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THE GROWTH ()F GERMAN UNITY.
GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY
An Historical and Critical Study
3 1 2 9 F -
HZY"
GUSTAV K RAUSE
“ Das ganze Deutschland soll es sein."
–Arndt.
LONDON
DAVID NUTT, 27e sTRAND, W. C.
I 89 2

TO
ALDERMAN J. L. SEATON, J.P.,
HULL,
Q big Jº O OR
IS, IN TESTIMONY OF VALUED FRIENDSHIP,
DEDICATED BY THE AUTHOR.
PREFACE.
THE appearance of the present sketch may seem to require
a few words of explanation.
For years after the constitution of the German Empire,
and as late as 1886 and 1887, when discussing with English-
men the political condition of Germany, I very often
heard the opinion expressed, even by some who warmly
sympathized with the cause of Germany, that the Empire
must come to grief as soon as its chief founders, the well-
known triad, had passed away. It is said to be the un-
expected that happens; but apart from paradox, an opinion
such as that mentioned could only have been formed by those
unacquainted with the fundamental conditions of modern
Germany, and with the forces that were such powerful
weapons in the hands of the founders of the new Teutonic
Empire.
The frequent expression of doubts on the cohesive
strength of Imperial Germany led me, in 1887, to deliver a
lecture on the Growth of German Unity, and English
friends who were present urged me to enlarge my notes
PREFACE.
e
and publish them in book form. Owing however to the
claims of other literary work, it was not until this summer
that I returned to the subject.
And now the famous triad are no longer at the helm of
the State, for two are dead, and the third and mightiest has
retired from the scene of his triumphs; but the Imperial
flag of Germany continues to float on high, falsifying the
prognostications of the doubters. The number of these
has considerably decreased of late years: many have
familiarized themselves more thoroughly with German life
and thought, with German history and politics. Yet even to
them the present treatise may be welcome as a brief account
of the longings and strivings of a people struggling through
centuries for the attainment of one great object, national
unity and independence.
My aim has not been to enter into a scientific and
theoretical investigation of the historical development
of German unity, as has been done by Dr. Jastrow,
whose work is referred to in the following pages, but
rather to handle the subject in a popular way, and to
draw within the range of observation ideas, sentiments,
and actualities which, although quite matters of course
to the German mind, may require to be pointed out
to the English reader who does not happen to be
familiar with German modes of thought or with the
PREF.A.C.E.
intricacies of the political and general condition of the
Germany of the past.
Quite in keeping with this plan are the many Quotations
inserted in the text: if I have not always related
incidents and argued conclusions objectively, but have
allowed the voices of poets, philosophers, and historians of
various periods to be heard, it is because I wished to take
the reader to the primary sources of information on the
spirit of the different epochs. The numerous quotations,
therefore, I trust, are rather an element of strength than of
weakness.
For the translations of the various Snatches of poetry,
except the few which are marked as having been adopted
from other sources, I must crave the reader's indulgence,
for poetry always suffers by transference from one idiom
into another, and the more when the translator is not
himself a poet. -
That the book is written in the German spirit, and
from the German point of view, I acknowledge and
state from the outset. But its avowedly national character
cannot surely offend anyone or need any apology from me.
The more the legitimate aspirations of each great national
community are understood and respected, the greater
are the chances for a rational advancement of the interests
of the whole human race.
CONTENTS.
INTROI) UCTION
CHAPTER I.—The Rise and Decline of the Mediaeval
German Kingdom, or “Holy Roman Empire
of the German Nation * ...
II. —The Dream of German Unity in its Earliest
Form
* > III.-The Reformation and the Thirty Years' War
—Aggressive Policy of France
• * IV.-Rise of Brandenburg-Prussia—Dualism be-
tween Austria and Prussia
V.—The Literary Movement and Philosophical
and Political Thought at the Close of the
Eighteenth Century
5 : VI. —The Fall of the Empire—Humiliation of
Prussia—Dismemberment of Germany
* 5 VII.-Regeneration of Prussia and Germany—The
Dream of German Unity in its Modern Form—
The Wars of Liberation ...
3 : VIII. —The Results of the Wars of Liberation—
Subsequent Movements in Favour of Liberty
and Unity—Reactionary Policy of the Govern-
ments—The German ‘‘ Lied ?”
PAGE
59
6
3
7
2
IOS
CONTENTS.
PAGE
CHAPTER IX. —Impotence of the “Bund”—Manifestation of
National Feeling ... * * * e is e & e º tº e & I 22
3 5 X. —The “Zollverein”—Development of the Idea
of Unity ... e & tº e & e * * * is & tº * 6 & I 29
XI.-The Revolution and the Attempts at Unity
from 1848 to 1850 e is a tº tº & sº e ºs * * * I 33
* 5 XII.-Further Progress of the Idea of Unity—
Italian and German Unity—The Prussian
Headship ... tº e is gº tº a * @ 8 * * * e g tº I44
2 3 XIII.-The Struggle for Leadership between Austria
and Prussia tº ſº tº e ºn tº * * * * & e & © e I62
2 3 XIV.-The Unification of “ Klein-Deutschland ” and
the Establishment of the Empire is is tº e e º I79
CONCLUSION.—A Glance towards the Future ... & ſº º * * * I99
THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
INTRODUCTION.
OMENTOUS changes in the life and political
constitution of a nation can only be understood
when the light of history has been thrown on their
causes and the degree of their necessity; for any attempt to
form an opinion of them de se, without consideration of
their connection with the past, without a critical review of
the nation's own case and the special wants arising out
of its geographical position and its temperament, must
necessarily lead to grave errors of judgment as to the
intrinsic merits or demerits, as to the stability or possible
instability of institutions established by such changes.
Such errors were, and to a great extent still are, very
common with regard to the affairs of the German Empire.
Few men, in this country or elsewhere, are familiar with the
complex history of the Empire as a whole, and the still
more entangled history of the various German states in their
relations to each other. And when Germany, which
to foreign nations had for centuries been only a
“geographical notion,” not a political entity, suddenly
rose to foremost rank among the nations of Europe, there
prevailed outside the Fatherland much disbelief in the
A.
2 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
stability of the newly-created German Empire, the more so
as the peculiarities of its constitution, differing widely from
those of other countries, could not be readily understood
without special study.
This strange incongruous creation, it was thought, owed
its origin solely to the ambitious designs of the most
formidable political triad of modern times, the statesman,
the Soldier, the king–Bismarck, Moltke, and William I. :
the common view was that it rested on no sound
foundation, and that, as a mere product of despotic
arbitrariness, it could have but the short-lived existence
of the motley cosmopolitan empire of Napoleon I. It is
true that, through the course events have taken since
1871, the opinions of many have undergone considerable
modification ; and it has, above all, become evident that
the rulers of the German Empire are not actuated by
visions of universal monarchy, such as we are accustomed
to associate with the French Empire of Napoleon I.,
but that their policy is exclusively guided by the national
requirements.
Yet in the minds of a not inconsiderable number there is
still a lingering disposition to suppose that the origin of the
German Empire was in its character absolutely sudden and
accidental, and that it was rendered possible solely by the
use of forcible means on the part of the powerful statesman
then at the helm of the Prussian Government. If this were
so, the hopes or fears of those who did not believe in the
permanence of the changes effected between '66 and '71
would have been realized long since, for attempts at
innovations, the necessity for which is not rooted in the
core of the nation itself, are inevitably doomed to failure,
INTRODUCTION. 3
German unity, however, as ought to be clear to every one,
does rest upon the will of the overwhelming majority of the
people, and, far from being the arbitrary creation of a single
mind, was but the realization of a long-cherished wish, the
consummation of an ever-growing feeling of nationality, a
feeling gradually ripening into an all-absorbing passion, the
strength of which, though not unknown to the careful
observer, did not reveal itself to the world in general until
the decisive moment for action had come.
It is quite true that just as Italian unity had its chief
promoter in Cavour, so the work of German unification
found its most powerful agent in Bismarck. Yet we see in
these men but the concentrated and most perfect expression
of the popular will, the embodiment of the Zeitgeist. In
fact, to generalize from the point in question, great men of
any kind are always the concentrated genius of a
people. Frederick the Great, Moltke, Napoleon I., Nelson,
Richelieu, Cromwell, Pitt, Cavour, Bismarck, Shakespeare,
Voltaire, Goethe, Luther, Kant, Beethoven, Wagner: these
are but so many names for, or personifications of, the con-
centrated military, political, poetical, philosophical, and
musical genius of the various nations to which they belong
“Nimmer in tausend Kopfen, der Genius wohnt nur in Einem,
Und die unendliche Welt wurzelt zuletzt doch im Punkt.” ”
“World-historical men, the heroes of an epoch,” says
Hegel, f “must be recognized as its clear-sighted ones;
their deeds, their words are the best of that time. . . .
Others, therefore, follow these soul-leaders, feeling the
* Hebbel.
+. Lectures on the Philosophy of History.
4 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
irresistible power of their own inner spirit thus em-
bodied.” Hence, when great men come on the scene in
moments of need, they appear all the greater because they
grasp more clearly the tendencies of their time, and thus
seem to create from within themselves what in reality must
happen, what, like the unification of Germany under the
leadership of Prussia, is but the result of a vast series of
historical causes.
It is certainly a mistake to think that the idea of a German
Empire as at present established was primarily a product of
the great Chancellor's brain : Bismarck, though seemingly
at times against its will, carried out the wishes and
commands of the nation, put into execution the ideas of
others. The Erókaiserpartei º of the Frankfort Parliament
of '48 originated the plan which their old adversary executed
two decades later. Bismarck acknowledged this him-
self, when, on the 1st of April, 1885, the veterans of that
party, and with them their political friend and supporter,
Duke Ernst of Saxe-Coburg, greeted and addressed him as
the man who had given effect to their intentions, who had
realized their dream, the “Dream of Unity.”
If this be so, it is apparent, as was said
before, that only from a close historical examination of
what is generally termed “the Dream of German Unity”
—der deutsche Einheitsfraum—can there be gained a clear
and thorough understanding of its realisation.
We shall, therefore, have to consider what were the
inherent causes of weakness in the German Empire such
as it was established a thousand years ago; we shall
* The party which advocated the establishment of an hereditary
Empire, with the King of Prussia as Emperor. g
INTRODUCTION. 5
then see how through these causes, and by a gradual
process, the mighty Empire, after a glorious history of
centuries, found itself split up into a multiplicity of in-
dependent states, and how out of this multiplicity there
grew the dream of unity, which, after many struggles,
finally developed into unity.
We thus shall have to pass in review more than six
centuries, and must, therefore, in view of the great extent
of such a period of time, remain satisfied with purely
kaleidoscopic glimpses of events and personalities: our
object is not narrative history, but the historical develop-
ment of an idea. With the details of warlike and diplomatic
action and of political and religious strife we have little or
no concern, and only those events in German history will
be drawn within our range of vision and examined which
have a direct bearing on our particular question. The
point on which, solely and exclusively, we fix our attention
is the psychological development, in its historical pro-
gression, of the idea of National Unity, so as to see how
this idea evolves from the innermost Volkssee/e, the
Soul of the people, how it expands, grows, and obtains
vital force, how it struggles for existence in the midst of
adverse conditions, and how, finally, overcoming all
resistance, it becomes a reality.
Though the sketch, as a whole, can be and will be
nothing but a mere outline, to which will be wanting
the vivid colouring of detailed matter as regards both
persons and things, it will nevertheless, it is hoped, show
clearly that German Unity, as established in 1871 by means
of a confederacy of the various states with a central
imperial power at their head, is the product of the organic
6 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
historical development of the nation, and the moral and
intellectual offspring of the conditions of the old Empire;
and that for this very reason, though far from perfect, it
rests on such a foundation as, on account of the absence of
arbitrary and fitful innovations, always has given, and there-
fore presumably always will give, a sufficient degree of
vitality and stability to political institutions.
CHAPTER I.
The Rise and Decline of the Mediaeval German Aïngdom,
or “ Foly Roman Empire of the German Mation.”
I.
HOUGH modern Germany generally regards as the
commencement of her national existence the era of
the partition of Charlemagne's great empire, known as the
partition of Verdun, the beginnings of a real German
Kingdom can hardly be dated earlier than the reign of the
first king of the Saxon dynasty, Henry the Fowler, who
laid the foundation of a firm monarchy that under his
Saxon and Franconian successors forced its way to a
commanding position in Europe.
Its greatest cohesive strength the German Kingdom of
the Middle Ages undoubtedly enjoyed under its Saxon
dynasty; yet the period of its greatest influence and
brilliancy was during the sway of the proud and powerful
emperors of the Swabian House of Hohenstaufen. Of
these the most striking figure is that of Frederick II. No
monarch ever occupied a position of greater outward
splendour, for when he died, in 1250, he possessed no
fewer than six crowns: the imperial crown, and the royal
crowns of Germany, Burgundy, Lombardy, Sicily and
Jerusalem.
842.
**
919–936.
9I9-IO24.
II38–1254.
8 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
None of the mediaeval dynasties had such a hold
on the hearts of the people as that of the Hohenstaufens. The
secret of their great popularity, especially that of Frederick
I., commonly called Barbarossa, and Frederick II., lay
partly in the national pride excited by their foreign achieve-
ments, partly in the ascendency which their genius gave
them over other minds, partly in their determination to
yield nothing of their rights, whilst asking no more than
they were entitled to by the laws of the Empire. Not
only in outward splendour, but also in real power, in
poetical charm and ideal excellence, the Hohenstaufens
overtop every other dynasty that ever ruled in
Germany.
“The age of the Hohenstaufen Emperors,” says Mr.
Sime,” “is, in many respects, the most interesting in the
mediaeval history of Germany. Everywhere there were
dramatic contrasts of character: in the innumerable struggles
of the time we are struck, now by heroic devotion, again by
almost incredible selfishness; a gay enjoyment of the world
as it existed side by side with almost superhuman
spirituality. Chivalry was in full bloom, with much in its
nature that was fantastic and insincere, but keeping alive a
beautiful ideal of manliness, Courtesy, and generosity.
Women never held a higher place, nor, on the whole, did
they ever respond more nobly to the honours freely
lavished upon them. The excitement of the Crusades, the
contact with the life of Italy, and the study of the Provençal
poets revealed worlds that had been hitherto unknown :
while the national genius for the first time flowered in
* History of Germany—Encyclopaedia Britannica.
DECLINE OF THE MEDIAEVAL GERMAN EMPIRE. 9
the romances and lyrics of the Minnes&nger.” In the cities,
magnificent churches in the Gothic style gave expression to
high aspiration, and gratified a cultivated feeling for art. . .
Altogether Germany has seen no more fascinating epoch,
none more full of life, movement, and colour.”
2.
Strange as it may seem, it is during this brilliant age that
the German nation entirely lost her cohesive strength ; for
the Hohenstaufens, like their Saxon and Franconian
predecessors since Otto the Great, would be content with
nothing short of universal dominion, of the realisation of
what was implied by the title of “Emperor of the Holy
Roman Empire,” a title first bestowed by Pope Leo III.
on Charles the Great, and given by later Popes to Otto the
Great and succeeding Kings of Germany.
To the peoples of Europe this appellation suggested a
revival of the all-embracing Empire of Rome. As the
* The national spirit of the time found perhaps its brightest and
clearest expression in Walther von der Vogelweide who sings:
Ich hän lande vilgesehen Von der Elbe unz an den Rin
unde nam der besten gerne war : und her wider unz an der Unger lant
ilbel mileze mir geschehen, mugen wol die besten sin,
künde ich ie min herze bringen dar, die ich in der werlte hān erkant.
dazim wolgevallen kan ich rehte schouwen
wolte fremeder site. guot geláz und lip,
nă waz hulfe mich, ob ich unrehte strite? Sam mir got, så swuere ich wol daz hie
tiuschiu zuht gåt vor in allen. diu wip
bezzer sint dann' ander frouwen.
Tiusche man sint wol gezogen,
rehte als engel sint diu wip getán.
swer sie schiltet, der 'st betrogen :
ich enkan sin anders niht verstän.
tugent und reine minne,
swer die suochen wil,
der Sol komen in unser lant: da ist wunne vil.
lange mueze ich leben dar innel
(Deutschland über Alles.)
IO THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
Pope stood at the summit of the spiritual power, so
the Emperor stood at the head of the State which, it was
hoped, would equally include all Christendom. Every
form of authority and rule had its source in the Emperor,
and was held from him in their various degrees by Kings,
Dukes, Counts, down to the smallest feudal tenant. Thus
a new and universal Christian empire was to be founded,
over which the Emperor would rule as the prime defender
of the Catholic Church and of the Christian Faith—the
World-Monarchy resting on the World-Religion. With a
position like this, the Emperor regarded as his own all
nations in general, and no one nation in particular, though
for the time the imperial power was in the hands of
Germans, as once it had been in the hands of Romans. *
Great and beautiful as was this ideal conception of
universal dominion, this very crown, this dazzling crown
of the Holy Roman Empire, proved the most fatal gift that
could have been offered to the German kings. In craving
the possession of this crown they were in reality running
after the shadow instead of grasping the substance. They
wasted forces which they should have employed in re-
claiming territories from Slav occupation, and above all in
asserting their own power over that of their vassals, as was
gradually done in France, England, and Spain. Instead of
strengthening the allegiance of the Germans towards their
sovereign, the imperial title was the means of steadily
undermining it.
* Nothing but a bare outline of the theory of the Mediaeval Empire
is given here. Ample details, with exemplifications, will be found in
the work, “The Holy Roman Empire,” by James Bryce. Macmillan
and Co.
DECLINE OF THE MEDIAEVAL GERMAN EMPIRE. II
It was indeed owing to the elective character of the
German monarchy and to its connection with the Roman
Empire that for centuries the Germans were the most
divided of European nations, and that incalculable suffering
was inflicted on them for generations.
The German Kings, as Emperors, had duties which often
took them away for long periods from Germany. This
alone would have shaken their authority, for during their
absence the great vassals seized rights which it was after-
wards difficult to recover. But the Emperors were not
merely absent: in order to assert their authority in Italy,
they had to engage in struggles in which they exhausted
the energies necessary to enforce obedience at home ; and
to obtain help they were sometimes glad to concede
advantages to which, under other conditions, they would
have tenaciously clung. . And it must be remembered that
the imperial crown, though on several occasions it seemed
to be on the verge of becoming hereditary, had been kept
elective through the jealousy of the papacy and the
growing influence of the aristocracy. Although such
elections needed the sanction of the whole class of
immediate nobles, the right of appointing the king was soon
virtually left in the hands of the leading princes, called
Electors. These were very important factors in German
politics, since they could maintain the existing disunion by
imposing rigid conditions on candidates for the crown, and
by taking care, as they did more particularly after the
Hohenstaufen dynasty had ceased, that it should be
conferred on no prince likely to be dangerous to the
aristocracy.
The Emperors, too, struggled bitterly and continuously
I 2 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
I254–I273.
with the papacy, so that a power outside their dominion,
but exercising immense influence within it, was always
prepared to weaken them by exciting dissension among
their people. Thus it happened that the imperial
crown, for three centuries the symbol of power and
Splendour, gradually sank into contempt; and although,
under the strong rule of Frederick Barbarossa and his son,
the process was stopped for the time, it only went on the
more rapidly when they had departed. During the con-
fusion of the civil war * carried on between Otto IV. and
Philip, the territorial princes, feeling themselves subject to
hardly any check, seized crown lands and crown rights;
and the mischief was too extensive to be undone by even so
powerful an Emperor as Frederick II., especially as
he left Germany for a space of fifteen years to accomplish
his famous crusade and to carry on his bitter contest
with the Lombard cities and Pope Gregory IX. And
when, in 1250, the news reached Germany that Frederick
had suddenly died in the midst of his struggles against
papal assumptions, men felt that evil days must come,
since the elements of strife could no longer be controlled
by his strong hand. And very speedily did the evil days
COIn 62.
After the death of the last of the Hohenstaufen
kings, Conrad IV., came a lawless interregnum, “a frightful
time without a chief,” when might was right. There were
* Walther von der Vogelweide then raised his warning voice:
Sö we dir, tiuschiu zunge,
wie stèt din ordenunge
daz nã diu mugge ir kulnec hat,
und daz din ére alsó zergāt,
bekērā dich, bekère.
DECLINE OF THE MEDIAEVAL GERMAN EMPIRE. I3
several nominal Emperors, but there was no ruler. None
of the powerful German princes would at the time accept
the worthless royal crown. Indeed, since it must be
acknowledged, the royal crown of Germany was now put
up to auction | And it seems that its traditional splendours
still formed a sufficient attraction for foreign bidders. Thus
the Archbishop of Cologne sold his own and his followers'
votes in the imperial election to the brother of the
English King, Richard, Earl of Cornwall; whilst the Arch-
bishop of Treves, for hard cash, disposed of his influence
in favour of King Alphonso of Castile. The country then
enjoyed the somewhat doubtful advantage of having
two foreign kings at the same time. Of these,
however, Alphonso never visited Germany ; though
Richard indulged in the luxury of two or three royal
processions through the land, dispensing royal privileges
in abundance, and increasing the number of his
adherents as long as he had anything to give
away out of his English resources or those of
the Empire. But when, in the course of his
journey up the Rhine, he ran short of money at Basle,
all forsook him, and, the chronicle writer sarcastically adds,
“he travelled back to his country on a different road.”
The sense of honour among German princes must have
been at a very low ebb / And this edifying state of
things lasted for twenty years.
If the country had still been divided into only a few
duchies, with skilful management, these might, at great
crises, have yet been made to act together for any common
purpose ; but great duchies were now a thing of the past.
Bavaria had been deprived of considerable territories, over
I4. THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
which ruled new dukes; the duchies of Saxony, Swabia, and
Franconia were more or less broken up; in addition to the
original duchy of Lorraine, there were now the duchy of
Brabant and other small immediate states. And where
formerly there were only a few dukes, there now existed,
besides or instead of those dukes, a large body of prelates,
palsgraves, margraves, landgraves, and counts, all
more or less independent; even petty knights and barons
claimed to have no superior except the Emperor. They
claimed the Emperor as their master in order to have no
master, and to acknowledge no law save their own free will.
As a body they had completely fallen from their former
character: their castles became, for the most part, mere
robber-holds, from which their retainers fell in armed
bands on the merchants and travellers passing unprotected
on stream or high road. Justice or retribution there was
In One.
CHAPTER II.
The Dream of German Unity in its Earliest Porm.
I.
I" was during that time of political confusion, of deep
uneasiness, and even misery, that the Kaisersage, the
legend of the Emperor, arose and spread.*
To the suffering masses, to whom the death of
Frederick II. had been the beginning of sorrows, the great
king had remained the embodiment of their idea of
German greatness; and when a report soon spread through
Germany that the Emperor was not really dead, that he was
yet alive, the news was willingly believed, for the wish is
father to the thought.
So heartily was the fable accepted that any impostor who
announced himself as the Emperor “come back again "
was certain of strong support, and the unmasking of one
deceiver was no hindrance to the speedy acceptance of
* There is much controversy as to the earliest traces of the Åaiser-
sage, whether it is of heathen or Christian origin, whether it arose on
Byzantine or German ground. To enter into the details of the subject
would be beyond the scope of our plan. Suffice it to say "that the
Aaisersage, in the form it ultimately assumed, was probably the result of
an interweaving of Christian superstitious beliefs and heathen myths.
For information, see Voigt, Die deutschen Aaisersagen : Haussner, Die
deattsche Aaisersage ; Fulda, Die A ºffhausersage ; Jastrow, Zur
Mitteratur der Kyffhausersage.
I6 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
I273-129I.
another. Thirty-five years after the Emperor's death, one
of these “false Fredericks’’ was burnt at Wetzlar. The
mob rummaged in the ashes for remains of bones, and,
finding nothing satisfactory, declared it zwas the Emperor
Frederick after all, and his body had been caught away
out of the flames. God willed, they thought, that his body
should not perish, so that some day he might return.
After the conception of a still-living Frederick had
become the only ground of hope for security against what
was regarded as the certain destruction of a world without
an Emperor, additional probability seemed to be given to
the idea by the short-lived splendour of the Empire under
Rudolf of Habsburg, a splendour brilliant enough to deepen
the longing for Frederick's return, too brief to extinguish it.
As the evils of the Church became more pronounced,
and the Papal claims more insupportable, the tradition
graved ever deeper the lines which marked in the popular
portrait of the last of the great Hohenstaufens his hatred of
the clerical domination. “He’ll hunt the priests,” so ran
the saw fully a hundred years after his death, “he’ll hunt
the priests till they stick their heads under a dung-heap
rather than show a tonsure. And the monks who lied of
him to the Pope, and took away his Empire, he’ll drive
them from the earth. . He'll make his throne the home of
justice; if any man's goods are stolen, he will restore them ;
he will befriend the widow and the orphan ; he will give
’ and so on. In
the poor girl to the wealthy man to wife;’
all this we hear the voice of a people living under in-
supportable conditions, dreaming of a better time, and
clinging to the assurance that some day they will reach it.
“He will come, for he must come.”
THE DREAM OF UNITY IN ITS EARLIEST FORM. 17
Further evidence of the hold the legend had taken on
the German imagination appears in its localisation every-
where on some well-known spot close at hand. At first it
ran vaguely : “Somewhere in the world the Emperor is
still alive.” But gradually, wherever the decaying ruins of
imperial magnificence reminded the people of departed
glories, there, among the crumbling walls, one or another
imagined he saw the Emperor ; and according as those
remains and signs of departed greatness, for instance the
Burg of Kaiserslautern, or that of Tilleda, recalled
Frederick I., the Emperor Redbeard, or Frederick II., the
Kaisersage connected itself by local colouring with the one
or the other of these two greatest Hohenstaufen princes.
Here, as there, men believed that the waste castle was still
the seat of the Kaiser, who would step out into the daylight
as soon as his time was come; and that no sovereign ruler
more just than he would ever sit upon the imperial throne.
2.
Meanwhile, the real form of the vanished Emperor retires
into ever dimmer obscurity. As centuries roll on, his home
has sunk from the castle into the mountain on which it
stands. “In the hollow hill,” the Kaiser sits and
bides his time. Near Tilleda, in Thuringia, it is the
Kyffhäuser mountain into which the Emperor Frederick
has withdrawn. The people of Salzburg imagined him—or
originally the Emperor Charles V.-to be hidden in their
Untersberg. And there were other mountains round which
the popular imagination wove the same fancy.
The pictorial details in which the belief was clothed had
gradually been worked into the still-lingering heathen
B
I8 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
traditions, and the hidden Emperor had been invested with
traits and attributes belonging to some of those old
Teutonic gods that had vanished from the earth, though
the people, after their conversion to Christianity, still
ascribed to them an underground existence. Thus Wodan,
the chief god of the Teutons, to whom sacrifices had
formerly been offered on Wodan's mountain—afterwards
called the Kyffhäuser mountain from the castle erected on
it—had been thought to be still holding his sway within it,
and from him, the vanished god, the vanished emperor
inherited the ravens which examine into the state of
the outer world, and from time to time fly into the
mountain to the Emperor's shoulders in order to whisper the
news into his ears. In other places, the hidden Emperor
borrows from Thor, the god of Thunder, hair and beard
that flash like lightning. And so the legend gradually
relinquishes Frederick II. and clings more closely to the
more popular of the two great monarchs, the lion-hearted
Emperor Redbeard. He died far away in the East, on a
crusade, washed down when attempting to cross the river
Saleph : it was, therefore, easier to believe that it was he who
“had never died and lived yet” in the Kyffhäuser mountain,
where he “had taken down with him the glories of the
Empire,” and whence, “when the day came round, he
would return to bring them back again.” In close con-
nection with the growth of these ideas, the representation
of the personality of the Emperor and of his surroundings
becomes more and more distinct. Usually he is pictured
as sitting at a round marble table, resting his head upon
his hand while he sleeps, or winking and nodding half
awake. His beard is as red as fire, and is grown pro-
THE DREAM OF UNITY IN ITS EARLIEST FORM. I9
digiously long. According to some, it has grown through
the table, or, if we are to believe others, only round
it; and it is to reach three times round before the Emperor
may be awakened. Poetic tradition, as time flowed on,
had also surrounded the “enchanted ” monarch with a
court-state, with knights and dwarfs, and a lovely little
daughter. *
Many professed to have seen him, and charmingly naïve
are some of the many stories that give evidence of the
popular belief in the Kaisersage. Here is one which
arose during the 17th century:-
Once a shepherd drove his small flock among the ruins
of the old castle, joyfully blowing from his pipe the
while a merry tune that sounded afar. Suddenly a
mannikin stood before him, and with a friendly greeting
asked : “Wouldst thou like to see the Emperor Frederick,
and to play before him such a merry tune?” “Why not P”
replied the shepherd. Then he followed the mannikin
through a passage cut into the rock, till at last they came
into a wide hall ” in which Barbarossa was seated, with
drooping head, as if slumbering. Courageously the
shepherd seized his pipe and played a lively little tune.
The Emperor raised his mighty head and asked :
“Are the ravens still flying round the mountain P” “They
are,” answered the shepherd. On receiving this reply, the
Emperor sighed deeply, and sorrowfully spoke: “Then
must I go to sleep again for another hundred years.”
* It may be noted that during Christmas week, I865, there was
discovered in the Kyffhäuser a finely vaulted cavern, from twenty to
eighty feet high, at many places one hundred feet wide, and two
kilometres long ; it contains nine little lakes, and presents a magni-
ficent appearance when lit up with the Bengal light,
2O THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
Thereupon he let his head droop, and seemed to slumber
as before. . . .
So Kaiser Zºothóart sits in his favourite castle, Kyffhausen,
pondering, dreaming: he may not live, he cannot die, till
Germany is restored to her old power and greatness; for so
long the old ravens will still tell him of the spirits of discord
which have overthrown Germany from its lofty seat, which
have torn it with dissensions, and brought it to the verge
of ruin.
We see then in how many ways the people varied the
form of the original conception without modifying its nature,
its essence, hope.
Among the sundered realmlets that once owned the rule of
the Empire the memory of its greatness survived in the hearts
..of the people, and, with the memory, a firm faith in a
revival of its glories and the return of the Emperor.
Though this Messianic expectation never put the national
banner into the hands of a great leader, the legend, in its
poetic garb, has kept alive in thousands of hearts the only
thing that was left to the people as a whole, the belief in
themselves; for what more than aught beside we recognise
in the legend growing on from generation to generation, is
a gaze, clouded perhaps, but confident, turned upon the
past, because there and there alone it finds the mirror of
the future. Such is the earliest and most popular form of
the dream of German Unity.*
But this dream was not to be realised until the German
people had undergone the very bitterest humiliations, until
* Jastrow, Geschichte des deutschen Einheitstraumes.
THE DREAM OF UNITY IN ITS EARLIEST FORM. 2 I
their Empire had suffered most cruel dismemberment, and
until, through their political and religious dissensions,
through the petty jealousies and the selfishness of their
princes, aggravated by the dangers of their geographical
position, they had well-nigh extinguished themselves as a
nation.
3.
It must not, however, be supposed that the material
welfare of the country, as a whole, suffered at the same rate
at which the national disruption went on. The cities of
the Empire at least, by the development of commerce
and manufactures, of the industries and arts, attained in
the fifteenth century to great independence, prosperity,
and splendour. A sharp-witted and clever Italian writer,
Aeneas Sylvius—at one time Chancellor to the Emperor
Frederick III., then Cardinal, and finally Pope as Pius II.
—gives, about the middle of the fifteenth century, a
eulogistic description of the state of German cities. Here
are a few of his statements:—
“Aachen, the old seat of the Empire, has a palace with
stone statues of the Emperors, and a temple rich in relics.
The splendour of the churches and citizens' houses of Cologne,
its wealth and strength of arms are unsurpassed in Europe.
In Mainz, which is magnificently built, we have fault to
find only with the narrowness of its streets. . . . Strasburg,
intersected by canals, is like Venice; it is, however,
pleasanter and healthier; it has a cathedral of hewn stones,
the one completed tower of which hides its wondrous head
in the clouds; of the townhall, of the citizens' dwellings,
no prince need be ashamed. . . . Berne, too, and Zürich
are beautiful, wealthy, and well administered. . . . But
22 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
particularly splendid is Vienna ; of the tower of St. Stephen,
Bosnian envoys said that it alone was worth more than
their whole kingdom ; the houses are built of stone, and
have wide cellars and showy furniture; but the manners
of the people are voluptuous and violent. . . . Prague may
be likened to Florence in splendour, and is half German.
But all the cities in the North are excelled by Lübeck,
through its lofty buildings and magnificent churches; its
authority stands so high that at its beck three mighty
kingdoms of the North accept or reject their rulers. . . . In
Franconia, besides the bishoprics of Bamberg, Aschaffen-
burg, and Würzburg, Nuremberg stands out prominently
before all others; when one comes from Lower Franconia
and sees this glorious town in the distance, it appears in
truly majestic splendour; and this, when you enter its gates,
is further enhanced by the beauty of its streets and the
quaintness of its houses ; the churches of St. Sebald and
St. Lawrence are venerable and superb; the Imperial Castle
looks down proudly and firmly ; the citizens’ houses seem
to be built for princes; indeed, the kings of Scotland would
wish to live like the middle classes of Nuremberg.
One may truly assert that no people in Europe inhabits
towns cleaner and more airily situated than the German ;
their appearance is as new as if they had only been built
yesterday. Through commerce the inhabitants accumulate
wealth ; there is no banquet at which they do not drink
from silver vessels, no citizen's wife but wears golden
trinkets. Besides this, the citizens are trained in arms,
each has, so to Say, an armoury in his house. The boys in
this country learn to ride before learning to speak, and sit
immovable in the Saddle at the quickest pace of the horse;
THE DREAM OF UNITY IN ITS EARLIEST FORM. 23
and the grown-up man carries his arms as easily as his
limbs. He who has seen the armouries of the Germans
cannot but laugh at the stores of arms of others.”
“Truly,” the Italian observer adds significantly, addressing
the Germans, “you might still be masters of the world, as
formerly, but for the multiplicity of your dominions, at which
all wise people have long since marked their displeasure.”
CHAPTER III.
The Reformation and the Thirty Years' War—Aggressive
Policy of France.
I.
“Awake, dear Germans, the time for sleeping is past.”
—Luther.
FTER the long and terrible night of the Middle
Ages there broke at length the dawn of a brighter
and more hopeful era.
Two main factors were originated on German soil to
contribute towards producing modern civilisation: they were
Gunpowder and the Art of Printing.
Both supplied the want of the age in which they were
invented.
Gunpowder was needed to free the peoples of the world
from the domination of physical force, to deprive the
nobility of the Supremacy which they owed to their armour,
and to obliterate, along with the distinction between the
weapons they used, the distinction between lord and
serf; it was needed to destroy the power and significance
of strongholds and castles, to place the different classes
of society more on a level, and to effect the advance from
Feudalism to Monarchy.
