the other sort, which are naturally weak, will sup-
port themselves by mutual aid; and, therefore, if they cannot
prevail from being strong, they will prevail from being nume-
rous, as the object of all is to establish the same point.
5. Thus, if any person should accuse another of having killed
a man for the sake of his property, and should say, You
eaſpected to succeed to the inheritance, and a large inheritance
it was ; you were poor, and were greatly harassed by your
creditors; and you had offended him to whom you were heir,
and knew that he intended to alter his will; the allegations,
considered separately, have little weight and nothing peculiar,
but, brought forward in a body, they produce a damaging
effect, if not with the force of a thunderbolt, at least with that
of a shower of hail.
6. Some arguments it is not sufficient merely to advance;
they must be supported ; as, if you say that covetousness was
the cause of a crime, you must show how great the influence of
covetousness is ; or if you say anger, you must observe how
nuch power that passion has over the minds of men; thus
the arguments will be both stronger in themselves, and will
appear with more grace, from not presenting, as it were, their
limbs unapparelled or denuded of flesh. 7. If, again, we rest
a charge upon a motive of hatred, it will be of importance to
show whether it arose from envy, or from injury, or from am-
bition ; whether it was old or recent; whether it was entertained
towards an inferior, an equal, or a superior, a stranger or a
relative; for all such circumstances require peculiar considera-
tion, and must be turned to the advantage of the side which
CH.XII.] E}}|UCATION OF AN ORATOR. 375
we defend. 8. Yet we must not load a judge with all the argu-
ments that we can invent; for such an accumulation would
both tire his patience and excite his mistrust, since he can
hardly suppose those proofs sufficiently valid, which we our-
selves, who offer them, seem to regard as unsatisfactory. On
the other hand, to argue in support of a matter that is clear, is
as foolish as to bring a common taper into the brightest
Sunshine.
9. To these kinds of proof some add those which they call
pathetic, Tc,0Arizcág, drawn from the feelings;* and Aristotle,
indeed, thinks that the most powerful argument on the part
of him who speaks is that he be a good man ; and as this will
have the best effect, so to seem good ranks next to it, though
far below it. 10. Hence that noble defence of Scaurus :*
Quintus Varius of Sucro says that Æmilius Scaurus has
betrayed the interests of the people of Rome; Æmilius Scaurus
denies it. Iphicrates, too, is said to have justified himself in
a similar manner; for having asked Aristophon, by whom, as
accuser, he was charged with a like offence, whether he would
betray his country on receiving a sum of momey, and Aristophon
having replied that he would not, Have I, then, rejoined Iphi-
crates, done what you would not do 8 11. But we must
consider what is the character of the judge before whom we
plead, and ascertain what is likely to appear most probable to
him ; a point on which I have spoken $ both in my directions
regarding the exordium, and on those regarding deliberative
oratory. * {
12. There is another mode of proof in asseveration : I did
this: You told me this: O horrible deed 1 and the like. Such
affirmations ought not to be wanting in any pleading, and, if
they are wanting, their absence has a very ill effect. They
are not to be accounted, however, as great supports, because
they may be made on either side, in the same cause, with
equal positiveness. 13. Those proofs are stronger which are
drawn from the character of a person, and have some credible
* IIa.0ntikäg vocant, ductas eac affectibus.] Turnebus and Cappe-
ronier think that we should read #6tkác, which indeed suits better
with Quintilian's remarks, but to which the Words ductas eac affectibw8
are hardly applicable.
t Val. Max. iii. 7, 8.
† Aristot. Rhet. ii. 23, 7.
§ IV. 1, 17–22; iii. 8, 36–48.
376 QUINTILIAN. [B. V.
reason to support them : as, It is not likely that a wounded
man, or one whose son has been murdered, would mean to accuse
any other than the guilty person ; since, if he makes a charge
against an innocent person, he would let the guilty escape
punishment. It is from such reasoning that fathers scek sup-
port when they accuse their sons; or others, whoever they
may be, that accuse their own relatives.
l4. It is also inquired, whether the strongest arguments
should be placed in front, that they may take forcible possession
of the judge's mind, or in the rear, that they may leave an im-
pression upon it, or partly in front and partly in the rear, so
that, according to Homer's arrangement,f the weakest may be
in the middle ; or whether they should be in a progressive
order, commencing with the weakest. But the disposition of
the arguments must be such as the nature of the cause re-
quires; a rule, as I think, with only one exception, that our
series must not descend from the Strongest to the weakest.
15. Contenting myself with giving these brief intimations
respecting arguments, I have offered them in such a way as to
show, with as much clearness as I could, the topics and heads
from which they are derived. Some writers have descanted
on them more diffusely, having thought proper to speak of the
whole subject of common places, and to show in what manner
every particular topic may be treated. 16. But to me such
detail appeared superfluous; for it occurs almost to every
person what is to be said against envy, or avarice, or a mali-
cious witness, or powerful friends, and to speak on all such
subjects would be an endless task, as much as if I should
undertake to enumerate all the questions, arguments, and
opinions in all cases now depending, or that will ever arise.
17. I have not the confidence to suppose that I have pointed
out all the sources of argument, but I consider that I have
specified the greater number.
Such specification required the greater care, as the declama-
tions, in which we used to exercise ourselves, as military men
with foils, for the battles of the forum, have for some time
* Alleging that they would not bring them to judgment unless they
felt compelled. Spalding.
+ Iliad. iv. 299. See Cic. de Orat. ii. 77. Also vi. 4, 22; vii. 1, 10.
j: Velut praepilatis, sc. hastis. Salmasius de Cruce, pag. 301, proves
that praepilatae hastas were spears with soft balls fixed on the point to
prevent them from inflicting a wound. Capperonier.
CH. XII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 377
past departed from the true resemblance of pleading, and,
being composed merely to please, are destitute of vigour, there
being the same evil practice among declaimers, assuredly, as
that which slave-dealers adopt, when they try to add to the
beauty of young fellows by depriving them of their virility.
18. For as slave-dealers regard strength and muscles, and
more especially the beard and other distinctions which nature
has appropriated to males, as at variance with grace, and
soften down, as being harsh, whatever would be strong if it
were allowed its full growth, so we cover the manly form of
eloquence, and the ability of speaking closely and forcibly,
With a certain delicate texture of language, and, if our words
be but smooth and elegant, think it of little consequence what
Vigour they have. 19. But to me, who look to mature, any
man, with the full appearance of virility, will be more pleasing
than a eunuch; nor will divine providence ever be so unfavour-
able to its own work as to ordain that weakness be numbered
among its excellences; nor shall I think that an animal is
made beautiful by the knife, which would have been a monster
if it had been born in the state to which the knife has reduced
it. Let a deceitful resemblance to the female sex serve the
purposes of licentiousness if it will, but licentiousness will
never attain such power as to render that, which it has rendered
valuable for its own purposes, also honourable. 20. Such effe-
minate eloquence, therefore, however audiences, overcome with
pleasure, may applaud it, I (for I shall speak what I think)
shall never consider worthy of the name of eloquence,
language which bears in it not the least indication of manliness
or purity, to say nothing of gravity or Sanctity, in the speaker.
21. When the most eminent sculptors and painters, if they
sought to represent the highest personal beauty in stone or on
Canvas, never fell into the error of taking a Bagoas or
Megabyzus for their model, but choose a young Doryphorus, Š
fitted alike for war or the palaestra, and consider the persons
of other warlike youths and athletes truly graceful, shall I,
who study to form a perfect orator, give him, not the arms, but
the tinkling cymbals, of eloquence 2 22. Let the youth whom
I am instructing, therefore, devote himself, as much as he can,
to the imitation of truth, and, as he is to engage in frequent
* Alluding to the statue of Polycletus, which he made viriliter
puerum Plin. H. N. xxxiv. 8. See also Cic. Brut. c. 86 ; Orat. c. 2.
378 QUINTILIAN. [B. V.
contests in the forum, let him aspire to victory in the schools,
and learn to strike at the vital parts of his adversary and to
protect his own. Let the preceptor exact such manly exercise
above all things, and bestow the highest commendation on it
when it is displayed; for though youth are enticed by praise
to what is faulty, they nevertheless rejoice at being com-
mended for what is right. 23. At present, there is this evil
among teachers, that they pass over necessary points in silence,
and the useful is not numbered among the requisites of elo-
quence. But these matters have been considered by me in
another work,” and must frequently be noticed in this. I
now return to my prescribed course.f
* What work is meant is unknown ; perhaps the treatise de Causis
Corrupta Eloquentiae, which is lost. See b. vi. Introd.
f See iii. 6, 60 ; iii. 9, 1; Introduction to this book, sect. 5.
CH.XIII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR, 379
CHAPTER XIII.
Refutation twofold, § 1. Why it is more difficult to defend than to
accuse, 2, 3. Deprecation not to be adopted without some ground
of defence, 4–6. Nothing to be gained by silence in regard to
matters that cannot be defended, 7–11. We may attack some of
our adversary's arguments in a body, some singly, 12–14. What
arguments may be easily refuted, 15, 16. What arguments of
our adversary may be turned to our advantage, 17, 18. Many
will fall under conjecture, definition, quality, 19–21. Some of
the adversary’s arguments may be treated as unworthy of notice,
22. Precedents, which he assumes to be applicable to his case,
we must endeavour to prove inapplicable, 23, 24. We may repeat
the statements of the adversary so as to weaken them, 25–27.
We may sometimes expose the whole charge, sometimes particular
parts of it, 28. How we make arguments common to both sides
adverse to us; how discrepancies in the pleading of the adversary
are to be exposed, 29–33. Some faults easily shown, 34, 35.
Not to neglect arguments of our adversary, and not to be too
anxious to refute them all, 36, 37. How far we should spare our
adversary personally, 38–44. Some pleaders, in endeavouring to
expose their adversaries, give occasion against themselves, 45–48.
Sometimes, however, we may represent that there are contradic-
tions in his statements, 49, 50. A pleader ought to appear con-
fident of the justice of his cause, 51, 52. Order which we must
observe in supporting our own arguments and refuting those of
the opposite party, 53–55. We must support our proofs and
refutations by the power of eloquence, 56–58. Foolish dispute
between Theodorus and Apollodorus, 59, 60.
1. Refutation may be understood in two senses; for the
part of the defender consists wholly in refutation ; and what-
ever is said by either party in opposition to the other, requires
to be refuted. It is properly in the latter sense that the
fourth place* is assigned to it in judicial pleadings. But the
manner of conducting both is similar ; for the principles of
argument in refutation can be drawn from no other sources
than those used in affirmation ; nor is the nature of the com-
mon places, or thoughts, or words, or figures,f at all different.
2. It has, in general, little to do with moving the passions.
It is not without reason, however, that it is thought more
* There are five parts in a cause, or judicial pleading, the exordium,
the statement of facts, the confirmation, the refutation, and the pero-
ration. Capperonier. - -
f This word is to be understood here, apparently, in the same sense
as in iv. 2, 118. Spalding.
380 QUINTILIAN. [B. v.
difficult (as Cicero” often testifies) to defend than to accuse.
In the first place, accusation is more simple, for a charge may
be brought in one way, but may be overthrown in many ; and
it is sufficient for the accuser, in general, that what he advances
appear true ; while the defendant has to deny, to justify, to
take exceptions,t to excuse, to deprecate, to soften, to extenu-
ate, to avert, to affect contempt, to ridicule ; and accordingly,
on the accuser's side, the pleading is for the most part straight-
forward and, so to speak, open-mouthed ; while on that of the
defendant a thousand turns and artifices are required.
3. The accuser, too, generally sets forth what he has previously
meditated at leisure; the defendant has frequently to oppose
what is entirely unexpected. The accuser produces his wit-
nesses; the defendant has to refute him by arguments drawn
from the cause itself. The accuser finds matter for his speech
in the odiousness of the charges, $ even though they are false,
as parricide, for instance, or sacrilege, or treachery to the
state; which the defendant can only demy. Hence even mode-
rate speakers have succeeded in accusations ; while none but
the most eloquent have proved able defenders; for, to dispatch
what I mean in a word, it is as much more easy to accuse than
to defend, as it is to make wounds than to cure them.
4. It is a point of great importance to consider what the
opposite party has said, and in what manner. We must first
of all examine, therefore, whether that which we have to
answer belongs properly to the cause, or has been introduced
into it extrinsically ; for if it be inherent in the cause, we must
either deny it, or justify it, or prove that the action is illegally
brought ; besides these there is scarcely any means of defence
in any kind of trial. 5. Deprecation, at least such as is without
appearance of defence, is extremely rare, and before such
* Spalding observes that he cannot direct his reader to any passages
of the kind in Cicero. Turnebus refers to De Off. ii. 14, but that
passage is hardly applicable to the subject; “another to which he
refers in the Orator,” says Spalding, “I cannot find. That Cicero was
oftener engaged in defences than in accusations is apparent from his
own testimony in the Divinatio in Cacilium, and from his speeches.”
+ Transferat.] See note on iii. 6, 23.
f Comp. iv. 1, 38; v. 13, 22.
Ś Accusator criminum invidić, &c. Gesner justly observes that the
reposition à should be inserted before criminum.
| Comp. vii. 4, 17.
CH. XIII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 381
judges only as are confined to no certain form of decision;%
and even those pleadingst before Caius Caesar and the Trium-
viri, in behalf of men of the opposite party, though they
depend chiefly on intreaty, yet mingle with it some defensive
arguments; for it is surely the expression of a bold defender
to exclaim,. What object have we had in view, Tubero, but that
we might have the power which Casar now has 3 6. But if on
any occasion, in pleading for another before a sovereign prince,
or any other personage who may condemn or acquit at his
pleasure, we have to say that he whose cause we undertake is
worthy indeed of death, but of such a character that his life
may be spared by a merciful judge, we must consider, first of
all, that we shall not have to do with an adversary, but with
an arbitrator, and, in the next, that we shall have to adopt the
style of deliberative rather than of judicial oratory; for we
shall have to counsel him to prefer the praise of humanity to
the pleasure of vengeance. 7. As for pleadings before judges
that must give sentence according to law, it would be ridicu-
lous to offer precepts in regard to those who confess their guilt.
Charges, therefore, which cannot be denied, or set aside by
taking exceptions on a point of law, must be justified, what-
ever be their nature, or we must abandon our cause.
Of negation I have specified two forms; that the matter in
question did not happen, or that what did happen is not the
matter in question. What cannot be justified, or set aside on
a point of law, must necessarily be denied, not only if a defini-
tion of it may prove in our favour, but even if nothing but
simple denial is left to us. 8. If witnesses be produced, we
may say much against them; if writings, we may descant on
the resemblance of hands. Certainly nothing can be worse
than confession. When there is no ground either for justifica-
tion or denial, the last resource for maintaining our cause is
legal eaception. 9. But, it may be said, there are some
charges which can neither be denied nor justified, and to
* Turnebus and Gedoyn understand judges that are above the law,
as sovereign princes, the senate, or the people. Spalding thinks that
the allusion is to such judges as are meant, iii. 10, 1, to whom the
praetor might appoint multas et diversas formulas judicamdi. The
former notion seems to suit better with what follows.
+ We have no knowledge of any such pleadings except that of
Cicero for Ligarius.
† Pro Ligar. c. 4.
382 º QUINTILLAN. |B. V.
which no legal exception can be taken. A woman is accused,
for instance, of adultery, who, after being a widow a year, had
a child; here there can be no case for the judge. It is, there-
fore, most foolishly directed that what cannot be justified
should be pretended to be forgotten and passed in silence,
for that is the point on which the judge has to pronounce.
10. But if what the accuser alleges be foreign to the cause,
or merely accessory to it, I should prefer to Say in the de-
fence that it has nothing to do with the question, that it is
needless to dwell upon it, and that it is of less importance
than our adversary represents it; or I might, indeed, in such
a case, pardon the pretence of forgetfulness to which I just
now alluded; for a good advocate ought not to fear a slight
censure for negligence if he can thus save his client.
11. We must consider also whether we ought to attack the
charges of an accuser in a body, or overthrow them one by one.
We may assail a number at once, if they are either so weak that
they may be borne down in a mass, or so annoying that it is
not expedient to engage them in detail; for we must then
struggle with our whole force, and, if I may be allowed
the expression, must fight with the enemy front to front.
12. Sometimes, if it be difficult to refute the allegations
on the other side, we may compare our arguments with
those of our opponents, provided there be a probability of
making ours appear the stronger. Such arguments against us
as are strong from their number must be separated ; as, in the
example which I gave a little above, You were the heir of the
deceased; you were poor; you were harassed for a large sum of
money by your creditors; you had offended the deceased, and
you know that he purposed to alter his will. 13. These argu-
ments, taken together, have much weight; but if you divide
them, and consider them separately, they will be like a great
flame, which had its strength from a large mass of fuel, but
which will dwindle away when that which mourished it is with-
drawn, or like large rivers, which, if they are divided into
rivulets, become fordable in any part. The form of our refu-
tation, therefore, mnst be adapted to the interest of our cause;
we may sometimes state the arguments of our adversary sepa-
rately, and sometimes collect them into a body; 14. for, in
certain cases, what our opponent has deduced from several
particulars, it will be sufficient for us to include in a single
CH. XIII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 383
proposition; for example, if the accuser shall say that the
defendant had many motives for committing the crime with
which he charges him, we may, without recapitulating all the
alleged motives, deny simply that the argument from the motives
ought to be regarded, because it is not to be supposed that
every man who had a motive for committing a crime has com-
mitted it. 15. Yet it is best for the prosecutor, in general, to
group arguments and for the defendant to disperse them.
But the defendant must consider in what manner that which
has been stated by the prosecutor must be refuted. If it be
evidently false, it will be sufficient to deny it; as Cicero, in
pleading for Cluentius,” denies that he, whom the accuser had
affirmed to have fallen down dead on drinking from a cup,
died the same day. 16. To refute allegations that are incon-
sistent, or idle, or foolish, requires no art, and it is therefore
unnecessary to give either precepts or examples concerning
them. That also which is said to have been done in secret,
(they call it the obscure kind of charge,) and without witness
or proof, is sufficiently weak in itself (for it is enough that the
adversary cannot attest it); and it is the same with whatever
has no reference to the question. 17. It is the business of a
pleader, however, at times, to represent the statements of the
adversary in such a way that they may either appear contra-
dictory, or foreign to the question, or incredible, or super-
fluous, or favourable to our side rather than his own. It is a
charge against Oppius+ that he embezzled the provisions intended
jor the soldiers; a grave accusation ; but Cicero, shows that it
was inconsistent with other charges brought by the same pro-
secutors, who accused Oppius, at the same time, of attempting
to corrupt the soldiers with largesses. 18. The accuser of
Cornelius ; engages to produce witnesses of the law having been
read by him when tribune; this charge Cicero renders in-
effectual by admitting it. Quintus Cacilius Solicits the office of
prosecuting Verres, because he had been Verres' quastor; but
Cicero $ made that very circumstance appear in his own favour.
# C, 60.
i C. 10, sect. 69.
i: See iv. 3, 13.
§ Divinat, in Quint. Caecil. c. 2, 6, 11, et passim. He was a Jew by
birth, according to Plutarch, Life of Cicero, as well as the other
Caecilius mentioned by Quintilian, iii. 1, 16. Spalding.
38.4 QUINTILIAN. [B.V.
19. As to other charges, the mode of refuting them all is
much the same ; for they are either to be examined by conjec-
ture, whether they are true; or by definition, whether they pro
perly concern the cause ; or, with regard to their quality,
whether they are dishonourable, unjust, Scandalous, inhuman,
cruel, or deserve any other designation that falls under the
head of quality. 20. It is to be considered, indeed, not only
with regard to the first charges in an action, but throughout
the whole of it, whether it be eacessively rigorous, as that of
Labienus against Rabirius, under the lea, perduellionis;* or un-
feeling, as that of Tubero against Ligarius, whom he accused
when an exile, and exerted himself to the utmost to prevent
Caesar from pardoning him ; or presumptuous, as that against
Oppius when he was accused on a letter of Cotta. 21. In
like manner other actions may be contemplated, and shown to
be rash, insidious, or vindictive. But the strongest allegation
that you can bring against an action, is, either that it is fraught
with danger to the public, as Cicero says in his defence of
Tullius,t who has ever laid down such a maa'im, or to whom
could it be permitted without danger to the whole community, to
kill a man because he says that he is apprehensive of being killed
by him ºf or to the judges themselves, as Cicero, speaking for
Oppius, exhorts the judges at Some length that they should not
sanction that kind of action against the equestrian order.
22. For some arguments, again, contempt may be at times
* Rabirius was an aged senator, accused of having caused the death
of the Tribune Saturninus, forty years after that event had taken
place. Labienus brought the charge against him at the instigation of
Julius Caesar, who wished to deter the senate from taking up arms
against the popular party. The accusation was made, not on the
ground of lacsa majestas, as was usual, but under the old lea, per-
duellionis, the severity of which is apparent from Livy, i. 26. The
duumviri appointed to try the cause, in conformity with that law,
were Julius Cæsar himself and his relative Lucius Caesar, by whom he
was condemned, and would have been put to death had he not
appealed to the people. The people, too, would have ratified his con-
demnation, had it not been for a stratagem of Quintus Metellus Celer,
who removed the military flag that waved over the Janiculum, and
thus, according to ancient usage, broke off the proceedings. See Dion
Cass. xxxvii. 26–28; and Cic. pro Rabirio passim.
+ iv. 2, 131.
† Ne ipse posteriºs occideretur..] For posteriès Francius would read
potººs, Capperonier prič8. As the word is useless, I have not trans-
lated it.
CH. VII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 385
expressed, as being frivolous or having nothing to do with the
question; a course which Cicero frequently adopts; and this
affectation of contempt is sometimes carried so far, that we
trample with disdain as it were upon that which we should be
unable to refute by regular argument. -
23. But since the greater part of such charges is founded
upon resemblances,” we must use our utmost efforts, in refuting
them, to discover some discrepancy in what is stated. This is
most easily found in legal questions; for the law, to which we
refer, was assuredly made with reference to other matters than
that under consideration; and so much more easily may varia-
tion in the different cases be made to appear.f As to com-
parisons drawn from brute animals, or inanimate objects, it is
easy to elude them. 24. As to examples from historical facts,
if they bear hard upon us, they may be met in various ways;
if they are ancient, we may treat them as fabulous; if they
cannot be doubted, we may endeavour to show that they are
inapplicable to the case ; for it is impossible that two cases
should be alike in all respects; for instance, if Scipio Nasica,
after killing Gracchus, should be defended on the resemblance
of his act to that of Ahala, by whom Maelius was killed, it
may be said that Maºlius aspired to sovereignty, but that
Gracchus only brought forward some popular laws; that Ahala
was master of the horse, but Nasica a private individual. If
all other means fail us, we must then see whether it can be
shown that even the fact adduced as a precedent was not justi-
fiable. What is to be understood with regard to examples, is
also to be observed with regard to previous judgments.S
25. From the remark which I made above, that it is of impor-
tant to notice in what manner || the accuser stated his charges,
I wish it to be understood, that if he has expressed himself but
feebly, his very words may be repeated by ourselves; or, if he
has used fierce and violent language, we may reproduce his matter
in milder terms; 26. as Cicero says in his defence of Cornelius,
* Similibus constat.] Those arguments which are drawn & Simili, or,
as we now say, a pari. Capperonier.
+ Scarcely any two cases being entirely similar.
†: iii. 7, 21 ; v. 9, 13.
§ De Judicatis.] Judicata or praejudicia, or res antea judicatae, con-
cerning which see the second chapter of this book. Capperonier.
| See sect. 4. .
C C
386 QUINTILIAN. [B.v.
He took hold of the tablet of the law; * and this we may do with
a certain degree of deference to our client; so that, if we have
to speak on behalf of a man of pleasure, we may observe that a
rather free course of life has been imputed to him; and so we
call a person frugal instead of niggardly, or free of speech in-
stead of slanderous.t 27. We must at any rate take care not
to repeat our adversary's charges with their proofs, or to
amplify any point in them, unless such as we mean to ridicule,
as is done in the following passage from Cicero ; ; You have
been with the army, Says he ; for so many years you have not
set foot in the forum ; and, when you return after so long an
interval of time, do you contend for honours with those who have
made the forum as it were their dwelling-place 3 28. In replies,
too, the whole accusation may be sometimes repeated; a mode
which Cicero adopts in his defence of Scaurus with reference to
Bostar,' speaking in the character of his antagonist; or, if
we do not repeat the whole, we may take parts of it, and put
them together, as in Cicero's defence of Varenus: When he
was travelling through fields and solitary places with Pompu-
lenus, they met, as they said, the slaves of Ancharius, when
Pompulenus was killed, and Varenus immediately after bound,
and kept in custody till his father should signify what he wished
to be done with him. Such a mode may always be adopted
when the order of facts stated by the accuser appears impro-
bable, and may be deprived of credit by a comment. Some-
times points which prejudice us collectively may be separated;
and this is generally the safest method. Sometimes the parts
of a reply are naturally independent of each other; of which
no example need be given.
, 29. Common arguments are easily apprehended, not only
because they may be used by either party, but because they are
of more service to the defendant than to the prosecutor; for I
think it no trouble to repeat what I have often intimated,"
* See iv. 4, 8.
+ Comp. iv. 2, 117.
† Pro Muraen. c. 9.
§ iv. 1, 69. Scaurus was accused of having caused the death of
Bostar.
| v. 10, 69.
* Quod scepe monui.] It is conjectured with great ingenuity, and, I
think, on very good grounds, by Gesner, that Quintilian had made
CH. XIII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 387
that he who is the first to employ a common argument, renders
it adverse to him; for that is adverse to him which his opponent
can use equally well. * You say it is not probable that Marcus
Cotta contemplated so great a crime; and is it credible, then,
that Oppius attempted to commit so great a crime # 30. But
it is the part of a skilful pleader to discover in the case of
his adversary particulars that are at variance with one another,
or that may be made to appear at variance; and such contra-
dictions are sometimes evident on the very face of a statement,
as those noticed by Cicero on the trial of Caelius; + Clodia
says that she lent Calius money, which is a sign of great friend-
ship on her part ; yet alleges that poison was prepared for her
by Caºlius, which is a sign of the most violent hatred on his.
31. So, in his speech for Ligarius, Tubero, says he, makes it a
crime in Ligarius that he was in Africa; and yet complains
that he himself was not admitted into Africa by Ligarius. Some-
times an inadvertent remark of our opponent affords us an
opportunity of exposing his statements; an opportunity given
chiefly by those who are fond of fine thoughts, and who,
enticed by some opening for their eloquence, do not suffi-
ciently regard what they assert, fixing their attention on the
passage before them, and not on the whole scope of the cause.
32. What could appear more prejudicial to Cluentius Š than
the mark of infamy set on him by the censors? What could
have seemed more to his disadvantage than that the son of
Egnatius || had been disinherited by his father, for the very
crime of corrupt judgment by which Cluentius had procured
the condemnation of Oppianicus? 33. But Cicero shows that
these two facts contradict one another : But I think that you,
Accius, should consider carefully whether you would have the
judgment of the censors, or that of Egnatius, to carry the greater
weight. If that of Egnatius, you think that judgment light
which the censors have pronouneed against others, for they
eapelled this very Egnatius, whom you represent as a man of
this remark to his pupils orally, for there is no observation of the
kind to be found in the work before us. Spalding.
* Comp. c. 20.
+ Cic. pro Cael. c. 13.
# C. 3. e
§ Cic. pro Cluent. c. 48. ---
| The son of Egnatius had been one of the judices on tho trial of
Oppianicus.
U (, Q
388 - QUINTILIAN. | B.V.
authority, from the senate. If that of the censors, they retained
Egnatius the son, whom his father had disinherited by evereis-
ing censorial functions, in the "senate, when they ejected his
father from it.
34. As to some faults, there is far more folly in committing
them than acuteness in noting them. I mean such as
advancing a disputable for an indisputable argument, a contro-
verted for an acknowledged fact, a point common to many causes,
for one peculiar to the cause in hand, or introducing anything
vulgar, superfluous, too late for the purpose, or incredible. For
it is incident to incautious speakers to aggravate a charge,
when it is still to be proved; to dispute about an act when
the question is about the agent; to attempt what is impossi-
ble; to break off a discussion as finished when it is scarcely
commenced; to prefer speaking of the party instead of the
cause; to attribute to things the faults of persons, as, for
example, accusing the decemviral power instead of Appius; to
contradict what is evident; to say what may be taken in
another sense from that which they intend; to lose sight of
the main point of the cause ; to reply to something that is not
asserted. 35. This mode of reply, indeed, may be adopted as an
artifice in some cases, as when a bad cause requires to be sup-
ported by foreign aid; thus when Verres” was accused of
ea tortion, he was defended for having bravely and actively
defended Sicily against pirates.
36. The same rules may be given with regard to objections
that we may have to encounter; but they require the more
attention in this case, as many speakers fall into two opposite
errors as to objections. Some, even in the forum, neglect them
as matters troublesome and disagreeable, and content, for the
most part, with what they have premeditated, speak as if they
had no opponent; an error which is still more common in the
schools, in which not only are objections disregarded, but the
declamations themselves are in general so framed, that nothing
can be said on the opposite side. 37. Others, erring from too
great caution, think that they must reply, if not to every word,
at least to every thought or insinuation, even the lightest, of
their adversary; a task which is endless and superfluous; for
then it is the cause that is refuted, and not the pleader. For
my own part, I shall consider a speaker eloquent only when
". * Cicero in Verr. v. 1.
CH. XIII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 389
he speaks in such a way that whatever he says to benefit his
party, the credit of it may seem to be due to his talent and
not to his cause, and, if he says anything to injure his party,
the blame of it may seem attributable to his cause and not to
his talent.
38. Invectives, such as that against Rullus * for the
obscurity of his language, against Pisof for his foolishness of
speech, against Antony for his ignorance of things and
words, as well for his stolidity, are allowed to passion or just
resentment, and are of effect in exciting dislike towards those
whom the speaker may wish to render hateful. 39. The mode of
reply adopted towards advocates should be different; though at
times not only their mode of speech, but even their character,
their look, their walk, their air, are excusably attacked; as
Cicero, in speaking against Quintius, Š assails not only such
personal peculiarities, but even his purple-bordered toga
descending to his heels; for Quintius had pressed hard upon
Cluentius by his turbulent harangues.
40. Sometimes, for the purpose of effacing an unpleasant
impression, what is said severely by one party is eluded with a
jest by the other. In this way Triarius was mocked by
Cicero; for when he had observed that the pillars of the house
of Scaurus were conveyed through the city on waggons, Cicero
retorted, And I, who have pillars from the Alban mount, had
them brought in panniers. Such ridicule is more freely allowed
against an accuser, whom concern for his client sometimes leads
a defender to assail with severity. 41. But what is allowed
against all pleaders, without any violation of good manners, is
complaint, if they can be said to have craftily passed in silence,
or abbreviated, or obscured, or put off any point. 42. A
change in the direction of the defence, too, is often a subject of
blame; a point on which Accius] objects in pleading against
Cluentius, and AEschines" in his speech against Ctesiphon,
Accius complaining that Cicero would adhere only to the letter
of the law, and Æschines that Demosthenes would say nothing
* Cic. De Lege Agraria, ii. 5.
+ Cic. in Pis, c. 1 and 30.
i. Philipp. ii. 4; iii. 4; xiii. 19.
§ Cic. pro Cluent. c. 40.
| Cic. pro Cluent. c. 52.
* Comp. iii. 6, 3.
390 QUINTILIAN. * [B. v.
on the subject of the law. But our declaimers should be
especially admonished not to offer such objections as may be
easily answered, or imagine that their opponent is an absolute
fool. But as fertile common-places, and thoughts that may
please the multitude, occur to us, we make to ourselves matter
for our speeches, moulding it to our fancy; so that this verse
may be not disadvantageously borne in mind:
Non male respondit ; malê enim prior ille rogárat.*
The answer's nonsense; that we all admit;
But nonsense only could th’ objection fit.
43. Such a practice will be fatal to us in the forum, where
we shall have to reply to our adversary, and not to ourselves.
It is said that Accius being asked why he did not plead causes,
when he displayed in his tragedies such power in making
able replies, gave this reason, that on the stage he made his
characters say what he wished, but that in the forum his
adversaries would say what he did not wish. 44. It is there-
fore ridiculous in exercises which are preparatory to the forum,
to consider what reply may be made before we consider what
objections may be offered; and a good teacher ought to com-
mend a pupil when he ably imagines anything favourable to
the opposite side as much as when he conceives anything
serviceable to his own.
45. There is another practice with regard to objections that
seems to be always permissible in the Schools, but ought rarely
to be allowed in the forum. For where when we have to speak
first on the side of the prosecutor, f in a real cause, how can
we make replies to objections, when our opponent has not yet
spoken 2 46. Many speakers, however, fall into this absurdity,
whether from a habit contracted in the schools, or from fond-
ness for speaking, and afford amusement and sport to those
who answer them, and who sometimes jestingly remark that
they said nothing, and could have said nothing so foolish;
sometimes, that they have been well reminded by their opponent,
and thank him for his assistance; but most frequently, what is,
indeed, a very strong argument in their favour, that their oppo-
* Whence this verse comes, says Spalding, I know not. I have
borrowed Guthrie's translation of it.
tº Nam loco à petitore primo J. Quando primo loco dicinus à petitore,
id est, in gratiam petitoris. Copperonier.
CH.XIII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 391
ment would never have replied to objections that had not been
made, whless he knew that such objections were well founded,
and had been impelled to acknowledge their justice by the voice
of conscience. 47. Thus Cicero, in his speech for Cluentius *
says, You have repeatedly observed, that you are informed that
I intend to defend this cause by the aid of the letter of the law.
. Is it so º Am I then to suppose that I am secretly betrayed by
my friends 7 Is there some one among those, whom I fancy to
be my friends, that reports my designs to the enemy # Who is
it that told you of my intention ? Who has been so perfidious 3
To whom have I communicated it 8 No one, I conceive, is
to blame; it was, doubtless, the law itself that informed you.
48. But some, not content with answering imaginary objec-
tions, amplify whole portions of them, saying that they knew
the opposite party would say so and so, and support their
assertions with such and such arguments. This practice Vibius
Crispus, a man of pleasing and refined humour, very happily
ridiculed when I was at the bar: I, said he, in reply to an
opponent of that sort, do not make those objections, for to what
purpose is it that they should be twice made # 49. Some-
times, however, something like an answer to an objection may
be made, if anything be comprised in the depositions on the
part of the adversary be discussed in a private consultation of
advocates,f for we shall then reply to something said by the
opposite party and not to anything imagined by ourselves; or
if the cause be of such a nature that we can State certain
objections besides which no others can be offered; as, for
example, when stolen goods are found in a house, he who is
accused of having stolen them must, if he deny the charge,
necessarily say either that they were brought thither without his
knowledge, or deposited with him, or given to him ; to all which
allegations we may reply, even though they have not been
advanced. 50. In the schools, too, we may very properly
obviate objections, so as to exercise ourselves for speaking in
# C. 52.
+ Advocationibus.] By this word I understand private meetings of
the advocates. Spalding. “Patronorum et amicorum consultationes.”
Turnebw8. -
£ At in scholis rectè et contradictionibus occurremus, wt in utrumque
locum, id est primum et Secundum, simul eacerceamwr.] This is the form
in which Spalding gives this passage. But the copies vary. Some of
the manuscripts have rectè et plena'ibus contradictionibus. Turnebus
392 QUINTILLAN. - [B.v.
both places, the first and the second, on the side of the prose-
cutor. Unless we do so, we shall never acquire practice in
combating objections, as we have no adversary to whom we are
called upon to reply. . -
51. It is also a fault in a pleader to be too anxious, and to
labour at removing every thing that stands in his way ; for
such solicitude excites distrust in the judge ; and very fre-
quently arguments, which, if stated off hand, would have re-
moved all doubt, but which are tardily advanced through
excessive precaution, lose credit, because the advocate himself
seems to think something additional necessary to support
what he alleges. An orator, therefore, should carry confidence
in his manner, and speak as if he had the highest assurance
of the success of his cause, 52. This quality, like all others,
is eminently apparent in Cicero; for his extraordinary affecta-
tion of security is like security itself; and there is such autho-
rity in his language as Supplies the place of proof, so that we
do not venture to doubt his statements. But he who can per-
ceive what is the strongest point in his adversary's case and
his own, will easily judge what arguments he will have to
oppose or to urge,
53. As to order, there is no part of a cause in which it will
give us less trouble ; for, if we are the prosecutors, we have
first to support our own allegations, and then to refute what is
brought against them ; if we are defendants, we have to com-
mence with refutation. 54. But from what we advance against
any objection there arise other objections, and sometimes to a
great extent; as the hands” of gladiators, which are called
and Burmann would therefore read recié et probationibus et contradic-
tionibus, so that there may be two objects to which wºrwmque locum,
may properly be referred.
* Gladiatorum manus.] This passage is almost wholly unintelligible
to us, from our want of knowledge of the gladiatorial movements to
which Quintilian refers. “By comparing the passage,” says Spalding,
“with vi. 4, 8, ix. 1, 20, and passages of other authors, it is pretty
clear that manus is used for ictus, in conformity with the interpretation
of the old scholiast on Statius Theb. vi. 788; see also Lucan. vi. 190.
. . . . But the matter is obscure, as well in itself as in relation to
that which is compared to it.” “Nothing is more certain,” says Bur-
mann, “than that manus primaº, Secundae, &c., are modes of assault, in
which the gladiators were disciplined by the masters of the schools.”
Capperonier refers to aquis manibus in Ammian. Marcell. xxiv. 4, 18,
which however affords little illustration.
CH.XIII.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 393
the second, become the third, if the first was intended to pro-
voke the assault of the adversary, and the fourth, if the chal.
lenge be repeated, so as to make it necessary to stand on
guard twice and to attack twice ; and this process may lead
still further. *
55. Refutation includes also that simple kind of proof of
which I have given an example above,” proceeding from the
feelings, and consisting in mere affirmation, such as that of
Scaurus, of which I have already spoken if and I know not
whether such sort of proof may not even be used more fre-
quently when a denial is made. But the chief object of each
party must be to see where the main point lies; for it too
frequently happens in a cause that many points are disputed,
while judgment is to be passed on few.
56. In these particulars consists the art of proving and re-
futing ; but it requires to be supported and embellished by
the powers of the speaker; for however well adapted our
arguments may be to establish our case, they will neverthe-
less be but weak unless they are urged with extraordinary
vigour by him who uses them, 57. Those common-place observa-
tions, accordingly, concerning witnesses, written evidence, argu
ments, and other matters of the kind, produce great impression
on the minds of the judges; as well as those peculiarly arising
from the cause, in which we praise or blame any action, show
that it is just or unjust, or make it appear greater or less, worse
or better, than it really is. Of these some are useful in the
comparison of one argument with another, others in the com-
parison of several, others in influencing the decision of a whole
cause. 58. Some, too, serve to prepare the mind of the
judge, others to confirm it in the opinions which he has
already formed ; and such preparation or confirmation has
reference sometimes to particular heads, and may be offered
as may be suitable for each. 59. I wonder, therefore, that it
should have been disputed, and with no small acrimony,
between two leaders of opposite sects as it were, whether argu-
ments from moral considerations should accompany each parti-
cular head, as Theodorus would have it, or whether the judge
should be informed before his feelings are earcited, as Apollo-
dorus directs; as if no middle course could be pursued, and
* C. 12, sect. 12.
+ C. 12, sect. 10.
394 QUINTILIAN. [B. v.
as if nothing could be ordered to suit the interests of the
cause. But it is men who do not speak in the forum them-
selves that give these directions; and their systems of rules,
which they have composed at leisure and at ease, are dis-
turbed by the necessary confusion of battle. 60. For almost
all authors, who have set forth methods of speaking, as a kind
of mysteries,” have bound us not only to certain subjects for
our arguments, but by fixed laws as to the form of expressing
them. But having offered these few remarks on this head, I
shall not shrink from communicating what I myself think
about it, that is, what I observe to have been the practice of
the most eminent orators.
CHAPTER XIV.
Of the enthymeme and its parts, $ 1–4. Of the epicheirema and its
parts, 5–9. Not always of the same form, 10--13. The epi-
cheirema of the orators is the syllogism of the philosophers, 14—
16. All the parts of it not always necessary to be specified, 17–
19. Three modes of opposing this form of argument, 20–23.
How the enthymeme differs from the syllogism, 24–26. We must
not crowd our speech with rhetorical forms of argument, 27–32.
We must not leave our arguments unembellished, 33–35.
1. THE term enthymeme rhetoricians apply not only to the
argument itself, that is the matter which is used for the proof
of any thing else, but to the enunciation of the argument,
which they make, as I said,t twofold ; one from consequents,
which consists of a proposition and a proof immediately fol-
lowing it; as in this passage of Cicero's speech for Lijarius:
The cause was them doubtful, because there was something that
might be sustained on each side ; but now that side must be
deemed the stronger to which even the gods have given support;
this is an enthymeme, for it contains a proposition and a
reason, but no logical conclusion, and is therefore an imper-
fect syllogism ; 2. the other from opposites, which some call
* Burmann compares Cic. de Orat. i. 47 : Earplicet nobis, et illa
dicendi mysteria enºwnciet. Gesner refers to c. 14, sect. 27.
+ C. 10, sect. 2.
iſ C. 6.
CH.xIV.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 395
the only form of enthymeme,” and in which the proof is much
stronger. Such is that in the speech of Cicero for Milo ºf You
sit therefore as avengers of the death of a man to whom you would
be unwilling to restore life even if you thought it could be restored
by your means. 3. This form is sometimes made to consist
of several clauses, of which we have an example by the same
orator on behalf of the same client: Him, therefore, whom he
would not kill to the satisfaction of all, was he willing to kill to
the dissatisfaction of some & Him, whom he did not dare to kill
with the sanction of the law, in a favourable place, at a favour-
able time, and with impunity, did he boldly resolve to kill un-
justly, in an unfavourable place, at an unfavourable time, and at
the hazard of his own life 3 4. But the best kind of enthymeme
appears to be that in which a reason is subjoined to a proposi-
tion dissimilar or opposite, as in this passage of Demos-
themes: For, if acts have at times been committed against the
laws, and you have imitated them, it does not follow that you
should therefore escape punishment, but much rather that you
should be condemned ; for if any of the violators of laws had
been condemned, you would not have written this, and, if you
are condemned, no other will write anything similar.
5. Of the epicheiremaš four, five, and even six parts are
made by some rhetoricians; Cicero || makes at most five; the
proposition, or major, with its reason; the assumption, or
minor, with its proof; and, as the fifth, the conclusion; but
as the major has sometimes no need of a reason, and the
minor no need of proof, and as there is sometimes, too, no
need of a conclusion, he thinks that the epicheirema may at
times consist of only four, or three, or even two parts. 6. To
* See c. 10, sect. 2.
+ C. 29.
f In Androtionem, p. Reisk. 595.
§ Quintilian, after noticing several opinions about the parts of an
epicheirema, at last adopts that of Aristotle, that there are three
necessary parts of it, the proposition, the assumption, and the con-
clusion. That which is the subject of inquiry is comprehended in the
proposition, which logicians call the major ; that by which it is proved
is called the assumption or minor ; and that which is collected from
the major and minor is the conclusion or inference. Turnebus. Cicero
makes five parts by attaching a reason to the major and a proof to the
minor. -
| De Inv. i., 37; Script. ad Herenn. ii. 18.
396 QUINTILIAN. [B.V.
me, as well as to the greater number of authors, there appears
to be not more than three ; for such is the nature of reasoning,
that there must be something about which there is a question,
and something by which it is to be proved ; and a third may
be added as resulting from the agreement of the two former.
Thus there will be first the proposition, or major ; Secondly,
the assumption, or minor; and thirdly, the conclusion; for the
reason of the first part and the proof of the second may be in-
cluded in those parts to which they are attached. 7. Let us take,
accordingly, an example of the five parts from Cicero:* Those
things are better managed which are regulated by some plan
than those which are conducted without any fiaſed design;
“this,” says Cicero, “they call the first part, and think that
it ought to be established with various reasons and the most
copious eloquence possible.” For myself, I consider the whole
proposition with its reasons as but one part; else, if the rea-
soning be called a part, and that reasoning be various, there
must necessarily be various parts. 8. He then gives the
assumption, or minor: But of all things nothing is managed
better than the whole world; “and,” he adds, “of this assump-
tion they introduce its proof as a fourth part;” but I say the
same concerning the assumption as concerning the proposition.
9. “In the fifth place,” he continues, “they place the conclu-
Sion, which either infers that only which necessarily results
from all the preceding parts, as, Therefore the world is regu-
lated by some plan; or, after briefly bringing together the
proposition and assumption, adds what is collected from them,
as, But if those things are better managed which are regulated
by a plan than those which are conducted without a plan, and
if of all things nothing is managed better than the whole world,
it follows therefore that the world is regulated by a plan.” A
third part I accordingly admit.
10. In the three parts, however, which I have made, there
is not always the same form. There is ONE FORM in which
the same is expressed in the conclusion as in the major propo-
sition: The soul is immortal, for whatever has its motion from
itself, is immortal: But the soul has its motion from itself:
Therefore the soul is immortal. This form prevails not only in
detached arguments, but throughout all causes, such at least
* 19e Inv. i. 34.