In like manner the Art of Printing supplied the main
THE REFORMATION AND THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR. 25
need of the times. The new ideas arising from
the spread of Greek literature and culture consequent
upon the fall of the Byzantine Empire, needed an organ
of diffusion in order to throw the new learning broadcast
among the masses. This organ they found in Gutenberg's
new invention, so absolutely necessary in the subsequent
struggle against a corrupted Church, the momentous
struggle known as the Reformation.
On that memorable day, the 31st of October, 1517, when
Luther affixed his ninety-five theses to the door of the Castle
Church of Wittenberg, the bright and glorious Sun
of Enlightenment rose above the horizon, while the mighty
voice of the stout-hearted “little monk,” who feared not
the thunderbolts of Pope and Emperor, was freeing the
German people and the civilized world from religious
thraldom by proclaiming the emancipation of conscience,
which, in itself a grand and noble thing, is also the
fundamental condition of political emancipation and
freedom. Let us add that by his translation of the Bible,
Iuther created an important bond between the races of
Germany, viz., a common literary language.
It is on the soil of the Reformation that the Modern
German Empire has grown up, and from it that it has
primarily drawn its vital Sap. It is the liberating and
constructive work of three great master minds that has
shaped modern Germany, the work of Luther, of
Frederick the Great, and of Bismarck.
It was Luther who proclaimed the spiritual, it was
Bismarck who proclaimed the national independence
of Germany : it was Frederick the Great who forged the
connecting link between the two in the political leadership
I453.
26 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
1519-1556.
of that state, which as the bearer and upholder of the
spiritual freedom of Germany, was to accomplish her
national independence and unity.
2.
Luther would fain have created a national Church of
Germany, and have furthered the reform of the Empire:
“For my Germans I have been born, them will I serve.”
All eyes, in fact, were turned upon the youthful Emperor,
Charles V., to see whether he would place himself at the
head of the movement of reform, with which a great
majority of the German people was in sympathy. Had
he openly declared in favour of Luther, the nation would
have joyfully followed him, and, in its temper at the time,
would have broken any possible resistance on the part
of the princes: Charles would then have made the imperial
power absolute, and had every possible chance, not only
of establishing a national Church, but of transforming
the Empire into a truly national state.
But Charles had been brought up abroad; he was King of
Spain as well as Emperor of Germany, and was not in
touch with, if indeed he had any appreciation of, the
needs and aspirations of the German people. Moreover,
he was more than most of his predecessors since the
Hohenstaufens, imbued with a keen sense of the dignity
of his position as Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire;
and if he looked upon himself as the successor of Charles
the Great and Otto the Great, he could not, while asserting
the principle of a catholic religion and a universal empire,
have shown himself in sympathy with the idea of a national
church and a national state. Under such circumstances
THE REFORMATION AND THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR. 27
it was unfortunately but natural that Charles should have
broken outright with the spirit of the nation in declaring
for the Pope, and placing Luther under the ban of the
Empire.
Thus the Dualism which had existed for centuries in the
form of Papal and anti-Papal currents and contests, grew,
through the action of Charles V., into still stronger
antagonism, and in the sequel led to Sanguinary wars.
Though these wars, in their various stages and aspects,
must be said to have frequently borne a political rather than
a religious character, yet they were fought with all the
implacability that springs from religious hatred and persecu-
tion ; for persecution, in accordance with that most abomin-
able principle, cujus regio, ejus religio, was carried on through-
out the Empire, with the exception of Brandenburg-Prussia,
the sole important state of Europe which did not stoop to
regulate by force the consciences of its subjects.
3.
It was at this time of religious feud and protracted war-
fare, when Maurice of Saxony, in conjunction with the
Elector of Brandenburg and other princes, had risen
against the Emperor in defence of the Protestant faith, that
Henry II. of France, who had already been preparing
war against Charles, allied himself with these princes, and,
as “Protector of the Liberties of Germany,” entered
Lorraine and tore from the Empire the three bishoprics of
Metz, Toul, and Verdun.
It must be borne in mind that from the seizure of those
three imperial towns dates the historical controversy in
regard to the boundary between Germany and France, and
I552
28 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
1618–1648.
that since then scarcely a generation has passed in which
the Germans have not been compelled to draw the sword
to defend their frontier against the French.
The time even came when not Germany's western
frontier alone, but her very existence was at stake.
Z'appétit Zient en mangeant. The policy of spoliation,
inaugurated under Henry II., in 1552, was to assume, under
Louis XIV., the most alarming dimensions, and to culminate,
under Napoleon I., in the avowed intention of completely
annihilating German nationality.*
But for the time the most disastrous outcome
of the religious dissensions which shook Christen-
dom to its very foundations was, that not only
German Catholics and Protestants, but nearly all
European nations, some to further the ends of religion,
others to satisfy their political ambitions, made Germany
the theatre of one of the most sanguinary contests that
history has to record, the Thirty Years' War, a war carried
on not by disciplined armies, but by hordes of adventurers,
who fought for no other object than plunder, and who
inflicted on their victims cruelties almost beyond conception.
And what was the result of these thirty years of un-
scrupulous statesmanship and ferocious vandalism P
From the North Sea to the Danube, from Rhine to
Oder alike, want, misery, and desolation ruled the land.
Thousands of hamlets, villages, and towns lay in ruins
and ashes, and the unhappy inhabitants wandered homeless
over the country, their sufferings so awful that even the
* “You must know,” Napoleon said, in a letter to his brother Louis,
“that the annihilation of German nationality is a necessary leading
principle of my policy.”
THE REFORMATION AND THE THIRTY YEARs' waR. 29
horrors of cannibalism, it is said, were not unknown among
them. Whole districts, once the seat of a cheerful, bustling
life, were transformed into an uninhabited wilderness. The
educational establishments were either entirely disorganised
or had altogether ceased. The fields lay untilled. Trade
and manufactures had come to a standstill. Of the twenty
millions which Germany numbered at the beginning of the
war, there were at the end of it but six or seven millions
left; two-thirds of the population had been carried off by
sword, famine, and pestilence, and the miserable remnant
were almost reduced, through their awful privations and
wretched surroundings, to a state of semi-barbarism.
Another most serious consequence of the war was the
enormous territorial losses which Germany suffered. France
received sovereign rights over those parts of Alsace which
belonged to Austria, and the three bishoprics of Lorraine,
Metz, Toul, and Verdun, the seizure of which had up
to that time never been officially recognized, were, in 1648,
formally conceded to her. Western Pomerania, with
Stettin and the bishoprics of Bremen and Verden, passed
into the possession of Sweden, a power which then
became a member of the Empire. A still further
diminution and weakening of Germany was caused by the
recognition of the independence of two branches of the
Germanic family, viz.: Switzerland and the United Provinces
of the Netherlands, Once integral parts of Germany, and
until then legally considered members of her body.
Having long been virtually free, they now for the first
time took the position of distinct independent States, and
the source and the mouth of the Rhine were thereby lost
to the German Empire.
3O THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
4.
Before the Thirty Years' War, the Empire had practically
ceased to exist, and Germany had become a loose con-
federation of principalities and free cities. This state of
affairs the Peace of Westphalia had legalised.
It is difficult in these days to imagine the completeness
of the disruption that had taken place. There were now
not less than a hundred sovereign monarchies, as many
ecclesiastical principalities with the same measure of
independence, and more than fifty corporate republics,
which, under the name of Imperial Free Towns, claimed
similar freedom of action. These together made up a
total of not less than 266 distinct and fully constituted
German States, each with its own laws, its little army, its
coinage, its tolls, and so forth. Imperial government
there was none; for all the prerogatives of the head had
been transferred to the vassals, who had become inde-
pendent monarchs, even possessing the right of forming
alliances with each other or with foreign powers under
the nominal restriction that their alliances should not be
injurious to the empire.
Since the kings of Germany, at great cost of blood, had
won the proud title of Roman Emperors, the German
Empire and the German people had been looked upon as
the first among the peoples of Christendom. Even in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, long after the fatal want
of cohesion had declared itself, the rising House of Austria
maintained the semblance of authority; and till the time of
the Reformation, the Germans still felt and showed their full
worth. But now, both substance and semblance of author-
THE REFORMATION AND THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR. 3 I
ity were gone. In the Middle Ages, decisions of the greatest
importance for Europe were made in Germany. Now every
movement of Europe re-acted upon Germany, its struggles
were fought out on the soil of Germany, and settled at
Germany’s expense. The Empire became the byword of
the world, till Germans themselves laughed at it.
In accounting for the gradual disruption of the German
Empire, emphasis has been laid on the selfishness which
actuated the princes. But if we are to make a just estimate
of the disintegrating process we must not leave out of con-
sideration the fact that the many-state system was, to a great
extent, also the outcome of the German character, which,
from the earliest times, has shown a tendency towards a
stubborn assertion of individuality, by fostering and
cultivating distinctive peculiarities and idiosyncrasies,
Even the Franconian and Saxon Emperors had found
themselves engaged in difficulties and struggles for the
purpose of keeping under the seclusive and often rebellious
tribal spirit of Franks, Swabians, Bavarians, Lorrainers,
Saxons, and Thuringians. The breaking up of the
duchies into parts was undoubtedly facilitated and
furthered by this strong sense of individuality, which readily
attached itself in many ways to the miniature realmlets
that grew up like mushrooms. Not altogether without
reason it has been sarcastically remarked that if Germans
were but rich enough they would each keep a king of their
OWI).
It is impossible to deny that out of the tendency
to cultivate the individual and local peculiarities of the
various families of the German race, many satis-
factory results have sprung, as is apparent from the
32 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
beneficial variety and healthy rivalry found in the social and
literary life, in the arts and industries, and in the educational
and other public institutions of Germany. The assertion of
individuality in political and national life, however, as it was
not checked by regard for the interests of the whole
race, and was with headstrong tenacity carried to extremes,
had a most undesirable effect in so far as it tended to
unhinge the whole machinery of the Empire.
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the German Kingdom
was in a condition so absolutely hopeless that its energies
might not have been concentrated again in a powerful state
system by a really great man. The House of Habsburg,
however, in which the imperial dignity, though nominally
still elective, had practically become hereditary, produced
only men of ordinary calibre. Proud of representing the
great memories of the old Empire, they yet found them-
selves unable, especially after the Thirty Years' War, to cope
with the independent spirit of the different sections of the
nation, and drifted into an absolutely selfish policy, caring
for nothing but the increase of the territories of their own
dynasty, bartering away German for non-German territory,
and leaving the western borderlands unprotected against a
watchful and grasping neighbour.,
Leopold I., who occupied the imperial throne during the
second half of the Seventeenth century, was a man of narrow
intellect and feeble will. Yet at that time Germany was sorely
in need of a sagacious and energetic ruler, for during two
AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF FRANCE. 33
generations she had to contend with external dangers of the
greatest magnitude.
Since the middle of the sixteenth century, as was pointed
out, it had been the policy of France to strengthen herself by
fostering the internal dissensions of Germany. This policy
found a most unscrupulous exponent in Louis XIV.”
A prince so ambitious, crafty, and grasping as Louis was,
could not fail to take the utmost advantage of the discord
among his neighbours, of their consequent weakness,
and of the unpatriotic sentiments held by their princes.
Some of these even stooped to accept the bribes he offered
to induce them to acquiesce in his aggressive policy, a
policy so audacious that it did not shrink from maintaining
that when France, by the Peace of Westphalia, gained the
Austrian possessions in Alsace, she also acquired a right to
all the places that had ever been united with them. Under
this shameless pretext, the French King, in time of peace,
began a series of systematic robberies of German towns and
territories. So-called “Chambers of Reunion,” were
formed to give an appearance of legality to these scandalous
proceedings, by which Saarlouis, Saarbrücken, Mömpelgard,
Luxemburg, and other towns were annexed to France. The
* The patriotic German philosopher and Savant, Leibnitz, wished
to divert the ambitious plans of Louis XIV. from Germany and the
Netherlands. For this purpose he presented to the king, in 1672, a
memorial, in which he proposed to Louis the conquest of Egypt,
declaring that after four years’ study of the subject, he was convinced
there existed in the whole known world no country of such surpassing
importance as Egypt. It was, in his opinion, to the interest of the
human race and the Christian religion that France should unite itself
with Egypt as closely as possible. This remarkable memorial was
long kept a state secret, and was publicly known only at the beginning
of the present century.
C
34 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
3oth Sept., 1681.
Diet of the Empire, which had its seat at Ratisbon,
protested, but did not act. In vain did the national poets
raise their warning voices:—“Now is it time to wake,
before our country's honour dies, gulped down into the
dragon's gaping jaws. Up ! up ! to arms 1 and hunt back to
Saone and Rhone the toads that swarm about our Rhine.”
It was of no avail: the dissevered fractions of the
German nation seemed to have lost all community of
purpose and of action. In deference to the protests made
by the Diet and the population of the annexed districts,
the wily King of France finally consented to send
ambassadors to Frankfort; but while the delegates were
quarrelling whether they should hold their deliberations at a
Square, a round, or a semi-circular table, an unheard-of piece
of villany was perpetrated.
In the midst of peace, Louis XIV. took possession of the
imperial city of Strasburg.
In this perfidious act he was aided by Bishop Egon von
Fürstenberg, who employed his influence in the interest of
the King of France, and since April 29th, 1680, had been
receiving for his traitorous services an annual revenue of
60,000 livres.f
* Hans Assmann von Abschatz.
+ In connection with the above it should be mentioned that, accord-
ing to official documents, the Most Christian King paid bribes in the
form of pensions to people in Strasburg who returned from the
Lutheran faith to the Catholic fold. The reformation, and in fact all
the intellectual and literary movements of Germany in the 15th and 16th
centuries, had been heartily welcomed in Alsace ; and from 1592 to
1604 Strasburg even owned a Protestant bishop in the person of John
George, a Prince of the House of Brandenburg-Hohenzollern, who,
however, receiving but feeble help from the Protestants of Germany,
was in the end compelled to give way to his Catholic opponent,
Cardinal Charles of Lorraine, Bishop of Metz, who enjoyed the power-
AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF FRANCE. 35
Thus was wrenched from the prostrated Fatherland the
glorious old city which had stood out proudly as one of the
principal seats of the intellectual life of the nation : the
city where Gottfried von Strassburg had written his “Tristan
und Isolde,” where Erwin von Steinbach had built that
noble monument of German art, the magnificent Cathedral,
and where Gutenberg had invented the art of printing ;
the city which had been held so important as the key to the
whole of South Germany, that Charles V. once said of it:
“If Vienna were threatened by the Turks, and at the same
time Strasburg by the French, I should first hasten to the
rescue of Strasburg.”
When the outrageous act became known, Germans of all
states and ranks were indignant at the humiliation. But
even the loss of Strasburg could not move the German
Diet. The Emperor would probably have interfered. But
the dexterous King of France had carefully provided for such
an eventuality by making employment for the imperial forces
elsewhere, through stirring up against his adversary the
ful support of the King of France and the Catholic league of that
country. The fact is important, because from that time, as German
influence had shown itself extremely weak both in the Protestant and in
the Catholic interest, the eyes of Alsatian Catholics turned away from
the mother country to the more powerful Western neighbour, who was
both able and disposed to assist in the regaining of lost ground. The
French success in that dispute must indeed be considered as a first
stepping-stone towards the utilization of the Catholic influence in Alsace
by Egon von Fürstenberg in favour of Louis XIV.’s policy of encroach-
ment.—The details and the importance of the rival claims of the
Protestants and Catholics to the Bishopric of Strasburg have been
treated by the present writer in the Grenzboten of 1874, in an article
entitled “Ein Prinz aus dem Brandenburgisch-Hohenzollernschen
Hause als Bischof von Strassburg (1592-1604).”
36 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
Hungarians and Turks, who threatened the Austrian
dominions with devastation.
And when at last, in 1686, the Emperor and most of the
German Princes formed the Augsburg alliance with the
object of opposing further encroachments of the French,
Louis XIV. conceived the monstrous idea of laying waste all
the flourishing cities and fertile country of the Palatinate and
the Middle Rhine, in order to make warfare along the Rhine
impossible for the Imperial army. With jests at the misery
he was causing, the French general, Melac, let loose his
hordes upon the defenceless country, blew up the beautiful
towers and fortifications of Heidelberg Castle, and laid half
the town in ashes.
A similar fate befel the towns and villages along the
high road through the Black Forest. When the poor
inhabitants showed any intention of saving their property
they were ruthlessly slain, and throughout the country
there might be seen appalling numbers of bodies of
poor wretched people that had been frozen to death. The
citizens of Mannheim first were forced to work at the
demolition of their fortifications, and then, their town being
laid in ashes, were driven forth, starving and half-naked, into
the cold of winter. Similar cruelty was inflicted on the
inhabitants of Frankenthal, Ladenburg, and Kreuznach.
Then came the turn of the districts of Treves, Cologne, and
Jülich, where the peasants were forced to destroy their own
crops, and other acts of devastation were perpetrated. The
venerable old towns of Worms and Speyer, to which so
many memories of the Empire attached, were burnt and
levelled to the ground by the incendiary army; in Speyer,
indeed, the French soldiers opened and ravaged the tombs,
AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF FIRANCE. 37
and with Scornful laughter scattered to the winds the ashes
of many great emperors.
Entering into an alliance with England, Holland,
Denmark, and Spain, the Emperor of Germany, in a war of
nearly ten years’ duration, in which all the horrors of the
Thirty Years' War were repeated, endeavoured to win back
from his ruthless antagonist the territories which, under the
euphemistic name of réunions, had been filched from
Germany; but in vain. Alsace, with Strasburg, had to be
left in the possession of the French : the side of the German
body remained lacerated and open, at the mercy of a ruth-
less and covetous neighbour.
Indignantly and sorrowfully Leibnitz wrote: “He who is
compelled to yield up the key of his house to a neighbour
that is his enemy, his formidable enemy, an enemy who
entertains and will never abandon unintermitting, envious
and ambitious designs against him, can certainly not sleep
in peace under his own roof.”
Generations passed away without a ray of hope for the
recovery of what had been so ignominiously lost; but the
historical conscience of the nation never let slip the
thought that there must be reparation for so unjust and
cruel a blow to both her honour and her safety.
6.
It may, perhaps, seem inexplicable—and the nation may
appear all the more guilty—that even when disgrace after
disgrace fell on the German name, when calamity after
calamity struck their country, that even then the German
Diet, which represented the various states, could not rise to
a higher moral sense and to a perception of its national
38 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
duties. But fully to understand the events of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, it must be borne in
mind that the German Diet during those two centuries was
no longer capable of forming and pursuing a national
policy: in fact was absolutely debarred from it. To become
convinced of this we have only to pass in review the various
elements of which it was constituted, and regard the rea/
powers who, through their representatives at the Diet of
Ratisbon, presided over the weal and woe of the Empire.
Then we find, first the large and complete group of
Austrian and Hungarian possessions in the hands of the
Habsburg dynasty, a dynasty which, according to the
precedent of all its past history, could not do otherwise than
shape its policy in these polyglot lands according to the
requirements of its motley territories. To a state composed
of So many centrifugal elements the furthering of a national
German policy was an impossibility. Again, half of
Pomerania, Rügen, Wismar, Bremen, Verden, with the
control of the Oder, Elbe, and Weser, belonged to the
Swedes; and Holstein had become subject to the Danish
Crown. The kings of Sweden and Denmark consequently
were represented at the German Diet as lords of German
lands. Several German princes acquired foreign crowns: the
Electors of Saxony, for example, wore the crown of Poland,
for which they sacrificed the faith of their ancestors; and the
Hanoverian Guelphs became kings of England. And as
these princes had gained a European position they exercised
their right of voting at the German Diet no longer entirely
for the interests of their German possessions and of Germany
collectively, but largely in conformity with the policy of those
foreign countries. The princes of Nassau maintained their
AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF FIRANCE. 39
connection with the Netherlands as hereditary Stadtholders.
The strange changes on the French frontier placed the
Prince of Salm-Salm with one foot in his hereditary German
principality, and the other in his French county of Pouligny
and Ogeviller.
Lastly, there was the overwhelming host of ecclesiastical
princes from the Imperial Chancellor and Elector of
Mainz down to the Abbot of Ochsenhausen, who formed
an integral part of that powerful organisation which received
its directions from Rome, and who voted at the German
Diet according to orders dictated by the Pope.
So we see that Hungary, Sweden, Denmark, England,
Poland, and the Papal power of Rome were represented
with the full weight of their influence at the Diet of the
German Empire ; and when it is added that France and
Sweden, as the guaranteeing powers of the Peace of
Westphalia, possessed the right of controlling the manage-
ment of the affairs of the Empire, and that later, by the
Peace of Teschen, a similar right had to be acceded to
Russia, then, indeed, it can readily be understood that this
assembly, still called the German Diet of Ratisbon, had
hardly a will of its own ; and, even if the German princes
had wished it, could not have pursued a national policy. In
reality, it was nothing but a congress of European
ambassadors, who strove to conduct the affairs of the
Empire according to the instructions received from their
respective Governments; and whether alliances were con-
cluded or dissolved, whether war or peace was decided
upon, everything was done for the benefit of that power
which happened to be in the ascendency in this international
Congress.
4O THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
Thus the whole imperial apparatus was manipulated by
foreign powers; and the active cosmopolitanism of the early
German Empire, when a German was a citizen of the
world, had faded into a passive cosmopolitanism, in which a
German was ruled from abroad.
CHAPTER IV.
Aºise of Brandenburg-Prussia—/Jualism betzween Austria
and AE’russia.
I.
HOUGH the Thirty Years' War had completed the dis-
organization of the German Empire, and had led to
almost utter ruin and demoralization in the political and social
life of some of the States, yet the consequences of that terrible
contest were not entirely evil. Its two main results, the
complete territorial independence of the German princi-
palities, and the recognised liberty of worship both
Catholic and Protestant, together so changed the
popular conditions that a regenerate national life gradually
bloomed above the ruins of the past, bringing with it
freedom of thought, and producing the Prussian State
as a Protestant and enlightened power.
To Catholic Austria belonged the past, but the future to
Protestant Prussia.
Brandenburg, which formed the nucleus from which the
Prussian Kingdom sprung, had been granted, in 1415, by
the Emperor Sigismund, to Frederick, Count of Hohen-
zollern, Burggrave of Nuremberg. As a consequence of
the prudent and Sagacious policy pursued by him and his
successors, the Electorate, although not rich in natural
42 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
1640–1688.
resources, became one of the most flourishing North
German States.
In fact Prussia is really the creation of the House
of Hohenzollern. One may imagine English history with-
out William III., the history of France without Richelieu,
but the building up of the Prussian State is essentially the
work of its princes. In but few countries have the reigning
dynasties so continuously given evidence of those two
virtues which alone can lead to eminence: the keen, far-
seeing idealism that sacrifices the comfort of to-day to the
welfare of the greater to-morrow, and the stern sense of duty
and justice that makes every selfish impulse subservient to
the public weal.
The prince under whom appear the first signs of rivalry
between Austria and Prussia, between the old and the new
spirit, is Frederick William, the Great Elector, a ruler of
strong common sense, of much foresight and courage, from
whose reign must be dated the gradual rise of the House of
Hohenzollern over that of Habsburg, and the history of
the regenerated Germany of to-day. He alone among the
German princes of the time understood his duties towards
the common Fatherland, and in the midst of the national
dissensions uttered the warning cry, “Remember that thou
art a German.” It was he who made the only serious
attempt, unfortunately unsuccessful, to rescue Alsace from
the hands of the all-powerful King of France; and when
Louis, to get rid of so embarrassing an enemy in the
coveted Rhineland, instigated the Swedes to invade
Brandenburg, it was he who stayed their advance in his own
territories, and their progress in Germany, by the splendid
victory of Fehrbellin.
RISE OF BRANDENBURG-PRUSSIA. 43
To the authority and influence which the Great Elector
had gained for the new Protestant State, his successor
added the lustre of more exalted rank by assuming the
title of King of Prussia.
Not, however, until nearly the middle of the eighteenth
century was Germany thoroughly roused from her apathy
and torpor by the genius of the Hohenzollern race, which
burst forth in full splendour in Frederick II.
2.
“Ich aber, vom Orkan bedroht,
Muss trotz dem nahenden Verderben
Als König denken, leben, sterben.”
—Friedrich II., 1757.
Frederick, on his accession, at once signalized himself as
a Superior mind, capable, in that dull age, of rising far
above prejudice and tradition. He aptly inaugurated his
reign by inscribing on his flag, “Tolerance and Enlighten-
ment,” as is duly recorded by the following decree:–
“All religions must be tolerated, and the Fiscal must
have an eye that none of them make unjust encroachment
on the other; for in this country every man must get to
heaven in his own way.”
Golden words these, standing out with heavenly
brightness amid the gloom of religious zealotism
and political falsehood in eighteenth century life.
A philosophical king, he stimulated culture and the
peaceful arts, and gathered around him in his capital
men of wit and learning, thus placing Berlin, as a centre
of light, in striking contrast with Vienna, where Popery
I7OI.
1740–1786.
44 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
and feudalism exercised full sway. * It should not be
forgotten that during his lifetime, Kant, at Königsberg
University, enjoyed perfectly free scope to develope and
disseminate his new philosophical ideas, which, together
with the principles and events of the French revolution,
formed the most important factors in determining the
characteristic features of nineteenth century culture.
Liberty of the press—so far as there was a press—
Frederick allowed without restriction, exceptions being
exceedingly rare. Shackling men's pens and gagging men's
mouths he objected to on principle, even when he himself
was the object of fierce criticism, satire, or slander. A
pamphlet severely attacking him had one day been affixed
to one of the palace walls. He promptly gave orders that
it should be placed lower, “so that every one might be
able to read it.” To have justice done to nobleman and
beggar alike was to him a plain dictate of political morality.
Being an absolute ruler, and strong-willed to boot, he might
be guilty of an arbitrary act at times, but yet he would
readily acquiesce in the remonstrance of the miller of Sans-
Souci: “Il y a des juges à Berlin.”
His despotism was a benevolent and enlightened despot-
ism. In the imagination of most of the princes and prince-
lings, his contemporaries, the people existed for their sake,
not they for the people's sake. Frederick, on the contrary,
knew nothing of gratification and benefit to himself, but only
of Duty towards his country—“ Mein einziger Gott, ist
* A period of a somewhat more enlightened rule dawned on Austria
only at the accession of the Emperor Joseph II. (1765-1790), who
attempted a number of reforms in Frederick's spirit, though with less
Sll CCCSS,
RISE OF BRANDENBURG-PRUSSIA. 45
meine Pflicht.” It was his own maxim, which he had laid
down for his guidance, that the king is but “the first servant
of the State.”
Kingship was a lofty ideal as well as a stern reality with
him—“als König denken, leben und sterben,”—and activity
was the very essence of his being. The flashes of his mind
were like lightning; his movements were comparatively
as swift. With an energy and rapidity quite astonishing he
moved, even in his old age, indefatigably from place to place,
inspecting troops and providing for their efficiency, Con-
ferring with ministerial boards, issuing decrees, seeing to
the establishment of schools, to the cultivation of the soil
and the creation of an independent peasant class, con-
trolling or looking into almost every department of the
administration, and thus making his genius the motive
power in the whole state system and diffusing his own
alert spirit throughout the kingdom. The Prussians
consequently, during his reign, made more rapid strides,
both in intelligence and material well-being, than they had
ever done before.
By the side of his peaceful achievements his military
successes stand out in bold relief, and are better known,
though their real importance does not lie in their brilliancy,
but in their far-reaching effect on Prussia's position in
Germany, and ultimately on Germany's position in the
European State system.
The jealousies and rival claims of Austria and Prussia
had led to the two Silesian campaigns, and finally to the
Seven Years' War, during which Frederick, in alliance with
England, had to confront nearly the whole of Europe, and
all the potent influence of the Papal Power besides.
I756–1763.
46 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
Austrians and Saxons from the south, French armies and
troops of some minor German States from the west, Swedes
from the north, and Russian hordes from the east, bore
down fiercely upon the ruler of five million subjects.
Prussia, which boasted of being the headquarters of
“Protestantism and free thought,” was to be crushed,—was
to be wiped off the map of Europe.
Each State had, of course, its own reasons for action. Since
practically there existed no central authority in the Empire,
the question had naturally thrust itself upon the attention
of leading statesmen, which of the two Powers, Austria or
Prussia, would profit by the decay of the Empire and
ultimately establish its hegemony in Germany. If Prussia
was to be allowed to grow as she had hitherto done, Austria
might be forced out of Germany altogether. Maria Theresa
saw the danger clearly, and determined on a war of annihila-
tion against Prussia to save the Austrian Monarchy.
France felt aggrieved because its hopes of supremacy
in Germany, hopes conceived during the Austrian
War of Succession, had been foiled by Frederick's
ascendency. And as to the Muscovite Power, Prussia
seemed to her but a barrier to her advance westward.
They felt instinctively, one and all, that the rise and growth
of Prussia foreboded a new order of things, and hence their
united cry of “Danger ahead, down with this impertinent
upstart ”
“Habsburgs Adler schwebt schreckbar tiber ihm,
Er diirstete Friedrichs Blut ||
Moscoviens Bär mit eisbehang'nen Haaren
Dürstete Friedrichs Blut.
Gallia Schwang die lichtweisse Lilie,
Sie zu tauchen in Friedrichs Blut.
RISE OF BRANDENBURG-PRUSSIA. 47
“Selbst Wasa’s Enkel
Und Germaniens måchtigste Fürsten und Städte
Zuckten die Schwerter, ins Schlachtthal zu giessen
Friedrich-Wodan’s Blut.”
But with the help of his “Berlin Guard-Parade,” the
“Petit Marquis de Brandebourg’—a mock title of
Madame de Pompadour's invention—most severely and
magnificently discomfited the intrigues of the Petticoat Trio
of Paris, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.
The marvellous generalship of Frederick, the discipline
and valour of his army, and the patriotism of his Prussians
repelled the onslaught of overwhelming forces, to the
wonder and admiration of friend and foe throughout the
world.
“Ja so stand er sieben Jahre im Feld des Todes,
Es staunten die Völker. Der Helden Geister
Nickten ihm Beifall vom Wipfel der Eichen.
Ringsum wichen vor ihm die Schaaren der Hasser,
Und so stand er in seiner Heldenhoheit
Allein da.”f
3.
For a moment here let us pause. Let us listen awhile to
voices from that stirring past, to echoes from Frederick’s
camp, that we may come into touch, direct and
immediate, with the terrible sternness and grandeur of
Prussia's struggle for life or death, and with the enthusiasm
which its remarkable and striking incidents set ablaze.
Here is Frederick, after defeating the French at
Rossbach, hastening to confront the Austrians in Silesia,
where things are in a very critical plight. At Parchwitz,
* Friedrich der Grosse. Ein Hymnus von Chr. F. D. Schubart
(1739-1791).
+ Ibid.
48 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
on the 3rd of December, 1757, he assembles his generals,
and thus addresses them : “It is not unknown to you,
gentlemen, what disasters have happened here, while we
were busy with the French and the Imperial Army.
Schweidnitz is gone, the Duke of Bevern beaten; Breslau
gone, and all our war stores there; good part of Silesia gone;
and, in fact, my embarrassments would be at the insuperable
pitch, had not I boundless trust in you and your qualities,
which have been so often manifested, as soldiers and sons of
your country. Hardly one among you but has distinguished
himself by some nobly memorable action: all those services
to the State and me I know well, and will never forget.
“I flatter myself, therefore, that in this case, too, nothing
will be wanting which the State has a right to expect of your
valour. The hour is at hand. I should think I had done
nothing if I left the Austrians in Silesia. Let me apprise
you then that I intend, in spite of the rules of art, to
attack Prince Karl's army, which is nearly thrice our
strength, wherever I find it. The question is not of his
numbers, or the strength of his position : all this, I trust,
my troops will endeavour to overcome by courage and by
prompt execution of my orders. This step I must risk, or
everything is lost. We must beat the enemy, or perish all
of us before his batteries. Thus I think, and thus I shall
act.
“Make this, my determination, known to all officers of the
army; prepare the men for what work is now to ensue, and
say that I hold myself entitled to demand exact fulfilment
of orders. For the rest, when you reflect that you are
Prussians, you will certainly not render yourselves unworthy
of this privilege. But if there should be one or another
RISE OF BRANDENBURG-PRUSSIA. 49
who dreads to share all dangers with me, he can have
his discharge even to-day, without suffering the least reproach
from me.” Here the King pauses, casting interrogative
looks around on his veteran captains. There is no mistake
about their response. Their murmuring lips, their
sparkling, eager eyes are eloquent of courage and
determination.
“Ha,” he continues, “I was convinced from the very
first that none of you would desert me. I depend on your
help, then ; and on victory as sure. Should I perish, and
not be able to reward you for the services you have rendered
me, then the Fatherland must do so. Now go into the
camp, and repeat to the regiments what you have just heard
from me.”
Then, with a stern, kingly look, he adds: “The cavalry
regiment that does not on the instant, on order given, dash
unhesitatingly into the enemy, I will, directly after the
battle, unhorse, and make it a garrison regiment. The
infantry battalion which, meet with what it may, shows the
least indecision, loses its colours and its Sabres, and I cut
the trimmings from its uniform | Now, good-night,
gentlemen : shortly we have either beaten the enemy, or we
never see one another again.”
Truly this King is made of steel, with heroism awful in
its grandeur, heroism quite antique, but leavened with
Prussian sternness.
And his army?
There, too, we meet with rough-shod heroism, with
stern sense of duty, borne up by hope, and by trust
in their great captain.
The King, that same night, rides into the camp. As he
D
5o THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
passes on, the men of each regiment bid him good evening
in their wonted manner. Frederick responds. First he
comes upon the Life-Guard Cuirassiers. Some veterans
turning to him, in their rugged but good-humoured fashion :
“What is thy news, then, so late?” “Good news, children,
to-morrow you will beat the Austrians soundly l’ “That
we will, by Heaven,” they answer. “But, just think where
they stand yonder, and how they have entrenched them-
selves,” says Frederick. “And if they had the devil in
front and all around them, we will knock them out, only
thou lead us on 1’’ “Well, I will see what you can do ;
now, lay you down and sleep Sound, and good sleep to you
all.” “Good night, Fritz " answer all.
Next it is the famous Pomeranian foot regiment, Von
Manteuffel, which he accosts : “Well, children, how think
you it will be to-morrow? They are nearly thrice as
strong as we.” “Never thou mind that: there are no
Pomeranians among them : thou knowest what the
Pomeranians can do l’ Whereupon Frederick; “Yea,
truly, that I do: otherwise, I durst not risk the battle.
Now, good sleep to you: to-morrow, then, we shall either have
beaten the enemy, or else be all dead.” “Yea,” answered
the whole regiment, “dead, or else the enemy beaten.”
Tramp ! tramp ! steadily and swiftly and silently as
commanded, the columns march along on the morn of
battle, nearing the enemy. “You could read in the eyes of
our brave troops the noble temper they were in,” says
Tempelhof, an eye-witness. Suddenly the melody of a
church hymn, sung by thousands of voices to the accom-
paniment of their field-music, rings through the air; and this
is what they sing:
RISE OF BRANDENBURG-PRUSSIA. 51
“Grant that with zeal and skill in all things I may do
What me to do behoves, what thou command'st me to ;
Grant that I do it soon when need and time may tell,
And when I do it, grant that I may do it well.”
Remarkable thing: sense of duty ever present in the
Prussian mind. They are marching to battle, these warriors,
not with thoughts of vain glory, but modestly praying to
God to grant that they may do their duty, and that they
“may do it well.” In all its simplicity, it is as touching as
it is grand.
“Shall we order that to cease, your Majesty P” says a
general to Frederick, who is riding in the vanguard, as usual.
“By no means,” replies the King, and a moment after he
adds: “With men like these, don’t you think I shall have
victory to-day ?”
And victory he had, victory for ever famous—with his
3o, ooo against their 80,000. And of the spirit in which
these stout-hearted Prussians fought, or fought and died,
just one more echo from the battlefield of Leuthen may
tell.
The Bavarian general, Count Kreit, at the time a
volunteer in the Imperial army, comes upon a Prussian
grenadier who has had both his feet torn off by a shell, and,
lying in a pool of blood, is quietly smoking his pipe. In
astonishment the general calls out to him, “Comrade, how,
in your dreadful state, can you Smoke so calmly P You are
dying !” The grenadier takes the pipe out of his mouth
and coolly replies, “What care I Am I not dying for my
king !”
Thus then the thoughts of duty, country, and king are
* Archenholtz, Geschichte des siebenj. Krieges.
52 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
5th Nov., 1757.
5th Dec., 1757.
the springs of action in the soldier's breast, and it is
Frederick's genius that sets them in motion to such mighty
purpose.
“Austerlitz and Wagram,” says Carlyle,” “shot away
more gunpowder—gunpowder probably in the proportion of
ten to one, or a hundred to one ; but neither of them was
tenth-part such a beating to your enemy as that of
Rossbach, brought about by strategic art, human ingenuity
and intrepidity, and the loss of 165 men. Leuthen, too,
the battle of Leuthen (though so few English readers ever
heard of it) may very well hold up its head beside any
victory gained by Napoleon or another. For the odds were
not far from three to one ; the soldiers were of not far from
equal quality; and only the general was consummately
superior, and the defeat a destruction. Napoleon did,
indeed, by immense expenditure of men and gunpowder,
overrun Europe for a time ; but Napoleon never, by hus-
banding and wisely expending his men and gunpowder,
defended a little Prussia against all Europe, year after year
for seven years long, till Europe had enough, and gave up
the enterprise as one it could not manage.”
4.
And now as to the result of Frederick’s successful
struggles. Whilst it was Frederick's fate sharply to
accentuate and place in strong dissonant evidence the
Dualism which had existed in Germany since the time
of Charles V., he nevertheless became the means
of a remarkable revival of the national spirit. All
good Germans looked with enthusiasm on this great king
* History of Frederick the Great.
RISE OF BRANDENBURG-PRUSSIA. 53
who was eminent as a warrior, a statesman, and a
philosopher; and even in those countries whose princes
were in favour of Austria the people sided with Frederick,
of whom they were proud as a national hero, and who had
shown them what they could do if united action for some
common purpose were possible again. Of all Frederick's
victories perhaps none had so stirring and potent an effect
upon the national mind as that of Rossbach.*
There existed among the German people, indifferent as
they were to political and national concerns, a deep-felt
irritation against the French because, in their overbearing
arrogance, they never lost an opportunity to express their
contempt for the German name and language, for German
merit and genius. So when, in the Seven Years' War, French
armies swept again ravaging over the fair land of the Rhine,
and covered its soil with ruins and blood, this was felt as a
bitter humiliation, and Frederick himself, an admirer of
French literature and wit, burst into an ode of patriotic
indignation :
“To its depths the old Rhine quivers,
Foams along in angry flow,
Cursing fortune that delivers
German stream to foreign foe.”
But when Frederick's good sword sent the insolent
invaders panic-stricken from Saale to Rhine, all the German
peoples, whether otherwise they professed Prussian or anti-
Prussian sympathies, rejoiced aloud, and hailed the victory
* Napoleon, who much admired Frederick, remarking on the battle
of Rossbach, finds that the victory was inevitable. He adds: “But
what fills me with astonishment and shame is that it was gained by six
battalions and thirty squadrons (he should have said seven and thirty-
eight respectively) over such a multitude.”—See Montholon, Mémoires
etc de Mapoléon.
54 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
of Rossbach as a national triumph. Even on the very
battlefield of Rossbach the general disposition of the
people revealed itself, as the following delightful little
incident will not fail to illustrate :
A Prussian horseman seizes a French trooper, and is on
the point of carrying him off as his prisoner. At this
moment an Austrian cuirassier raises his sword to strike the
Prussian. “Brother German,” cries the latter, “let me
have the Frenchman.” “Take him,” replies the Austrian,
and rides away.
Thus the feeling of a common nationality, feeble as it
had become, could not be entirely repressed even by war-
like antagonism. Nay, among a great part of the nation,
especially among the youth of Germany, this feeling, kindled
by the admiration people felt for Frederick's captainship
and statesmanlike genius, again manifested distinct signs of
life. For it certainly was something that into the shrivelled
and stunted national consciences of the Germans so much
vitality had been infused again, that Gleim’s song, “Lasst uns
Deutsche sein und bleiben,” should have stirred many hearts
and have resounded from many lips in the Father-
land. Love of country, in those times, found expression in
a great amount of patriotic literature, and was re-echoed in
its purest form by Klopstock, though this great bard may
not be reckoned among the admirers of King Frederick of
Prussia. “You fool,” he exclaims in one of his patriotic
outbursts, “what harm has your Fatherland done you ?
If at its mighty name your heart glows not within your
5
breast, I scorn you ; ” and prophetically he declares, in
1773, “Germany, one day thou shalt be free; only
another hundred years and thou art free.”
RISE OF BRANDENBURG-PRUSSIA. 55
5.
But besides the revival of the national spirit, the foremost
result of Frederick’s victories was that there could be no
longer any question of the dissolution of the Prussian
Monarchy, but that, on the contrary, Prussia henceforth
took rank among the leading powers of Europe.*
There now arose that Pentarchy of European States
in whom the power to decide on the world's affairs was
vested. In this Pentarchy, however, there were two
Protestant Powers, England and Prussia, besides one
Schismatic, viz., Russia ; and every chance of the return
of Europe under the sway of the Crowned Priest had thus
for ever vanished. In this respect Frederick's successes
were of the highest importance for the civilization of
Germany and the world.
Frederick, as the ruler of the greatest Protestant State in
Germany, however little he was in touch with the positive
elements of the evangelical faith, was nevertheless looked
upon as the champion of Protestantism. The Seven Years'
War, it is true, was not in itself a religious war, but it was so
in regard to its ultimate issues, and in regard to the general
disposition of both leaders and soldiers arrayed on either
side. Did not the Pope himself consecrate the sword of
the Austrian commander, Field-Marshal Daun, and was not
the destruction of Prussia, as the bulwark of heresy,
avowedly one of the main objects the Allied Powers had in
view P. It may, therefore, since Frederick effectively
thwarted their intentions, be justly asserted that in his
* Even Horace Walpole went so far as to confess that this Prussian
King held the balance of European power in his hands.
56 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
person the Protestant principle had routed Catholicism, and
that since Luther, Romanism had not suffered such a severe
defeat as was inflicted on it by the firm establishment of
Prussia as the Protestant Great Power of Germany.
It may, indeed, be said of King Frederick, as the English
Ambassador Mitchell” did say of him, that he has fought
for the freedom of the human race. Pitt himself, during
the Seven Years' War, marked his sense of the momentous
significance of Frederick’s struggles by exclaiming : “Even
if the French were already besieging the Tower I should
still be true to King Frederick.”
6.
If Frederick had wished not only to save Prussia, but also
to conquer Germany, the nation, no doubt, would have
acclaimed him. Nations, however, in those times of political
perversity, had no voice in political affairs. But in a
spiritual sense, at least, Frederick had conquered Germany;
and, with their eyes turned to the future, all unbiassed
observers saw in him the national king and hero who had
taught Germans self-respect, and had compelled foreign
nations to look again with due regard on German
intelligence and bravery.
Frederick, whom the mediaeval constitution of the
Empire filled with contempt, and whom the unfavourable
conditions then existing prevented from transforming
Germany into a modern State, had at least succeeded in
creating such a State in Germany, and in firmly establish-
ing its claim to a leading voice in the national concerns. In
* British Ambassador to Frederick's Court at the time of the Seven
Years' War.
RISE OF BRANDENBURG-PRUSSIA. 57
order to guard for Prussia this position there was but one
course open for him to pursue, and that was to keep Austria
in check. Indeed, although associated with the Empire,
Austria could no longer feel sure of her predominance; and
a final conflict for the leadership presented itself to political
minds henceforward as inevitable among the contingencies
of the more or less distant future.*
Although Frederick, at the commencement of his reign,
had failed in his attempt to cause the Imperial dignity to be
transferred from the House of Habsburg-Lorraine to the
Bavarian House of Wittelsbach, yet his vigilant policy was
always skilfully directed towards preventing any increase of
the Habsburg Hausmacht on German soil, as well as any
encroachments by which Austria's influence over the Empire
might be strengthened. We find a distinct manifestation of
this policy at the time when the younger branch of the
House of Wittelsbach, which had hitherto possessed
Bavaria, died out, and the Emperor Joseph II. asserted
claims to part of its territory. Frederick then resisted
Austria's attack on Bavaria by force of arms. Joseph II.,
however, did not relinquish his idea of getting hold of the
* When Prussian successes were at their height in the Seven Years'
War, the boldest designs had been planned among Frederick’s most
influential advisers. General von Winterfeldt, the King's favourite and
intimate friend, not only advised the invasion of Hungary, there “to
call to arms the malcontents,” but he even enthusiastically urged the
idea “of conquering all Germany, and, by forming it into one State,
of making it capable of resisting any foreign power.” In May, 1757,
he felt so confident that he hoped “to see, in less than two years, the
Constitution of the German Empire overthrown, and Frederick placed
on the Imperial Throne.” But in the course of the wearisome and pro-
tracted struggles against the superior forces of Europe, these bold
designs gave way to more modest aims. –See A. Schmidt, Preussens
Deutsche Politzá.
I777.
58 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
I785.
coveted country, and seven years later proposed to the
Elector Charles Theodore to give him the Austrian Nether-
lands, except Luxemburg and Limburg, with the title of
King of Burgundy, in exchange for his Bavarian dominions,
a project for which the Emperor had secured the approval
of Russia and France, the latter by the offer of the
two fortresses just mentioned. Frederick again promptly
baffled the scheme by threatening armed intervention,
and by forming the Fürstenbund, or League of Princes,
which was joined by the majority of the small States,
and had for its object the maintenance of the status quo
and the defence of the Imperial Constitution.
Although this League cannot be said to have had any
direct national aim in view, it is nevertheless memorable
because Prussia, as the State whose interests are identical
with the national interests of Germany, appears for the first
time as the leader of a coalition of German States in direct
hostility to Austria. The memory of the League was soon
after almost blotted out by the all-absorbing interest
of the French Revolution ; but it nevertheless indicates
what political forces were at work beneath the surface,
and in what direction they tended.
If we ask, then, what is the foremost result of Frederick's
warlike efforts, of his astute and watchful statesmanship,
the answer is this ; that as the “Creator of the Prussian
Monarchy’ this king gave to Protestant Prussia position and
prestige as a Great Power, and qualified her for her
mission, the thought of which in the sequel gradually
dawned upon Prussian princes and statesmen, the mission
of creating a new Germany, vigorous, progressive, and
imbued with the spirit of modern culture.
X
CHAPTER V.
The Literary Movement and Philosophical and Political
Thought at the Close of the Eighteenth Century.
I.
HEN the eighteenth century, that “bankrupt
century,” as Carlyle contemptuously characterises
it, drew to a close, there was absolute stagnation in matters
political.
The reign of Frederick the Great, as we have observed,
had not resulted in any reconstruction of the decaying
edifice of the Empire. The Diet of Ratisbon was a mere
shadow, the imperial dignity a silly mockery; and as the
management of the State did not depend at all on the co-
operation of the educated and middle classes, and even less
on that of the great mass of the people, public life was
necessarily uninteresting, dull, and barren. Yet, from the
midst of this barrenness sprang luxuriant blossoms.
A hundred years—a short period, everything considered
—after that disastrous and most ruinous Thirty Years' War,
the national genius had so far recovered its strength that it
sought an outlet for its energy, and, finding the political soil
hopelessly arid, or even entirely hardened against it, turned
its course into a different direction, and discovered con-
genial fields of activity in the domains of abstract science,
6o THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
speculative philosophy, poetry, and music.” Thus whilst
literary bloom with other nations is, and with Germany
during the Middle Ages also was, coincident with political
greatness, we observe from the middle of the eighteenth
century, in the midst of political sterility and want of
freedom, the singular phenomenon of extraordinary literary
activity, ultimately culminating in the splendid achievements
of those Titans of thought, Kant, Lessing, Schiller, and
Goethe.f Shall we add to these names those that ring
in the musical world, Bach, Händel, Mozart, and
Beethoven P
This intellectual and literary evolution—in its effects a
revolution—distinctly proved one thing: that there was
still vital force in the German nation.
Here and there the new literary activity even showed
traces of national consciousness. Taken however in its
general aspect, the culture of the eighteenth century was
not political ; it knew nothing of national ideals, and was
mainly aesthetic and cosmopolitan. The fettered national
spirit had gone in search of freedom ; it had found it in the
realms of lofty thought, and had abandoned itself to a high-
soaring enthusiasm for the purely human, “the good, the
true, and the beautiful.”
* Similarly, during the time of hopeless disruption and impotence
in Italy, the national genius found an outlet in the development of
the fine arts.
+ “Germany,” says Carlyle, referring to the time when Goethe was
only about to enter the literary arena, “ has risen to a level with
Europe, is henceforth participant of all European influences; nay, it is
now appointed, though not yet ascertained, that Germany is to be the
leader of spiritual Europe.”—Zssays, Vol. III., p. 140, “Goethe's
Works.”
THE LITERARY MOVEMENT. 6I
It is certainly remarkable that this outburst of literary
activity was not productive of any political literature worth
speaking of. In fact, the great thinkers of that period
either ignored national politics or rejected them
as an element clouding and troubling the pure realm of
aesthetic and humanitarian ideals.
And thus, towards the close of the eighteenth century,
the educated classes, from want of a real Staatsbièrgerthum,
a citizenship of the state, were drifting towards an
ideal Weſtbürgerthum, a citizenship of the world, or
cosmopolitanism.
2.
Yet, at the same time, notwithstanding these vague
cosmopolitan dreams, there lived in all the intellectual
leaders of Germany the noble ambition to show to the
world that, as Herder put it, “the German name was in
itself strong, firm, and great.” And as for the people, the
very pride and admiration they felt for their great country-
men again formed a bond of union among them unawares.
But further, these master minds created for the
people what is the original source of a common national
feeling, viz., a common national property. And from this
common national property, the vast and deep and sparkling
literary treasure, from this common national fountain, the
politically-divided tribes of Germany drank the invigorating
and healthy draught of the national genius, so that from the
enthusiasm for the ideals of pure humanity there stole into
German hearts again a higher appreciation of the national
characteristics, an appreciation which, under influences from
without, gradually awakened the dormant national feeling
to a new and youthful bloom.
62 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
3.
It then happened that a desire to participate in the
management of the Commonwealth was kindled by the
French Revolution, its proclamation of the rights of man,
and its subsequent convulsing events. Nothing was wanted
but that the two forces, the re-awakened national conscious-
ness and the re-awakened political interest, should join in
order to give rise to the idea of the National State.
This was brought about by the tremendous shock with
which the French volcano shook the entire State system, not
only of Germany, but of Europe. When inexorable fate by
cruel blows reminded the German genius, always apt to soar
into the clouds, of the finite conditions of all existence, then
the nation, as will still further appear in the sequel—awoke
to the truth that its new intellectual freedom could only
endure in a respected and independent State.
“The ideality,” says Treitschke, “which was voiced forth
in Kant's thoughts and Schiller's dramas, assumed a new
form in the heroic anger of the year 1813. Thus our
classical literature, from quite different starting points, has
tended towards the same end as the political work of the
Prussian Monarchy.”
º:
CHAPTER VI.
The Fa// of the Empire –Aſumiliation of Prussia—
Alismemberment of Germany.
I.
F we ask what was the general disposition of the people,
| especially in non-Prussian Germany, at the outbreak
of the French Revolution, we find (1) the higher and
ruling classes, Prussia not excepted, seeking perfection of
social culture, since the time of Louis XIV., in adopting
the French language and French manners, and with
them French frivolity; (2) the learned and the
educated middle classes imbued with the aesthetic and
cosmopolitan spirit of the new classical literature; (3) the
lower classes, in Some of the States, politically indifferent
and acquiescing in a despotism more or less mild and
beneficent, in others, decidedly discontented with the
unjust and tyrannical rule under which they are languishing.
As to national feeling, we know that it was either dead or
neutralized by the want of union among the states.
Thus, when the shouts of “Liberté ! Egalité ! Fraternité !”
were heard from across the Vosges and the Rhine, the best
minds of the nation saw in the rising of the French people
the dawn of a new morn for all mankind. At that time it
might still have been possible for earnest reformers to guide
64 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
18or.
into German grooves the movement then beginning, and, by
resisting France, to re-establish and re-assert German
nationality. But instead of seeking in the condition of
affairs at home, the causes which made the French
ideas of political freedom dangerous for Germany the
German governments laid all the blame of the upheaval on
the French revolutionary propaganda, and allowed them-
selves to be just as much misled by the aristocratic
emigrants as the people in some of the States were mis-
guided by the democratic apostles of liberty. The
consequence was that Germany, already too much divided,
was split into two camps, an aristocratic and a democratic,
one of which was bent on resisting the Revolution, whilst the
other wished to aid it.
In this conflict, Prussia, whose policy, as she had
inherited it from Frederick, should naturally have tended
towards internal progress and reform, and towards the
intellectual and political leadership in Germany, suddenly
changed front under the great king’s unworthy successor,
Frederick William II., and placed herself again under
Austria's banner for the purpose of combating the Revolution.
The consequent struggle brought nothing but discredit and
disaster to the allied Powers, and resulted in the definite
cession at the Peace of Luneville, of the left bank of the
Rhine to the French Republic.
2.
When, but few years later, Napoleon, impelled by his
boundless ambition, and aided by his marvellous military
genius, set about uprooting the laboriously-built State-
system of Europe, and fashioning the world to his liking,
THE FAILL OF THE EMPIRE, 65
the German States, loosely connected and ill-prepared as
they were, proved unable to resist the sweeping tide of the
conqueror's power. As they would not act in concord,
they were, some decoyed, the others separately defeated.
Austria succumbed at Austerlitz, and the degradation of
Germany was completed by the formation of a Confedera-
tion of the Rhine, composed of the chief central and
southern States. The princes of these States had become
mere satraps of Napoleon. The Confederation had
ostensibly for its object the welfare of the Empire; but in
reality, with Napoleon for its protector, it was intended to
serve as a buffer against Austria and Prussia. And when
Napoleon presently declared that he no longer took notice
of the existence of an Emperor of Germany, Francis II.
resigned the imperial crown—a crown most shadowy and
meaningless. Thus the Holy Roman Empire and the
German Kingdom, virtually dead long before, existed no
more even in name.
3.
Whilst this process of disruption went on, the thought of
Prussian leadership, put aside since the time of the
Aºirs/enbund, again re-asserted itself. The scheme of a North
German Empire appeared among the political changes of
the time. Negotiations were actually carried on by Prussia
with the Electorates of Saxóny and Hesse regarding the
constitution of a North German Confederation. Napoleon
himself professed to support the plan. On the 22nd of
July, 1806, Talleyrand, Napoleon's Minister for Foreign
Affairs, wrote to the French Ambassador Laforest, at Berlin :
“It is now for Prussia to profit by So favourable an
E.
2nd Dec , 1805.
6th Aug., 1806.
66 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
Opportunity in order to enlarge and strengthen her State-
System. She will find Napoleon disposed to support her
intentions and plans. She may, under new federal laws,
unite the States which still belong to the German Empire,
and secure the imperial crown for the House of
Brandenburg. Or she may, if she prefers, form a
confederation of the North German States which more
particularly lie within her sphere of interest. The Emperor
approves beforehand of any such arrangement as Prussia
may think proper to make.”
This ready compliance with Prussia's aspirations was
nothing but a delusion and a snare. The bait was thrown
Out for the purpose of obtaining Prussia's immediate
recognition of the Rhenish Confederation. ZXivide ef
impera is a maxim that Napoleon knew perfectly how to
apply in such easy circumstances as presented them-
selves in the petty courts of the Germany of the past,
where incredible selfishness overruled every reasonable
consideration.
At the very moment when he was pretending to counten-
ance Prussia's plans, Napoleon sent a confidential message
to Dresden that Saxony would do well to be on her guard
lest she be carried away by Prussia, which was running to its
ruin; and that the Elector could do nothing better than
declare his independence and neutrality, which he might
easily strengthen by annexing the neighbouring small States
to his own system.
Suffice it to add that, after many subterfuges employed
by the Courts of Dresden and Cassel, the negotiations
came to a miserable end.
HUMILIATION OF PRUSSIA. 67
4.
The inevitable crisis arrived at last.
Frederick William III., a peace-loving prince, who had
looked on inactively at the dismemberment of Germany,
and patiently suffered insult after insult, at length declared
war. “Better die gloriously than live disgraced,” he
thought.
But was Prussia prepared P
Court and Government relied on the two creations of
Frederick the Great : the State machinery and the army.
But the two successors of Frederick had never become
aware that the old form of the Prussian Monarchy had been
upheld solely by the individual genius of that great ruler.
“If thou wert, I should not be,” Napoleon is reported by
some writer to have written in the dust on the coffin of
Frederick the Great. However this may be, it is certain
that in those times of general upheaval only a king endowed
with the qualities of a great captain or a great political
reformer could have hoped to maintain undiminished the
inheritance of Frederick II.
It was Germany's ill fate that Frederick's successors were
neither generals nor reformers. Such men as Freiherr
vom Stein and Major von dem Knesebeck, who drew
Frederick William’s attention to the fact that the
State machinery was rusted, and the army devoid
of moral and intellectual strength and elasticity, met,
in response to their reforming projects, with nothing
but angry treatment on the part of the King and his
incapable and arrogant advisers. Thus, with a State-
system that lacked force, and an army whose organization
68 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
had outlived its purpose, Prussia opposed the great
Napoleonic Empire, teeming with new vital factors,
disposing of immense and victorious armies, and ruled
by such a general and statesman as Napoleon.
It was the vain struggle of a people under tutelage against
a people unfettered.
5.
Oct. 14th, 1866. The battle of Jena was fatal to the arms of Prussia, and
decided the fate of the old Prussian State. On the army
alone the Prussian State had staked its existence, with
the army it collapsed. Prussia, as Queen Louise rightly
put it, had “slept too long on the laurels of Frederick
the Great.”
July 9th, 1807. When the oppressive conditions of the Treaty of Tilsit
were publicly announced, the nation sank in deep despair,
for Frederick William was deprived of half his kingdom,
including all his possessions between Elbe and Rhine, and
their inhabitants, together with those of Hanover,
Brunswick, and Hesse-Cassel, had to submit to the foreign
yoke of Napoleon's incapable and frivolous brother Jérôme,
then created King of Westphalia.
How thoroughly Germany was now in Napoleon's grip,
and how absolute was his power, appears from the fact that
in 1810, by a mere stroke of the pen, the whole northern
coast as far as Lubeck, including Bremen and Hamburg,
was annexed to France.
The completeness of Germany's humiliation was, how-
ever, the means of her deliverance. It needed the brutal
dismemberment of the Fatherland and the wanton enthral-
ment of its people by France to rouse the spirit of
HUMILIATION OF PRUSSIA. 69
resistance in so patient and long-suffering a nation as the
| German, who, under the sway of feudal lords and petty
princelings, seemed almost to have lost the power of political
initiative.
6.
It is fitting to quote here the remarkable words which
Louise, Prussia's beautiful and popular. Queen, addressed to
her children when the overwhelming news of the disaster
of Jena and Auerstädt reached her. “You see me in
tears,” she exclaimed at the sight of her children; “I am
weeping for the destruction of my house and the loss of the
glory with which your ancestors and their generals have
crowned the race of the Hohenzollerns. Oh, how that
splendour is obscured In one day fate has destroyed an
edifice which great men had worked for two centuries past
to raise. The Prussian State, the Prussian army, and the
national glory are things of the past. Ah, my sons, you are
at an age when you can comprehend and feel the great
calamity that is now visiting us. In the days to come,
when your mother and queen is no more, recall this
unfortunate hour to your minds, weep for my memory .
as I weep now for the overthrow of my Fatherland . But do
not content yourselves with mere tears : develop your
powers: perhaps the guardian spirit of Prussia will watch
over you : then liberate your people from the disgrace and
the reproach of degradation in which it will be languishing :
endeavour to wrest back from France the now tarnished
glory of your ancestors, as your great-grandfather, the Great
Elector, at Fehrbellin once avenged the defeat and disgrace
of his father on the Swedes. Do not, my princes, allow
yourselves to be carried away by the degeneration of the
7o THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
present age ; become men, and aspire to the glory of great
generals and heroes. If you had not that ambition, you
would be unworthy of the name of princes and of grand-
sons of the great Frederick. But if, with all your efforts,
you cannot raise the broken State again, then seek death as
Louis Ferdinand has sought it !” ”
Is there in the spirit of the ancients anything more truly
pathetic and heroic than this appeal of the Royal mother to
the sense of honour and the patriotism of her sons?
“I have born him that he might know how to die for his
country,” said the Spartan mother. “Save the Fatherland
from disgrace, and if you fail, seek death,” said the Prussian
Queen.
This noble-hearted Royal mother did not live to see her
country rise again. The insolent scorn with which
Napoleon treated the Prussian Court, the rude disrespect
with which, in his unmanly way, he even assailed her own
character, and above all the misfortunes that had befallen
her country, had broken her heart. Her health, under-
mined by a fever of both mind and body, rapidly gave
way, and she breathed her last on July 19th, 181 o. As
a queen, as a wise counsellor and noble help-mate to
the king, as a model of a Royal wife and mother, her
* Four days before the battle of Jena, Prince Louis Ferdinand of
Prussia, commanding the vanguard of Prince Hohenlohe’s army, with
6,000 men attacked the French at Saalfeld. After fighting for five
hours against overwhelming numbers, the Prussians gave way. The
chivalrous Prince, then, at the head of his cavalry, dashed forward to
stay the on-rushing wave of his foes. His horse was shot under him.
On foot, and in a hand-to-hand fight, he defended himself bravely.
“Surrender, general,” shouted a sergeant-major. A fresh onslaught
was all the reply the Hohenzollern prince made to his assailants. His
body was found on the battlefield covered with thirteen wounds.
HUMILIATION OF PRUSSIA. 71
memory is still cherished in the hearts of the people.
In the minds of the Prussian soldiers, during the Wars of
Liberation, she continued to live as their guardian-angel, who
watched over them on the field of honour. To her son,
the late Emperor William, she was the guiding-star during
his life.
CHAPTER VII.
A'egeneration of Prussia and Germany —Zhe ZX-eam of
German Unity in its Modern Form—The Wars of
Altöeration. ge
I.
Pº as we have seen, had already astonished the
other German States and the world at large by a
Sudden burst of hidden moral force, as, for instance, under
the Great Elector, and again under Frederick II. Yet
nothing could equal the surprise felt by all Germans at the
wonderful vitality and recuperative power which Prussia
displayed, and at the rapidity with which she rose to fresh
vigour, after the deep fall of Jena.
Old men and time-worn traditions were now thrust aside,
and to all that Germany's greatest minds had recently pro-
duced free admission was given. The stern old-Prussian
war-like spirit wedded itself to modern German culture, and
out of the union of these two forces, effected at the time of
national misfortune, sprang all those political ideals which,
one after the other, the German nation has to this day
worked to realise.
Regeneration was the great cry raised on all hands.
Nor did the King look in vain for helpers. Men of a
most eminent type came to the fore, all uniting their
REGENERATION OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY. 73
strength for one and the same great object: states-
men, military organizers, writers, and Orators, such as
Stein, Hardenberg, Scharnhorst, Humboldt, Fichte, Arndt,
and Schleiermacher ; and when the time came, men of
action such as Blücher, Gneisenau, York, and Bülow.
Foremost among the reformers whom Frederick William
gathered around him was Freiherr vom Stein, # who
had been lately somewhat ungraciously dismissed because of
his pressing advocacy of remedial measures, but who now
received full power for a thorough reform of the whole
state-system. And the very condition on which he again
accepted office constituted in itself an important advance
towards sound principles of government, for he insisted that
the system of governing through irresponsible cabinet coun-
cillors should cease, and that responsible ministers should
be at once the confidential advisers and the executive agents
of the king.
It was the fate of the Bonapartes to be the means of
furthur raising Prussia whilst attempting to ruin her.
Napoleon himself encouraged the appointment of Stein as
minister-president, because he saw in him merely the
clever organizer and financier who would best be able to
contrive the payment of the enormous indemnity which he
levied on Prussia.
2.
In Stein had been found the man of the hour, a man who
combined a clear and far-seeing mind with an iron will and
• * Stein was not a Prussian : he was a member of the independent
knighthood of the German Empire (Keichsritterschaft), and was born
at Nassau, where his ancestral castle stood on the same rock as that of
the House of Nassau.
74 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
firmness of purpose, a noble and ardent soul with practical
sense and wide experience, a proud and manly fearlessness
with a disinterested and self-sacrificing spirit, an unshrinking
truthfulness with fiery speech, a lofty appreciation of right
and freedom with the creative power of statesmanlike genius,
a passionate hatred of foreign dominion with a burning love
for his country, her honour, and her happiness.
His love of country, however, knew nothing of Prussia
or Nassau, of Austria or Saxony, of Hanover or Bavaria.
“I have but one Fatherland,” said this sturdy Reichsritter,
“ its name is Germany; and as, according to the old
constitution, I belong to her alone, and not to any of
her parts, so I am devoted with all my heart to her alone,
and not to any of her parts.”
Little affected by the aesthetic enthusiasm of his con-
temporaries, his vigorous and practical mind was early
absorbed in historical subjects. All the wonders of the
national history, from the vanquishers of the Roman
cohorts in the Teutoburg Forest down to Frederick's
grenadiers, stood vividly before his eyes; to the great
undivided Germany, as far as the German tongue is spoken,
his fiery soul was devoted ; he excluded from his heart no
one who had ever given evidence of any of the
strong or great characteristics of the German nature;
and when, in his old age, he built a tower in
his native Nassau in commemoration of Germany's
glorious deeds, he hung the pictures of Frederick
the Great and Maria Theresa, of Scharnhorst and
Wallenstein, peaceably side by side. His ideal was the
mighty German kingdom of the Saxon Emperors; the
new fractional States which since then had risen above the
REGENERATION OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY. 75
ruins of the monarchy, appeared to him, one and all, to be
solely the growth of arbitrary selfishness, of treachery at
home and intrigues abroad, ripe for destruction as soon as the
majesty of the old legitimate kingship, anywhere and
anyhow, should arise again ; and it seemed to him incon-
ceivable that so much ceremony should be made with all
those petty princelings who had grown at the expense of the
Imperial Power.”
3.
No Salvation, of course, as was clear to him, could be
expected from the antiquated forms of government then
existing, nor from the old diplomatic doctrines of what he
considered a purely artificial equilibrium. First among
statesmen he foresaw that, in the nineteenth century, the
principle of nationalities, i.e., the tendency towards the
formation of great national communities, would be the
impelling force in European politics and convulsions, result-
ing in a sounder and more stable re-construction and
grouping of states. The unnatural preponderance of
France, argued Stein, stands and falls with the weak-
ness of Germany and Italy f : a new balance of powers
can only be established if each of the two great peoples of
Central Europe is united into a powerfully organized state.
Stein, however, not only saw the urgent necessity of German
unity, but even then discerned future possibilities which
* Heinrich von Treitschke, Deutsche Geschichte im Neunzehnten
Jahrhundert.
t Napoleon, the emperor and conqueror, had ruthlessly trampled on
the principle of nationality; Napoleon, the captive of St. Helena,
and unwilling onlooker, acknowledged its force : “Sooner or later,” he
Said, “the Italian peoples will be united under a single government.”
—See Commentaires de Mapoléon.
76 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
might produce it, and—the most influential forerunner
of Bismarck in the creation of German unity—actually
inaugurated a policy intended to bring it about.
To attain this end, it was in Stein's estimation, funda-
mentally and absolutely necessary to enlist the warm
sympathy and intelligent co-operation of the nation,
and this in its turn, he held, could only be effected by
removing the fetters of undue tutelage, and by giving
freer and fuller scope to the moral and intellectual forces
of the people in all matters concerning themselves.
4.
It has often been said that the strength and vitality of
the Prussian State rests on three main duties incumbent
upon every citizen, viz.: to pay taxes (Steuerpfficht),
to attend School (Schu///?icht), and to defend his country
(Wehróſ'icht), or, in other words, universal taxation,
compulsory education, and universal military service, a
triad of duties, the principle of which, with very limited
application at first, dates from the reign of Frederick
William I.’”
The effectiveness of duties performed for the State
and the benefit accruing therefrom to the common-
wealth depend, of course, entirely on the spirit in which the
duties are carried out. But what was the conception of
political duty which the Great Elector and, perhaps more
than anyone else, Frederick William I. had inculcated in
the Prussian people? It was the conception of the ancient
Greeks and Romans, that existence in a State, demands
* The principle of universal taxation had however already been
established by the Great Elector.
REGENERATION OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY. 77
above all things, unselfishness—lex suprema civifas, and
that every individual, since he desires ideal and material
advantages from the organized State, must first think
of the good of the community, must subordinate his
claims and interests to those of society, sacrifice his own
wishes for its welfare, and submit to all restrictions which
may be imposed for the general weal.
“For six years,” says H. v. Treitschke, referring to the
Seven Years' War, “the miserably poor officials received
no salaries, and quietly attended to their duties as
if it were a matter of course. Vying with each other,
all the provinces did their ‘damned part and duty,’—
Zerdammie Pºžicht und Schuldigkeit, as the new Prussian
phraseology had it: from the brave peasants of the Rhenish
county of Mörs, across to the unfortunate East Prussians,
who opposed the Russian conqueror with their tough,
quiet resistance, without allowing themselves to be at all
disturbed in their firm loyalty when the inexorable king
taxed them with defection and loaded them with marks
of disfavour.””