CH.XIV.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 397
as are simple, and in the various questions in causes.* 11. For
all causes and all questions have a first proposition ; as, You,
have committed sacrilege; and, It is not every one that has killed
a man that is guilty of murder: and attached to this a propo-
sition, a reason, (which, however, is more expanded in causes
and portions of causes than in detached arguments,) and,
lastly, a conclusion, in which they commonly show, either by a
full enumeration of particulars, or a short recapitulation, what
they have established. In this kind of epicheirema the pro-
position is doubtful, for it is about the proposition that the
question is. 12. In ANOTHER FORM the conclusion is not indeed
the same as the major proposition, but has the same force :
Death is nothing to us, for what is dissolved into its elements, is
without consciousness; and that which is without consciousness
ts nothing to us. In a THIRD FORM the proposition is not the
Same as the conclusion : All animated things are better than
things inanimate: But nothing is better than the world: The
world therefore is animated. What is here the conclusion
might be made the major proposition;t for the reasoning
might be stated thus: The world is animated, for all animated
things are better than things inanimate. 13. But this major
proposition is either an acknowledged truth as in the last
example, or requires proof, as, He who wishes to lead a happy
life, ought to become a philosopher; this is not universally
admitted; and the conclusion cannot be drawn unless the
premises be established. The minor proposition, too, is
Sometimes universally acknowledged, as, But all wish to live a
happy life, and sometimes requires to be proved, as, What is
dissolved into its elements is void of consciousness, for it is
uncertain whether the soul, when detached from the body, may
not be immortal, or exist at least for a certain time. I may
observe that what some call the assumption, or minor proposi-
tion, others call the reason.
14CBut the epicheirema differs in no respect from the
* In quaestionibus.] Quaestiones are to be distinguished from the
causa wniversa ; see iii. 6, 9, 10. Spalding. -
f All editions have Hic potest videri de re contentio , but as no good
sense can be extracted from the words, Spalding proposes to read Haec
potest etiam videri intentio, i.e. propositio. I have adopted this con-
jecture in my translation. e
f He has made this example bipartite instead of tripartite, as
Spalding observes.
398 QUINTILIAN. [B.V.
syllogism, except that the syllogism has a greater number of
forms, and infers truth from truth; while the epicheirema is
generally employed about probabilities; for if it were always
possible to prove what is disputed by what is acknowledged,
there would scarcely be any work for the Orator in the matter;
since what need would there be of superior ability to reason
thus: 15. The property belongs to me, for I am the only son
of the deceased, or, I am the sole heir, since by the laws respect-
ing property the property of a testator is given to the heir
according to the purport of the will ; and to me therefore the
property belongs. 16. But when the reason given becomes
itself a matter of dispute, we must render that certain by
which we seek to prove what is uncertain; for instance, if it
be said by the adversary, You are not his son, or, You are not
legitimate, or, You are not the only 80m, or, again, You are not
the heir, or, The will is not valid, or, You are not capable of
inheriting, or, You have co-heirs, we must establish a just
ground on which the property ought to be adjudged to us.
17. But when a long chain of reasoning intervenes, a recapi-
tulatory conclusion is requisite. In other cases, a proposition
and reason may often be sufficient:* The laws are silent amidst
arms, and do not require their sanction to be waited for, when
he who would wait for it must suffer an unjust death before a .
just penalty could be ea’acted. Hence it has been observed
that the firm of enthymeme which rests upon consequents is
similar to a reason. Sometimes, again, a single proposition is
judiciously given alone, without any reason, as that which we
just now cited, The laws are silent amidst arms. 18. We
may also commence with the reason, and then draw a conclu-
sion, as, in the same speech, But if the twelve tables allow a
thief to be killed with impunity wºnder any circumstances, and
a thief in the day if he défend himself with a weapon, who can
suppose that in whatever case a man has been killed, he who
killed him must suffer punishment # Cicero has also made
some variation in this form, and put the reason in the third
place: When he sees that the sword is sometimes put into our
hands by the laws themselves. 19. The following sentence,
again, takes the form of that which precedes: But how can
death be unjustly inflicted on a lier-in-wait and a robber 3 This
is the proposition. What is the object of our escorts, of our
* Cic. Pro Mil. c. 4.
CH.XIV.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR, 399
weapons 3 This is the reason. Which certainly we should not
be allowed to have, if we were under no circumstances to make
w86 of them. This is a conclusion from the proposition and
the reason.
20. This mode of argument is refuted in three ways; that
is, it is attacked in each of its parts; for the proposition may
be combated, or the assumption, or the conclusion, or some-
times all the three. For example, the proposition that He is
justly killed who lies in wait to kill, may be combated, for the
first question in the defence of Milo is, Whether he should be
allowed to live who confesses that a man has been killed by his
hand *, 21. The assumption, or minor proposition, may be
assailed by all the arts which I have mentioned in the chapter
On refutation.* As to the reason, we may observe that it is
Sometimes true when the proposition to which it is attached
is false; and that a false reason is sometimes attached to a
true proposition. Virtue is a good, is a true proposition; but
if any one add as a reason, because it makes men rich, a false
reason is given for a true proposition. 22. As to the conclu-
sion, it is either denied to be just when it expresses something
different from what can be fairly deduced from the premises,
or is alleged to have nothing to do with the question: A lier-
in-wait is justly put to death, for he who prepared himself to
offer violence as an enemy, ought also to be repelled as an
enemy; Clodius, therefore, as an enemy, was justly put to
death : here the conclusion is false, for it has not yet been
proved that Clodius was a lier-in-wait. 23. On the other hand,
it would be a just conclusion to say, A lier-in-wait, therefore, as
an enemy, was justly put to death, but it would be nothing to
the purpose; for it had not previously been proved that
Clodius was a lier-in-wait. But though the proposition and
reason may be true, and the conclusion false, yet if the
proposition and reason are false, the conclusion cannot be
true. *
24. The enthymeme is called by some an Oratorical syllogism,
by others a part of a syllogism, because the syllogism has
always its regular proposition and conclusion, and establishes
by means of all its parts that which it has proposed ; while
the enthymeme is satisfied if merely what is stated in it be
understood. 25. A syllogism is of this form : Virtue is the only
* C. 13 of this book.
400 QUINTILIAN. [B.V.
good, for that only is good of which none can make an ill use:
But none can make an ill use of virtue: Therefore virtue is
the only good: the enthy meme will consist only of the conse-
quents, Virtue is a good, because none can make an ill use of
it. A negative syllogism will be of this nature: Money is not
a good, for that is not a good of which any one can make a bad
use : But any one can make a bad use of money : Therefore
money is not a good: here the enthymeme will consist of the
opposites:* Is money a good, when any one can make a bad
use of it # 26. The following sentence has the syllogistic
form : If money, which consists of coined silver, comes under
the general term silver, he that bequeathed all his silver
bequeathed also his money consisting in coined silver: But he
did bequeath all his silver: Therefore he bequeathed also his
money consisting of silver; but for an Orator it is sufficient to
Say, When he bequeathed all his silver, he bequeathed also his
money which consists of silver.
27. I think that I have now gone through the mysteries#
of those who deliver precepts on rhetoric. But judgment
must be exercised in applying such directions as I have given.
For though I do not think it unlawful to use syllogisms occa-
sionally in a speech, yet I should by no means like it to con-
sist wholly of syllogisms, or to be crowded with a mass of
epicheiremata and enthymemes, for it would then resemble the
dialogues and disputations of logicians, rather than oratorical
pleading ; and the two differ widely from one another.
28. Your men of learning, who are seeking for truth amongst
men of learning, examine every point with the utmost minute-
ness and scrupulosity, with the view of bringing it to clearness
and certainty, claiming to themselves the offices of discovering
and judging what is right, of which they call the one roºrixá,
“the art of finding arguments,” and the other agirix}, “the
power of judging of their soundness;” 29. but we orators
must compose our speeches to Suit the judgment of others,
and must frequently speak before people altogether uneducated,
or at least ignorant of any other literature than what we teach
them, and unless we allure them by gratification, attract them
force, and occasionally excite their feelings, we shall never
* An bonum est pecunia, &c.] Spalding dislikes the abrupt interro-
gation, and would read negatively, now bonwm, est, &c.
f Sacra.] See c. 13, sect. 60.
CH. XIV.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 401
impress upon them what is just and true. 30. Oratory should
be rich and brilliant; but it will have neither of those quali-
ties, if it be pieced out of regular and frequent syllogisms,
expressed almost always in the same form, for it will then incur
contempt from appearing mean, and aversion from looking
servile; if it is copious, it will excité Satiety; if it attempts to be
swelling, it will meet disdaimy 31. Let it hold its course,
therefore, not along foot-paths, but through open fields; let it
not be like subterranean springs confined in narrow channels,
but flow like broad rivers through whole valleys, forcing a way
wherever it does not find one. For what is a greater misery
to speakers than to be slaves to certain rules, like children
imitating copies set them, and, as the Greeks proverbially
express it, taking constant care of the coat which their mother
has given them * 32. Must there always be proposition and
conclusion, º and opposites? Is the speaker
not to animate his reasoning, to amplify it, to vary and diver-
Sify it with a thousand figures, making his language appear to
grow and spring forth naturally, and not to be manufactured,
looking suspicious from its art,t and showing everywhere the
fashioning of the master? What true orator has ever spoken
in such a way? In Demosthenes himself are not the traces to
be found of such regularity and art very few Yet the Greeks
of our own day (the only respect in which they act less judi.
ciously than ourselves) bind their thoughts as it were in chains,
connecting them in an inexplicable series, proving what is
undisputed, confirming what is admitted, and calling them-
selves, in these points, imitators of the ancients; but if they
are asked whom they imitate, they will never give an answer.
33. Of figures I shall speak in another place. At present,
it seems necessary only to add, that I do not agree with those
who think that arguments are always to be expressed in a
pure, lucid, and precise style, but neither copious nor ornate.
That they should be precise and perspicuous indeed, I admit,
and, on matters of little consequence, set forth in plain
* This proverb is given by Plutarch in his first Oration de Alexandri
Fortuné, vol. ii. p. 330 B. -
* Arte Suspecta.] Many copies have suscepta, which will also make
good sense. The reader must be careful, as Spalding remarks, not to
take either of them in the ablative case.
: Book ix. 1, 2, 3.
D D
402 QUINTILIAN. [B. v.
language, and in terms as appropriate and familiar as possible;
but, if the subject be of a higher nature, I think that no orna-
ment should be withheld from them, provided that it causes
no obscurity. 34. For a metaphor often throws a flood of
light on a subject ; so much so, that even lawyers, whose solici-
tude about the propriety of words is extreme, venture to call
litus, “the sea-shore,” the part where the wave eludit,
“Sports.” 35. The more rugged a subject is, too, by nature,
the more we must recommend it by charms of expression;
argument is less suspected when it is disguised, and to please
the hearer contributes greatly to convince him. Otherwise we
must pronounce Cicero deserving of censure, for using, in the
heat of his argumentation, the metaphorical expressions, The
laws are silent amid arms, and, The sword is sometimes pre-
sented to us by the laws themselves. But moderation must
be observed in the use of such figures, that, while they are an
embellishment to a subject, they may never be an incumbrance
to lt.
* See Cic. Topic. c. 7. “Aquillius,
Sion about shores, all of which you maintain to be public, used to
define a shore gua fluctus eluderet, where the wave sported.” See also
Cicero de Nat. Deor. ii. 39. Elwdere is to be taken intransitively in the
sense of eacwmdare.
when there was any discus-
EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 403
BOOK WI.
INTEROE)'UCTION.
Quintilian laments that his son, whose improvement, in conjunction with
that of the sons of Marcellus and Caesar, he had had in view in
the composition of this work, had been carried off by death, § 1,
2. He had previously lost, during the composition of another
work, a younger son, as well as his wife, 3–6. Abilities of which
his children gave indications, 7–9. His grief; he intreats
indulgence if, in consequence of it, he pursues his work with less
spirit, 10–16.
1. HAVING entered upon this undertaking, Marcellus Victor,
principally at your request,” but with a desire, at the same
time, that some profit to well-disposed youth might arise
from my labours, I have applied to it recently with great dili-
gence, from the necessity, almost, of the office conferred
upon me, yet with a regard also to my own gratification,
thinking that I should leave this work to my son, whose
remarkable ability deserved even the most anxious attention
of a father, as the best portion of his inheritance, so that if
the fates should cut me off before him, as would have been
but just and desirable, he might still have his father's pre-
cepts to guide him. 2. But while I was pursuing my design
day and night, and hastening the completion of it, through
fear of being prevented by death, fortune sent so sudden an
affliction upon me, that the result of my industry interests no
one less than myself, for I have lost by a second severe
bereavement that son, of whom I had conceived the highest
expectations; and in whom I reposed my only hopes for the
Solace of my age. 3. What shall I now do 2 Or what further
use can I suppose that there is for me upon the earth, when
the gods thus animadvert upon me? When I had just begun
to write the book which I have published, On the Causes of
the Corruption of Eloquence,$ it happened that I was struck
* See the Preface to the work, sect. 6.
+ See the Introduction to b. iv. sect. 2.
# He means the loss of his son, at the age of ten years. He had
previously lost another at the age of five.
§ This work is lost. The Dialogus de Oratoribus, sive de Causis
Corruptſe Bloquentiae is, as is generally supposed, the composition of
Tacitus. }
D D 2
404 QUINTILIAN. [B.VI.
with a similar blow. It would have been best for me, there-
fore, to have thrown that inauspicious work, and whatever ill-
omened learning there is in me, into the flames of that pre-
mature funeral pile which was to consume what I loved, and
not to have wearied my unnatural prolongation of life with
new and additional anxieties. 4. What parent, of right feel-
ings at least, would pardon me, if I could pursue my studies
with my accustomed diligence, and would not hate my insen-
sibility, if I had any other use for my voice than to accuse the
gods for causing me to survive all my children, and to testify
that divine providence pays no regard to terrestrial affairs?”
If such neglect of the gods is not visible in my own person,
to whom nothing can be objected but that I am still alive, it
is certainly manifest in the fate of those whom cruel death
has condemned to perish so undeservedly, their mother having
been previously snatched from me, who, after giving birth to
a second son, before she had completed her nineteenth year,
died, though cut off prematurely, a happyt death. 5. By that
one calamity I was so deeply afflicted, that no good fortune
could ever afterwards render me completely happy; for, ex-
hibiting every virtue that can grace a woman, she not only
caused incurable grief to her husband, but, being of so girlish
an age, especially when compared with my own, her loss
might be counted even as that of a daughter. 6. I consoled
myself, however, with my surviving children; and she, know-
ing, what was contrary to the order of nature, though she her-
self desired it, that I should be left alive, escaped the greatest
of pangs in her untimely death.j: My younger son dying,
first of the two, when he had just passed his fifth year, took
from me, as it were, the sight of one of my eyes. 7. I am not
Ostentatious of my misfortunes, nor desirous to exaggerate the
causes which I have for tears; on the contrary, I wish that I
* A common mistake among the ancients, who, when misfortune
fell upon the good, said that there was no divine providence, but,
when the bad suffered, declared that there was ; as may be seen, for
example, in several passages of Livy. Quintilian, in a calm state of
mind, had other thoughts of the divine Superintendence ; see v. 12, 19.
Stat. Sylv. Carm. v. Spalding.
+ Happy in not having seen the deaths of her children.
i Praecipiti vić.] This seems to be but a languid expression. May
we read praecipiti vità, taking praeceps vita in the sense of praecipitata,
&mmature abrupta ? Spalding.
INTROD.] EDUCATION OF, AN ORATOR. 405
had some mode of lessening them; but how can I forbear to
contemplate what beauty he showed in his countenance, what
Sweetness in his expressions, what nascent fire in his under-
standing, and what substantial tokens he gave, (such as I
know are scarcely credible in one so young,) not only of calm
but of deep thought? Such a child, even if he had been the
Son of a stranger, would have won my love. 8. It was the
will, too, of insidious fortune, with a view to torture me the more
severely, that he should show more affection for me than for
any one else, that he should prefer me to his nurses, to his
grandmother who was educating him, and to all such as gain
the love of children of that age. I, therefore, feel indebted to
that grief which I experienced a few months before for the
loss of his excellent mother, whose character is beyond all
praise, for I have less reason to mourn on my own, than to
rejoice on her account.
9. I then rested for my only hope and pleasure on my younger
son, my little Quintilian, and he might have sufficed to console
me, for he did not put forth merely flowers, like the other, but,
having entered his tenth year, certain and well-formed fruits.
10. I swear by my own sufferings, by the sorrowful testimony
of my feelings, by his own shade, the deity that my grief
worships, that I discerned in him such excellences of mind, (not
in receiving instruction only, for which, in a long course of
experience, I have seen no child more remarkable, or in
steady application, requiring, even at that age, as his teachers
know, no compulsion, but in indications of honourable, pious.
humane, and generous feelings,) that the dread of such a thun
der-stroke might have been felt even from that cause, as it has
been generally observed, that precocious maturity is most
liable to early death, and that there reigns some malignant
influence to destroy our fairest hopes, in order that our enjoy-
ments may not be exalted beyond what is appointed to man.
11. He had also every adventitious advantage, agreeableness
and clearness of voice, sweetness of tone, and a peculiar
facility in sounding every letter in either language, as if he
had been born to speak that only. But these were still only
promising appearances; he had greater qualities, fortitude,
resolution, and strength to resist pain and fear; for with what
courage, with what admiration on the part of his physicians,
did he endure an illness of eight months How did he con-
406 QUINTILIAN. [B. VI.
sole me at the last ! How, when he was losing his senses,
and unable to recognize me, did he fix his thoughts in de-
lirium only on learning 12. O disappointment of my hopes
Did I endure, my son, to contemplate your eyes sinking in
death, and your breath taking its flight? Could I, after em-
bracing your cold and lifeless body, and receiving your last
breath, breathe again the common air 2 Justly do I deserve
the affliction which I endure, and the thoughts which affect
me! 13. Have I, your parent, lost you, when just raised, by
being adopted by a man” of consular dignity, to the hopes of
enjoying all the honours of your father;t you, who were des-
tined to be son-in-law to the praetor, your maternal uncle; you
who, in the opinion of all, were a candidate for the highest
distinctions of Attic eloquence, surviving myself only to grieve?
May my sufferings at least, if not my obstinate clinging to life,
make atonement to you during the rest of my existence We
in vain impute all our ills to the injustice of fortune, for no
man grieves long but through his own fault.j: 14. But I still
live, and some occupation for life must be sought, and I must
put faith in the learned, who have pronounced letters the only
consolation in adversity.
If the present violence of my grief, however, should in time
subside, so that some other thought may be admitted among
so many sorrowful reflections, I shall not unreasonably crave
pardon for the delay in my work; for who can wonder that
my studies were interrupted, when it must rather appear won-
derful that they were not relinquished entirely? 15. Should
anything, then, in this part of my work, appear less finished than
that which I commenced when less oppressed with affliction,
let it be excused on account of the rigorousness of fortune,
who, if she has not extinguished the moderate power of mind
which I previously possessed, has at least succeeded in weak-
ening it. But let me, on this very account, rouse myself to
action with the greater spirit, since, though it is difficult for
me to bear her oppression, it is easy for me to despise it, for
* Who he was, is unknown.
f Father by adoption.
†: A Stoic saying; comp. v. 12, 19; 6, 3. The tenet, however, was
not peculiar to the Stoic sect, but common to all the ancients, and was
supported by the example of the Epicurean Atticus. See Plin. H. N.
ii. 7. Spalding.
CH. I.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 407
she has left nothing further to inflict upon me, and has educed
for me, out of my calamities, a security which, though un-
happy, is certainly stable. 16. It is right to look favourably
on my efforts, too, for this reason, that I persevere for no in-
terest of my own, but that all my pains are devoted to the ser-
vice of others, if what I write, indeed, be of any service. My
work, like the acquisitions of my fortune, I, unhappy that I am,
shall not leave to those for whom I designed it.
CHAPTER I.
Peroration of a speech; the objects of it; some think that it should
consist wholly of recapitulation, § 1–8. Appeals to the feelings
may be made by the accuser and the advocate alike, 9. What
the exordium and the peroration have in common, and in what
respects they differ, 10–14. The accuser excites the feelings
either by showing the heinousness of the charge which he makes,
or the pitiable condition of the party for whom he seeks redress,
15—20. What qualities excite feeling in favour of an accused
person, 21, 22. Solicitations for pity may have great effect, but
should not be long, 23–28. Modes of exciting pity, 29–36.
How persons who are introduced to move pity at the conclusion
of a speech, should behave themselves, 37–43. No orator must
attempt to draw tears from the judges unless he be a man of
great ability, 44, 45. It is the part of the peroration to dispel
compassionate emotions, as well as to excite them, 46–49. Pero-
rations sometimes of a very mild character, 50. Appeals to the
feelings may be made in other parts of a speech as well as in the
peroration, 51—55.
1. WHAT was to follow,” was the peroration, which some
have termed the completion, and others the conclusion. There
are two species of it, the one comprising the substance of the
speech, and the other adapted to excite the feelings.
The repetition and summing-up of heads, which is called
by the Greeks 'oyoºspoCAGiogic, and by some of the Latins
enumeration, is intended both to refresh the memory of the
judge, to set the whole cause at once before his view, and to
enforce such arguments in a body as had produced an in-
sufficient effect in detail. 2. In this part of our speech,
* When the progress of the work was interrupted by the death of
his son.
408 QUINTILIAN. [B. VI.
what we repeat ought to be repeated as briefly as possible,
and we must, as is intimated by the Greek term, run over
only the principal heads; for, if we dwell upon them, the
result will be, not a recapitulation, but a sort of second
speech. What we may think necessary to recapitulate, must
be put forward with some emphasis, enlivened by suitable
remarks, and varied with different figures, for mothing is more
offensive than mere straightforward repetition, as if the
speaker distrusted the judge's memory.” The figures which
we may employ are innumerable; and Cicero affords us an
excellent example in his pleading against Verres, 3. If your
father himself were your judge, what would he say when these
things were proved against you ? where he subjoins an
enumeration of particulars; and there is another instance, in
which the same orator, in the same speech, enumerates, on
invoking the gods, all the temples spoiled by Verres in his
praetorship. We may also sometimes affect to doubt whether
Something has not escaped us, and to wonder what our
opponents will reply to such or such a point, or what hope the
accuser can have when our case is so fully established. 4.
But what affords us the greatest gratification, is the opportunity
of drawing some argument from the speech of our adversary,
as when we say, He has omitted this point in the cause; or,
He made it his object to oppress us with odium ; or, He had
Tecourse to entreaty, and not without reason, when he knew so
and so. 5. But I must not go through such figures of speech,
severally, lest those which I may now notice should be thought
the only ones that can be used; since opportunities for vary-
ing our forms of speech spring from the nature of particular
causes, from the remarks of the adversary, and even from
fortuitous circumstances. Nor must we recapitulate only the
points of our own case, but call also upon our opponent to
reply to certain questions. 6. But this can only be done
when there is time for further speaking, and when we have
advanced what cannot be refuted ; for to challenge the adver-
Sary on facts which make strongly for him, is to be, not his
opponent, but his prompter.
7. This has been thought by most of the Attic orators, and
by almost all the philosophers, who have left anything written
on the art of oratory, the only legitimate kind of peroration;
* L. W. C. 52.
CH. I.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 409
a tenet which the Attic orators adopted, I suppose, for this
reason, that at Athens an Orator was prohibited even by an
officer of the court from attempting to excite the feelings. At
the philosophers I am less surprised, since with them all
excitement of the feelings is accounted vicious ; nor is it
consistent with morality, in their opinion, that the judge
should be thus diverted from truth, or becoming a good man
to use vicious means. Yet they will allow that to move the
feelings is justifiable,” if what is true, and just, and sub-
servient to the public good, cannot be established by any
other method. 8. It is admitted however among all orators
that a recapitulation may be made with advantage even in
other parts of a pleading, if the cause be complex and require
to be supported by numerous arguments; while nobody doubts,
on the other hand, that there are many short and simple
causes in which recapitulation is by no means necessary.
This part of the peroration is common alike both to the
prosecutor and the defendant.
9. Both of them also have recourse to the excitement of
the feelings; but the defendant more rarely, the prosecutor
more frequently and with greater earnestness; for the prose-
cutor has to rouse the judge, while the defendant's business is
to soothe him. But the prosecutor at times produces tears
from the pity which he expresses for the matter for which he
seeks redress; and the defendant sometimes inveighs with
great vehemence at the injustice of the calumny or conspiracy
of which he is the object.f It is therefore most convenient
to divide these duties, which are for the most part similarly
introduced, as I said,S in the exordium, but are in the pero-
ration more free and full. 10. A feeling of the judge in our
favour is sought but modestly at the commencement, when it
is sufficient that it be just admitted, and when the whole
speech is before us; but in the peroration we have to mark
with what sort of feeling the judge will proceed to consider
his sentence, as we have then nothing more to say, and no
place is left us for which we can reserve further arguments.
* Comp. v. 14, 29.
+ We must, as Spalding observes, read calumnice et conspirationis
with Rollin.
i: Those of exciting and soothing.
Ś He doubtless refers to iv. 1, 27, 28. Spalding.
4 10 QUINTILIAN. [B VI.
11. It is therefore common to each party to endeavour to
attract the favour of the judge towards himself, to withdraw it
from his adversary, to excite the feelings and to compose them ;
and this very brief admonition may be given to both parties,
that a pleader should bring the whole force of his cause before
his view, and, when he has noticed what, among its various
points, is likely, or may be made likely, to excite disapproba-
tion or favour, dislike or pity, should dwell on those par-
ticulars by which he himself, if he were judge, would be most
impressed. 12. But it is safer for me to consider the parts
of each separately.
What recommends the prosecutor to the judge, I have
already noticed * in the precepts which I have given for the
exordium. Some particulars, however, which it is sufficient
to intimate in the commencement, must be stated more fullyf
in the conclusion, especially if the cause be undertaken against
a violent, odious, or dangerous character, or if the condemna-
tion of the accused will be an honour to the judges, and his
acquittal a disgrace to them. 13. Thus Calvus; makes an
admirable remark in his speech against Vatinius, You know,
judges, that bribery has been committed. and all men know that
you know it. Cicero, too, in pleading against Verres, $ observes
that the disrepute which had fallen on the courts might be
effaced by the condemnation of Verres; and this is one of the
conciliatory modes of address to which I have before alluded.
If intimidation, too, is to be used, in order to produce a
similar effect, it has a more forcible position here than in the
exordium. What my opinion is on this point, I have already
stated in another book." 14. It is possible also to excite jeal-
ousy, hatred, or indignation, more freely in the peroration than
elsewhere; in regard to which feelings, the influence of the
accused contributes to excite jealousy, ill-reputation hatred, and
disrespect for the judge, (if the accused be contumacious, arro-
gant, or full of assurance,) indignation, the judge being often in-
fluenced, not only by an act or word, but by look, air, or manner.
* See IV. 1, 5–27.
$ Act. i. iń.
| Fear itself makes the judge unwilling to be unjust to the accuser.
• IV. 1, 20, 21.
CH.I.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 41 l
The accuser* of Cossutianus Capito was thought, when I was
young, to have made a very happy remark, in Greek, f indeed,
but to this effect, You are ashamed to fear even Casar. 15.
But the most effective way for the accuser to excite the feel-
ings of the judge, is to make that which he lays to the charge
of the accused appear the most atrocious act possible, or, if
the subject allow, the most deplorable. Atrocity is made to
appear from such considerations as these, What has been done,
by whom, against whom, with what feeling, at what time, in
what place, in what manner; all which have infinite ramifica-
tions. 16. We complain that somebody has been beaten; we
must first speak of the act; and then state whether the
sufferer was an old man, or a youth, or a magistrate, or a man
of high character, or one who has deserved well of his country;
also whether he was struck by some vile contemptible fellow ;
or, on the other hand, by some tyrannical person, or by some
one from whom he ought least of all to have received such
treatment; also whether he was struck, as it might be, on a
solemn festival, or when prosecutions for similar offences were
being rigorously conducted, or at a time when the government was
wnsettled, Or, as to place, in a theatre, in a temple, in a public as-
sembly, for under such circumstances the offence is aggravated;
17. also whether it can be proved that he was not struck by
mistake, or in a sudden fit of passion, or, if in a passion, with
great injustice, when, perhaps, he was taking the part of his
father, or had made some reply £ to the aggressor, or was
standing for office in opposition to him ; and whether the
aggressor would have proceeded to greater violence than he
actually committed. But the manner contributes most to the
heinousness of the act, if he struck the person violently, or
insultingly; as Demosthenes excites odium against Meidias
by alluding to the part of his body which was struck, and the
look and mien of the striker. 18. A man has been killed;
we must consider whether it was with a sword, or fire, or
* Who the accuser was we do not know. It appears from Tacitus,
Ann. xiii. 33, that Cossutianus Capito was condemned for extortion in
his province of Cilicia. See also Juv. viii. 92.
+ It had become customary to plead occasionally in Greek since the
time of Molo the tutor of Cicero: Val. Max. ii. 2, 3.
f Qudd respondisset.] See v. 7, 14; iii. 5, 15. The injustice, which
the aggressor committed, had not been borne by the young man in
silence, Compare Terent. Phorm. Prol. 19. Spalding.
412 QUINTILIAN. |B. VI,
poison ; with one wound or with several ; whether suddenly, or
whether he was made to languish in tortures; all which con-
siderations have great effect in this way.*
The accuser, also, often attempts to excite pity, as when he
bewails the sad fate of him whose cause he is pleading, or the
destitution of his children or parents. 19. He may also move
the judges by a representation of the future, showing what
will be the consequences to those who complain of violence
and injustice, unless their cause be avenged; that they must
flee from their country, sacrifice their property, or endure
everything that their enemies may be disposed to inflict on thew.
20. But it is more frequently the part of the accuser to guard
the feelings of the judge against that pity which the accused
would seek to excite, and to urge him to give judgment with
boldness. In doing so, he may also anticipate what he thinks
his opponent likely to say or do; for this course makes the
judges more cautious in adhering to the Sacredness of their
oath, and diminishes the influence of those who have to reply,
since what has been once stated by the accuser, will, if urged
in favour of the accused, be no longer new ; thus Servius
Sulpicius, in pleading against Aufidia,t admonishes the judges
that the danger to the witnesses from those persons ; was not to
be brought against him. It is also previously intimated by
AEschines $ what sort of defence Demosthenes was likely to
use. Judges may sometimes be instructed, too, as to answers
which they should make to those who may solicit them in
favour of the defendant; an instruction which is a species of
recapitulation.
21. As to a party on trial, his dignity, or manly pursuits, or
wounds received in war, or mobility of birth, or the services of his
ancestors, may be subjects of recommendation to him, This
kind of considerations Cicero and Asinius Pollio have urged
even emulously, Cicero || for Scaurus the father, and Pollio for
Scaurus the son. 22. The cause, also, which has brought him
* That is, in heightening the heinousness of the charge. See sect. 15.
+ See iv. 2, 106.
i Ab ipsis.] Who they were, we cannot, from the few fragments
which we possess of the speech, form any conjecture. Spalding.
§ See Reisk. Orat. iii. 597, 608 ; Steph. lxxxiii. 28–84, 23; 6 11–
623; St. lxxxiv. 33–86, 30. See also Quint. iii. 6, 3; vii. 1, 2.
Spalding.
| See iv. 1, 69. Wal. Max, viii. 1, 10
CH.I.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 413
into danger, may be pleaded in his favour, if he appear,
for example, to have incurred enmity for some honourable
act, and his goodness, humanity, pity, may especially be
eulogized; for a person seems justly to solicité from the
judge that which he himself has shown to others. In this
part of a speech,+ too, allusions may be made to the public
good, to the honour of the judges, to precedent, to regard for pos-
terity. 23. But that which produces the most powerful im-
pression is pity, which not only forces the judge to change his
opinions, but to manifest the feelings in his breast even by
tears. Pity will be excited by dwelling either on that which
the accused has suffered, or on that which he is actually
suffering, or on that which awaits him if he be condemned;
representations which have double force, when we show from
what condition he has fallen, and into what condition he is in
danger of falling. 24. To these considerations age and sex may
add weight, as well as objects of affection, I mean children,
parents, and other relatives; and all these matters may be
treated in various ways. Sometimes also the advocate num-
bers himself among his client's connexions, as Cicero in his
speech for Milo :: O unhappy that I am 1 O unfortunate that
thou art 1 Could you, Milo, by means of those who are this
day your judges, recall me into my country, and cannot I, by
means of the same judges, retain you in yours ? 25. This is a very
good resource, if, as was then the case, entreaty is unsuited to
the party who is accused ; for who would endure to hear Milo
supplicating for his life, when he acknowledged that he had
killed a nobleman because he deserved to be killed ? Cicero,
therefore, sought to gain Miloš the favour of the judges for
his magnanimity, and took upon himself the part of suppliant
for him. ..
In this part of a speech prosopopeia are extremely effective,
that is, fictitious addresses delivered in another person’s
character, such as are suitable either to a prosecutor or
* The text has Justè enim, tune petere, but Spalding justly observes
that twnc is useless, and proposes to read Justissimé enim petéré.
+ See iv. 1, 7. He means that such allusions may be made in the
peroration as well as in the exordium. -
it C. 37. -
§ I read illi, instead of ille, with Spalding.
414 QUINTILIAN. . [B. VI.
defendant.* Even mute objects + may touch the feelings,
either when we speak to them ourselves, or represent them as
speaking. 26. But the feelings are very strongly moved by
the personification of characters; for the judge seems not to
be listening to an orator lamenting the sufferings of others,
but to hear with his own ears the expressions and tones of the
unfortunate suppliants themselves, whose presence, even with-
out speech, would be sufficient to call forth tears; and as
their pleadings would excite greater pity if they themselves
uttered them, so they are in some degree more effective when
they are spoken apparently by their own mouth in a personi-
fication ; as with actors on the stage, the same voice and the
same pronunciation have greater power to excite the feelings
when accompanied with a mask representing the character.
27. Cicero, accordingly, though he puts no entreaties into the
mouth of Milo, but rather commends him to favour for his
firmness of mind, has yet attributed to him words and lamen-
tations not unworthy of a man of spirit; O labours, undertaken
by me in vain l O deceitful hopes / O thoughts, cherished by me
to no purpose /
Yet our supplications for pity should not be long; as it is
observed, not without reason, that nothing dries sooner than
tears. 28. For, since time lessens even matural sorrows, the
representation of sorrow, which we produce in a speech, must
lose its effect still sooner; and, if we are prolix in it, the
hearer, wearied with tears, will recover his tranquillity, and
return from the emotion which had surprised him to the exer-
cise of his reason. 29. Let us not allow the impressions that
we make, therefore, to cool, but, when we have raised the
feelings of our audience to the utmost, let us quit the subject,
and not expect that any person will long bewail the misfortunes
* Quales litigatorem docent vel patronwm. All commentators have
been dissatisfied with these words. Spalding very properly asks,
“What kinds of prosopopeiae are suitable to a patronus 3 Surely all
kinds, if he be but a skilful pleader.” Gedoyn renders the words, tele
qu'ils conviennent à l'avocat ow a sa partie, taking litigator in the sense
of “client.” I have thought it better to understand it in that of
“accuser” or “prosecutor.” Rollin proposes to substitute for it litis
actorem, in that sense, but Burmann disapproves.
+ Muta, tamen res.] In place of tamen some manuscripts have
tamtºwn.
CH.I.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATO1& 4 15
of another. Not only in other parts of our speech, accordingly,
but most of all in this part, our eloquence ought gradually to
rise; for whatever does not add to that which has been said,
seems even to take away from it, and the feeling which begins
to subside soon passes away.
30. We may excite tears, however, rot only by words, but
by acts; and hence it becomeșa practice to exhibit persons on
their trial in a squalid and pitiful garb, accompanied with their
children and parents; hence, too, we see blood-stained swords
produced by accusers, with fractured bones extracted from
wounds, and garments spotted with blood; we behold wounds
unbound, and scourged backs exposed to view. 31. The effect
of such exhibitions is generally very strong, so that they fix
the attention of the spectators on the act as if it were com-
mitted before their eyes. The blood-stained toga of Julius
Caesar, when exhibited in the forum, excited the populace of
Rome almost to madness. It was known that he was killed;
his body was even stretched on the bier; yet his robe, drenched
in blood, excited such a vivid idea of the crime, that Caesar
seemed not to have been assassinated, but to be subjected to
assassination at that very moment. 32. But I would not for
that reason approve of a device of which I have read, and which
I have myself seen adopted, a representation, displayed in a
painting or on a curtain, of the act at the atrocity of which the
judge was to be shocked. For how conscious must a pleader
be of his inefficiency, who thinks that a dumb picture will
speak better for him than his own words 2 33. But a humble
garb, and wretched appearance, on the part as well of the
accused as of his relatives, has, I know, been of much effect;
aud I am aware that entreaties have contributed greatly to save
accused persons from death. To implore mercy of the judges,
therefore, by the defendant's dearest objects of affection, (that
is to say, if he has children, wife, or parents,) will be of great
advantage, as well as to invoke the gods, since such invocation
seems to proceed from a clear conscience. 34. To fall pros-
trate, also, and embrace the knees of the judge, may be
allowable at times, unless the character of the accused, and his
past life and station, dissuade him from such humiliation; for
there are some deeds that ought to be defended with the same
boldness with which they were committed. But regard is to
#16 QUINTILIAN. [B.IV.
be had to the defendant's dignity, with such caution that an
offensive confidence may not appear in him.
35. Among all arguments for a client, the most potent, In
former times, was that by means of which Cicero seems chiefly
to have saved Lucius Muraena from the eminent men who
were his accusers, when he persuaded them that nothing was
more advantageous for the state of things at that period than
that Muraena should enter on his consulship the day before the
Kalends of January.” But this kind of argument is wholly
get aside in our days, as everything depends on the care and
protection of our sovereign, and cannot be endangered by the
issue of any single cause.
36. I have spoken of prosecutors and defendants, because
It is on their trials that the pathetic is chiefly employed. But
private causest also admit both kinds of perorations, that
which consists in a recapitulation of proofs, and that which
depends on the excitement of the feelings, the latter having
place whenever the accused party is in danger either as to
station or as to character; for to attempt such tragic pleadings
in trifling causes would be like trying to adjust the mask and
buskins of Hercules on an infant.
37. Nor is it improper for me to intimate, that much of the
success of a peroration depends, in my opinion, on the manner
in which the defendant, who is presented before the judge,
accommodates his demeanour to that of him who pleads in his
favour ; for ignorance, rusticity, stiffness, and vulgarity in a
client sometimes damp a pleader's efforts; and against such
untowardness he should take diligent precaution. 38. I have
seen the behaviour of clients quite at variance with the
language of their advocate, showing no concern in their coun-
tenance, laughing without reason, and, by some act or look,
making even others laugh, especially when anything was
delivered at all theatrically. 39. On one occasion, an advo-
cate led over a girl, who was said to be the sister of the
adverse party, (for it was about that point that the controversy
* Cicero pro Flacc. c. 39, says that it was by this argument that he
saved Muraena. Quintilian, says Spalding, seems to intimate that that
consideration had more effect on the judges than Cicero's eloquence.
ºf In private causes there was properly only petitor and unde petitwr.
In public causes, prosecutor and defendant. Spalding.
CH. I.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 4.17
was,) to the opposite benches,” as if intending to leave her in
the arms of her brother; but the brother, previously instructed
by me, had gone off; and the advocate, although an eloquent
man at other times, was struck dumb by his unexpected dis-
appearance, and, with his ardour cooled, took his little girl
back again. 40. Another advocate, pleading for a woman who
was on her trial, thought it would have a great effect to exhibit
the likeness of her deceased husband; but the image excited
little else but laughter; for the persons whose business it was
to produce it, being ignorant what a peroration meant, dis-
played it to view whenever the advocate looked towards them,
and, when it was brought still more into sight at the conclusion,
it destroyed the effect of all his previous eloquence by its ugli-
ness, being a mere cast from an old man's dead body.t 41. It
is well known, too, what happened to Glycon, surnamed
Spiridion: A little boy, whom he brought into court, and
asked Why he was weeping, replied, “That he had had his ears
pulled by his tutor.”$ But nothing is better adapted to show
the dangers attendant on perorations, than the story of Cicero
about the Cepasii. 42. Yet all such mishaps are easily reme-
died by those who can alter the fashion of their speech; but
those who cannot vary from what they have composed, are
either struck dumb at such occurrences, or, as is frequently
the case, say what is not true; for hence are such imperti-
nences as these : He is raising his supplicating hands towards
your knees, or, He is locked, unhappy man, in the embraces of
his children, or, See, he recalls my attention, &c.; though the
client does no single thing of all that his advocate attributes
to him. 43. These absurdities come from the schools, in
which we give play to our imagination freely and with impu-
* The defendant was on the right hand seats; the accuser on the
left. The advocate, therefore, transferred the girl from his own seat
to that of his adversary, with a view to produce a moving scene.
T'wrnebw8.
+ That such casts were taken among the ancients, appears, as Gesner
remarks, from what Pliny says of Lysistratus, H. N. xxxv. 12.
†: A Greek rhetorician, mentioned several times with respect by
Seneca the father; for instance, p. 151, ed. Bip. Spalding.
§ Nicholas Faber, on the passage of Seneca just quoted, supposes
that the boy had really been beaten, in order that he might appear in
the court in tears, but that it was intended he should be silent.
| See iv. 2, 19.
E E
4.18 QUINTILIAN. [B. VI.
nity, because whatever we wish is supposed to be done; but
reality does not allow of such suppositions, and Cassius Severus
made a most happy retort to a young orator who said, “Why
look you so sternly on me, Severus’’ “I did not, I assure
you,” replied Cassius, “but you had written those words, I
Suppose, in your notes, and So here is a look for you,” when he
threw on him as terrible a glance as he could possibly assume.
44. The student ought above all things to be admonished,
also, that an orator should not attempt to excite tears, unless
he be endowed with extraordinary genius; for as the effect on
the feelings, if he succeeds, is extremely powerful, so, if he
is unsuccessful, the result is vapidity; and a middling pleader
had better leave the pathos to the quiet meditations of the
judges; 45. for the look, tone, and even the very face, of a de-
fendant called to stand before the judges, are a laughing-stock
to such persons as they do not move. Let a pleader, therefore,
in such a case, carefully measure and contemplate his strength,
and consider how difficult a task he will have to undertake. In
the result there will be no medium; he will either provoke
tears or laughter.
46. But the business of a peroration is not only to excite
feelings of pity, but also to deaden them, either by a set
speech, which may recall the judges, when shaken by com-
passion, to considerations of justice, or by Some jocose remark,
as, Give the child a cake, that he may leave off crying ; or, as
a pleader said to his corpulent client, whose opponent, a mere
child, had been carried round among the judges by his advo-
cate, What shall I do 3 I cannot carry you. 47. But such
pleasantries must have nothing of buffoonery; and I cannot
praise the orator,” though he was among the most eminent of
his time, who, when Some children were brought in at the pero-
ration by the opposite party, threw some playthingst among
them, for which they began to Scramble; for the children's
insensibility to ill that threatened them might of itself excite
compassion. 48. Nor can I commend him, who, when a blood-
stained sword was produced by his adversary, which he offered
as a proof that a man had been killed, suddenly took flight, as
* Who he was, I find nothing to assist me in conjecturing. The
story, I believe, is nowhere else told.
f Talos.] Bones from the pastern of cloven-footed animals, with
which boys were accustomed to play. Twrmebus.
CH.I.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 419
if terrified, from his seat, and looking out from the crowd,
with his head half covered with his robe, asked whether the
man with the sword was yet gone; for he raised a laugh,
indeed, but made himself at the same time ridiculous. 49. The
effect of such acting is to be dispelled by the calm power of elo-
quence; and Cicero gives us excellent examples, who, in his
oration for Rabirius, attacks with great force the production of
the likeness of Saturninus,” and, in his speech for Varenus,t
rallies with much wit the young man whose wound was unbound
from time to time during the trial.
50. There are also perorations of a milder sort, in which
we seek to pacify an adversary, if his character, for instance,
be such that respect is due to him, or in which we give him
Some friendly admonition, and exhort him to concord; a kind
of peroration that was admirably managed by Passienus, i.
when he pleaded the cause of his wife Domitia, to recover a
sum of money, against her brother Ænobarbus, for, after he
had enlarged on their relationship, he added some remarks on
their fortune, of which both had abundance, saying, There is
nothing of which you have less need than that about which you
are contending.
51. But all these addresses to the feelings, though they are
thought by some to have a place only in the exordium and the
peroration, in which indeed they are most frequently intro-
duced, are admissible also in other parts, but more sparingly,
as it is from them that the decision of the cause must be
chiefly evolved ;S but in the peroration, if anywhere, we may
call forth all the resources of eloquence; 52. for if we have
treated the other parts successfully, we are secure of the at-
tention of the judges at the conclusion; where, having passed
the rocks and shallows on our voyage, we may expand our
* Titus Labienus, the accuser of Rabirius, had exhibited an image
of Lucius Saturninus, killed many years before, to excite the feelings.
See Cic. pro Rabir. c. 9.
f See v. 13, 28.
f The husband of Agrippina, and step-father of Nero. He had
been previously married to Domitia. See c. 3, sect. 74 ; x. 1, 24.
§ Ut quwm ea is plurima sit res eruenda.] Ex aliis istis partibus
widelicet narramdi et proband? veritas rei maximé est eruenda, nec
patiuntur propterea magnam affectuum copiam et diuturnitatem ; conf.
xii. 9, 3. Plurima res seems to be for “plurimum rei, maxima pars
rei.” Spalding. -
E E 2
420 QUINTILIAN. [B.VI.
sails in safety; and, as amplification forms the greatest part
of a peroration, we may use language and thoughts of the
greatest magnificence and elegance. It is then that we may
shake the theatre, when we come to that with which the old
tragedies and comedies were concluded, Plaudite, “Give us
your applause.”
53. But in other parts we must work upon the feelings, as
occasion for working on any of them may present itself, for
matters of a horrible or lamentable nature should never be
related without exciting in the mind of the judges a feeling in
conformity with them; and when we discuss the quality of
any act, a remark addressed to the feelings may be aptly sub-
joined to the proof of each particular point. 54. And when
we plead a complicated cause, consisting, it may be said, of
several causes, we shall be under the necessity of using, as it
were, several perorations; as Cicero has done in his pleading
against Verres; for he has lamented over Philodamus,” over
the captains of the vessels,f over the tortures of the Roman
citizens, and over several other of that praetor's victims. 55.
Some call these gagixoi ärſkoyol, by which they mean parts of
a divided peroration ; but to me they seem not so much parts
as species of perorations; for the very terms firſ?.0)0g and
peroratio show, clearly enough, that the conclusion of a speech
is implied.