This is certainly an admirable manifestation of imper-
* Sense of duty as a motive power characterizes the whole of the
Teutonic, and thus, also, the Anglo-Saxon race. It is otherwise with
the Celts, whose temperament requires an appeal to the imaginative.
“From the summit of these pyramids forty centuries look down upon
you !” said Napoleon to his soldiers. “England expects that every
man will do his duty,” said Nelson to his sailors. On which A. de
Lamartine remarks :-‘‘ On sent à la différence d’accent et d’émulation
donnée aux deux peuples que l’un pense à la gloire et l'autre aux foyers.
La gloire de l’Anglais, c'est sa patrie ; celle du Français, c'est le monde.
La renommée enivre l'un, le devoir suffit à l'autre: la postérité
distribuera selon les mobiles et selon les oeuvres.”—See AWelson, par
A. de Lamartine,
78 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
turbable loyalty; and the performance, in such a spirit
of duties towards the community and the country could
not but create a deep attachment to such a community
and such a country. But was this attachment, was this
patriotism a spontaneous, an active patriotism, capable
of asserting itself suo motu ? Scarcely so. It was an
un-initiative, a passive patriotism which waits for the word
of command, a patriotism which responds to influences from
without rather than to calls from within, and which, in
cases of great emergency, though it might be kindled
by the genius of a Frederick, would of itself be wanting
in spontaneousness of outburst, in intensity of moral
impulse, in force and in energy. The necessities,
the new spirit of the times, demanded that the maxim then
obtaining, “Quiet is the first duty of a citizen,” should be
transformed into “Activity is the first duty of a citizen,”
with the logical corollary, “And let the best man take
upon himself the most difficult task.” Thus would active
patriotism arise from active citizenship.
Kant's philosophy, with its ethical earnestness, had
already prepared the way for such ideas. It boldly over-
threw the old inactive speculation, and, wedding ideality
with stern ethics, sought to solve problems by “practical
reason " alone.
Formulate for yourselves, Kant said in effect, the
highest ethical and aesthetical standard according to the
laws of reason, and act in Such a manner that the
maxim of your will may obtain force as a principle of
universal law. His “categorical imperative ’’ made the
participation in the concerns of public life, and particularly
in those of state life, a duty incumbent on the man of
REGENERATION OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY. 79
ethical culture, and raised the “verdammte Pflicht und
Schuldigkeit” to a higher level as the manifestation of a
conscious free will.”
It was then apparent that the ancient conception of a
citizen's duties towards the state, which at that time prevailed
in Prussia, lacked an indispensable complement, viz.: the
acknowledgment of the right—or, in Kant's conception, the
additional duty—of each citizen actively, and with a sense
of political independence and responsibility, to co-operate
in the management of public affairs.
To apply the principles of the aforementioned triad of
duties justly and to their fullest extent; at the same time to
replace soulless state-mechanism by pulsating state-life ; to
form the masses into self-governing communities; in fact,
to raise the Prussians from passive to active citizenship, and
thus to infuse the body politic with public spirit and active
patriotic devotion as a source of vital and ever-renewed popular
strength : this was, first and foremost, the aim of Stein.
5.
First, the condition of the peasantry was improved. The
emancipation of October 9th, 1807, which Schön called the
Aabeas Corpus Act of Prussia, abolished serfdom, and
established freedom of exchange in land, and free choice of
occupation. An independent peasantry was thereby created,
* “His dictum of the ‘categorical imperative,’ the call of duty on
us all to regulate our race towards the unattainable, remains to-day the
key-note of German intellectual and ethical life. In fact, it is impossible
to study the ethical and intellectual life of Germany without being
impressed by the vast influence which the teaching of the Königsberg
philosopher still exercises over its best minds, and through them has
gradually sifted into the masses, almost unconsciously to them.”—
“Imperial Germany,” by Sydney Whitman (Trübner & Co.).
lſº
8o THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
I8o3.
and the legal distinction of classes obliterated. On all
Crown domains, moreover, the peasants became free owners
of the land they tilled. Reformatory measures of many kinds
were introduced, the entire administration was re-organized,
and all classes were invited to compete for civil offices. In
Stein's spirit, when Napoleon's hatred had driven the great
reformer into exile,” Hardenberg continued the agrarian
reforms, and still further freed the people from feudal
burdens and other vexatious restrictions. On his proposi-
tion, the King abrogated all exemptions from taxes, and,
much to the displeasure of the “Junkers,” decreed the in-
troduction of a uniform ground rent. The emancipation of
the Jews was likewise one of the progressive steps of the time.
But while Stein's social reforms, for the most part, realized
only what all enlightened minds, especially since the out-
break of the French Revolution, considered as an absolutely
necessary concession to the spirit of the times, one
work was exclusively the product of his own creative
power, his Städte-Ordnung, or Municipal Ordinance,
which reformed the municipalities, gave them important
rights of self-government, and established their entire
independence of the State authorities, in their own house-
hold affairs.
* A letter addressed to Prince Wittgenstein, in which Stein had
discussed the question as to the means of freeing Germany from foreign
dominion, had been intercepted by the French. In order not to place
the King in a false position towards Napoleon, Stein resigned. But the
fall of the great minister did not satisfy the Emperor. In December,
1808, there appeared in the Paris Moniteur an Imperial decree, by
which “le nommé Stein’ was outlawed as a “ demagogue,” and his
property within the Confederation of the Rhine confiscated. Stein
escaped. He went first to Austria, and afterwards to Russia. The
removal of this central figure was a great loss to all patriots, although
Stein, during his exile, continued to further the cause of the Fatherland.
REGENERATION OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY., 81
Thus municipal life was to become the school for the
wider sphere of political life; and, to crown his edifice, Stein
contemplated the conversion of the absolute monarchy into
a representative State. He indeed urged upon the King
who had readily consented to all other reforms, the granting
of provincial diets, and of a representative assembly for the
whole kingdom ; the latter, as the people had had no
political training, to have at first a deliberative voice only.
But such a concession the King could not be induced to
make. Had he conceded it of his own free will, he would
have saved the monarchy, under his successor, from the
humiliation of having to yield it to revolutionary force, and
a whole generation might probably have been spared the
experience of a groping, ill-guided, and irritating policy.
Much however had been obtained, and, as Stein himself
said in his farewell address to his officials, “the immovable
pillar of every throne, the free action of free men, had been
established.” As a result of these various reforms, great
and small, all classes were astir with stimulating ideas, fresh
life, and new interests: the political consciousness of the
people had been roused.
6.
In the same spirit, a drastic military reform was effected
under Scharnhorst. Wehrlos, ehrlos º was an adage both
old and significant among Germans. “Every subject is born
to bear arms,” said the old Soldier King, in his “Cantonregle-
ment,” in 1733. “See to it that we get a national army from
which no one be exempt, and let it be considered a
* Lit. : Weaponless, honourless, i.e., Dishonoured is he who cannot
wield a weapon.
F
82 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
disgrace not to have served in it,” begged Blücher of his
friend Scharnhorst, after the conclusion of peace, in 1807.
And what Frederick William I., in 1733, had only
established as a principle * now became a reality under
Frederick William III. “All the inhabitants of the State
are its born defenders,” was the rule laid down in paragraph I
of Scharnhorst's plan of reorganization. The reforms then
introduced all tended towards one object, the creation
of a national army as the only means of performing the task
of national liberation. Thus rose to life again the old
Germanic idea : the arming of the whole people, zwehrlos,
ehrlos. Army and people were henceforth identical: the
army was the people in arms.
France, in the Revolution, had already taken a step in
the same direction, but the law of conscription, as decreed
under the government of the Directory, left a loop-hole by
which the well-to-do could escape military service through
buying substitutes. The Prussian law was more democratic
than that of the French Revolution; it knew of but one duty
for all, rich and poor ; each and all must defend their
country.
At the same time, every endeavour was made to raise the
moral tone in the army. Only personal merit was to be a
qualification for the position of officer; flogging was abolished
as degrading, and hence demoralizing; strict discipline was
to go hand in hand with the awakening and strengthening
of the sense of honour and of manly qualities.
* It is true that the last battles of Frederick the Great had really been
fought by what may be called a national army, the almost exhausted
country straining every nerve under the stress of the times; but since
then the old system of exemptions, and of enlistment of hirelings, native
and foreign, had again become the rule,
REGENERATION OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY. 83
Scharnhorst's scheme, however, could only be carried
out with great difficulty, and with regard to the formation
of the Zandwehr, very incompletely ; for Napoleon had
exacted that the Prussian army should not exceed 42, ooo
men. Nothing was left to Scharnhorst but to outwit the
conqueror by fulfilling the condition in the letter, while
setting it aside in spirit. So, adhering to the prescribed
number, he called in, and trained for a short period, one
body of men after another, until the larger portion of the
male population were in a position to take up arms for the
deliverance of their country. And when the decisive
moment came, this little Prussia alone, which had been
reduced to five millions inhabitants, was able to place in
the field an army of 277, ooo men.
7.
And how did the third of the triad, the Schulpſicht,
fare in the midst of all these reforms ? It was not likely to
be neglected in a country in which there existed already,
at least among the better classes, a wide appreciation of
education, and in which the science of education, in the
spirit of Pestalozzi, was fully comprehended. The idea in
fact, as even a superficial glance at German literature
reveals, was pressed upon the people by all their
great writers, who, from Luther to Herder, Goethe, Jean
Paul, Kant, Fichte, and Schleiermacher, had all given their
attention to, and contributed towards the solution of, the
problems of the education of mankind, and those of the
evolution of the single mind. “Behind education,” said
Kant, “lies hid the great secret of the perfection of human
nature.” “Only that nation,” argued Fichte, “which shall
84 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
first perform the task of educating up to perfect manhood,
by actual practice, will perform the task of the perfect
State.” + And in Prussia, education had already been
regarded as specially the duty of the State : the idea of
compulsory education was as old as the Reformation; for
education only could free the people from the grasp of
overawing priestcraft. “I hold,” says Luther, “that the
authorities are bound to compel their subjects to keep
their children at school,” and it is the Protestant States of
* It is interesting to note that education in Germany springs from,
and takes root in ideal ground from the very outset: in England, from
purely practical. Mr. Donaldson marks the contrast in one
of his lectures delivered at Edinburgh, in 1874: “But we find
nowhere a wide grasp,” he says, with regard to England, “ of what is
required to organize education, and no attempt is made to connect the
development of the individual members of the State with the work of
the State. On the contrary, the argument most commonly put forward,
is an argument from fear and from greed. The lower classes are
becoming more and more powerful. They are likely to overwhelm us,
and, therefore, to prevent this calamity, we must get them instructed.
Or the number of the vicious is increasing. Ignorance is one of the
causes of this; and so we must educate the young. Or it is the special
work of Government to protect life and property. The police is
as yet the only instrument we have employed for this purpose. But
prevention is better than cure. Let us train up the children aright,
and then we shall effect a great saving in the police-rates, and be
altogether much more comfortable. Yes, fear and selfishness have again
and again been held forth as the motives for establishing a system of
popular education. . . . Let me for a moment contrast with it the
Prussian idea—God has given to each man capacities. These capacities
it is his own duty to develop to the utmost of his power. It is his
neighbour's duty to help him to develop them. The neighbour can
best effect this as a member of the State. The State, therefore, as the
union of all, undertakes to provide the best means for the full develop-
ment of all the powers of its members. It therefore establishes a
complete system of education, from the most elementary to the highest
stages; and this system renders the lowest education imperative on all,
and the highest accessible to all.”
REGENERATION OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY. 85
Germany which took the lead in gradually adopting this
principle.
The idea of compulsory education is therefore met with
at various periods of Prussian history, and we find com-
pulsion expressly laid down in the decrees of 1717 and
I736.
Thus the idea came from above downwards, from the
thinkers and rulers down to the people, till the latter them-
selves became steady and staunch believers in it. Education
will make better men, maintained religious reformers and
thinkers; education will make our subjects better citizens,
better soldiers, better fighters in “the struggle for existence,”
added the Prussian rulers and statesmen.
After Frederick the Great had given battle for seven long
years to the Austrians, the Russians, and the French, the
very first thing he did, in 1763, in order to revive his
exhausted kingdom, was to promulgate the excellent
Education Act of Hecker, which contained precise directions
as to the application of compulsion,” the institution of
seminaries for teachers, etc.; to which must be added,
later on, the establishment of the Ober-Schulco//egium or
Supreme Council of Education, and the provisions of the
A//gemeine Zandrecht, which affirmed that Schools and
universities are institutions of the State, and under the
superintendence of the State. Again, when Prussia had
been laid low by Napoleon, Frederick William III. and his
* The German obscurantists, as, later on, English anti-educationalists,
had of course their doubts as to whether education was good for the
labouring classes, but it is rather amusing to find that they did not
object so much to education for the men as for the women: What good
can it do, they said, to teach girls to write P They will then spend their
whole time in writing love letters.
86 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
minister Stein turned to the regenerative influences of
further improved education, and improved educational
methods. “Unguestionably we have lost in territory,”
said the King ; “unguestionably, the State has sunk in
external might and glory; and therefore it is my earnest
desire that the greatest attention be devoted to the education
of the people.” And his minister: “Most is to be ex-
pected from the education and instruction of the youth.
If by a method” based on the nature of the mind every
power of the soul is unfolded, and every crude principle of
life be stirred up and nourished, if all one-sided culture be
avoided, and if the impulse (hitherto often neglected with
great indifference), on which the strength and worth of man
rest, be carefully attended to, then we may hope to see a
race physically and morally powerful grow up, and a better
future dawn upon us.” These words of king and minister
found an echo among the people.
It was the wide-hearted and highly-cultured Wilhelm von
Humboldt to whose care the educational department was
entrusted, and whose reforms established the school system
of Prussia on its present basis. These reforms could not,
of course, bear fruit all at once, nor could they, for various
reasons, even be carried thoroughly into effect, in all points
of detail, until after the Wars of Liberation, when Altenstein
became Minister of Public Instruction.f Yet Humboldt's
* The method to which Stein alludes is that of the famous Swiss
teacher, Pestalozzi.
t “It was within the twenty-three years of Altenstein's ministry,”
says Mr. Donaldson, “that Prussia made such progress in education,
that she became an object of admiration to the nations of Europe,
and Frenchmen and Englishmen went to see the system. And by it
Prussia grew in strength and power. The Prussian people had faith
REGENERATION OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY. 87
merit, although his activity did not extend over more
than a year and a quarter, is to have infused the whole
educational Organization with that spirit of humanity and
ideality which has remained one of its distinguishing
features to this day.
The German universities, it must be remembered, were
not only centres of learning and culture, but, at the same
time, harbouring places of the national ideals, where the
idea of national unity was kept alive, and continued to
flicker and to flame when, in the general indifference or the
general confusion, it seemed well-nigh extinct everywhere
else.
As a consequence of her dismemberment, Prussia had
lost four or five of her academical institutions, among them
in education. . . . And history records, in great successes in war, and
still greater successes in the realms of thought and science, that her
faith has not been in vain.” Whilst acknowledging all that education
has done for the growth of Prussia, and the resuscitation of the whole
Fatherland, one is, however, compelled to admit, what has of late been
frequently said, that education has gradually been carried to excess.
Too much stress has been laid on learning, too little on developing
physical strength, too little on cultivating character and individuality.
Goethe already protested against the one-sidedness of mere abstract
learning. “We hope, however, and expect,” said he, “that in some-
thing like a hundred years hence, things may look different with us
Germans, and that we may have got to this, that we are no longer
abstract men of learning and philosophers, but men.” A reaction
happily seems to have set in recently against this excessive develop-
ment of the brain power at the expense of bodily strength and
individuality, and efforts are being made to restore the balance between
mental and physical training. Whatever we may think of the English
educational system as a whole, we certainly must concur in what Sir
Albert Rollitt said not long ago : “Our English enterprise and energy
is manufactured in our playing fields.” Let Englishmen learn from
Germans how to teach and organize education, and let Germans take
a lesson from the English how to cultivate physique and character.
88 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
18Io.
1811.
the flourishing universities of Halle and Erlangen. The
King resolved to open a new sanctuary to German learning
in his capital, and, with Humboldt's aid, the Berlin
University became a reality. With a brilliant and un-
rivalled array of men of light, among whom were Fichte,
Boeckh, Niebuhr, Schleiermacher, Savigny, and Hufeland,
it took its stand on that broad foundation on which all
German universities rest, that truly liberal principle which,
in the words of Schleiermacher, forms the very essence
of a university in the German sense, viz.: absolute
freedom of learning and teaching. The Prussian State,
however, went a step further, and showed its deference to
the tolerant spirit pervading the philosophical views of the
time by establishing two theological faculties, Catholic and
Protestant, at the re-organized University of Breslau, and by
thus creating what constitutes a peculiarity of German life
almost unintelligible to other nations, viz.: a paritätische
Onizersität, the first of its kind.*
What a difference, after all, between the conquered and
the conqueror . The conquered put their trust in the
moral force of education, and the creative power of un-
fettered thought : the conqueror, when, in 1802, Pestalozzi
attempted to interest him in a scheme of popular education,
replied,—that he could not trouble himself about the
alphabet.
8.
Manifold other influences were at work.
* A “paritätische Universität,” is a university with a Catholic and
a Protestant faculty enjoying equal rights and privileges. There are,
at present, three such universities in Germany, viz.: Breslau, Bonn,
and Tuibingen.
REGENERATION OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY. 89
The bluff and ardent patriot, Jahn, known as der deutsche
Turnvater, strove to steel the young by popularizing
gymnastics. A 7'ugend/und, League of Virtue, was formed
of men of all ranks, especially professors and students,
for the purpose of fostering earnest moral sense and
patriotic feeling. Schleiermacher, who was a really great
and liberal-minded theologian, exercised an elevating
and strengthening influence from the pulpit Over all
classes, and from the professor's chair Over academical
youth. •
The poet Arndt, that sterling son of the Island of
Rügen, fired the national spirit in his “Geist der Zeit.”
Inflaming, as it did, every German heart against French
despotism, this work was a moral victory over Napoleon.
And though its author had to flee before the persecutions of
the conqueror, the fugitive poet still continued to launch
among his countrymen pamphlet after pamphlet infused
with his own patriotic wrath, and full of incitement to
action.
To re-awaken the interest in the common Fatherland, the
folk-lore, the poetry and song, the art, the legendary and
historical deeds of the Germany of the past, were brought
to light again by the apostles of the romantic school.
Romanticism, besides many an unhealthy off-shoot,
was also productive of charming buds and much useful
fruit.
The Rhine, at all times dear to German hearts, but
intensely dearer now that it bore the conqueror's yoke,
pre-eminently attracted the interest and solicitude of the
romanticists, and had bestowed upon it many an affectionate
lament, such as Friedrich Schlegel's:
1807.
Qo THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
“Genial, earnest, mighty river,
Land by our beloved Rhine,
For your loss my heart-strings quiver,
Tears bedim these eyes of mine.”
With its wondrous cathedrals, its picturesque castles and
ruins, its sparkling and inspiring wines, its witching fairy
tales, its elves and water nixies, its Nibelungen and heroic
legends, its brilliant historical associations, the calm,
majestic Rhine now became Germany’s sacred river,
became an object of fantastic, yet passionate, worship, a
worship destined to broaden, with succeeding generations,
into wide national significance.
This absorption in the romantic spirit of the Middle
Ages and the remoter past naturally led to the study of
archaeology, of the earlier literature and language,
especially to the establishment of philological research on a
scientific basis by the two brothers Jacob and Wilhelm
Grimm, and in the sequel caused a remarkable development
of the historico-philological sciences, which since have
formed so essential a part of the intellectual life of
Germany.
Among the patriotic romanticists, such as Brentano,
Arnim, Schlegel, Tieck, and Schenkendorf, there was one to
whom, as truly a man of genius, belongs the place of
honour. This was Heinrich von Kleist, who, in his
“Germania to her Children º’ and his “Battle of Arminius,”
touched the national conscience to the core, and who, with
all the impetuosity of impassioned genius, sent forth
vehement dithyrambic outbursts of patriotic grief and anger
and of inextinguishable, almost demoniac, hatred, such as
only a heart could feel that was convulsed with indigna-
REGENERATION OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY. 9I
tion at the disgrace heaped by the oppressor on the
Fatherland :
“Rescue from the yoke of slavery,
Iron-wrought with many a blow,
Which a son of hell, which knavery
O'er our necks has dared to throw.”
With this storm of hatred raging in his bosom he was
ever passionately putting the feverishly-impatient question,
“Dost thou rise, Germania P is the day of vengeance
nigh P” But when the day of vengeance did not come as
quickly as his ardent soul desired, overwhelmed with despair,
he put an end to his existence, a victim to the all-consuming
fire of a wildly-flaming patriotism.
9.
In the midst of all this stir among the bards of
the German Parnassus, our eyes naturally turn on him whose
genius towered far above the rest, and we eagerly ask:
Did Goethe, the favourite son of the Muses, share the
national sorrows of his fellow-countrymen, did he feel
active sympathy with their national hopes and aspirations P
Painful as the fact was to his contemporaries, and regrettable
as it appears to the present generation, there is no other
reply than that Goethe stood silently aloof, whilst all that
were best and greatest next to him vied in furthering the
cause of the Fatherland in her struggle for life or death.
There is no great man in whom we do not find
some glaring defect. Frederick the Great had no
appreciation of the rising literature of Germany : Goethe
showed no outward sympathy with the rising national spirit
of his time. And yet no two men were more truly German
I8II.
92 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
in their highest achievements than they. As to Goethe, his
whole being was too deeply rooted in the purely aesthetic
culture of the cosmopolitan eighteenth century ; and what
had thus formed the very essence of his thinking, his life
and his work, would not, in the man of nearly sixty, readily
accommodate itself to active participation in the combative
patriotism of the nineteenth century. Combative,
moreover, Goethe was not in any sense. He was not a
politician. The aristocratic reserve of his genius kept him
from contact with popular movements. It was his
nature to escape from the weary strife of passions that
agitate the outer world into the calm regions of contempla-
tion, and in all things to find inner harmony and artistic
repose. In political struggles, however, there is no finality
and no repose ; and the Sentiment expressed in Fausſ–" A
nasty Song fie a political song !”—was no doubt very
much his own. The fantastic excitement of the romanticists,
the boisterous patriotism and defiant national pathos of the
new generation, before and after the Wars of Liberation,
were distasteful to him, and he would not stir from his
Olympic dignity and repose ; though it would have been so
easy for him, the “Master” among German poets, to guide,
to temper, to ennoble.
Yet he was not indifferent to the fate of the German
people. On the contrary, he believed in its vitality, in its
future, and its ultimate rise to national greatness, though he
did not estimate the recuperative capacity of his own genera-
tion at its full worth, and could never bring himself to give to
patriotic warmth and national feeling any public expression
worthy of a great man. We have to refer to conversations.
he had with Eckermann and Luden to obtain a conception
REGENERATION OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY. 93
of the feelings he really entertained with regard to the
national question and the great common Fatherland.
Speaking to Eckermann, at a period somewhat later than
that which now occupies our attention, about German unity
and the sense in which it might be possible and desirable,
Goethe said : * “I am not afraid that Germany will not
become one : Our good high-roads and future railways will
no doubt contribute towards that. But above all, let it be
one in mutual love among its people, and always one
against the foreign foe. I.et it be one, that the German
thaler and groschen may have the same value throughout
the Empire ; one, that my travelling trunk may pass un-
opened through all the thirty-six States. Let it be one, that
the municipal passport of a citizen of Weimar may not be
considered insufficient by the frontier officials of a great
neighbouring State, as if it were the passport of a foreigner.
Let there be no longer anywhere the question of native and
foreign among German States. Further let Germany be
one in measure and weights, in trade and commerce, and a
hundred similar things, all of which I cannot and may not
mention.
“But if men think that German unity consists in having
one single capital for this very large empire, and that this one
large capital should aid the development of great individual
talents as well as the welfare of the great mass of the people,
they are mistaken.”
To the historian Luden, Goethe once spoke with warmth
* Eckermann, “Gespräche mit Goethe,” vol. iii., p. 270 ; on pages
311-316 is an attempt towards an apology for his political and national
indifference. g
94 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
on the tragic fate of Germany : * “Do not believe by any
means,” said the poet, “that I am indifferent to the great
ideas: liberty, people, fatherland. No, these ideas are in
us, they are part of our being, and no one can cast them
from himself. I even have the well-being of Germany
warmly at heart. I have often been bitterly grieved when
thinking of the German people, which is so worthy of
respect in particular matters, and so wretched as a whole.
A comparison of the German people with other nations
awakens painful feelings within us, which I for my part try to
overcome in every possible manner. In science and art I
have found the pinions by which one can raise oneself
above them ; for science and art belong to the world, and
before them the barriers of nationality vanish. But the com-
fort which they afford is only, after all, a sorry comfort, and
does not equal the proud consciousness of belonging to
a nation, great, strong, respected, and feared. It is
only the belief in Germany’s future that can really give
comfort. To this belief I cling as firmly as you do. Yes,
the German people gives promise of a future: it has a
future. The destiny of the Germans, to use Napoleon's
words, is not yet fulfilled. Had they had no other task to
fulfil than to break up the old Roman Empire, and to create
and order a new world, they would long ago have perished.
But, as they have continued to exist, and show so much
vigour and ability, they must, in my opinion, still have a great
destiny, a destiny which will become still greater than that
of having to destroy the Roman Empire, and to shape the
Middle Ages; all the greater, indeed, that their culture
* Luden, Rückblicke in mein Zeben.—Cf. Klüpfel, Die deutschen
A.inheitsbestrebungen, 1853.
REGENERATION OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY. 95
now stands so much higher. But the time, the opportunity,
a human eye may not foresee, and human power may not
hasten on or bring about. To us individuals, meanwhile,
there is nothing left but, to each according to his talents,
inclination, and position, the duty of increasing and
strengthening the culture of the people, and of spreading it
on all sides, downwards, and more particularly upwards, in
order that the German people may not remain behind the
other peoples, but may, at least in this matter, stand out
first, that the popular mind may not be stunted, but may
remain fresh and cheerful, that it may not grow disheartened
and despondent, but may remain fit for every great deed
when the day of glory breaks.”
As a national leader, it is evident, Goethe contented him-
self with a passive rôle. But though he thought that as such
he had done all his duty in contributing to “increase and
spread culture,” so that the people might be “fit for every
great deed,” it must be admitted that no one has more power-
fully furthered the development of a joyous national self-
consciousness than Goethe. The heaven-born poet
emitted numerous flashes of genius; but “Faust,” in
1808, dazzled all intellectual Germany.
Here was reflected all the fulness and abundance
of German life, evolved, as it seemed, from the very
soul of the German people: the fantastic and weird
diab/erie and witchery of popular belief and superstition,
the tender and deep inwardness of a woman's love, the
mirth and merriment of student life, the soldier's eagerness
for the fray, the lofty flight of German thought, the all-
pervading idea that the divine must triumph over the spirit
of negation, “that always wills the wrong, and always works
96 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
the right.” Could this work, the crown of modern poetic
creations, have sprung from among a people doomed to
annihilation P That could not be if great men are
but the concentrated genius of a nation. To the
German people, in that hour of degradation, “Faust”
was a deeply-comforting revelation that German culture
was still an essential factor in the shaping of the
world's progress, and that, if German culture were destined
to live, German nationality could not die.
IO.
Schiller was dead. But his works now became more
fully appreciated, and obtained a deeper significance.
It was a strange contradiction that German patriotism
should have sought warmth and inspiration at the hearth
of its enemies. It was, nevertheless, by his “Maid of
Orleans,” with its glowing description of a nation's struggle
against foreign dominion, that Schiller helped to arouse and
shake the national conscience of his countrymen : “Worth-
less,” said he, “is the nation that will not joyfully stake her
life-blood on her honour.” But above all in his drama
“Wilhelm Tell,” with its free-born, brawny German high-
land peasants, he had presented the glorified picture of
a war of liberation, the noble portraiture of a people
rising with manly courage to defend freedom and home ;
and from the inspiring and lofty ideas embodied in this
popular drama, the young generation, full of ideality, largely
drew its enthusiasm for liberty and fatherland. They felt
as if the dramatic exhortation :
“Be one—be one—be one !”
had been left behind as a political legacy to the German
REGENERATION OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY. 97
nation, as if for them he had written the rousing Rütli
Oath :
“We swear to be a nation of true brothers,
Never to part in danger or in death ! .
We swear we will be free as were our sires,
And sooner die than live in slavery !
We swear to put our trust in God Most High,
And not to quail before the might of man | * *
II.
Mightiest, however, among the voices of the dead and the
living was that of Kant's pupil, Fichte, who, in place of
mere instruction and self-sufficing culture, demanded the
education of the people to moral and political volition, not
to sufferance, but to action, so that it might fully com-
prehend the intolerableness of its condition, and create a
new and a better. Thus, in his endeavours towards national
regeneration, Stein, the statesman and reformer, found a
most powerful ally in Fichte, the philosopher and orator.
Under the disguise of abstract philosophical disquisition
—in order to evade the interference of the French police—
Fichte delivered his fiery “Orations to the German Nation,”
even whilst the French battalions, with beating drums, were
marching past the Academy. There he stood, his head
proudly erect, his eyes alight with wrathful flashes, his lips
pouring forth the “anger of free speech.” Spell-bound and
conscience-stricken, his countrymen listened as he uttered
his judgments over them, first humbling and chiding them
on account of their indifference and selfishness, and telling
them point-blank that a nation incapable of ruling itself
* Like the Swiss Confederates on the Rütli, Jahn and his gymnastic
associates met by night in a wood near Berlin, and vowed that they
would stand, fight, and die for home and fatherland.
G
1807–1808.
98 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
1809.
must even forfeit its very language; then lifting them up
again by recalling their past deeds and their achieve-
ments in the realms of thought; at last exhorting them to
concord and manly action, proclaiming his unfaltering Con-
fidence in the ultimate victory of German culture, and, to
the very tramp of the hostile cohorts in the capital of a
crushed State, fearlessly prophesying, in the spirit of the
seer of Chebar, the resurrection of the Fatherland : “Let
the elements of our higher spiritual life be as withered,
and the bonds of our national union therefore lie torn
and scattered pell-mell in as wild confusion, as the dry
bones of the Prophet’s vision ; let them be bleached and
parched by the storms and Scorching Suns of centuries:
the life-giving breath of the spiritual world has not yet
ceased to blow. It will seize the withered bones of our
national body, and join them together so that they shall
stand there splendid, in a new and glorified life.”
I 2.
Thus, after the fatal days of Ulm and Austerlitz, of Jena
and Auerstädt—with Austria, too, carrying out moderate
reforms under Count Stadion—there soon came over the
hearts and minds of the German people an altered spirit,
purified, strong, and active, determined to break the fetters
of foreign bondage.
Patriotism now for the first time became a Consuming
passion among a large section of the community. It at
once manifested itself in the bold and heroic, though for the
moment futile, risings of Hofer and his brave Tyrolese, of
Schill, Dörnberg, and the Duke of Brunswick. It gave
surprising evidence—surprising to the oppressor—of its
REGENERATION OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY. 99
vitality and impatience, of the resolution it imparted to the
sons of the Fatherland to do or die.
And out of the midst of all this feverish stir, as a growth
of historical longing, of cruel awakening, of poetic and
political enthusiasm, the idea of German unity budded and
blossomed into youthful life.
True, there were those in Southern and Western Germany,
who in 1792 had joyfully welcomed the French as the
bearers of the heavenly torch of freedom, and as the
apostles of the sovereignty of the people, for, especially
in the old ecclesiastical States, they owed to the French
the abolition of the accumulated abuses of centuries, and
the establishment of freer institutions:* others in 1804,
in the very Kaiserstadt, the royal city of Aachen, in Mainz, in
several Rhenish towns, had hailed Napoleon as the successor
of Charlemagne, who had rescued them from the unwhole-
some atmosphere, the straitening narrowness and miserable
pettiness of German Kleinstaaterei, and who would realize
theircherished cosmopolitan dreams and make them members
of a great and happy world-empire. But they were gradually
disillusioned, as that vaunted sovereignty of the people
became absorbed in the individual will of one man, a man
of boundless and insatiable ambition, and as cosmo-
politanism was seen to mean nothing but the intolerable
hegemony of one nation, the supremacy of that nation's
language, law, and political interests.f When all that was
* Even years afterwards, in 1817, the farmers in the Magdeburg dis-
trict, in all their simple-heartedness, confessed to the Prussian Minister,
Klewiz, as he was making an official tour through that district, that
they would like to have such a Constitution again.
+ The official language of the Kingdom of Westphalia was French.
In the salons of Paris, says H. von Treitschke, no one had any
:
º
:
e©
º
:
IOO THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
best and greatest in the German race had thus crumbled
into ruins, when all that was dearest to it, even its very
language, was threatened with obliteration and extinction by
the levelling forces of a perverted cosmopolitanism, then the
people learnt again to appreciate national individuality at its
full worth, and to value it as a necessary element of Sound
culture and advancement. And when, to serve the ends of
this universal monarchy, ends entirely alien to the domestic
interests of the nation, thousands of sons of the Father-
land, compelled to follow in the train of the conqueror,
perished under the burning sun of Spain and on the terrible
ice-fields of Russia, then, shuddering, the whole generation
felt that there was a power by which it was possible to stem
this dire calamity, and one power only, a National State.
Regarding the exact course to be taken for the attainment
of this power, the means of reconciling the conflicting
interests of the various States, and the relative position of
Austria and Prussia in the new State, there certainly existed
—and this was the weak point of the movement—a wide
difference of opinion among patriots such as Stein,
Hardenberg, Fichte, and Arndt. With many, indeed,
who had not formed a definite opinion of any kind, the
desire for unity remained merely an aspiration, a vague
dream. But the patriotic enthusiasts, especially those of
the younger generation, all had the child-like belief and
the inplicit trust that national happiness of some kind,
that wonderful blessings must come to the Fatherland if
only they freed it again from foreign oppression.
doubt as to the ultimate fate of the Rhenish Confederation, and the
subjects of the King of Westphalia, when visiting the French capital,
were jestingly welcomed as “Français futurs.”
:
º
.
:
:
:
:
:
º
c:
:
REGENERATION OF PRUSSIA AND GERMANY. I O Í
I3.
At Schönbrunn, where, in October, 1809, Napoleon was
dictating the conditions of peace to unfortunate Austria,
Friedrich Staps, the son of a German pastor at Naumburg,
had contemplated an attack on the Emperor's life, that
the Fatherland might be freed from tyranny's strangling
grasp.
Whereupon Brutus appeared in chains before Caesar,
free.
“What would you do if I pardoned you?” asked the
mighty conqueror.
“Kill you all the same !” responded the fearless youth.
Terror-struck, Napoleon learned how deeply hatred had
eaten into the hearts of even the pious, the pure. But
tyranny, when stared in the face by the spectre of
implacable hatred, can have but one reply, but one resource:
Fusilade Dragonnade
The platoon fire of the oppressor's myrmidons made
answer to ill-fated Staps as answer it had made to guiltless
Palm and the valiant officers, termed “robbers,” of Schill's
hapless band, and as answer, heartless and cruel, it was
soon to make to the “Tell of the Tyrol,” to brave and
honest Andreas Hofer.
Men, indeed, despots may kill: ideas, never. The
victim's body may be riddled with balls, the idea lives |
Exalted and hallowed by its defender's martyrdom, it takes
flight into other breasts, and, by the death of each succeeding
victim increasing multifold its strength and glory, it strikes,
electrifies, inflames and impassions hundreds and thou-
sands and hundreds of thousands of hearts, till its surging
I O2 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
might Sweeps away the resisting powers of oppression, and
Right at last stands out triumphant.
If a bullet had suddenly struck Napoleon on the battle-
field, if he had fallen by the hands of any exasperated
individual patriot, his death would have lacked appropriate-
ness. It was a befitting fate that he should feel the Scourge
and strength of outraged nationality.
Since the rulers of Germany and other European countries
were too dull-witted to allow the breath of freedom to
sweep out of the edifice of the State the fusty and unhealthy
air which was stifling the life of the people, Napoleon
undoubtedly fulfilled a mission in breaking up the miserable
system of petty dominions in Germany and Italy, and in
casting into the lumber chamber the rusty relics of
an antiquated feudalism. But this mission of destruction
he carried to extremes; and, in spite of his prodigious
victories and his astounding genius, he created nothing
lasting in the European State system. And this for three
reasons : because he was quite incapable of rising
above his ambitious self; because his successes had
entirely blinded him to his own interests and those of
France; and because among all the peoples of Europe
he violated to an exasperating degree the sense of national
individuality and national honour.
This very feeling of nationality, stirred into passion by his
political aberrations, finally overthrew this Colossus from
his giddy height. The day of reckoning came. Moscow
shook and convulsed the edifice of universal empire from
end to end; Leipzig hurled its battlements and pillars
crashing and crumbling into the dust : Waterloo shattered
and blasted its tottering wreck, and razed it level with the
THE WARS OF LIBERATION. 1 Og
ground. And vain-glorious World-Dominion vanished from
the field of history, its last flicker dying away on the barren
rocks of a desert island.
I4.
The wrecking of Napoleon’s army on the icy plains of
Russia was Germany's opportunity. “Now or never,”
writes York to Bülow, “is the time to regain
freedom and honour. Providence shows us the way ;
we are unworthy of her assistance if we reject her favour.
The army desires war against France, the people desire it,
the King desires it. But the King has no free will. The
army must set his will free. I shall shortly be near Berlin
with 50,000 men, and soon at the Elbe. At the Elbe I
shall say to the King : Here, sire, is your army, and here is
my old head. At the King's feet I will willingly lay down
my head, but York is not to be judged or sentenced by a
Dec., 1812.
Murat. I act boldly, but I act as a faithful servant and a
true Prussian.”
Urged into a determined course by the resolute acts of
York and Stein, and the patriotic initiative of his East
Prussians, King Frederick William, first of German princes,
in his “Proclamation to the People,” summoned the nation
“to rise and expel the French from German soil,” and held
out to them the hope of “the establishment of the German
Constitution with rejuvenated power and unity, without
foreign influence, through the German princes and peoples
alone, out of the innermost life and spirit of the German
nation.”
Der König rieſ, und Alle, Alle kamem.
Then did the people flock in their thousands round
Mar. 17th, 1813.
IO4 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
the national banner which Prussia was upholding, to
sacrifice their property on the altar of the Fatherland, or
their lives on the field of battle. Never did the national
feeling burn with more brilliant flame. Regulars and
volunteers, Zandwehr and Zand'sſurm, all united in
one accordant cry: With God for King and Fatherland
And quite an army in themselves, an army by the
enthusiasm they aroused, were the national poets, such as
Rückert, Körner, Arndt, and Schenkendorf, in whom the
Teutonic fire burst forth with more or less splendour. To
wield the weapon and strike the lyre was in the true German
spirit: -
“Not the lyre alone has strings,
Strings the bow has too.”
Rückert sent forth whole batteries of “Sonnets in
Armour.”
Moritz Arndt kindled the sacred fire by songs such as the
“German Battle Cry of Freedom,” commencing :
“The God who planted iron ore
No slavery permitted :
A trusty sword and spear therefore
To each right hand committed.”
And ending with the appeal :
“Then raise your hands to heaven on high,
With hearts in concord blended,
And man for man let each one cry:
‘Our slavery is ended !”
Max von Schenkendorf even then heralded a new, united,
and mighty empire.
A Tyrtaeus in very truth, youthful and chivalrous Körner
* Goethe.
THE WARS OF LIBERATION. Io 5
rushes to the deadly combat with “Lyre and Sword,”
exclaiming :
“The people are rising, storm sweeps through the land,
And where is the man without sword in his hand?
Shame to thee, coward I go slink in a corner,
Pet of the women and butt of the scorner
Wretch that thou art, be dishonour thy lot
Germany's maidens kiss thee not,
Germany's songs delight thee not,
Germany's wines inspire thee not
Clink the can,
Man to man,
Wield the sabre ye that can
“And what if we fall on the red field of fight P
Then welcome the death of the soldier and knight !
In the silk coverlet shrink where thou’rt lying,
Death has its terrors, tremble in dying !
Die as a wretch, with dishonour thy lot
Germany's maids bewail thee not,
Germany’s songs record thee not,
Germany’s goblets toast thee not
Clink the can,
Man to man,
Wield the sabre ye that can l’”
“The people in arms,” responding to the call of King
and poet, gave brilliant evidence of their re-awakened love
of the Fatherland on the battlefields of Grossbeeren, the
Katzbach, Dennewitz, in the furious three days’ fighting
on the plains of Leipzig, and in that memorable final contest
of Waterloo, where English and German brotherhood-in-
arms sealed the Conqueror's doom.
For accounts of the fighting there is, of course, no room
here; but a breath of the spirit that fanned the flame of
enthusiasm in those warrior-souls may be caught from one
* Translation from “Flowers from Fatherland.” Blackwood &
Sons.
Ioé THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
of Lützow’s “Black Band of Vengeance,” who shed his
life-blood on the field of battle, for Körner gives voice to
the fierce, dogged, indomitable determination of his
comrades-in-arms to hunt the oppressors from German soil,
to free hearth and home, and safeguard the honour and
independence of the nation:
“What streams from yon wood, where the sunbeams shine,
Still nearer and nearer sounding P
It hurries along, dusky line upon line,
The shrill-sounding horns with shouting combine,
The soul with dark horror confounding.
Swart hunters, say whither that furious race P
This is Lützow's daring and desperate chase.
“From hill unto hill through the woods they hie,
Each one to his comrades calling;
Behind the dark thickets in ambush they lie,
The rifle is heard, the loud battle cry,
In numbers the foemen are falling.
Swart warriors, say whither that furious race P
This is Lützow's daring and desperate chase.
“The tyrants, they trust in the rolling Rhine,
'Neath sheltering vineyards hiding;
But the torrent impedes not the hunters’ swift line,
Undaunted they follow their leader's sign,
Through floods on their foes boldly riding.
Strong swimmers, what means that furious race?
This is Lützow's daring and desperate chase.
“The slaughter is raging now hand to hand,
And wildly the weapons are clashing;
For fierce are the blows of the valorous band,
And freedom’s bright spark to a blaze is fann’d,
And blood-red the flames are flashing.
Who are they, that ride such a furious race?
That is Lützow's daring and desperate chase.
THE WARS OF LIBERATION. Io?
“Some stagger and fall mid the groaning foe,
No more the bright sunlight seeing ;
The writhings of death on their faces they show,
Yet hearts that are free no terror can know ;
The foemen are routed and fleeing.
Who are they that fall in that furious race?
That was Lützow's daring and desperate chase.
“O glorious chase that from bondage shakes
Our homes, by those tyrants invaded ;
Then ye, who have loved us, weep not for our sakes,
For the Fatherland’s free and the morning breaks,
Our country's no longer degraded !
And tell ye our sons of this furious race :
That was Lützow's daring and desperate chase.” “
* Verses one, two, and five, with the exception of the refrain, have
been adopted, by kind permission of Messrs. Novello, Ewer, & Co.,
from their edition of Lützow's Wild Chase (Orpheus Series of Part
Songs, No. 57).
CHAPTER VIII.
The A’esults of the Wars of Ziberation—Suðsequent Move-
ſments in Favour of Ziberty and Unity—Keactionary
Aolicy of the Governments—The German “Zied.”
I.
W W YERE the results of this great struggle commensurate
with the enormous sacrifices so spontaneously, so
cheerfully made by the people?
Alas, no l The very question sounds like mockery.
If ever a generation, after making heroic efforts, was
hurled from the heights of transcendent enthusiasm to the
depth of bitter and painful disappointment, of base and
humiliating ill-treatment, it was the generation that fought
the Wars of Freedom.
The disappointment began with the conditions of the
Peace of Paris. Both princes and people demanded that
Alsace and the German portion of Lorraine should be re-
united with the Fatherland, even if only that Germany
might recover its natural, strong frontier line. But,
owing to the opposition of Russia and England,” they
* Public opinion in England was favourable to the cession, but
Wellington and Castlereagh, like the Emperor Alexander, strongly
opposed the German claims, the principal champion of which was the
Prussian Minister, von Humboldt.
THE RESULTS OF THE WARS OF LIBERATION. Io9
had to content themselves with the restoration of their
boundary as it had existed in 1790. - -
Blücher angrily exclaimed: “Prussia, together with
Germany, in spite of her exertions, figures again before the
whole world as a dupe.” And the people, in their indigna-
tion, re-echoed the poet's lament:
“But yonder lieth ever
A lost land by the Vosges.
Our German kin we’ve still
From hellish yoke to sever.”
The great moment when it was possible to restore the
equilibrium so unnaturally displaced since Richelieu, and to
give back to the Germans their old inheritance, was lost,
because the powers of the East and West united in the
resolve to keep down perpetually the central power of the
Continent. By painful experience the German nation
bought the knowledge that she could expect the redress of
the old wrong from her own good sword alone.*
2.
And what was the gain to the national cause, and to
political progress and freedom ?
At that time, says Friedrich von Gagern, the people
seemed to say to the princes: What is needed you know :
above all things, we demand back from you our Fatherland,
which you have broken up.
But what the princes created was that political abnormity,
that monstrous hydra, the German Bund, which, in
due course, had to be destroyed again with Herculean
blows by the man of “blood and iron.” And as to political
* v. Treitschke, D. Gesch.
I IO THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
power and privileges, the balance was all on the side of the
dynasties: the people got light weight, very light weight
indeed, except that their hearts were heavy with the weight
of disappointment and persecution. This was the more
calamitous since the deliverance from foreign bondage was
the work rather of the people than of the princes.
In his proclamation of 1813, as has been shown, King
Frederick William had spoken of “restoring a venerable
Empire,” and had promised “the establishment of the
German Constitution, with rejuvenated power and unity,
from the innermost life and spirit of the German nation.”
Prussia had borne the brunt of the fight: Prussia and
her monarchy, by the achievements of her heroes of the
sword and of the pen, stood out glorified in the eyes of
Germany. Would Frederick William III. profit by the
favourable auspices, and realize, by energetic action, the
aspirations of the people? “Let us have a despot for
Germanism,” wrote Fichte, in 1813, whilst still under the
immediate impression of the King’s proclamation, “let us
have a despot who will enforce the establishment of a
Germanic State—einen Zwingherrn zur ZXeutschheit / No
matter who he be, let our King gain for himself this dis-
tinction l’ But Frederick William was not the man :—
Germany had to wait another fifty years before such a
Zwingherr zur Deutschheit arose in King William I.
Frederick William III., though endowed with personal
qualities which gained for him the love and the respect of
his subjects, was incapable of large and Sweeping resolutions,
and, rather shrinking from the popular spirit than placing
his trust in it, made no determined stand to obtain the
establishment of a vigorous national State. And the people,
THE RESULTS OF THE WARS OF LIBERATION. I I I
especially in the complicated conditions which arose out
of the multiplicity of States, were not sufficiently advanced
in political Science to give practical expression and actual
shape to their desires.
At the Congress of Vienna, therefore, the princes, in
reconstituting Europe and Germany, had only to serve their
own selfish ends, and this they did most conscientiously,–if
some of them can be said to have had a conscience at all.
The Prussian Minister Hardenberg presented a scheme,
which, while it respected the independence of the princes,
proposed to treat Germany as a united State for all matters
of vital importance. But the dark spirit of Metternich rose
against it, dulling the enthusiasm of patriots; and the repre-
sentatives of the newly-created Kings of Bavaria and
Würtemberg delivered themselves of violent and unpatriotic
protests against any surrender of “sovereign rights,”—theirs,
be it remembered, by the grace of Napoleon Bonaparte.
There were soon schemes and counter schemes; and
numerous projects for the restoration of the “Ancient
Venerable Empire,” were put forward by twenty-nine minor
States, and supported, among others, by Stein. “Why do
you not elect an Emperor P” was the impatient question
put by the press. But there was no result to be obtained
from this Congress of any value for the welfare of the nation.
There was but obstruction to every proposal; there was
endless intriguing, bickering and wrangling; there was
acrimonious controversy and confusion : there was even
harmony—at festivities. Prince Metternich most aptly
Summed up the activity of this remarkable assembly of
diplomatists: “Le Congrès danse, mais il ne marche pas.”
Cramped by the hostile counter action of Foreign Powers,
II 2 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
June Ioth, 1815.
the jealousy between Austria and Prussia, the feebleness
of the Prussian Government, the reactionary and intriguing
policy of Metternich, and the selfishness of some of the
German Princes, the Congress was absolutely powerless. It
was clearly unable to effect an organic reconstruction of
the German Empire; and, at last, exhausted by futile
attempts to reconcile conflicting claims, and alarmed by
the return of Napoleon, it terminated its wearisome
deliberations by moulding a scheme propounded by
Metternich into the Act of Foundation of the Germanic
Confederation or Bund.
This Confederation, which was to be a “perpetual,
indissoluble union, dependent on the law of nations,” was
composed of thirty-nine states, for the common interests
of which it was to act, while each was independent with
regard to its internal affairs. A permanent Diet—
Aundestag—consisting of representatives of the various
Governments—the people being left entirely aside—was
to sit at Frankfort-on-the-Main, under the presidency
of the Austrian plenipotentiary, and was to settle all points
of dispute between the various States, each of which was
bound never to make war on any other member of the
Bund. Through their German possessions, the Kings of
Hungary, England, Holland, and Denmark, were members
of the Federal, as they had been of the Imperial Diet.
3.
To assert that this Confederation in any way fulfilled the
expectations.of the nation, would be to misrepresent the
facts: for in its external relations, it proved entirely
powerless, indeed it condemned Germany to absolute
REACTIONARY POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENTS. II.3
impotence; and in internal matters, it in nowise contributed
to the welfare of the people, for it not only did nothing
towards the establishment of modern political institutions,
but even soon became a ready and convenient tool in the
hands of the enemies both of unity and liberty.
The tide of reaction set mainly from Austria, then ruled
by the all-powerful minister, Prince Metternich. In Austria,
the absolute form of government was naturally considered
the best means of keeping a firm grasp over a population
of various nationalities. Metternich opposed popular
freedom because he had no faith in it. He hated the idea
of German unity too, for it was mainly upheld by the liberal
element in the country, and did not comport with the
interests of the Austrian Moriarchy. From the beginning
of 1813 Prussia had been manifestly successful in taking
the lead in Germany, and it was easy enough to foresee
that the sympathies of the whole German people would be
drawn resistlessly towards Prussia, if the latter power were
to adopt a policy decidedly in favour of popular govern-
ment. For Austria, however, it was of the greatest possible
importance that Prussia should be estranged from her
natural mission of being leader of Germany. Metternich's
crafty diplomacy, with Russia's help, succeeded only too
well in rendering Frederick William III. still more dis-
trustful of the popular spirit, in thwarting any tendency
towards the establishment of constitutional government in
his kingdom, and in causing Prussian statesmen, from
whose ranks such men as Stein, Hardenberg, and
Humboldt soon departed, to follow humbly in the wake of
Austria as a faithful member of the Holy Alliance. And
it was Metternich's baneful influence that encouraged
H
II.4. THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
the German sovereigns to have recourse to numberless and
most pitiful devices in order to evade the promises they
had so lavishly made to the people at the outbreak of
the Wars of Liberation.
How true were the bitter words uttered by Goethe .
“Den Bösen sind sie los, die Bösen sind geblieben.”
At the same time the constitutional principle triumphed
in, at least, some of the States, notably in Saxe-Weimar
(1816), Bavaria (1818), Würtemburg, Baden, and later
in Hesse-Darmstadt (1820), where the popular representa-
tives, either by the free concession of the sovereigns, or
after some pressure on the part of the people, obtained
the right of passing legislative measures and granting taxes.
This however did not last, for, in the course of time,
constitutionalism had its wings clipt again, as will soon
become apparent.
4.
It was but natural that the enthusiasm for the ideas of
freedom, national unity, and national greatness which the
rising against foreign dominion had called forth should not
at once subside, but, on the contrary, should retain its hold
over the public mind, and more particularly over the minds
of the German youth. It even caused occasional ebullitions
of patriotic feeling on the part of the latter. Harmless
though these might be, the suspicious Governments watched
them with great vigilance, for, according to Metternich's
political catechism, even the thought of German unity was
high treason. At the Universities, however, neither
professors nor students would allow the national aspirations
to die, and the youthful rashness of some students soon
MOVEMENTS IN FAVOUR OF LIBERTY AND UNITY. II5
gave the Governments a pretext for stern reactionary
IY) ea SUITCS. -
In 1817, the students of several Universities assembled at
the Wartburg in order to celebrate the tercentenary of the
Reformation. In the evening, a small number of them,
the majority having already left, were carried away
by enthusiastic zeal, and, in imitation of Luther, burnt
a number of writings recently published against German
freedom, together with other emblems of what was con-
sidered hateful in the institutions of some of the German
States. These youthful excesses were viewed by the
Governments as symptoms of grave peril.
At the same time, a large number of students united to
form one great German Burschenschaft,” whose aim was
the cultivation of a love of country, a love of freedom, and
the moral sense. Thereupon increased anxiety on the part
of the Governments, followed by vexatious police inter-
ference. Matters grew worse in consequence of the rash
act of a fanatical student, named Sand. It became known
that the Russian Government was using all its powerful
influence to have liberal ideas suppressed in Germany, and
that the play-wright Kotzebue had secretly sent to Russia
slanderous and libellous reports on German patriots.
Sand travelled to Mannheim, and thrust a dagger into
Kotzebue's heart. The consequences were most disastrous
to the cause of freedom in Germany. The distrust of the
Governments reached its height : it was held that this bloody
deed must needs be the result of a wide-spread conspiracy:
the authorities suspected demagogues everywhere.
* Fellowship or association,
II6 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
1819.
Ministers, of course at the instigation of Metternich, met at
Karlsbad, and determined on repressive measures. These
were afterwards adopted by the Federal Diet at Frankfort,
which henceforth became an instrument in the hands of the
Emperor Francis and his Minister for guiding the in-
ternal policy of the German States. Accordingly, the
cession of state-constitutions was opposed, and prosecu-
tions were instituted throughout Germany against all who
identified themselves with the popular movement ; many
young men were thrown into prison ; gymnastic and other
societies were arbitrarily suppressed ; a rigid censorship
of the press was established, and the freedom of the
Universities restrained ; various professors, among them
Arndt, whose songs had helped to fire the enthusiasm of
the Freiheitskämpfer—the soldiers of Freedom—in the
recent war, were deprived of their offices; the Burschen-
schaft was dissolved, and the wearing of their colours, the
future colours of the German Empire, black, red, and gold,
was forbidden.
When the members of the Burschenschaft parted,
they did so singing the well-known song written by
Binzer for the occasion, “Wir hatten gebauet ein stattliches
Haus ”:
“Now rent is the ribbon
Of black, red, and gold :
Why God should permit it
Can never be told.”
But their aspirations were not dead. With hope and
trustful confidence in that which must be and will be, their
song concluded :
MOVEMENTS IN FAVOUR OF LIBERTY AND UNITY. I 17
“Let the edifice crumble,
We feel no dismay :
The spirit lives in us,
And God is our stay.”
The Universities continued to uphold the national idea ;
the Burschenschaft soon secretly revived as a private
association and as early as 1820 there again existed at most
German Universities, Burschenschaftem, which, though
their aims were not sharply defined, borea political colouring
and placed the demand for German Unity in the foreground.
The leading associations were those of the Universities of
Jena and Erlangen, where history and politics formed
favourite subjects of study, and where professors and
students earnestly discussed plans for the future reconstruc-
tion of Germany. Again, from 1822 to 1824, several Secret
societies had to suffer the penalties of the law, and many
enthusiastic and gifted young men were sentenced to
several years' detention in a fortress. In short, every
opportunity was seized by the various Governments to
repress the free movement of ideas.
5.
There was, however, one thing even so powerful a man
as Metternich could not accomplish : he could, for the time,
check all efforts towards liberty on the part of So patient
and law-abiding a people as the Germans; but he could not
banish the vision of a free and united Fatherland from their
eyes or aspirations after its realization from their hearts.
And at a time when every attempt towards it was ruthlessly
crushed it continued to live in poetry and Song.
II.8 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
“The spirit lives in us,
And God is our stay.”
And this “spirit,” this vague longing for the restoration
of a great German nationality, was imparted to and kept
alive in even the most youthful mind, the most youthful
heart, through the revival, during the second decade of
the century, by Jakob Grimm in his “Heldensagen,”
and by Rückert in verse, of the legend of the returning
Emperor which the people had preserved for centuries,
the legend of Frederick Barbarossa, as he was seated
in his underground castle, waiting to restore the Father-
land to a worthy position among the nations as Soon as the
ravens had vanished from around the mountain.
“Er hat hinabgenommen des Reiches Herrlichkeit
Und wird einst wiederkommen mit ihr zu seiner Zeit.”
Though the time was past when people believed in myths
such as this, yet the hearty welcome with which the poem and
its legendary embodiment of the dream of German Unity
were received, served to maintain in the breasts of young
and old the belief in a brighter future, in the ultimate
consummation of such a union of German States as Arndt
had emphasized in the oft-re-echoed national song, written
in 1813, “Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland?”—“What
is the German Fatherland P”
Not Prussia alone, not Bavaria, not Swabia, not
Austria, but
“Where'er resounds the German tongue,
And hymns to God on high are sung,
That is the land,
Brave German, 'tis thy Fatherland!
THE GERMAN “LIED.” I IQ
“All Germany, such shall it be,
God grant that we may e'er agree,
Let courage in our hearts endure,
To love our land with fervour pure.
Such shall it be,
All Germany united, free l’”
“Das ganze Deutschland soll es sein "
6.
There is not, perhaps, a people in the world whose moods
and actions, whose joys and Sorrows, whose misfortunes and
rejoicings, whose despair, whose hopes and aspirations are
reflected so truly and so completely as are those of the
Germans in their “Liederschatz,” their inexhaustible store
of Songs.
The charm and the magic influence which the “Lied"
exercises over the heart of each Son of the Fatherland,
and its power to strike within him the key-note for almost
any feeling and action, has been so well and happily
expressed in Wilhelm Weismann’s “Das deutsche Lied,”
set to impressive music by Kalliwocia, that the little poem
may be fitly inserted here, although in an unworthy
translation :-
“Whene'er on pinions of devotion
The soul takes flight,
From earthly gloom, life’s troubled Ocean,
Seeks heavenly light;
Then swells the breast with sacred feeling,
Emotions throng,
And loud resounds, with solemn pealing,
Our German Song.
“When childhood’s glimmering stars are paling,
Their course now run,
And purple dawn at morn is hailing
The rising sun ;
I 2 O THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
1832.
“Then swells the breast with blissful feeling,
Bright visions throng,
And loud resounds, with joyous pealing,
Our German Song.
“When war, when perils are assailing
The Fatherland,
Around her banner flocks unfailing
A fearless band ;
Then swells the breast with quickened feeling
Of courage strong,
And loud resounds, like thunder pealing,
Our German song.
“When song from German breasts is ringing,
So free and true,
All sorrow flees, for joy 'tis bringing
And youth anew :
What stirs the heart with ardent feeling,
Takes wing in song :
Resound then loud, for ever pealing,
Thou German song.”
7.
The Revolution of 1830 in France caused a fresh stir
in Germany, and the constitutional principle was again
victorious in some of the North German States, such as
Brunswick, Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse-Cassel. Then
came the Hambach demonstration, where a large popular
meeting raised the black, red, and gold tricolour, and
demanded a unified Germany with popular representation.
This was followed, the next year, by the foolish attempt
on the part of some seventy demonstrators, mostly students,
to seize Frankfort and to disperse the Federal Diet.
These incidents, insignificant in themselves, were again
blown up by Metternich and his reactionary confederates
to the importance of revolutionary acts of great magnitude,
REACTIONARY POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENTS. I2 I
endangering the very existence of the Federal States.
Needless to say the Frankfort Diet, secretly in-
fluenced of course by Russia, must at once pass
fresh decrees strictly enjoining the Federal Govern-
ments to suppress all Societies and popular meetings,
to abolish the freedom of the press, -where such freedom
existed,—and to reduce to a mere shadow the legislative
rights of the representative bodies in all States in which
any parliamentary forms had been adopted.
Poor short-sighted statesmanship ! that expends its skill
and energy on staying the approach of the inevitable.
What Napoleon attempted by shooting men, the ex-
termination of an idea, Metternich certainly did not
accomplish by gagging and imprisoning them. National
rising in 1813 Revolution in 1848 |
CHAPTER IX.
Impoſence of the Bund—Manifestation of Mational
Feeling.
I.
W W YE have become aware that, in regard to the inner
development of the German States, the Bund
made itself the champion of every retrograde movement.
The part it played in international disputes was, if possible,
even more discreditable. Its incompetence, its lack of policy
and purpose, its inability to deal satisfactorily with the most
trifling international difficulty, its powerlessness to satisfy the
conflicting interests of its component States, its helplessness
even against the arrogance of its own servants, are lamentably
shown in the dispute over Luxemburg, which dragged
through the years between 1830 and 1840.
Luxemburg, an old member of the German Empire,
which, however, during the last 150 years, had several times
changed its masters, had in 1815 been allotted by the
Treaty of Vienna to the King of the Netherlands, as com-
pensation for the loss of the small principalities of Hadamar,
Siegen, Dietz, and Nassau-Dillemburg, the surrender of
which to Prussia had deprived him of his place in the
Germanic body. By the same treaty, the Grand-
Duchy formed an integral part of the German Confederation ;
IMPOTENCE OF THE BUND. I 23
its capital, as a federal fortress, was occupied by federal
troops ; and Prussia, in the name of the Bund,
exercised the right of garrisoning it.
As the population of the western half of the Grand-Duchy
were Walloons, it is not surprising that, on the rising of the
Belgians against Dutch rule, in 1830, the Luxemburgers
sided with them. In the presence of this revolutionary
movement, the Diet decided to support the rights of the
King of Holland as Grand-Duke of Luxemburg, and to
maintain its hold over the land.
But here complications arose. The new Belgian States
were under the guaranteed protection of France and
England, and, as Belgian rule had been established in
Luxemburg, an attack on it might be regarded as a declara-
tion of war. It was at last decided that the movement
should be treated as a revolt in Confederate territory, and
suppressed by an army of the Federation. At length, in
March 1831, after more than six months of representations,
discussions, objections, inspections, and reports, it was
resolved to send a force of 24, ooo men to garrison the
fortress of Luxemburg, the only spot in the Grand-
Duchy really in German hands. These troops,
drawn from the contingents of Lippe-Detmold, Waldeck,
and Bückeburg, had mutinied even during their
march to Luxemburg, and, on their arrival, were found so
discontented, so ill-trained, and so badly disciplined that
the Prussian Governor had to raise their pay and have them
drilled. Hence new difficulties. Who should bear these
expenses? The Federation, who used the troops; or
Prussia, whose general had directed the outlay ; or the
sovereigns, whose soldiers were thus being forcibly improved?
I 24 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
A knot plainly not to be untied by any Federal Diet, and
therefore cut by the withdrawal of the incompetent troops.
Their place was to be supplied by Hanoverians. But
the Hanoverian policy was directed from England, and
England's sympathy was with the Belgians. Payment was
therefore demanded in advance for the expense of the
expedition, a condition which it was known could not be
complied with. Other States followed the example of
Hanover. In Prussia, it is true, the power and the will to
help were found together, but Prussian military operations,
in the immediate neighbourhood of France, were objected
to by that power. Thus the year 1831 was fast
passing away without bringing any action in solution
of the difficulty, when the difficulty was good
enough to dissolve of itself. The Dutch fortresses
of Venloo and Roermond were surrounded, according to
the last territorial re-arrangement, by land in Belgian hands.
The King of Holland therefore suggested the exchange of
the western half of Luxemburg against the northern part of
Limburg, a suggestion universally welcomed, except by the
Belgians, who were in recognised possession of both
districts.
That they did not remain so may be attributed to the
action of one man, General Dumoulin. A Dutchman by
birth, a Prussian officer by profession, he was, at this time,
in command of the fortress of Luxemburg. He not only
held it in the midst of a hostile country, ruled the town in
the frequent absences of the Civil Governor, transacted
diplomatic business, and administered in a rough but
thorough manner a kind of soldier's justice, he
further did what the Federal Diet had never dared to do,
IMPOTENCE OF THE BUND. I 25
snubbed the Belgian Governor of Arlon, extended his
authority in spite of the objections of England, and main.
tained his activity regardless of the threats of France.
That the Diet counted for less than he, he must have
known, for to their remonstrances, on one occasion, he
replied that, for that time, he could not obey his superiors
in Frankfort.
For eight years, while the Diet stood by in helpless
inactivity, his patience, his energy held out. Even the
Prussian Government had begun to advise the surrender of
Luxemburg, the King of Holland himself was ready to
sacrifice the western half, but firmer counsels pre-
vailed, and in 1839 the suggested re-arrangement took
place. The amount of territory under the control of the
Confederation remained thus undiminished, but its moral
influence was irretrievably undermined. In its dealings
with Luxemburg, it had shown that it had neither policy
abroad nor control at home, and what little weight it had
hitherto had in the councils of Europe was lost, never to be
recovered.
Such a miserable institution as the Federal Diet fully
deserved the mockery Heine poured over it in his well-
known song, “O Bund, du Hund, du bist nicht gesund.”
Well might the people, with Hoffmann von Fallersleben,
longingly exclaim :
“Would but the Emperor rise,
Alas, he sleeps too long.”
2.
Whilst the Federal Diet proved itself utterly incapable
of upholding Germany's interests and honour in the face
I 26 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
of foreign interference, the people, in favourable contrast,
still showed the same determination, as in 1813, to
maintain the integrity of the Fatherland. This was clearly
demonstrated when, in 1840, Thiers attempted to incite
the French people to claim the frontier of the Rhine.
The popular feeling of Germany then found utterance in
the ringing voice of a son of the Rhineland, Nikolaus
Becker :
“Ye shall not from us sever
The noble German Rhine,
Though ye like crows for ever
In greedy shrieks combine.” ”
Heine, that master of caustic wit and truculent satire,
might indeed taunt his countrymen,
“The land belongs to the Russians and French,
In the British the ocean is vested,
But we in dream’s airy regions possess
The mastery uncontested'’ t—
yet the mighty wave of sound that carried Becker's song
as the people's unanimous reply across the Rhine into
France, showed to the nations that these were no longer
the same Germans who had formerly suffered the
establishment of the Rhenish Confederation, and had
allowed the foreigner to dispose at his pleasure of their
lives and national property. The determined reply showed
plainly that public opinion in Germany had now become
a power which was resolved to throw its weight into the
balance.f
* To which Alfred de Musset replied by a poem, commencing,
“Nous l’avons eu, votre Rhin allemand.”
+ The Poems of Heine (Bell and Sons).
† Heine himself, who so frequently poured his sarcasm over
his native country, then likened Germany, in one of his poems,
MANIFESTATION OF NATIONAL FEELING. I27
It was at this time, too, that the South German poet,
Max Schneckenburger, called up the “Watch on the
Rhine” by the patriotic cry that rang forth “like thunder
crash, like roar of waves, like Sabre clash.” In that one line,
the response to the call to arms : “We all, we
all will guardians be,”—even then lay
the conviction which, in the sequel, grew with
ever-increasing force upon the people, that the defence
of their western frontier would prove the crucial test of
expressed
their ability to assert their national independence.
As in 1830, when first the voices of the re-awakening
warlike spirit of the French were heard, so in 1840, when
a threatening war-cry was actually raised, Germans felt again
sorely what a continual threat to Germany was Strasburg
as a French sally-port, whence their over-weening neighbours
might, at any time, pour their armies over the unprotected
South of the Fatherland. This insecurity, it seemed evident,
to a giant in his cradle, with whom it was dangerous for his neighbours
to quarrel, as he would grow some day into a Siegfried, would kill the
hideous dragon, and would place the imperial diadem on his head.
Here is the poet’s prophecy:
“Deutschland ist
noch ein kleines
Kind,
Doch die Sonne ist seine Amme,
Sie saugtes nicht mit stiller Milch,
Sie saugtes mit wilder Flamme.
“Bei soloher Nahrung wachst man
schnell,
Und kocht das Blut in den Adern :
Ihr Nachbarskinder, hutet euch
Mit dem jungen Burschen zu hadern |
“Erist ein tappisches Rieselein,
Reisst aus dem Boden die Eiche,
Und schlagt euch damit den Ruicken
wund
Und die Köpfe windelweiche.
“Dem Siegfried gleicht er, dem edlen
Fant,
Von dem wir singen und sagen :
Der hat, nachdem er geschmiedet sein
Schwert,
Den Amboss entzwei geschlagen
“Ja, du wirst einst wie Siegfried sein,
Und todten den hasslichen Drachen,
Heisa' wie freudig vom Himmel herab
Wird deine Frau Amme lachen
“Du wirst ihn
Hort,
Die Reichskleinodien, besitzen.
Heisal wie wird auf deinem Haupt
Die goldne Krone blitzen l’”
tödten, und seinen
I 28 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
could only be removed by remedying an old wrong, and by
forcing back the French wave beyond the Vosges. *
To this opinion, Herr von Bismarck himself gave expres-
sion when, in 1842, he visited Strasburg for the first time,
and, conversing with a Frenchman, told him plainly :
“This land was once ours, and must become ours
again.” To which the Frenchman replied, “Alors il
faudrait croiser la baïonnette.” “Eh bien,” retorted,
Bismarck, “nous la croiserons.”