CHAPTER II.
Necessity of studying how to work on the minds of the judges, § 1, 2.
This department of oratory requires great ability, 3–7. Of
Trá00g and j6og, 8–24. If we would move others, we must feel
moved ourselves, 25–28. Of presenting images to the imagination
of our hearers, 29–35. Pupils should be exercised in this in the
schools, 36.
1. BUT though the peroration is a principal part of judicial
causes, and is chiefly concerned with the feelings, and though
1 have of necessity, therefore, said something of the feelings
* In Werr. i. 30.
+ W. 45, 46.
f V. 53, 68.
CH. II.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 421
in treating of it, yet I could not bring the whole of that sub-
ject under one head, nor indeed should I have been justified
in doing so. A duty of the orator, accordingly, still remains
to be considered, which is of the greatest efficacy in securing
his success, and is of far more difficulty than any of those
already noticed, I mean that of influencing the minds of the
judges, and of moulding and transforming them, as it were,
to that disposition which we wish them to assume. 2. With
regard to this point, I have touched on a few particulars, such
as the subject called forth, but so as rather to show what
ought to be done than how we may be able to effect it. The
nature of the whole subject must now be considered more
deeply.
Throughout the whole of any cause, as I remarked,” there
is room for addresses to the feelings. The nature of the feel-
ings is varied, and not to be treated cursorily; nor does the
whole art of oratory present any subject that requires greater
study. 3. As to other matters, moderate and limited powers of
mind, if they be but aided by learning and practice, may in-
vigorate them, and bring them to some fruit; certainly there
are, and always have been, no small number of pleaders, who
could find out, with sufficient skill, whatever would be of ser-
vice to establish proofs; and such men I do not despise,
though I consider that their ability extends no farther than
to the communication of instruction to the judge; and, to say
what I think, I look upon them as fit only to explain causes
to eloquent pleaders; but such as can seize the attention of
the judge, and lead him to whatever frame of mind he desires,
forcing him to weep or feel angry as their words influence
him, f are but rarely to be found. 4. But it is this power that
is supreme in causes; it is this that makes eloquence effec
tive. As to arguments, they generally arise out of the cause,
and are more numerous on the side that has the greater jus-
tice; so that he who gains his cause by force of arguments,
will only have the satisfaction of knowing that his advocate
* C. 1, sect. 51. -
+ Qwo dicto ſlendum et irascendum esset.] Dicto, as Spalding observes,
cannot be correct. He would either alter it into décente, or consider
the whole phrase as a gloss. I should prefer the alteration.
† The text is hoc eloquentiam regumi, but can hardly be sound, as
the singular hoc immediately precedes. The state of the text in many
parts of this chapter is very unsatisfactory.
422 QUINTILIAN. [B.VI.
did not fail him. 5. But when violence is to be offered to
the minds of the judges, and their thoughts are to be drawn
away from the contemplation of truth, then it is that the pe.
culiar duty of the orator is required. This the contending
parties cannot teach ; this cannot be put into written instrug-
tions. Proofs in our favour, it is true, may make the judge
think our cause the better, but impressions on his feelings
make him wish it to be the better, and what he wishes he also
believes. 6. For when judges begin to feelindignant, to favour,
to hate, to pity, they fancy that their own cause is concerned;
and, as lovers are not competent judges of beauty, because
passion overpowers the sense of sight, so a judge, when led
away by his feelings, loses the faculty of discerning truth ; he
is hurried along as it were by a flood, and yields to the force
of a torrent, 7. What effect arguments and witnesses have
produced, it is only the final decision that proves; but the
judge, when his feelings are touched by the orator, shows,
while he is still sitting and hearing, what his inclination is.
When the tear, which is the great object in most perorations,
swells forth, is not the sentence plainly pronounced 2 To
this end, then, let the orator direct his efforts; this is his
work, this his labour;* without this everything else is bare and
meagre, weak and unattractive ; SO true is it, that the life and
Soul of eloquence is shown in the effect produced on the
feelings. -
8. Of feelings, as we are taught by the old writers, there
are two kinds; one, which the Greeks included under the term
orá00g, which we translate rightly and literally by the word
“passion ;” the other, to which they give the appellation à00g,
for which, as I consider, the Roman language has no equiva-
lent term ; it is rendered, however, by mores, “manners;”
whence that part of philosophy, which the Greeks call #912%, is
called moralis, “moral.” 9. But when I consider the nature
of the thing, it appears to me that it is not so much mores in
general that is meant, as a certain proprietas morum, or “pro-
priety of manners;” for under the word mores is comprehended
every habitude of the mind. The more cautious writers,
therefore, have chosen rather to express the sense than to
interpret the words, and have designated the one class of feel-
ings as the more violent, the other as the more gentle and calm ;
* Hoc opus, hic labor est. Virg. Æn. vi. 128.
CH. II.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR, 423
under ºróðog they have included the stronger passions, under
#90; the gentler, saying that the former are adapted to com-
mand, the latter to persuade, the former to disturb, the latter
to conciliate. 10. Some of the very learned” add that the
effect of the ºrðog is but transitory; but while I admit that
this is more generally the case, I consider that there are some
subjects which require a permanent strain of ºrd,00g to run
through the whole of them. Addresses however to the milder
feelings require not less art and practice, though they do not
call for so much energy and vehemence ; and they enter into
the majority of causes, or rather, in some sense,f into all;
11. for as nothing is treated by the orator that may not be
referred either to Tá00g or #803;i whatever is said concerning
homour or advantage, concerning things that may be done or
may not be done, is very properly included under the term
ethic. Some think that commendation and palliation are the
peculiar duties of the 700g, and I do not deny that they fall
under that head, but I do not allow that they are its only
object. 12. I would also add that Tó00g and 700; are some-
times of the same nature, the one in a greater and the other
in a less degree, as love, for instance, will be ºráčog, and friend-
ship figog, and sometimes of a different nature, as Tó00g, in a
peroration, will excite the judges, and 700g soothe them.
But I must develope more precisely the force of the term
700g, as it seems not to be sufficiently intimated by the word
itself. 13. The 700g, of which we form a conception, and which
we desire to find in speakers, is recommended, above all, by
goodness, being not only mild and placid, but for the most
part pleasing and polite, and amiable and attractive to the
hearers; and the greatest merit in the expression of it, is,
that it should seem to flow from the nature of the things and
* Adjicłunt guidam peritorwm Trá90c temporale esse.] The strangeness
of the word peritorwm induces Spalding to suspect that the words
º originally thus: Adjöciunt guidam perpetww.m. f60g, Trá6og tempo-
*O,062 6836.
f Secundum quemdan intellectum.] This is the same as our French
phrase €02, 2007, 36.728. Capperonier.
: Nam quwm misi eac illo et hoc loco mihil ab oratore tractetur..] I
interpret these words according to the notion of Capperonier. What-
ever cannot be placed under the head of Trá9og, may be placed under
that of fiðog. Spalding, with Regius, would refer illo and hoc to the
following words, homesta and utilia, but this mode is so forced that I
cannot concur with him. -
424 QUINTILIAN. - [B.VI.
persons with which we are concerned, so that the moral cha-
racter of the speaker may clearly appear, and be recognized
as it were, in his discourse. 14. This kind of #60; ought especi-
ally to prevail between persons closely connected, as often as they
endure anything from each other, or grant pardon, or satisfac-
tion, or offer admonition, all which should be free from anger,
or dislike. But the #00g of a father towards his son, of a
guardian towards his ward, of a husband towards his wife, (all
of whom manifest affection for those with whom they are
offended, and throw blame upon them by no other means than
showing that they love them,)” is very different from that
which is shown by an old man towards a young one from whom
he has received an insult, or from that of a man of rank
towards an inferior who has been disrespectful to him, (for the
man of rank may only be provoked, the old man must also be
concerned.) 15. Of the same character, though less affecting
to the feelings, are solicitations for forgiveness, or apologies for
the amours of youth. Sometimes, too, a little gentle raillery
of another person's heatf may have its source in the #90g,
though it does not proceed from such a source only. But
what more peculiarly belongs to it is simulation of some virtue,
of making satisfaction to some one, and gigoyeio, in asking ques-
tions, which means something different from that which it
expresses. 16. Hence also springs that stronger appeal to the
feelings, adapted to draw the dislike of the judge on an over-
bearing adversary, when, by feigning submission to him, we
imply a quiet censure on his presumption; for the very fact
that we yield to him, proves him to be arrogant and insupport-
able; and orators who are fond of invective, or affect liberty
of speech, are not aware how much more effective it is thus to
throw odium on an opponent than to reproach him, since that
kind of treatment renders him disliked, while reproach would
bring dislike on ourselves. 17. The feeling arising from our
love and regard for our friends and relatives is, we may say, of
an intermediate character, being stronger than 300g and weaker
than ºrd:00g. -
It is not without significance, too, that we call those exer-
* While the objects of their love make no proper return for it.—
A little below, we must for illic, as Spalding observes, read ille.
+ Alieni caloris.] The heat which others exhibit in blaming or
accusing those whom we have undertaken to defend, Capperonicr.
CH. II.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 425
cises of the schools #94, in which we are accustomed to repre-
sent the characters of the rustic, the Superstitious, the
avaricious, the timid, agreeably to the thesis proposed for dis-
cussion. For as āūn are manners, we, in imitating manners,
adapt our speech to them.
18. All this species of eloquence, however, requires the
speaker to be a man of good character, and of pleasing
manners. The virtues which he ought to praise, if possible,
in his client, he should possess, or be thought to possess, him-
self. Thus he will be a great support to the causes that he
undertakes, to which he will bring credit by his own excellent
qualities. But he who, while he speaks, is thought a bad man,
must certainly speak ineffectively; for he will not be thought
to speak sincerely; if he did, his #00g, or character, would
appear. 19. With a view to credibility, accordingly, the style
of speaking in this kind of oratory should be calm and mild ;
it requires,” at least, nothing of vehemence, elevation, or sub-
limity; to speak with propriety, in a pleasing manner, and an
air of probability, is sufficient for it; and the middling sort of
eloquence is therefore most suitable.
20. What the Greeks call ºróðog, and we, very properly,
affectus, is quite different from that which is referred to the
#90g : and that I may mark, as exactly as I can,t the diversity
between them, I would say that the one is similar to comedy,
the other to tragedy. This kind of eloquence is almost wholly
engaged in exciting anger, hatred, fear, envy, or pity; and
from what sources its topics are to be drawn is manifest to all,
and has been mentioned by met in speaking of the exordium
and peroration. 21. Fear, however, I wish to be understood
in two senses, that which we feel ourselves, and that which we
cause to others; and I would observe that there are two sorts
of invidia, “ dislike,” one that makes invidum, “envious,”
and another that makes invidiosum, “ disliked.”$ The first is
applied to persons, the second to things; and it is with this
that eloquence has the greater difficulty; for though some
* All the texts have desideret, but we must read, as Rollin says,
desiderat.
† Proacime.] That is proacimè ad veritatem, quâm verissime fieri potest.
Spalding.
f B. iv. c. 1, and b. vi. c. 1. Spalding.
§ Altera invidum, altera, invidiosum facit..] “Il y a deux sortes de
liaine, celle que l’on ressent et celle que l’on excite.” Gedoyn.
426 QUINTILIAN. [B. VI.
things are detestable in themselves, as parricide, murder,
poisoning, others require to be made to appear so. 22. Such
representation is made, either by showing that what we have
suffered is more grievous than evils ordinarily considered
great; as in these lines of Virgil,”
O feliac wha ante alias Priameia virgo,
Hostilem ad tumulwm Trojae sub maenibus altis
Jussa mor? /
O happy thou above all other maids,
Daughter of Priam, doom'd to die before
Thy enemy's tomb, beneath the lofty walls
Of Troy r
(for how wretched was the lot of Andromache, if that of
Polyxena, compared with hers, was happy () 23. or by mag-
nifying some injury that we have received, so as to make even
injuries that are far less appear intolerable; as, If you had
struck me, you would have been inexcusable ; but you wounded
me. But these points I shall consider with more attention,
when I come to speak of amplification. In the mean time,
I shall content myself with observing that the object of the
pathetic is not only that those things may appear grievous
and lamentable, which in reality are so, but also that those
which are generally regarded as inconsiderable, may seem
intolerable; as when we say that there is more injury in
a verbal insult than in a blow, or that there is more punishment.
in dishonour than in death. 24. For such is the power of ,
eloquence, that it not only impels the judge to that to which
he is led by the nature of the matter before him, but excites
feelings which are not suggested by it, or strengthens such as
are suggested. This is what the Greeks call betwoolg, language
adding force to things unbecoming, cruel, detestable; in which
excellence, more than in any other, Demosthenes showed his
extraordinary power.
25. If I thought it sufficient merely to adhere to the pre-
cepts that have been delivered, I should do enough for this
part of my work by omitting nothing that I have read or
learned, that is at all reasonable, on the subject; but it is my
intention to open the deepest recesses of the topic on which
we have entered, and to set forth what I have acquired, not
from any teacher, but from my own experience, and under the
* AEn. iii. 321. *
CH.II.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 427
guidance of nature herself. 26. The chief requisite, then,
for moving the feelings of others, is, as far as I can judge,
that we ourselves be moved; for the assumption of grief, and
anger, and indignation, will be often ridiculous, if we adapt
merely our words and looks, and not our minds, to those
passions. For what else is the reason that mourners, when
their grief is fresh at least, are heard to utter exclamations of
the greatest expressiveness, and that anger sometimes produces
eloquence even in the ignorant, but that there are strong
sensations in them, and sincerity of feeling 2 27. In deliver-
ing, therefore, whatever we wish to appear like truth, let us
assimilate ourselves to the feelings of those who are truly
affected, and let our language proceed from such a temper of
mind as we would wish to excite in the judge, Will he grieve,
let me ask, who shall hear me, that speak for the purpose of
moving him, expressing myself without concern ? Will he be
angry, if the orator who seeks to excite him to anger, and to
force him to it, shows no like feeling? Will he shed tears
at the words of one who pleads with dry eyes 2 28. Such
results are impossible. We are not burned without fire, or
wet without moisture; nor does one thing give to another the
colour which it has not itself. Our first object must be,
therefore, that what we wish to impress the judge may impress
ourselves, and that we may be touched ourselves before we
begin to touch others.
29. But by what means, it may be asked, shall we be affected,
since our feelings are not in our own power ? I will attempt
to say something also on this point. What the Greeks call
poyroza foºt we call visiones ; images by which the representations
of absent objects are so distinctly represented to the mind,
that we seem to see them with our eyes, and to have them
before us. 30. Whoever shall best conceive such images, will
have the greatest power in moving the feelings. A man of
Such lively imagination some call gigoyrocoſorog, being one who
can vividly represent to himself things, voices, actions, with
the exactness of reality; and this faculty may readily be
acquired by ourselves if we desire it. When, for example,
while the mind is unoccupied, and we are indulging in
chimerical hopes, and dreams, as of men awake, the images of
which I am speaking beset us so closely, that we seem to be
on a journey, on a voyage, in a battle, to be haranguing
428 QUINTILIAN. [B. VI.
assemblies of people, to dispose of wealth which we do not
possess, and not to be thinking but acting, shall we not turn
this lawless power of our minds to our advantage 2 31. I make
8, complaint that a man has been murdered; shall I not bring
before my eyes everything that is likely to have happened
when the murder occurred 2 Shall not the assassin suddenly
sally forth ? - Shall not the other tremble, cry out, supplicate,
or flee? Shall I not behold the one striking, the other
falling 2 Shall not the blood, and paleness, and last gasp of
the expiring victim, present itself fully to my mental view 2
32. Hence will result that śvágyetc., which is called by Cicero
illustration and evidentness, which seems not so much to
narrate as to exhibit ; and our feelings will be moved not less
strongly than if we were actually present at the affairs of
which we are speaking. Are not the following descriptions
to be numbered among representations of this nature ?
Eaccussi manibus radii, revolutague pensa : *
The shuttle from her hands was shaken forth,
And all the web unravelled.
33. Levigue patens in pectore vulnus ºf
The gaping wound
In his smooth breast.
And that of the horse at the funeral of Pallas,
—positis insignibus—f
His trappings laid aside e
Has not the same poet also conceived with the deepest feeling
the idea of a man's dying moments, when he says
—Ét dulces moriens reminiscitur Argos, Š
And on his dearest Argos thinks in death !
34. Where there is occasion for moving compassion, too, we
must endeavour to believe, and to feel convinced, that the evils
of which we complain have actually happened to ourselves.
We must imagine ourselves to be those very persons for whom
we lament as having suffered grievous, undeserved, and pitiable
treatment; we must not plead their cause as that of another,
* Virg. AEn. ix, 476.
+ AEn. xi, 40.
† AEn. xi. 89.
§ AEn. x. 781.
CH.II.] ED'UCATION OF AN ORATOR. 429
but must endeavour to feel for a time their sufferings; and
thus we shall say for them what we should in similar circum-
stances Say for ourselves. 35. I have often seen actors, both
in tragedy and comedy, when they laid aside their mask after
going through some distressing scene, quit the theatre weeping;
and if the mere delivery of what is written by another can
add such force to fictitious feelings, what effect ought we to
produce, when we should feel what we express, and may be
moved at the condition of those who are on their trial 2
36. In the schools, also, it would be proper for learners to
feel moved with the subjects on which they speak, and imagine
that they are real, especially as we discuss matters there.
more frequently as parties concerned than as advocates. We
assume the character of an orphan, of a person that has been
Shipwrecked, or one that is in danger of losing his life; but
to what purpose is it to assume their characters, if we do not
adopt their feelings 2 This art I thought should not be
concealed from the reader, the art by which I myself (whatever
is or was my real power) conceive that I have attained at least
Some reputation for ability; and I have often been so affected,
that not only tears, but paleness, and Sorrow, similar to real
Sorrow, have betrayed my emotions.
430 QUINTILIAN. [B. VI.
CHAPTER III.
Of the power of exciting laughter in an audience, § 1. There was
little of it in Demosthenes; perhaps a superabundance of it in
Cicero, 2–5. Causes of laughter not sufficiently explained, 6, 7.
Is of great effect, 8–10. Depends far more on nature and
favourable circumstances than on art, 11—13. No instructions
given in exciting laughter, 14–16. Various names for jocularity
or wit, 17–21. Depends partly on matter, partly on words;
subjects of it, 22–24. Laughter may be excited by some act, or
look, or gesture, 25–27. What is becoming to the orator, 28–32.
What to be avoided by him, 33–35. Topics for jesting, and modes
of it, 36–46. Ambiguity in words, 47–56. The best jests are
taken from things, not from words; of similarity, 57–62. Of dis-
similarity, 63, 64. From all forms of argument arise occasions for
jesting, 65, 66. Jests in the form of tropes and figures, 67–70. Of
jocular refutation, 71–78. Of eluding a charge ; of pretended con-
fession, 79–81. Some kinds of jests are beneath an orator, 8.2, 83.
Of deceiving expectation, 84–87. Of jocular imitation, 88. Of
attributing thoughts to ourselves or others; and of irony, 89–92.
The least offensive jokes are the best, 93–95. Quotations from
poets, proverbs, and anecdotes, 96–98. Apparent absurdities, 99,
100. T)omitius Marsus confounds politeness with humour, 101—
107. His distinctions, 108—112.
1. VERY different from this is the talent which, by exciting
laughter in the judge, dispels melancholy affections, diverting his
mind from too intense application to the subject before it, re-
cruiting at times its powers, and reviving it after disgust and
fatigue. - -
2. How difficult it is to succeed in that way, even the two
greatest of all orators, the one the prince of Greek and the
other of Latin eloquence, afford us sufficient proof. Most
think that the faculty was altogether wanting to Demosthenes,”
and moderation in the management of it to Cicero. Demos-
themes, certainly, cannot be thought to have been unwilling to
cultivate it, as his jests, though very few, and by no means
correspondent to his other excellences, plainly show that jocu-
* Gesner observes that Cicero, Orat. c. 26, in noticing the general
opinion that Demosthenes wanted humour, says that he had much
wrbanitas; and that Plutarch in his Life of Demosthenes mentions some
of his jests. Capperonier refers to Longinus, c. 34, who says that
when Demosthenes attempted to be facetious he only raised a laugh at
his own expense. Spalding remarks that the judgment of Dionysius
Halicarnassensis, Tapi Ampload. Ös twórntoc, c. 54, agrees with the com-
mon opinion.
CH. III.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 43]
larity was not disliked by him, but that it had not been liberally
bestowed on him by nature. 3. But as for our own coun
tryman, he was regarded, not only when not engaged in plead
ing, but even in his public speeches, as too much an affecte
of pleasantry. To myself, whether I judge rightly in that re
spect, or whether I err through immoderate admiration for ouſ
great master of eloquence, there appears to have been ar
extraordinary vein of delicate wit in him. 4. For in his
common conversation, in disputes, and in examining witnesses
he uttered more jokes than any other orator; the dull jests ir
his orations against Verres * he attributed to others, repeating
them as a part of his evidence; and the more vulgar they are
the more probable is it that they were not of his invention
but had been circulated among the people. 5. I could wish
too, that his freedman Tiro, or whoever it was that published
the three books of his jests, had been more sparing as to thei
number, and had used greater judgment in selecting than in
dustry in gathering; for he would then have been less expose
to calumniators, who, however, as in regard to all the produc
tions of his genius, can more easily discover what may be take
away than what may be added.
6. But what causes the chief difficulty in 1éspect to jestin
is, that a saying adapted to excite laughter is generally base
on false reasoning, and has always f something low in it; it i
often purposely sunk into buffoonery; it is never honourable t
him who is the subject of it; while the judgments of th
hearers with regard to it will be various, as a thing which i
estimated, not by any certain reasoning, but by some impulse
I know not whether inexplicable, of the mind. 7. Certainly
think that it has not been sufficiently explained by any one
though many have attempted explanations, whence laughte
proceeds, which is excited, not only by actions or words, bu
sometimes even by a touch of the body. Besides, it is not b
one kind of jests only that it is produced; for not merely witt.
and agreeable acts or Sayings, but what is said or don
foolishly, angrily, fearfully, are equally the objects of laughter
and thus the origin of it is doubtful, as laughter is not far from
* See i. 46.
+ The text has hoc Semper humile. Burmann says that we shoul
read ad hoc scepe. I think him right in both alterations. Spaldin
refuses to adopt Stepe.
432 QUINTILIAN. [B.VI.
derision.* 8. Cicero has said i that it has its seat in some de-
formity or offensiveness, and if this is made to appear in others,
the result is called raillery, but if what we say recoils on our-
selves, it is but folly.
Though laughter may appear, however, a light thing, as it is
often excited by buffoons, mimics, and even fools, yet it has
power perhaps more despotic than any thing else, such as can
by no means be resisted. 9. It bursts forth in people even
against their will, and extorts a confession of its influence not
only from the face and the voice, but shakes the whole frame
with its vehemence. It often changes, too, as I said, the
tendency of the greatest affairs, as it very frequently dissipates
both hatred and anger. 10. Of this the young Tarentines
afford an instance, who, having spoken, at a banquet, with
great freedom about king Pyrrhus, and being called before
him to account for their conduct, when the fact could neither
be denied nor justified, saved themselves by a fortunate laugh
and jest; for one of them said, Ah 1 if our flagon had no.
failed us, we should have murdered you; and by this pleasantry
the whole odium of the charge was dispelled.