* “Germany,” said a national thinker, the well-known Professor
Lagarde, in 1853, “has at present such frontiers as would leave her
open to any hostile attack. In Alsace, a French army may be collected
under our very eyes, and, from the angle at Weissenburg, pushed
forward in such a manner as to prevent the South German forces from
uniting with those of the North. . . . Holstein and Lauenburg are
like a wedge, driven in between the East and the West: if a great
military power were to ally itself with the owner of Jutland, the road
into the very heart of Germany would lie open to it uncontested. . .
From this it follows that Germany must strive to acquire frontiers which
are strategically tenable, i.e., frontiers which, consisting of mountains,
or impediments equivalent to mountains, run in as straight lines as
possible.”—See Paul de Lagarde, Deutsche Schriften.
CHAPTER X.
The “Zollverein "--Development of the Idea of Unity.
I.
Y one achievement during that long period of
B reaction following the Wars of Liberation, Prussia
made, though not a direct, yet an indirect step in the
direction of unification : this was the formation of the
“Zollverein,” or Customs Union.
The Bund had failed to obtain the abolition of the in-
jurious restrictions on the commercial relations of the
various German States; but Prussia, by her own efforts,
arrived at an understanding first with the Governments of
Bavaria, Würtemberg, and then with several other States,
and formed a union, which, between 1833 and 1835, was
joined by all German States except Austria. About that
time railways began to be introduced, and, with hope and
confidence, Karl Beck hailed the railway shares as bills
“drawn on Germany's Unity.” The Zollverein now enabled
the people to derive the greatest possible benefit from the
new mode of communication ; and, in spite of the political
confusion, Germany attained to a condition of considerable
national prosperity.
The great advantages derived from this commercial
union contributed to deepen the desire for unity in
I
1833.
I3o - THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
other departments. Hoffman von Fallersleben expresses
it in a humorous song on the goods of the customs tariff of
the Zollverein :
“Denn ihr habtein Band gewunden
Um das deutsche Vaterland,
Und die Herzen hat verbunden,
Mehr als unser Bund dies Band.”
Austria stood aloof from the Zollverein, a position which
proved fatal to her as a German State, for the success of
the Union naturally raised the authority of Prussia.
On the whole, a comparison between the two Powers
would have resulted decidedly in favour of the latter State,
although this was not then generally acknowledged. It is
true that Prussia, like Austria, resisted the popular aspira-
tions, and did not go beyond the establishment of so-called
Provincial Diets, but Frederick William III. could not, and
did not act, on a system quite so antiquated as that on
which the government of Francis I. rested.
Only the minor part of the population of Austria was
German, serfdom still existed there, the Government
adhered to the system of conscription, thus favouring the
richer classes, the land was priest-ridden, and not even free
from religious persecution. Prussia, on the other hand,
was a purely German Power; she continued to be guided
by the spirit of religious toleration, and received, in 1837,
the persecuted Austrian inhabitants of the Zillerthal, as
she had a hundred years before received the Salzburg
Protestants; she promoted, by a sagacious and circumspect
policy, the material welfare of the people in such a way that
the old military State gradually became transformed into
an industrial State ; she continued to give every impulse
DEVELOPMENT OF THE II).EA OF UNITY. I3 I
and support to primary and secondary education, to the arts
and sciences, and to the general culture of her inhabitants ;
so that indirectly she prepared the people for political
maturity, and thus served the cause of popular progress.
2.
In the meanwhile, the people had made a great advance
towards embodying the national ideal.
The first attempt, made at the time of the Wars of
Liberation, had failed, mainly because the people had no
definite idea as to what form the national State should
take, and which power should assume the task of establishing
it. They had, therefore, after overcoming the first
disappointment at the failure of their hopes, set themselves
to think how the question of unification could be
approached in a more practical way, and how a vigorous
and progressive political institution could be evolved out
of the actual and historical conditions of the many-State
system then existing in Germany.
It was at that time that the fundamental question,--what
the form of the desired national State should be, had first
begun to occupy the minds of those interested in political
questions. Thinkers had been hammering out the scheme
which was later to be put into practice. At first it had seemed
that to the existing “Staatenbund,” the Confederacy of States,
in which all had equal rights but in which there was no central
authority, no alternative existed except the “Einheits-Staat,”
the Single State. This was equally unpractical and
impracticable; unpractical because the German States
refused any union in which the motley peoples of Austria,
its Croates, Poles, and Magyars, should be blended with
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I32 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
themselves; impracticable inasmuch as it was repugnant to
both princes and people that the corporate existence of each
State, with its rule, laws, and customs sanctioned by the
use of generations, should be thus rudely extinguished.
The most advanced thinkers, however, Learliest among
them the philosopher Fries—saw that there was a juste
milieu, a possible compromise, in which the central
authority and the consistent action of the Single State
might be united with the liberty enjoyed under a confedera-
tion; and Friedrich von Gagern, Paul Pfizer, and K. Th.
Welcker demonstrated the feasibility of a “Bundesstaat,”
a Confederate State, which should leave to each member
the control of its internal affairs but have one supreme
power, one common law, one joint army, and one executive
for foreign policy.
Gradually the popular mind saw the value of this scheme.
The King of Prussia, Frederick William IV., himself
approved it, and declared that to change the Confederation
into a Confederate State was the aim of the Prussian policy.
He thereby re-awakened the hopes of German Iliberals.
It required, however, a more energetic nature to put it into
practice. “The imperial crown can be won only on the
battlefield,” said Frederick William ; but when the hour
came he did not venture on action. The opportune
moment was the time of the French Revolution of 1848,
which had a profound effect upon the public mind through-
out the whole length and breadth of Germany.
:
CHAPTER XI.
The Revolution and the Attempts at Unity from
1848 to 1850.
I.
TNREDERICK William IV., who succeeded to the
H throne in 1840, was a thoughtful and cultivated
prince, and in less disturbed conditions of political life
would have occupied his exalted position with distinction.
The vivacity of his mind, his wit, and his brilliant oratory,
for a time concealed from public observation the fact that
he lacked resoluteness and energy. Unlike most of the
Hohenzollerns, he was not possessed of soldierly qualities,
and showed but little appreciation for the art of war. It
also soon became apparent that his sympathies lay all with
the spirit of the romantic Middle Ages, such as he himself
imagined it, and that, although he desired to a certain
extent the freedom of the people and the greatness of
Germany, he was too much hampered, apart from his
irresolution, by his mediaeval conception of the divine right
of princes.
The consequence was that the Radical feeling grew
stronger every day, and manifested itself in the press, in
pamphlets, and at public meetings, where voices were heard
reminding the King of the early promises of his father, and
I34 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
urging him to grant a constitutional system of government.
When at last, in 1847, urged by entreaties from all sides,
the King summoned to Berlin a “United Diet”—not a Parlia-
ment, but a mere combination of the several provincial
Diets—and declared that nothing would induce him to
Concede a constitution, he caused still further dissatisfaction
throughout the country. It is true that Frederick William,
in a memoir written by his friend von Radowitz, declared
in the same year that the German Confederation had
accomplished nothing, never would accomplish anything
unless it were thoroughly reformed, and that for this
purpose he made several propositions; but there he
stopped, dreading a conflict with Austria and Russia.
The approach of a crisis began now to be felt in
all parts of Germany. A popular meeting at Offenburg, in
September, 1847, demanded radical reforms; an assembly
of notables, at Heppenheim, passed a resolution requesting
that a German Parliament should be summoned ; and a
formal motion to that effect was brought forward in the
Chamber of the Grand-Duchy of Baden, on the 12th
February, 1848. Then the flash of a fresh Revolution in
France struck right into the midst of all the inflammable
material that had been collecting during the last three
decades, and kindled it into flame.
The majority of the people, though some might think of
a republic, and others of the restoration of the imperial
power, were at one in the conviction that the time was
come for replacing the effete Bund by some kind of national
representation capable of fostering enlightened political
institutions at home, and of upholding the dignity and
honour of Germany abroad. The princes of most of the
THE ATTEMPTS AT UNITY FROM 1848 to 1850. 135
Smaller States, without much loss of time, changed their
ministries, and adopted a Liberal policy. In Vienna, the
supports of Metternich's oppressive rule were speedily
swept away by the revolutionary tide, and the Emperor
of Austria was compelled to summon a Diet, to be
elected by universal suffrage. In Prussia, King Frederick
William, after the lamentable bloodshed in the streets of
Berlin, on March 18th, yielded to the Revolution: displaying
the German colours, black, red, and gold, he made a
procession through the capital, and announced “that for the
Salvation of Germany he placed himself at her head, and, as a
new constitutional king, would be the leader of the free,
regenerated German nation.” Had the King only been
able resolutely to pursue a policy in conformity with the
demands of the Moderates, something might have been
achieved, but by his continual vacillation, and his inability
to comprehend the spirit of the times he only supplied the
Extremists with an excuse for fresh acts of violence.
2.
Meanwhile, with the assent of the Federal Diet, some
5oo leading men from all parts of Germany had constituted
themselves a preliminary Parliament at Frankfort-on-the-Mar. 31st, 1848.
Main, and had resolved that a national assembly should
be elected by universal suffrage to deliberate and decide on
the future constitution of Germany.
The National Assembly met on May 18th. The
majority, though consisting of various sections, was
monarchical and progressist, whilst there were two small
minorities, one republican, the other reactionary.
Great hopes were founded on the meeting of the popular
I36 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
representatives; many hearts beat with joy at the thought
of “the national spring tide’” which, it was believed, had
come at last. Poor hearts they were doomed to disappoint-
ment again. It would be idle now to imagine what the
National Assembly might have accomplished for German
unity if, while the Governments were still embarrassed by
the revolutionary movement, it had acted with promptness
and decision instead of exhausting itself by pedantic
disquisitions on the fundamental laws of Germany and on
the abstract principles of jurisprudence.
As the Germans had had little or no experience of
political debate and political life, it was perhaps but natural
that their representatives should have drifted into tedious
and useless discussions. At any rate, it may be charitable
to assume that the wise man was wrong who asserted that
Germans did not illustrate the truth of the old Roman
adage, “quot homines, tot sententiae,” but that wherever six
of them happened to be assembled there were sure to be
seven opinions among them, even if an educated German
—armed with all the weapons of logic, metaphysics, and
dialectics—has not at his disposal such astonishing
resources in matters polemical that he may at any time be
expected to prove conclusively the absolute contrary of his
own opinion. If the leaning towards an over-wrought
doctrinarism is a drawback in political life, the weakness
of “quarrelling about the Emperor's beard,” as Germans
ut it, is even a greater disqualification. But
themselves pu eater disqualif 1. Ji e -º-P V-1 U.
unfortunately a propensity to hair-splitting and Carping,
a tendency towards pedantry and petty malice has been
fostered by the long political disruption under which
Germans have suffered, by the narrowness of public life,
THE ATTEMPTS AT UNITY FROM 1848 To 1850. 137
and the consequent growth of “Philisterthum,” Philistine
spirit, in the many small and dull communities into which
they were divided after the downfall of the national
splendour in the Middle Ages.
For these reasons doctrinarism and rhetorical wrangling
were rampant at Frankfort from the outset. Learned
jurists launched into profound legal disquisitions, erudite
professors argued from theories of transcendental philo-
sophy, nearly every deputy had his own fixed conception
as to the course of procedure, and felt firmly convinced
that the Fatherland would totter to its fall if any other
were adopted.
At last the Assembly appointed as Administrator of the
Empire—Reichszerzweser—the Archduke John of Austria,
who chose seven members from the Assembly, and formed
a responsible Ministry. Thereupon the President of the
Federal Diet made over to the new Government the authority July 12th, 1848
which had hitherto belonged to the Diet, the members
of which dispersed. A Central Government now existed
in Germany. But what is a government without actual
political power to support it?
The discussion that followed on the fundamental laws
of the Constitution to be given to Germany, of course,
offered many magnificent opportunities for the display of
intellectual subtlety, but the disputes were interrupted by
another question which had forced itself on the attention
of the nation.
3.
The duchy of Holstein, although it acknowledged the
King of Denmark as its sovereign, was a member of the
Germanic Confederation, and, by virtue of ancient treaties,
138 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
Aug. 27th, 1848.
could not be dissevered from Schleswig. When, in 1846,
Christian VIII. of Denmark had officially proclaimed that
Schleswig and the greater part of Holstein were indissolubly
Connected with the Danish monarchy, vehement opposition
was aroused in Germany. This was, in fact, the only
question on which all Germany was united in these troubled
times. When Christian's successor, Frederick VII., tried
to make Schleswig altogether Danish, and to tear it from
Holstein, the German inhabitants rose against their
oppressors, and Prussia, acting in the name of the Federa-
tion, came to their rescue ; but Frederick William IV.,
influenced by the threats of the Emperor Nicholas of
Russia, soon concluded a disadvantageous treaty at
Malmö, by which the rights of the duchies were but
imperfectly protected.
The majority of the National Assembly, and among them
the Republicans, were enraged by the arrangement, which
they denounced as a national humiliation. A mob,
influenced by passions long carefully excited by the
Democrats, then broke into revolution at Frankfort, and
most brutally tore to pieces two Conservative deputies,
the Prussian general von Auerswald and Prince Lichnowsky.
These events irreparably damaged the authority of the
National Assembly, and still further embittered the
German Governments against the popular movement.
4.
The National Assembly, nevertheless, with much talkative
perseverance, continued its deliberations on the Constitu-
tion. The very first paragraph, fixing the territory of
the Empire, gave rise to excited discussions on the
THE ATTEMPTS AT UNITY FROM 1848 To 1850. 139
position which the non-German States of Austria should
hold to the Germany of the future. It was decided that
German and foreign States could only be united by means
of personal union.
Presently two ideas stood out in sharp opposition to each
other : either a loose Federation of States with Austria, or
a Federal State without her. There was no other alternative,
for in a confederate State, which apparently formed the
goal of the majority, there was no room for Austria with
her thirty millions of non-German population. The ex-
clusion of Austria, however, meant hostility to Austria.
In fact the Austrian Government, which meanwhile had
suppressed the insurrection, demanded that the whole of
her territory, as forming one single State, should be
included in the German Empire. It became evident that
the work of the National Assembly could only have been
successful if it had had the support of a powerful State ;
and this State could have been none other than Prussia.
And thus two parties now stood face to face: the Party
of the Great Germany, die grossdeutsche Partei, -the heir,
so to speak, to the idea of unity as it had grown out of
the enthusiasm for the Wars of Liberation, whose ideal was,
in the words of Uhland, “the bright, unmutilated, full-
grown Germania,” and whose aim was the formation of a
great Confederation of all German States under Austria's
leadership ; and the Party of the Little Germany, die
Åleindeutsche Partei, who advocated a smaller Confederate
State, under Prussia's leadership.
After protracted oratorical struggles, the deliberations on
the Constitution of the A’eich had reached an end, and it
had been decided that the headship of the Confederate
I4O THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
Mar. 28th, 1849.
State should be offered to one of the German princes, with
the hereditary title of Emperor of the Germans. When the
election took place, 248 deputies, Austrians, Bavarians,
Ultramontanes, and Democrats, abstained; but the re-
maining majority of 290 elected the King of Prussia as
German Emperor.
All Germany then awaited with anxiety the reply of
Frederick William IV.
The King, naturally reluctant to accept anything from the
Revolution, especially when but scanty prerogatives had been
bestowed on the crown offered him, was further swayed
by religious scruples, for although a large number of the
States were not unwilling to submit to the arrangement, he
could not bring himself to interfere by force of arms with
the privileges and divine rights of those of his fellow-
sovereigns who would not of their own accord comply with
the decision of the popular representatives. The logic of
such reasoning may perhaps be doubtful: even from
a religious point of view, the King might have considered
the welfare of the whole nation, which he professed to have
at heart, as more Sacred than any princely privileges in-
consistent with the common interests. Above all, however,
—and this reason probably outweighed all the rest,--the
King foresaw that the assertion of his authority as Emperor
of Germany would imply the facing of the armed interven-
tion of Austria and Russia : into a struggle of such
magnitude he would not plunge. He therefoie declared to
President Simson, who headed the deputation from the
National Assembly, that he could not assume the Imperial title
without the full sanction of the German princes and free
cities, and that the Constitution would not give him power
THE ATTEMPTS AT UNITY FROM 1848 To 1850. I41
enough efficiently to direct the destinies of the great German
Fatherland.
This answer was a death-blow to the hopes of German
patriots, and the National Assembly soon came to a pitiful
end. The Austrian representatives had already withdrawn.
After some weak attempts of the Assembly to assert its
authority, all non-republican deputies left Frankfort. The
republican Left then called upon the people to rise, and
transferred its sittings to Stuttgart. But here the representa-
tives were forcibly dispersed by the Würtemberg Govern-
ment, and the Assembly ceased to exist on the 18th June,
I849.
The appeal to rise, under the pretext of maintaining the
new Constitution, was responded to at Dresden, in some
Prussian towns, in the Bavarian Palatinate, and in the
Grand-Duchy of Baden, but Prussian troops soon quelled
these separate revolts, and in Prussia the constitutional
struggle came to a conclusion when, on February 6th, 1850,
the King took the oath to the Constitution which had been
agreed upon with the Chambers.
5.
Although Frederick William had declined to become
emperor, he did not wish altogether to miss the opportunity
for effecting some kind of unification on a smaller scale.
He concluded a treaty with the Kings of Saxony and
Hanover, the third “Dreifürstenbund?” since 1785–
agreeing with them on a Constitution which, in many
respects, was identical with that drawn up by the National
Assembly. The other States, with the exception of Bavaria
and Würtemberg, having joined the alliance, which assumed
I42 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
Apl. 28th, 1850.
the name of “The Union,” a Reichstag met at Erfurt and
accepted the Constitution.
By that time, however, the situation in Germany had
entirely changed. Austria, with the help of Russia, had
succeeded in quelling the insurrection in Hungary, and was
in no way disposed to allow Prussia to assume the position
that the former regarded as lawfully her own. In threatening
language she protested against the Erfurt Reichstag, and,
encouraged by her, Hanover and Saxony severed their
connection with the Union. In conjunction with Bavaria
and Würtemberg, she called on the German Governments
to reconstitute the Frankfort Diet, and Hanover, Saxony,
and some of the smaller principalities responded to the
summons. Representatives from the States which supported
this policy therefore met at Frankfort, as the restored
Diet, on the very same day on which the Congress of
Princes who accepted the leadership of Prussia assembled
at Berlin.
Germany now appeared to be again divided into two hostile
camps, one set of States being grouped round Austria, another
round Prussia, and the issue to which events had pointed
for the last hundred years seemed to be raised. Prince
William of Prussia, afterwards the first Emperor of
Germany, thought that the time had come to settle with
Austria the question of the leadership in Germany, but
his royal brother had not the courage of his opinions.
War, indeed, seemed imminent on account of dis-
turbances that had broken out in Hesse-Cassel, where the
Elector and his Minister, Hassenpflug, had violated the
Constitution, and appealed to the Frankfort Diet against
his subjects in revolt. Prussia sided with the constitutional
THE ATTEMPTS AT UNITY FROM 1848 TO 1850. 143
party, and soon her troops were in the presence of an
Austrian and Bavarian army. An outpost skirmish took
place; but only the historical white horse was left on the
battlefield.
Things went no further. The King gave way on every
point, and in this he had the support of the Conservative
party, who would rather come to an understanding
with Austria than make concessions of any kind to
liberalism, or, as it was then put, to democracy. Herr von
Bismarck, who afterwards held very different opinions, at
that time took the same view. Prussia consequently
dissolved the Union, and all the German States recognised
the Frankfort Diet. Radowitz, the Foreign Minister,
who had pursued a vigorous policy, retired, and the
reactionary Minister, von Manteuffel, went to Olmütz
to confer with the Austrian statesman, Prince Schwarzen-
berg. As the result of the conferences, after every scheme
of reform had been found unacceptable by one side
or the other, Prussia resumed her attitude of submissive
adherence to Austria's policy. In Holstein, with the help
of Austria and Prussia, Danish rule was restored ; in Hesse-
Cassel, Austrian and Bavarian bayonets enforced the
restoration of Hassenpflug's hateful authority, and the
Diet !—well, the Diet met again, as if nothing had June 12th, 1851.
happened, -the same old image of utter incompetence, the
same ready tool for mischief and intrigue.
CHAPTER XII.
Aºurther Progress of the Idea of Unity—Italian and
German Unity—The Prussian Aſeadship.
I.
HOUGH the reactionary forces had won the day, yet
the German people had made a great advance in
their political and popular institutions ; constitutional
forms had sprung up everywhere except in Austria, which
remained stagnant; juries had been introduced, and
various other progressive measures carried into execution.
On the other hand, the idea of unity, although on some
occasions it seemed almost to have reached practical
development, had not been realized. Germany, it
is true, still continued a mere “geographical notion,”
and German unity was apparently again relegated
to the lumber-room. But only apparently. The restoration
of the Federal Constitution was regarded as merely
provisional. Projects of reform emanated sometimes from
Governments, sometimes from associations or individuals;
and the reorganization of Germany was continually kept
before the people.
As after the Wars of Liberation, so again after this
second attempt at political freedom and national unity the
question was asked,—What is the cause of the failure?
FURTHER PROGRESS OF THE IDEA OF UNITY. I 45
The first attempt, as has been demonstrated, had led to
no positive results, because, though there was a vague desire
for unity, there existed no clear national comprehension of
the form the national State should assume, nor a complete
recognition of the rights of any one to be the leading Power.
During the second great attempt of '48 to '50, progress
had been made in regard to the first question, and the
“Confederate State,” with a Central Government, the
Empire above the States, had been definitely fixed upon as
most in harmony with the historical development of the
nation ; but the other question, viz., which should be the
leading Power, had received only vague and unsatisfactory
consideration. Hence the fatal mistake. The national
representatives had studiously avoided all connec-
tion with the existing Governments, had decreed a
constitution in the abstract for a kind of Cloud-Cuckoo-
Aland, with “fundamental rights” for the citizens of that
loftily-situated community duly established, and had then
asked the King of Prussia to place himself at the head of
their airy realm. This manner of proceeding could not but
be found impracticable, even had no difficulties arisen out of
the King's individuality, which, as has been pointed out, was
peculiarly ill-fitted for dealing with conflicting tendencies.
The lesson, therefore, had to be learned, and it was learned
only after a great expenditure of national energy, that the
constitution of the Germany of the future must necessarily
conform to the conditions of the leading Power already
organically established. It was in the knowledge thus
gained that the new advance was madr.
The want of connection with , , established political
Power then was seen to be the great fault of the movement.
K
I46 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
The first aim must evidently be the formation of such
a Connection; and a general inclination was shown to
entrust the execution of the nation's long-cherished wish to
that Power which had the will and the means to carry it out.
2.
It will now be seen how from the Zdea/politik of 1848, a
theoretical policy alloyed with Radicalism, a gradual
progression takes place to Aea/poſitić, or practical policy,
relying on power, as measured by the number of bayonets,
for the ultimate victory of an idea and of right, as
against an obnoxious principle upheld by brute force.
In fact, the transformation of the Germany of Hegel
into the Germany of Bismarck is now gradually effecting
itself.
This may not appear with all desirable clearness from
the present essay, which is only concerned with the question
of unity, to the exclusion of other elements and moving
forces of public life; but a study of the German literature
of the nineteenth century would show that, from romanticism
to humanitarian and political doctrinarism and then to the
principles of action of the present generation, there is
organic development, and that there is no such annazing
gap as some imagine between the philosophico-poetical
Germany of Hegel, the “people of dreamers,” and the
present self-asserting generation, which cherishes actual
power, and, having thrown off the purely lyrical and
ideological element while yet taking its stand on a broad
foundation of theory and general culture, has embraced the
practical, and, in its manifestations, often blunt, realism
towards which Bismarck so strongly impelled it.
ITALIAN AND GERMAN UNITY. 147
3.
The national aspirations received fresh force from the
accomplishment of Italian unity in 1859. The principle
of nationality is being asserted south of the Alps, why not
in the North P was the question variously raised.
Amongst the pamphlets which appeared at the time,
the most remarkable was that of Ferdinand Lassalle, * the
founder of the Social-Democratic Party. With statesman-
like foresight, he predicts that France will annex Savoy,
that Italy will constitute itself a single State against
Napoleon’s wish, and that the consequences of the Italian
war must benefit Prussia and Germany. He demands
that Prussia should turn Austria out of the Confederation,
and proclaim the German Empire. f In fact, he develops
the very programme which Herr von Bismarck began to
carry out five years later.
* The Italian War and Prussia's Duty: a voice from the Democracy.
I859.
f The demand for a Protestant emperor at the head of Germany is
also the theme of which his historical tragedy, “Franz von Sickingen,”
treats. Says Franz : “I would sooner despair of my own salvation
than show inactive despondency about my fatherland | Such is not my
mind I will willingly stake my life for the great cause, for the
true welfare of the country. What we want is the destruction of
priestly rule; a complete rupture with everything Roman ; the pure
doctrine as the sole church of Germany; the restoration, in accordance
with the times, of the old Germanic common freedom ; the annihilation
of our princely dwarf States; . . . and, powerfully supported by
the mighty impulses of the times, rooted in their innermost nature,
an evangelic head as Emperor at the helm of the great realm.”
The drama, inferior as a literary work, but noteworthy as a political
thesis, offers another point of interest in its development of the idea,
since reproduced by Prince Bismarck, that great historical changes
have always been accomplished “with fire and sword.”
I48 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
It is interesting to read some of his concluding remarks.
He says: “If a Frederick the Great were now seated on the
throne, there can be little doubt what policy he would pursue.
. . . He would consider the moment most fit for invading
Austria, proclaiming the German Empire, and leaving it
to the Habsburg dynasty to find whether, and in what
manner, it could maintain itself in its non-German lands.”
But if Prussia is not prepared to take such radical
measures, he has another alternative, that she should
perform a “great, imposing, and national task.” “The
only worthy and great course, a course as much to
the interest of the German nation as to that of Prussia,
would be that Prussia should hold the following language:
“If Napoleon revises the European map according to
the principle of nationalities in the South, good, we shall
do the same in the North. If Napoleon frees Italy, good,
we shall take Schleswig-Holstein.’ And with this proclama-
tion let our armies be sent against Denmark. . .
Napoleon cannot side against us in this war: partly
because he has for the present enough to overthrow in
Italy, enough to keep down in France, and is without a
war-cry to incite against us the French people, which is
inaccessible to diplomatic intricacies, and exceedingly little
interested in Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark; and partly
because the force of logic is too inexorable for Napoleon
to oppose us at the present moment in any other way
than diplomatically. He cannot make war against us
because we do in Schleswig-Holstein what he is doing
in Italy. His Italian proclamations, his articles in the
Moniteur, their very words might be used for our manifesto
against Denmark. . . .”
ITALIAN AND GERMAN UNITY. I49
After discussing the possible attitude of England and
Russia, he continues: “Whatever position the Foreign
Powers would like to take up towards this matter so
dear to the heart of the nation, Germany is, at last, capable of
minding her own affairs without regard to foreign countries.
If the armies of Bonaparte opposed us in the struggle
for Schleswig-Holstein, the war against him would be-
Come a most just and legitimate one and, from Rhine
to Vistula, the call to arms would find a ringing
echo in the armed rising of the whole German people.
The sympathy with Schleswig-Holstein, the yearning for
a consistent national policy in the present crisis, the thirst
for national greatness, in general, the hatred of Napoleon,
the ardent, feverish longing for national unity, all these
flames would converge in one conflagration, which
would transform every impediment into fresh fuel, and
grow with every obstacle placed in its way.
Let the Prussian Government begin this national war,
quickly, without hesitation, alone, of its own motion, free
from the intrigues of the Bund: let it come before the
Bund only with the fait accompli of the declaration of war,
and, carried away by this imposing display of power, the
Aund will follow it. Should intriguing cabinets dare to
exhibit an un-German disposition, that would be the
moment to recall the fact that once before a King of
Prussia has signed the solemn declaration : ‘Every
German Prince who does not comply, within a fixed term,
with the summons to liberate the Fatherland, will be
threatened with the loss of his States.’” And the
* Convention of Breslau from 7th to 19th March, 1813, between
Russia and Prussia, Art. I.
I5o THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
government may rest assured of one thing: in such a
war, which is as much a vital interest of the German
people as it is of Prussia, German Democracy itself
would bear Prussia's banner, and hurl to the ground
every obstacle in her way, with an expansive power such
as can be produced only by the intoxicating outburst of a
national passion which, compressed for the last fifty years,
has been thrilling and throbbing in the hearts of a great
people.”
So far the voice of democracy.*
4.
In the official world a voice was heard, and had been
heard for Some years, advocating, though unknown to the
general public, a determined anti-Austrian policy as the
only salvation of Germany.
Herr von Bismarck,--to look back a few years,
had since 1851 been representing Prussian interests at
the Federal Diet at Frankfort. He had become acquainted
with all the wretchedness, the hopeless impotence of the
Bund, and the resolve had ripened within him to shake
off the tutelage which Austria exercised over Prussia.
* After the signing of the Peace of Villafranca, on July 12th, 1859,
Lassalle went to see Garibaldi at Caprera, and, it is reported, tried to
persuade him to undertake an expedition against Austria with his
volunteers, hoping thus to open the question of German Unity. In
Sanguine moments ile Iſlay have indulged in dreams of accomplishing,
for his own country, what Garibaldi had done for Italy. In common
with other Radical politicians it was, of course, not the Confederate
State, but the Single State he had in view. “On the day,” he says,
“when the independent state-existence of Austria comes to an end,
the colours on the toll-bars of Bavaria, Würtemberg, and the other
States, will pale, for on that day Germany is constituted.”
ITALIAN AND GERMAN UNITY. I5 I
“I did not know,” he said, at a much later period, “that I
was to play a part in the future ; but at that time I formed
the resolution to free Germany from the yoke of Austria.”
He was not long in asserting himself. The consciousness
of his own superiority and of his mastery of the
situation, finds amusing expression in a letter to his
sister, Frau von Arnim : “I am getting accustomed, in
the consciousness of yawning innocence, to submit to all
symptoms of coldness and permit a spirit of entire
indolence (die Stimmung gºinz/icker Wurschtigkeit) to
possess me after, as I flatter myself, gradually bringing
the Diet to a piercing knowledge of its absolute nothing-
ness. The well-known song of Heine, “O Bund, du Hund,
du bist nicht gesund' (O Diet, you dog, you are not well),
will soon be unanimously adopted by resolution as the
national anthem of the Germans.”
Bismarck's determined opposition to the tutelage under
which Prussia and the Diet were held by Austria, obtained
a signal success in 1855, for it was owing to him that
Prussia and the Bund remained neutral during the Crimean
war, and did not allow themselves to be dragged in the
wake of either France or Russia. Led by Prussia, the
Federal Diet resisted Austria's plan of joining the Western
Powers, and thereby took the first step towards shaking
off Austria's dictatorship.
Presently, Herr von Bismarck would take a step further,
for in 1856 he forwarded—to his chief at Berlin—a com-
plete plan of campaign,” according to which Prussia
should settle accounts with Austria by means of war, should
* Letter to von Manteuffel, April 26th, 1856.
º
:
*:
:
:
I52 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
establish a better Federal Constitution, and make an
“honest’ arrangement with the Austrian Empire. “I will
only express my conviction,” he says, “that at no very
distant time we shall have to fight against Austria for Our
existence, and that it does not lie in our power to obviate
Such a struggle, because the course of affairs in Germany
can have no other issue.”
With regard to the Holstein question, he thinks that “it
is certainly advisable so to arrange our conduct that we may
not be regarded as withdrawing from the clear and definite
demands of the mission of representing Germany abroad.” ”
He considers it important to keep the Schleswig-Holstein
question open, not to solve it prematurely, but to await
“eventualities,” and relies upon “the fanatical Danish
parliamentary majority,” which in reality afterwards brought
about the armed conflict that arose on that matter.
When the Italian question began to occupy the attention
of the political world, Bismarck, with his wonted frankness,
openly expressed himself in sympathy with the national
demands of Sardinia, and shocked his colleagues at the
Diet not a little by walking down the Frankfort
“Zeil” arm-in-arm with Count Barral, the Sardinian
Ambassador. Bismarck, in fact, had been, as early as
1857, in the secret of Count Cavour's plans, and foresaw
that Italian would prepare the way for German Unity.
And when hostilities actually broke out between Austria
and France, he held it an opportune moment for asserting
Prussia's authority in Germany : Prussia, in his opinion,
should not draw the Sword against France for the sake of
* Letter to Herr von Manteuffel, 2nd July, 1857.
.
:
:
ITALIAN AND GERMAN UNITY. I53
Austria, unless the Emperor of Austria was prepared to
acknowledge Prussia as a power entitled to equal rights
with her own at the Diet, and to reform the Constitution of
the Bund in accordance with the Prussian desires. The
Liberal Ministry at Berlin did not, however, quite agree
with the views held by their representative at the Diet.
Though Herr von Bismarck was recalled from Frankfort in
January, 1859, on account of his vigorous expression of anti-
Austrian views, he still wrote from St. Petersburg, whither
he had been transferred as Prussian Ambassador : “I see in
our position in the Diet a defect of Prussia that we shall
have to heal sooner or later, ferro et igni, unless we adopt
in time, and at a proper season, measures for a cure,” ”
5.
The two voices, however, the voice of the democratic
politician f and the voice of the aristocratic statesman met
with no response. An attack on Austria when she was
being assailed by France was unpopular, more particularly
in South Germany. In the North, many would have wished
Prussia to seize the opportunity for placing herself at the
head of Germany, whether in armed opposition to, or in
alliance with, France.
The policy of the Prince Regent f of Prussia was directed
* Report addressed to the Prussian Minister, von Schleinitz,
May 12th, 1859.
t Lassalle is referred to here solely as a national politician, not as the
Social-Democratic agitator he became four years later; though as such he
still took his stand on strictly national ground.
: Prince William had assumed the Regency on the 8th October,
1858, in consequence of a severe illness from which his brother was
suffering.
I54 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
1860.
towards preventing Austria from being crippled, and
Napoleon from becoming too powerful, and at the same
time towards furthering the interests of Prussia and
Germany. The bugbear of a possible Franco-Russian
alliance to divide the spoils of Europe was appear-
ing even then on the political horizon. The Prussian
army was mobilized, North and South German armies were
to be formed, and the outbreak of war on the Rhine seemed
to be imminent, when Napoleon and Francis Joseph, to the
surprise of the world, hastened to conclude peace at
Villafranca, the former because he wished to avoid war with
Germany, the latter because he would sooner renounce the
possession of Lombardy than give the Regent of Prussia a
chance of leading the troops of Germany to victory.