11. But though I should not venture to say that this talent,
whatever it is, is certainly independent of art, (for it may be
cultivated by observation, and rules relating to it have been
composed both by Greek and Latin writers,) yet I may fairly
assert that it chiefly depends on nature and opportunity.
12. Nature, moreover, has influence in it, not only so far that
one man is more acute and ready than another in inventing
jokes, (for such facility may certainly be increased by study,)
but that there is in certain persons a peculiar grace in their
manner and look, so that the same things that they say, would,
if another were to say them, appear less happy. 13. As to
opportunity, and circumstances, they have such effect, that not
only unlearned persons, but even peasants, when favoured by
them, make witty repartees to such as are first to address
them ; for all facetiousness appears to greater advantage in
* A derisw mon procul abest risus. He that seeks to excite laughter
is in danger of incurring derision.
ºf De Orat. ii. 59.
it Ut diaci.] I cannot point out the place where this remark is made.
The interpreters pass the words in silence; Gedoyn has very wisely
omitted them. Did Quintilian merely fancy that he had made such
an observation somewhere 3 See v. 11, 26. Spalding.
CH. III.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 433
reply than in attack.” 14. It adds to the difficulty, that,there
is no exercise in this department, nor any instructors in it. It
is true that at convivial meetings, and in the familiar inter-
course of life, many jesters are to be met; but their number
arises from the circumstance that men improve in jesting by
daily practice ; the wit that suits the orator is rare, and is not
cultivated on its own account, but sent for practice to the
school of the world. 15. Yet there would be no objection to
subjects being invented for this exercise, so that fictitious causes
might be pleaded with a mixture of jesting, or particular theses
might be proposed to youth exclusively for such practice.
16. Even those very pleasantries, which are and are called
jokes,f and in which we are accustomed to indulge on certain
days of festal licence, might, if they were produced with some
degree of method, or if some serious matter were mingled with
them, prove of considerable advantage to the orator; but now
they are merely the diversion of youth, or of people amusing
themselves.
17. In reference to the subject of which we are treating, we
commonly use several words to express the same thing; but,
if we consider them separately, each will be found to have its
own peculiar signification. The term urbanity || is applied to
it, by which is meant, I observe, a style of speaking which ex-
hibits in the choice of words, in tone, and in manner, a certain
taste of the city, and a tincture of erudition derived from con-
versation with the learned ; something, in a word, of which
rusticity is the reverse. 18. That that is graceful, which is
expressed with grace and agreeableness, is evident. Salt “I
we understand in common conversation only as something to
make us laugh; but this motion is not founded in nature ;
though certainly whatever is to make us laugh must be salt.
Cicero * says that everything salt is in the taste of the Attics,
* So Cicero de Orat. ii. 56, sub fin.
+ Dicta sunt ac vocantwr.] Spalding suspects the integrity of these
words, but suggests no satisfactory emendation. The text of this
chapter is evidently corrupt in many passages.
f As the Bacchanalia and Saturnalia, at which wits contended in
uttering jokes for prizes. Turnebw8
§ Urbanitas.
| Wem w8twm.
*|| Salswºm.
** Orat. c. 26.
434 QUINTILIAN. [B.VI.
but not because the Attics were most of all people inclined to
laughter; and when Catullus * says of a woman, There is not
a grain of salt in her whole body, he does not mean that there
\ .
certain peculiar relish, So Salt in language has a certain charm,
is nothing in her body to excite laughter. 19. That therefore
will be salt which is not insipid ºf and salt will be a natural
seasoning of language, which is perceived by a secret taste, as
food is tasted by the palate, and which enlivens discourse and
keeps it from becoming wearisome. As salt, too, mixed with
food rather liberally, but not so as to be in excess, gives it a
which creates in us a thirst, as it were, for hearing more.
20. Nor do I conceive that the facetum is confined solely to
that which excites laughter ; for, if such were the case,
Horace ; would not have said that “the facetum in poetry had
been granted by nature to Virgil.” I think it rather a term
for grace and a certain polished elegance; and it is in this sense
that Cicero in his letters š quotes these words of Brutus: Nae
illi pedes faceti ac deliciis ingredienti molles, “Graceful indeed
are her feet, and move gently and with delicacy as she walks ;”
an expression similar to that of Horace, Molle atque facetum
Virgilio. 21. Jest || we understand as something contrary to that
which is serious; for to feign, to intimidate, and to promise,
are sometimes modes of jesting. Dicacitas" is doubtless de-
rived from dico, and is common to every species of jesting, but
it properly signifies language that attacks a person in order to
raise a laugh against him. Thus they say that Demosthenes
was urbanus, “witty,” but deny that he was dicaw, “gifted
with the faculty of humorous raillery.” -
22. But what belongs properly to the subject of which we
are treating is that which eacites laughter ; and thus all dis-
cussion on the topic is entitled by the Greeks regi 'yaxofov.
Its primary division is the same as that of every other kind of
speech, as it must lie either in things or in words. 23. The
application of it is very simple; for we try either to make
others the subject of laughter, or ourselves, or something that is
* Epigr. in Quintiam et Lesbiam.
+ Inswlswim.
† Sat. i. 10, 44.
§ Not extant.
|| Jocus.
*|| Jocularity; jocular attacks on individuals.
CH.III.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 435
foreign to both. What proceeds from others we either blame,
or refute, or make light of, or rebut, or elude. As to what
concerns ourselves, we speak of it with something of ridicule,
and, to adopt a word of Cicero's,” utter subabsurda, “apparent
absurdities;” for the same things that, if they fell from us .
unawares, would be silly, are thought, if we express them with
dissimulation, extremely humorous.f 24. The third: kind, as
Cicero also remarks, consists in deceiving expectation, in taking
words in a sense different from that in which the speaker uses
them, and in allusions to other things, which affect neither
ourselves nor others, and which I therefore call intermediate
or neutral. -
25. In the Second place, we either do, or say, things
intended to excite a laugh. Laughter may be raised by some
act of humour, with a mixture, sometimes, of gravity, as
Marcus Caelius; the praetor, when the consul Isauricus broke
his curule chair, had another fixed with straps, as the consul
was said to have been once beaten with a strap by his father;
Sometimes without due regard to decency, as in the story of
Calius's boa,S which is becoming neither to an orator nor to any
man of proper character. 26. The same may be said of looks
and gestures to provoke laughter, from which there may
certainly be some amusement, and so much the more when
they do not seem to aim at raising a laugh ; for nothing is
more silly than what is offered as witty. Gravity, however,
adds much to the force of jests, and the very circumstance that
he who utters a joke does not laugh, makes others laugh; yet
Sometimes a humorous look, and cast of countenance, and
* De Orat. ii. 71.
f See a similar remark on solecisms and figures, i. 5, 53.
f The disputes of Caelius with Isauricus, the son, were famous.
What the ancients have said of them has been judiciously brought
together by Freinsheimius in his supplement to Livy. This practical
joke is related, as far as I know, by no other author besides Quintilian ;
though the breaking of the chair of Caelius by Isauricus, when he was
flattering the people with the hopes of an abolition of debts, is men-
tioned by Dio Cassius, lib. xlii. The affair took place during the life
of Isauricus's father, who died at the age of ninety, about six years
afterwards. Spalding.
§ See Cic, pro Cael. c. 25–29. But to find the indecency of the
joke we shall in vain inspect either Cicero or his commentators. . . . .
That Quintilian should speak with such severity of Cicero I cannot
but wonder. Spalding.
F F 2
436 QUINTILIAN. [B. VI.
gesture, may be assumed, provided that certain bounds be
observed. -
27. What is said in jest, moreover, is either gay and cheer.
ful, as most of the jokes of Aulus Galba;% or malicious, as those
of the late Junius Bassus;f or bitter, as those of Cassius
Severus; or inoffensive, as those of Domitius Afer. But it
makes a great difference where we indulge injests. At enter-
tainments, and in common conversation, a more free kind of
speech is allowed to the humbler class of mankind, amusing
discourse to all. 28. To offend we should always be unwilling;
and the inclination to lose a friend rather than a joke should be
far from us In the very battles of the forum I should wish it
to be in my power to use mild words, though it is allowed
to speak against our opponents with contumely and bitter-
mess, as it is permitted us to accuse openly, and to seek
the life of another according to law; but in the forum, as in
other places, to insult another's misfortune is thought inhuman,
either because the insulted party may be free from blame, or
because similar misfortune may fall on him who offers the in-
sult. A speaker is first of all to consider, therefore, what his
own character is ; in what sort of cause he is to speak; before
whom ; against whom ; and what he should say. 29. Distortion
of features and gesture, such as is the object of laughter in buf
foons, is by no means suited to an orator. Scurrilous jests, too,
and such as are used in low comedy, are utterly unbecoming
his character. As for indecency, it should be so entirely
banished from his language, that there should not be the
slightest possible allusion to it; and if it should be imputable,
on any occasion, to his adversary, it is not in jest that he should
reproach him with it. 30. Though I should wish an orator,
moreover, to speak with wit, I should certainly not wish him to
seem to affect wit ; and he must not therefore speak facetiously
as often as he can, but must rather lose a joke occasionally,
than lower his dignity. 31. No one will endure a prosecutor
jesting in a cause of a horrible, or a defendant in one of a piti-
* He is mentioned by Quintilian several times in this chapter, and
nowhere else. I can say nothing certain as to who he was. Spalding.
Whether he was the Galba mentioned by Juvenal, v. 4, by Martial, i.
42, x. 20, and by Plutarch, vol. ii. p. 700 A., it is vain to conjecture,
+ Of him as little is known. His name occurs three times in this
chapter; see sect. 57, 74. See also vi. 3, 27.
{ vi. 1, 43 ; v. 10, 79.
CH.III.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOP, 437
able, nature. There are some judges also of too grave a dispo-
sition to yield willingly to laughter. It will sometimes occur,
too, that reflections which we make on our adversary may
apply to the judge, or even to our own client. 32. Some orators
have been found indeed, who would not lose a jest that might
recoil even on themselves; as was the case with Sulpicius
Longus,” who, though he was himself an ugly man, remarked
that a person, against whom he appeared on a trial for his right
to freedom,t had not even the face of a free man; when Do-
mitius Afer, in reply to him, Said, On your conscience, Longus,
do you think that he who has an ugly face cannot be a free
man. 3 -
33. We must take care, also, that what we say of this sort
may not appear petulant, insulting, unsuitable to the place
and time, or premeditated and brought from our study. As
to jests on the unfortunate, they are, as I said above, unfeeling.
Some persons, too, are of such established authority, and such
known respectability, that insolence in addressing them could
not but hurt ourselves. 34. Regarding our friends a remark
has already been made ; and it concerns the good sense, not
merely of an orator, but of every reasonable being, not to
assail; in this way one whom it is dangerous to offend, lest
bitter enmity, or humiliating satisfaction, be the consequence.
Raillery is also indulged injudiciously that applies to many;
if, for example, whole nations, or orders, or conditions, or
professions, be attacked by it. Whatever a good man says,
he will say with dignity and decency; for the price of a laugh
is too high, if it is raised at the expense of propriety.
35. Whence laughter may be fairly excited, and from what
topics it is generally drawn, it is very difficult to say ; for if
we would go through all the species of subjects for it, we
* Of him I have nothing to say. No one of that name mentioned
by other writers was contemporary with Domitius Afer. Spalding.
+ Judicio liberali..] In which the point to be tried is whether the ..º.
party is to be a slave or free; it is otherwise called causa liberalis, or
assertio. See v. 2, 1. Capperonier.
† Ne lacessat.] I read me before lacess&t with Capperonier and most
other editors. Spalding omits the me, giving the passage, after Badius
Ascensius, this interpretation : lacessat ewm, quém periculosum sit
lapdere hoc modo me, &c. “The orator must jest with him, whom it is
dangerous to offend, in such a way, that,” &c. Lacessere, he adds, is
less than laidere. -
l
;
4.38 s QUINTILIAN. [B. VI.
should find no end, and should labour in vain. 36. For the
topics from which jests may be elicited, are not less numerous
than those from which what we call thoughts may be derived,”
nor are they of a different nature, since in jocularity also there
is invention and eaſpression, and a display of the force of elo-
quence, as consisting partly in the choice of words, and partly
in the use of figures of speech. 37. But I may say in general
that laughter is educed either from corporeal peculiarities in
him against whom we speak, or from his state of mind, as
collected from his actions and words, or from easterior circum-
stances relating to him; for under these three heads fall all
kinds of animadversion, which, if applied severely, is of a
serious, if lightly, of a ludicrous character. Such subjects
for jests are either pointed out to the eye, or related in words,
or indicated by some happy remark. 38. But an opportunity
rarely offers of bringing them before the eye, as Lucius Julius
did, who having said to Helvius Mancia, when he was
repeatedly clamouring against him, I will now show what you
are like, and Mancia persisting, and asking him to show him
what he was like, he pointed with his finger to the figure of
a Gaul painted on a Cimbrian shield, which Mancia was
acknowledged exactly to resemble; there were shops round the
forum, and the shield was hung over one of them as a sign.
39. To relate a jocular story is eminently ingenious, and
suitable to an orator; as Cicero in his speech for Cluentius:
tells a story about Cepasius and Fabricius, and Marcus Caelius
that of the contention of Decimus $ Laelius and his colleague
when they were hastening into their province. But in all
such recitals elegance and grace of statement is necessary,
and what the orator adds of his own should be the most
humorous part of it. 40. So the retirement of Fabricius
from the court is thus set off by Cicero: || When Cepasius,
therefore, thought that he was speaking with the utmost skill,
* See b. viii. c. 5; also Cicero de Orat. ii. 61.
f Cicero de Orat. ii. 66.
† C. 21. - .
§ Some editors read Caius Laelius, “who,” says Burmann, “was
quaestor in Sicily, and went away secretly into his province, in order
to anticipate his colleague, with whom he had had a dispute as to
which of them should have the province of Syracuse or Libybaeum; as
is shown, with reference to this passage, by Pighius Ann. ad A.U.C, 699.”
| Pro Cluent. c. 21.
CH.III.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 439
and had drawn forth those solemn words from the innermost
stores of his art, Look on the old age of Caius Fabricius,
when, I say, he had, to embellish his speech, repeated the word
look several times, he himself looked, but Fabricius had gone off
from his seat with his head hanging down, and what he adds
besides, (for the passage is well known,) when there is nothing in
reality told but that Fabricius left the court. 41. Caelius also has
invented every circumstance of his narrative most happily, and
especially the last: How he, in following, crossed over, whether
in a ship, or a fisherman's boat, nobody knew ; but the Sicilians,
a lively and jocular 80xt of people, said that he took his seat on
a dolphin, and sailed across like another Arion.
42. Cicero” thinks that humour is shown in recital, and jocu-
larity in smart attacks or defences. Domitius Afer showed
extraordinary wit in narration; and many stories of this kind
are to be found in his speeches; but books of his shorter
witticisms have also been published. 43. Raillery may also be
displayed not in mere shooting of words, as it were, and short
efforts of wit, but in longer portions of a pleading, as that
which Cicero relates of Crassus against Brutus in his second
book De Oratore,f and in some other passages. 44. When
Brutus, in accusing Cneius Plancus, had shown, by the mouths
of two readers, that Lucius Crassus, the advocate of Plancus,
had recommended, in his speech on the colony of Narbonne,
measures contrary to those which he had proposed in speaking
on the Servilian law, Crassus on his part called up three
readers, to whom he gave the Dialogues of Brutus's father to
read, and as one of those dialogues contained a discourse held
on his estate at Privermum, another on that at Alba, and
another on that at Tibur, he asked Brutus where all those
lands were. But Brutus had sold them all, and, for having
made away with his father's estates, was considered to have
dishonoured himself. Similar gratification from narrative
attends on the repetition of apologues, and sometimes on
historical anecdotes. -
45. But the brevity observed in jocular sayings has some-
**-
* Orat. c. 26.
# C. 55.
† The commentators refer to Pro Cluent. c. 51. Whether the story
is told in any other passage of the extant works of Cicero, I really
cannot say. Spalding.
440 QUINTILIAN. [B.VI.
thing more of point and liveliness. It may be employed in
two ways, in attack or in reply; and the nature of the two is
in a great degree the same; for nothing can be said in
aggression that may not also be said in retort. 46. Yet there
are some points that seem to belong more peculiarly to reply.
What is said in attack, those who are heated with anger* often
utter; what is said in rejoinder, is generally produced in
a dispute, or in examining witnesses. But as there are innu-
merable topics from which jokes may be drawn, I must repeat
that they are not all suitable for the orator. 47. In the
first place, those obscure jokes do not become him, which
depend on double meanings, and are captious as the jests of
an Atellan farce; + nor such as are uttered by the lowest class
of people, and which out of ambiguity produce obloquy ; nor
even such as sometimes fell from Cicero, though not in his
pleadings, as when he said, for instance, On occasion of a
candidate for office, who was reported to be the son of a cook,
Soliciting a vote from another person in his presence, Ego
quoque tibi favel»o. 48. Not that all words which have two
meanings are to be excluded from our speech, but because
they rarely have a good effect unless when they are well
Supported by the matter. Of which sort $ there is not only
a joke of Cicero, almost Scurrilous, on Isauricus, the same
that I mentioned above, I wonder what is the reason that
your father, the most steady of men, left us a son of so varied
a character'ſ as yourself, 49. but another excellent jest of his,
of the same nature, uttered when the accuser of Milo advanced
in proof of an ambush having been laid for Clodius, that Milo
had turned aside to Bovilla before the ninth hour, to wait till
* Ir4 concitati.] Spalding justly doubts the genuineness of these
words, but proposes no emendation that satisfies even himself.
+ Atellande more captent.] The Atellance fabulae were a species of
farce or low comedy, having their name from Atella, a town of the
Osci, where they had their origin. Tivy, vii. 2.
† The jest cannot be translated. It consists in the play on quoque
for coque. “I also will support you,” or, “I, O cook, will support you.”
The ancients wrote coquus, with a g instead of a c, as appears from
Donatus on Ter. Adelph. iii. 3, 69.
Spalding very properly reads Qūale for Quare,
| Sect. 25.
* Varium.] Philander and Gesner rightly understand this word in
the sense of maculosºm & plagis, “Spotted with stripes.” Spalding.
CH. III.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 441
Clodius should leave his villa, and asked several times when
Clodius was killed, Cicero replied, Late ; a repartee which is
alone sufficient to prevent this sort of jests from being wholly
rejected. 50. Nor do ambiguous words only signify more
things than one, but even things of the most opposite nature;
as Nero said of a dishonest slave, That no one was more
trusted in his house; that nothing was shut or sealed up from
him.* * * . . r
5 1. Such ambiguity may be carried so far as to be even enig-
matical; as in the jest of Cicero on Pletorius, the accuser
of Fonteius,f whose mother, he said, had had a school while she
was alive, and masters after she was dead; the truth was, that
women of bad character were said to have frequented her house
while she was alive, and that her goods were sold after her
death ; so that school is here used metaphorically, and masters
ambiguously.. -
52 This kind of jest often falls into metalepsis :S as Fabius
Maximus, remarking on the smallness of the presents which
were given by Augustus to his friends, said that his congiaria
were heminaria, congiarium signifying both a gratuity and a
measure, and the word heminarium being employed to show
the littleness of the gratuities." 53. This sort of jest is as poor
as is the play upon names, by adding, taking away, or altering
letters; as I have seen, for instance, a man named Acisculus
called Pacisculus,” because of some bargain that he had made;
* Cicero de Orat. ii. 61. But the words Wulli plus apud se fidei
haberi, which spoil the joke, are not given by Cicero.
+ A great part of the speech which Cicero delivered in defence of
Marcus Fonteius is lost; and among the lost passages is that to which
Quintilian alludes. Spalding.
† The word magistri, “masters,” as appears from several passages
in Cicero's letters, was a term applied to those who had the charge of
property sold for debt under the praetor's edict.
$ A figure by which the consequent is put for that which precedes.
See viii. 6, 37.
| He was consul A.U.C. 743; Tacit. Ann. i. 5. Some epistles of
Ovid from Pontus are addressed to him. Spalding.
‘ī. The word congiarium is from congius, a liquid measure containing
nearly six pints English, which, when wine or oil was distributed on
certain occasions among the people, was the quantity usually given to
each person. Liv. xxv. 2. The hemina or cotyla, was the twelfth part
of the congius, about half a pint English. -
* From paciscor, to make a bargain.
442 QUINTILIAN, [B. VI.
another named Placidus called Acidus for the sourness of
his femper; and Tullius, because he was a thief, called
Tollius.* 54. But pleasantries of this nature succeed better
in allusious to things than to names, Thus Domitius Afer
very happily said of Manlius Sura, who, while he was pleading,
darted to and fro, leaped up, tossed about his hands, and let
fall and re-adjusted his toga, Non agere sed satagere, that “he
was not merely doing business in the pleading, but over-doing
it.” The employment of the word satagere is a very good joke
in itself, though there was no resemblance to any other word.
55. Such jests are made by adding or taking away an aspirate,
or by joining two words together ; modes in general equally
poor, but sometimes passable. Similar, too, is the nature of
all jokes that are made upon names; many of which are re-
peated, as the conceits of others, by Cicero against Verres; in
one place, that, as he was called Verres, he was destined
verrere omnia, “to sweep away everything;”f in another,
that being Verres, “a boar-pig,” he had been more troublesome
to Hercules, whose temple he had pillaged, than the boar of
Erymanthus ;... in another, that he was a bad Sacerdos who had
left so vicious a Verres; because Verres had been the successor
of Sacerdos.S 56. Fortune, however, sometimes affords an op-
portunity of indulging happily in a jest of this kind; as Cicero,
in his speech for Caecina, remarked upon a witness named
Sextus Clodius Phormio, that he was not less black, or less bold,
than the Phormio of Terence.
57. But jests which are derived from peculiarities in things
are more spirited and elegant. Resemblances are most condu-
cive to the production of them, especially if the allusion be to
something meaner and of less consideration ; a sort of plea-
Santry to which the ancients were attached, who called Len-
* From tollo, to take away.
+ Spalding observes that the reader will in vain seek for this witti-
cism in the pleadings against Verres, though something of a similar
Inature occurs, ii. 21, and iv. 24, 25; that Quintilian may have learned
it from some other quarter, and have imagined that he had seen it in
Cicero; and that the allusion is to the second person singular of the
future indicative of the verb verro.
† In Verr. iv. 43.
§ In Verr. i. 46.
|| C. 10.
CH. III.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 443
tulus Spinther,” and Scipio Serapion.f 58. But such jests are
taken not only from human beings, but from other animals;
thus, when I was young, Junius Bassus, a man of extraordinary
jocularity, was called a white ass; and Sarmentus,S or Publius
Blessus, called Junius, a black man, lean and crook-backed,
an iron clasp. This mode of exciting laughter is now very
common. 59. Such comparisons are sometimes made undis-
guisedly, and sometimes insinuated in the way of inference.