6.
Positive results, therefore, for the national cause there
were none, to the dissatisfaction of many patriots.
Meanwhile, however, the popular interest in the one great
question had been fully aroused again, and the celebration
of the centenary of Schiller's birthday, towards the end of
1859, was made the occasion for a national demonstration.
The Kleindeutschen again bestirred themselves, taking
up the heritage of the National Assembly of 1849.
Repeated conferences were held by the ablest and noblest
politicians of the Fatherland, and as a result an organization
was founded at Frankfort to promote the national cause,
j
under the name of “National Verein,” or National Union.
At its head was Herr von Bennigsen, who later became the
leader of the National Liberal party in the German
Parliament.
THE PRUSSIAN HEADSHIP. I55
Whilst Prussia, under the Prince Regent, allowed the
movement free Scope, and even looked upon it with favour,
Austria, inasmuch as the Mational Verein gradually
showed its leaning towards the Arussian headship, assumed
an attitude of hostility towards it and obtained its expulsion
from Frankfort by the Federal Diet. But its Central
Committee found a home at Gotha, with Duke Ernst, who
was ever an ardent sympathizer and active furtherer of the
national aspirations.”
The Grossdeutschen, whose leanings were towards
Austria, and whose ranks consisted of German Con-
servatives mostly belonging to Bavaria, Würtemberg,
and Hanover, formed a rival association, under the name of
the Reform Union, with a policy, however, mainly defensive.
The AWaſional Verein soon counted thousands of
members in the North and South of the Fatherland, and
from the Lake of Constance to the Baltic and the North
Sea these displayed the greatest possible activity in
endeavouring to convince the people, among whom they
still encountered much of the old failing, “particularism,”—
that the national question could never be solved unless the
most powerful German State took the lead in the common
Call Se.
Just as formerly, through the propagation of the idea of
a Confederate State, the dream of a United Germany
crystallized into a firm demand for unity, so now, the
* When the King of Prussia was proclaimed German Emperor, at
Versailles, in 1871, he said publicly, as he shook hands with Duke Ernst :
“I do not forget that for the main object of this day’s gathering I am
also indebted to your endeavours.” Cf. Aus mezmem. Zeben und anes
meiner Zeit, zon Ernst ZZ., Herzog von Sachsen-Åoburg-Gotha, 1833.
1862.
I56 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
Continual emphasizing of the Prussian headship—
A reussische Spitze—consolidated the demand into a definite
political programme.
“Prussia and Germany,” so we are told in a proclamation
of the National Union to German patriots, “Prussia and
Germany are indispensible to each other. Prussia is
obliged to pursue a German policy, if for no other reason
than because of her divided territories. Our confidence in
Prussia's mission must be entirely independent of the
question whether we can have confidence in the present
leaders of her policy.” And further : “Prussia's policy with
regard to the national question is not sufficiently decided.
It follows then that all Germans who recognise the necessity
of an energetic national policy on the part of Prussia should
strive to bring about an improvement in this respect. It is
not the men who at the present moment are at the head of
affairs in Prussia, but it is the Prussian State that Germany
needs. It would be most fortunate if her Government of its
own accord would place itself at the head of the movement,
would inspire, extend, and guide it. But if this should not
be done, it follows, not that we must idly look on, but
rather that we must use all our strength and all our energy
to force the Prussian Government into the right course.”
Here then we see a most distinct advance in the develop-
ment of the national question : the headship of Prussia
recognised as necessary for the achievement of the national
unity.
Yet there is one point which the national writers and
orators of the time never ventured to accentuate. Although
they advocated the conferring on Prussia of the central
power in Germany, they avoided stating that, in order to
THE PRIUSSIAN HEADSHIP. I57
constitute the new Germany, it was necessary to exclude
from the paternal home—at least temporarily—nine
millions of Germans, “the Austrian brothers; ” they shrunk
from making Austria's exclusion the shibboleth of the party
with that harshness, that pitilessness which, in great
crises, becomes the duty of the statesman as of the
physician. In examining the daily literature of the time,
says Dr. Jastrow, one has the impression that the national
party dare not bring about the sacrifice of Austria, and yet
are prepared to acquiesce in it, if compulsion is brought to
bear upon them from without ; and in fact there are situations
in which one longs for compulsion.
7.
Thus everything led to the conclusion that Prussia should
make herself the champion of German unity, if only a King
of Prussia, as Fichte had said, would come forward as
Zwingherr zur Deutschheit, since sentiment and conviction,
however frequently expressed in speech and song, in
gymnastic, rifle, and vocal associations, as well as at
public demonstrations, could never alone create a united
Germany.
The much-needed Zwingherr zur Deutschheit came at last.
Changes were then taking place in Prussia which led to the
solution of the long-discussed problem. On the 2nd
January, 1861, at the death of Frederick William IV., the
Prince Regent assumed the crown of Prussia as William I.
“Fantastic notions, romanticism, and inconsistency,” says
Dr. Henne am Rhyn,” “were now superseded by the
* Die nationale Einigung der Deutschen, die Entwickelung und die
Auſgaben des Reiches. 1891.
I58 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
marked practical policy and untiring energy of the second
of the brothers, who were in every way very dissimilar.
People soon recognised in him a mild and just ruler such
as is rare in history. Now everything became clear,
practical, and consistent in Prussia's policy.”
Profoundly religious, high-minded and frank, kind in
disposition, yet firm of will, a true Hohenzollern in his
rigorous devotion to duty and in his fine soldierly qualities,
sagacious in finding the right man for the right position
both in the state-service and in the army, and himself an
indefatigable worker, pure of purpose, disinterested in aim,
King William had set himself agreat and arduous task, but, un-
dismayed by difficulties and hindrances, he never swerved one
inch from the straight and rugged path that lay before him.*
* Prince Albert, who, as Prince Consort, continued to take a warm
interest in the affairs of his native land, anticipated the solution
of the German question by King William I. Discussing the un-
satisfactory state of Germany in a letter dated 12th March, 1861,
and addressed to his “dear Cousin,” the King of Prussia, with
whom he was on terms of sincere friendship, he says: “My hope,
like that of most German patriots, rests on Prussia, rests on you :
on Prussia, which only needs to work her constitution in order to
find within herself means to satisfy all the demands of the time, to serve
as a model to the remainder of Germany, and to win its sympathies, so
that the latter must desire the closest union with the Prussian system ;
on you, who have succeeded to the government without having been
bound up and embroiled with the unfortunate reactionary policy, who
have frequently even suffered under it, and whose well-known loyalty of
character stands before the minds of Germans as a symbol of their oldest
motto, AEzra Marzzz, ein Worf (a man’s word is his bond).” And further
on “But when the German pcople, relying oil a prince who is ready
to lead, asserts its national feeling, it will be strong enough of itself, and
need not be afraid of Italians, French, Hungarians, and Poles, nay, it
will itself be a power to which its neighbours (and even the Zºmes) will
show due respect.”—See the Political Correspondence between the
Emperor William I. and the Prince Consort of England, from 1854 to
1861. Berlin, I88I.
THE PRIUSSIAN HEAI)SHIP. I 59
“He had not always been satisfied,” as Heinrich von
Sybel” points out, “with the ways of the Prussian policy,”
during his brother's time, and on his accession he at once
struck the key note on the German question by declaring :
“My duties to Prussia go hand in hand with my duties to
Germany, and, for the welfare of all, I shall strive to
strengthen Prussia,”—thus adding to the demand of the
National Union for the headship of Prussia a second, the
demand for efficient military strength, for a powerful
national army, with which to enter upon this momentous,
this gigantic struggle. For, unlike Italian unity, the
unification of Germany was more or less openly opposed
by all the powers surrounding her, whose policy had for
centuries aimed at a weak and divided Germany. The
only course open to Prussia therefore was to cut the
Gordian knot with the sword.
The difficulties of the Herculean task which the King
had set himself were still further increased by the opposition
which his plan of re-organization encountered in the
Chamber of Deputies. The Progressist majority, though
demanding the reform of the German Confederation, would
not grant means for the military reform, whilst the small
Conservative minority desired the military reform, although,
being still largely imbued with the particularist Stock-
preussenthum, they were by no means in sympathy with the
movement for German unity. Both parties were too short-
sighted to perceive the connection between the two reforms,
for both, the one with indignation, the other with complacency,
saw in the strengthening of the army, a strengthening of
* Die Begritna’ung des deutschen Reiches durch Wilhelm Z. Berlin,
1889.
I6o THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
the principles of absolutism, and the continued practice
of the reactionary device, “soldiers are the only remedy
against democrats.” Whilst the Reactionary party tried to
thwart German unity, the Progressists indulged in the
illusion that, with a Liberal Prussia, German unity would
come of itself; in fact, the Radical left wing, which
was composed of the revolutionary elements of 1848, still
adhered to the doctrinary hobby, “durch Freiheit zur
Einheit.”—through freedom to unity, and the Liberals,
who held the opposite view, “through unity to freedom,”
did not, at the time, command sufficient numerical strength
to make their influence felt.
8.
It became evident then that the enormous difficulties
arising from the hostility of foreign nations, the political
complications within the German Confederation, and
the parliamentary opposition in Prussia herself, could be
conquered only by a Statesman of extraordinary ability
and surpassing strength of will. King William therefore
looked around for the man who would be his faithful
Paladin, thrust himself heart and soul into the diplomatic
and parliamentary struggle, and fearlessly make himself
the bearer and champion of such a message to the people as:
“Enough of words: 'tis time that we
Were come to deeds !”
Great times bring forth great men. And a man of com-
manding character was found: a bold and unbending spirit,
ready to face the situation with dogged determination
and unswerving courage ; a patriot, a true son of the
THE PRUSSIAN HEADSHIP. I61
Fatherland, impelled not by the desire of vain glory,
but by an intense and boundless love of his native
Country; a Statesman who understood and deeply sympa-
thized with the struggling aspirations of his countrymen,
and felt within his breast the mission and the strength
to regain for the ill-used German people the right to
breathe as an independent nation; an astute diplomatist
who, announcing his aims with boisterous frankness,
laughed to scorn the rusty traditions of a mysterious,
intriguing, and deceitful diplomacy, and, undeterred
by the narrow scruples of the ordinary Statesman,
with masterly and unprecedented skill manipulated, soothed,
utilized, or crushed the conflicting influences within and
without the Fatherland, overcame the opposition of the
petty German princes, and steered clear of the Scylla
and Charybdis which confronted him in the jealousies,
the threats and resistance of one or another Power of
Europe; a genius who, as the potential concentration
of the national will with but one limited, yet intense
purpose within him, gathered up with heroic strength
all the forces, intellectual, moral, military, and national,
that the philosopher, the poet, the patriot, and the soldier
had called into life, with an iron will, welded them
together into one mighty weapon, and armed with
this, went with irresistible power crashing and dashing,
like a Titan of old, through the towering difficulties that
had sprung from the mistakes and complications of
centuries, and evolved out of the chaotic elements the
united Germany which the people had dreamt of and
ardently striven for, but which his gigantic mind alone
could lead them to realize. That man was Bismarck.
L
Sept. 24th, 1862.
CHAPTER XIII.
The Struggle for Zeadership betzween Austria and Prussia.
I.
“Durch Blut und Eisen.”
E now witness the strange phenomenon that the
national will which demands unity, and the
national force which makes for unity, co-exist side by side,
with so little understanding of each other that open conflict
actually breaks out between them.
The Prussian Government from 1862 to 1866 had two
tasks before it, to collect the military means for carrying
into execution the programme of the “Smaller Germany,”
and, at the same time, to conduct a parliamentary
contest with the party which, by this very programme,
was paving the way for the national policy kept in view by
the Government. The solution of this twofold problem
devolved on Otto von Bismarck-Schönhausen.
When the Liberal Ministry retired and Herr von
Bismarck was appointed Prime Minister, there was an out-
burst of indignation through the whole country, for he was
known to be a staunch Opponent of parliamentary govern-
ment. In fact people still looked upon him as the
reactionary Hotspur of 1849 and 1850, who had blusteringly
proclaimed that all large cities, as being hot-beds of
revolution, ought to be swept off the surface of the earth,
THE STRUGGLE FOR LEADERSHIP. I63
and who in the national question had taken his stand on
what he termed “Stockpreussenthum,” i.e., on the exclusive
and thorough-going Prussian spirit. The party organs of
the Progressists received the new Minister with open
distrust and bitter contempt. They spoke of him as
a “burschikoser Junker” (a free and easy country
Squire), a “hohler Renommist” (a hollow braggart),
a “Napoleonvergötterer” (a worshipper of Napoleon), the
“Städtevertilger’ (the extirpator of cities), and, finally,
Summed up its verdict in the sentence: “Bismarck ist
der Staatsstreich,”—Bismarck is the coup d'état. People
saw in him still the narrow party man, not the
far-sighted Statesman. They did not know that during the
eight years of his official connection with the moribund
Federal Diet of Frankfort, new views had taken possession
of him, that plans had ripened within him which tended
towards the gratification of their national aspirations.”
* Addressing the delegates of the Conservative Club of Kiel, in
April, 1891, Prince Bismarck said: “When I became Minister, and
earlier in Frankfort, I was firmly convinced that we could only
obtain the power to breathe and live freely among the European
nations by reawakening the sentiment of German nationality, and by
securing the unity of the German races. At first, I placed that above
everything else, as soon as I saw the possibility of extending our unity
beyond the limits of Prussia. We had, and have, a special national
feeling as Prussians, which was, originally, an offshoot of the great
German national feeling. At bottom, it has no more justification than
the special patriotism of other German States. It was a matter of
course for me that I should feel this Prussian consciousness, in which
I had been brought up, very vividly. But as soon as I was convinced
that the Prussian national feeling was the stumbling block in the way
of German unity, I ceased to pursue Prussian aims exclusively. . . .
For me, the main thing was to fan the embers of German national
feeling which were still glowing, in other words, to preserve a very
ancient possession. . . .”
I64 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
With what suspicion he was regarded, and at what cross
purposes he and the national party were working, he tells
in a letter, dated St. Petersburg, 22nd August, 1860:
“Speaking of the Bonapartists, it occurs to me that a
sort of general rumour reaches me how the Press, Maſional
Verein, Magdeburger, Ostpreussische Zeitung, are carrying OI).
a systematic war of calumny against me. I am said to
have openly supported Russo-French pretensions respect-
ing a cession of the Rhine province, on condition of
compensation nearer home; I am a second Borries, and SO
on. I will pay a thousand fredericks to the person
who will prove to me that any such Russo-French pro-
positions have been brought to my knowledge by any one.
During the whole time of my residence in Germany, I
never gave any other advice than that we should rely on our
own strength, and in case of war, upon the aid of the
national forces of Germany. These foolish geese of the
German Press do not see that in attacking me they are losing
the better part of their own efforts.” In a similar strain, he
wrote, on June 16th of the same year: “If I have made
myself over to a devil, it is a Teutonic and not a Gallic
One.”
What the “foolish geese of the German Press” of 1860
did not see, the Progressist party in the Prussian Chamber
of Deputies did not, in part would not, perceive either,
although Bismarck began by throwing out hints to the
Liberals as to the existence, between them and him, of
actual and Substantial community of purpose, for in reality,
under the colours of the Progressist party, there were
gathered all those to whom Prussia's greatness and the
ultimate unification of Germany, was the goal of political life.
THE STRUGGLE FOR LEADERSHIP. I65
“At first,” says Hesekiel,” “he thought it not impossible
to win over the hostile party leaders, and he conferred with
many of them : whether they were Liberals or Progressists,
in the end they were at any rate Prussians. He appealed
to their Prussian patriotism ; they could not fail, although
they sought it by different ways to himself, to have their
country's fame and glory as a common goal. But if they
desired the well-being of Prussia and Germany, they could
not but also desire the means to that end—the newly-
Organized army. No doubt that many of those with whom
Bismarck negotiated, or who were negotiated with by others
at his instance, felt their hearts beating loudly at this
appeal; but he succeeded only in winning a very few.
With the majority, the rigid party doctrine prevailed as an
insurmountable barrier; with others, every attempt at an
understanding was rendered unsuccessful by unvanquishable
suspicion ; many well understood the hints—and more than
hints it was impossible for Bismarck to give—but they did
nothing more. He thus finally attained to a summation of
undeceptions, which did not discourage him, although this
gradually filled his patriotic heart with the deepest sorrow.”f
* “The Life of Bismarck” (J. Hogg & Son, London, 1870).
+ It has been said of Lassalle that wherever he cast his eyes he did so
with the insight of genius. Certainly, when Bismarck met with nothing
but angry denunciations all round, he, the only politician, almost at once
recognised in him the man of the future ; and so clearly had he grasped
the spirit and the bearing of that Statesman’s ultimate designs that he
actually foretold what Bismarck would do. When accused of high
treason, because his agitation in favour of universal suffrage, tended
towards the overthrow of the Constitution, he exclaimed, when address-
ing his judges on March 12th, 1864: “Well, gentlemen, although a
simple private individual, I can tell you : I not only wish to overthrow
the Constitution, but perhaps before a year is over I shall overthrow it !
I66 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
The underlying causes of the parliamentary “conflict”
may therefore be summed up as these : an all-absorbing
suspicion, parliamentary doctrinarism, and that stern and un-
bending “Uberzeugungstreue,” fidelity to conviction, which
may become a terribly pedantic crotchet when it immutably
adheres to an opinion and allows of no compromise even in
cases of great emergency, or of entirely altered circumstances.
The sledge-hammer blows which Bismarck levelled at the
unyielding majority who refused to vote supplies did not, of
course, improve the situation, and at times affairs looked
tempestuous and threatening.
It was in one of the earliest debates that Bismarck,
addressing the doctrinary Progressists, exclaimed, with
blunt frankness: “Not by speeches, but by blood and iron
alone can German unity be accomplished.” ”
It was not, however, until, by the events of 1866, the scales
were taken from everyone's eyes that the people recognised
in Bismarck the man who was destined to work out their
national Salvation.
Perhaps before the end of another year universal suffrage
will have been granted. Strong games, gentlement, cazz be played with
the cards on the table / That diplomacy is the strongest which need not
surround its calculations with secrecy, because they are founded on iron
necessity, and so I announce to you at this solemn place : perhaps
before a year is over Herr von Bismarck will have played the part of
Robert Peel, and granted universal and direct suffrage l’ It only needs
adding that Bismarck, immediately after the war with Austria, realized
this prognostication with regard to the newly-created North German
Confederation.
* Speech in the Prussian Chamber, on the 30th September, 1862.
The popular poet, Julius Mosen, thirty years before Prince Bismarck,
had enunciated the same principle: “Blood and iron make free.”
THE STRUGGLE FOR LEADERSHIP. 167
2.
Whether the retaliatory measures then taken against Press
and people, the retrograde and hyper-Orthodox spirit again
suffered to creep into the Home Department and that of
Worship and Public Instruction, did not naturally give
unnecessary provocation, must remain undiscussed in this
connection, but certain it is that, as a consequence of the
slight regard apparently shown at this time for the forms of
constitutional government in Prussia, that Power again
became extremely unpopular with the Liberals of the South
and West.
Austria therefore thought the opportunity favourable for
an attempt to thrust Prussia into the background, and again
assert her influence in Germany. She issued invitations to
the reigning princes and representatives of the free cities to
meet at Frankfort in order to discuss a scheme of federal
reform which, though it appeared to strengthen the cohesion
of the Confederation, would have tended to increase the
power of Austria. King William, H. von Sybel tells us, if he
had obeyed the promptings of his heart, would have attended
the “Fürsten Congress,” to which his fellow-sovereigns called
him, but Bismarck's advice prevailed, the King stayed away,
and the Prussian Government declared the Austrian scheme
unacceptable. The deliberations of the assembled princes
were consequently productive of no positive result: the
“foam wave,” as Bismarck described their work, vanished
into nothingness. But he himself proclaimed all the more
loudly the identity of German and Prussian interests, and
inscribed on his programme the creation of a German
Parliament.
August, 1863.
I 68 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY".
1852.
3.
“The Fürsten Congress at Frankfort,” says Oncken,
“was a preliminary skirmish, which could not but be
followed, sooner or later, by the decisive contest. Before it
broke out, however, the world saw with astonishment the
two deeply alienated Powers co-operate in wiping off an old
debt of honour, in regard to which German policy, from the
first, showed a martial determination and energy such as had
not been witnessed since the invasion of Silesia by
Frederick II.”
The duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg, by
an arrangement between Denmark and the German Con-
federation, had, it is true, been united with the Danish
crown, but had been granted a Provincial Diet of their
own ; and in the London Protocol the Great Powers had
recognised this state of affairs, though without undertaking
any guarantee. But the inhabitants of the duchies had
often complained that the Danes continually violated this
compact. Indeed the latter had abolished the freedom of
the press and the right of public meeting, they had con-
stituted what was really a reign of terror, with the object of
suppressing the German language and German nationality,
and of persecuting every man who, in 1848-1850, had openly
shown his leanings towards Germany. On March 3oth,
1863, Frederick VII. issued a proclamation declaring
that Holstein was to contribute to the revenue of Denmark,
though it had no share in the control of national affairs.
The Germans took up the cause of their brethren in
Schleswig-Holstein warmly, and the Federal Diet demanded
the withdrawal of the proclamation.
THE STRUGGLE FOR LEADERSHIP. I69
The Danish Government not only refused this, but even
submitted to Parliament a bill for a new constitution,
whereby Schleswig would be deprived of all its special
rights and be incorporated with Denmark. Two days after
the measure had passed through Parliament Frederick VII.
died suddenly, before giving the royal sanction to the new
law. In accordance with the London Treaty of 1852 the
Duke of Glücksburg a few weeks later succeeded to the
throne as Christian IX. The Frankfort Diet had mean-
while decreed federal execution against the Kingdom of
Denmark, and Christian, compelled by a threatening
populace to accede, against his personal wish, to the
constitution depriving the duchies of their independence,
found himself immediately committed to the contest, so long
foreseen and delayed, between the Danes and the Germans,
respecting their rights over Schleswig and Holstein,
a contest destined to become the first of a series of
events ending in the establishment of the German
Empire.
Indescribable indignation at the action of the Danes
agitated the whole of Germany, and the cry of “Separation
from Denmark,” raised in the duchies, found a sympathetic
and enthusiastic echo throughout the Fatherland. The
German Press demanded that Germany should declare
herself to be no longer bound by the London Protocol,
and that Prince Frederick of Augustenburg should be
recognised as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein. All parties
found themselves at one on this question : the National
Union and the Reform Union—the Åleindeutschen and
Grossdeutschem—appointed a joint committee, established
Schleswig-Holstein Unions in all parts of Germany, and
17 o THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
promoted the enrolling of volunteers for the deliverance
of the duchies.
So powerful was the patriotic wave passing over the
country that even that decrepit old body, the Federal
Diet, was infused with patriotic ardour enough to carry
out its resolution for a federal execution ; and against
the wish of Prussia and Austria, on Christmas eve
1863, Saxon and Hanoverian troops marched into
Holstein. The restraining power of Prussia and Austria
however was strong enough to prevent the Federal Diet
from recognising Frederick as Duke.
The question became more and more intricate. Prussia,
Austria, the Federal Diet, the German people as a whole,
were agreed in the one purpose of freeing Schleswig-
Holstein from Danish dominion, but as to the ultimate
position of the duchies within the German union they
differed entirely. In fact, there was only one man who
rightly knew his own mind ; that was Bismarck, who
carried out his views against all opposition. The
handling of the Schleswig-Holstein question he has always
himself considered as his happiest diplomatic action.
“Prussia,” says Professor Bryce, * “had a difficult game
to play, and she played it with consummate skill. Her
Ministers were unwilling to aid the Prince of Augustenburg,
both because she was bound to Denmark as one of the
signatories of the Treaty of London, and because their views
of the future included other contingelicies which it would then
have been premature to mention. But if hope and the
voice of the nation called on them to act, prudence forbade
them to act alone. It was essential to carry Austria along
* The Holy Roman Empire.
THE STRUGGLE FOR LEADERSHIP. I 7 I
with them, not only because the Austrian alliance would
be needed if England, France, and Russia threatened war,
but because she could in this way be made to share the
unpopularity which backwardness in the national cause
was bringing upon Prussia, and because she was thus
alienated from Bavaria, Hanover, and the other States
of the second rank, with which her relations had been,
especially since the Frankfort Congress, so close and
cordial. When the co-operation of Austria had been
secured-–partly by adroitly playing on her fears of the
democratic and almost revolutionary character which the
Schleswig-Holstein movement was taking in Germany,
partly by her own reluctance to let Prussia gain any
advantage by acting alone against Denmark,+the Prussian
Government resolved to take the control of the quarrel
Out of the hands of the Diet, so as to decide the fate of
the two duchies in the way most favourable to their own
plans for the reconstruction of North Germany.”
Austria and Prussia therefore demanded the repeal of the
Act of November 18th, 1863, by which Schleswig had
been incorporated with the Danish monarchy, and which,
as they rightly alleged, was contrary to treaty stipulations.
Denmark refused to comply with the request, and the two
powers declared war.
The haughty contempt which Denmark had shown for
German nationality she had to atone for by the reverses
which Prussian arms inflicted upon her at Düppel and
Alsen.
By the Treaty of Vienna, Denmark ceded Schleswig- Oct. 30th, 1864.
Holstein to Austria and Prussia.
172 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
April 6th, 1866.
4.
Now the question arose, what was to be done with the
duchies P Prussia professed herself ready to recognise
Prince Frederick as Duke on condition that he agreed to
a cession of the fortresses of Schleswig-Holstein, an incor-
poration of its military forces with hers, and an absorption
of its postal and telegraphic system. These proposals were
rejected by Prince Frederick, who felt himself encouraged
by the sympathy he enjoyed in Germany, even in the
Prussian Chamber, above all, by the support of Austria, which
was making every effort to counteract any strengthening of
Prussia. The relations between the two Powers therefore
became again very strained, and even during the summer of
1865 Bismarck spoke openly of impending war, and began
to negotiate an alliance with Italy.
The evil day however was postponed for the time by the
Convention of Gastein, which stipulated that, pending the
final decision on the question of inheritance, Schleswig
should be placed under Prussian and Holstein under
Austrian administration, and that the Emperor Francis
Joseph, in return for a money compensation, should resign all
his rights in the Duchy of Lauenburg in favour of the King of
Prussia. This treaty was felt to be nothing but a hollow
truce. The Italian negotiations were continued, and
resulted in the conclusion of a defensive and offensive
alliance between the two kingdoms.
With Napoleon III., who had been counselling war with
like zeal at Berlin and Florence, Bismarck, displaying all
that diplomatic adroitness and astuteness that lies in him,
and regardless of the suspicions harboured against him by
THE STRUGGLE FOR LEADERSHIP. I 73
mistaken German patriots, had cultivated friendly relations
in every possible way. “Thus,” he said later,” “a
relationship of goodwill arose with Napoleon, who, on
his part, would rather make treaties with Prussia than with
others, but did not, it must be assumed, expect that the war
of , 1866 would take the course it did. He relied on
Our defeat and the resultant opportunity for extending to us
his benevolent protection, not, of course, altogether without
compensation. But, in my opinion, it is politically fortunate
that up to the battle of Sadowa, when he was undeceived as
to the strength of our respective organizations, he remained
well disposed towards us, particularly towards me personally.”
The day after the conclusion of the Prusso-Italian
alliance, to bring to a head the struggle with Austria for the
hegemony in Germany, he moved the convening of a German
Parliament, to be elected by universal suffrage. The motion
was referred to a committee; but Austria with her German
allies, Hanover, Saxony, and some others, clearly saw its
aim, which was the exclusion of Austria from Germany, and
the unification of the remainder under Prussian leadership.
Meanwhile, further complications had arisen in Schleswig-
Holstein. Austria, unwilling that the duchies should pass
into the possession of Prussia, had allowed unrestricted
agitation in Holstein in favour of Prince Frederick’s
succession. Count Bismarck protested : Austria replied
that her policy must be maintained : whereupon prepara-
tions for war were made on both sides. Then Austria
submitted the decision on the duchies to the Federal Diet:
this Prussia declared a breach of the Gastein Convention :
* Speech in the German Reichstag on February 21st, 1879.
I 74 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
June 11th and
14th, 1866.
and Austria's final step was the motion to mobilize the
federal contingents for an execution against Prussia.
5.
The most critical moment in the unhonoured life of the
Federal Diet had come.
Austria or Prussia P Was the old conservative or the
modern and progressive power to prevail? That was the
question.
With Austria voted Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover,
Würtemberg, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau,
Meiningen, Frankfort, Reuss, Lippe, Lichtenstein ; against
her Baden, Weimar, Oldenburg, Mecklenburg, Anhalt,
Luxemburg, Schwarzburg, Coburg, Altenburg, Bremen,
Hamburg, Lübeck. Prussia abstained. Austria's motion
had been carried by a majority of nine of the curiae against
six : a federal execution was to be carried out against
Prussia. Thereupon the Prussian Ambassador rose,
declared that Prussia now considered the Bund dissolved,
that she would endeavour to establish a new one on
Sounder foundations, and withdrew.
And the poor exhausted Diet,_de mortuis mil misi bonum,
—breathed its last, and departed from an ungrateful
world.
The truth of Bismarck's words soon appeared : “The
Cabinets and the nations underrate us: the world will see
~ + wºrk- la -- ~£ -4------ ~4-
U. l
isplay of Strength this Prussia,
which is so much scoffed at, can make.” With a speed that
almost paralyzed her opponents Prussia advanced her armies.
The terrible but inevitable Bruderkrieg, “the war of
brother against brother,” was, fortunately, as short as it was
THE STRUGGLE FOR LEADERSHIP. I 75
decisive. The rush of Prussian successes culminating
in the great victory of Sadowa, amazed Europe and violently July 3rd, 1866
agitated France. The whole French nation felt the
ancient military fame of France eclipsed by the splendid
fighting capacity of Prussia revealed in the seven days' war
against Austria. Napoleon's Minister, Drouyn de Lhuys,
demanded an immediate occupation of the left bank of the
Rhine, if Prussia proceeded to increase her territory. But
it was found that in consequence of the losses sustained in
Mexico, France had only 4o, ooo men available for the
intended “armed mediation.” Napoleon therefore had to
confine himself to diplomatic action.
The preliminary Peace of Nikolsburg, later confirmed Aug. 23rd. 1866.
by the Peace of Prague, stipulated the exclusion of Austria
from the Germanic body, her resignation to Prussia of all her
rights in Schleswig-Holstein, and the creation of a North
German Confederation with Prussia at its head. The con-
ditions of peace also left it open to the Southern States to
choose what relationship they would form with the Northern
Confederation. This was a compromise between Bismarck
and Napoleon, the latter fearing a United Germany, the
former preferring to restrict himself to what was attainable
at the time, and taking care not to humiliate or seriously
to injure Austria, whose friendship he foresaw that Germany
would need.
Meanwhile Napoleon's interference continued. Scarcely
had Benedetti, who had followed Bismarck to the battle-
fields, returned to Berlin, when he received orders from his
Government to demand not less than the left bank of the
Rhine as a compensation for Prussia's increase of territory.
For this purpose he submitted the draft of a treaty by
*
176 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
which Prussia was even to bind herself to lend an active
Support to the cession of the Bavarian and Hessian
possessions west of the Rhine !
The most amusing thing about these proceedings is that
this diplomatist never doubted the acceptance of his
impudent proposition. He had to find out that he had
put the saddle on the wrong horse. Bismarck would listen
to no mention of ceding German territory. “Si vous
refusez,” said the conceited Corsican, “c'est la guerre.”—
“Eh bien, la guerre,” replied Bismarck calmly. Just as
little success had Benedetti with King William. “Not a
clod of German soil, not a chimney of a German village,”
was William's kingly reply.
Napoleon was not disposed at the time to carry out his
threat. He disavowed Benedetti's action, declaring
that the instructions had been obtained from him during
his illness and that he wished to live in peace and friend-
ship with Prussia.
Napoleon's covetousness had at least one good effect: it
furthered the work of German union. Bavaria and
Würtemberg, who during the war had sided with Austria,
had at first appealed to Napoleon to mediate between them
and Prussia. But when the Ministers of the four South
German States appeared at Berlin to negotiate with
Bismarck and Benedetti's draft-treaty was communicated
to them, there was a complete change of disposition. They
then wished to go much further than the Prussian Statesman
was prepared to go : they asked, in order to be protected
from French encroachments, to be admitted into the North
German Confederation. But Bismarck would not depart
from the stipulations of the Treaty of Nikolsburg.
THE STRUGGLE FOR LEADERSHIP. 177
The most important result of the negotiations was that
secret treaties were concluded by which the Southern States
bound themselves to an alliance with the Northern Con-
federation for the defence of Germany, and engaged to
place their troops under the Supreme command of the
Prussian King in the event of any attack by a foreign Power.
In a military sense Alein-Zeutschland was now one, though
not yet politically.
6.
Besides a material victory, Prussia had also gained a
moral one. The very day when, on the battlefield of
Sadowa, the Prussian army decided the question of leader-
ship in Germany, the Prussian people, in an electoral contest,
freed themselves from the domination of the uncompromising
Progressists, who in their blind infatuation had done well-
nigh everything to render impossible what they themselves
were wishing for, Prussia's victory and Germany’s unity.
It had now become evident who, the Government or the
Progressists, had been right with regard to the army.
Though some reactionary spirits wished to commit the
Government to the overthrow of the Constitution, the King
promptly set the public mind at rest. In his speech from
the throne on August 5th, he referred in dignified language
to the parliamentary conflict, preserving a modest silence
on his own triumph. He frankly admitted that, in
the absence of an agreement with the Chamber, the
State expenditure had for several years lacked the
foundation of legality, but that nevertheless his Govern-
ment had acted conscientiously in considering the army
question as a question of national existence. Nor was
M
178 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
he too proud to hold out the hand of conciliation, and to
ask the representatives of the people to grant indemnity to
his Government for having carried on the administration of
the State without a regular budget. The advance was
cordially met, a vote of confidence in the Ministry passed,
and the conflict ended for ever. “From this day,” said the
Progressist deputy, Twesten, “our negative policy ceases:
we can now, if it is possible, create something positive on
constitutional ground in common with the Government and
with the Conservative party.”
CHAPTER XIV.
The Unification of “A Zein-ZXeutschland” and the Establish-
ment of the Empire.
I.
“Geduld, ich kenne meines Volkes Mark,
Was langsam wachst, das wird gedoppelt stark.”
HAT Prussia was the truly representative German
State had been obvious to the thoughtful long
before: the fact now stood out in clear light to all who
would open their eyes to see.
Progress had meanwhile been made with the construction
of the North German Confederation, which embraced all
the States to the north of the river Main. Its affairs
were to be regulated by a Reichstag elected by
universal suffrage and by a Federal Council formed of
the representatives of the North German Governments.
In a military sense it was a Single State, politically a
Confederate State, with the King of Prussia as President.