Of the former sort is the remark of Augustus, who, when a
Soldier was timidly holding out a memorial to him, said, Do
not shrink back, as if you were offering a piece of money to an
elephant, 60. Jokes sometimes rest on some fanciful compa-
rison: as that which Watinius made, when, being on his trial,
and Calvus pleading against him, he wiped his forehead with
a white handkerchief, and the accuser made the circumstance
the subject of a reflection on him, Although I lie whder an ac-
cusation, returned Vatinius, I eat white bread."I 61. An ap-
plication of one thing to another, from some similarity between
them, is still more ingenious; as when we adapt, as it were,
to one purpose, that which is intended for another. This may
very well be called an imagination; as, for instance, when, at
one of Caesar's triumphs, models in ivory of the towns which
he had taken were carried in procession, and, a few days after,
at a triumph of Fabius Maximus,” models in wood of those
which Fabius had taken were exhibited, Chrysippustif observed
* From his resemblance to an inferior actor of that name. Wal.
Max, ix. 14, 4. tº
+ Because he resembled a victimarius, or dealer in animals for sacri-
fice, of that name. Val. Max. ix. 14, 3.
† Asinus albus.] Burmann supposes that he was called Asinus from
some resemblance that he bore to an ass in some part of his person,
and albus from his complexion.
$ We are made acquainted with Sarmentus by Horace, Sat. i. 5.
That he was a favourite of Augustus, appears from Plutarch, vol ii.
p. 943. In Horace he has a certain advantage over the adversary with
whom he is made to contend. See also Juvenal. v. 3 and his Scholiast.
Spalding.
| From his bent figure.
* If I eat white bread, why may I not wipe my face with a white
handkerchief ? If I use one white thing, why may I not use another ?
We should remember, as Turnebus observes, that persons under
accusation generally wore a dark dress.
** Caesar's lieutenant-general in Spain ; consul A.U.C. 709. Spalding.
++ Burmann seems to be right in supposing that this was Chrysippus
444 * QUINTILIAN. [B VI.
that Fabius's wooden models were the cases of Casar's ivory
ones. That was something similar which Pedo * said of a
mirmillo, who was pursuing a retiarius, but did not strike him,
Be wishes to take him alive. 62. Similitude is united with
ambiguity; as Aulus Galba Said to a player at ball who was
standing to catch the ball very much at his ease, You stand as
if you were one of Casar's candidates;f for in the word “stand”
there is ambiguity; the “ease" is similar in both cases. This
it is sufficient to have noticed. 63. But there is very fre-
quently a mixture of different kinds of pleasantry; and that
indeed is the best which is the most varied.
A like use may be made of things that are dissimilar. A
Roman knight, to whom, as he was drinking at the public
games, j. Augustus had sent an attendant with the message, If
I wish to dine, I retire to my house, replied, You, Augustus, are
not afraid of losing your place. 64. From contraries Š there
are many kinds of jokes. It was not the same sort of jest
with which Augustus addressed an officer whom he dismissed
with dishonour, and who tried several times to move him with
entreaties, saying, “What shall I tell my father ?” Tell him,
said the emperor, that I have displeased you, as that with which
Galba'ſ replied to a person who asked him for the loan of a
Vettius, the freedman of Cyrus, and an architect, as he appears to
have been in Gaul, and was perhaps in the retinue of Caesar. See
Cicero ad Div. vii. 14; ad Att. xiv. 9. Spalding.
* I have no doubt that this was the poet Caius Pedo Albinovanus,
who is casually mentioned, x. 1, 90. Spalding.
+ Sic petis tanguam, Cæsaris candidatus.] There is an ambiguity in
the Latin petis, for which I have given “stand.” Caesaris candidatus
means a candidate for office recommended by the emperor, and conse-
quently sure of being elected. -
£ After the time of Augustus this practice became common enough;
and, when the people were detained whole days at the spectacles, a
certain sum of money was allowed by the emperor to each order, to
buy wine to drink in the theatre; see the commentators on Martial,
i. 12, 27, who refer to this passage of Quintilian. Spalding.
§ When the reply is contrary to what might have been expected
from the question.
| See Macrob. Sat. ii. 4, whence we learn that the officer was
Herennius, a young man of immoral character. Spalding. r
* Whether this be the same Galba that is mentioned in sect. 62, I
think is very uncertain, as he lived, it appears, in a caenaculum, or garret,
a habitation for the poorer classes. Perhaps we should understand
Caius Galba, the brother of the emperor, who, after wasting his
property, is said to have left the city. Suet. Galb. c. 3. Burmann,
CH.III.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR 445
cloak, I cannot lend it you, for I am going to stay at home, the
fact being that the rain was pouring through the roof into his
garret. I will add a third, though respect for its author pre-
vents me from giving his name, You are more libidinous than
any eunuch ; where doubtless expectation is deceived by some-
thing contrary to that was looked for. Of similar origin,
though different from any of the preceding, is the observation
of Marcus Westinius, when he was told that some nasty fellow
was dead, He will then at length, said he, cease to stink.”
65. But I should overload my book with examples, and make it
similar to such as are composed to excite laughter, if 1 should
go through all the sorts of jests uttered by the ancients.
From all modes of argument, there is the same facility for
extracting jokes. Thus Augustus, in speaking of two actors
in pantomime, who vied with each other in gesticulation, em-
ployed definition, calling the one a dancer, and the other an
interrupter of dancing.f 66. Galba used distinction, when he
replied to one who asked him for his cloak, You cannot
have it, for, if it does not rain, you will not want ºt, and,
if it does rain, I shall wear it myself. From genus,
species, peculiarities, differences, connea;ions, adjuncts, conse-
quents, antecedents, contrarieties, causes, effects, comparisons of
things equal, greater, and less, similar matter for jesting is ex-
tracted. 67. It is found, too, in all the figures of speech.
Are not many jokes made zo.6 Tagºo??v, by the aid of hyper-
bole 2 Cicero gives us one example, in reference to a very tall
man, that he had struck his head against the arch of Fabius;S
and another is afforded in what Oppius Said of the family of
the Lentuli, of which the children were invariably shorter than
their parents, that it would by propagation come to nothing.
68. As for irony, is it not in itself, when employed very
* He was of course, says Burmann, a dirty fellow, that offended
other people's noses.
+ Alterum saltatorem dia.it, alterwm interpellatorem.] The one,
says Spalding, was such a dancer as he ought to have been ; the other
a mere spoiler of dancing. But we do not see the point of the joke.
Perhaps interpellatorem is corrupt. .
†: Jugatis.] See v. 10, 85. -
§ Cicero de Orat. ii. 66. But the joke is there attributed to Crassus.
Nor is it quite the same in form, for Memmius is said by Crassus
merely to have stooped his head as he went under the arch of Fabius.
Spalding supposes that Quintilian was misled by his imagination. The
arch of Fabius was so called from having been built by Fabius, Allo-
brogicus.
446 QUINTILIAN. [B.VI.
gravely, a species of joking? Domitius Afer used it very hap-
pily, when he said to Didius Gallus, who had made great
solicitations for a province, and, after obtaining it, complained
as if he were forced to accept it. Well, do something for the sake
of the commonwealth.* Cicero, too, employed it very sportively,
on a report of the death of Vatinius, for which the authority
was said to be far from certain, In the meantime, said he, I
will enjoy the interest.f 69. Cicero used also to say, allegori-
cally, of Marcus Caelius, who was better at accusing than
defending, that he had a good right-hand, but a bad left.j.
Julius used the antonomasia, when he said Ferrum. Accium
Navium incidisse. Š
70. Jocularity also admits all figures of thought, called by the
Greeks oxá007& 61&yoſo.g., under which some have ranked the
various species of jests; for we ask questions, and eaſpress doubt,
and affirm, and threaten, and wish ; and we make some remarks
as if in compassion, and others with anger. But everything is
jocular that is evidently pretended.
71. To laugh at foolish remarks is very easy; for they are
ridiculous in themselves; but some addition of our own in-
creases the wit. Titus Maximus foolishly asked Carpathius as
he was going out of the theatre, Whether he had seen the play;
when Carpathius made the question appear more ridiculous
by replying, No, for I was playing at ball in the orchestra.
72. Refutation admits of jesting either in the form of de-
nial, retort, defence, or eatenuation. Manius Curius made a
good repartee by way of denial; for when his accuser had had
him painted on a curtain, everywhere either stripped and
in prison in consequence of gambling, or being redeemed by
* Having obtained the province, by solicitation, for your own sake,
govern it for the sake of your country.
+ The report may not be true, but I will enjoy the hope that it may
not be false. If the capital on which interest is paid me, be but
imaginary, I may still make the most of the interest.
: The sword was held in the right hand, to attack ; the shield in
the left, to defend. Thºebus. ~.
§ A passage which we must leave in despair ; for it cannot be
amended without the help of some better manuscript. Burmann.
How the words are to be taken, so as to make a joke, it is impossible
to conjecture.
| We must suppose, says Gesner, that the curtain was divided into
compartments, and that some scene of his life was represented in
each compartment.
CH III.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR, 447
his friends, Was I, then, he replied, never successful ? 73. Retort
we use sometimes undisguisedly, as Cicero in reply to Vibius
Curius, who was telling falsehood concerning his age, said,
Then, when we declaimed in the schools together, you were not
born ; Sometimes with feigned assent, as the same orator said to
Fabia, Dolabella's wife, who observed that she was thirty years
old, No doubt, for I have heard you say so these twenty years.
74. Sometimes in place of what you deny, something more
cutting is happily substituted: as Junius Bassus, when Do-
mitia, the wife” of Passienus, complained that he had said,
as a charge of meanness against her, that she used to sell old
shoes, replied, No, indeed, I never said any such thing ; I said
that you used to buy them. A defence a Roman knight made
with some humour, replying to Augustus, who reproached him
with having eaten up his patrimony, I thought it was my own.
75. Of eatenuation there are two modes; a person may
make light of another's claims to indulgence,f or of some
boast that he utters. Thus Caius Cæsari said to Pomponius,
who was showing a wound which he had received in his mouth
in the sedition of Sulpicius, and which he boasted that he had
received in fighting for Caesar, When you are fleeing, never look
back. Or it may extenuate some fault imputed to us, as Cicero
said to those who reproached him with having at sixty years of
age married Publilia § a virgin, To-morrow she will be a woman.
76. Some call this kind of jest consequent, and similar to that
of Cicero when he said that Curio, who always began his
pleadings with an excuse for his age, would find his eacordium
every day more easy, because the reply seems naturally to follow
and attach itself to the remark. 77. But one kind of extenu-
ation is a suggestion of a reason, such as Cicero gave to
Vatinius, who, having the gout, but wishing to appear im-
proved in health, said that he could walk two miles a-day, The
days, rejoined Cicero, are very long. Augustus made a similar
answer to the people of Tarraco, who told him that a palm-
tree had grown on his altar in their city: It shows, said he,
* See c. 1, sect. 50. -
+ Voniam..] The genuineness of this word is very doubtful.
Spalding would read awt vanam quis alius jactantiam minuat, &c.
†. Caius Julius Caesar Strabo, cousin to the dictator's father. Turne-
bus.
§ Whom he married after he divorced Terentia. Ad Att. xii. 32.
448 QUINTILIAN. [B.vn
how often you make a fire on it. 78. Cassius Severus trans-
ferredº a charge from himself to others; for when he was
reproached by the praetor that his advocates had insulted
Lucius Varus an Epicuream, a friend of Caesar, he replied, 1
do not know what sort of characters committed the insult, but
suppose that they must have been Stoics. t
Of rebutting a jest there are many ways; the most happy
is that which is aided by Some resemblance in the words, as
Trachalus, when Suellius said to him, If this is so, you go into
eacile, replied, And if it is not so, you return into easile.
79. Cassius Severus, when a person made it a charge against
him that Proculeius had forbidden him his house, eluded the
charge by replying, Do I ever then go to Proculeius's house 3
Thus one jest is eluded by another; as the Emperor Augustus,
when the Gauls had made him a present of a collar of a
hundred pounds weight, and Dolabella had said in jest, though
with some solicitude as to the event of the jest, Distinguish
me, General, with the honour of the collar, replied, I had rather
distinguish you with the honour of a civic crown ºf 80. and one
falsehood may also be eluded by another; as when a person
said in the hearing of Galba that he had bought in Sicily for
one victoriatus ; a lamprey five feet long, Galba rejoined that
ăț was not at all surprising, as they grew so long there that the
fishermen used them for ropes. 81. Opposed to the negative
is the pretence of confession, which also has much wit. Thus
Domitius Afer, when he was pleading against a freedman of
Claudius Cæsar, and a person of the same condition as the
party against whom he was pleading called out from the
opposite side of the court, Do you then always speak against
the freedmen of Casar 3 replied, Always, and yet, by Hercules,
I produce no effect. § Similar to confession is not to demy what
is alleged, though it be evidently false, and though opportunity
for an excellent answer be suggested by it; as Catulus, when
Philippus said to him, Why do you bark & replied, Because
* Transtulit.] See on translatio, or “exception,” iii. 6, 23.
t Which was made of oak leaves.
# A small coin, the half of a denarius, about 3; d. of our money. It
was so called from having a figure of victory stamped on it.
§ It is known from Tacitus, Suetonius, and Dio Cassius, how much
Claudius was under the government of his freedmen. Hence the
boldness of Domitius Afer's remark is the more commendable.
Spalding. .
CH.III.] ED'UCATION OF AN ORATOR. 449
I see a thief.* 82. To joke upon one's self, is, I may say, the
part only of a buffoom, and is by no means allowable in an orator.
It may be done in as many ways as we joke upon others;
therefore, though it be too common, I pass it over. 83. What-
ever, moreover, is expressed scurrilously or passionately, is,
though it may raise a laugh, unworthy of a man of respec-
tability. Thus I know a man who said to an inferior person,
that had addressed him with too little respect, I will inflict a
blow on your head, and bring an action against you for hurting
my hand by the hardness of your head. At such a saying
it is doubtful whether the hearers ought to laugh or feel
indignation.
84. There remains to be noticed the kind of joke that
consists in deceiving eaſpectation,f or taking the words of
another in a sense different from that in which he uses them ;
and of all sorts of jests these may be said to be the happiest.
But an unexpected turn may be adopted even by one who
attacks; such as that of which Cicero gives an example:
What is wanting to this man earcept fortune and virtue # Or
as that of Domitius Afer : For pleading causes he is a man
eacellently apparelled.S. Or it may be used in anticipating
the answer of another person. Thus Cicero, on hearing a
false report of the death of Vatinius, asked his freedman
Ovinius, Is all well ? and, when he said All is well, rejoined,
He is then dead # 85. Great laughter attends on simulation
and dissimulation, which may be thought similar and almost
the same, but simulation is the act of one who pretends to feel
a certain persuasion in his mind; dissimulation that of one who
feigns not to understand another's meaning, Domitius Afer
used simulation, when, on some persons reiterating at a trial that
Celsima knew the facts, (who was a woman of some influence,)
he asked, Who is he 3 wishing to make it appear that he
thought Celsina a man. 86. Cicero used dissimulation when
a witness, named Sextus Annalis, had given testimony against
a person whom he was defending, and the prosecutor several
* Cicero de Orat. ii. 54.
f I interpret this jest according to the conception of Burmann.
I See ix. 2, 22; Cicero de Orat. ii. 70.
Ś Optimè vestitus J Pestitus instead of eacercitatus, versatws, or paratus.
Turnebus.
| Comp. sect. 68. -
G G
450 QUINTILIAN. [B. VI.
|
times pressed him, crying, Tell us, Marcus Cicero, whether you
can say anything of Seatus Annalis; Cicero immediately began
to recite from the sixth book of the Annals of Ennius,”
Quis potis ingentis causas evolvere belli ?
Who can the cause of this great war disclose ?
87. For this kind of jest ambiguity doubtless affords the most
frequent opportunity; as it did to Cascellius,t who, when a
person consulting him said, I wish to divide my ship, rejoined,
You will lose it then. But the thoughts are often sent in
another direction, by a remark being turned off from something
of greater to something of less consequence; as when the
person who was asked what he thought of a man caught in
adultery, replied that he was slow. § 88. Of a similar nature
is that which is said in such a manner as to convey a suspicion
of the meaning; as in an example to be found in Cicero.]
When a man was lamenting that his wife had hung herself on
a fig-tree, I beg you, said another to him, to give me a slip of
that tree, that I may plant it; for the meaning, though not
expressed, is very well understood. 89. Indeed all facetious-
ness lies in expressing things with some deviation from the
natural and genuine sense of the words employed;" and this
is wholly done by misrepresenting our own or other people's
thoughts, or by stating something that cannot be. 90. Juba”
misrepresented the thought of another, when he said to a man
that complained of having been bespattered by his horse,
What I do you think me a Hippocentaur 3 H Caius Cassius
misrepresented his own, when he said to a soldier hurrying to
the field without his sword, Ah 1 comrade, you will use your
* Dic, said the prosecutor, de Seacto Ammali : Cicero repeated a verse
de Sea to Ammali, or de Seacto Emmi Ammalium libro. It was probably
the first verse of the book ; or, if not, one with which his hearers
were well acquainted. Virgil has an imitation of it, Æn. ix. 528.
+ Cascellius Aulus, the famous lawyer mentioned by Hor. Epist, ad
Pis. 371.
Í Meaning, to divide or share the freight of it with some other
person.
§ Cicero de Orat. ii. 68.
|| De Orat. ii. 69. -
"I Aliter quám est rectum verumque..] So in sect. 6 he says ridiculum
dictum, plerwmque falswm est.
** Juba the historian, whom Julius Caesar led in triumph, and
Augustus restored to his kingdom.
++. The person who complained seems to have said, “You have
bespattered me,” when the spattering had proceeded from the horse.
CH.III.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 451
fist well;* and Galba did the same when some fish, which
had been partly eaten the day before, were put upon the table
with their other side uppermost : Let us make haste to eat,
Said he, for there are people under the table supping upon the
same dish. Of the same sort is the jest of Cicero on Curius,
which I have just mentioned,t for it was impossible that he
should not have been born when he was declaiming. 91. There
is a certain misrepresentation, too, that has its origin in irony,
of which Caius Caesar; gives us an example; for when a
witness said that his groin had been wounded by the accused
person, and it was easy to show why he had wished to wound
that part of his body rather than any other, Caesar preferred
to say, What could he do, when you had a helmet and a coat of
mail & S 92. But the best of all simulation is that which is
directed against one who simulates, such as that which was
employed in the following instance by Domitius Afer : He had
by him a will which had been made some time, and a man
whom he had taken into his friendship since the date of it,
hoping to gain something if he should alter it, told him a story
of his own invention, for the purpose of asking him whether
he should advise an old chief centurion, who had already
made his will, to make another,” By no means do so, said
Domitius, for you will offend him.
93. But the most agreeable of all such pleasantries, are
such as are good-natured, and, so to speak, easy of digestion ;
Such as that which the same orator once addressed to an un-
grateful client, who avoided recognition from him one day in
the forum ; he sent this message to him by an attendant:
Are you not obliged to me for not having seen you ? Or as that
which he addressed to his steward, who, when he was unable to
give an account of the money in his hands, remarked several
* He pretended to think that the soldier had left his sword behind
him intentionally, and was going to fight with his fists. Turnebus.
+ Sect. 73.
# The same, I suppose, that is mentioned in sect. 75. Spalding.
Ś Quintilian doubtless saw more wit in this supposition than we can
See.
| Perhaps there was a good deal of talk about the wills of that class
of men at that time. Spalding.
* Ordinare Suprema judicia.] This phrase is often used for testar;
by the lawyers. The substantive, however, is very frequently omitted.
Spalding.
G G 2
452 UI NTILIAN. - [B.VI.
times, “I have eaten no bread, and I drink water;” Sparrow,
said Domitius, return what you ought to return.” These kinds
of jokes they call jokes applicable to character. 94. It is a
pleasing sort of jest, too, that lays less to the charge of another
than might be laid ; thus when a candidate for office applied to
Domitius Afer for his vote, saying, “I have always respected
your family,” Domitius, when he might have boldly denied
the assertion, said, I believe you, and it is true. It is some-
times amusing to speak of one's self.t That, too, which, if said
regarding a person in his absence, would be ill-natured, is,
when uttered as an attack upon him to his face, a mere sub-
ject for laughter. 95. Such was the remark of Augustus,
when a soldier was requesting something unreasonable of him,
and Marcianus, whom he suspected of intending to ask of him
Something unjust, came up at the time: I will no more do
what you ask, comrade, said he to the soldier, than I will do
that which Marcianus is going to ask. 96. Verses also, aptly
quoted, have given great effect to witticisms, whether introduced
entire and just as they are, (a thing so easy, that Ovid has
composed a book against bad poets in verses taken from the
Tetrastichs of Macer, i) and this mode of citation is the more
agreeable if it be seasoned with something of ambiguity, as in
Cicero's remark upon Marcius, Š a man of much cunning and
artifice, when he was suspected of unfair dealing in a cause,
Nisi qué Ulia'es rate evasit Laertius,"
Unless Ulysses, old Laertes' son,
Had in his ship escap'd ;
97. Or with some little change in the words; as when Cicero
jested on a Senator, who, having been always thought extremely
foolish, was, after inheriting an estate, called upon first to give
his vote in the Senate, saying, s
* Passer, redde quod debes.] The commentators give no satisfactory
explanation of Passer. Gebhardt's comment on it is mere trifling.
Spalding admits that he can find nothing among the ancient writers to
illustrate it, though he retains it in his text. It is certainly better to
read pascere, “Eat, and give a proper account of your money,” with
Obrecht and Francius.
+ I wonder that no example is given. Spalding.
† Of these tetrastichs of AEmilius Macer nothing is left. See
Broulthusius ad Tibullum, ii. 6, 1.
Ś It is uncertain whether this name be genuine.
| A verse from some unknown tragedy.
CH.III.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 453
Cujus hatreditas est quam vocant Sapientiam,
Th’ estate of whom is that which they call wisdom,
putting hareditas, “estate,” for facilitas, “faculty;” or by in-
venting verses similar to some well-known verses, which is
called a parody. 98. Or proverbs may be aptly applied, as a
person said to a man of bad character who had fallen down,
and asked to be helped up, Let some one take you up who
does not know you.”
To take a jest from history shows learning; as Cicero did, on
the trial of Verres; for when he was examining a witness,
Hortensius observed, “I do not understand these enigmas;”
But you ought, replied Cicero, as you have a Sphina, at home ;
for he had received from Verres a brazen Sphinx of great
value.
99. As to apparent absurdities, they consist in an imitation of
foolish sayings, and would, if they were not affected, be foolish;
as that of the man who, when the people expressed their
wonder that he had bought a low candlestick, said to them,
It will serve me for breakfast.f. But Some that are very like
absurdities, and that seem to be said without any reason at all,
are extremely pointed; as when the slave of Dolabella was
asked whether his master had advertised a sale of his property,
he replied, He has sold his house.S 100. Persons taken by sur-
prise sometimes get rid of their embarrassment by a jest. Thus
when an advocate asked a witness who said that he had been
wounded by the person on trial, “whether he had a scar to
show,” and the witness showed a large one on his groin, He
ought, observed the advocate, to have aimed at your side.|| It
is also possible to use insulting expressions happily; as Hispo,
when his accuser twice imputed heinous crimes to him, replied,
* Compare Hor. Epist. i. 17, 62.
* See sect. 43. -
† Pransorium erit.] Prandia. similar to our breakfasts, required
smaller apparatus than were used for dinner. Spalding. A low
candlestick diffuses but little light, and is consequently of small use
at night; the man said, therefore, that it would serve for breakfast,
when, indeed, as it would be daylight, no lamp would be required.
Twº'nebws.
Š By this reply he signified that his master was reduced to sell
everything; for the house which a person inhabits will be the last
thing that he will sell. Turnebus.
| My client ought to have aimed at your side, and at a mortal part,
and you would then have been prevented from giving evidence against
him on the present occasion. Gesner.
454 QUINTILIAN. [B. VI.
You lie. And Fulvius, when Legatus, who asked him whether
a will, which he produced, had a signature, replied, And a true
one, master.”
101. These are the most usual sources, that I have either
found indicated by others, or discovered for myself, from which
jests may be derived ; but I must repeat,f that there are as
many subjects for facetiousness as for gravity; all which per-
sons, places, occasions, and chances, which are almost infinite,
suggest to us. 102. I have therefore touched upon these
points that I might not seem to neglect them ; and what I
have said on the practice and manner of jesting was, though
unsatisfactory, nevertheless necessary.
To these Domitius Marsus, who wrote a very carefully
studied treatise on Urbanitas, “urbanity,” adds some exam-
ples of sayings that are not laughable, but admissible even
into the gravest speeches; they are elegantly expressed, and
rendered agreeable by a certain peculiar kind of wit; they are
indeed urbana, “urbane,” or “polished,” but have nothing
to do with the ridiculous. 103. Nor was his work intended
to treat of laughter, but of urbanitas, which, he says, is pe.
culiar to our city, and was not at all understood till a late
period, after it became common for the term urbs, though the
proper name was not added, to be taken as signifying Rome.
104. He thus defines it: ; “Urbanitas is a certain power of
thought, comprised in a concise form of expression, and
adapted to please and excite mankind, with reference to every
variety of feeling, being especially fitted either to repel or to
attack, as circumstances or persons may render necessary.”
But this definition, if we take from it the particular of con-
ciseness, may be considered as embracing all the excellences
of language; for, if it concerns things and persons, to say
what property applies to each of them is the part of consum-
mate eloquence; and why he made it a necessary condition
that it should be concise, I do not know.
105. But, in the same book, a little farther on, he defines
another kind of urbanitas. peculiar to narrative, (which has
* In these two repartees no wit is to be discovered; the text is
probably corrupt or defective; “but,” says Spalding, “I had rather
abstain from attempting emendation than pretend to see in the
thickest darkness.”
T Comp. sect. 35, 36.
# See Quintilian's own definition, sect. 17. Gesner.
CH.III.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 455
been displayed, he says, in many speakers,) in the following
manner, adhering, as he states, to the opinion of Cato :
“A man of urbanitas will be one from whom many good say
ings and repartees shall have proceeded, and who, in common
conversation, at meetings, at entertainments, in assemblies of
the people, and, in short, everywhere, speaks with humour and
propriety. Whatever orator shall deliver himself in this way,
laughter will follow.” 106. But if we receive these definitions,
whatever is said well, will also have the character of wrbanitas.
To a writer who proposed such specifications, it was natural to
make such a division of urbane sayings as to call some serious,
Some jocose, and others intermediate; for this division applies
to all properly expressed thoughts, 107. But to me, even
Some sayings that are jocose, appear not to be expressed with
sufficient urbanitas, which, in my judgment, is a character of
Oratory in which there is nothing incongruous, nothing coarse,
nothing unpolished, nothing barbarous to be discovered, either
in the thoughts, or the words, or the pronunciation, or the
gestures ; so that it is not to be looked for so much in words
considered singly, as in the whole complexion of a speech;
like Atticism among the Greeks, which was a delicacy of taste
peculiar to the city of Athens.
108. Yet that I may not do injustice to the judgment of
Marsus, who was a very learned man, I will add that he dis-
tinguishes urbanitas, as applied to serious sayings, into the
commendatory, the reproachful, and the intermediate. Of the
commendatory he gives an example from Cicero, in his speech
for Ligarius,” when he says to Caesar, Thou who art wont to
forget nothing but injuries. 109. Of the reproachful he gives
as an instance what Cicero wrote to Atticust concerning Pom-
pey and Caesar : I have one whom I can avoid; one whom I
can follow, I have not. Of the intermediate, which he calls
apopthegmatic, he cites as a specimen these other words of
Cicero : that death could never be either grievous to a brave
man, or premature to a man who has attained the consulship,
or calamitous to a wise man. All these passages are very
happily expressed; but why they should be peculiarly dis-
* C. 12.
f Ad Att. viii. 7, with which Quintilian's words do not exactly
correspond. Comp. Plutarch, vol. ii. p. 205; Macrob. Saturn. ii. 3.
See also viii. 5, 18. Spalding.
# In Catil. iv. 2.
456 - QUINTILIAN. [B. VI.
tinguished by the character of urbanitas, I do not see. 110.
If it is not the whole complexion of a composition, (as it ap-
pears to me,) that entitles it to this distinction, and if the
term is to be applied to single expressions, I should rather
give the character of urbanitas to those sayings which are of
the kind called droll, but which yet are not droll, such as the
following: 111. It was said of Asinius Pollio, who could
adapt himself alike either to business or to pleasure, that he
was a man for all hours; and of a pleader, who spoke with
ease extemporaneously, that he had all his wit in ready cash.
Such, too, was the saying of Pompey, which Marsus notices,
addressed to Cicero, who expressed distrust of his party; go
over to Caesar, then, and you will fear me.* Though this, if
it had been uttered on a less important occasion, or in another
spirit, or by any other person than Pompey, might have been
numbered among droll sayings. 112. To these may be added
what Cicero wrote to Cerellia,f assigning a reason why he so
patiently endured the proceedings of Caesar: These things
must be borne, either with the mind of a Cato or with the
stomach of a Cicero ; for the word stomach carries with it
Something like a jest.
These reflections, which struck me with regard to the
definitions of Marsus, I could not withhold from my readers;
in which, though I may have erred, I have not deceived them,
having pointed out at the same time a different opinion, which
it is free for those, who approve it, to follow.
CHAPTER IV.
Remarks on altercation or discussion, $ 1–5. Too much neglected by
some pleaders, 6, 7. Qualifications requisite for success in it;
acuteness, knowledge of the case, good temper, attention to the
main question, 8–13. Further observations, 14–16. We may
dissemble our strength, in order to mislead our adversary, 17, 18.
Disposition of the judge to be observed, 19, 20. The student
should exercise himself in this department, 21. Order of proofs
is important, 22.
1. IT might appear that I should not enter upon precepts
* As Cicero was constantly saying that he was afraid of Caesar and
his army, Pompey said to him, Go over to Caesar, and you will then
fear me, you who are always afraid of the enemy. Capperonier.
ºf A learned and philosophical lady with whom Cicero had some
correspondence, of which the sentence in the text is the only remaining
fragment. Spalding. See Dio Cass. b. xlvi. p. 461, ed. Reim.
CH.IV.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 457
concerning discussion” until I have treated of every particular
regarding continuous speaking; for recourse is had to discus-
sion last of all;f but, as it depends on invention alone, and
can have no concern with arrangement, nor requires any great
ornament from style, or much assistance from memory or
delivery, I think that, before I proceed to the second of the
five parts, I shall treat of this, which is connected wholly
with the first, in a not improper place, if I speak of it here.
2. It is a matter which other writers have neglected, perhaps
because sufficient regard seemed to have been paid to it in the
other rules of the art; for it consists either in attack or
defence, concerning which a considerable number of directions
have been given; since whatever is proper with regard to
proofs in a continued speech, must also necessarily be appli-
cable to the brevity and conciseness of discussion, in which no
other topics are introduced than are in the rest of the
pleading; they are only treated in another manner, that is,
by Way of question and answer. Almost all that is necessary
to be observed with respect to this head has been noticed by
me $ in the part relating to witnesses. 3. Yet, as I am pursuing
this work on an extensive plan, and as an orator cannot be
called accomplished without ability in discussion, let me devote
a little particular attention to this point also, which, indeed,
in some causes, contributes greatly to insure success. 4. For
as, with regard to the general quality of an action, when it is
considered whether it was justly done or otherwise, continuous
Speaking is most required, which also sufficiently sets forth,
for the most part, questions of definition or exception, as well
as all those in which a fact is admitted, or inferred, by
* Altercationis.] Altercatio is disputation consisting in answers and
replies, or, as Quintilian says a little farther on, brevis et concisa actio,
as opposed to actio continua or perpetua, which is not interrupted by
any questions from the opposite party. There is an excellent example
of altercatio in Cicero's Epist. ad Att. i. 16. Capperonier.
+ That is, after the regular pleading of the cause. Thºrnebus.
f The commentators refer to b. iii. c. 9, but there are allusions to
the subject in various passages of the work, especially in book v.,
where proof and refutation are formally noticed. Spalding.
Š B. V. c. 7.
| Quaestiones finitionis (et) actionis.] Actio is here to be interpreted
status translativus, or “state of exception.” See iii. 6, 23. Spalding.
We must read quaestiones in the plural, as Spalding observes; and it
will be better to insert et between the two other substantives.
458 QUINTILIAN. | B. VI.
conjecture” from artificial proof;f so in those causes, (a very
numerous class,) which either depend solely on proofs called
inartificial, or such as are of a mixed kind, the heat of
discussion is frequently most fierce; nor should we say that
advocates point their swords at each other in any part of
a cause more closely than in this. 5. For the strongest
arguments must here be inculcated on the mind of the judge;
whatever we promised in the course of our pleading must be
made good; and the false allegations of the opposite party
must be refuted. There is no part of a cause, indeed, in
which the judge is more attentive; and some pleaders, though
but of moderate power in speaking, have, by their excellence
in disputation, gained a just title to the name of advocates.
6. But some, on the other hand, satisfied with having bestowed
on their clients the showy labour of declamation, quit the
benches at the close of it, attended with a crowd of flatterers,
and leave to ignorant and mean practitioners $ the conduct of
the battle which ought to decide the cause. 7. Accordingly,
in private causes, we may see some advocates chosen for
pleading and others for the establishment of proofs. But if
these duties are to be divided, the latter is surely of more
importance than the former; and it is dishonourable to Oratory
to say that inferior pleaders profit their clients more than
those of greater ability. At public trials, however, the voice
of the crier cites him who has pleaded | as well as the other
advocates.
8. For such disputation, then, there is need, in the first
place, of a quick and active intellect, and of a ready and keen
judgment. For we have no time to reflect, but must speak
at once, and aim a blow at our adversary at the same time
that we parry his attempt on ourselves. As it is of the
greatest importance, therefore, to every part of an orator's
duty, to know his whole cause not only accurately, but
familiarly, so it is of the utmost necessity, in altercation with
our adversary, to have a thorough knowledge of all the cha-
* Statu conjecturali.] See b. iii. c. 6.
+ See b. v. c. 1.
3: See b. v. c. 1.
§ Pullatae turbat.] Comp. ii. 12, 10. But it is the pragmatic; that
are here understood, as Turnebus justly remarks. Spalding.
| He cannot go off, as in private causes.
CH. Iv.] EDUCATION OF AN. ORATOR, 459
racters, instruments, times, and places connected with it;
otherwise we shall often be put to silence, or, if others suggest
replies to us, we must, from necessary haste to speak,
unreasoningly acquiesce in what they say ; whence it will
sometimes happen that in trusting to others, we shall have to
blush for their folly. Nor is the matter made clear by these
monitors.* 9. Some advocates, too, try undisguisedly to bring
us to a quarrel; for we may see many of them, transported
apparently with Wrath, calling upon the judge to attend, and
saying that what is suggested is contrary to fact, and that he
who is to decide the cause should understand the evil which is
kept out of sight. 10. He who would be a good disputant,
therefore, must be free from the vice of passionateness; for
no affection of the mind is a greater enemy to reason ; it
carries us out of the cause, leads us, frequently, to offer and
incur gross insults, sometimes draws upon us the indignation of
the judges themselves. Moderation is better, and sometimes
even sufferance ; for allegations made by the opposite party
must not only be refuted, but must be held up to contempt,
must be undervalued and ridiculed ; nor can wit find any
better place for exercise than this. Such is the case as long
as matters are conducted with order and due respect to us;
but against turbulent adversaries we must show a bold face,
and oppose impudence with firmness. 11. For there are
some speakers of such a hardened front that they assail us
with loud bluster, interrupt us in the middle of a speech, and
confuse and disturb the whole proceedings; these we must be
so far from imitating, that we must vigorously repel them;
their insolence must be put down ; and we must at times
appeal to the judges or presiding magistrates that the times
for speaking may be fairly observed. It is no task for an
indolent mind, or an excessively modest character; and that
which is called honesty often bears a false name, and should
rather be called imbecility.
12. What is of the greatest value in disputation is acuteness,
which doubtless does not come from art; (since what is natural
is not taught;) but it may be improved by art. 13. The
chief requisite is, to keep the point in dispute, and that which
we wish to establish, constantly before our eyes; because, if we
keep to one object, we shall not be led into useless altercation,
* Wegwe tamen hoc ipsis monitoribus clarescit..] Burmann would read
neqwe tamen lis his monitoribus clarescit.
460 QUINTILIAN. [B.VI.
or waste the time due to the cause in railing; and, if our
adversary commit such errors, we shall have the pleasure of
taking advantage of them.
14. To those who have meditated carefully what may be ob-
jected on the opposite side, or what replies may be made on
their own, all occasions * may be turned to advantage. It is a
kind of artifice employed at times, however, to contrive that
certain points, which have been concealed in the course of the
pleading. may be suddenly brought forth in the subsequent
discussion; starting out as it were in an unexpected Sally, or
a spring f from an ambush. This is a plan which may be
adopted when there is some particular in the cause on which
we cannot speak satisfactorily at once, but which we can make
clear when time is given us for consideration. 15. What is
secure and solid, it will be best to bring forward at the com-
mencement of our proceedings, that we may insist upon it the
oftener and the longer. It seems scarcely necessary to direct
that a disputant should not be turbulent and clamorous merely,
like people who are utterly strangers to learning; for audacity,
though it may be troublesome to the adversary, is at the same
time hateful to the judge. 16. It is inexpedient, too, to con-
tend long for a point which you cannot carry; for where you
must be conquered, it is better to yield; because, if there be
several points in dispute, the good faith which we show with
regard to one will cause us to be more trusted with respect to
others, or, if there be but one point, a lighter penalty may be
inflicted on us in consequence of a candid acknowledgment.
To persist in vindicating a fault, especially when it is exposed,
is to commit another fault.
17. While the contest is undecided, there is great skill and
artifice in drawing on Our adversary when wandering from the
point, and forcing him to go as far from it as possible, in such
a way that he may exult at times in false hopes of success.
Some points in our evidence may accordingly with advantage
be kept back; for Our opponents will perhaps press for them
with importunity, and risk the whole of their cause on what
* Omnia tempora.] Capperonier and Spalding agree with Rollin in
thinking that tempora should be expunged.
+ Citissimo facto.] Facto, observes Burmann, can hardly be Quin-
tilian's word. He proposes impetui or incurswi.
f Ad disponendum.] I have no doubt that Quintilian wrote dispici.
andwm. Comp. x. 7, 20. Spalding.
CH. Iv.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 461
they think that we cannot produce, adding authority to our
proofs by the earnestness with which they demand them.
18. It may be of use, too, at times, to abandon some point to
our adversary, which he may think in his favour, in order that,
while he is grasping it, he may let slip something of greater
importance; or to offer him his choice of two things, either of
which he will choose to his disadvantage; a course which may
be adopted with more effect in discussion than in regular
pleading, because in the one we reply to ourselves, and in the
other we convict our adversary, as it were, on his own con-
fession. - -
19. It is the part of an acute pleader to observe, above all,
by what remarks the judge is most impressed, and to what he
listens with disapprobation; a circumstance which may often
be discovered from his looks, and sometimes from some word
or gesture. He ought then to insist upon whatever promotes
his object, and to withdraw adroitly from whatever is preju-
dicial to him. It is in such a way that physicians act; they
continue or cease to give medicines, just as they see that they
are relished or loathed by the patient. 20. Sometimes, if it
is not easy to make a point that we have stated clear, we may
raise another question, and fix the attention of the judge, if
possible, upon it; for when you yourself cannot answer to a
thing, what is to be done but to find something else to which
your opponent may be unable to answer 2 21. In regard to
most parts of a disputation, as I observed,” the same is to be
Said as in regard to the examination of witnesses, the difference
being only with respect to persons; as in the one case the
contest is between advocates, and in the other between the
witness and the advocate. But to exercise one's self in dispu-
tation is much more easy ; for it is possible, and may be of
the greatest advantage, to choose, in conjunction with some one
engaged in the same studies, a subject, either true or fictitious,
for discussion, and to take different sides upon it after the
manner of altercations in the courts; a practice which may
also be adopted in respect to the simple sort of questions.#
22. I would also have an advocate understand in what order
his various proofs should be brought before the judge in
Such disputations; and the same plan may be adopted with
* Sect. 2.
+ I understand questions, theses, as distinct from causes; see v. 10,
53; ii. 1, 9. Spalding.
462 QUINTILIAN. [B. VI.
regard to them as with regard to the arguments in his speech,
namely, that the strongest be placed first and last ; for the
former dispose the judge to believe him, and the latter to
decide in his favour.
CHAPTER V.
Of judgment and sagacity ; their importance, § 1–6. Examples from
Demosthenes, 7, 8. From Cicero, 9, 10. Conclusion of the book, 11.
1. HAVING treated of this head to the best of my ability, I
should not hesitate to pass at Once to disposition, which follows
next in order, were I not. apprehensive that, as there are
writers who place judgment * under invention, I might be
thought by some to have purposely omitted that subject, though
it is a quality, in my opinion, so blended and mixed with every
part of oratory that its influence is inseparable from even a
single thought or word; and it is not communicable by art
any more than taste or smell. 2. All that I can do, accord-
ingly, is to teach, and persevere in teaching, what is to be
imitated or avoided in each department of the art, in order
that judgment may be exercised in reference to it. I shall
continue to teach, therefore, that we must not attempt what
cannot be accomplished; that we must avoid all arguments
that are contradictory or common to both sides;f and that
nothing in our speech must be barbarous or obscure; but the
observance of all such rules must be under the guidance of
common sense, which cannot be taught. -
3. From judgment I do not consider that sagacity greatly
differs, except that judgment is employed about things which
are evident in themselves, and Sagacity about things that are
obscure, having either not been noticed at all, or being of a
doubtful nature. Judgment is very often sure; Sagacity is
a certain reasoning, as it were, from the depths of things,
generally weighing and comparing different arguments, and
exercising the faculties both of invention and arbitration. 4, But
such observations are not to be taken as universally true; for
Sagacity is often exercised on Some circumstance that precedes
the pleading of a cause ; as Cicero, in pleading against Verres,
* See iii. 3, 5, 6.
t Communia.] See iii. 3, 5.
CH. V.] EDUCATION OF AN ORATOR. 463
appears with great sagacity to have preferred occupying a
shorter time with his speech to prolonging it to the year in
which Quintus Hortensius was to be consul.” 5. In the
conduct of a pleading, Sagacity-holds the first-and-most influ-
-ential place; for it is required to determine what we ought to
Say, what to suppress, and what to defer; whether it be better
to deny a fact, or to justify it; when we should use an
exordium, and of what kind; whether we should give a state-
ment of facts, and in what form ; whether we should rest our
case on law or on equity; what order is the most eligible;
what style we should adopt, and whether it be expedient to
speak boldly, gently, or humbly. 6. But upon these points I
have already, as occasiou has allowed, given some directions,
and I shall continue to do so in the rest of my work. I will
make a few remarks here, however, by way of example, that it
may be more clearly understood what it is that I think cannot
be taught by rules of art. 7. The sagacity of Demosthenes is
commended in this respect, that, when he was recommending
war to the Athenians, who had previously tried it with little
success, he showed that nothing had been done in it with
prudent management, so their neglect might be made amends
for, whereas if no error had been committed, there would have
been no ground for better hopes for the future. 8. The same
Orator, too, when he feared to give offence if he reproached the
people for their indolence in maintaining the liberty of their
country, preferred to dwell on the praise of their ancestors, who
had governed it with such effect; for he thus found them
willing to listen, and it naturally followed that, while they
approved of the better, they repented of the worse. 9. As to
Cicero, his speech for Cluentius alone is worth an infinity of
examples. For what proof of sagacity in it hall I admire
most 2 The opening of the case, in which he deprives the
mother, whose influence bore hard upon her son, of all credit?
* When Cicero saw that it was in contemplation to prolong the pro-
ceedings to another year and another praetorship, and to rescue the
accused by the aid of Hortensius and Metellus, who would then be
consuls, he contrived to avoid protracting his pleading, and spending
time on increasing the number of his charges, and called witnesses to
Support each individual charge that he had made, consigning them to
Hortensius for examination; a mode by which Hortensius was so
fatigued, that he ceased to offer further opposition; and Verres,
despairing of support, went of his own accord into exile. Asconius
Pedianus.
464 - QUINTILIAN. [B. VI.
Or his determination to transfer the guilt of having bribed the
judges on the adverse party, rather than deny it, on account, as
he says, of the notorious infamy of their judgment 2 . Or his
recourse, last of all, in so odious an affair, to the support of the
law, a mode of defence by which he would have alienated the
feelings of the judges, if they had not been previously softened?
Or his protestation that he adopted that course contrary to
the inclination of Cluentius 2 10. Or what shall I commend
in his speech for Milo 2 That he made no statement
of the case until he had removed the prejudices entertained
against the accused ?” That he threw the odium of having
laim in wait upon Clodius, though the encounter was in
reality fortuitous 2 That he commended the deed, and yet
exculpates Milo from having intentionally committed it?
That he put no supplications into the mouth of his client, but
took the character of suppliant on himself?'t It would be
endless to enumerate all the proofs of Sagacity that he exhibits;
how he divests Cotta of all credit; how he opposes himself in
the place of Ligarius; how he reacues Cornelius || by alleging
the openness of his confession." 11. I think it sufficient to
observe, that there is nothing, not only in Oratory, but in the
whole conduct of life, more valuable than Sagacity; "| that
without it all instruction is given in vain ; and that judgment
can do more without learning than learning without judgment;
for it is the part of that virtue to adapt our speech to places,
circumstances, and characters. But as this part of my subject
is somewhat comprehensive, and is intimately connected with
oratorical effect, it shall be noticed when I proceed to give
directions on speaking with propriety.**
* Comp. iii. 6, 93.
f Comp. c. 1, sect. 25, 27.
+ Comp. v. 13, 30.
§ Comp. v. 10, 93.
| Comp. v. 13, 18, 26.
"I See c. 3, sect. 34.
** B. xi. c. 1 ; comp. i. 5, 1.
ENID OF WOI, I.
AND CHARING GROSS:
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