This arrangement was not of course regarded as final:
and in his speech from the throne to the North German
Reichstag, King William emphasized the declaration that
Germany, so long torn, so long powerless, so long the theatre
of war for foreign nations, would henceforth strive to recover
the greatness of her past. With a view to bring about the
I8o THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
I868.
union between South and North, and as one step towards
this end, a great party, the National Liberal Party,’ was
formed. It supported Count Bismarck’s national policy
both in the Prussian Parliament and the North German
Reichstag; and there could be no better testimony
to its well-directed political activity than that given by
the great Statesman with whom it worked in harmony for
many years. “The best days of my official life,” he said
not long ago, “were those when I had a National Liberal
majority. The foundations of the Empire were prepared
with its support and co-operation.” f
2.
A first step towards “bridging over the Main,” i.e.,
causing South and North to join hands again, was
taken by the creation of a Zol/parlament, or Customs
Parliament, which was elected by the whole of Klein-
Deutschland, and met at Berlin, henceforth the capital of
Germany. It was also a step in advance that Baden
and Hesse-Darmstadt signed conventions by which their
military system was put on the same footing as that of
the North German Confederation.
Baden f indeed would willingly have entered into political
* It originated among the moderate elements of the old Prussian
Progressists in September, 1866; it was joined by Liberals from the new
Prussian provinces and other German States, and the President of the
old National Union, Herr von Bennigsen, became its leader.
T Prince Bismarck's address to the Geesteriſtinde
National Liberals in May, 1891.
: Baden, under her patriotic Grand-Duke, was then becoming an
object of hatred to French statesmen. “Il faut écraser ce grand-duché
de Bade qui n'est qu'une succursale de la Prusse,” said Napoleon's
Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Bavarian representative before the
outbreak of the Franco-German War.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EMPIRE. I 81
union with the North, had the same disposition pre-
vailed at the time in the other South German States. The
National Liberals however had to contend with strong
opposition from the Democrats in Würtemberg, and from
the Ultramontanes in Bavaria. The latter were hostile to
Prussia on account of her Protestantism, the former on
account of the stern principles and severe discipline
that pervaded her administration. How long it would
have taken to remove this animosity, which had been
increased by the civil war of 1866, it would now be
useless to consider. Certain it is that beneath this apparent
animosity against Prussia there lay hidden the love for
the great common Fatherland, a love which only needed
quickening by a common object to contend for, by a
common danger to oppose, to sweep away all minor
considerations, to drown every individual feeling of hostility,
and to make German from the South join hands with
German from the North in concord and united effort.
3.
In the work of German unification the Bonapartes have
an important share; and if they are to be judged by their
conduct and their actions in connection with this work, they
may truly be described, in the language of “Faust,” as
“. . . A part of that primordial might
Which always wills the wrong, and always works the right.”
By outraging the principle of nationality, Napoleon I. had
re-awakened the feeling of nationality among Germans:
Napoleon III., by attempting to prevent the unification
of Germany, actually hastened it on.
It is true that when, on New Year's Day, 1859, the latter
I82 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
declared that “Italy's cry of agony” had reached his ears,
he had thereby professed to be in sympathy with the
principle of nationality: but if he conferred partial
unification on Italy, he did so for his own selfish purposes.
And as his ill-luck would have it, he had created an enemy for
France and a friend for the movement towards German unity.
When the Italians went much further than he really intended
them to do, and he was unable to conjure back the spirits
he had called up, he was compelled practically to disavow
the principle, and to accept a most embarrassing position.
Even though he might entertain a kind of , sentimental
sympathy for German unity within certain limits, he
could not repeat the experiment on the eastern frontier of
France: For France, which under Louis XIV. and
Napoleon I., had arrogated to itself a most unjustifiable
preponderance in European politics, and by Napoleon
III. had been restored to the recognised leadership among
Continental nations, felt an irresistible repugnance, an
absolute unwillingness to see and suffer on her frontiers a
Power of the first rank. “I remember,” said Prince
Bismarck on a recent occasion, “that, whilst I was Minister
in Paris, one of my best French friends was old Marshal
Vaillant, then Governor of the Tuileries. He was a
charming old gentleman, and really had a great regard
for me. One day, in 1867, he said to me, ‘See, my friend,
I like you ; I like the Germans; in particular I like the
Prussians; but I know that we shall have to cross bayonets
with you one of these days. We Frenchmen are like a
barndoor cock, ruling the roost, and we cannot bear that
any other cock should crow audibly in Europe except
ourselves'.”
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EMPIRE. 183
Obeying the innermost instincts of the French nation,
Napoleon III. had dictated to Russia, had dictated to
Austria, and was holding the Italians in a leash : realizing
the profoundest desires and pretensions of his subjects,
he had assumed the part of arbiter of the destinies of
Europe. In such a course, once taken, there is no finality
except in the inevitable fall from presumptuous heights.
Borne on the shoulders of a vainglorious people, who
would drop him in the mire of disgrace when he no longer
satisfied their ambition, the Emperor of the French was
no longer a free agent; he had no choice but to play
at all hazards his part of international dictator, and,
disregarding his professed principle, the principle of
nationality, challenge the right of Germany to be the
equal of France as a united and independent country.
That was his fate.
4.
When King William had replied that he would not yield
up an inch of German soil, “patriotic pangs" at Prussian
successes and the thirst for “compensation * continued to
disturb the sleep of the French Emperor, and as he was
unwilling to appear baffled in his purpose, he returned to
the charge.
On the 16th of August, 1866, through his Ambassador
Benedetti, he demanded the cession of Landau, Saar-
brücken, Saarlouis, and Luxemburg, together with
Prussia's consent to the annexation of Belgium by
France. If that could not be obtained, he would be
satisfied with Luxemburg and Belgium ; he would even
exclude Antwerp from the territority claimed that it might
184 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
be created a free town. Thus he hoped to spare the
susceptibilities of England. As a gracious return he offered
the alliance of France. After his first interview Benedetti
gave up his demand for the three German towns, and
submitted a new scheme, according to which Germany
should induce the King of the Netherlands to a cession
of Luxemburg, and should support France in the conquest
of Belgium ; whilst, on his part, Napoleon would permit
the formation of a federal union between the Northern
Confederation and the South German States, and would
enter into a defensive and offensive alliance with
Germany.
Count Bismarck treated these propositions, as he himself
has stated, “in a dilatory manner,” that is to say, he
did not reject them, but he took good care not to make
any definite promises.
When the Prussian Prime Minister returned from his
furlough to Berlin, towards the end of 1866, Benedetti
resumed his negotiations, but now only with regard to
Luxemburg, still garrisoned by Prussian troops as at the
time of the old Germanic Confederation.
Though the Grand-Duchy of Luxemburg did not belong
to the new North German Confederation, Bismarck was not
willing to allow it to be annexed by France. Moltke
moreover declared that the fortress could only be evacuated
by the Prussian troops if the fortifications were razed. But
without its fortifications Napoleon would not have it. And
when, with regard to the Emperor's intentions upon
Belgium, Prussia offered no active support, but only
promised observance of neutrality, France renounced the
idea of an alliance with Prussia, and entered into direct
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EMPIRE. 185
negotiations with the King of Holland, as Grand-Duke of
Luxemburg.
Great excitement was thereby caused in Germany, and
as a timely warning to France, Bismarck surprised the
world with the publication of the secret treaties between
Prussia and the South German States. But when it became
known that the King of Holland was actually consenting to
the sale of his rights in Luxemburg to Napoleon, there was
so loud a cry of indignation * in all parts of Germany, there
was so powerful a protest in the North German Parliament
against any sale of German territory by the King of Holland,
* The present writer, in a pamphlet on the Luxemburg Question, in
I867, said: “Is it not at last time. to demonstrate to France that
Germany is no longer to be regarded as an accidental conglomeration of
incongruous States, which may arbitrarily be torn one from another, but
that it is destined and determined to become one great empire, claiming
even the smallest of its members, and commanding the respect of
Europe. Let no one dare to ask of us that we should in cold blood
allow the integrity of our German Fatherland to be endangered at a
moment when the Prussian people is still in the full consciousness of its
recently-displayed strength and energy, at a moment when the German
people heartily rejoice at the thought that at last the morn has com-
menced to dawn on a strong and united Germany, that at last the
German voice is to ring powerfully again in the areopagus of nations.
To comply with such a request would be to inaugurate the new
Germany with an act of humiliation, would be to deprive the German
people of all that Self-confidence of which it stands so much in need for
the great work of its national unification.
“That such a solution of the Luxemburg question as would be a
disgrace to Germany will never be allowed to take place, we rely on our
Government, which has so far furthered the work of national union with
unequalled energy and skill; we rely on the word of our King, that not
a clod of German Soil shall be lost to the Fatherland. . . . Let France
then be summoned to put away her evil desires, and, if words cannot
convince her, if she be bent on fanning up the flames of war, let her
fear the just anger of the German people, which will rise with the sturdy
vigour of old to enforce its right at the point of the sword.”
March, 1867
I86 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
that Count Bismarck, himself surprised at the vigour of the
patriotic outburst, declared to the Government of the Hague
that the cession of Luxemburg would be considered a casus
àelli. This peremptory declaration had the desired effect:
the cession did not take place. his was the first success in
European politics of a united Germany, united not yet
politically, but in spirit.
That was satisfactory.
A Conference of the Great Powers then met in London :
by its decision, Luxemburg was separated from Germany,”
and,-to give some kind of satisfaction to the Emperor of
the French,--was formed into a neutral State.
From a national point of view, that was unsatisfactory.
In 1864 the long-continued process of tearing from
Germania her children, of slicing off parts of her body, of
carving, as in 1806, into her very entrails, had at length
been stayed, had at length been changed for the opposite
process, the opposite course, since adhered to, of claiming
again her own flesh and blood, of gathering again her own
kith and kin.
The year 1867 saw a slight check on this course.
The Gaul, it is true, had been prevented from swallowing,
besides his profession of the principle of nationality, another
child of Mother Germania; yet diplomacy—wise diplomacy
—which has a sad mania for the pitiful palliative of creating
petty neutral States, was once more allowed to dispose of
German territory in its own fashion, and to tear a pound of
flesh from the Germanic body. Whether this will be an
enduring arrangement has still to be seen. So much is
* Luxemburg however remained within the German Customs Union.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EMPIRE, 187
certain, that wise diplomacy will find it difficult to repeat
the experiment, for the Germanic body happily is now
sufficiently robust and strong to kick against such im-
pertinent carving Operations.
5.
The danger of an outbreak of war between France and
Germany had only been warded off for a time by the inter-
national settlement of the Luxemburg question. Prussia's
offence,— for an offence it was in French eyes, that of reveal-
ing extraordinary military strength and fighting capacity,
still existed ; indeed, it had been aggravated by the
conclusion of military treaties with the Southern States.
The insult inflicted by Sadowa upon the French flag, O
perversity of human nature —must needs be avenged
“One last consideration,” the A'ays wrote in 1867, “does
not permit France to recoil : the failure of the noble expedi-
tion to Mexico and our disinterested neutrality in 1866 have,
in the public opinion, affected the prestige of our flag. We
must fully and entirely restore to it its legitimate and
necessary splendour.” Astounding vanity Astounding,
and fatal Under such circumstances, the Germans awaited,
with calm watchfulness and resigned determination, the
supreme moment; for the humblest son of the Fatherland
felt and knew that German Unity must be won or lost
in a fierce and final contest with the arch-enemy, the
implacable opponent of a strong and united Germany.
Every artifice was used by France to prevent the South
from joining the North. In their self-delusion, it pleased
the French to believe that the military treaties had been
extorted by Prussia from the Southern Governments, and
I88 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
attempts were made to deepen the wound which the civil
war of 1866 had left behind, for the Journal Officiel, the
mouth-piece of the French Ministry, went so far as to
speak of the “audacious encroachments made by Prussia
in destroying the independence of the South German
States.” Napoleon III. indeed calculated that in forcing
a quarrel upon the Northern Confederation he might, like
Napoleon I. at the beginning of the century, rely upon the
support, or at least upon the neutrality, of the Southern
States; he fancied that in Hanover and Hesse, he would
be welcomed as a liberator from the Prussian yoke.
A more fatal mistake has never been made. The
Emperor of the French did not realize how vivid,
and even bitter, in South as well as in North Germany,
were the recollections of the hardships suffered under the
French domination in the past. Above all, he was not
clear-sighted enough to see that the time was past when
Germans would trample on their own nationality, and
fight the battles of the foreigner against sons of the
common Fatherland, to recognise that, in spite of all their
internal quarrels and jealousies, there had grown up in the
hearts of the people an over-mastering desire for a strong
national commonwealth, or to perceive that the mere
attempt to threaten the integrity and dignity of their
country must rouse their patriotic indignation and hasten
the realization of their unity.
But, ill-informed as he was with regard to the Inorai and
military strength of his adversaries and his own
resources, we cannot wonder that he blindly hurried into
fatal action on the most unwarrantable pretext, in order to
satisfy the craving of his subjects and restore his waning
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EMPIRE. 189
authority among them. He himself had once said that
“among free nations no government, however strong, may
suppress freedom, unless it seeks glory in enterprises
abroad.”
6.
In the early part of July, 1870, Prince Leopold of
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, at the request of the Spanish
Government, became a candidate for the Spanish
throne. Napoleon III. seized the occasion to carry
into effect his hostile intentions against Germany. At
once, at the instigation of the Government, a cry was
raised in the Legislative Assembly that Prussia was about
to place one of her princes on the throne of Charles V.
The cry was taken up by those who demanded that Prussia
should be made amenable to the will of France, and the
Press hailed the “war of revenge so greatly desired.”
“The democrats of all countries, and Frenchmen of all
parties,” says the Swiss writer, Dr. Henne am Rhyn, “have
maintained since the war that the hatred of France against
Germany originated from the forced surrender of Alsace-
Lorraine. But if people will only remember the utterances
made before the war, before even a shot had been fired, and
therefore, of course, before any annexation had taken place,
they must admit that that hatred cannot be stronger to-day
than it was twenty years ago for no reason whatever.
Though they had lost nothing, though they could adduce
no palpable reason, the French demanded four times as
much as they forfeited afterwards, that is to say, all the
German Rhine-land. It was as if the whole of France had
become a mad-house. The people insisted on the de-
I90 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
July 15th, 1870.
claration of war quite irrespective of any steps that Prussia
might take towards compliance.”
It was in vain that the Prince of Hohenzollern formally
resigned his candidature : there was to be war. And if
Napoleon still had any hesitation, the Empress Eugénie
kept fanning the flames for what she benevolently called
“ma petite guerre.” “We will crush this Protestant
Prussia,” she boasted in her religious ardour. “France,”
said the clerical Univers with heroic candour, “cannot
permit Prussia still further to aggrandize herself; in order
to prevent her from doing so, we must cut her down. . . .
Better to-day than to-morrow.” If a journal with a
spark of moral sense remaining, as for instance, the
Constitutionnel, ventured to suggest that France might be
satisfied with Prince Leopold's resignation without insist-
ing on any further guarantees from the King of Prussia, all
the remaining organs of public opinion, like a pack of
bloodhounds, raised a savage howl of execration. If a
solitary representative in the Legislative Assembly had
still sense and courage enough to counsel caution, his
voice, amidst threats and insults from a raving majority,
was drowned by the wild clamours for “War,”—clamours
re-echoed in the streets by a mob frantically shouting:
“a Berlin a Berlin | *
And the die was cast : there was War.
7
-
When, on the hollowest, most frivolous pretext, Napoleon
thus lightheartedly declared war against the Northern
Confederation, when the whole French nation, with arrogant
cry, vehemently demanded the frontier of the Rhine, all
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EMPIRE. I9 I
German lands shook with patriotic indignation, so mighty,
so fierce, that it swept away in an instant all the dissensions
and heartburnings of South * and North, of Catholic
and Protestant, of Feudalist and Progressist, of Liberal
and Democrat ; all listening, responding but to the one call,
“The Fatherland in danger.” Conscious that its cause was
the cause of justice and patriotism, all Germany to a man
rose with an enthusiasm unparalleled in its intensity and
universality, and with a determination, with a unanimity of
purpose such as Germans had not felt for centuries, a
million warriors, “the nation in arms,” pressed round the
national banner raised by the venerable King of Prussia,
and drew up, fearless and exultant, in majestic battle-array
along that sacred river of theirs, drowning the French
clamours in the mighty strains:
“A shout bursts forth like thunder crash,
Like roar of waves, like sabre clash :
On to the Rhine, the German Rhine !
Who'll guard the noble river's line P
Dear Fatherland, no fear be thine;
Firm stands the watch that guards the Rhine !
“Through thousands thrills that mighty cry,
Like lightning flashes every eye:
And man by man each German brave
Protects the sacred frontier wave.
Dear Fatherland, no fear be thine;
Firm stands the watch that guards the Rhine !
* The journey of the Crown Prince, afterwards the Emperor
Frederick, through South Germany when proceeding to the frontier to
take command of the South German forces, was a veritable triumphal
progress,
I92 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
“Each glances towards the heavenly fires,
And Swears before his hero sires :
Thou Rhine, with all thy vine-clad crests,
Shalt still be German, as our breasts.
Dear Fatherland, no fear be thine;
Firm stands the watch that guards the Rhine !
“While there's a drop of blood to run,
While there's an arm to bear a gun,
While there's a sword in German hand,
No foe shall dare to tread thy strand.
Dear Fatherland, no fear be thine;
Firm stands the watch that guards the Rhine !
“And o'er the waters rings the cry,
As in the breeze our banners fly :
Along the German Rhine, so free,
We all, we all will guardians be
Dear Fatherland, no fear be thine;
Firm stands the watch that guards the Rhine!”
And we all who hastened to the defence of the
threatened river felt as our hearts thrilled to the inspir-
ing accents of the “Watch on the Rhine” that
in the vow, “We all, we all will guardians be,”
, there lay the essence, the quickening power of German
unity. We all felt that if we only combined like a nation
of brothers in one great sacrifice to atone for the discord of
the past, if we showed sirength enough to vindicate our
right to our own frontier, and to guard against our ruthless
neighbours the borders, already too often cruelly lacerated,
of our sacred Rhine,—we felt that thereby we should gain
the universal recognition of our capacity and our inalterable
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EMPIRE. I93
determination to resume among the great nations of Europe
the rank worthy of the traditions, the vitality, and the
intellectual achievements of the Teutonic race.
8.
Led by the venerable Hero-King, William I., guided by
the great “Thinker of Battles,” Moltke, the national army
did its duty. Victory was with the cause of Germany.
And whilst the peoples of the Fatherland were showing
on the field of battle that unity is strength, the voices of
patriots grew louder and louder in the demand that this
Supreme effort must end in the realization of the nation's
dream, in the demand that to this unity, even then
practically existent, should be given its formal and
appropriate expression.
What the people so ardently wished and hoped for at that
time, the poet Karl Gerock has depicted as a vision that
arose before him in the night between 1870 and 1871, while
the German armies were still engaged in the fierce contest : *
“’Twas New Year's Eve, and silent
The stars shone through the night:
When in the solemn stillness
I saw a wondrous sight.
“At midnight I stood watching
Upon a lofty brow;
My Swabian home around me
Lay in the dusk below.
* The poem is entitled “Two Mountains of Swabia,” meaning the
Staufen and the Zollern, on which stood the respective ancestral seats of
the two great dynasties. On the Zollern a magnificent pile of buildings
of bold and skilful construction was erected by Frederick William IV.,
in 1850-55, as a royal château, and finally completed in 1867.
N
I 94
THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
“From Zollern on to Staufen
The Swabian Alps stretched wide,
And in the silvery moonlight
Lay peak and mountain side.
“High towering through the night-mists
The Staufen's bald crest shone,
With saddest memories crowded,—
Its diadem was gone.
“Then from the clouds that floated
The mountain side along,
Gigantic forms rose slowly,
A weird and ghostly throng.
“They were the Swabian Emperors,
The noble Staufen blood,
Like oak-trees strong and sturdy,
A haughty lion-brood.
“They stretched their giant bodies
And stood there stark and stern,
The old heroic ardour
Seemed in their hearts to burn.
“The proud procession heading,
With stately gait and bold,
Stepped Frederick Barbarossa,
The Emperor loved of old.
“He wore his crown and mantle,
His sword hung at his side,
The sword that once had carried
His empire far and wide,
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EMPIRE. I 95
“And after him were thronging
His sons and all his kin,
The last, so pale and handsome,
Was youthful Conradin.
“And each his crown was wearing,
And each his mighty glaive,
The deep wounds still were gaping
On many a Staufen brave.
“With silent steps they journeyed,
Unhelped by path or bridge,
Straight o'er the hills of Swabia,
O'er crest and rugged ridge.
“Their misty cloaks were sweeping
Along the mountain side,
And silently their cloud-shoes
Seemed o'er the trees to glide.
“And where at distant corner
The hill-tops scattered lie,
Where Hohenzollern Castle
As guardian rises high,
“There paused the band and halted :
And with the moon’s last ray
The spectral giants vanished
In clouds of misty grey.
“Methought I saw the princes
Their crowns lay on the hill,
And hover round the Summit,
To breathe their blessings still,
I96 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
“And as I stood there gazing
I felt the freshening air,
And borne on morning breezes
Awoke the glad New Year.
“Then clearer, and still clearer,
As growing daylight spread,
The Hohenzollern lifted
Into the sky his head.
“The glowing dawn threw o'er him
A lordly purple gown,
The rising orb placed on him
The proud imperial crown.
“And down to far-off Staufen
There spread a rosy gleam
That made the pale grey mountains
With radiant brightness beam ;
“On mighty pinions sweeping
An eagle, fair and grand,
Into the heavens mounted,
High o'er the German land ;
“And through the clear air ringing,
Far over hill and dale,
Bells pealed their salutation :
Hail! German Empire, hail!”
-* -º- ºr à.
9.
The poet's vision was then already nearing its realization.
The first in the official world to suggest the restoration
of the Empire was the Emperor Frederick, then Crown
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EMPIRE. I97
Prince of Prussia. His ideal was the Single State ; and
in order to establish it, he was even inclined to meet
by force any possible resistance of the individual States.
Prince Bismarck however rejected all violent means, and
counselled what was, without endangering anything, clearly
and plainly attainable, viz.: the Confederate State.
Negotiations between the leading Statesman and the
Southern Governments began a few days after the battle
of Sedan, and came to a successful conclusion on the
5th December, two days before which date the high-
minded King of Bavaria had already proposed to King
William that, as the head of the Confederation, he should
assume the title of German Emperor. A resolution to the
same effect was passed by the North German Reichstag
on the 9th December. A deputation, headed by Eduard
Simson, the same man who in the name of the Frankfort
Parliament had offered the imperial title to Frederick
William IV. in 1849, then proceeded to the Royal
headquarters at Versailles, and on the 18th December
offered the imperial crown to the brother of the King who
had once declined it. This time he met with greater
success: deeply touched, King William declared his
readiness to comply with the wish of the princes and
the nation ; and after the South German Parliaments
had also voted in favour of the restoration of the Empire,
the venerable King of Prussia, in the midst of a brilliant
assembly of German princes, officers, and Ministers of
State, was proclaimed German Emperor, was proclaimed
Emperor in the Palace of Louis XIV., the very temple of
the Power that for three centuries had inscribed on its
flag the humiliation and dismemberment of the Fatherland.
18th January,
1871.
I98 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
March 21st,
1871.
The dream of centuries was fulfilled !—fulfilled at last !
The misery of national impotence was lost all at once in
the night of oblivion
At length the Empire was restored to rejuvenated might
and splendour, no longer existing only in legends of old
and memories of the past, but in brilliant living reality
Not the Holy Roman Empire, not the Empire
of the Middle Ages, with its fatal vision of universal
dominion and its disregard of the principle of nationality,
but a German Empire as a truly national State, and a
safeguard of the culture and independence of an enlightened
nation, such as the Emperor William announced it to the
first parliamentary representatives of the re-united Germany,
when he concluded his address: “God grant that we and
the heirs to our Imperial Crown may ever be the means
of the growth of the German Empire, not by warlike
conquests, but by increasing the national well-being, and by
extending freedom and civilization.”
CONCLUSION.
A Glance towards the Future.
“Deutschland, Deutschland liber Alles,
uber Alles in der Welt,
Wenn es Stets zu Schutz und Trutze
Brüderlich zusammen halt,
Von der Maas bis an die Memel,
Von der Etsch bis an den Belt :—
Deutschland, I)eutschland uber Alles,
über Alles in der Welt.”
—Hoffmann von Fallersleben,
T does not lie within the scope of the present essay to
dwell upon or even to enumerate the benefits the
German nation has reaped from the establishment of unity
and the formation of the “Smaller Germany.” The fact
that the German name, long a by-word in the world, is again
respected among civilized nations in Europe and beyond
the seas, demonstrates, more forcibly than the most eloquent
words, what Germans owe to the united efforts that created
a vigorous national State.
Yet it is a truth as old as the world that there is no
happiness without alloy. It is, perhaps, not desirable that
there should be. Calm enjoyment is not conducive to
development and progress: in struggle lies the renewal of
vitality: where there is no struggle there is stagnation and
decay. Such considerations may have enabled the German
2OO THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
nation to receive with philosophical resignation the words
which Moltke pronounced after the great national war: “For
fifty years we shall have to guard with the sword what in one
year we have won with the sword.”
In contending against external dangers, Germans accom-
plished their partial unification, and brought about the
constitution of “ Klein-Deutschland.” Whatever the future
may have in store, Germans are continually reminded by
dangers threatening from without, from both East and West,
that, as yet, their national forces remain scattered, and that
they can develop and display their full strength and expansive
power, intellectual, commercial, and national, only by con-
stituting the Great-Germany of Stein and Arndt, “as far as the
German tongue is spoken,” by realizing the ideal of Uhland,
“ the unmutilated, full-grown, Germania,” by calling back her
kin, that, in the course of centuries, have strayed from the
mother country, and by uniting, “zu Schutz und Trutz,” as
Hoffmann von Fallersleben sings, all Germanic peoples,
“From the Meuse unto the Memel,
From the Adige to the Belt.”
It has been shown that the peculiar religious, political, and
historical conditions of Germany rendered it necessary that
the first practical attempt at unification should be accom-
panied by the exclusion of the Austrian Germans from the
paternal fold. But the establishment of “Klein-Deutschland,”
can, of course, be nothing but a phase in the unification of
all Germany. Because Prussia defeated Austria in the
struggle for leadership, it does not follow that the Austrian
Germans were to be sent adrift for ever : because Protestant
Prussia was victorious over Catholic Austria, it does not
.A. GILANCE TOWARDS THE FUTURE. 2O I
follow that the modern Germany has no room for the
Austrian Catholics, or that their admission would endanger
the Protestant principle in the new State. The victory of
the Protestant principle, cannot, and does not, imply the
victory of the Protestant Church ; but it implies the assertion
of the principle of toleration founded on pure evangelism,
the establishment of the rule laid down by the great
Frederick, that “everyone must be allowed to go to heaven
in his own way.” The principle of toleration and parity”
is too firmly rooted in the life of the nation to be dislodged.
Besides, in the domain of religion and politics, the
Habsburg House has not failed to profit by its defeats:
Catholicism in Austria has conformed to the times; other-
wise the people of that country could not be firm adherents
of the Triple Alliance, one of the members of which
occupies a position of hostility to the Pope. There is no
longer room for religious antagonism in Germany. The
hardy mountaineer of the Tyrol or Styria is as good a German
as is the Swabian, the Holsteiner, or the Pomeranian. The
art and literature of Berlin and Munich are not more
essential factors in German culture than those of Vienna.
No doubt there are those whose religious and political
bias makes them forget all this, who take the beginning
for the end, forget that the old Empire embraced all German-
speaking peoples, and regard the present as the “restored
German Empire.” Against these Lagarde turns sharply,
pictures it as “limping through history like a three-legged
lion,” and scolds the princes, statesmen, and people for
giving no thought to “the ten millions” outside the A’eich,
* See reference to “paritatische Universitäten,” on p. 88.
2O2 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
who, nevertheless, “remain our flesh and blood.” It cannot,
however, be justly said that the Austrian brothers, and the
Great Germany, are really being forgotten. On the contrary,
the thought of both is daily growing stronger in the public
mind, as is fully evidenced by a variety of publications
that have appeared of late on the subject of national
policy. A South German writer, G. A. Klausner, says: *
“He whose mind is still engrossed with the old idea of the
Great Germany, which in our youth shone black, red and
gold, into our hearts, and filled us with enthusiasm, he who
still values and cherishes this ideal, and compares it with
the new German Empire, will proclaim with the poet Arndt
that the German Fatherland must be greater, or rather,
that it must be made greater. . . . Now that Alsace-Lorraine
has fortunately been regained, earnest endeavours should
be directed towards bringing back to the Empire our kin
in Austria, who, under the conditions obtaining there, feel
depressed and unhappy, and on every occasion that offers
give solemn expression to their grief at the separation.”
A voice from the North speaks thus: f “Men always return
to their old love. The external political development of
Germany is not yet concluded: and the spread of its rule,
which in some way will Surely come about, may possibly,
nay must certainly be followed by another change of its
national colours. These have been changed from black
and white to black, white and red : they may change again
* Das deutsche Reich. Mationalpolitische Betrachtungen atts
Siidaeutschland, 1890.
+ Rembrandt als Erzieher. Von einem Deutschem. Zeipzig, 1891.
This book has had an extraordinary success, and gone through over
thirty editions within two years.
A GLANCE TOWARDS THE FUTURE. 2O3
to black, red, and gold. What grows, changes. If we
wish to give outward expression to the intellectual and
racial community that unites the present Germany with
Austria, by means of national colours, the combination of
the Austrian yellow with the German flag would commend
itself as the simplest means of doing so. Even in that way,
we should return again to black, red and gold. To this
day, flags of black, red and gold are occasionally displayed
in Austria.”
Lagarde goes a step further. He formulates the demand
for a State compact between Austria and Germany, an idea
which was first propounded by Gagern in the National
Assembly of 1848, and which Prince Bismarck was credited
with entertaining after the conclusion of the Austro-German
Alliance in 1879. Lagarde proposes * a Vezöriiderung, the
formation of a close bond, between the Houses of Habsburg
and Hohenzollern, each guaranteeing for all time the posses-
sions of the other; and, in order that “the fourth quarter
of the German nation may be brought into organic connec-
tion with the other three quarters,” he further advocates the
establishment of a community of law and taxation, of
military organization, of foreign and commercial policy.
Such a treaty—apart from Lagarde's ideas of government,
which are, to say the least, of a debatable character—
would certainly be a step in advance. It would be a step
towards an end. Yet at the same time the scheme is
complicated and under the actual political conditions of the
two Empires must be so ; and it is doubtful whether in a
State system thus worked from two centres a perfect com-
* Deutsche Schriftem, pp. 4II-4I4.
2O4 THE GROWTH () F GERMAN UNITY.
munity of purpose and of policy could be maintained. The
adoption of the plan might, however, after changes easy
enough to divine, lead to a final settlement. But there is
One great obstacle—and it is a serious one—that stands in
its way, viz., that under ordinary circumstances the compact
is scarcely likely to be concluded at all. The executing of
the plan would involve such sacrifices on the part of one or
the other State as would be made only under the pressure of
extreme danger, or of popular enthusiasm, which, if roused
by such events as those of the Franco-German War, sweeps
away all resistance of either governments or political parties,
and realizes in an instant what the representations, schemes
and counter-Schemes, discussions and negotiations of whole
generations were unable to bring about. And in this
matter, too, the iron and irresistible force of circumstances
will in the end prove more powerful than all tendencies,
concurrent or conflicting, and will strike out its own solution
in its own time.
Austria is impelled towards the East. As early as 1866
Bismarck threw out the hint that the Habsburg Monarchy
should remove its centre of gravity to Ofen, i.e., to Hungary.
The step which Austria made in occupying Bosnia and
Herzegovina she is bound to follow up. She needs
Saloniki for the development of her commercial system.
On her, as the bearer of German culture and as the inter-
mediary between the Teutonic race and that of the southern
Slavs, devolves the mission of spreading civilization and life
where Turkish misrule has caused degeneration and
decay.
Russia, with her despotism and her stagnant mediaeval
system of church government, can have no such mission in
A GLANCE TOWARDS THE FUTURE. 2O5
Europe. If she has a mission, it can only lie in Asia. She
has never spread, and for a long time to come never will
spread, real culture, or any of the means of national happi-
ness. Russia conquered Mahometan countries on the Volga,
at the north of the Caspian Sea, and in the Bashki country;
hundreds of years have passed away, and the inhabitants of
these countries remain Tartars as they were before.
In striking contrast with this stands Austria's success in
Bosnia, where thirteen years of a well-ordered administration
have sufficed to make the institutions of modern State life
take root, and to develop the natural resources of the
country to a remarkable extent. The tendency to establish
in the Balkan peninsula a variety of States—States too
Small to perform the tasks of a modern commonwealth—
is a bane to Europe ; for from their petty rivalries and
the never-ending intrigues of Russia, against which they are
absolutely powerless, they form a standing danger to the peace
of all other nations. They require the guidance as well as
the protection of a strong hand, and Austria can give them
both. Possessing, as she does, a nucleus of Slav popula-
tions in her Croations, Serbs, and Bosniacks, she is well
fitted to perform the task of assimilating the Balkan States,
and would find in her Magyar subjects the means of
extending her rule more easily over the Bulgarians, who
are of the same race.* Thus a new State system would
be made to crystallize round the old monarchy, from which
it would receive the impulse necessary for political,
intellectual, and commercial advance.
* It is a conventional misrepresentation of the Panslavists, that the
Bulgarians are Slavs. The truth is that, like the Magyars, they belong
to the Ural-Altaic race.
2O6 THE GROWTH OF GERMAN UNITY.
To conclude: in proportion as the Austrian authority
extends East and South, the position of the Habsburg
Monarchy will be changed : in a community overwhelmingly
Slav and Hungarian there could no longer be room
for the German population of the present Austria, since
their interests as a race could not be sufficiently safe-
guarded, and, in the course of events, they would
be irresistibly drawn towards the more natural home,
that of their own race,—the German Empire. This is a
simple question of political and national gravitation, a case
of the operation of laws that overrule the will of both
individuals and peoples. Great national movements work
themselves out in spite of conscious efforts to withstand
them. Though it may not be recognised at the moment, all
the forces in action, whether direct and impelling, or
resistant and obstructive, in the long run tend in the same
direction, and form but parts of that mysterious motive
power that brings about great historical changes.
Fortunate is the people that does not lack one main
requisite for wise political movement, a quality which may
be perceived in all prosperous and well-developed State
systems: the ability to wait, to wait till the right moment
for action has come, till the golden time for reaping has
arrived.
WILLIAM ANDREWS AND CO., PRINTERS, THE HULL PRESS, HULL.
DID
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